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THE

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EDITED BY

Prest. A MAHAN, and Prof. C. G. FINNEY.

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OBERLIN QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME III....No I.

AUGUST, 1847.

ARTICLE LI.

"The Doctrine of Imperfection."

Lectures on the moral imperfection of Christians; designed to show, that while sinless perfection is obligatory on all, it is attained by none: By Seth Williston, author of the Harmony of Divine Truth; a Vindication of the Doctrines of the Reformation, etc. New York, M. W. Dodd, 1846, *pp* 262.

By Pres. A. Mahan.

The work above named is very highly commended by the advocates of the doctrine which it professes to elucidate and confirm. We do not review it, because that therein are found any new and important arguments against the doctrine it professes to overthrow, or in favor of that which it intends to establish. We have in view another and different end, an end which the reader will not fail to apprehend, as he progresses through the present article. Two paragraphs which we meet with in the preface demand special attention before we advance into the interior of the work itself. The first sets forth the intention of the author, in the publication of these Lectures. In the proclamation, either through the tongue or pen, of any particular doctrine, an individual always has in view some particular end, and that end, if intelligently pursued, can in no case be higher than the doctrine proclaimed as a means to that end, is intrinsically adapted to secure. No intelligent man, for example, would ever undertake to demonstrate the fact, that no individual ever did or ever will raise a certain weight, and aim to produce that conviction as a means

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of persuading persons honestly and earnestly even to aim to raise that weight. The mind, before it can aim to produce such a conviction, as a means of inducing such efforts, must pass through a process of most complete dementation, as far at least as this one subject is concerned. With this great principle before us, let us now contemplate the extract referred to.

"Should a Perfectionist take up this book and read its title-page, it is not improbable he will say in his heart, The author had been better employed in an effort to raise the Church from its present Laodiceanism to our high standard, than in seeking to bring us down to the common level. But what is there in the title of his book which should subject the author to the suspicion of being unfriendly to sanctification, even in its greatest extent? True, it is asserted on the title-page, that sinless perfection is attained by *none*. Does this amount to proof that it is the object of his book to hinder Christians from growing in grace?"

No one, surely, who knows the author will regard him as entertaining feelings of opposition to sanctification, or suppose that he has written a book "to hinder Christians from *growing in grace*." No doubt the object of the book is to promote such growth. But what is growing in grace, according to the idea of our author? "A gradual improvement of character," he says, "proceeding from one degree of sanctification to another, is the thing intended." In other words, a gradual renunciation of sin, and a corresponding advance in holiness—this is our author's idea of growing in grace. Now we can readily conceive that an individual might prepare and publish a work like the one under consideration, with the serious intention of inducing, on the part of believers, growth in grace according to the view of the subject here presented. He might very rationally aim to prove that a certain standard of Christian character will never in fact be reached in this life, and do this with a most sincere intention of inducing Christians most earnestly to aim at a different and lower standard. But could our author have rationally prepared this work, with the serious intention of inducing his readers earnestly to aim at the standard which he endeavors to render demonstrably evident to their minds they will not reach? Could an honest mind, knowing at the same time what it is doing, ever attempt to demonstrate to an individual the fact that he will not, however sincere his actual endeavors, make certain attainments, and attempt that demonstration as a means of inducing that individual most earnestly to aim to make those attainments? A most palpable absurdity is involved in such a supposition. The object of our author

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then, in the preparation of this work, could not have been, (if, as we are bound to suppose he did, he acted rationally,) to induce Christians even to aim at perfect obedience to all God's commandments. Unless this was his aim, however, it could not be in harmony with the Bible. This sacred book presents but one standard at which the Christian is permitted to aim. Conformity to this one standard was the theme of the discourses, the precepts, admonitions, and prayers of the writers of the New Testament especially. "Be ye therefore perfect." "Let patience have her perfect work, that ye may be perfect and entire wanting nothing." "The very God of peace sanctify you wholly," &c. Every doctrine they taught had an avowed reference to this one end, the inducing believers to aim at perfect obedience to all God's commandments. Now as all they taught had such a relation to this one end, and as no individual can rationally proclaim the doctrine of Imperfection as a means of inducing believers even to aim at full conformity to the entire will of God, it is perfectly evident, that this doctrine could not have found a place in their teachings. Suppose that the apostle, after penning the following passage—

"Epaphras, who is one of you, a servant of Christ, saluteth you, always laboring fervently for you in prayers, that ye may stand perfect and complete in all the will of God,"

had added, And now, brethren, as a means of inducing you to aim at this state, I send you a treatise, (what our author has sent forth to the churches) designed to demonstrate to you, that no believer ever did or ever will, in this life attain to the state at which you are required to aim. Look at this great truth, and see in it a grand motive why *you* should aim at this state, and why *we* should most fervently pray, that you may actually attain to it. What would the world think of such a message? Would they not most justly impute to him one of the greatest conceivable absurdities? No such absurdity darkens the sacred page. Our author then, in the very outset, has presented a perfect demonstration of the fact, that the doctrine taught in his book, is not and can not be in conformity to the teachings of inspiration. He could not have prepared it, (as he himself shows that he did not,) with an intention of inducing Christians even to aim at the only standard at which the Bible permits the believer to aim.

We are now prepared to contemplate the second paragraph, which we promised to present to our readers. "The reader will not find these lectures written in much of the polemic

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style. While writing them I had nothing from the pen of my opponents lying before me." Notwithstanding the important fact here announced, our author devotes one entire lecture to a consideration of "a few of the most prominent arguments which are made use of on the other side of the question," that is, in favor of the doctrine of Christian Perfection. Now here to us is a very singular announcement. Our author is professedly about to state, and then reply to, the main arguments of the advocates of the doctrine under consideration, in support of this great article of their faith. Yet he has not before him even a scrap of their writings on the subject. What should we expect from such a method of stating and then replying to the arguments of brethren differing from us in respect to important questions of Christian doctrine? Would it be at all strange, (what is in fact true of our author in respect to ourselves,) if we should find imputed to them arguments which they have never used, instead of replying to those which they actually do use? Should we not expect such a result almost as a matter of course?

Our author, as stated above, devotes one entire lecture, a lecture consisting of twenty-eight pages, to a statement and refutation of some of "the most prominent arguments" adduced by the advocates of the doctrine of Christian Perfection. The reader will please to notice particularly two things here, the assertion that the arguments replied to are actually used by the advocates of this doctrine in its support—and that they are also among "the most prominent" arguments which they do use for this end. Yet of the seven arguments which he imputes to us, as among the most prominent we ever use, but three of them have ever been used at all in any form for the purpose imputed to us, but we have again and again published to the world that we do not and never did thus use them. Of the three which we have excepted, one is only in *form* stated correctly, while the passage or passages of scripture imputed to us in its support, we have never, in a single instance used for any such purpose; so that the argument as really stated, should not be an exception at all. To another of the three, similar remarks are, in most important respects, equally applicable. Most of the passages imputed to us in its support we have never used for that purpose, while a majority of those we do use are not referred to at all. Under the third, one solitary passage only among the many which we cite in its support is referred to, but not cited. Thus we may properly say, that a majority of the "most prominent arguments"

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imputed to us in support of the great doctrine of Christian Perfection, we have never used at all as stated by him, while he has totally failed to present one of our arguments *as we* have presented it.

In elucidation of the above statements we will now advance into the interior of the work under consideration. In accomplishing our object, the first thing to be done is to determine the real question at issue, as stated by our author himself. On this point, we will permit him to speak for himself.

"Does the Scripture teach that there are any, who in *this life* attain to such a degree of sanctification as to be sinless characters? Do any of the saints, while they remain on earth, arrive at such a state, as to *do* nothing wrong, and *speak* nothing wrong—at such a state, as to have *no unholy affections*; or, which is the same, as to be influenced by no selfish motives? Do they ever so live a single day, that there is nothing either in their external conduct, or in the inward frame of their heart, to make new work for repentance? From what attention I have paid to the Bible in relation to this subject, I am convinced that no such saints are to be found on the earth at the present period; and that none of this character have lived in the former, or will live in the future periods of time."

Again,

"Before I proceed to those scriptural arguments which, in my view, serve to prove that none of the saints attain to sinless perfection in the present life, I shall notice a few of the most prominent arguments which are made use of on the other side of the question."

The object of our author in the work before us is to prove that no saint ever in this life actually attains to a state of entire sanctification. The design of the discourse from which the above extracts are taken is to answer a "few of the most prominent arguments which are made use of on the other side of the question." The obligation which our author assumes in this discourse is certainly a sacred one. He professes to speak to the public in behalf of brethern who differ from him on points of christian doctrine mutually regarded as of very great importance, to say the least. In respect to such a subject, he assumes the responsibility of presenting their views to the public as they are, and of adducing and answering some of "the most prominent arguments" by which they actually sustain those views. He could not but have been sensible, that he was about to address many who would never have their writings before them, and that consequently such persons would form their opinions of the views and arguments of the class referred to entirely from his representations. He was also aware that there is in the Bible such a precept as the following, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." We would not be understood as allu-

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ding to the above precept, with the design of fastening upon or imputing to our author the charge of intentional misrepresentation in any form or degree. We believe that he has imputed to us nothing not supposed at the time to be held by us. We are constrained to the belief, that he not only had not, at the time he wrote, our writings before him, but that he had never perused those writings at all, that he had taken our views and arguments as presented by others who have as palpably misrepresented them, as he was thus unwittingly led to do. We allude to the above precept for the purpose of reminding those who speak for others, that there are such precepts in the Bible as that above cited, and that such precepts have a bearing upon the conduct of individuals in the relations under consideration. What then are the arguments which our author imputes to the advocates of the doctrine of Christian Perfection as among the most prominent they ever use in support of that doctrine?

"First. It is said," he says, "that nothing short of sinless perfection comes up to the divine requirements." After showing that such perfection is required not only in the precepts specifically enjoining it, but that "all other commandments are to be understood as going to the same extent," he then argues most conclusively, that the existence of such precepts does not prove that any are or will be thus perfect in this life. The following sentence presents the sum of his unanswerable argument on this point:

"But this argument, if it prove any thing, proves too much for that class of Perfectionists with whom we are more particularly contending: for if we have a right to infer that some saints have arrived, or will arrive at a state of perfection, from the fact, that God requires this much of them, why have we not a right to infer the same concerning their whole number, from the fact, that the requirement extends to them all?"

Now if this is one of "the most prominent arguments" used by the advocates of the doctrine of Christian Perfection, then we freely acknowledge that they are most illogical reasoners. Their doctrine also, if it has no more solid foundation on which to rest, stands upon a basis hardly as solid as vacancy itself. It so happens, however, that they have never in a solitary instance that we ever heard of made use of this argument for any such purpose as is here imputed to them, and they have often, before the wide world disavowed any such use of it, and protested against the injustice so often done them, of representing them as having made such a use of it. We here again renew that protest. We solemnly charge our brethren as men and as christians, never again to

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impute such an argument as that to us, an argument which we never thought of using for any such purpose. We affirm that if the precept requiring perfection proves that saints are or will be perfect, either in this life or the next, it proves equally, that no moral agent ever did or will sin at all.

The second argument which our author attributes to us, and as attributed, most conclusively answers, is thus stated: "Secondly. It is said, God has not only required perfection, but has signified his purpose to effect it. 'This is the will of God, even your perfection.'—1 Thes. 4: 3. The only passage which he represents us as using to sustain this proposition is the one here cited. We have, as an argument in favor of the fact, that some will, not that any yet have attained to entire sanctification, endeavored to sustain the above proposition, on the authority of other passages which we will notice in another place. This passage, however, we have never used for any such purpose, and that for two reasons. No such passage, in the first place, is found in the Bible. If the reader will turn to the place referred to, he will find it to read thus: "This is the will of God, even your *sanctification*," not perfection, as our author has it. We have not used this passage for the purpose here imputed to us, in the next place, because, that if it did read perfection, we well knew that it would not prove, that any are perfect, any more than the fact that God is not "willing that any should perish," proves that none will perish. All the use, to our knowledge, ever made of this passage by the advocates of the doctrine of Perfect Love, as having a bearing upon this subject, is this. When we pray for blessings which are known to be "according to the will of God," we ought to pray for them *expecting* to receive the good for which we pray. Such passages as this clearly show, that the blessing of entire sanctification is according to the divine will. We ought, therefore, to pray that the "very God of peace will sanctify us wholly," expecting to receive the blessing for which we pray. As thus presented, the advocates of the doctrine of Imperfection have never even professedly met this argument, and we are confident, they never will do it.

We will now consider the argument which comes next in order:

"It is thought by some that the actual attainment of sinless perfection may be safely inferred from the circumstance, that some of the approved prayers of the Scriptures are fraught with petitions for such perfection. 2 *Cor.* 13: 7. 1 *Thess.* 5: 23."

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We rejoice, that we are able to assure our readers, that when our author attributed the above argument to us, he had none of our writings before him. If any individual has ever used any such argument for the purpose here stated, we are in total ignorance of the fact. Our argument upon the subject may be thus stated: Christ, and his inspired apostles, and holy men under the immediate influence, and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, made the attainment of this one definite state, on the part of believers, a great theme of their teachings, exhortations, and *prayers*. As far as present holiness is concerned, they never taught, required, nor prayed for any thing else. In view of such facts all admit that we are authorized and required to make this one state a similar theme. When we put up such petitions in our own behalf, no one doubts but that we must pray in faith, or not "receive any thing from the Lord." What then is faith in prayer in respect to perfect holiness, according to the two doctrines under consideration. According to the doctrine of Imperfection, faith in prayer for this blessing implies the expectation of not receiving the blessing for which we pray. According to the opposite doctrine it implies the opposite expectation. Now we say, that the Spirit of God has never thus influenced and inspired holy men to pray for a blessing which it would be unbelief in us to expect to receive. This is the argument as we present it. To the argument as stated in this form, advocates of the doctrine of Imperfection have never even attempted a reply, though often solicited to do so.

It is by no means an adequate reply, to show that there are certain blessings for which good men put up acceptable petitions, without expecting to receive the blessings for which they pray. It must be shown that there are blessings which the Holy Spirit, as stated above, influences and requires the entire church to make the *great theme* of her prayers, while at the same time, he requires her to believe, that it would imply unbelief in her to pray for such blessings expecting to receive them. Such a case, we confidently affirm, will never be adduced. But it is time to pass to a consideration of the fourth argument which our author attributes to us:

"In support of the doctrine of sinless perfection it is said, that the Scriptures speak of it as a thing which has an actual existence. It is urged, that the saints are often spoken of as *perfect* men; that some of them are described as seeking the Lord with their *whole heart*, and others as following Him *wholly*, and others as living a *blameless* life.

Now I will grant, in case it can be shown from the Scriptures, that any mere man since the fall has in this life perfectly kept the commandments of God, so as not

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to break them in thought, word, or deed, the truth of the doctrine of sinless perfection is established. For if there is an individual believer who has come up to this degree of sanctification, another may attain to it, and another, until every believer on earth has become a sinless character. But I have carefully looked at the texts which are depended on for proof of the actual existence of sinless characters in our apostate world, and I am convinced that when they are examined in connection with their several contexts, as well as in connection with the whole inspired volume, it will be seen that they constitute no substantial proof of the existence of such perfection. Noah and Job are declared to be perfect men, and yet the Scripture records the faults of both of them. The perfect man, in Scripture language, is commonly, if not invariably, the contrast of the wicked man, the graceless sinner; not of the imperfect saint. So it is in the following passages: 'Behold God will not cast away a *perfect* man, neither will he help the *evil doers*.' 'This is one thing, therefore I said it, He destroyeth the *perfect* and the *wicked*.' 'Mark the *perfect* man,—for the end of that man is peace: but the *transgressors* shall be destroyed together, the end of the *wicked* shall be cut off.' 'The righteousness of the *perfect* shall direct his way; but the *wicked* shall fall by his own wickedness.' *Job* 8: 20, and 9: 22. *Ps.* 37: 37, 38. *Prov.* 11: 5."

We have long since taken the ground that inspiration affirms the fact that some individuals through the grace of Christ, have attained to a state of entire sanctification. We have never affirmed this, however, from the mere fact, as our author represents us as having done, that such terms as perfect, blameless, &c., are sometimes applied to individuals, or merely because some individuals are said to have "sought the Lord with the *whole heart*" or to have "followed him *wholly*." We are well aware that from no such isolated terms, can we determine especially the permanent character of individuals. The case is quite different, however, when such words are found in connections which determine and limit their meaning. Now we affirm that such words are applied in the scriptures to individuals in such connections as clearly to indicate the design of marking out such individuals as wholly sanctified persons. In Luke 1: 6, for example, we have the following testimony respecting two individuals: "They were both righteous before God, walking in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless." Here it is positively asserted, that as sanctified persons there was not a solitary command or ordinance of the Lord, in the light of which, even in God's sight, they stood convicted of sin. Any laws of interpretation which would make such language mean any thing less than a state of entire sanctification would put it out of the power of language to express that idea.

Again,

"Those things, which ye have both learned, and received, and heard, and seen in me, do, and the God of peace shall be with you." *Phil.* 4: 9.

Here we have an unqualified command of an inspired apostle, to copy and that without reserve, his entire example as a

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christian. On obedience to this command, we are pledged the continued protection and favor of God. Now we put the question to any candid mind, would such an individual give such a command to unenlightened converts who would be disposed, on account of their peculiarly endearing relations to him, to "think more highly of him, than they ought to think," were he conscious of continued short comings in duty, were he conscious of any thing less than perfect conformity to the divine will? Under such circumstances, had the apostle been an Imperfectionist, would he not have affirmed his own short comings, and cautioned his readers against an unqualified imitation of his example? But he never does any such thing. What all honest Imperfectionists always do in respect to themselves, under the circumstances supposed, the apostle never does in respect to himself. His views therefore must have been the opposite of theirs. We have cited the above passages, as mere specimens of proof texts which we do employ, and of our manner of employing them. For these many years we have waited in vain for even an attempted reply to the argument as thus presented. Instead of taking the arguments which we do use directly by the horns, our opponents adopt a much easier task. They turn away, and prove undeniably, that passages which we do not use as proof texts at all, do not prove that any have attained to perfect obedience to the will of God. Thus our author occupies about six pages in proving that such terms as those above referred to, do not in themselves imply of necessity, a state of entire sanctification; while he bearly alludes to two passages, Luke 1: 6, and Gal. 2: 20, passages on which we do place reliance as proof texts. With the exception of these allusions, his entire argument on this point may be admitted as valid, and the arguments which we do use remain unanswered, and even unreferred to. Such a victory over an opponent it is quite easy to win, however strong and invincible his real arguments may be.

It is time now to consider the fifth argument attributed to us by our author, together with his reply to the same:

"While those who advocate the doctrine of sinless perfection, concede that such perfection was not attained under the Old Testament, they assert that its attainment is foretold and promised under the New. Such a prediction or promise they think they discover in the thirty-first chapter of Jeremiah, which is quoted in the eighth of Hebrews. It is true that in this prophecy God promises to make a new covenant with his people—not according to the covenant he made with their fathers when he brought them out of the land of Egypt; which covenant they brake, though he, on his part, was an husband to them. But he

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promises, at the time which is here predicted, to write his law in their hearts, and to be a God to them, and cause them to be his people; so that all shall know him from the least unto the greatest.

This promise, as it stands in the prophet, and as it is applied by the apostle, seems to to teach,

1. That under the Gospel there would be a new dispensation of the covenant of grace, in which the ceremonies of the Old Testament should be laid aside, without effecting any essential change in its gracious character. It was only in relation to its types that it decayed, waxed old, and finally vanished away. *Heb.* 8: 13.

2. It was also intended to teach, that under the new dispensation, especially in the time of the latter day of glory, there would be such a great increase of piety, that Israelites in name would more universally be Israelites indeed. But I discover nothing in the passage, as it stands in the Old Testament, or as it is applied in the New, which authorizes us to infer that between the two dispensations there exists that difference which is made by imperfect and perfect sanctification. It is clear, these passages authorize us to expect, that under the New Testament there would be an augmentation of the number of true believers, and also of the degree of their piety. But what is there in these, or any other passages in the Bible, to assure us that the saints of the New Testament, in distinction from those of the Old, shall arrive at a state of immaculate perfection? *Is* it this, that God promises to write his law in their hearts? And did he not do as much as this for the saints of the Old Testament? Or is it because he promises that he will be their God, and that they shall be his people? Is the perpetuity of grace peculiar to believers under the new dispensation? Has it not been true, ever since the kingdom of grace was set up in this fallen world, that in every heart, where God has pleased to write his law, he has never suffered it to be obliterated? It is in relation to the believer under the Old Testament, (though it is strictly true in relation to the believer of every other period,) that it was said, "The law of his God is in his heart; none of his steps shall slide." *Ps.* 37: 31.

In reply, we would observe, in the first place, that we have not maintained the distinction here imputed to us between the attainments of saints under the old and new dispensation. We have always maintained it, as a truth of revelation, that under both alike some have actually attained to this state. It appears to us quite remarakable, that our author should have imputed such a sentiment to us, when he had previously remarked upon two cases, Zacharias and Elizabeth, whom we had been accustomed to cite as instances of persons having made such attainments under the ancient dispensation.

But our author has referred to but one among the many, and that not the most decisive of the passages which we have been accustomed to cite in proof of the proposition under consideration, and has thus totally failed to present our argument on the point as it is. The argument as presented by us may be thus stated: The leading prophets from Isaiah onward unite in predicting a glorious consummation in the actual experience of the church under the new dispensation, This consummation they speak of in language which can, according to the fixed laws of intepretation, imply nothing less

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than a state of pure and permanent holiness on the part of believers generally, a state to which the church as a body had not then, and has not yet attained. As examples of the many passages which we are accustomed to cite in proof of the statement we will barely cite the following: The prophet Jeremiah, after uttering the perdiction referred to by our author, thus, in a subsequent chapter, describes the state predicted:

"In those days, and in that time, saith the Lord, the iniquity of Israel shall be sought for, and there shall be none; and the sins of Judah, and they shall not be found: for I will pardon them whom I reserve.—*Jer.* 50: 20.

What, let us ask, will be the state of the church, but that of entire sanctification, when a solemn scrutiny shall be made for her iniquity and her sins, and no form of transgression shall be found upon her? In language alike explicit does the prophet Ezekiel speak upon the same subject.

"Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you."—*Ezekiel* 36: 25.

We know of no higher form of sanctification than that implied in being fully "cleansed from *all* our filthiness, and from *all* our idols," &c. This, it should be borne in mind, is a predicted consummation in the history of the church. To this she must attain, or prophecy itself fail. We wait with interest for the time when the advocates of the doctrine of Imperfection shall meet this argument in this form.

"In support of the doctrine of a present entire sanctification, it is urged, that provision has been made for such a blessing: that the death of Christ furnishes as ample provision for a perfect sanctification as for a perfect justification."

We would ask our author, together with every Imperfectionist throughout christendom, to name the advocate of the doctrine of Christian Perfection who has ever made use of such an argument for such a purpose. We here, for the tenth time at least, enter publicly our solemn protest against such an argument being imputed to us. We have ever said, that provision for entire sanctification no more proves the fact, that any are thus sanctified, than provisions for pardon proves that some are pardoned. On the other hand, we have argued that revealed provisions for entire sanctification render the attainment of that state an *object of rational expectation*, just as revealed provisions for pardon render that blessing an object of similar expectation. Again and again have we asked the advocates of the doctrine of Imperfection, to show us

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why revealed provisions acknowledged to be equally adequate to the attainment of both blessings alike, do not render one blessing an object of rational expectation as well as the other. The only reply they ever make is: Revealed provisions for entire sanctification do not prove that any are thus sanctified! They then hold us up to the public as adducing the above argument for no other purpose than to prove this one point! We think that we "set down nought in anger" when we avow the conviction, that the time is not distant, when no individual, especially no minister of Christ, can thus misrepresent us, without a fearful violation of conscience.

"It is urged, that if perfect sanctification is never attained in this life, none can expect it; and if it be not a matter of expectation, it will not be sought after, and, of course, there will be but little progress made in the divine life. In reply to this argument we would say, that the hope of the immediate attainment of a desired object, is by no means necessary to awaken effort for its attainment. Jacob served Laban twice seven years for his daughter Rachel, before he obtained the prize he sought: yet such was the desirableness of the object he sought, that it made the whole of this time seem to him but a few days. Is the worldling prevented from making effort to acquire property, because he does not expect to acquire it all at once? Does the patient, who is convalescent, feel indifferent in the use of means to effect a complete removal of his malady, merely because his return to health is by degrees? Does not the man who runs in a race strain every nerve to gain the prize, though he knows that every step, which precedes the last, will fail of reaching the goal? All his previous steps serve to bring him nearer to this point, but it is actually reached by none except the very last. Why then may not the Christian, in running his spiritual race, press toward the mark with increasing zeal, although he is convinced that he shall always, while on earth, be obliged to confess that he has not reached it?"

The cases cited above are perfectly analogous to those commonly cited by the advocates of the doctrine of Imperfection, to free that doctrine from the inexplicable difficulties in which it is involved. The cases cited, however, are all totally wanting on the score of resemblance and analogy both. Jacob, to be sure, could labor fourteen years for his wives, aiming to secure and enjoy them at the close of that period. But could he aim to secure them in *one* year, when he knew absolutely, that he would not do it short of fourteen? Will the patient use remedies for the instantaneous and complete removal of his maladies, when he knows perfectly, that weeks will intervene before such remedies will produce that result? Will the man who runs in a race, seriously intend to reach the goal at a single step, when he knows that it will take hundreds to gain it? The holiness at which we are required to aim is not perfection at death, or at any future period, but at the present moment. "Herein do I exercise myself to have *always* a conscience void of offence both towards God,

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and towards man." While we believe that perfection in holiness will not in fact be attained till death, we may aim to reach that consummation, at that period. But can we seriously aim at *present* perfection in holiness, while we hold it, as a revealed truth that no one will attain it till the close of life? This is the question. The examples which our opponents adduce in reply, have no bearing whatever upon the real point to the elucidation of which they are adduced. Take in illustration the most common and plausible example ever adduced, to prove that we may aim at perfection in holiness at the present moment, while we know that we shall not attain it, that of the painter. Such an individual, it is said, knows perfectly, that he will never produce a perfect painting. Yet he is all the while aiming to produce that result. The fact here stated is, in the first place, positively denied. The painter never aims in strict reality, to produce a perfect picture, while he believes and knows that he never will do it, but one as neary so as practicable. This last, and not the former, is his real intention, as he will avow when closely questioned upon the subject. For the sake of the argument, however, we will grant, the fact under consideration. The conclusion based upon it however is by no means sustained by the fact. The cases are in no respects analogous. The artist, if we grant (which is denied) that he is aiming to produce a perfect picture, is aiming at what is, and is known to be absolutely, impossible to him. The christian in aiming to do his entire duty, is aiming at what is, and is known to be to him perfectly practicable. From the fact that an individual might aim to perform a known impossibility, with the expectation of not performing it, it by no means follows that an individual may honestly aim at what he knows he may perform expecting at the same time *that he will not* perform it. I owe a man we will suppose one hundred dollars. I hold that amount in my possession, and know perfectly, that I am able to hand it to him. Is it possible—is it not self-contradictory to affirm that it is possible for me seriously to aim, under such circumstances, to pay this entire amount, expecting all the while to pay but ninety dollars? Does it follow that I may do this, from the fact, should it be granted, that I may aim to perform a known impossibility, expecting not to perform it? Certainly not.

The manner in which our opponents have labored the point under consideration fully evinces its importance to their cause, even in their apprehensions. Indeed the doctrine of Imperfection must stand or fall, as they maintain, or fail to main-

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tain their position in respect to it. That no one can be a christian at all without aiming, at least, to do all his duty, no one denies. That the performance of all present duty is perfectly practicable to us is every where admitted by the mass of professing christians. That we should aim to do all present duty, that is, to do whatever we know to be perfectly practicable to us, expecting not to perform it, enters, as a fundamental element, into the doctrine of imperfection. Its advocates therefore must show, that we may honestly aim, at the present moment, to perform what we know to be perfectly practicable to us, expecting not to perform it, or that doctrine cannot but be regarded, as most palpably unscriptural and self-contradictory. This they never have done, and we venture the expression of the conviction, that they never will do it.

Having thus stated and replied to "a few of the most prominent arguments which are made use of on the other side of the question," our author now proceeds to argue directly by the truth of the doctrine of Imperfection. His thirteen distinct arguments on this point are thus at the close summed up by himself:

"First, We looked at the biographical sketches of the saints, as they are noted in "the Scripture of truth," even of some of the best of those whose names are there recorded. We saw palpable evidence of imperfect sanctification in such men as Abraham, Moses, David, Hezekiah; and even in such men as the apostles of the Lamb.

Secondly, In accordance with the unfavorable particulars found in these biographical sketches, we heard the Scripture make the broad assertion, that there is no man that sinneth not; there is not a just man upon earth that doeth good, and sinneth not.

In the next place, we took a view of some of the best among the excellent of the earth, and that in their nearest approaches to the God of holiness. In this situation we saw that they were uncommonly sensible of their great sinfulness in His sight; not only of their past, but of their present sinfulness.

We then took a view of those covenants of promise, the one of which was made between the Persons of the Trinity before the foundation of the world, in relation to the chosen seed; and the other made with the elect themselves after their effectual calling. In the structure of both these covenants we perceived that the sinful imperfection of the subjects of grace, during their sojourn in this lower world, was contemplated as a fact.

The next thing we noticed was the provision which God had made for the exercise of discipline in his church while it should remain on earth; rendering it the duty of his people to reprove the sin which they should see in their brethren, and to confess their faults one to another.

After noticing the discipline that God had established for the purpose of purifying his church, we were led to take notice of the discipline which he himself made use of for improving the character of his people. We saw that his object in afflicting them, was to take away their sin; and since their afflictions were continued to the end of their life, we were led to the conclusion, that to the end of their life they needed their influence to purge away their dross.

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Next, we were led to contemplate those inculcations which relate to self-examination, as a duty requiring great thoroughness, to enable Christians to determine whether they are in the faith. These inculcations seem to intimate that Christians have something in their hearts besides pure holiness, and that this creates a difficulty in forming a decision concerning the genuineness of their religion.

We then examined some of the exhortations that the Scriptures address to those who are born of God; which exhortations manifestly imply their remaining depravity. We found the very best of them were exhorted to cleanse themselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God: and to lay aside every weight, and their easily besetting sin.

In harmony with such exhortations, we found that the Christian character was described as *progressive*, advancing from a seed to a plant or tree, and from the first dawn of light to the perfect day.

We next took notice of such prayers as are prescribed for God's children, as being suited to their condition in this life: also, of many of those prayers they offered, which are recorded in the Scriptures; and we found them to be adapted to the condition of saints whose sanctification is yet imperfect.

We were then led to take a scriptural view of the Christian warfare. We saw that the Christian's *heart* is represented as being emphatically the seat of the war, the place where the conflict is the most severe and lasting. This led us to the conclusion, that though the old man is crucified, he is not yet dead and lifeless.

We also thought we could see in the word of God a pointed condemnation of all pretensions to a sinless purity, as though it proved such pretenders to be ignorant of their own hearts.

And last of all, we took a view of the contrast which the Scriptures draw between the church on earth, and the church in heaven; between the saint on earth, and the saint in heaven. And here we saw that the difference was as great as between a state of progress and that of full attainment—as great as between spirits partially cleansed, and spirits made perfect in holiness—as great as between a state of severe conflict, and one of eternal triumph."

The reader will perceive at once, that Dr. Williston has advanced nothing new, no arguments which have not been often and fully replied to by the advocates of the doctrine of Christian Perfection. With these replies our readers are already too familiar to need any extended remarks from us on the present occasion. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a passing notice of a few of the "most prominent arguments" here presented. In doing this, we have, "the writings" of the individual to whom we are replying directly before us. We remark then that the first argument adduced by our author, an argument universally appealed to as perfectly settling the question, by our opponents, presents a singular and most palpable example of *non sequiter* in reasoning. We find it recorded in the scriptures that such individuals as those named, did, at particular periods of their lives, commit under circumstances of peculiar temptation, particular forms of sin. This is all that is recorded upon the subject. From such facts, our author, in common with all other imperfectionists, draws the two following important inferences—that these individuals were never at any previous or subsequent moment of their lives free from sin; and that no other be-

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lievers at any moment of their earthly existence, do their entire duty. Stated in a logical form, the argument would stand thus: Whatever inspiration asserts as having been true of such men as Abraham, Moses, David, and Hezekiah, at any one moment after their conversion, must be understood as asserted not only of these individuals, but of all other converted persons at every moment of their lives. Particular forms of sin are attributed by inspiration to those individuals at particular periods of their lives subsequent to their conversion. Therefore, inspiration must be understood as asserting not only of these, but of all other converted persons, the commission of sin in some form, at every moment of their lives. We leave it with our readers to discover the connection between the premises and conclusions in such a syllogism. The main passage, 1 Kings, 8: 46, on which our author relies to sustain the affirmation, that the Bible makes the "broad assertion," that no believer ever attains to a state of perfect holiness in this life, must be strangely wrested from its most obvious meaning to make it express any such sentiment. The words "If they sin against thee, (for there is no man that sinneth not,") must in that case, read thus: If they sin against thee, (for there is no man who is not sinning at every moment of his existence on earth,) in other words, IF they should happen to do what themselves and all other men are in fact doing, at every moment of their lives. Where is the place for an if, in such a case as that? A proper rendering of the passage, on the other hand, makes its meaning perfectly plain and the sentiment it reveals, equally pertinent. "If they sin against thee, (and there is no man who *may* not sin,") in other words, should they do what all men are liable to do, that is sin against God.

No less illogical than those just noticed is the argument of our author based upon the revealed fact, that the most spiritual men, when in the most spiritual state, have the deepest sense of their own sinfulness. Of the truth of the fact referred to, no candid reader of the Bible can doubt. The testimony of scripture on the point also is verified by the experience of true believers in all ages of the world. But what is the real fact in the case? Does it in any form sustain the conclusion based upon it? Very far from it. Let the reader search the Bible throughout, and he will not find in it, a solitary confession on the part of any holy man, of present sinfulness, that is, of actual sin at the moment of making the confession. Such confessions, on the other hand, always re-

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late to past sin, and contain the implication of its total present abandonment. What foundation then do such confessions lay for the dogma, that all believers, at every moment of their lives are actually committing sin. Paul, for example, in respect to his character before conversion, every where proclaimed himself the chief of sinners. In view of his character as a christian, however, he affirmed with equal positiveness, that he served God, "with a pure conscience," that is, "with a conscience void of offence, both toward God and toward men." The more deeply spiritual he became, the more distinct and positive was the "testimony of his conscience" to the infinite aggravation of his guilt as a sinner, on the one hand, and to the great fact, on the other, that as a servant of Christ, "with simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, he had his conversation in the world." What evidence then we ask again, do such facts present of the present moral imperfection of all true believers.

In his arguments drawn from the fact that the life of the christian is represented in the Bible, as a state of continued progression, and of uninterrupted conflicts, our author has manifestly erred in two important respects. He has, in the first place mistaken wholly the nature of this progression and conflict. The life of the true believer, as represented in the Bible, is not a progression from one degree of moral imperfection to one less imperfect, but from one stage of moral perfection to another still higher. "We all with open face, beholding as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the *same image* from glory to glory." So the christian warfare is not a conflict with sin itself, that is, with what the subject is now determined to do, (the most absurd idea conceivable,) but with *temptation* to the commission of sin. Hence growth in holiness, and the christian warfare as presented in the Bible, are essential elements of moral perfection, instead of implying the opposite.

In each of these arguments also, our author has palpably contradicted himself. In the early part of his work, he asserts most correctly, that all the precepts of the Bible, whether expressly naming it or not, are to be understood as really requiring moral perfection. He then argues from the precepts "grow in grace," and "fight the good fight of faith" the continued moral imperfection of all christians during life. If these precepts, as the author affirms, are to be understood as requiring perfect holiness, then we can no more argue from

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them to the present imperfection of christians, than we can from those which specifically require perfection.

The argument of our author from what he asserts to be contained in the covenant of grace between the persons of the Trinity in respect to believers, and in that between God and his people, presents one of the most striking exemplifications that we are acquainted with, of the manner in which old errors received without examination, blinds the mind to the most obvious teachings of Inspiration. The reader will look in vain in the work under consideration, as well as into the Bible itself, for a solitary passage which either directly or indirectly, plainly or obscurely reveals any covenant between the persons of the Trinity implying in the most remote degree the moral imperfection of all believers during life. The new covenant, on the other hand, the covenant of grace between God and his people, as shown—Jer. 31: 31—34, 50: 20, and Ez. 36: 25—27 specifically proffers to our faith, a state of entire sanctification, and no other form or degree of holiness. Yet our author argues from one covenant in which absolutely nothing is either directly or indirectly referred to on the subject, and from another in which moral perfection and nothing else is proffered to the faith of all believers, to the revealed universal moral imperfection of all christians during life.

Our author's argument from the revealed "provisions for discipline in the church," is about as conclusive, and no more so, in favor of the continued moral imperfection of all christians during life, as provisions for the punishment of criminals by the state are that all citizens are at every moment violating the laws of their country. Besides, if revealed provisions for discipline prove that all at every moment need discipline, why do not revealed provisions for the entire sanctification of all believers at all times, prove their uninterrupted moral perfection? The revealed fact also, that all believers do at some periods of their lives need and actually receive "chastisement" from the hand of their Heavenly Father, no more proves the continued imperfection of all believers during life than the fact, that every child does at some period need correction, proves that no child, at any moment, ever was or ever will be in a state, of implicit obedience to parental authority. A further reply to the arguments of our author is deemed unnecessary. We will therefore close this article by two or three remarks of a general nature.

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REMARKS.

1. We hardly need to add, that in his professed reply to our arguments, our author has fallen into two important errors—misstating the question at issue, as we have stated it—and then replying to our arguments, as if adduced to settle one question upon which they obviously have no bearing at all, when they were adduced to settle another and very different question, a question upon which they have a real and most decisive bearing. Such a mode of procedure is such a manifest departure from the universally known and acknowledged principles of righteous discussion, that it is very difficult to reconcile it with moral honesty. Yet we would by no means be understood as impeaching the character of our author in this respect, before the public.

2. The course pursued by our author, in replying to the arguments of the advocates of the doctrine of Christian Perfection, is by no means a singular one. On the other hand, it is the course pursued without exception by Synods, Presbyteries, Professors of Theology, Ministers, Editors, and all others who have attempted a reply to such arguments. After speaking of the argument from the divine promises as "one of the hinges on which the existing controversy turns," Dr. Woods thus presents our argument: "I understand your position to be," he says, "that the divine promises and declarations clearly imply, that believers will be sanctified completely during the progress of the present life." When he made that statement, he had lying before him our solemn asseveration, that we had never used this argument for any such purpose, that we argued from the promises the *attainability* and not at all the actual attainment of perfect holiness in this life. As a further illustration of the manner in which our arguments have ever been treated by men in the highest places in the church, we present the following abstract of a course of lectures upon the subject, by another Professor of Theology, of leading influence, a course delivered to his own students. The abstract was taken down by one of his pupils at the time when the lecture was delivered, and subsequently submitted to the Professor, and by him acknowledged to be correct.

ABSTRACT.

"*Dr. W.'s definition of Sanctification.*

'It is that gradual work of divine grace upon the heart whereby the Christian's measure of holiness is increased—the stability of his holy principles established, and his sinful propensities weakened and diminished until the work terminates in perfection.'

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Dr W.'s statement of the arguments in favor of the fact that Entire Sanctification is attained in this life.

1. Simplicity of moral action. Ans. No perfection in this any more than the sand in an hour glass, when part are black grains, is purely white.

2. Natural ability. Ans. Moral inability may forever prevent its taking place.

3. The fulness of the gospel provisions. Ans. That they are so full as to remove natural obstacles, is freely admitted. But are they so full as to secure right action, or the right state of mind? If the fulness of the provisions proves that *any* are, why does it not prove that *all* are?

4. We are *commanded* to be perfect. Ans. Does the fact that a command is given, prove that it will ever be obeyed?

5. The *promises* of the Gospel. Ans. God has promised to make His saints perfect, but not in this life. There is not a promise in the word of God that any man shall live an hour without sin! But there are promises in the Bible that we shall 'Go on unto perfection.'

6. We cannot aim at perfection without expecting to attain it. Ans. We can. Example. Not one artist in the world ever expected to be perfect. Yet all aim at perfection.

7. The prayer of faith secures it. Ans.

(1.) The argument proceeds upon the erroneous supposition that in answer to the prayer of faith the specific object will in each instance be granted.

(2.) If the man were to exercise the most perfect faith, and pray never to sin again, there is no promise in the bible that he never shall. But:—

(3.) How are we to get this faith? Is every exercise of faith a perfect exercise? Is there any promise in the bible that a man shall exercise perfect faith and not perfect love?

8. *Consciousness.* Ans. How far can we rely upon the testimony of a man who says he is conscious that he is perfect? It is a great thing for a man to be conscious of perfection. If he commits a single wrong once a month he is imperfect. Can a man notice and retain every mental exercise even the smallest? 'If our hearts condemn us not, God is greater than our hearts, &c.' Paul pretends not in this respect to judge himself, &c. (See Cor. 4: 4.)"

After submitting the above abstract to his professor and receiving his admission that it was correct, the pupil referred to informed him that six out of the eight arguments which he had imputed to us, we had never used for any such purpose. This was several years ago. Notwithstanding that assurance, this Professor has continued from year to year to repeat the same course to his pupils unchanged ever since. A case precisely similar, we repeat, has been invariably adopted by our opponents whenever they have attempted a reply to our arguments. Whenever they have attempted a reply, they have done it as shown by Prof. Finney in the last number of the Quarterly, not by meeting, but by dodging the question submitted, and doing it in precisely the same manner.

3. With one other suggestion, we close the present article. The question why our opponents have so invariably adopted this mode of procedure in respect to arguments bearing upon this one subject, certainly needs to be accounted for. One solution very naturally presents itself to every reflecting mind. It is this, our opponents are themselves distinctly and

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perfectly aware, that it is wholly impossible to meet the arguments in favor of the doctrine of Christian Perfection as actually presented by its advocates, and that there is but one form of evasion to which they can resort with even a show of argument on their part. Hence with one mind they have agreed in evading the real question at issue, and evading it in precisely the same manner. If our readers, or even our opponents themselves can furnish us with any other solution of this question, we shall rejoice to present it to the public through our columns.

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ARTICLE LII.

An Examination,

By Prof. C. G. Finney,

Of the Review of Finney's Systematic Theology published in the Biblical Repertory, Princeton, N. J., June, 1847.

This Review is so very miscellaneous in its character that to reply to it, *in extenso*, were but little less than to re-write the volume reviewed. Every one familiar with the work criticised by the reviewer, will perceive upon an attentive perusal that the reviewer had not made himself well acquainted with the work in question, and that, almost without an exception, a complete answer to his objections might be quoted verbatim from the work itself. I have read and re-read his review, and every time with increasing wonder that the reviewer could pass over, so apparently without reading or consideration, the full and complete answer to nearly all his objections which is found in the book he was reviewing.

This consideration has led me seriously to question the propriety of replying at all to his remarks, since to do so in the best manner, would be little more than to quote page after page from the work reviewed.

There is nothing new or unexpected in the review except it be some of his admissions, and it is upon the whole just what might be expected from that School, and probably the best that can come from that quarter.

Were it allowable I should publish the above named article entire. But since this is not the case, I must content myself with making such quotations as will fairly exhibit the writer's views of the work in question, and with a brief reply to his strictures.

The great object of the reviewer seems to have been to fasten upon New School men what he esteems to be the errors of Oberlin and to sustain the peculiarities of Old Schoolism. Hence I am not flattered by his so fully endorsing and eulogizing my logic, because it was essential to his purpose to

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show that my conclusions follow by a rigorous logic from what he supposes to be the two fundamental errors of New Schoolism.

He however admits the great and even fundamental importance of the principles and conclusions of the work if they are true.

He assumes, as we shall see, the Old School dogma of original sin or constitutional moral depravity, and the head and front of the offending of my work is that it denies and disproves that doctrine with its consequences.

The reviewer refuses to argue the questions at issue but says, "We promised not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to rely upon the *reductio ad absurdum* and make his doctrines the refutation of his principles."

In several instances he misapprehends my meaning and of course misrepresents me. This he also does by quoting and applying passages out of their proper connection. But I do not complain of *intentional* misrepresentation. I can easily perceive, that with his views, those misapprehensions and consequent misrepresentations of my views are natural.

His *admissions* have greatly narrowed the field of debate. I am happy that this is so; for I hate the spirit and dread even the form of controversy. In the compass of a reply to his review I can not follow the reviewer through the whole train of his miscellaneous remarks, nor is it proper that I should. Our readers would not thereby be edified. I care not for masteries. If I know my heart I am willing and anxious to have the errors of the work under consideration detected and exposed, if errors there be in it. As the interests of truth are concerned only with the discussion and settlement of the main positions of the work and their legitimate consequences I shall content myself with the examination of these, only prefacing the discussion with a few words of explanation.

EXPLANATIONS.

The reviewer complains that I do not in my work *name* the understanding as distinct from the reason, though he affirms that I proceed under the direction of it in my investigations. To this I would only reply that I designed in my work to enter as little into Psychology as was consistent with rendering myself intelligible to common readers. In speaking of the intellect, it was not important and therefore not intended by me so much as to name all its departments or functions. I propo-

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sed to proceed in my investigations so much under the guidance of scripture and the reason or intuitive faculty that I considered it foreign to my purpose to name and define all the functions and departments of the intellect. I therefore said nothing of the understanding as distinct from the reason. Nor did I name the judgment, the memory, the imagination &c. It did not occur to me that a *philosopher* could fail to see why I named and defined only the reason, conscience, and self-consciousness. Of these I should have frequent occasion to speak in a manner that might require explanation. To avoid prolixity and embarrassing the common reader I avoided entering into a fuller account of the intellect.

Philosophers who understand the distinction between the reason and the understanding, can judge as well as we whether his criticism upon this subject is of any value. It were not difficult to point out some remarkable inconsistencies in this part of the review; but I forbear, as it is not important to the trial of the issues between us.

The reviewer strangely misapprehends my reasons for so often closing up my argument under the different heads by an appeal to scripture. From this fact he strangely infers that I undervalue the testimony of the Bible. One might have expected that a student and a philosopher would better appreciate the design of presenting evidence and argument in that order. I did not wish to present my *weakest* argument or my *least conclusive evidence last*, but *first*. I therefore appealed, as I proceeded, and as was natural, and as I thought philosophical, first to *natural* and lastly to *revealed* theology; inquiring first, what light we can get from reason, and then bringing in the *sure testimony of the Bible* to confirm and put beyond debate the positions I aimed to establish. It did not once occur to me that any reasoner could fail to see the propriety of this course. I must confess myself a little surprised that so sensible a man as this reveiwer should have inferred from such a fact that I undervalued the testimony of the blessed Bible.

I have read his review carefully and prayerfully several times, with an eye upon the questions, wherein do we agree? and wherein do we differ? For edification's sake I waive the notice of several points in which he has done me at least unintentional injustice, and confine my reply to the statement of the points wherein we agree and the discussion of the points wherein we differ. But before I proceed to this task I must not fail to notice some striking peculiarities of this review.

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The reviewer has taken a most extraordinary course. He sat down to review a book of which he says,

"The work is therefore in a high degree logical. It is as hard to read as Euclid. Nothing can be omitted; nothing passed over slightly. The unhappy reader once committed to a perusal is obliged to go on, sentence by sentence, through the long concatenation. There is not one resting place: not one lapse into amplification, or declamation, from the beginning to the close. It is like one of those spiral staircases, which lead to the top of some high tower, without a landing from the base to the summit; which if a man has once ascended, he resolves never to do the like again. The author begins with certain postulates, or what he calls first truths of reason, and these he traces out with singular clearness and strength to their legitimate conclusions. We do not see that there is a break or a defective link in the whole chain. If you grant his principles, you have already granted his conclusions."

The same in substance he repeats elsewhere. Now what course does this reviewer take in the review before us? Does he take issue upon the premises from which he admits that the conclusions irresistably follow? Does he meet argument with argument? Does he attempt by argument to show that either the premises or the conclusions of the book before him are unsound? O, no indeed. This were a painful and hopeless task. He therefore assumes the correctness of the peculiarities of what is called Old Schoolism; to wit, constitutional sinfulness, physical divine influence, physical regeneration, natural inability; that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of moral obligation; that moral obligation does not imply ability; that moral obligation extends beyond the sphere of moral agency to the substance of the soul and body, and that therefore these can be and are sinful in every faculty and part; that the involuntary states of the intellect and the sensibility are virtuous in a higher degree than benevolence or good will to being is—I say he assumes the correctness of these and sundry other similar dogmas; and finding that the conclusions in the work before him conflict with these, he most conveniently appeals to the prejudices of all who sympathize with him in those views, and without one sentence of argument, condemns the work because of its conclusions. He says, p. 257,

"We promised, however, not to discuss Mr. Finney's principles. We propose to rely on the *reductio ad absurdum* and make his doctrines the refutation of his principles."

Again he says, p. 263,

"We consider this a fair refutation. If the principle that obligation is limited by ability, leads to the conclusion that moral character is confined to intention, and that again to the conclusion that when the intention is right, nothing can be morally wrong, then the principle is false. Even if we could not detect its fallacy, we should know it could not be true."

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He relies altogether upon the absurdity of the conclusions to refute the premises. And has he shown that the conclusions are absurd? No indeed; but he has all along assumed this upon the strength of his own preconceived opinions and prejudices and those of his readers. A summary and most short hand method truly of disposing of the opinions and arguments of an opponent! They contradict our theory—therefore they must be absurd. The argument when reduced to a logical formula would stand thus: Whatever is inconsistent with Old Schoolism must be absurd; the book under review is inconsistent with Old Schoolism; therefore its doctrines and conclusions are absurd. He has not thus stated the argument in form, but, as every reader may see for himself, he has done the same thing in substance. Now suppose I should do the same thing in reply, or suppose I had done the same thing in the book under consideration; how much would our readers be edified? It is very natural for such men as the editors of the New England Puritan and the New York Observer, and that class of men who sympathize with the reviewer, to inform their readers that the reviewer has used up the book in question. But stay. Men are not all of this mind. Many would like to be better informed and to see the premises on which the argument in the work rests grappled with and overthrown by argument, or in some legitimate way disposed of before they can suffer the mere say so or the prejudices of any school to settle the weighty questions in debate.

I am well aware that the peculiarities of Old Schoolism will not bear reasoning upon. Who by any process of reasoning, or by any affirmation, or by any deduction of the intelligence whatever, could arrive at the positions comprising the peculiarities of the school above named? Who in the use of his reason could affirm for example that men deserve the wrath and curse of God forever for inheriting, (of course without their knowledge or consent,) a nature from Adam wholly sinful in every faculty of soul and body; or that a man is under infinite obligation to do what he never possessed any more ability to do than he has to create a world, and that he deserves the wrath and curse of God forever for not performing natural impossibilities; that he deserves eternal damnation for not being regenerated, when his regeneration is a thing in which he is entirely passive; a work of God as wholly and exclusively as the work of creation, and a work which he has no more power to effect than he has to recreate himself? What has either reason or reasoning to do with such dogmas as these

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which make up the peculiarities of Old Schoolism, but to deny and spurn them? Nothing surely. But since these are the points assumed by the writer, no wonder that he refuses to reason or to take issue either with the premises or the conclusions. That will never do. He must appeal to prejudice, and professedly to the Bible while he only assumes that the Bible sustains his positions, without so much as examining one text!! This to be sure is a summary way of disposing of all the great questions between us.

But another peculiarity of this writer is that he admits that the conclusions follow with irresistible logic from the premises without knowing what the premises are. At first he appears to have been much confused in his mind, and on page 250 he says,

"As it would be impossible to discuss the various questions presented in such a work as this, within the compass of a review, we propose to do no more than to state the principles which Mr. Finney assumes, and show that they legitimately lead to his conclusions. In other words, we wish to show that his conclusions are the best refutation of his premises. Our task would be much easier than it is, if there were any one radical principle to which his several axioms could be reduced, and from which the whole system could be evolved, but this is not the case. No one principle includes all the others, nor leads to all the conclusions here deduced; nor do the conclusions admit of being classed, and some referred to one principle and some to another, because the same conclusions often follow with equal certainty from different premises. We despair therefore of giving anything like unity to our exhibition of Mr. Finney's system, but we shall try not to do him injustice. We regard him as a most important laborer in the cause of truth. Principles which have been long current in this country, and which multitudes hold without seeing half their consequences, he has had the strength of intellect and will, to trace out to their legitimate conclusions, and has thus shown the borderers that there is no neutral ground; that they must either go forward to Oberlin or back to the common faith of Protestants."

In this paragraph he sees not plainly what the premises are from which he had before said that my conclusions irresistibly follow. But soon after his vision clears up a little and he says at the bottom of the same page,

"We are not sure that all Mr. Finney's doctrines may not be traced to two fundamental principles; namely, that obligation is limited by ability; and that satisfaction, happiness, blessedness is the only ultimate good, the only thing intrinsically valuable."

Here he is not sure that he has not discovered the premises from which he had asserted before he saw them, that my conclusions followed irresistibly.

On page 258 it appears that he had finally come to be assured that he had discovered the premises upon which the logical conclusions of the book were based. And lo! these principles, instead of being manifold as he had represented them, are discovered to be but two in number. Thus after

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writing twenty pages of his review, and nearly one half of the whole, he finally begins to understand the work he is reviewing; and behold, instead of its being a wilderness of premises and conclusions that mock all systematic discussion and examination, the conclusions are based, as he at last discovers, upon two fundamental positions. Now what does he do? Does he, since now he has found the clue, lay aside what he had written and close in with and attempt to refute either the premises or the conclusions? O no; but, as has been said, he assumes the truth of an opposite scheme of doctrine, and then comes to the grave conclusion that the premises in the work are false because they are opposed to what he calls the common and the long established views of christians.

But what are the two principles upon which he has discovered the whole work to rest, and from which he so fully admits the whole train of conclusions to follow. We will hear him again, page 258.

"The two principles to which all the important doctrines contained in this work, may be traced are, first, that obligation is limited by ability; and secondly, that enjoyment, satisfaction or happiness is the only ultimate good, which is to be chosen for its own sake."

This to be sure is most extraordinary. He begins by discovering and affirming the logical conclusiveness of the whole work; that the conclusions follow from the premises; but soon he despairs of finding the definite premises upon which the conclusions are based. Then he is not sure but the conclusions may be traced to two premises, and at length he is sure of this. How he could set out with the affirmation that the conclusion, followed from the premises, that there was not a defective link in the whole chain of argument, that to admit the premises is to grant the conclusions, while at the same time he had not discovered the premises, is hard to say.

But what does he do with the two principles or premises in question? Why, he undertakes to show, partly by garbled quotations from the work before him, and partly by his own logic that the conclusions of the book do follow from the premises, then relies upon the manifest absurdity of the conclusions as a sufficient refutation of the premises.

I now proceed to a brief statement of the points upon which it appears from his admissions that we are agreed.

He states what he regards as my two fundamental principles as follows, p. 258:

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"The two principles to which all the important doctrines contained in this work, may be traced, are, first, that obligation is limited by ability; and secondly, that enjoyment, satisfaction or happiness is the only ultimate good, which is to be chosen for its own sake."

Again he says, page 258:

"If these principles are correct, then it follows, FIRST, that moral obligation, or the demands of the moral law can relate to nothing but intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. If that is right, all is right. The law can demand nothing more. That this is a fair sequence from the above principles is plain, as appears from the following statement of the case. The law can demand nothing but what is within the power of a moral agent. The power of such an agent extends no further than to the acts of the will. All acts of the will are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that end: the latter of course having no moral character except as they derive it from the nature of the end in view of the mind. Therefore all moral character attaches properly to the intention or ultimate choice which the agent forms."

Again he says, page 253:

"1. Mr. Finney obviously uses the word will in its strict and limited sense. Every one is aware that the word is often used for every thing in the mind not included under the category of the understanding. In this sense all mental affections, such as being pleased or displeased, liking and disliking, preferring, and so on, are acts of the will. In its strict and proper sense, it is the power of self-determination, the faculty by which we decide our own acts. This is the sense in which the word is uniformly and correctly used in the work before us.

2. Mr. Finney is further correct in confining causality to the will, that is, in saying that our ability extends no farther than to voluntary acts. We have no direct control over our mental states beyond the sphere of the will. We can decide on our bodily acts and on the course of our thoughts, but we cannot govern our emotions and affections by direct acts of volition. We cannot feel as we will.

3. In confounding liberty and ability, or in asserting their identity, Mr. Finney, as remarked on a preceding page, passes beyond the limits of first truths, and asserts that to be an axiom which the common consciousness of men denies to be truth.

4. The fallacy of which he is guilty is very obvious. He transfers a maxim which is an axiom in one department, to another in which it has no legitimate force. It is a first truth that a man without eyes cannot be under an obligation to see, or a man without ears to hear. No blind man ever felt remorse for not seeing, nor any deaf man for not hearing. Within the sphere therefore of physical impossibilities, the maxim that obligation is limited by ability, is undoubtedly true."

Again he says page 243:

"It is a conceded point that man is a free agent. The author therefore is authorized to lay down as one of his axioms that liberty is essential to moral agency."

From these quotations it is manifest that we agree,

1. That the conclusions contained in the work reviewed legitimately and irresistibly follow from the premises.

2. We also agree that men are moral agents.

3. We also agree that liberty of will is a condition of moral agency.

4. We also agree that moral agency is a condition of moral obligation.

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5. We also agree that so far as acts of the will are concerned, liberty of will implies ability of will to obey God. In other words, so far as acts of will are concerned, we agree that men have ability, and that with respect to voluntary acts, obligation is limited by ability. This is fully admitted. After stating what he calls my two fundamental principles as follows, page 258,

"The two principles to which the all important doctrines contained in this work, may be traced, are, first, that obligation is limited by ability; and secondly, that enjoyment, satisfaction or happiness is the only ultimate good, which is to be chosen for its own sake,"

He immediately subjoins: (I quote again for the sake of perspicuity.)

"If these principles are correct, then it follows, FIRST, that moral obligation or the demands of the moral law can relate to nothing but intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. If that is right all is right. The law can demand nothing more. That this is a fair sequence from the above principles is plain, as appears from the following statement of the case. The law can demand nothing but what is within the power of a moral agent. The power of such an agent extends no further than to the acts of the will. All the acts of the will are either choices of an end, or volitions designed to attain that end; the latter of course having no moral character except as they derive it from the nature of the end in view of the mind. Therefore all moral character attaches properly to the intention or ultimate choice which the agent forms."

This and many other sayings in this review render it evident that the writer holds, and therefore that we agree, that my first premise, to wit, that moral obligation is limited by ability, is true so far forth as acts of will are concerned.

6. The foregoing quotations also show that we are agreed that all causality resides in the will; that whatever a man can accomplish directly or indirectly by willing is possible to him; and whatever he can not thus accomplish is to him a natural impossibility.

7. We also agree, as the foregoing quotations show, that the states of the intellect and of the sensibility are passive or involuntary states of mind.

8. We further agree that muscular action together with the attention of the intellect is under the direct control of the will.

9. We also agree that the states of the sensibility or the desires, appetites, passions, and feelings, are only under the indirect control of the will.

10. We, therefore, further agree that in so far forth as any action or state of mind is under either the direct or indirect control of the will, or, which is the same thing, that whatever is possible to man, may be justly required of him.

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11. We also agree, that in so far forth as thoughts, actions or feelings are under the direct or indirect control of the will, they are proper objects of command, and of praise and blame.

12. We also further agree that strictly speaking the moral character of acts and states of mind that proceed directly or indirectly from acts of will, belongs to or resides in the intention that directly or indirectly caused them.

13. We also fully agree that all acts of will consist in choice and volition, that is, in the choice of an end, and volition or executive efforts to secure that end.

14. We also agree, that in so far forth as acts of will are concerned, moral obligation and moral character strictly belong only to the ultimate intention, and that volitions designed to secure the end intended derive their character from the nature of the end. His language is, page 258:

"All the acts of the will are either choices of an end or volitions designed to attain that end; the latter of course having no moral character except as they derive it from the nature of the end in view of the mind. Therefore moral character attaches properly to the intention or ultimate choice which the agent forms."

I wish the reader to mark and ponder well these admissions, and to examine the quotations in which they are made and see if he fully makes these admissions together with those that follow. I desire this because I shall soon call the attention of the reader to the remarkable delemma in which his admissions have placed him.

15. We also further agree that a physical inability is a bar to or inconsistent with moral obligation. He says,

"He transfers a maxim which is an axiom in one department to another in which it has no force. It is a first-truth that a man without eyes can not be under an obligation to see, or a man without ears to hear. No blind man ever felt remorse for not seeing, nor any deaf man for not hearing. Within the sphere, therefore, of physical impossibilities, the maxim that obligation is limited by ability is undoubtedly true."

Let the reader mark this admission.

16. In so far forth as acts of will are concerned we also agree in the simplicity of moral action; that acts of will must in their own nature be for the time being either wholly right or wholly wrong. This is one conclusion which I deduce from the premises in question and which he admits to follow from them.

17. We also agree that if moral obligation be limited by ability, it follows that moral obligation and moral character must strictly belong only to acts of will and not strictly speaking to outward acts or any involuntary feelings or states

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of mind. These have moral character only in a qualified sense as proceeding from the intention, and receive character, so far as they have character, from that intention. Thus from his admissions it appears that in respect to what he calls the first of my fundamental principles we differ only in this, to wit: he affirms, and I deny, that moral obligation extends beyond the sphere of moral agency, to that state of the constitution which he calls sinful and to those states of mind that lie wholly beyond either the direct or indirect control of the will. Observe we are fully agreed as touching every thing that lies within either the direct or indirect control of the will. Our disagreement then in respect to what he calls my first principle, respects only those states of mind over which the will has no direct or indirect control.

Now, reader, observe: he fully admits,

1. That all causality resides in the will, and that therefore, whatever cannot be accomplished either directly or indirectly by willing, is impossible to man. He fully admits,

2. That whatever comes within the sphere of physical impossibility is without the pale of moral obligation, that is, that a physical impossibility or inability is a bar to or inconsistent with moral obligation.

The real and only point of difference between us in respect to the first great principle in question, resolves itself into this: WHAT IS PHYSICAL INABILITY?

This writer and his school admit and maintain that the inability of men to obey God, is a proper inability of *nature* or constitution; and that it consists in a nature that is wholly sinful in every faculty and part of soul and body. This I call a proper *physical* inability, and therefore I insist, that did such an inability exist, it would be a bar to moral obligation. This writer will not call this a physical inability, although he insists that it is a real inability of *nature*. He must, to save his orthodoxy, maintain that this is a real constitutional or natural inability, but for the same reason, he must deny that it is a physical inability, to avoid the charge of denying moral obligation. But how is the question between us here to be decided? The question and the only question thus far between us is: What is a proper physical inability? Webster's primary definition of physical is, "Pertaining to nature or natural productions, or to material things as opposed to things moral or imaginary."

This writer assumes that a physical inability must be a *material* inability. "A man without eyes is under no obligation

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Food and drink are necessary means of its well-being. Hence appetites terminating on these necessary means. So the soul has its wants. The reason indicates the means of meeting its necessities. The end demanded by the reason is the highest good of universal being, and, so far as may be, of every being in particular. The means or conditions it affirms to be universal conformity to the laws of our being, especially to moral law. The reason has its ideas of the intrinsically and the relatively valuable, of moral law and moral obligation to will the intrinsically valuable with the conditions and means to that end. It has also the idea of the *moral rightness* and justice of thus willing and of the wrongness of selfish willing. It also has the idea of the moral beauty, fitness, and propriety of benevolence both as it respects the end upon which it terminates and also as it respects the conditions or means by which its end is to be secured. Hence it has the idea of moral excellence or of praise and blameworthiness, and affirms that the benevolent ought to be at least ultimately happy, and that of this happiness he can not be justly deprived but by his own consent; that the selfish man who refuses to will the good of being in general deserves no good himself, and that on the contrary, he deserves to be deprived of good and to be made miserable. The reason demands that he be made miserable unless he becomes benevolent. These ideas are necessarily in the mind of a moral agent. Now let it be distinctly understood that the reason affirms the moral obligation of all moral agents to conform their wills to these ideas, and God also commands the same. This is what is truly meant by moral law or the law of nature. It is the law of God. It is the authoritative command of God and of reason that the will of every moral agent be conformed to these ideas. This conformity both God and reason affirm to be the indispensable condition of the ultimate and highest enjoyment of moral agents.

But this writer, it would seem, sees no way to avoid the conclusions and errors of the Jesuits but by assuming that the law of right, justice &c, is distinct from and may be opposed to the law of benevolence; that, therefore, certain things are right or wrong in themselves as violations of the law of right entirely irrespective of their relation to the law of benevolence; that certain acts are wrong such as stealing, fraud, lying, &c, entirely irrespective of their relations to the law of benevolence and only on account of their being violations of the law of right, and also wholly irrespective of the ultimate

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state either of soul or body that lies wholly beyond both the direct and indirect control of the will, so that it is naturally impossible for the agent to be or do it.

He says, page 253,

"Mr. Finney is further correct in confining causality to the will, that is, in saying that our ability extends no further than to voluntary acts."

Again, page 243, he says,

"It is a conceded point that man is a free agent. The author, therefore, is authorized to lay down as one of his axioms that liberty is essential to moral agency."

From these two quotations it appears that men have ability so far as the sphere of moral agency extends. Moral agency implies free agency. Free agency implies liberty of will. Liberty of will implies ability of will according to him. His inability then lies beyond the pale of moral agency. In support of his position he assumes that both the instinctive judgments of all men and the Bible affirm that there is moral obligation where there is a conscious inability. This I deny, and maintain that neither reason, the instinctive judgments of men, nor the Bible, affirm moral obligation of any act or state of mind that lies wholly beyond the direct or indirect control of the will. Both reason and revelation hold men responsible for all voluntary and intelligent acts, and also for all states of mind that lie within the direct or indirect control of the will; but no other. Men are conscious that their will is free and that for its acts they are responsible; also that their outward life and most of their inward feelings are under the direct or indirect control of their will, and for this reason alone, do they affirm or even conceive that moral obligation extends to them. That they have this consciousness is certain, and that this is a sufficient ground of the affirmation of moral obligation in respect to them can not be denied. Now it must not be assumed that reason or revelation affirms obligation in respect to any thing whatever that lies wholly beyond the direct or indirect control of will. He complains that I assume that moral obligation does not and can not extend beyond moral agency or which is the same thing beyond the acts of will and those acts and states which lie within its direct or indirect control.

Now before I close my remarks upon this point, let me request my readers to mark and understand distinctly the exact difference between this writer and myself upon the subject of ability. Here, let it be observed, is the real point of divergence between the Old and the New School in theology.

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upon an examination of this subject. This question I have discussed at lenght in the work under review, but this writer has not replied to my argument, and, as I have said, for this reason I have doubted the propriety of my replying at all to his assumptions. A sufficient refutation of his assumption that there are divers grounds of moral obligation, might be quoted verbatim from the work reviewed. But it would occupy too much room for our article. I will, therefore, condense as much as possible the substance of the argument upon that subject, as far as is necessary to reply to this reviewer.

1. Let it be remembered that the present inquiry respects *acts of will*, since to no other can the objection arising out of the perversion of the Jesuits apply.

2. Let it be remembered also that this writer admits that all intelligent acts of will are either choices or volitions; that is that they consist in the choice of an end or volitions to secure an end.

3. He also admits that in respect to acts of will moral obligation belongs strictly only to the choice of an end or to the ultimate intention. In this all schools must agree. The moral law or laws, then, so far as acts of will are concerned must be *laws of choice or of ultimate intention*, the ultimate intention or choice always implying the choice of all the appropriate conditions and means of securing the end upon which it terminates.

4. Moral law and moral obligation respect the choice of an ultimate end, or of something for its own sake, or for what it is in and of itself, and for the reason that it is what it is.

5. It is plain, therefore, that the ground of the obligation must be found in the thing itself which is to be chosen for its own sake. That is, it must be worthy of being chosen for what it is in and of itself. The thing of itself must be such as to impose obligation to choose it by virtue of its own nature.

6. A *ground or foundation* of moral obligation, then, must be that which, upon condition of moral agency, can and does impose obligation of itself to choose itself as an ultimate end.

7. That which is a *ground of moral obligation, must impose obligation* under all circumstances; that is, its own nature being such that it ought to be chosen for its own sake, it always and necessarily imposes obligation upon a moral agent to choose it as an ultimate end. It can never be wrong but always right to choose it.

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8. Moral law is the rule that requires this ultimate end, or, if there be more than one, these ultimate ends, to be chosen for their own sake. Observe: moral obligation, it is admitted so far as acts of the will are concerned respects only ultimate intention or the choice of an ultimate end or of something for its own sake, together with the condition and means of securing it. This something must be of such a nature as to be worthy of being chosen for its own sake. This nature enforces the obligation to choose it. The law is the affirmation of God and of reason that the thing ought to be chosen for its own sake Let it then be distinctly borne in mind that there can be no moral law enforcing obligation to choose an ultimate end except the nature of the end be such as to deserve to be chosen for its own sake; and all moral law does and must require the choice of any thing as an ultimate end for this reason, that is, for its own sake.

9. It is admitted that the intrinsically valuable must be a ground of moral obligation. To deny this were to deny a first-truth, for by the valuable we mean that which is a good to being, something that is worthy of being chosen for its own sake; and is it not self-evident that what is worthy of being chosen for its own sake ought to be so chosen as has been said.

10. It is admitted also that enjoyment is intrinsically valuable, and therefore that it is a ground of moral obligation, that is, that it imposes obligation on a moral agent to choose it as an ultimate good or end; that, therefore, it is always duty to intend or choose the highest enjoyment of the whole universe as an end, also to use the necessary means to that end.

11. It is admitted that entire consecration to this end is virtuous; that is, that it is always right to be entirely consecrated to the promotion of the highest glory of God and the highest well being of the universe. Now the enquiry before us is, can there be any other ground of moral obligation? any other end than the valuable to being which ought to be chosen for its own sake? Any thing else than the valuable that can of itself impose obligation to choose it for its own sake? The writer whose views we are examining must hold that there are other ultimate ends or grounds of moral obligation, other things than the intrinsically valuable to being that can of themselves not only impose obligation, but can set aside the law of benevolence, as has been said. He thinks by this assumption to avoid the rock upon which the Jesuits have split. He holds that the will of God is a ground or

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foundation of obligation, and complains of me for denying it. If the will of God be a foundation of obligation, then it can, upon the conditions of moral agency, impose obligation of itself. But moral obligation in our present inquiry respects acts of will and the choice of an ultimate end. Now, what is the ultimate end which the will of God alone can impose obligation to choose? Observe—an ultimate end is something chosen for its own sake, not for a reason out of itself, but for a reason within itself, that is, for its own nature. If the will of God can be a foundation of obligation to choose an ultimate end, that end must be the will of God itself. But this is absurd. It is a contradiction to affirm that the will of God is the ground or *a* ground of obligation to choose any ultimate end whatever; for the ground of the obligation must be the nature and intrinsic value of the end itself. God requires us to will his good. Now are we to will good to him because of its own value to him, or because he commands it? If his will is the reason or ground of the obligation, or *a* ground of the obligation that could of itself impose obligation, then if he should command us to will evil to him as an ultimate end, we should be under obligation to obey. In this case obligations would be opposites, and of course opposite duties would exist. The well being of God is intrinsically and infinitely valuable; and for that reason it is unalterably right to will it. But if God's will can of itself impose obligation to will an ultimate end, and should he command us to will evil instead of good to him, it would impose a contrary obligation. What! should we love God or will his good, not because his well being is infinitely valuable, but because he commands it? God's will is always authoritative and imposes obligation, not in the sense of its being a foundation of obligation, but in the sense that it is an infallible declaration of the law of nature or of the end at which in the nature of things moral agents ought to aim and of the conditions or means of this end. But this writer admits that it is not the *arbitrary* will of God which, except in some cases, is a ground or foundation of obligation. He says, pages 264—5:

"Mr. Finney's book is made up of half-truths. It is true that the will of God divorced from his infinite wisdom and excellence, mere arbitrary will, is not the foundation of moral obligation. But the preceptive will of God, is but the revelation of his nature, the expression of what that nature is, sees to be right and approves. It is also true that some things are right because God wills or commands them, and that he wills other things because they are right. Some of his precepts, therefore, are founded on his own immutable nature, others on the peculiar relations of man, and others again upon his simple command. We can have no higher evidence that a thing is right, than the command of God,

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and his command creates an obligation to obedience, whether we can see the reason of the precept or not, or whether it have any reason apart from his good pleasure. Mr. Finney is right so far as saying that the will of God, considered as irrational, groundless volition, is not the ultimate foundation of moral obligation, but his will as the revelation of the infinitely perfect nature of God, is not merely the rule, but ground of obligation to his creatures."

What does he mean by the preceptive will of God being the revelation of his nature, the expression of what that nature is and sees to be right and approves? If this has any meaning, it is only another way of expressing the very doctrine of the book he was reviewing; but being thrown into this mystical form, it conceals the fact that he agrees with me. I said that the moral law has its foundation in the nature of God and is an idea, eternally existing in the divine reason, of the course of willing that is obligatory upon him and upon all moral agents, and that the expression of this law by commandment imposes obligation upon us, not fundamentally because God wills it (for this course of willing would be obligatory upon us if God forbade it;) but his will imposes obligation for the reason that it is an infallible declaration of what infinite intelligence sees to be right. Law is given by the intellect, and not by the will of any being. Will may express and declare it, as God's will does. But his reason gives the law to himself and to us. It is the Divine Reason and not the Divine Will that perceives and affirms the rule of conduct. The Divine will publishes but does not originate the rule. Can not this writer see this? It is true, as he says, pp. 264—5.

"We can have no higher evidence that a thing is right, than the command of God, and his command creates an obligation to obedience, whether we can see the reason of the precept or not."

To be sure we can have no higher evidence and need no other; and this evidence alone imposes obligation whether we are able to see the reason for the command or not, because our own reason affirms that he must have some good reason for the requirement, although we are unable to see what it is. But when this writer adds that "it would be obligatory whether it have any reason apart from his good pleasure," it is not true, if by good pleasure be meant his arbitrary pleasure. If by good pleasure is meant that his pleasure is good because founded in a good reason, why then the expression of his good pleasure is sufficient to impose obligation. But if, as I said, by good pleasure is meant a pleasure not finding its reason in the Divine intelligence, then such pleasure can not be a ground of obligation; for if it could, it would follow

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that it could be our duty to will the direct opposite, should God command it. "Some precepts," he says, "are founded on his own immutable nature, others in the peculiar relations of man, and others again upon his simple command." Now, what does this mean? This writer talks so loosely upon this and most other points as to render it difficult to understand him. "Some of his precepts are founded," &c. It is evident that this writer has in his mind the precepts that respect the outward life, not the ultimate intention. It is true that God's precepts are often conditionated upon the relations of certain things to the highest well being of himself and the universe. But what does he mean when he says that "some of his precepts are founded on his simple command?" I suppose he means, (but he has not expressed it; and I suppose he means this, because I can not conceive any other meaning or thing to have been in his mind,) that the obligation to obedience is founded simply on his command, that is, whether we assume that he has any good reason for it or not. But this is a mistake. As I have shown in the book in question, we always affirm our obligation to obey and to submit to the providence of God upon the ground that we always affirm that God must have a good reason for all his requirements and for all his dispensations. And on no other ground do or can we affirm our obligation. But if, as he assumes, the obligation rests upon the simple command irrespective of any assumed reason for it, it would follow that had he commanded the direct opposite under the identical circumstances we should have been under obligations to obey. Had this reviewer fairly and fully represented my argument on the will of God being the foundation of obligation, there had been no need of a reply. Let the reader consult it for himself. See Systematic Theology, Moral Government, pages 67—70, and 127—32.

Observe, I do not deny but fully admit that the expressed will of God is an all-sufficient reason for our willing and nilling whatever he commands in the sense and for the reason that it infallibly declares what is the dictate and affirmation of infinite intelligence, and our own reason affirms the obligation upon this assumption, to wit, that God always has and must have infinitely wise and good reasons for all his requirements. Were it not for this assumption, our reason could not affirm our obligation to regard the Divine will as the rule of duty. This writer has strangely misapprehended and misrepresented my views in relation to our obligation to obey the will of God. I say that the Divine reason gives and

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the Divine will publishes moral law. This law is *revealed* to our reason sometimes by the expressed will of God and sometimes by the light of nature. When we have this law, it lies in our reason as an idea of what we ought to will and do. The will of God then is not the foundation of obligation in such a sense as to impose obligation irrespective of *its* being founded in any good reason: But if God wills as he does because he has a good reason so to will, then that reason must be the foundation of the obligation; and the assumption that there is a good reason for the divine command, is the condition both of the obligation and of our affirming obligation to obey.

But before I leave this point, let me remind you of the intrinsic absurdity of the will of God being the foundation of obligation to choose any ultimate end besides the will of God itself. What! a moral agent bound to choose something for its own sake or because of its intrinsic nature and value, yet not for this reason, but because God commands it! That is, God commands men to will it as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, yet not for this reason, but because he wills that they should will it! Or he commands me to will it for its own sake, and also because he wills it. Now if his command be a distinct ground of moral obligation, it would follow that should he command me to will it as an ultimate end, I should be under obligation to do so irrespective of its intrinsic value, even if it were an ultimate evil instead of a good. But this is absurd and impossible. God's will then can never be a moral law distinct from the law of benevolence. God is always benevolent and can never will any thing inconsistent with benevolence; and until recently I did not know that any body would now deny that every moral attribute of God is a modification of benevolence. But to be consistent, this reviewer must deny it. Benevolence has been regarded, and I suppose justly, as comprising the whole of God's moral character, and his different moral attributes as only modifications of benevolence, or as only benevolence contemplated in different relations. But if this writer is correct, it must follow that this is all a mistake. But if this is a mistake, the gospel surely is false, that represents God as love and his moral attributes as all harmonizing and limiting the exercise of each other; justice as limiting the exercise of mercy, and mercy as limiting the exercise of justice. But if these attributes are not modifications of benevolence, it is impossible and inconceivable that this limitation should take place;

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for unless the law of benevolence is to decide when mercy or justice is to be exercised, no possible rule of limitation can exist.

But to come to the enquiry, are there distinct grounds of moral obligation and consequently distinct moral laws; for example:—Is *right* a distinct ground of moral obligation? Remember that moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end or of something for its own sake. If right is a ground of moral obligation, it must, upon condition of moral agency, impose obligation of itself and invariably impose it. And moreover, the obligation must be to choose right itself as the end, for the reason or the ground of the obligation to choose an ultimate end, must be found in the end itself. But what is right that it ought to be chosen as an ultimate end? Right is objective or subjective. Objective right is a mere abstraction or an idea of the fit, the suitable, and of that choice which is subjectively right or which constitutes virtue. Can this abstraction impose obligation to will itself as an end? What is it? Why it is an abstraction. It is nothing in the concrete—nothing actual or possible. And can nothing be a ground of moral obligation and impose infinite obligation to will itself for its own sake? The supposition is absurd. Remember, it is objective or abstract right of which we are now treating. Subjective right or virtue will come under consideration in its proper place. The question now is, can objective right be a ground or foundation of obligation? Can it impose obligation by virtue of its own nature to choose itself as an ultimate end? This, we have seen, can not be, because it is absolutely nothing but an abstraction, and in no case is or can it be any thing in the concrete.

The same is true of objective justice &c. &c. Neither right, nor justice, regarded objectively, can be a ground or foundation of moral obligation.

1. Because they are only abstractions, and,

2. Because if they were distinct grounds of moral obligation, they could in no case be set aside, and right and justice must be done in every instance, and mercy could in no case be exercised.

3. It involves a contradiction and an absurdity to make these distinct grounds of moral obligation in the sense that they impose obligation of themselves to choose themselves as ultimates. It is admitted that the valuable is always to be chosen for its own sake. Now if right, and justice, are not to

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be ascertained by reference to the law of benevolence, but by a law of right distinct from the law of benevolence and always to be chosen for their own sake, here are distinct and often conflicting moral laws and duties. The laws of right and of justice demand the punishment of sinners, but the law of benevolence demands their pardon upon condition of repentance &c. Now if you say that upon these conditions the laws of right and of justice also demand their forgiveness, you give up the ground that right and justice are distinct grounds of moral obligation, or that these are distinct moral laws, and merge them in the law of benevolence. Benevolence does not demand nor admit their forgiveness except upon those conditions. The fact is that right and justice &c., are only words that express the moral attributes or qualities of benevolence. But suppose objective right and justice &c., are distinct grounds of moral obligation. It follows that there are distinct moral laws or precepts, and that these may come into conflict. In this case, which shall limit and restrain the other? Or shall they all remain in force? If all remain in force, then there are conflicting obligations at the same time. But this is absurd. If they come into conflict, one of these laws or precepts must be for the time-being repealed. But this is inconsistent with the very nature of moral law. Moral law is the law of nature and immutable as nature itself. But suppose otherwise, and that one might be for the time being repealed or limited by the other. Shall the law of benevolence be limited and set aside? or shall the law of objective right or justice yield to the law of benevolence? Must we in such a case will the abstractly right and the abstractly just? or the good, that is, the highest well-being of God and the universe? Shall we in such an emergency cease to will the good and will the abstract right? But shall we will a mere abstraction which can be of no possible value in itself in preference to that which is infinitely valuable? Impossible that this should be obligatory. If you reply that no case can occur in which objective right or in which these supposed laws or precepts can come into conflict, you not only deny that they are distinct grounds of moral obligation and distinct moral laws or precepts, but you fail utterly in making out your attempted reply to the Jesuit. If whatever is demanded by the law of benevolence must be demanded by the law of God, of right, of justice &c., then the Jesuit turns upon you and says, this is plainly demanded by the law of benevolence, and therefore it must be right and

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just &c:, for these can never conflict with each other. This you admit upon the last made supposition. Now where is your pretended answer to the Jesuits? Should you say that although the law of right and the law of benevolence can never come into conflict, yet sometimes we are to be guided by the law of right instead of the law of benevolence because we can tell what is right but can not, in a given case, tell what is demanded by the law of benevolence—should you say thus, you would talk nonsense. Both the law of right and the law of benevolence, if there be two such laws have respect to and demand certain ultimate intentions, and neither of them regards any thing as right but these intentions and those volitions that proceed and receive their character from them. If, therefore, you would know what is right, the law of right must answer, to will the right as an ultimate end and the conditions and means of promoting this end. But this were nonsense. The law of benevolence must answer, to will the good as an ultimate end and the conditions and means of promoting it, is right. You can, therefore, always as infallibly know what is right by reference to the law of benevolence as by reference to the law of right. If these laws can not come into conflict it is always right and always safe to will the good, and in so doing you always will right. But to suppose the laws can come into conflict involves an absurdity and a contradiction. Whenever one supposes himself to know what right demands better than he knows what the law of benevolence demands, he is deceived. In the supposition he supposes that there is a law of right distinct from and which may be opposed to the law of benevolence, which is not true. And again. In the supposition he is conceiving of moral obligation and moral character as belonging to some *particular act* and not to the ultimate intention. It is common to hear people loosely say, I know that such and such a thing is right or wrong when they can have respect only to the outward act or to the volition that caused it, or, to say the most that can truly be said, they make the affirmation only of the proximate and not of the ultimate intention. But it is certain that if they affirm right or wrong of acts of will without regard to ultimate intention, they deceive themselves, for with respect to acts of will at least, it is admitted that right and wrong can stricly be predicated only of ultimate intention. But if we are to look to the ultimate intention for right and wrong, and if executive volitions receive their character from the ultimate intention, then we can always as certainly tell

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what is right or wrong by reference to the law of benevolence as by reference to the law of right, if there be two moral laws. For suppose we would know what is right by consulting the law of right, the answer is, to intend the right as an end is right; and all volitions and actions proceeding from this intention receive their character from this intention. Should we enquire what is right by consulting the law of benevolence, the answer would be, to will the good or the intrinsically valuable to being as an end is always right, and all the volitions and actions which proceed from this intention receive their character from the intention. We can in no case decide what is right or wrong without reference to the ultimate intention, for in this all moral character properly resides. But if the end or the intention is right whatever the end may be supposed to be, whether, it be abstact right, or justice, or the will of God, or the valuable, if the intention be right the executive volitions and acts must be right as proceeding from a right intention. So that whatever be supposed to be the foundation of moral obligation, if it be granted, as it must be, that obligation respects ultimate intention, and that executive volitions and acts receive their character from the ultimate intention, it follows,

1. That we can tell as well what is right in any one case as in any other; and,

2. That the doctrine lies equally open to the perversion of the Jesuits or to any one who is wicked enough to abuse it; and,

3. That nothing is gained in replying to the Jesuits or to those who would abuse the doctrine of intention by assuming that there are divers grounds of moral obligation.

But since this writer will have it that the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, let us see how the supposed different moral precepts would read upon the supposition that the will of God is the foundation of the obligation to obey them. Take first the law of right. This law, if there be such an one separate from the law of benevolence says, Will the right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Now if the will of God is the foundation of the obligation to obey this law it should read thus, "will the right for its own sake, yet not for this reason but because God commands it." if God's will of itself instead of the nature of right makes it obligatory and right to will the right, then should he will the direct opposite, it would *make that right* and duty.

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The same is true of justice. Suppose there be a distinct moral law requiring justice. This law must require that the just should be willed as an ultimate end or for its own sake. But if the will of God be the ground of the obligation to obey this law, it would read, will the just, not for the sake of the just, but because God wills that you should will the just. Or suppose God's will is a distinct ground of obligation in such a sense that it could of itself impose obligation to will the right or the just irrespective of the nature of right or justice, which it must be, to be a ground of obligation at all, it would follow that should God will that I should choose the direct opposite, it would impose obligation. The same is and must be true whatever we suppose to be the end required to be chosen. Unless the will of God itself be the end to be chosen it can never be the ground of foundation, or *a* ground of obligation to will it. The ground and the only ground of the obligation to will any thing whatever as an ultimate end must be found in and be identical with the end itself. God requires it because it is obligatory in its own nature, and his will is only a declaration of the law of his own reason respecting it. The Divine reason sees it to be right, fit, and suitable, and therefore the Divine will publishes the affirmation of the Divine reason, and pronounces the sentence of the Divine reason against disobedience. It has been so long customary to talk looscly in reference to the foundation of moral obligation and to speak of God as an arbitrary sovereign whose will alone is law without so much as assuming that he has any good reason for his requirements, or without once thinking that his own will is under the law of his infinite reason and that his commands are nothing else than the revelation of the decisions of the infinite intelligence—I say it has been so long customary for theologians to talk and write loosely upon this subject, that now if we introduce a rigid enquiry into this subject, what this writer would call the *pious feelings* of many are shocked. But it is their *prejudices*, and not their piety, that are shocked, unless their piety consists in the belief of error.

Nor is the Divine reason the ground of obligation. It gives law to God and to us. It declares that we ought to will the good for the sake of the good, or because it is good and not because the Divine will or the Divine reason requires it. Law is never itself the *ground* of obligation. It only discloses, declares or reveals the ground of obligation, and affirms the obligation with the sanctions that enforce it, and is in no case

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itself the ground or foundation of the obligation. Law is always a *condition* but never a ground of of obligation; so that where there is no law there is no obligation. But law never is nor can be the *ground* of obligation. But all this and much more is contained in the work in question, and I am doing little else than rewriting the arguments to which the reviewer has made no reply. The fact is, his review is rather, for the most part, an appeal to loose prejudices than to reason or revelation, as any one may see by a thorough examination both of the review and of the work reviewed. I do not in thus saying intend to impeach his motives; for he has himself been so long accustomed to a certain way of thinking and speaking that he really feels shocked at the conclusions of my work as he understands them, and speaks as he feels. I can not deny however that there is in his review an *appearance* at least of a disposition to excite a public prejudice against the work reviewed.

But can virtue or *subjective* right be a ground of moral obligation? What is it? Observe we are now enquiring not whether it can be a ground of obligation to exercise certain emotions; but whether it can be a ground of obligation to choose an ultimate end. If it can, it must impose obligation to choose itself as an ultimate end, for the ground of the obligation to choose any thing as an ultimate end must be found in and be identical with the end itself.

Now whether there be virtue separate from choice or not, it is admitted that the choice of the highest good of being is virtuous. That is, either the choice itself is virtue, or virtue is the moral attribute or quality of this choice. Hence, I remark,

1. One's own present virtue can not be a ground of moral obligation, for in this case his obligation must be to choose either his own present choice, or an attribute of his own choice as an end, which is absurd. If his virtue consists in the choice of good, or of right, or of any thing, to choose his own virtue as an ultimate end, were to choose his own choice as an ultimate end, instead of choosing the right or the good, without regard to any other end which is absurd. Observe, if virtue consist in the choice of an end, and if it be a foundation or ground of obligation, it can of itself impose obligation to choose itself without any other reason. But can a present choice be its own end or object? Impossible. But suppose virtue be regarded as the moral attribute or quality of choice; then if it can be a ground of moral obliga-

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tion, the quality of a present choice can impose obligation to will it irrespective of any other end, or thing chosen. This again is absurd, for it is not possible to regard the quality of a present or a proposed choice as a sufficient ground of obligation to make it, and as constituting the only object of choice. But if it be a ground of obligation, it must impose obligation by itself, to choose itself as an ultimate end. The moral quality of a present choice an end which of itself imposes obligation to choose itself as an ultimate! If this is not absurd, what is?

2. I remark that our *future* virtue can not be a distinct ground of moral obligation. For if it can, it must impose obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But my future virtue must consist either in chosing an ultimate end or in the quality of that choice. If it consists in future choice, then I am under present obligation to choose a future choice for its own sake and wholly irrespective of any other end whatever. If you say that virtue consists in the choice of good or of the right and I am boundto choose the future choice of the good or the right because this choice is virtuous, I ask, Is the choice virtuous because of the end on which it terminates? Then it is the end that gives character to the choice, and it is not the *choice* but the *end* upon which it terminates that imposes the obligation. If you say the choice is to be chosen for its own sake irrespective of the end, then the choice is to terminate on choice as an end without regard to any other end. If you say that the choice is to be chosen or imposes obligation to choose itself only because it terminates on a certain end, then it must be the end on which the future choice is to terminate that imposes the obligation to choose this choice. But if you say that I am under obligation to choose both the end and the choice upon which it is to terminate as ultimates, this is the same as to say that the choice itself without regard to its end can impose obligation to choose itself as an ultimate end; this is absurd. But suppose virtue to consist in the moral quality or attribute of future choice. If this quality can impose obligation to will or choose itself as an ultimate end it can do so irrespective of all other ends. But the quality of this choice depends entirely upon the end chosen. If it can impose obligation, it must be to choose itself for its own sake, and not for any other reason. But what it is, in and of itself, depends altogether upon the end upon which the choice of which it is a quality terminates. It is therefore impossible and absurd

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to say that a quality of present or of a future choice should of itself be a ground of obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.

3. The same is true if we regard the present or future virtue of any other being than ourselves as a ground or foundation of moral obligation. It matters not at all what we regard as the ultimate end upon which choice ought to terminate—whether it be happiness or objective right or virtue—the virtuousness of choosing this end can never of itself impose obligation to make this choice; and to affirm that it can, is to affirm that the virtuousness of a choice can impose obligation to make the choice without regard to the end, the nature of which end alone makes the choice virtuous. Why, if the virtue of a choice depends wholly on the nature of the end upon which it terminates, it is absurd and ridiculous to say that the virtue of the choice can alone impose obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.

But surely I have proceeded far enough in this discussion to show that nothing is gained in replying to the Jesuits by assuming that there are divers independent grounds of moral obligation and consequently divers moral laws. For if the supposition be admitted that there are, either these laws may come into conflict or they can not. If they can, who will say that the law of benevolence shall yield to the law of right, or that it can be a duty to will abstract right as an end, rather than the highest well being of God and the universe? But if these supposed moral laws can not come into conflict, why then the Jesuit will of course reply that it, is and must be always right to will the highest well being or good of God and the universe with the necessary conditions and means, and therefore the end or the intention must give character to and sanctify the means. Or again; suppose that there be divers ultimate ends or grounds of moral obligation, he would tell you that in the pursuit of any one of these, the end or intention sanctifies the means, so that nothing is gained so far as avoiding the perversion of the Jesuits is concerned, by assuming that there are divers grounds of moral obligation and of course divers moral laws. And the same is true whether it be admitted or denied that these ends or laws can come into conflict.

The fact is that the assumption that there are divers independent grounds of moral obligation each of which can impose obligation of itself is a mistake; and when men think that there are; it is only because they have lost sight of the

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fact that moral obligation is strictly predicable only of ultimate intention, or of the choice of something for its own sake. Nothing can be thus chosen but the intrinsically valuable to being, and therefore there can be no other ground of moral obligation but that which is intrinsically valuable. This is and must be the sole ground of moral obligation for the plain reason that it is naturally impossible to choose any thing else as an ultimate end. This writer admits that it is a first truth of reason that enjoyment is valuable in itself and ought to be chosen for this reason. This has the characteristics of a first truth; all men practically admit that enjoyment is a good *per se*.

But suppose this writer to take the ground, which in fact I understand him to take, that there may be divers grounds of moral obligation in respect to one and the same intention. Suppose he should say that although there can not be divers grounds of obligation in such a sense that they can come into conflict, yet there may be several distinct and consistent grounds of obligation in respect to the same act. He says, p. 266.

"It is one of Mr. Finney's hobbies that the ground of obligation must be one and simple. If it is the will of God, it is not his moral excellence; if his moral excellence it is not his will. This however may be safely referred to the common judgment of men. They are conscious that even entirely distinct grounds of obligation may concur: as the nature of the thing commanded, the authority of him who gives the command, and the tendency of what is enjoined."

Here this writer affirms what I have above supposed, namely: that these are distinct grounds of moral obligation in respect to one and the same act. The *nature* of the thing commanded—the *authority* of him who gives the command and the *tendency* of what is enforced. These he says are distinct *grounds* of moral obligation, of course he must mean in respect to one and the same act. This is a common error. I will therefore spend a moment upon it. Here let it be remembered that we are discoursing of acts of will and of ultimate choice or intention for as this writer agrees, and as all must agree so far as acts of will are concerned strictly speaking moral obligation belongs only to the ultimate choice or intention. If therefore there can be several distinct grounds of moral obligation respecting the same act, it must be that there are divers distinct grounds of moral obligation to make an ultimate choice or intention. But the absurdity of this will appear if we consider that the choice of an ultimate end consists in choosing it for its own sake, and not for some

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other reason. Now suppose that there are, the following distinct grounds of moral obligation to will the well being of God and the universe.

1. The intrinsic value of the end.
2. The will or authority of God.
3. The utility, and
4. The rightness of thus willing.

Now be it remembered that a *ground* of moral obligation must be something which upon certain conditions can *impose obligation of itself*, without the existence of any other ground of obligation. The intrinsic value of the end named is *a ground* of moral obligation, and is seen by all men instantly and necessarily to impose obligation. But can the will of God *alone* in this case impose obligation? Should he command me to choose his well being as an ultimate end would this impose obligation to do so entirely irrespective of the value of the end? No, for it were a contradiction and an impossibility to make this choice in obedience to his will irrespective of the value of the end. But for the value of the end his command to will it as an ultimate end could impose no obligation to will it for its own sake. But to will it as an ultimate end, is to will it for its own sake. But suppose the *utility* of the choice is a *distinct ground* of obligation. The utility of the choice depends upon the value of the end. The choice can be useful only because the end which it tends to promote is valuable. The tendency or utility of the choice then can never be a distinct *ground* of obligation, for aside from the value of the end the tendency of the choice to secure it would be no sufficient reason, or any reason at all for the choice. Suppose the *rightness* of the choice to be a distinct ground of obligation. But the choice is not right, aside from the value of the end chosen. Leave out of view the value of the end and the choice of it would not be right, therefore the rightness of the choice cannot be a distinct ground of obligation, for if it could it would impose obligation irrespective of the value of the end, but irrespective of the value of the end the choice would not be right, and of course irrespective of the value of the end, there can be no ground whatever of obligation to will it as an ultimate. No consideration whatever could impose obligation to will the good of being as an ultimate end irrespective of the intrinsic value of the end. Of course there can be no *ground* of obligation in any proper sense of the term, except the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen. This writer and all who affirm distinct grounds

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of moral obligation, are thinking when they make the affirmation not of *ultimate choice* or intention but of some executive act.

But suppose it be admitted that obligation belongs to executive acts of will, that is, to volitions as distinct from ultimate choice and suppose that it be said that the value of the end which the volition is designed to secure and the tendency of the volition to secure it, and the rightness of the volition and the authority of God are so many distinct grounds of moral obligation to put forth the executive act. It is seen at a glance that the value of the end of itself imposes obligation to put forth the executive act to secure it upon condition of the tendency to do so. But the tendency of the volition to secure the end can not be a ground of obligation irrespective of the value of the end, for if we have no regard to the value of the end there is no reason whatever, that is, no good reason for the act although it might tend to secure an end. The rightness of the act can not be a ground of obligation separate from the value of the end, for aside from the value of the end the executive act would not be right. The will of God could not impose obligation to put forth such a volition irrespective of the value of the end for the plain reason that it involves a contradiction to put forth an executive volition to secure an ultimate end, irrespective of, or without regard to the value of the end. Should God command me to put forth a volition to secure an ultimate end, or to secure something for its own sake, it could not impose obligation without respect to the value of the end, for the thing commanded is that I put forth volition to secure the end for its own sake, that is, for its own value. To put forth the volition without reference to the value of the end to be secured by it were not obedience to the command. But suppose God should command me to put forth any act whatever and should inform me that there was no reason for it whatever but his arbitrary will. That he had no reason for giving the command and I had none for obedience except his arbitrary will, would this impose obligation. No, I say again we can affirm our obligation only, as we assume that God was in fact a good reason for all his requirements, whether we can understand what they are or not. Observe, I expressly maintain that the command of God always imposes obligation without the knowledge of any other reason, but it does this upon the ground of an affirmation of reason that he has a good reason for the command whether we can understand it or not.

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But I have dwelt enough at length on this part of the subject, my object being only to show that the great objection of this writer to my views, lies as really and as fully against himself and against all others as against me, and that he does not avoid the difficulty by the assumption that there are divers distinct grounds of moral obligation and that there is in fact no way of replying to this objection, but that in which I have replied both here and in the book reviewed.

I must remark very briefly upon what this writer calls my second fundamental principle, to wit, that mental satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness or happiness, is the ultimate good of being. I did not *assume* this as true, but showed, as I think conclusively, that this follows irresistibly from the first truth that obligation is limited by ability. This writer has not replied at all to my argument in support of the position now to be examined, which has led me to doubt whether I should reply at all to his strictures upon this point. As it is, nothing more can be expected of me than a condensation of the argument in support of this position, when it is replied to it will be in time either for me to yield the point or enter into a fuller vindication of it. I assumed as a first truth that obligation must imply a possibility of obedience. This I now, in view of what has been said, take as established. If obligation is limited by ability, it follows as this writer concedes, that all obligation must strictly and properly belong to ultimate intention, or to the choice of an ultimate end with all the necessary conditions and means of securing it. This end must be something chosen for what it is, in and of itself, that is, it must be regarded by the mind as intrinsically valuable to being, and chosen for that reason. Nothing can be so regarded but a *state of mind*, that is, the ultimate good of God and of all beings, must be something existing within the field of consciousness, that of which a being can be conscious. I insist that this ultimate good must be enjoyment alone. This, my reviewer denies. Now, we are agreed that in so far forth as acts of will are concerned, obligation is strictly predicable only of the choice of an ultimate end, or of something which the mind regards as a good or as intrinsically valuable in itself, together with the necessary conditions and means. I insist that this end is enjoyment *alone*. He admits that enjoyment is an ultimate good, and that this is a first truth, and that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. But he also insists that moral excellence is also a good in itself and that it ought to be chosen as an ultimate end, and that this is also a

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first truth. This I deny. We are agreed then that enjoyment is an ultimate good. The only question between us here is, Is moral excellence also an ultimate good? He says, p. 265,

"Our author denies that the divine moral excellence is the ground of moral obligation. This he pronounces to be absurd. Moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end. The reason of the obligation and the end chosen must be identical. Therefore, what is chosen as an end, must be chosen for its own sake. But virtue being chosen as a means to an end, viz: enjoyment cannot be the end chosen. This of course follows from the principle that enjoyment is the only intrinsic good, the only thing that should be chosen for its own sake, and other things only as they are the means or conditions of attaining that end.

We should like to ask, however, how Mr. Finney knows that happiness is a good, and a good in itself to be chosen for its own sake? If he should answer that is a first truth of reason; is it not a first truth of reason, that moral excellence is a good, and a far higher good to be chosen for its own sake? It is degraded and denied, if it be chosen simply as a means of enjoyment. If the moral idea of excellence, is not a primary, independent one, then we have no moral nature, we have a sentient and rational nature; a capacity for enjoyment, and the power of perceiving and adapting means to its attainment."

This writer here, as elsewhere confounds virtue with moral excellence. I have distinguished between them. I hold that moal excellence consists in character and is not a state of mind, but only a result of a state of mind. Since the ultimate good must consist in a state of mind, and since the moral character of a being is not a state of mind, but the result of moral action, moral excellence can not be an ultimate good. I think it is plain that this writer regards virtue, which he confounds with moral exellence, as an ultimate good. To this I have two objections:

1. That it is impossible, as has been shown, that virtue should be chosen as an ultimate end; and,

2. That virtue is an ultimate good and is so regarded by moral agents, is not and can not be a first truth of reason.

1. Virtue can not be chosen as an ultimate end. Virtue in so far forth as acts of will are concerned, it is admitted, is either identical with, or is a quality of ultimate choice. It either consists in that choice which the law requires or is a quality of it. It is either identical with obedience to law or is a quality of obedience. Now it is ridiculous to say that the required choice is identical with the end chosen. The law requires the choice of an ultimate end. Can this end be identical with the choice of it? The choice and the end chosen identical! This is nonsense. But suppose virtue be regarded, not as identical with choice, but as the moral attribute or quality of ultimate choice. But the virtue of choice depends upon the end chosen—can that end be the quality of

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the choice itself? The choice terminating on a quality of itself, which quality depends upon and owes its existence to the nature of the end chosen. But this end is the quality which has no existence until the end is chosen. Who does not see that ultimate choice must terminate on some valuable end out of itself, which end gives character to the choice.

But can we not choose the virtue of another being as an ultimate end. No, for his virtue is either identical with his choice of an ultimate end or is a quality of that choice. If identical with it, to choose his virtue as an ultimate end, were to choose his choice as an ultimate end instead of choosing the end that he ought to choose. If virtue consists in choosing the virtue of other beings as an ultimate end, it amounts to this: If virtue be identical with choice, I must will that another should will that another should will, and so on *ad infinitum*, without any end willed in any case except the willing of another. All willing in an everlasting circle.

If virtue be regarded merely as a quality of choice, then I am to will the quality of another's choice, of the quality of another's choice of the quality of another's choice, and so on forever. But this quality depends upon the end chosen. Unless the choice terminate on an intrinsically valuable end or on the right end, the choice is not virtuous. But in the case supposed the end is nothing but the quality of another's choice, and this quality of the other's choice depends upon the end he chooses. But he chooses only the quality of an other's choice and so on to infinity. This is is ridiculous enough. But there is no escaping this absurdity, if virtue is to be regarded as an ultimate good to be chosen for its own sake. It is plain that virtue can not be an object of ultimate choice, and therefore can not be an ultimate good and a foundation of moral obligation. The ultimate good must consist in a state of mind. All states of mind are voluntary or involuntary. A voluntary state we have just seen can not be chosen as an ultimate end. The ultimate good then must be an involuntary state of mind. But no involuntary state of mind can be an ultimate good but enjoyment. This every body knows to be an ultimate good. After this all are seeking either selfishly or benevolently. This is the *ultimate*, the end at which all moral agents aim. The selfish aim at their own personal enjoyment, that is, they seek enjoyment selfishly. Benevolent beings aim at promoting the highest ultimate enjoyment of all or of as many as possible.

2. I deny that it is a first truth of reason that virtue is an ultimate good. This has not the characteristic of a first truth.

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A first truth is necessarily and universally known and practically assumed by all men, whether they admit or deny it in theory. But all men do not assume that virtue is an ultimate good. We have seen that it can not be chosen as an ultimate end, and of course it can not be a first truth of reason that it is an ultimate good. All moral agents do regard virtue as a good and as a great good, but not as an ultimate good. It is a good of infinite value, but it is only a *relative* good. It is the condition of the infinite blessedness of God and therefore infinitely valuable. It is the condition of blessedness in all moral agents, and therefore as really valuable as their blessedness; but it is not an ultimate good. Its value is relative and not ultimate. Hence ultimate good is that blessedness in which virtue naturally and governmentally results. Moral agents from the laws of their being can not but approve of virtue. Holy beings *delight* in it for its own sake. It is morally beautiful and lovely and the contemplation of it gives a sweet satisfaction and pleasure to the mind of a holy being. Hence we say we love it for its own sake, and so we do if by love we mean *delight*. But to delight in a thing for its own sake is not the same as choosing it for its own sake. *Delight* is not *choice*. Virtue is *delighted in* for its own sake but we have seen that it can not be chosen for its own sake. We are apt to call that a good in itself which we are conscious of delighting in, without considering that *the delight* is really the *ultimate* good and not that which gives delight. I contemplate physical or moral beauty, I experience a sweet enjoyment in the contemplation. Now I may call the beauty which I enjoy a good *per se*, but I talk loosely. It is not the beauty but the enjoyment that is the good *per se;* beauty is only a relative and not the ultimate good. This is the fact with virtue. It is morally and exquisitely beautiful. God and all holy beings enjoy the exercise and the contemplation of it. Men are wont to confound the cause of the enjoyment with the enjoyment itself and to speak of holiness or virtue as a good in itself. But suppose that moral agents had no pleasure at all in it; Suppose it was not to them a beautiful object; Suppose that its contemplation did not excite the least feeling, desire or emotion of any kind; Suppose it were contemplated as a pure act of will or as a moral quality of a choice, and that we were so constituted as to experience not the least pleasure in the contemplation, or that it did not satisfy any demand of our being. Could it be regarded as a good in itself, or as a good in the sense of

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valuable at all? But if it were not regarded either as relatively or intrinsically valuable we could not affirm obligation to choose it at all. We know nothing as valuable except upon condition of its relation to the sensibility. But for this faculty the idea of the valuable could not exist. All moral agents regard obedience to moral laws as the condition of moral blessedness, and since they regard blessedness as a good in itself, they affirm their obligation to fulfil the necessary conditions of their own blessedness, and to will the blessedness of all other moral agents, and that they should be virtuous, or do right, as the condition of their blessedness. Were it not for the relation that virtue is seen to sustain to happiness in general, no moral agent would conceive of it as valuable.

Virtue is obedience to moral law. Now, do but consider how ridiculous it is to assert that obedience is itself the ultimate good or end contemplated by the law? Does the law aim not at the results of obedience as an end, but at obedience itself as an ultimate end? Do moral agents, can they possibly, regard obedience itself as the ultimate good? Obedience consists in choice or willing, and does the law contemplate mere choice or a quality of choice, as an ultimate end? The ultimate good is that blessedness promised as the reward of obedience to law. So all moral agents must regard it, and so they must affirm, when they know what they say, and whereof they affirm. Obedience to law, the ultimate good, instead of that which is the end or object of obedience? The assertion is ridiculous. Obedience is not and cannot be regarded as of any value at all were it not for its relation to the end or object to be secured by it. Law is of no value except as it is related to the end proposed to be secured by it. So it is with obligation and with obedience. Obedience to moral law is morally beautiful, that is, we so regard it by a law of our being just as we regard a rose as naturally beautiful. We have pleasure in both, but the pleasure and not the beauty is the ultimate good. The beauty is a good to us, but it is only a relative good, that is, the beauty is the cause of the enjoyment and is valuable for that reason.

Observe I am not contending that our own personal enjoyment is the end at which we ought supremely to aim. The precept of the law requires me to choose as an ultimate end the highest enjoyment of being in general, and the sanction promises that obedience shall secure my own enjoyment and the highest amount of enjoyment in others which can result

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from my efforts. It is not partial good will or self enjoyment of which I am speaking as the requirement of the law, nor partial enjoyment which is its end. It requires the choice of universal good and aims as far as possible to secure it.

But in support of the affirmation that virtue is a good in itself it may be said that God requires virtue. Now does he require it as an end or as a means? If as an end this proves that he regards it as an ultimate good, if as a means then this is the doctrine that utility is the foundation of moral obligation, which my work denies. To this I answer as in substance, I have before done,

1. That virtue consists in obedience to moral law, and it is nonsense to make obedience to moral law an end. The law requires the choice of an end. Can choice be the end chosen? Virtue strictly speaking is an attribute of choice, can a quality of the choice be the end chosen? But the quality of the choice depends altogether upon the nature of the end chosen, the quality does not exist and can not therefore be known or conceived of until it is settled in regard to the end upon which the choice terminates or is to terminate. If this end is valuable in itself the quality of the choice is virtue; if the end be not a good *per se*, the choice has no virtue. Now how absurd and nonsensical it is to say that the quality or virtue of the choice is the end chosen when the quality does not exist except upon condition that something besides itself is chosen as the ultimate end.

2. It is absurd to talk of requiring *any thing* whatever as an ultimate end. What, require an ultimate end instead of requiring the choice of that end! All requirement respects *doing* or *choosing*, but doing or choosing can not be an ultimate end. All law or commandment respects so far at least as acts of will are concerned, *action in reference to some end.* Requirement in respect to acts of will at least, must of necessity respect the choice of an end or the choice of means to secure an end and virtue must be a quality of this required choice. To say that the choice of the end is required not for the sake of the end but for the sake of the quality of the choice is to over look the fact that it is the value of the end alone that gives quality to the choice. It were strange indeed if the quality of choice which owes its existence to the value of the end were of greater intrinsic value than the end itself, and it is absurd to say that the quality of the choice is the ultimate end instead of the end whose value gives the quality

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to the choice. But let us come back to the thought that it is an absurdity to say, that which is required, the action, choice, should be an ultimate end. Law, I say again, proposes an end and requires *action in reference to that end.* The thing required is *not the end* but action in reference to that end. Nor can the end be the quality of this required choice or action.

If it be asked why God or reason demands the choice of the intrinsically valuable for its own sake, the answer is, God and reason demand the choice for the sake of the intrinsic value of the end. It is right *per se* to choose the valuable for its own sake. Virtue is a quality of this choice. That is, the choice of the valuable for its own sake is a right choice. God requires the choice because right demands it, or, which is the same thing, because the end demands it. The law of right or of moral order demands it. But is not this making the rightness of the choice the foundation of the obligation instead of the good? No, I reply. The rightness of the choice is a *condition* of the obligation but not the *foundation* of it. It is the *good* that is to be chosen as an ultimate end, and not the *right* or virtue of the choice, the goodness or value of the end makes the choice right, but the rightness of the choice does not affect the value of the end. Choice of which virtue is an attribute is not demanded as an end, for it can not be an end. Ultimate choice is not demanded as a condition or means. It is demanded by the law of reason and of God as a thing *right* in itself, but not as a thing *valuable* in itself. Choice respects ends or means—Law requires the choice of an end with the conditions and means. It requires the choice of the end for its intrinsic value, and of means upon condition of the perceived tendency to secure the end, but the *ground* of the obligation to choose the means is the value of the end. Moral law then does not require the choice of which virtue is an attribute as an end. Nor does it require it as a means, but it requires this choice because of the value of the end, and upon condition that it is right *per se.* But if the law requires this choice upon condition that it is right *per se,* are we not to *make* this choice *because* it is right *per se?* I answer, no. The thing is impossible and absurd, for this were to choose the right and not the good as an ultimate end. The thing required by the law is to choose the intrinsically valuable to being for its own sake or as an end: the law requires this upon the condition that this is right *per se.* But I am bound, not to will the *rightness* of the choice as an end or to will the valuable because it is *right* thus to will, but for the

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sake of the valuable. That is, it is the valuable and not the right which I am bound to will.

Unless I will the valuable for its own sake, the choice is not right, for it is not what the law demands. God requires the choice then of which virtue is a quality neither as an end nor as a means. The choice required must terminate on an end, but the choice is not required as an end. The choice will secure the use of means, but ultimate choice is not required as a means.

Law does not require ends and means, but the *choice* of ends and means. Choice therefore is never demanded as an end or as means, but choice is required because of the value of the end and upon condition that the choice of this end is right *per se*. The argument to which I am now replying assumes that whatever the moral law requires, it requires as an end or as a condition or means, whereas the truth is that the law requires not ends and means, but the *choice* of ends and means. The choice of the right end and of the appropriate conditions and means is virtuous. God requires the choice both of the end and the means for the sake of the value of the end, but upon condition that such choice is right *per se*. Right, therefore, is a condition of the requirement, but not the foundation of it, for were it not for the value of the end, I say again, it would not be right to choose it, and therefore God could not command us to choose it.

Now, reader, let us see where we are in our argument. Observe, we are now inquiring into the ultimate ground of obligation, or what is the ultimate good of being. I have asserted that enjoyment, blessedness, mental satisfaction, or happiness is the only ultimate good. My reviewer asserts that virtue is an ultimate good. Now what have we seen?

1. That the ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind.

2. That a voluntary state of mind or a choice or volition can not be an ultimate end, and therefore can not be an ultimate good.

3. That the ultimate good must consist in an involuntary state of mind and in that involuntary state in which all action conformed to law terminates.

4. That this involuntary state is mental satisfaction or happiness.

5. We have seen that voluntary action can not be the end aimed at by law or requirement, but that requirement must always contemplate an end, and require action or choice in reference to that end; that this end can not be the choice required nor a quality of this choice.

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6. We have also seen that the will of God can not be the ultimate good that is to be chosen for its own sake that objective right can not, that virtue can not.

7. That all men give the highest evidence of regarding enjoyment as an ultimate good.

8. But that they do not and can not understandingly affirm that virtue is an ultimate good.

9. That the very idea of regarding choice or a quality of choice as an ultimate good, is absurd and ridiculous. These things are indubitably established? Where then is the foundation upon which this reviewer rests his criticism? "It has vanished into thin air." He "has labored in vain and spent his strength for nought and in vain." We have seen that what he calls my two main positions or premises from which he admits that my conclusions logically follow, are established. Why then does he triumph and say New Schoolism is fallen? Such triumphing is short.

I have already said so much that I must close this reply with a few additional words in reference to some of his many (I would hope) unintentional misrepresentations, and perhaps a few sentences respecting some of the absurdities contained in his review. Some of these last are so gross and glaring and withal so heterodox that it is well for the reviewer that he does not live in Oberlin. If he did, the welkin would ring with the cry of heresy! heresy!! In respect to his misrepresentations I am willing to ascribe them to misapprehension and his misapprehensions to his loose habit of thinking on metaphysical and moral subjects, and to his want of rigid analysis in his theological investigations.

He says pages 272, 273:

"Mr. Finney's principles lead him to assert that there is no difference in their feelings between the renewed and the unrenewed, the sinner and the saint. 'The sensibility of the sinner,' he says, 'is susceptible of every kind and degree of feeling that is possible to saints.' p. 521. He accordingly goes on to show that sinners may desire sanctification, delight in the truth, abhor sin, have complacency in good men, entertain feelings of love and gratitude to God, and in short, be as to feeling and conduct, exactly what saints are. The only essential difference is in the will, in their ultimate purpose or intention. The sinner's ultimate intention may be to promote the glory of God, from a sense of duty, or from appreciation of the loveliness of moral excellence, and he be no better than a pirate; if his ultimate end is to promote happiness because happiness is intrinsically valuable, he is a saint."

This is a specimen of this writer's reading and criticism Here he represents me as holding the ridiculous absurdity that a sinner's *ultimate intention* may be to glorify God *from a sense of duty or from an appreciation of the loveliness of mor*

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al excellence; that is, his *ultimate choice* or intention may be to glorify God, and yet *this* is not chosen as an end for its own sake, but *from a sense of duty* or from an apprehension of the loveliness of moral excellence. He may choose the glory of God for its *own sake*, and yet not for its own sake, but from a sense of duty, &c. This is a ridiculous contradiction, and if this writer had understood the book he was reviewing, he would not have failed to see that I again and again expose the very absurdity which he here charges upon me. The thing I hold is not that the sinner's *ultimate end* may be the *glory of God* and he be as wicked as a pirate, but I say that his *ultimate end* may be *selfish* and yet he may aim to do his duty as a means of securing his own interest, or he may be selfish in aiming to promote the glory of God, &c. *Self* may be his *end*, and *duty* or *aiming* to *glorify God* a means. What a gross blunder for the reviewer to represent me as holding that the *ultimate intention* may be to glorify God, and yet the glory of God not be his *end*, but duty or something else be his end, or to represent me as holding that a man can be wicked at all when his *ultimate end* is to glorify God. But as I said, this is but a specimen of the misrepresentations of this reviewer. The book was regarded by him as so hard to read that he reviewed it without taking pains to understand it, or else he was unqualifiedly wicked in misrepresenting me. I prefer the former supposition. Further: what this writer here says will make a false impression in other respects. He says, I "assert that there is no difference in their feelings between the renewed and the unrenewed, the sinner and the saint." He then quotes from me that "the sensibility of the sinner is *susceptible* of every kind and degree of feeling that is possible to saints." But is this saying what he says I say, that there is no actual difference in their feelings? I said sinners are *capable* of feeling as saints do. Is this saying that they really do feel as saints do? I say what sinners *may* feel, that is, what they are susceptible of feeling. This leads him to say that I hold that there *is* no difference in their actual feelings. Is not this a misrepresentation of what I say? I will not accuse this writer of a design to misrepresent, but this, I am sorry to say, looks like an appeal to prejudice.

Again 267:

"Mr. Finney's system will not allow him to attach any other meaning to love than 'good will,' that is, willing good or happiness to any one. Love of God therefore can, according to his doctrine, be nothing, more than willing his happiness; and this obligation is entirely independent of his moral excellence. He admits that his moral goodness is the *condition* of our willing his actual hap-

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piness, but it is not the ground of our obligation to love him, or to will his good. As far as our *feelings* are concerned, there ought to be no difference between God and Satan—we are bound to will the happiness of each according to its intrinsic value."

Here he complains of me for holding that the *ground* of our obligation to will the good of God as an ultimate end is not his moral excellence. *He* then holds that we ought to will the good or well being of God as an ultimate end, *not for its own sake* or value *to him*, but for his moral excellence. This is again a ridiculous contradiction, that the *foundation* of the obligation is *not* the *value of God's happiness* to him but because He is virtuous. But suppose God were not virtuous, should we be under no obligation to will his good? Are we to will the good of God and of all beings *for its own value* or because they are virtuous? I hold that the *intrinsic value* of their well-being is the *ground* of the obligation to will it as a possible good, and their virtue is a *condition* of the obligation to will their present actual blessedness. But *he* holds that we ought to will good to God, not for the sake of its own value to him, but for the sake of his moral excellence. But this is to will his moral excellence as the ultimate end and not the well-being of God. I will the highest blessedness of God for its own value to him, but I will his actual and perfect blessedness as a concrete reality upon *condition* of his moral excellence. But do not overlook the contradiction involved in what he holds, to wit, that we ought to will good to God for it own sake or as an ultimate end, yet not as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, but for or on account of the Divine excellence. The utter looseness of this writer's thoughts upon questions of this kind has led him into many truly ridiculous blunders in this review.

But here again he entirely misrepresents me. I say that we are bound to will the good of every being according to its relative value so far as we understand it; that Satan's character and governmental relations are such that we are not at liberty to do him good or to express our benevolence toward him, but as his well-being is really valuable, we ought to be benevolent toward him or to will his good. And is not this true? Have we a right to be otherwise than benevolent towards any being? In the passage just quoted the writer represents me as holding that as far as our *feelings* are concerned there ought to be no difference between God and Satan. I said we ought to *will the good* of each according to its perceived relative value, but he represents me as holding that we ought to *feel* alike toward God and Satan. Such con-

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fusion is common in the thoughts and language of this writer. He has here represented me as holding the very opposite of what I do hold in the work under review. It is impossible for us to *feel* alike toward God and Satan, nor have we any reason to do so. We can not but have *feelings* of abhorrence toward Satan. These feelings correspond with his infernal character; while at the same time we ought to have, because if our will is right we shall have feelings of complacency in God. Thus in this case again this writer by his loose way of thinking and writing totally misrepresents me. Is it the same thing to *feel* and to *will?* I said we ought to will the good of Satan or to be really benevolent to him. God is benevolent and loves his enemies, and we ought to love ours or will their good. But from this, this writer represents me as holding that we ought to *feel* alike toward them; and to render the sentiment ridiculous, which it truly is, he italicised *feelings*. But the instances of misapprehension and of consequent misrepresentation are too numerous to be noticed. I could not believe this writer honest in all these misrepresentations were it not that every part of his review affords so high evidence of his loose way of thinking and writing upon metaphysical subjects. But I have followed him far enough. He endorses my conclusions provided my premises are sound. But I must not omit the notice of this writer's idea of true religion. On pp. 256 and 257 he says:

"On this doctrine we remark, 1. That it is readily admitted that happiness is a good. 2. That it is consequently obligatory on all moral agents to endeavor to promote it. 3. That the highest happiness of the universe, being an unspeakably exalted and important end, to make its attainment the object of life is a noble principle of action. 4. Consequently this theory of moral obligation is inconceivably more elevated than that which makes self-love the ultimate principle of action, and our own happiness the highest object of pursuit. 5. That the error of the theory is making enjoyment the highest and the only intrinsic or real good. 6. That this error derives no countenance from the fact that the Bible represents love to God and love to our neighbor as the fulfilling of the law. To derive any argument from this source Mr. Finney must first take the truth of his theory for granted. To prove that all love is benevolence, it must be assumed that happiness is the only good. If love is vastly more than benevolence, if a disposition to promote happiness is only one and that one of the lowest forms of that comprehensive excellence which the Scriptures call love, his argument is worth nothing. In accordance with that meaning of the term, which universal usage has given it, any out-going of the soul, whether under the form of desire, affection, complacency, reverence, delight towards an appropriate object, is in the Bible called love. To squeeze all this down, and wire-draw it through one pin hole, is as impossible as to change the nature of the human soul. Every man, not a slave to some barren theory of the understanding, knows that love to God is not benevolence; that it is approbation, complacency, delight in his moral excellence, reverence, gratitude, devotion. The reason then why the Scriptures represent love as the fulfilling of the law, is twofold. First, because love to an infinitely perfect Being, involves in it appro-

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being of all conceivable forms of moral excellence, and consequent complacicity of soul with it under all those forms. He who really loves a God of truth, justice, purity, mercy and benevolence, is himself truthful, just, holy, merciful and kind. Secondly, because love to God and man will secure all obedience to the precepts of the law. We may admit therefore that love is the fulfilling of the law, without being sophisticated into believing or rather saying, that faith is love, justice is love, patience love, humility love."

Upon this paragraph I remark:

1. That this writer's views of what constitutes virtue or true religion are utterly defective. I trust that, as we say, his heart is upon this subject better than his head. He freely admits that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest happiness and well-being of God and of the universe, and that benevolence is true virtue.

2. He regards benevolence, as has been said, as possessing no attributes, but as consisting in the simple choice of the happiness of God and of being as an ultimate end without taking into view the essential attributes of benevolence. He talks of squeezing down and wire-drawing all virtue through a pin-hole, &c. He then regards the representation that benevolence is the love required by the law of God, and that it is, when properly defined, the whole of virtue, as squeezing down and wire-drawing virtue through a pin-hole! I had said in the work before him, (See Systematic Theology, pp. 211, 212, 213.)

"Of this truth we shall be constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall find illustrations of it at every step of our progress. Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is important to remark that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that comprehensively expresses them all. *God is love.* This term expresses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love, as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe as an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it be, we are apt to receive very inadequate conceptions of what really belongs *to* as implied in benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true religion; that the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one word, *love*—these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as to need with all minds much amplification and explanation. The fact is, that many things are implied in love or benevolence. By this is intended that benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects and in various relations, and its dispositions or willings considered in the various relations in which it is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. Now if we suppose that this is all that is implied in benevolence, we shall egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the means by which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of its end, and in its efforts to realize it. *Wisdom, justice,* mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as we shall see, are essential elements or constituents of benevolence. To understand what true benevolence is, we must inquire into these attributes. Not every thing that is called love, has

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at all the nature of benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural affection is called love. The affection that exists between the sexes is also called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. Hence we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, &c. Benevolence is also called love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required by the law of God. But there is more than one state of mind that is called benevolence. There is a constitutional or phrenological benevolence, which is often mistaken for and confounded with the benevolence which constitutes virtue. This so called benevolence is in truth only an imposing form of selfishness: nevertheless it is called benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken in giving religious instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of the reason. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to gratify self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to gratify the desires and propensities for the pleasure of the gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end and as the supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of being. Phrenological or constitutional benevolence is only obedience to the impulse of the sensibility—a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.

It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the Divine law and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in his works, providence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us. Also the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much as we proceed in our inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly affirms that love comprehends the whole character of God—that it is the whole that the law requires of man—that the end of the commandment is charity or love—we may be assured that every form of true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence, that is, in its last analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects, or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence. This is true of God's moral attributes. They are, as has been said, only attributes of benevolence. They are only benevolence viewed in certain relations and aspects. All his virtues are only so many attributes of benevolence. This is and must be true of every holy being."

I then proceed to point out and define strictly thirty-two of the moral attributes of benevolence as specimens and illustrations of the varieties or modifications under which benevolence develops and manifests itself. Could I here quote entire what I have written upon this subject, in the work before him, perhaps the reader might wonder, as I have done, how an honest and a christian man could represent me as squeezing down and wire-drawing through a pin-hole the love required by the law of God. But I can not in a reply make the quotation, as it occupies sixty-four pages of the work reviewed. The object of writing so fully on the attributes of benevolence was as the above extract shows to prevent the very in-

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ference or mistake into which this writer has fallen. But this is only a painful specimen of his strange misapprehensions and misrepresentations of the work reviewed. I had shown that every form of virtue was resolvable in the last analysis into a modification of benevolence. But he represents me as squeezing down and wire-drawing through a pin-hole the love required by the law of God, instead of saying as he was bound to do that I amplified the meaning of the word, and understood it as being comprehensive of all those modifications of virtue of which we have been accustomed to hear and speak. Let any one read what I have written upon the attributes of benevolence and the pronounce judgment upon this reviewer's representations. But as I said, what he has here done is only a specimen of the manner in which he blundered through or rather over the work he was reviewing. But I make all due allowance for his Old School eyes and prejudices, and would exercise all charity towards him.

3. In this paragraph he represents benevolence as one of the lowest forms of virtue. He says p. 257:

"To prove that all love is benevolence, it must be assumed that happiness is the only good. If love is vastly more than benevolence, if a disposition to promote happiness is only one, and that one of the lowest forms of that comprehensive excellence which the scriptures call love, his argument is worth nothing. In accordance with that meaning of the term, which universal usage has given it, any out-going of the soul, whether under the form of desire, affection, complacency, reverence, delight towards an appropriate object, is in the Bible called love. To squeeze all this down, and wire-draw it through one pin hole, is as impossible as to change the nature of the human soul. Every man, not a slave to some barren theory of the understanding, knows that love to God is not benevolence; that it is approbation, complacency, delight in his moral excellence, reverence, gratitude, devotion. The reason then why the scriptures represent love as the fulfilling of the law, is two fold. First, because love to an infinitely perfect Being, involves in it approbation of all conceivable forms of moral excellence, and consequent congeniality of soul with it under those forms. He who really loves a God of truth, justice, purity, mercy benevolence, is himself truthful, just, holy, merciful and kind. Secondly, because love to God and man will secure all obedience to the precepts of the law."

God's love to us must be benevolence, and his love to the universe must be benevolence. Complacency in holiness, I have shown, may consist either in an emotion of delight in it or in a modification of benevolence or good will. God loves all beings with good will, and towards holy beings he exercises complacency both in the form of benevolence and in the form of an emotion of delight in them. But it seems that this writer considers *approbation* as a higher form of virtue than benevolence. But what is *approbation?* Why it is a necessary state of the intellect in view of moral excellence. No moral agent can otherwise than approve of virtue or of mor-

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al excellence. This is as true of the worst as of the best of men. Who does not know that from a law of the intellect a moral agent whether holy or sinful must and does of necessity approve of moral excellence. But this it seems we are to regard as a higher form of virtue than that which we approbate in God. God is benevolent, and we are, from the laws of our being, necessitated to approve of it, but in this involuntary state we are more virtuous or exercise a higher order of virtue than the benevolence which we behold in God and approve.

Now I affirm that there is nothing of the nature of virtue in the approbation of moral excellence, and that this approbation is common to saints and sinners and doubtless to devil and holy angels. What sinner on earth or in hell is not conscious of approving the moral excellency of God? But he makes *delight* in moral excellence another form of virtue of a higher order than benevolence. *Delight*, as he uses, it is not a modification of good will, but an involuntary state of mind. So it seems that delight in God's moral excellence or which is the same thing, in his benevolence, is more virtuous than the benevolence in which we delight. But this state of the sensibility I have shown may exist in the mind of a sinner as well as in a saint, and I believe that many sinners can attest that they are conscious at times of this delight. They give themselves credit for it as something really good, and it seems that at Princeton they grant to such sinners, not only all that they claim of virtue in this exercise, but infinitely more. They make the delight a higher form of virtue than benevolence. So the sinner who plays the miser and hoards up his millions, may quiet himself, and by approving and delighting in the benevolence of God, may be even more virtuous than God is. This is worse than Jesuitism.

Again. He represents *reverence*, *gratitude*, and *devotion* as higher forms of virtue than benevolence. I had shown that these were attributes of benevolence, but he regards them manifestly as involuntary emotions. Reverence for God for or on account of his benevolence—gratitude to God for his love or benevolence—devotion to God for his benevolence higher forms of virtue than the benevolence which we adore! Amazing! What will the church and the world say when they are told that at Princeton they hold such views of the nature of true religion? What, good will to God and to being in general, that efficient principle that is the foundation and the source of all doing good one of the lowest forms of

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virtue! Tell it not in Gath. I could enlarge indefinitely on the absurd and most false and ruinous views of this writer as it respects the nature of true religion. With his views, I do not wonder that he says on page 276:

"Mr. Finney is well aware that his doctrine changes the whole nature of religion; and hence his frequent denunciations of the false philosophy and pretended orthodoxy, by which religion has been perverted and the church corrupted. And certain it is that religion, as represented by him, is something exceedingly different from what good people in all ages have commonly regarded it. We should have to provide a new language, new hymns, new prayers, and especially a new Bible."

I freely admit that this writer and myself have exceedingly diverse views of the nature of true religion. If, as he says, the involuntary states of the intellect and the sensibility are more virtuous than the benevolence in which I hold that all virtue strictly consists, I am utterly mistaken. And if on the other hand, supreme, disinterested good will to God and man including all its attributes and developments is virtue and strictly speaking the whole of virtue, then this writer is wholly in fault and has not the true ideal of the christian religion before him when he writes.

Again, this writer repeatedly insinuates that I confound God with the universe and make good will to the universe instead of love to God the great thing in religion. This representation is as false as possible, as every one who reads the book reviewed will see. I hold indeed that love to God considered as a virtue consists in good will, that love to God as an emotion always exists where good will exists, but that virtuous love is a voluntary exercise, that God's well-being and interests are of infinitely greater value than those of all the universe besides and of course that love to him should always be supreme.

It is amazing to me that this writer could have so misunderstood and misrepresented me as he has in many of these things.

There are a number of other things contained in the review before us that I should like to examine, and may do so, the Lord willing, at another time. But the present article has already become too long for our paper. It might be amusing enough to turn the *reductio ad absurdum* upon this writer himself. He has asserted many strange and absurd things included in this review. But for the present at least I must close.

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ARTICLE, LIII.

Simplicity of Moral Action. No. 3.

By Rev. Wm. Cochran.

Seen in the light of Westminster theology, a moral action bears a strong resemblance, in many respects, to the apparition which youthful imagination evokes from the charnel house and dimly discerns through the waving branches of a weeping-willow, as from time to time the moon looks forth from passing clouds. Its outline like that of the apparition is both ill defined and fluctuating; and like that of the apparition its essence is compounded of a large proportion of fantasy and a little reality, thereby almost wholly transmuted from its proper nature. A moment's reflection, convinced us that, between the adherents of that theology and ourselves, no fair issue could be made on the great question which we had undertaken to discuss, until a previous investigation had clearly exhibited how much of this formidable spectre is fancy and moonshine, and had moulded the residuum into a shape,

"Distinguishable, in member joint and limb."

As the readiest and most inoffensive method of accomplishing this delicate task, we attempted to draw a plain line of demarkation between those phenomena in the human mind which are really and in themselves praise or blameworthy and all others by which they are conditionated, accompanied, and followed. This task has been executed in vain or to comparatively little purpose, if the result of our discussion shall not be faithfully applied to our future inquiries: and if the reader is not so well acquainted with them as to be able to judge whether they be faithfully applied or not. This can hardly be hoped in all cases, after the unusual length of time which has disjoined our last from the present article. We deem it expedient therefore before proceeding farther to refresh his memory by a slight retrospect of the ground we have already gone over.

An examination of the writings of our opponents in this controversy, did not allow us to hope that we should encoun-

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ter no opposition in assuming our own definition of a moral action as our point of departure. We found, however, that they in common with all mankind, admit and every where assume the truth of the following propositions:

1. A moral action is one of which it can rationally be said that it ought, or ought not to be done.

2. It is an action which, without a contradiction, may be called right or wrong.

3. It is an action for which the agent is praise or blameworthy, and therefore justly deserving of reward or exposed to punishment.

From these admitted principles we deduced this grand inference: *A moral action cannot be a necessary action.* An action is necessary, when the agent at the time of its performance, and in the same circumstances which then environed him, could not have done otherwise. Or thus: "When the external influences, whether they be motives or physical forces which become the occasion of any action, so determine both its existence and all its qualities, that there is an impossibility of its not being, or being at all different from what it is, this action, when referred to the power on which these influences operate, is called a necessary action." We legitimated our inference by showng that a necessary action, as just defined, can neither be rationally required or prohibited, and therefore, that it can not without absurdity be called either right or wrong, or be supposed to render the agent either justly deserving of reward or liable to punishment.

Examining our outward actions, and the various phenomena of our intelligence and sensibility, we found them all to be subject to the law of absolute necessity; and by the preceding inference we excluded them wholly from the pale of morality.

It hence followed that responsibility can attach to the actions of the will alone. But a further investigation evinced, that our responsibilities are less extensive than even this narrow circle. Original acts of attention, and many other phenomena referable to the will, because spontaneous and unreflective, are not free. All executive volitions and dependent choices, through which ultimate intentions manifest themselves and seek to compass their objects are the necessary consequences of those intentions: hence they are no more really free than the unreflective acts of the will, or thought, feeling, or outward action. An *ultimate* intention, therefore, is the only phenomenon which is either absolutely free or real-

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ly responsible. This, then, is the definition to which our investigations at length conducted us:—*A moral action is the choice of an ultimate end:* Or, making intention synonymous with choice, and borrowing an adjective from its object: *A moral action is an ultimate intention.* We need not remark how strongly this definition contrasts with that which consistency would require, where blame-worthiness is predicated of the ontological existence as well as the active motions of a "corruption of nature" supposed to be derived from Adam by ordinary generation—of inborn constitutional tendencies, desires and aversions as well as voluntary acts of transgression—a real phantom, hideous and unformed, that rising from the ashes of the dead and lurking about holy places, holds a usurped empire over the credulity of mankind by the terror it inspires and the solemn guise it wears.

Three inquiries now present themselves. When is an intention right? and when is it wrong? By what test shall its character be exactly determined? To these inquiries we reply in general: an intention is *right*, when it terminates upon an object which the moral law requires us to choose; It is *wrong*, when it terminates upon a different object. Its character is in all cases determined by its object. But what does the moral law require us to choose? what is its most simple and exact enunciation? To this inquiry, ethical writers and theologians have given many apparently, and doubtless, some really different answers. Some for example, maintain that an intention must, of necessity, go out beyond the law and abstract idea of *Right*, *Order*, or *Fitness*, into the world of concrete existences actual and possible to find an object on which to terminate; that the only object which reason there discovers fit to be chosen as an ultimate end is that which is *good* or *valuable in itself* to God and his sentient universe; that nothing but *happiness*—meaning by that term, all those various enjoyments which constitute the well-being of the several orders of rational and sentient existences—is *in itself*, really good or valuable; and consequently, that nothing but the happiness of the universe can be the ultimate object which the law at all times requires us to choose. Its whole meaning, therefore, according to these philosophers, will be included in this simple *imperative*: *Will at all times, as an ultimate end, the happiness of the sentient universe, so far forth as its actual and possible existence is known to you.*

Others, admitting that happiness is *a good*, and perhaps, that it is a good *per se*, nevertheless maintain that it is not the only

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thing which is good *per se*. They hold for example, that *veracity, gratitude*, humility, meekness, and the like, are every where valued and admired by the human mind, *for their intrinsic worth and excellency* without any reference whatever to their consequences. Hence if the human mind is not deceived in its spontaneous convictions they are not mere *means* subordinate to some ulterior end, but *ends per se*. According to this view the ultimate object of a right intention may be complex—consisting of several *co-ordinate ends*, such as happiness, virtue and its various modifications, to say nothing of moral praise-worthiness and other things which charm the reason by their own inherent lustre and not by any borrowed attractions. An enunciation of the law corresponding with this view would stand thus: *Will at all times as an ultimate end the complex of all things which in your judgment are good in themselves.*

Others, still, seem to exclude happiness entirely from the ultimate end of a right intention, and without telling us distinctly what they mean by the term *right*, whether an abstraction or a concretion, a subjective idea or an objective law, content themselves by simply saying that "*to will the right for the sake of the right* is the whole duty of man."

Jouffroy distinctly avows that *moral order* is the only *bonum in se*, of which, he contends that happiness is but the consequence, or, to use his own language, "the feeling." The all-embracing requisition of the law according to this writer would be: "*Will moral order, at all times for the sake of moral order.*"

According to Kant, the law urges its claims upon us anterior to all experience or any relationship with objects of space and time and consequently before we have any knowledge of actually existing objects of choice; and all these requirements are included in this brief categorical imperative: "*Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal.*"

This list of enunciations might be greatly extended. But it is already sufficiently long to answer our present purpose. There are two things which must have struck the reader in perusing it.

1. All these enunciations are based upon the assumption that there is one and only one end which the moral law requires all moral agents to choose. Each of them professes to be a correct exhibition of that one end. According to the first, it is happiness, and nothing else; according to the third it is right, and nothing else; according to the fourth it is moral order, and nothing else; according to the fifth it is a

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maxim fit for law universal, and nothing else; and according to the second it is happiness and many things besides. All this is inexplicable, except upon the supposition that, in the estimation of their respective authors, the ultimate object which we are required to will, is of necessity the same for all rational beings. For if they suppose that there may be many different ends required of different individuals, or of the same individual at different times, the attempt to show that there is but one end—one universal and the only valid ground of moral obligation is perfectly absurd and even highly ridiculous.

2. They nevertheless greatly differ from each other in regard to what that end is. One asserts that it is nothing but happiness; another that it is nothing but right; another that it is nothing but moral order; another that it is nothing but a maxim fit for law universal; and still another that it is all these ends combined, or at least happiness and many things else. Now it needs not an oracle to tell us that if one be right the rest are wrong. The very existence of mutually exclusive, or even dissimilar theories where, in the nature of things, only one true theory is possible, is absolute demonstration of the total or partial falsehood of all of them save one; and till this one is ascertained, just suspicion is cast upon the pretensions of all. Like aspirants to a vacant throne, each of these theories lays claim to absolute and exclusive sovereignty; they all have their supporters apparently equally wise and equally good; and notwithstanding their numerous conflicts none of them has acknowledged itself defeated or abjured its right to reign, and the conflict still rages in all its fury. Under these circumstances a prudent on-looker will not be hasty in declaring himself for either theory, for he is as yet ignorant of the legality of its title. He may even suspect that a more profound investigation will at length compel them all to give place to a more fortunate aspirant, or by dropping their claims so far as they are exclusive and antagonistic, to negotiate a peace which shall entitle them all to equal participation in the prerogatives of sovereignty. At all events, be this as it may, no one can escape the conclusion that either the assumption of these philosophers is false, or that most, if not all of these theories are false: since they are nothing but a tissue of dissimilarities, and palpable contradictions; and the question cannot but arise, where is the falsehood found? a question of most vital importance in this discussion and the hinge on which turns the very possibility of ethical science. Preliminary to a correct answer to this question, we lay down this disjunctive

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proposition: *the end which we are required to will as ultimate—the ground of moral obligation—is either necessarily the same for all moral agents or it is not.* This disjunction includes every possible supposition that can be made touching this matter, and one of its members therefore, must be the exact truth. We shall attempt to demonstrate that the first is that member.

1. In the first place, if the end which we are required to choose is not necessarily the same for all moral agents, no *science* of moral obligation is possible. For on this supposition we can never say of any end whatever that it *must be* the end which all are required to will, for the opposite can take place. We can not even say that it *is* the end which all are required to choose; for if it is not a matter of strict necessity that the end prescribed by the law is one and universal, it can never be entirely *certain* that it is one and universal. A universal certainty can be securely based upon nothing short of absolute necessity. However plain therefore it may seem to the author of the first theory, that happiness is the only ultimate good and ground of moral obligation, on the supposition before us, he can never be certain that others are not as strongly convinced that right is the only ultimate good, or moral order, or almost any thing else that can be named. And however plain it may seem to the authors of the second theory that happiness and other things combined with it constitute the ground of moral obligation, he can not be certain that the authors of the other theories do not see as clearly that the views which they have respectively expressed are true. The same remark in substance is applicable to the authors of every theory of obligation in existence. And thus it results that it is impossible to know that all these theorists have not exhibited truly in their respective enunciations of the law the identical end which it requires *them* to choose, and which constitutes the ground of their obligation. Rightarian and utilitarian, the disciples of Hobbes and of Cudworth—those who believe that happiness is the only ultimate good, and those who deny that it is an ultimate good at all—those who make a maxim the legal object, and those who frame an end out of the jarring elements of almost every theory—may all will in entire accordance with their theories, and obtain the approbation of conscience in doing so! Still further, it is not *impossible* that one may regard happiness as the only ultimate good, and another, misery; one what we now call right, and another what we call wrong;

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one what Kant would deem a maxim fit for law universal, and another the exact opposite. In these circumstances what can be more absurd than the attempt to show what is *the* ground of moral obligation—the end which the law requires all moral agents to will? We are in the dark and warring elements of a perfect chaos where order is a stranger and into which Reason, the mother of all science, has never introduced her changeless laws and perfect harmony.

2. If the end to be willed is not necessarily one and universal, the law itself is not one and universal. We have before shown that nothing can be law for a moral agent which is unknown to him; and that to say the law is not different in any case from what a moral agent knows it to be is the same thing as to say that it is not different from what it is. But a law can not be known until its meaning is known; and its meaning can not be known, until we know what it requires us to do and not do. Now there is no faculty whose acts or phenomena are subject to moral legislation but the will; hence when it is not known what *object* or end we are to will, its meaning is unknown. To say choose is to command nothing, it must be added what we are to choose before we have a law. Although therefore, the law may have a potential existence in the reason, and lie in readiness, as it were, to come forth into the world of consciousness as soon as some object or end of moral election presented to the mind shall demand its appearance, before that dread moment arrives, it is but a barren possibility without content or meaning; or rather it is a real nonentity. Before it can become a reality, the end which it requires us to will must be apprehended. And its whole meaning is both communicated and limited by the idea or conception of this end; and when this end has been willed, its whole requirements have been obeyed. As is the end so is the law. Consequently if the intelligence does not necessarily prescribe one and the same *end* for all moral agents it does not, and can not, necessarily prescribe one and the same *law*. If one may *really* regard happiness as the only ultimate good, and another right, another moral order, another a maxim fit for law universal, and another may make an end of all these combined; there must be as many different laws—one requiring the choice of happines alone, another of right alone, another of moral order alone, another of the aforementioned maxim alone, and another of all these combined. If it is not impossible that one man should regard happiness as the only ultimate good, and another misery;

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one what we mean by right, and another what we mean by wrong; one what we mean by moral excellence, and another *the* opposite; it is not impossible that there should be one moral law requiring the choice of happiness as an ultimate end, and another that of misery; one requiring the choice of right, and another that of wrong; one requiring the choice of moral excellence, and another that of its opposite. In a word, if it is possible that there should be diverse, dissimilar, and antithetical *ends*, it is possible that there should be diverse, dissimilar, and antithetical *laws;* the reverse is equally true, if it is impossible that there should be diverse, dissimilar, and antithetical *laws* it is impossible that there should be diverse, dissimilar, and antithetical *ends*.

3. Hence since different countries, cities, villages, and households may have each its own law and ground of obligation, it follows that what may be sin in England, may be holiness in the United States, and perfectly indifferent in France or Germany. What is perfectly right and good morality in London may be perfectly wrong and vicious in Paris, and neither one nor the other in New York. And since the same individual may fall under the control of as many distinct moral laws as he shall live years or days, he may change his notions of right and wrong, virtue and vice as often. What he wills as the right end to day, he may reject as a wrong one to morrow, and the third day find another end totally distinct from either, which he shall hold himself under obligation to choose.

4. Again, no finite agent can ever know whether he is willing the wisest and best end or not. Of the several ends already mentioned, it is certain that each one can not be the wisest and the best. Happiness and right are not both the wisest and the best ends, much less happiness and misery. Hence if it be possible to will each of these ends as a good *per se*, how is any one to know whether that one which he has chosen at any time is the wisest and best, or that it is not the worst possible? Moreover, if the wisest and best end be synonymous with the absolute good, no one can ever tell whether in a single instance he has chosen that which is absolutely good, or that he has not chosen an absolute evil. And, in selecting and applying means to realize his chosen end, he can never know whether the result of his labors, if successful would be a good or an evil; like a blind man seeking for a healing potion, he is just as likely to light upon a deadly poison as a renovating balsam.

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5. No man in selecting the end required by his intelligence can be sure that any other moral agents select the same, or that they ought to do so, for he can not know whether it is the best and wisest end or the worst possible; and hence he can never wisely will or pray that they may choose the same end; he can never be sure that this is the end which God wills, and so can never know whether his will is in harmony with that of the Deity, and whether in compassing this end he is not thwarting the Divine will.

6. Hence there is as much room for regret in relation to the ultimate choices strictly conformed to moral law as any other however wicked and unwise. I may find to morrow that I have to day set my heart upon the highest evil, and wish that the choice had never been made; and by how much the more perfectly adapted were the means I used to secure that end, by so much the more deeply must I regret their folly and evil tendency.

7. Since the terms right and wrong, virtue and vice, designate conformity to or transgression of the moral law, and since there may be many different and even antithical laws, it follows that these terms may convey very different and even opposite ideas to different minds; and no two moral agents can ever be sure that they exactly understand each other when discoursing on moral subjects. The signs which they use are the same; the things signified may be manifold and are just as likely to be opposite or dissimilar as to be identical.

Now all these consequences which necessarily flow from the contradictory of the position we have assumed, are at war with the spontaneous and invincible convictions of universal reason. No man ever dreamed that the end of right choice—the ground of moral obligation—prescribed by his own intelligence was in any respect different from that which is prescribed by the intelligence of his neighbor; or even suspected that any Reason throughout the whole moral universe could possibly prescribe any other. No man ever had the slightest suspicion that in choosing this end he was choosing any thing different from the end chosen by the heavenly inhabitants and all the holy of earth. All men know absolutely that whatever else changes, the moral law changes not. Immutable as the Deity, the same requirement which it made in their early childhood it still makes, and will continue to make till the end of time. Many would give the world if they could erase it from the imperishable tablets of their reason, or change it into another and milder form

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They strive to stifle its voice, they struggle against its authority but all in vain. In the language of Coleridge,

"It has no ear for my threats—it has no substance, that my hands can grasp, or my weapons find vulnerable—it commands and cannot be commanded—it acts and is insusceptible of my reaction—the more I strive to subdue it, the more I am compelled to think of it—and the more do I find it to possess a reality out of myself, and not to be a phantom of my own imagination: and yet that *for me* its power is the same with that of my own permanent Self, and that all the choice, which is permitted to me, consists in having it for my Guardian Angel or my avenging Fiend!"

But if the law is immutable, the end which it requires is in like manner immutable. For it is this end which gives it all its meaning. No man ever doubted that in choosing this end or in making what his conscience recognized as a right choice, he was choosing the wisest and best possible, the absolute and only ultimate good; no man ever doubted that when willing in accordance with HIS reason he was choosing the identical end which all rational agents ought to will, which all holy beings do will, and that in selecting and promoting this end his will is in strict harmony with that of the Deity. No man ever regretted the choice of this end or the use of means adapted to secure it. No man ever dreamed that in using the terms *right*, *wrong*, *guilt innocence* and the like, that all do not attach the very same ideas to them which he did himself. He never regarded them as signs or symbols which might represent many different and even opposite things, but infallibly conveying the same idea to all minds acquainted with the languages in which they are found. Either, therefore, the human intelligence is a universal lie or the hypothesis from which these consequences are deduced is not true; and the conclusion is inevitable that the end which the law requires us to will is of necessity one and the same for all moral beings.

We have not space in the present article to push these inquiries farther; or we might show that if the position we have assumed be not true, the Bible is false, since it every where assumes it; that infidelity in its most sensual, and grovelling, and unbelieving form is the only rational faith, since both the law and the end we are required to will are mere conventionalities floating upon the restless waves of incertitude, and changing their position both absolute and relative as often as cerebral conditions and casual circumstances of custom and climate undergo any alteration; conscience is a mere creature of education; and the words and the ideas of right and wrong, justice and injustice, merit and demerit, are robbed of all deep and

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solemn significancy and point no longer to an eternal, immutable and necessary distinction and opposition of things; that the orgin and existence of law, proclaiming itself to our intelligence as *universally* obligatory, are inexplicable, since, if it be not a necessary enactment of our reason, it must be a generalization, or induction from experience which can never attain such a stupendous height of knowledge as to say, "this *must be* the *end* for all moral beings;" that the very existence of moral destinctions is unaccountable, since if they are not the necessary products of reason carried forth into the world of experience, no act could be thought of as right or wrong, any more than a cause could be assumed for every event if the law of causality were not antecedently given in the reason; that moral government has no foundation to rest on, since its whole object and function is to secure the *willing* of absolute good, the wisest and best end, and by hypothesis no such end is known to finite agents or such as are to be governed; and that consequently religion is a dream, moral science a fable, man's moral nature an enigma and himself a fool.

The question may be asked here "why then are so many different theories of moral obligation recognized and defended by philosophers, if there can be but one ground of moral obligation?" A complete answer to this question would detain us too long, and draw us aside into a discussion which is not strictly connected with our present object and which we have determined to avoid. It may be expedient however to suggest in passing that a multiplicity of philosophical theories where but one true one is possible is not new or wonderful. Look for example, at the theories relating to the freedom of the will. Here all believe the same thing by absolute necessity and yet one tells us that the will is nothing but a pair of scales for determining the relative weight of motives; and an other tells us that its action is wholly self-originated and when no motives are found "*stat pro ratio volentas.*" That philosophers therefore hold different opinions on any point is no proof that there are difierent realities corresponding to those opinions, nay frequently their discussions prove that all their theories, save one, are false, for they turn upon the supposition that but one can be true and thus evince a spontaneous and necessary conviction of the human intelligence. And this is no less true of the different theories of moral obligation, than of such as relate to the determination of the will.

We now invite the readers attention to a few consequences which seem to us to flow from the position just established.

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1. Both the conception of the end which we are under obligation to choose and the law commanding this choice, though their development is occasioned by experience, are of purely *a priori* origin. They have all the characteristics of such ideas and conceptions. They are *necessary;* they are *immutable;* they are *universal.* Their origin is coeval with the dawn of reason: they are destined to share its immortality; they ask not our consent to appear upon the theatre of consciousness; and we may as soon expel or alter our ideas of space and time as induce them to depart or change a single feature. A necessary accompaniment of reason, all who participate that heavenly gift, possess them in equal clearness, and the only limits of their control are the boundaries of the moral world.

2. Hence the self-same object which the Deity wills, all his holy angels will, and all the fallen spirits know they ought to will; and in this respect neither the celestial nor the infernal world can boast any pre-eminence of knowledge over our feeble and fallen race. We know as absolutely as they what this end is and must be, (for in reason nothing short of absolute knowledge is possible,) and one of us knows it with as much certainty and absoluteness as another. Kant himself has no superiority here over the miserable unfortunate who stands upon the misty confines of idiocy. The infant in whom reason is just developed may in this respect think "it no robbery to be equal with God."

3. Hence in the self-same time that we choose this end, we do and must impliedly choose that all rational beings should will the same and use their utmost powers to secure its universal realization. Although, therefore, Kant may not have enunciated the moral law with entire correctness, it is nevertheless certain that whenever we choose this reason-given end, we are "acting from a maxim fit for law universal." We are choosing that end and the only end which the entire moral world must obligate themselves to choose. We shall therefore be allowed to use this enunciation as an axiom in our future discussions. An action is right whenever its end is such that all ought to choose it, or when its maxim is such that all ought to adopt it.

4. It is plain also that this end is a unity, not in the sense of a whole compounded of parts by addition, where the conception of parts precedes and makes up the conception of the whole—but either an absolute unity in which conception or distinction of parts is impossible, or a *totum* whose concep-

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tion precedes the conception of all parts and distinctions included in or falling under it, and such that no part can be withdrawn without the total destruction of the whole conception. Reason being an absolute unity, such must be the nature of all its conceptions. This will be another important axiom in our future discussions.

5. Before the first theory of moral obligation above mentioned can be fairly legitimated it must be shown that happiness or enjoyment is every where and necessarily recognized by the human intelligence as the only ultimate and absolute good; for till this necessity is demonstrated it can never be certain that right is not so regarded, or moral order, or all combined. The like may be said of the second and all the other theories we have mentioned. Has either of these theories been thus firmly established? Can either of them be? We shall not attempt to discuss these questions; nor shall we attempt to establish an independent theory of our own; for we think it unnecessary to our present purpose, having arrived at the knowledge of all the characteristics of this end which can at all affect our argument. We have found that it is given us in an idea or conception of the reason; that it is necessarily one and identical for all the universe; that it is an absolute and indissoluble unity; that all rational beings know it with equal certainty; and that whenever any one wills it he is acting from a maxim fit for law universal. Now if we should go on and prove that happiness or any thing else actually is this end, we cannot see that we would be in any better circumstances to establish the simplicity of moral actions than if we should represent it by A or any other arbitrary symbol. We shall therefore commend our remarks to the attention of these several theorists and recommit to them the question of the ground of moral obligation and proceed as if it were already known. And let it be remembered, if we shall at any time use language hereafter that seems to assume the truth of either of these theories, that such is not our purpose, and that we mean to rest the whole fate of our argument upon that which we have already proved.

In regard to the end which the law *prohibits*, few words will now be necessary. It is now almost universally agreed that it is nothing else than our own happiness dissevered from its connexion with, and proper subordination to the happiness of being in general. This position is professedly based upon experience, the teachings of inspiration, and a supposed impossibility of choosing any other end when we are law-

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less and disobedient. And hence it is asserted with confidence that where a right intention does not exist, whatever may be the apparent differences of their characters, all men are of necessity alike supremely devoted to their own gratification. The seeming liberality which distributes all its goods to feed the poor, kneels at the same shrine with the sordid avarice which recks not a famishing orphan's tears, and the heartless ambition which desolates a continent. The self-same object lulls the epicurian asleep upon the downy lap of sensual pleasure, and strengthens the suicidal arm to provide a way of escape from earthly sorrow, by the point of the dagger. All sin is selfishness. Kant maintains that it is the maxim of swerving occasionally from the law. And a few others contend that although self-gratification *is* doubtless the end of most wicked men, and perhaps of all, yet it is not *necessarily* so. For since the will is free, and therefore able to resist any array of motive how great soever it may be, and stem alike the current of conscience and passion, of duty and of interest, provided only it can find an object which neither the intelligence recommends, or the sensibility demands, it inevitably follows that we may will as an ultimate end not only our own supreme misery, but that of all the universe, since neither the reason commands nor the sensibility desires it.

Now whether it be possible to will universal misery or not, we shall not take the trouble to enquire. One thing must be certain to all, that the law prohibits the choice of every thing else as an ultimate end only that end which it requires to be thus chosen. Every thing else therefore that can be chosen as ultimate is the end or ends (we care not for the number) which the law forbids us to choose. Now whether our own gratification is alone that end, or whether misery also may be an end, it does not concern us at present to determine. Suffice it to say that these ends, whatever future investigation may find them to be, are perfect antagonisms and mutually exclusive of each other. They are moreover of universal extent; every possible object of choice that is not included in the first, must be included in the last. They are the true Ormusd and Ahriman of Eastern philosophy—the genuine angels of light and darkness; at their respective shrines, all rational beings in the universe offer their devout and whole-hearted adorations, and march to deadly and irreconcilable warfare under their respective banners.

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An intention is right when it terminates upon the former end: it is wrong when it terminates upon the latter. Its character will in all cases correspond with its object or end. When it terminates upon the former object it complied with a maxim which the agent knows to be fit for law universal. When it terminates upon the latter, the agent knows that he has acted from a different maxim. To know on which of them it has terminated is all that we need to know to determine its character. Such are the conclusions to which this investigation has brought us.

Were there no different tests proposed or defended by the advocates of the doctrine of mixed moral action, we might now, without further remark, join issue with them upon the question of the possibility of such an action. But they have proposed others so very unlike this, that it is indispensable to disprove their validity before a nice issue on that great question is possible. Indeed, if some of them at least are not wholly chimerical, the doctrine of the necessary simplicity of moral actions is a dream which must vanish away as soon as revery shall give place to sober reflection. We have hence arrived at a cordon of forts and bulwarks which must be demolished and removed out of our way or the whole field is lost. It is however the last that can impede our progress, and is far from appearing impregnable. Let us try its strength.

A few quotations will serve to intoduce the first of these tests which we propose to examine.

Says President Edwards, when speaking of the possible character of converted men, while in this world:

"They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so much love as there is want of love: or in other words, they may love God more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet may not love God *near half so much as they ought to do.* This need not be esteemed a paradox: a person may love a father, or some great friend or benefactor of a very excellent character, more than some other object a thousand times less worthy of this esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times less than he ought; and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a deficiency in respect to gratitude, that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil affections, or positive principles of sin; by which principles it is that sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affections radically consist in inordinate love of other things besides God; and therefore virtue prevailing beyond these will have the governing influence. The predominance of the love of God in the heart of good men is more from the nature of the object loved and the nature of the principle of true love than the *degree* of the principle."

The reader will observe that, in this passage, the phenomena of the will are jumbled in blind confusion with those of

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the sensibility; that virtuous love is confounded with pathological liking; that the essence of all sin is made to consist *in an* inordinate degree of love [liking] for other things than God; that the phenominal conflict of the contrary tendencies of our sensitive nature is regarded as the true warfare of virtues and vices, or positive principles of holiness and sin, which warfare springs from the antagonism of love to God and other things; and that no test is given us by which we may determine what degree of love to the world is *in*ordinate, or what strength of love to God is equal to the requirements of the law. These positions will be examined in the sequel. For the present, we wish to call attention only to this one point: that whatever phenomena the author regards as virtuous or vicious, he also supposes to be capable of existing in very different degrees of *strength* or *intensity*.

Says Dr. Beecher;

"In the commencement of a christian's love to God, it is feeble compared with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength, according to the moral law: and to qualify for heaven must be progressively augmented through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."

How far below the requirements of the moral law, true love to God may be found, and what *degree* of it will qualify a saint for heaven, the Doctor does not see fit to tell us; but he does plainly teach, that between these two indefinite points, this love may have many different degrees of *intensity*, and allows us to infer if we choose, that, in his judgment, these degrees may be as numerous as the days of a christian's earthly life.

The sentiment which these two great teachers in Israel have thus unfolded, is found in the Westminster Confession, which they alike adopted as the rule of their faith and practice, and is weekly echoed by more than a thousand pulpits and conference rooms, both in this country and in Europe. We can hardly go where ministers and pious laymen are narrating their religious experience, or expounding that of the church, without hearing its reiteration. They often declare with apparent earnestness and humility, that their love to God and man is real—of that they have the pleasing evidence of their own consciousness—but they are well aware that it is cold, infinitely cold and weak, compared with what it ought to be; that in view of what God is, and has done for them as Father, Son and Holy Ghost, instead of finding it difficult to keep their thoughts on heaven, they should burn in love like a seraph, and adore and praise with all the rapture and constancy of a devout archangel; that their eyes seldom dimmed

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with a drop of grief and pity, should in view of the present condition and future liabilities of a sinful and careless world, like Jeremiah's, be a perennial fountain of tears; and that although they are making some honest endeavors to subdue their own sinful passions, and bring sinners to Christ, they are accomplishing little or nothing in furtherance of either of these ends, in comparison with what they know they ought to do. Now all this if meant for poetical hyperbole is liable to no censure, except for an ill timed and improper introduction. If viewed simply as the language of feeling, it may be regarded as an index to very amiable constitutional susceptibilities, and perhaps, to a very devotional frame of mind. But if meant for a real description of that which is in fact moral, in the midst of the complex of religious phenomena, nothing could be more vague and unsatisfactory. The inference is naturally suggested by such language that, in their opinion, feelings and outward actions, as well as choices of the will, are in themselves praise and blame-worthy; and yet, most likely, few of them would openly avow this sentiment. Whether, granting that these phenomena are not in themselves morally praise or blame-worthy, they mean to teach that they are an exact index of the state of the heart; and in their varying degrees of intensity and energy, clearly point out corresponding degrees of innocence or guilt, we can only conjecture. Indeed, it may admit of doubt, whether, in most cases, they would be able to attach any definite idea to their own language, or tell us precisely what they suppose constitutes either sin or holiness.

It is said of a certain illustrious knight, who flourished during the reign of the unfortunate Charles, that

> "His notions fitted things so well,
> That which was which he could not tell;
> But oftentimes mistook the one,
> For t'other, as great clerks have done."

And it must forcibly strike the reader, that the ethical education of these theological declaimers is equally exact and profound. All that we can conclude with entire certainty from their rambling jargon is, that *whatever* they regard as morally praise or blame-worthy, they also regard as capable of possessing very unequal degrees of intensity, all of which argue more or less defectiveness in virtue, till the unknown point is reached where the whole law is satisfied.

A few of a more philosophical cast of thinking, while they admit, that an intention alone is a moral action, nevertheless

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maintain that to be wholly right, it must not only terminate upon the right object, but possess in addition, a certain degree of force or intensity. If all who differ from our view, would accept this statement as their own, it would be comparatively easy to terminate the controversy. But the positive statements of Edwards, as well as the loose declamation of the common pulpit, preclude such a supposition. It is, therefore requisite to sweep the whole field of every possible *intensity-theory*, and attack them all in detail. These theories we conceive, will all fall under the following specifications.

I. All the phenomena of both mind and body, or, at least, others than those of the will, are moral actions, and to be wholly right, they must possess a certain degree of intensity.

II. The phenomena of the will alone, are moral actions; but they are not wholly free from blame, unless they possess a certain degree of intensity themselves, and are followed by a certain degree of thought, feeling, and outward action.

III. An intention alone, may fully meet the demands of the law, whether accompanied by much or little thought, by strong feeling or weak, by vigorous bodily exertion or none at all; but to do so, it must choose the apprehended good of being with a certain degree of intensity.

I. In our former numbers we have shown that moral character can attach to neither thought, feeling, nor outward action; and while that position remains unanswered, we hold ourselves under no obligation to take any notice of the first of these theories, in so far forth as it is different from the last. All these phenomena lie wholly beyond the confines of the moral world, and the law no more concerns itself with their intensity, than with that of a magnetic wire or the chord of a violin. Nevertheless, since the affections of the sensibility are not only regarded by President Edwards and the Old School divines generally, as morally good or evil, but also by many others of a radically different view in theology, we deem it expedient to throw out a few suggestious and enquiries, in passing.

1. In the first place, then, we enquire, what is the exact degree of exertion of mind and body which the law demands?

Is it so much that the least excess would produce immediate dissolution? Or, is it such a degree as is consistent with the longest life, and the most uniform and vigorous state of health? Or, is it some other degree, between these two limits, above the first, or below the last? Wherever it be, it seems

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quite certain, that no being short of the Deity can tell when it is exactly reached. Who among mortals can tell what is the utmost tension which his course of life will bear? Who can tell the healthful mean between too much and too little exertion? Who can fix limits to any other degree which shall be assigned? The alchymist, according to our weak judgment, will sooner discover the *elixir vitæ*, whose potent spell shall be proof against all sickness and even death itself, than either of these problems will be solved without the aid of divine revelation. Consequently, as physiological instruction is neither claimed nor hoped from the Spirit of God, all men must be in perpetual danger either of exceeding or falling short of the exact legal requisition; and what the precise angle of their obliquity from the straight line of duty at any time may be, they cannot even conjecture. If they should ever perfectly obey, it must be the result of a mere accident, and a matter totally unknown to themselves. Hence, they can never know what measure of praise or blame they should meet out to themselves, in view of any past action, and often may be in doubt of which they are deserving; and if honest, when, at night-fall they come to the throne of mercy to make confession of the sins of the day, they are compelled to adopt such language as the following: "O Lord, in some instances I *guess* I have sinned without any intermixture of obedience, and in all others, I *suppose* sin has more or less intermingled with good; but whether either of these conjectures is right or, if so, whether there has been 'more love than defect of true love' I cannot tell. But be the amount of my offending much or little, graciously forgive, for Jesus' sake, Amen." How pungent such conviction for sin! How contrite such confession! How well adapted to wring the heart and deter from future acts of transgression!

And then too "*horresco referens*"—in these circumstances, when to know the exact meaning of the law, or to form an idea even approaching accuracy of what degree of action will meet its demands, "every sin," according to the theory, "even the least, being against the sovereignty, goodness and holiness of God, and against his righteous law deserveth his wrath and curse both in this life and that which is to come!" Perhaps long time ago, when our forefathers were first emerging from the gross darkness and superstition of paganism, and their sense of justice and right was greatly obscured, if not utterly concealed, by spiritual and political slavery and despotism, it might have been necessary to prove that a doctrine

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imputing sentiments to the Divine being which would infallibly defeat the election of a candidate for the supreme control of the most sanguinary clan in the most sanguinary and barbarous age of the world, was necessarily false and blasphemous, because repugnant to our common reason and at war with the conception which its eternal author taught it to form of his moral character. For in such savage eras

> "The soul grows clotted by contagion.
> Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite loose
> The divine property of her first being,"

and history accordingly informs us that men have believed many things most ridiculous and absurd. But we flatter ourselves that we have fallen on better times and must entertain the pleasing conviction that in the true light now shining upon the world, the absurdity and impiety of such doctrines are sufficiently obvious without argument or delineation of ours. We simply signalize them as voices from the grave-yard of the past, mournful yet fraught with pleasing instruction, for they tell us most impressively that humanity has progressed somewhat, and that every radical error must sooner or later become a thing of ink and paper, harmlessly reposing in antique volumes as the dust of its author beneath the monumental marble. Let not these observations be construed into a censure of these great and good men from whose works we have quoted. When we compare them with a still more remote antiquity, we rather admire the progress they made, than wonder they advanced no farther, and find every harsher sentiment insensibly losing itself in gratitude and commendation. They were great souls and true, struggling manfully in the lingering night of papacy towards the cheerful dawning of the glorious day.

> Stent manibus aræ
> Cœruleis mœstæ vittis utraque cupresso.

2. If less intensity of action is required, than will absolutely sunder the chord of life, we can more than fulfil the law. If for example, only so much exertion is required, as is consistent with the most perfect health, and the greatest longevity, a higher degree than this is possible; and so on, of every other degree, till death is induced. Now what is the character of this excess of exertion, above the legal requirement? Is it praise-worthy? then is an act of supererogation possible, and like the good Catholics, we may acquire by extra obedience to-day, a surplus revenue of holiness, which may make a fair set off for the designed transgressions of to-morrow. Is

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it blameworthy? then it follows that God and the universe may be too strongly loved.

"Trop de vertu pourroit vous rendre criminelle."

If to avoid this difficulty, it is maintained that suicidal exertion is required, it will follow that self-murder, more potent than the patriot's blood or the lover's sigh, presented by the exiled Peri to the angel porter of Paradise, can at any time secure admittance to its eternal joys. Ominous conjecture, if not the darkness of absolute despair, is cast upon the peaceful death-bed of the saints, and when surviving affection repeats for its own consolation that death is too harsh a word to express their glorious exit, that they peacefully fell asleep without a struggle or a sigh; this is only saying in other words, that they were taken off,

"With all their crimes broad-blown, as flush as May."

Instead of peacefully melting away, as they supposed, in the bright dawning of eternal light, as stars disappear in the brighter effulgence of the rising sun, they most likely commenced their returnless wandering in the dark and rayless night of unmitigated wo.

3. Moreover, an exact harmony between the several powers of the mind, and between the mind and body is not a matter of course. The body, may be exerted to the injury of the mind, and the mind may be exerted to the prejudice of the body; the sensibility, may be developed at the expense of the intellect, and the intellect at the expense of the sensibility; and the will, may rule in paralysing tyranny over all. How are these different and often conflicting claims and interests to be adjusted? Is an exact harmony between the actions of all these powers to be preserved, by all persons, at all times, in all places and circumstances? If so—how shall this harmony be known? Or, in some instances, may one power or faculty be more vigorously exerted than another? How much more vigorously, and how shall the proper ratio be ascertained? Besides, either of these powers is capable of being developed almost exclusively in one of several directions. We may feel deeply for example, on the subject of religion, and little comparatively respecting worldly things; or we may feel much about the world and little about religion; our spiritual hungerings and thirstings may be quite intense, and our world-hankerings weak. Our feelings may all be absorbed by love and friendship, or drunk up in the pursuit of knowledge or renown. The intellect, too, may, in like man-

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ner, be devoted almost exclusively to some particular branch of science or art, of honor, interest or duty. And one bodily power, may be called forth in monstrous development, while others, for want of use, are dwarfed and imbecile. Now what rule shall guide us here? What constitutes "*inordinate*" love of the world? How shall its existence be known? What is true love to God? How much thought must be bestowed upon divine things? How much on matters of temporal concernment? How shall the requisitions of the first great commandment be made to harmonize with those of the second? How in a word, can the law be reduced to a unity, if all these conflicting phenomena—this wild weltering chaos of heterogenous elements and adverse tendencies belong to the moral world, and are fit material for moral legislation?

4. After all these difficulties have been satisfactorily explained, it needs next to be considered, that the knowledge of the intensity of all these phenomena, so far as it is possible, is wholly an acquisition of experience; and that consequently, it is behooved to be acquired after moral action begins. But the law which obliges action, must be known before the action is performed, and consequently that kind and degree of action which it requires. We are hence shut up to the necessity of performing tentative moral acts to ascertain what degree of exertion will be equal to the legal requirement, when by hypothesis we are as yet ignorant of what the legal requirement is. But on this thought we will not now enlarge inasmuch as it will again come into notice under our last head, and will there receive a more thorough discussion.

All that we deem it expedient to add in relation to this first theory is, this single remark; that what we have said of that supposition which makes the actions of the whole man morally praise or blame-worthy, will apply with slight alterations, if the bodily actions and even the phenomena of the intellect be wholly excluded from the reckoning.

II. 1. The second theory is embarassed with all the difficulties of the preceding. The only essential difference between them is this: the former, calls thought, feeling, and corporeal exertion, moral actions; this does not. Both agree in demanding, under a different label, an equal amount of the same material, and one is concerned just as deeply as the other, in answering the question, how great, in all cases, that amount shall be, and in furnishing us some reliable means of ascertaining when it exists. If that found it impossible to solve

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these difficult problems, reconcile the claims of so many difficult and conflicting phenomena, and reduce them to a unity, fit for moral legislation; so must this. If the one, by raising the demands of the law to suicidal tension, or fixing them somewhat below that "pernicious height," made self immolation the only passport to heaven, or gave us the abominable doctrine of supererogation, so must the other—and that too, in a form better fitted to strike and startle the mind, namely, the good of the universe may be too strongly *willed*, or suicidal exertion alone is perfect holiness.

2. Besides, this theory is based on palpable error. There is is no such fixed connexion, established by nature, between the choices of the will and these other phenomena as makes the intensity of the latter, at all times, an exact index to the merit or demerit of the former.

Two men, it is conccivable, although possessed of equal mental and bodily vigor, and enjoying exactly the same degree of health, may yet put forth, in any specified period of time, very different degrees of exertion, and be equally virtuous in the sight of heaven. The same man during the last of three successive years, may fall short of the sensitive, intellectual, and corporeal exertion of the first by more than one half, and notwithstanding, be more uniformly virtuous and never less pleasing to God. Exertion will vary not as the choice of the will alone, but also as the circumstances, judgment, temperament, and nervous susceptibility of the agent. And to insist that it shall always be the same, or bear any exact proportion to his whole strength, or any assignable exertion of will, is to insist that circumstances, judgment, temperament, and nervous susceptibility shall always be the same; or, that he shall act contrary to his judgment, and be wholly independent of constitutional susceptibilities, and accidental environments. The latter is impossible, the former is sin.

The fact is, what the theory admits, and what it maintains, will by no means keep peace with each other. In admitting that intentions alone are moral actions, it also admits that bodily action, and a goodly portion of the phenomena of the intellect and sensibility, are mere means and appliances, which our judgment prescribes for the realization of an ultimate end. But judgment, it is well known, does not always prescribe or permit the same amount of thought, feeling, and outward action; and hence, no fixed, or proportionate amount, of these phenomena can at all test the virtuousness or strength of an intention.

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3. To make this more plain, we will grant (what we by no means believe,) that the will is capable of exerting its strength in very many unequal degrees, and fix the highest number of these degrees at one thousand. Now, if one of these degrees is exerted in the choice of apprehended good, and all the rest remain quiescent, it is plain, that it will be followed by as much outward action, as intense thought, and deep feeling, as in the judgment of the agent, are best adapted to secure that end. If two degrees were exerted, no more thought, feeling or action, could be required or permitted, without sin. The same would hold true of three degrees, of four, and so on till a thousand. Consequently, if the will were capable of exerting less than all its moral strength in choice; we never should be able to tell, whether it had done so or not, from the *intensity* of the above mentioned phenomena.

We are not aware that this theory has ever been distinctly avowed: its application, however, to the spiritual condition and hopes of mankind is but too common. And but for this fact, it might have been passed without notice. Shallow or reckless ministers, contemplating an isolated portion of truth, or one aspect of christian obligation, become much excited; and forgetting that others may be as exclusively occupied with, or interested by, some other partial view, insensibly confound the secondary object of their immediate pursuit, with the ultimate aim of all right action, and convert their own partial zeal, into the measure of the sanctuary by which the hopes and pretensions of all men are to be tried. Thus with an unqualified certainty, suited only to absolute Omniscience, when strict science has ceased to instruct, we often hear them assure their christian brethren, that their hopes of heaven are no better than a spider's web, if they do not weep with as much anguish of spirit as Jeremiah during the apostacy of Israel, and as frequently as Paul during his three years ministry at Ephesus; or if they do not exhort their fellow sinners to flee from the wrath to come, at least, every day, and with an earnestness and tenderness equal to that of Whitefield; or if they do not attend so many meetings a week, pay so much to support the minister at home, or missionaries in foreign fields; and many other things, which neither they themselves habitually perform or others wisely can attempt; and which it were absurd to make a general rule. To the man whose more thoughtful and comprehensive mind perceives that the vociferating Methodist and the silent Quaker, the ever active

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evangelist and the retired devotee of science, may all be equally well pleasing to that eye, which looketh not upon the outward appearance, but on the heart, all this is disgusting folly, as well as blasphemous fanaticism. In saying this we by no means wish to deny, that any thing can be inferred from the outward life, respecting the governing intention of the heart. Certain forms of action and feeling, if practised or indulged, render it highly probable, and others, quite certain, that selfishness is our ruling star. But it is from the *kind*, and not from the *degree* of these phenomena, that any reliable inference can be drawn.

The influence of both this theory and the preceding, is evil and only evil continually. They tend to withdraw our attention from the good to be sought, and the best means of attaining it, by fixing it in painful introspection on ourselves; they busy us in strenuous efforts to feel strongly, and think intensely; instead of doing good to all men as we have opportunity. They do worse, they not only tend to restrict our efforts to the narrow circle of our own powers, they render success in the pitiable objects which we here undertake, well nigh impossible. As well may we raise ourselves from the earth by grasping our own garments, or propel a boat, by an artificial gale manufactured in its own stern, as feel by a direct effort to feel, or think by a direct effort to think.

We might show that this theory is not only embarrassed by insuperable difficulties, and founded in error, but that it also involves a palpable contradiction. As however, it is identical with the third, so far forth as the element it deems moral is concerned, and only differs from it, in regard to its consequences and tests, we will pass without farther remark to examination of that theory.

CONCLUDED IN OUR NEXT.

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ARTICLE, LIV.

Charlotte Elizabeth.

By T. B. Hudson,
Professor of Languages in O. C. Institute.

Reader, you have traveled by night, and watched the changes the approach of morning has wrought in the aspect of the scenery around you. But a few hours since, the earth was wrapt in gloom and silence. Dim outlines of rock and precipice—of hill and plain lay half hid beneath the darkness. Music was dumb. The only sounds that reached you were the foot-fall of the beasts that walk in darkness and the screach of the night-bird—or perhaps the rustling of a momentary breeze in the wood that skirted your way, or, it may be, the sound of some far away water-fall that wailed monotonously through the live-long night.

But morning comes. The change seems magical—a flood of glory covers every thing—from the pearls of dew that hang on every leaf to the lofty mountain peak that rises above the clouds—all reflects the radiance that has burst from above Day seems to have created every thing anew. Those dim outlines have started forth into a landscape of rich loveliness. The prowlers of night have vanished with the darkness that shrouded them—and sweet music from early birds—from bleating flocks and lowing herds—and from the mingled shout of multitudinous human voices—rises in an anthem of gladness to heaven.

Such is the result of benevolence—of the love of God shed abroad in the heart of man. The gloomy chaos into which sin has thrown the soul is changed into a world of happy order. Birds of ill omen flee at the approach of spiritual day—all the powers of mind pour forth a rich music whose burden and whose notes are borrowed from above—a light rests on the whole domain of the spiritual being—a light the more rich and blessed because it is a reflection of our Father's smile.

These thoughts are suggested to our minds, by the history of almost every marked case of conversion with which we

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have become familiar, by none perhaps more forcibly than by that of the gifted authoress whose name stands at the head of this article.

No one can read the "Personal Recollections of Charlotte Elizabeth" without being convinced that personal religion was in more than one sense the day-spring of joy to her soul.—The beautiful lines of Coleridge seem to have, in her experience, an exemplification of uncommon point:

"Thus from the Elect, regenerate through faith,
Pass the dark Passions and what thirsty Cares
Drink up the spirit and the dim regards,
Self-centre. Lo they vanish! or acquire
New names, new features—by supernal grace
Enrobed with light, and naturalized in Heaven.
As when a shepherd on a vernal morn
Through some thick fog creeps timorous with slow foot,
Darkling he fixes on the immediate road
His downward eye, all else of fairest kind
Hid or deform'd. But lo! the bursting Sun!
Touch'd by the enchantment of that sudden beam,
Straight the black vapor melteth, and in globes
Of dewy glitter gems each plant and tree;
On every leaf, on every blade it hangs!
Dance glad the new-born intermingling rays,
And wide around the landscape streams with glory!"

We will own that we feel great pleasue in meeting, among the crowd of gifted persons whose productions amuse or dazzle the present generation, one who is not ashamed to make religion every thing; who though largely endowed with those brilliant powers which the world loves to idolize—and though tempted by the most flattering proposals to engage in those departments of writing which might have brought her a rich harvest of fame and gold, still maintained her steadfastness, and who with her eye on "the mark of the prize of her high calling," patiently ran the race that was set before her, and who perpetually looked to Jesus the Author and Finisher of her faith, undazzled by the glittering prizes that lay around her path, and unseduced by the powerful temptations before which so many mighty have fallen.

We wish to speak in praise of Charlotte Elizabeth; and though we may be compelled to dissent in many cases from the opinions she expresses, and to confess that some blemishes stand forth with striking prominence on her pages, we feel little disposition to pass a stern judgment on her imperfections. The nobleness of her aim, and the devotion with which she pursued it, almost sanctify even her errors. Her life was in many respects, a life of extraordinary trials, and

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some thing must be pardoned to the occasional bitterness of an overtasked soul. The grave too has but just closed over all of her that was mortal, and we cannot select the moment when the funeral train is passing, when the stifled sobs of many whose hearts are wrung by this sad bereavement still fill our ears, to mete out that exact critical justice which, in other cases and in different circumstances, might be permitted.

Be it ours for the present to perform the more grateful and perhaps more useful office of recording some of her excellences.

Her intellectual endowments were manifestly of a rare order. But it is not our purpose to dwell minutely on the analysis of her mental character. A few specifications must suffice.

Her imagination—we use the word in its popular sense—is among her most striking gifts. "There is nothing which she touches that she does not beautify." Whatever be her theme, whether the abstractions of theological discussion, or the incidents of a day-school, she makes all to live and glow beneath the radiance which her own bright mind throws upon it. And yet one does not commonly feel in reading her works, what so often pains one in the perusal of authors endowed with a rich fancy, that she is the slave of her own gifts. Indeed her power of painting seems to us eminently under the control of her judgment. Her thoughts are not buried or overborne by the drapery with which she invests them. To produce a brilliant impression, to parade her jewelry so that all eyes shall be duly dazzled by its splendor, seems no part of her object. Women are said to be very fond of display. But in respect to this sort of display, our authoress has set an example to some of the other sex which they might copy with great advantage.

It may strike some of our readers as a little singular that after speaking of the imagination of Charlotte Elizabeth as we have done, we should pass no eulogy on her poetry. We do not praise her poetry because we cannot. Not that it lacks sense, or harmony, or elevated spirit, or a high purpose; nor yet that it is not rich in pictures, nor full of fine allusions; but it does lack what are essential to *good* poetry—originality and inspiration. To be reminded of the great bards of our literature, by the adoption of some of their peculiar forms of expression, and to have, by this very means, the general mediocrity of the performance forced on his atten-

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tention, one needs only to read a canto or two from any of the poems of our authoress. He will be satisfied of the truth of the remark we have just made. With the exception of some of her briefer effusions;—and we are not sure that even these are exceptions,—we know not a single poem of her's whose probable purpose might not have been as well, nay better, attained by the use of plain prose.

While discussing the imagination of our subject and the uses to which she has applied it, we can hardly forbear adverting to a point on which the religious world has been much divided. It is this, the utility of religious fictions. Charlotte Elizabeth seems to have given her decision practically in their favor; for a large portion of her writings is made up of works of this character. The question is not whether fictitious writing is wholly wrong, nor whether the use of imaginary illustrations may not be a powerful auxiliary in the enforcement of the highest truths. But it is this—is the novel an effective instrumentality for the conveyance of doctrinal instruction, or for the conversion of the soul from sin to holiness? On this question we have but a few words to say. If experience be appealed to for the decision of the case, we would ask, where is the person to be found who traces his sound religious knowledge or his conversion from sin to holiness, to the reading of a religious novel? Where is the company of intelligent believers that would not contemplate with incredulity such a statement on the part of one who was relating his religious experience? If we look at the state of the sensibility induced by the perusal of an interesting novel, (a dull novel is a poor vehicle for truth of any kind,) and compare it with that induced by the personal application of the awful truths which concern us as culprits before the throne of our Righteous Judge; we shall find such a contrast between them, that their co-existence in the same mind is as little to be expected as is the co-existence of comic drollery with speechless terror or overwhelming grief. When the soul is roused to gaze at these great verities, all the fantastic dreams of fiction vanish. The mariner may be charmed by the Eolian harp; but the condition of mind into which such music throws him has no very assignable relation to his preparation for resisting the hurricane which ere noon may founder his doomed vessel. So the kindling interest in imaginary scenes; the warm solicitude for the welfare of the hero or heroine of the story, the high wrought sentimentalism, which are, and *must be* wrought into the very texture of every charm-

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ing novel, are poor preparations indeed for the state of mind in which the soul makes its peace with its Maker. Be it remembered that we are not discussing the abstract propriety of these states of mind, as such. We are only asking whether they contribute to the end proposed. We humbly conceive they do not. Indeed we believe it to be one of the most palpable blunders in practical psychology to imagine that they do. Of course we do not approve the judgment of our authoress in the selection of the fictitious story as the medium of doctrinal instruction or as the means of leading the sinner to God. Such stories attempt impracticabilities; they must sacrifice the story to the moral, or the moral to the story; they very commonly sacrifice both. If the imaginary story has a place at all, in a sound literature, and we will not deny that it has, its sphere will be different from the one under consideration.

As an offset to what we have just been compelled to say, we are gratified to observe the happy gift of our authoress in symboling the unseen and spiritual, by the visible and material objects around her. She finds much unity in the universe of God. She believes that the same Architect who laid the foundations of the world, and curved the arch of the sky, has built up the temple of the soul, and fitted it for his own abode. Of course she finds a spiritual meaning in ten thousand things which the unanointed eye dwells on only because of their material beauties. She loves the world not only because it is beautiful in itself, nor yet because it every where breathes the life of a present God; but also because its great gallery of pictures are suggestive to her mind of the highest spiritual truths, and become for her a vast treasure-house of symbols significant of principles which will endure when the world and its transient glory shall have passed away. Her writing partakes largely of this character. She might doubtless exclaim with Wordsworth:

> "To me the meanest flower that blows can give
> Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

Indeed one whole work of hers, "The Flower Garden," is largely molded by this idea, partly of analogy and partly of resemblance between the seen and the unseen worlds. We should rejoice to see this mine of illustration and ornament more diligently worked. Notwithstanding the abuses and excesses that have been perpetrated in the use of symbolical language, we believe that its adoption by many of our ortho-

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dox writers would be like the departure of winter and the coming of spring with its song and flowers.

Another excellence both of her writings and of her character, is that a practical aim seems to pervade almost every thing she does. Her readers feel that she has a purpose to attain. Her life was not spent in aimless aspirations, though every one can see that her aspirings are of the noblest kind; she does not inflict on us whole columns of sentimentalism which seems to whisper in our ears "how pretty and modest I am," though her soul is alive to all of poetry that gushes from life and nature. She does not seek to amuse her readers at any expense, though spontaneous jets of wit and sport now and then shoot up from the sober stream of her thoughts. Her aim is practical good; and all the powers of her mind, and all the affections of her soul seem bent on this object. She is at no pains to conceal her design; she does not commonly leave us to guess it for ourselves; there it lies before her eye and towards it she struggles with all her powers; she forgets it no where; nor will she let us forget it. If we converse with her, we must throw ourselves upon the current of her impulses; we must look to the same ends with her. If we follow her guidance, we shall almost spontaneously find ourselves at work, spreading the Bible beforethe Irishman in his native tongue, or laboring for the restoration of the Jews, or looking after the welfare of "the little pin headers," or taking the statistics of suffering in the manufacturing districts of England, or measuring swords with some champion of Romish delusion, or refreshing ourselves with some picture of christian heroism in the past, that we may strengthen our spirits for the warfare of the present time.

This influence exerted over the minds of her readers is the right one. Our romance, our philosophy, our theology, our personal religion, are either counterfeits or perversions, if they do not urge us to the great work of doing good to others and contribute to our fitness for its performance. While the discoverer of new truth in whatever department, may perhaps be permitted to forget the practical bearing of the announcements he makes, it should be the direct aim of most others to enlarge the sum of human happiness, and diminish the amount of human woe. And we are happy in the hope that the example of Charlotte Elizabeth, may serve more even than her direct efforts, to admonish and encourage thousands of her sex to the most strenuous exertion of their powers in the work of doing good.

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We should be at once pleased and pained to contrast for a moment the character of Charlotte Elizabeth in this respect, with that of a multitude of women, who with the best endowments, the most abundant leisure, and the finest opportunity for the use of their powers, let their lives glide uselessly away, or devote them to objects unworthy alike of their sex and of their destiny. But what we would say will readily suggest itself to the minds of our readers. We will only add, that while their memory will and must perish, hers will be cherished in many grateful hearts; and when even her name is forgotten, her influence will live like the hidden stream which gives to the meadow a hue of fresher green along the path of its unseen meanderings.

Another of her excellences is the marked nerve and dignity of her style. We have rarely read the writings of a lady who deserves to be compared with her in these qualities. And we ought to add, that the greater number even of the stronger sex whose works are not unknown to fame, rarely maintain the even strength and majesty which belong to her. If here and there some local allusion were omitted, or some touch of feeling which beautifully betrays the woman, the reader of one of her essays who might be uninformed of its authorship, might suppose himself perusing the work of some prince of our religious literature—some powerful preacher, it may be, who had seized his pen to give a wider sweep of power to that fervent enthusiasm which had before fallen like fire on the hearts of his thrilled congregation. Open her works at any page, and read aloud, and the conviction at once seizes you that she has a command at once of her mind, of her subject, and of the language which gives her a high place among the most vigorous writers of the present day.

The finish of her sentences too deserves a place in the catalogue of her excellent qualities as a writer. For unity and harmony they deserve high praise. In every one of her periods, the meaning is distinctly perspicuous, and is unfolded with a neatness and point—with a climax and cadence that impart to her style a great charm, especially when united with the naturalness with which her thoughts seem to give themselves shape.

Another characteristic of her mind which will strike every reflective reader is, the clearness of her thoughts. This in an age when so many seem to covet obscurity as an honor, or seek to hide their littleness beneath the misty folds of an unintelligible terminology, is a shining excellence. To resist the

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external influences which urge one strongly in the direction of a fashionable fault, to persist in uttering plain understandable English, indicates a courage which challenges our involuntary respect. It is better to illuminate one's subject with steady day-light than to adorn darkness with momentary sky-rockets. This our authoress understood and acted accordingly. Hundreds do not, and they act accordingly.

Charlotte Elizabeth was a woman of great feeling. A vein of genuine pathos runs through all her works. Whether we stand with her by the bed-side of her dying pupil the dumb boy Jack—or follow her through all the terrible details of the seige of Derry—or behold the slow murder of Helen Fleetwood, drooping and dying under the complicated tortures of an English factory life; whether we bear her company in some one of her visits to the Irish poor, and witness the strong and clasping affection with which she presses those children of want and ignorance to her heart of christian love, or stand on one of the mountains near Jerusalem and listen to her story of the seige and sack of the holy city, or join in her soul-felt lamentation over the fallen estate of God's ancient people—whether we recall her touching description of her early home, or the warm smile which lights up her features at the mention of childhood—whether we observe the true enthusiasm which the physical universe ever awakens in her soul, or above all, her unspeakable solicitude for the welfare of the human soul—her sense of forgiving love—her overwhelming sense of the nothingness of every thing earthly except as it bears on eternity, we feel that hers is a full and overflowing soul—that her heart beats with great pulsations, and that much of her power over others, springs from the power of her emotions over her own mind.

Her sympathy with the persecuted and the humble, will be noticed and loved by all sober readers of her works. This sympathy is felt or affected quite extensively at the present moment. The great tide of human feeling is setting strongly in this direction, and thousands who have really little or no feeling, are led to fancy that they are overflowing with the warmest benevolence. The fashionable tale, the fugitive and evanescent poetry, the overdrawn pictures of our magazine literature, teem with the affectation of beneficence and kindness towards the masses. Now, pained as we are sometimes at the ill-concealed insincerity of much of this, we are right glad that the demands of the public mind are such that these caterers for the popular taste find themselves compelled

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to spice their viands largely with condiments of this sort. It is a good sign when those who write for money find that money is best secured by doing, or seeming to do, somewhat for the general good. If it be said that there is danger of hypocrisy in this direction, we reply that it is better in itself, and infinitely better for the safety of society, that men should find it more to their own interest to benefit their fellows than to harm them; that those who are acted upon by external impulses merely, of whom there is a large class, should find those impulses demanding of them a regular life, smooth speech, and some semblance of zeal and effort for the welfare of society. Not that we respect such a character at all, any more than we respect the dead flies that float with equal facility on a crystal brook, or on a reeking horse-pond. But they are a sign—as the deep mire and chilly storms of a western spring, are a sign that winter is resigning his stern dominion and that a green landscape and brighter skies are at hand.

But to return to Charlotte Elizabeth; her love for the lowly is at antipodes from that which we have just described. We see in her, to be sure, some traces of disdain—some shrinking of nerve as she approaches her work, but after all we feel that her sympathy with the lowly is not affectation—that her heart is really touched by the woes she has witnessed, and that she has drank largely of the spirit of him whose mission was described as "the preaching of deliverance to the captive and the opening of the prison doors to them that are bound," and who has made the humblest of all the children of despair his chosen representations in the thrilling words, "inasmuch as ye have done it unto the *least* of these ye have done it unto me." She incurred great odium in her self-denying labors. She relinquished many a bright prize in order to perform them. The prejudices of her birth and education every day lay across her path, and were every day overcome. Thus she toiled on with pen and hand, till her weary frame rested in the grave, and her soul in the bosom of her God.

From our heart we pray that such characters may be multiplied like the drops of the morning, that wherever woman's interest is awakened in the strange vicissitudes of her life, or woman's eye is moistened at her recital of suffering—her own or others—woman's heart may be filled with the same generous benevolence, and woman's life be devoted with the same zeal to the stern work of combatting error and sin, and disseminating truth and holiness.

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There is perceptible in the works of Charlotte Elizabeth, a large tendency to One Ideaism. We refer not to the grand One Idea of the Christian life—the conquest over sin—nor to the grand One Idea of the Christian world—the triumph of Christian truth thoughout the globe, but to the particular form of labor in which many persons become interested, and to which they devote their strength. Hatred of Romanism was the specific form of One Ideaism, which gained a paramount, though not exclusive, influence over her mind. A large number of her works are avowed cannonades on popery. Some of her most powerful and highly wrought passages are streams of liquid fire from the volcano of her indignation against this system of lies. In many a passage where you would least expect it, from behind some bower of clustering roses, from beyond some leafy covert whose deep shadows and waving boughs invite to repose, forth she leaps, a champion clad in steel—her war-cry, "death to Romanism"—her gleaming cimiter uplifted in act to slay. Such an intensity of feeling on a single subject, will seem to many of her American readers unseasonable and needless. But when we remember what Roman Catholicism has ever been—its creed of falsehood—its image worship—its cunning and duplicity—its degradation of the poor—its bloody persecution—its powerful and unprincipled priesthood—its claim of infallibility—its thousand wiles to grasp new power or maintain its old though crumbling dominion—when we recall the fact that its history crowds into a few centuries a frightful epitome of all that is rotten in pollution, or terrible in despotism, or frightful in unnatural cruelty; and when too we observe the effort that is made every where by large classes of Protestants to naturalize Romanism in Great Britain and in the United States, and to quicken into life by every artifice, the vipers' eggs so widely sown by the hand of vigilant propagandism, we can not wonder that a mind like Charlotte Elizabeth's in England where Puseyism is now doing its work of death, in Ireland where the darkness of popery is still unbroken save here and there by a single star, should be transfixed as it were with a sense of its horrors—that her fancy by day, and her vision by night should be haunted with its bloody figure—that it should dog her steps—that it should fever her blood—that it should stand between her and every picture of smiling joy, and that the struggle for its overthrow should become the great labor of her life.

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For ourselves we do not participate in these terrors. Awfully wicked as the system of Romanism is, and terrible as have been its workings, we believe it is on the wane. Struggles there may yet be, sharp and bloody. But we are persuaded that they will be the spasms of a dying monster, mighty perhaps, but brief and in vain. The foes of Protestantism are within. The pride, the time-serving, the lust of gold, the love of power, the practice of oppression, the silent sanction or open defence of wicked legislation, which have made Rome the detestation of the world, are rankling in the veins of American Protestantism at this hour. On the dung hill of a putrid Romanism, luxuriated the poisonous mushroom of French Atheism. On the dung hill of a putrescent Protestantism is springing up in Europe and America an equally poisonous infidelity, an infidelity the more to be dreaded because, in some form practical or metaphysical, it preaches from christian pulpits and is clad in the habiliments of heaven. If Romanism were as formidable now as it was three centuries ago, Protestantism is unfit to take the field against it. A living faith, a pure life, a resistance unto blood if need be, striving against sin national as well as personal, alone can restore to the Protestant church her lost power. With many of the foulest crimes which she truly imputes to Romanism, as truly and more criminally embosomed in her own communion, what can she effect against her foes? She may hurl her javelins at Rome, and they will be hurled back dipped in Romish malignity to pierce her own bosom. We repeat it, the foes of Protestantism are within. Unless the poison is purged from her own veins, the spears of her warriors must be broken and the shields of her mighty men must be vilely cast away.

But we have wandered far from our subject. We will own, heretical though it may seem, that we think this One Ideaism of our authoress a great excellence. We mean of course that characteristic of mind which prompts one to seize on some one great object and pursue it as one's great work, while life lasts, or till the object be achieved. We know it will be said in reply, that such a tendency degenerates into bigotry, sometimes into fanaticism—that it leads to narrowness of mind—that it destroys symmetry of character, and weakens the bond of sympathy that should unite all true laborers for man's improvement in one great band of reciprocal confidence and love. We admit the liability to all these unfavorable consequences. But we rejoin by saying that One Ideaism in the sense in which we use the phrase is

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the sole condition of improvement in any department of thought, of art, or of reform. Without it neither printing press, nor steamboat, nor railroad, nor magnetic telegraph, without it neither the telescope which brings the centres of ten thousand "solar systems," within our view, nor the microscope which peoples a drop of dew with millions of living creatures, would have been given to man. It is the parent of all discovery from the calculation of the first eclipse to the location of the orbit of Le Verrier. It has given to us every invention from the rude loom of Arabia to the complicated machinery of the modern factory. In the world of thought, One Ideaism has been quite as potent as in the world of art. Every truth which Philosophy has added to her casket of jewelry is the result of powerful and long continued concentration of thought. Men have pursued a single idea to all its hiding places—they have dragged it forth from its retirement, they have held it in the focus of the most powerful lenses, they have subjected it to the most searching scrutiny for years, perhaps for ages, before it has passed into the list of acknowledged truths, and received from mankind the stamp which has given it currency as an intellectual standard of value, as part of the circulating medium for the mental commerce of the world. From the infancy of human society, One Ideaism has dictated to men the division of labor, giving to each *one* calling, or some fraction of a calling. And successive centuries have only confirmed the conviction that this principle is the sole condition not only of discovering what is new, but of retaining what the dead generations have left to us. Let One Ideaism in this department abate one jot of its old demands, and civilized society would sink back to barbarism. Science would be forgotten, government would crumble into anarchy, and the fourth generation, a meagre horde of naked savages, would see the last ray of enlightenment expire. The race would lose in a century what it has taken nearly six thousand years to gain.

How slow we are to apply to social improvement the principles which have been the sole condition of man's physical comfort from time immemorial. We never think of charging with One Ideaism the man who spends his life, it may be, in making the fourteenth part* of a pin. But let a man devote his whole soul to some one *great* department of reform,—let him attempt to mold society to the shape which some great truth or

* The business of making pins is divided into fourteen different departments carried on by as many different classes of persons.

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some great right demands, and we straightway hear the cry, "A man of one Idea! a monomaniac! What narrow-mindedness! What bigotry!" To all this the reformer might well reply, "You charge me with One Ideaism as a crime. I accept it as my highest eulogy. You seek to make it the badge of my disgrace. It is at once my impenetrable armor and my all-conquering sword. You would tie it like a millstone about my principles, and with it plunge them into the depths of the sea. On it as on the wings of an angel shall they fly in triumph, scattering blessings under the whole heaven."

We have room only to state another excellence—the crowning one of all her writings. It is her fervent and mature piety. Very few, even among the clergy, seem to breathe the spirit of entire devotion or evince the profound practical knowledge of the heart, natural or regenerate, which are every where apparent in her works. How many a sermon really powerful and touching does she draw from the commonest objects, with a skill and naturalness which, while they surprise, prompt the exclamation, "She has been with Jesus." Her piety, we know, has the stern and solemn bearing of the high Calvinism belonging to the Evangelical portion of the Established Church. Her theology is the theology of Geneva grafted on the English stock. Yet while we meet now and then on her pages a doctrinal statement to which we never expect to subscribe, we find in her christian experience a large development of those graces in which the ripe believer of every sect traces the work of the Spirit. The great doctrines of total depravity—justification by faith—atonement by the blood of Christ—sanctification by the Holy Spirit—of the Trinity in Unity of the Godhead are among the grand features of her religious belief, and give shape alike to her speculations and her character. Among the features which her piety developed in her character, the following are prominent: a deep and abiding sense of the nothingness of human strength, a joyous confidence in all God's dealings with his children, whether joyous or afflictive, a firm conviction that the most trivial event in regard to them is shaped and directed by a Father's hand, for their everlasting good, a strong, and at times most touching, feeling of the love of Christ as shown in the atonement, and an overwhelming longing to see the triumph of his cause in her own country. All her powers are laid as offerings on the altar of her Savior. Her rich fancy seems but to render her

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strong religious appeals more impressive. If she finds a revelation in the universe around her, it bends her in a more humble prostration before her God. Her strong practical sense is a swift minister to her christian love. Her mastery over language, and the commanding dignity with which she wields it, are never so effectively employed as when she announces almost in thunder notes, some solemn religious truths. Her sympathy with suffering of every kind, is strong and deep. But her tears never flow so readily as when she deplores the wastes of Zion, or the fearful destiny of the soul rushing on to destruction. Her hatred of Romanism amounting to an almost omnipresent indignation, is only the sterner aspect of her reverence for the word of God, and of her overcoming desire to place his message of love in the hands of even the humblest human being. In short all her endowments of whatever sort seem only ministers to her fervent, active piety. Who will not be glad to see such gifts devoted to such an end?

Some of our critical friends will ask why we have not commented more freely on the obvious imperfections of our authoress. Were this the proper time, and were we writing for British readers we would do so, for there her errors may do harm. But we deem such an office needless for American readers. Not because an American public is more discerning than an English one, but because her imperfections are exotics and will not flourish on foreign soil, while her noble qualities may, we trust, become denizens of each hemisphere and every zone.

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ARTICLE LV.

The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church.

An exposition of the Confession of Faith of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. By the Rev. Robert Shaw. Revised by the committee of publication. Philadelphia: presbyterian board of publication: 1847.

By Prof. A. Mahan.

[continued.]

The doctrines of Imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity, of Physical or Constitutional Depravity, as set forth in our preceding article, together with the dogma, that all the determinations of the human Will, with the exception of those of man before the Fall, are in necessary conformity to the prior state of the propensities, may very properly be regarded, and we believe, universally are regarded by all its orthodox expounders, as embracing the fundamental principles of the Confession of Faith; principles from which the entire system of doctrine therein developed receives its characteristic features, form, and dimensions. No one of its doctrines can be understood and appreciated, as set forth in the instrument itself, unless it is contemplated in the light of, and in its relations to these doctrines. From these admitted leading positions, we proceed in our exposition of the system of doctrine set forth in the instrument before us. The doctrines which next claims our attention, are those of Election, and Reprobation.

All evangelical christians believe in election and reprobation both, in some form. If the doctrines of Free Will, General Atonement, and other kindred doctrines be admitted, then men are elected or reprobated according to their foreseen acceptance or rejection of the provisions of grace for their redemption. "*Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.*" This, did our limits permit, and this view

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alone, it could readily be shown, corresponds with scripture and reason both. Distinct and opposite is the view of the subject, however, presented in the Confession of Faith, as demanded by its fundamental principles. According to its teachings, election precedes redemption, as the end is prior to the means. A certain portion of the human family are from eternity, selected in the divine purposes, as subjects of salvation. The work of redemption is determined on and arranged, as a means of accomplishing this purpose of election. The rest of mankind are "passed by, and ordained to dishonor and wrath for their sins." To present a view of these doctrines as taught in the Confession of Faith, we will cite the chapter in which they are set forth, together with such extracts from the Exposition as are necessary to a distinct elucidation of the text.

"SECTION I.—God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

SECTION II.—Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions."

The following extracts from the Exposition will sufficiently elucidate the doctrine set forth in these Sections.

"It has been objected to the doctrine respecting the divine decrees taught in our Confession, that it represents God as the author of sin. But the Confession expressly guards against this inference, by declaring that God has so ordained whatsoever comes to pass, as that he is not thereby the author of sin. The decree of God is either effective or permissive. His effective decree respects all the good that comes to pass: his permissive decree respects the evil that is in sinful actions. We must also distinguish betwixt an action *purely as such*, and the sinfulness of the action. The decree of God is effective with respect to the *action* abstractly considered; it is permissive with respect to the *sinfulness* of the action as a moral evil."

"It has also been objected, that if God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, human liberty is taken away. To this it has been commonly replied, that it is sufficient to human liberty, that a man acts without any constraint, and according to his own free choice; that the divine decree is extrinsic to the human mind; and, while it secures the futurition of events, it leaves rational agents to act as freely as if there had been no decree. This answer, it must be acknowledged, merely amounts to an assertion that, notwithstanding the decree of God, man retains his liberty of action. We wish still to know how the divine preordination of the event is consistent with human liberty. "Upon such a subject," says Dr. Dick, "no man should be ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance. We are not required to reconcile the divine decrees and human liberty." It is enough to know that God has decreed all things which come to pass, and that men are answerable for their actions. Of both these truths we are assured by the Scriptures; and the latter is confirmed by the testimony of conscience."

The distinction here set up "betwixt an action *purely as such*, and the sinfulness of the action" demands special atten-

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tion. It is admitted that if the decree of God "is effective" not only "with respect to the action abstractly considered," but also "with respect to the sinfulness of the action as moral evil," then is God truly and properly the author of sin. To avoid this fatal rock, it is asserted that in respect to all sinful actions, "the decree of God is effective in respect to the action abstractly considered," but "permissive with respect to the *sinfulness* of the action as moral evil." According to this profound distinction the divine decree was *effective* in respect to the first act of disobedience of our first parents, but simply permissive in respect to the sinfulness of that act. It was effective in respect to the act of Judas in betraying Christ, but permissive in respect to the sinfulness of the act. The act of murder, adultery, blasphemy, &c., abstractly considered is one thing. "The sinfulness of the act as moral evil" is quite another and different thing. A greater absurdity and contradiction, we venture to affirm, never lay upon the brain of a theologian, or Assembly of Divines. We might with the same propriety affirm, that when God said, "Let there be light," the act of creation was effective with respect to the existence of the object "abstractly considered," but only permissive with respect to its essential qualities, qualities without which it could not exist, as light, at all.

We can no more, even in thought separate between a sinful act and its essential quality as sinful, than we can separate between any substance and its essential qualities. If the decree of God is effective in respect to the occurrence of any sinful act, whether abstractly considered or not, it is equally effective in respect to the sinfulness of that act, and God is and must be the author of sin.

But what meaning must we attach to the term permissive in this connection? If it mean any thing it must be this: The decree of God is, "effective with respect to the occurrence of the sinful act abstractly considered," that is, without reference to the sinful quality of the act. In other words, it renders the non-occurrence of the act impossible, while it leaves the quality of the act as sinful or holy contingent, that is leaves it equally possible to be one or the other. What other meaning can we attach to the term permissive in such a connection? But this would overthrow the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, that God has "unchangably foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." The sinfulness of sinful actions is one among the many things that have come to pass. This, as well as all things else, acccording to the Confession, God

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has *unchangably ordained*, that is, rendered it absolutely impossible that it should not only not come to pass, but not be what it is. How can a decree which renders it impossible for an event not to occur, or to be otherwise than it is, be not effective, but permissive, in respect to that event? We leave it with the author of the Exposition and the Committee of Publication to solve this difficulty. We very seriously doubt whether either of them can tell us what, or whether any meaning at all should be attached to the term permissive as here used. It is only by such absurd, contradictory, and unmeaning distinctions, however, that the system of doctrine taught in the Confession can possibly be saved from being totally wrecked upon the fatal dogma, that God is the author of sin.

But the sentiment that the decree and agency of God are merely permissive in respect to the existence of sinful actions is directly contradicted by the Confession of Faith itself in the chapter on Providence, Section iv, while the sentiment is therein reasserted that God is not the author of sin:

"The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God; who being most holy and righteous, neither is, nor can be the author or approver of sin."

After affirming that it must be admitted, that the providence of God is concerned about the sinful actions of creatures, the author of the Exposition adds:

"At the same time, it is indisputable that God cannot be the author nor approver of sin. To solve the difficulty connected with this point, theologians distinguish between an action and its quality. The action, abstractly considered, is from God, for no action can be performed without the concurrence of Providence; but the sinfulness of the action proceeds entirely from the creature."

In order fully to appreciate this profound distinction we should bear distinctly in mind, that all sinful actions consist wholly of intentions. This is admitted by every school in theology old and new. According to this distinction then, the *intention* of Judas in betraying Christ abstractly considered, was from God. The sinfulness of the action was "entirely from the creature." So in all other instances. It is no mat-

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ter of wonder surely that the author should conclude his observations on this distinction with the following remark:

"But the full elucidation of this abstruse subject, so as to remove every difficulty, surpasses the human faculties. We are certain that God is concerned in all the actions of his creatures; we are equally certain that God cannot be the author of sin: and here we ought to rest."

It does indeed "surpass the human faculties" to conceive how that God's decree and agency can be so effective in respect to an intention and its characteristics, that both alike cannot possibly but be what they are, and He yet not be alike the author of both.

The sentiment that God has "from all eternity" "unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass," and that he has so done it that he is not thereby the author of sin, demands also a passing notice. God, according to the sentiment here expressed, has himself so ordered and fixed all the circumstances and causes upon which the occurrence of all sinful acts (intentions) depend, that in these circumstances none but these acts can possibly arise and these cannot but occur; else He has not as above quoted, "unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass." What a palpable contradiction is it, to assert in the presence of such a sentiment, that God is not the author of sin. If the ordering of circumstances from which none other but one particular event can arise, and this one cannot but arise, does not make God the author of such an event, then He cannot properly be said to be the author of any thing. We had overlooked this most palpable contradiction when we asserted in a previous article, that, with the exception therein named, the Confession of Faith was consistent with itself.

The remark of Dr. Dick, that "We are not required to reconcile the divine decrees and human liberty," that is, the view of those decrees under consideration, is certainly true in a very important respect. No one surely ought to be required to reconcile palpable contradictions. In the above statement, the Dr. himself and those who cite his language with much approbation, in reality acknowledge, that they, even, can not see how the two things can be reconciled. The human intelligence can no more put these two ideas together and affirm their consistency—to wit, that God has, by his own decree so determined all our actions, that we can not by any possibility but do as we do, and that we are yet free and accountable for the same—than it can affirm, that the same thing, at the same time, may be and not be. To say that God has so or-

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dered the actions of sinners that they can not but do as they do, and that they ought notwithstanding to do differently, is equivalent to the affirmation that they ought to thwart and circumvent God's own omnipotent decree; in other words, to resist and overcome omnipotence. If this is not a contradiction and absurdity, we may safely challenge the universe to give a definition of the terms? But it is time to consider the doctrines of Election and Reprobation as set forth in the Confession of Faith:

"Section iii.—By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.

Section iv.—These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

Section v.—Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of glorious grace.

Section vii.—The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

From the exposition we make two citations, the first pertaining to Election, and the second to Reprobation.

"It would be tedious, and would serve no good purpose, to enumerate the multifarious opinions which have been held on this subject. It will be sufficient to mention the opinion of the Socinians, and of the Arminians. The Socinians deny the certain prescience of future contingencies, such as the determinations of free agents; and, therefore, the only decree respecting the salvation of men which they will admit to have been made from eternity, and to be unchangeable, is a general conditional decree, that such as believe and obey the gospel shall be saved: and, according to them, a special decree concerning particular persons, is only made in time, when persons perform the condition contained in the general decree. The Arminians, or Remonstrants, as they are also called, are distinguished from the Socinians, by admitting that contingent events such as the determinations and actions of men, are foreseen by God; but they also deny absolute and unconditional election, and maintain, that whatever God has decreed respecting men, is founded on the foresight of their conduct. Having foreseen, without any decree, that Adam would involve himself and his posterity in sin and its consequences, he purposed to send his Son to die for them all, and

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give them sufficient grace to improve the means of salvation; and knowing beforehand who would believe and persevere to the end, and who would not, he chose the former to eternal life, and left the latter in a state of condemnation. There is, however, a diversity of opinion among the holders of this general system; and some of them coincide with Socinians, in maintaining, that the decrees of God respecting men are not eternal, but are made in time; that men are elected to eternal life, after they have believed, and that if they have believed, and that, if they fall into a state of unbelief and impenitence, the sentence or decree is reversed.

In opposition to these systems, our Confession teaches that God made choice of, and predestinated a certain and definite number of individuals to everlasting life; that he predestinated them unto life before the foundation of the world was laid: that in so doing, he acted according to his sovereign will, and was not influenced by the foresight of their faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them; and that this purpose is immutable, it being impossible that any of the elect should perish."

"This section [see vii] describes what is usually called the decree of *rep robation*. This term is not used in the Confession, and when it occurs in Scripture, bears a different sense from the theological; but for the sake of convenience, it is used to express that act of God's will by which, when he viewed all mankind as involved in guilt and misery, he rejected some, while he chose others. Some who allow of personal and eternal election, deny any such thing as reprobation. But the one unavoidably follows from the other; for the choice of some must necessarily imply the rejection of others. "Election and rejection are correlative terms, and men impose upon themselves, and imagine that they conceive what it is impossible to conceive, when they admit election and deny reprobation."

In order to understand fully the doctrines of Election and Reprobation here set forth, the following considerations should be kept distinctly in mind:

1. According to the teachings of the Confession of Faith, all mankind are put under sentence of condemnation to death spiritual, temporal, and eternal, in the first instance for the act of another committed long before their existence commenced, an act which the decree of God had unchangeably ordained, that is, rendered impossible even for that being not to perform, and in the next for a nature in the production of which they had and could have had no more agency than in the creation of the world, and for which, on the principles of intrinsic justice they can no more be held responsible.

2. In connection with this nature the continuance or change of which depends exclusively upon the decree and agency of God, the existence of holiness and the non-existence of sin are to all men absolute impossibilities.

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3. Having by his own decree, and that exclusively, rendered it impossible for all men not to come into this state, the Most High "for the manifestation of his own glory," and from eternity elects from this mass of death and corruption, a certain definite number of individuals to be saved from this state, and rendered heirs of life eternal, while "for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures," He passes by and ordains the rest to "dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

4. The number thus elected and reprobated is from all eternity rendered by the divine decree, and that exclusively, so definite and fixed that by no possibility can it be "either increased or diminished."

5. The reprobate thus decreed and destined, are to be doomed "to everlasting death," not only for a sin committed when they had no existence, for a nature in the production of which they had no agency, and for actual transgression, which that nature, (which they could not but have) rendered it impossible for them not to perpetrate, but as we shall hereafter see, their doom is to receive infinite aggravation for the rejection of a salvation never in fact provided for them, and which the irreversible decree of God and their own constitution rendered it impossible for them not to reject when proffered to them. Such we repeat are the doctrines of Election and Reprobation set forth in the Confession of Faith. We may safely challenge its advocates to show that ignorance or prejudice in us has induced us to give a solitary false shade to the horrid picture. We would simply add, that in our solemn judgment, nothing but the strange blindness and ignorance which darken the minds of even good men saves the imputation of such a system to that being whose name is love and who has taken a solemn oath before the universe that "He is not willing that any should perish," from involving a sin against the Holy Ghost.

Did our limits permit we should have much more to say on the doctrines under consideration. We pass however, to a consideration of the doctrine which comes next in order, that of Atonement or Redemption. By all evangelical christians, this doctrine is regarded as a cardinal article of their faith. The only important point of disagreement between them in respect to it pertains to the *extent* of the provisions of grace for the salvation of mankind. On this point the teachings of the Confession of Faith are perfectly explicit. Election, as we have before said, is according to its teachings pri-

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or to Redemption, as the end is prior to the means. As the work of Atonement sustains merely the relation of a means to the purpose of election, all its provisions pertain exclusively to the elect. For the reprobate no provisions of pardon or salvation exist. The following passages will render it demonstrably evident to every candid mind, that we have not misinterpreted its teachings on this subject. The first selection is from chapter viii, entitled "Christ the Mediator."

"SECTION V.—The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal Spirit once offered up to God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him.

VI. Although the work of redemption was not actually wrought till after his incarnation, yet the virtue, efficacy, and benefits thereof, were communicated unto the elect, in all ages successively from the beginning of the world, in and by those promises, types, and sacrifices, wherein he was revealed, and signified to be the seed of the woman which should bruise the serpent's head, and the lamb slain from the beginning of the world, being the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

VII. Christ, in the work of mediation, acteth according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself: yet by reason of the unity of the person, that which is proper to one nature, is sometimes in Scripture, attributed to the person denominated by the other nature.

VIII. To all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same; making intercession for them; and revealing unto them in and by the word, the mysteries of salvation effectually persuading them by his Spirit to believe and obey: and governing their hearts by his word and Spirit; overcoming all their enemies by his almighty power and wisdom, in such manner and ways as are most consonant to his wonderful and unsearchable dispensation."

Here the reader will notice particularly, that while it is asserted on the one hand that redemption is purchased by Christ "for all those whom the Father hath given unto him," it is declared on the other, that "To all for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth *certainly* and *effectually* apply and communicate the same." This confines the provisions of grace exclusively to the elect. If atonement is general, then, according to the fundamental teachings of the Confession, salvation must be universal; for it is therein asserted, that to all for whom atonement is made, it is effectually applied, in the sense that they are persuaded by the Spirit to "believe and obey." If this does not assert the doctrine of particular in opposition to general atonement, we may safely

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affirm, that it is not in the power of language to express that idea. In conformity with the same dogma it is asserted, Larger Catechism, question 59: that "Redemption is certainly and effectually applied to all those for whom Christ hath purchased it." While the doctrine of particular atonement, or redemption is thus directly and undeniably asserted, there cannot be found in any part of the instrument a solitary sentence or principle that stands opposed to this dogma.

Hence with great pertinency, the Exposition thus comments upon Section VIII, quoted above.

"This section relates to the extent of Christ's death with respect to its objects, and in opposition to the Arminian tenet, that Christ died for all men, for those who shall finally perish, as well as for those who shall be eventually saved; it affirms that the purchase and application of redemption are exactly of the same extent. In the fifth section we were taught that Christ purchased redemption only for "those whom the Father hath given unto him;" and here it is asserted, that "to all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same." It was formerly remarked, that, at the period when the confession was framed, the phrase to *purchase redemption* was nearly synonymous with the phrase to *make atonement* for sin. What language, then, could affirm more explicitly than that here employed, that the atonement of Christ is specific and limited, that it is neither universal nor indefinite, but restricted to the elect, who shall be saved from wrath through him?"

[Our publisher has just returned the portion of our manuscript containing the remaining observations which we had made upon this part of our subject, and enters a protest against further procedure, at present, inasmuch as we have already landed on the last page of the present number. To this injunction, we are constrained to give heed till another occasion.]

"Brevity is very good
When we are, or are not understood."

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ARTICLE LVI.

The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church.

By Pres. A. Mahan.

[CONTINUED.]

Our last article, as our readers will recollect, closed with an elucidation of the doctrine of Redemption or Atonement, as set forth in the Confession of Faith. No attentive and candid reader, we are quite certain, can escape the conviction, that the doctrine therein set forth, in respect to this subject, is that of *particular*, in opposition to that of *general* Atonement. Before leaving this part of our subject however, it is requisite to notice the resort of Presbyterians of the New School to escape the charge of heresy on the ground of having departed, in a particular so fundamental, from the instrument adopted as "containing the system of doctrines revealed in the Holy Scriptures." As a means to this end, they are accustomed to distinguish between Atonement and Redemption. The former term, they say, expresses the provisions of grace for the pardon of sin, and the salvation of sinners. In respect to the question whether atonement is general or particular, the Confession is silent. It affirms neither the one doctrine nor the other. Redemption, on the other hand not only includes the idea of atonement, but also its effectual application, in the repentance, sanctification, pardon and salvation of the sinner. Atonement, they say, is general. Redemption, from the nature of the case is, and must be partic-

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ular. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose the opposite. The confession of Faith therefore teaches the doctrine of particular redemption; while in respect to the question, whether atonement is particular or general, it is undecided. Individuals may hold either doctrine, without denying any of the teachings of the Confession. That the term redemption is used in this instrument strictly in the sense of atonement, and not at all in that now before us, we argue from the following considerations.

1. Otherwise the doctrine of atonement is no where taught in the work. The term atonement is not found therein, and the doctrine expressed by the term is no where taught in it only under that of redemption. If then the term redemption is not used as synonymous with that of atonement, an individual may hold to a particular or general atonement, or to no atonement at all, without error, as far as the teachings of the Confession of Faith are concerned.

2. According to the sense which the New School attach to the term redemption, the sheerest tautology and nonsense conceivable attaches to the Confession of Faith. If redemption as therein used is to be understood as including the actual salvation of the sinner, to say that it is particular, is equivalent to the affirmation, that all who are finally saved, and none others, are finally saved. Did the assembly of divines torture their brains to express such an idea as that?

3. Redemption according to this view of the subject is really identical with effectual calling, which, in another part of the work is distinguished from the former, and is treated of in a distinct and separate chapter. The only difference that can be shown to exist between them, is that of a whole, as distinguished from its parts. In no such light, however, do they occur in the instrument under consideration. Redemption is there presented as exclusively the work of Christ, while effectual calling is presented as the no less exclusive work of the Spirit.

4. The term redemption is distinguished from effectual calling, justification, adoption, sanctification, &c., so as to render it demonstrably evident that it is used strictly and exclusively in the sense of atonement, as the following from Chap. III. evinces:

"SECTION VI.—As God has appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season;

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are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified and saved, but the elect only."

The reader will please to notice the order here presented, as first election, then redemption, (that is atonement,) then effectual calling, then justification, &c. We have here words without meaning, or rather the sheerest tautology conceivable, unless redemption is in this place, understood as strictly synonymous with atonement. Now it is strictly in conformity to such usage, that the term under consideration is employed throughout the work. If the laws of language determine any thing in respect to the meaning of any document whatever, they render two things undeniably evident—that the term redemption as used in the Confession of Faith, is strictly synonymous with that of atonement—and that particular instead of general atonement is the doctrine of that instrument. It is perfectly vain therefore, for Presbyterians of the New School to attempt to escape the charge of heresy, by a resort to the distinction under consideration. Such resort, if made, after due examination, can hardly escape the charge of delinquency on the score of moral honesty.

The attitude in which the reprobate will stand before God and the universe, in the light of the dogma under consideration, demands attention, before we pass from this department of our subject. Every attentive reader of the Bible must have noticed the fact as standing out with no little prominency upon the sacred page, that the chief source of the sinner's guilt, and the main reason for his aggravated condemnation at the great day, is his rejection of the grace proffered to his acceptance through the redemption of Christ. "This is the condemnation [the main reason why sinners will be condemned] that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." Such are the ever-varying teachings of inspiration on this subject. But how does the condemnation of the sinner appear in the light of the doctrine under consideration, together with the teachings of the Confession of Faith on other collateral subjects? The sinner, as we have seen, is, in the first instance "bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law," for original sin [the sin of Adam imputed, and the vitiation of constitution,] in the production of which he had, and could have had, no more agency than in the creation of the world, and for actual transgressions which he could not possibly but perpetrate. Then his doom is to receive infinite and endless ag-

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gravation for rejecting a salvation which was in fact never provided for him, and which it was absolutely impossible for him not to reject when proffered to his acceptance. Such is the character of the divine administration according to the fundamental teachings of the Confession of Faith. We say it in the fear of God, that such principles involve absolutely no elements of wisdom or justice, but all the darkest forms of absurdity, tyranny and oppression of which men or devils ever conceived. We forbear to add all that not only our feelings but most solemn convictions would prompt us to say, lest we should seem to be actuated by another spirit than that which really dwells in our hearts. We therefore proceed to a consideration of the teachings of the Confession of Faith in respect to the truth which comes next in order, to wit, that of *Regeneration or Effectual calling.*

If the doctrine of physical or constitutional depravity, together with the dogma, that the action of the will is, and ever must be in conformity to the prior state of the propensities, be admitted, but one view of the doctrine of Regeneration can legitimately be taken. It must consist exclusively in a change of the nature or constitution of the soul, a change resulting wholly from the supernatural agency of God, a change in which the subject is totally passive, and in the production of which he can have no more agency than he could have had in his original creation. Inasmuch also as the nature of man, prior to regeneration, is, according to the teachings of the Confession of Faith, wholly corrupt, and as a consequence, all the actions of his will can not but be "opposite to all good," and of course to any change of nature from which holiness would result, the elect are in all instances regenerated, not only not in conformity to any choice of theirs, but in opposition to, and in spite of all the prior determinations of their own wills. As all men are made sinners without any choice or agency of their own, so the elect are all made holy in opposition to their own wills. Inasmuch also as all men, prior to regeneration, cannot but sin, so the elect after regeneration cannot but be holy, to the extent to which their nature has been changed by the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit. Such must be the teachings of the Confession of Faith on these subjects, unless it is inconsistent with itself. That it has, in this respect, the merit of self consistency, we will now proceed to show. To accomplish this we need only cite the following sections from chapter X. on effectual calling:

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"SEC. I.—In this calling, all those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

"SEC. II.—This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from any thing at all foreseen in man; *who is altogether passive therein*, until being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it."

"'All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only" says the author of the Exposition, 'he is pleased effectually to call.' The subjects of this work are said to be 'called according to God's purpose,' and 'whom he did predestinate, them he also called.' Rom. viii. 28, 30; 2 Tim. i. 9. Those who dispense the word know not who are included in 'the election of grace,' and must therefore, address the calls and invitations of the gospel to men indiscriminately. They draw the bow ot a venture, but the Lord, who 'knoweth them that are his,' directs the arrow, so as to cause it to strike home to the hearts of those whom he 'hath chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world.'"

Again:

"The sinner is altogether *passive*, until he is quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit. Here it is proper to distinguish between regeneration and conversion: in the former the sinner is passive, in the latter he is active, or co-operates with the grace of God. In regeneration a principle of grace is implanted in the soul, and previous to this the sinner is incapable of moral activity; for, in the language of inspiration, he is 'dead in trespasses and sins.' In conversion the soul turns to God, which imports activity; but still the sinner only acts as he is acted upon by God, who 'worketh in him both to will and to do.'"

It is said in section I, cited above, that those who come to Christ, "come most freely, being made willing by his grace." This coming is the necessary consequent of the change of nature previously wrought in them by the Holy Spirit. As it was impossible for them prior to the change, not to reject the offer of life, so it is equally impossible for them subsequently not "most freely" to accept of it. In the change of nature, however, from which this coming does and cannot but result, the creature, as we are taught, Section II, is "altogether passive," "until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby," that is, in consequence of this prior change of constitution, "enabled to answer the call and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it," a thing, as we are elsewhere taught, absolutely impossible to man, prior to regeneration, and which is equally impossible for him not to do, this change having once been effected.

According to the teachings of the Confession of Faith on this subject, it is perfectly evident, that men may be regenerated and fitted for heaven in infancy, prior to all mental de-

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velopment, in a state of absolute idiocy, in sleep, and in a state of perfect derangement of all the mental faculties, as well as under the direct preaching of the word, or in any other circumstances. Life and death with man are suspended upon no rational act of his whatever. All is determined by the mere omnipotence of God acting upon him as a mere passive subject of an influence descending upon him without his knowledge, choice, or agency, an influence which he has no power to resist, and which might just as well, as far as anything pertaining to the creature is concerned, be imparted to all, as to one. Such is the teaching of the Confession on this subject, as the following section, together with the exposition of the same clearly evinces:

"SEC. III.—Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and where, and how he pleaseth. So also all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word."

EXPOSITION.

"The Holy spirit works by means; and the word read or preached, is the ordinary means which he renders effectual to the salvation of sinners. But he has immediate access to the hearts of men, and can produce a saving change in them without the use of ordinary means. 'As infants are not fit subjects of instruction, their regeneration must be effected without means, by the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit on their souls. There are adult persons, too, to whom the use of reason has been denied. It would be harsh and unwarrantable to suppose that they are, on this account, excluded from salvation; and to such of them as God has chosen, it may be applied in the same manner as to infants.'"

According to the teachings of the Confession the elect and the reprobate are, the one class taken to heaven, and the other doomed to eternal perdition, merely for being, and doing what they could not possibly avoid, and for no other reason. To the wicked, at the great day, the judge must say,—"Because I called," [invited you to accept of grace never provided for you,] "and ye refused," [a deed which the nature that I imparted to you rendered it impossible for you not to perpetrate,] "I stretched out my hand, and no man regarded, but ye have set at nought my counsel and would none of my reproof," [all of which, in the circumstances in which in my sovereignty, I myself placed and left you, you could not possibly but do,] "I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh." No one can show that we have here perverted, or falsely colored in the least degree, the fundamental teachings of the Confession of Faith.

The doctrine which next claims our attention, respects the *condition of the elect subsequent to regeneration.* As regeneration, according to the teachings of the Confession, is a change of

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the nature or constitution of the soul, a change produced exclusively by the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit, it follows as a necessary consequence, that a subsequent relapse from a state of grace, to one of total sinfulness, without a supernatural interposition of divine power, changing the renewed department of the soul back to its original corruption, is an absolute impossibility. Equally necessary also, and unavoidable, is subsequent obedience to the extent of the renewal of nature in regeneration, and the gracious influences which God in his sovereignty, may vouchsafe to call this renewed nature into activity. As the renewal however, is only partial in this life, actual transgressions to a greater or less extent necessarily pertain to the condition of all the regenerate during their earthly existence. That we have rightly interpreted the Confession on these points, the following sections from chapter XVII, entitled, "Of the perseverance of the saints," will render sufficiently evident.

"SEC. I.—They whom God hath accepted in his Beloved, effectually called and Sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace; but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.

"SEC. II.—This perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election, flowing from the free and unchangeable love of God the Father; upon the efficacy of the merit and intercession of Jesus Christ; the abiding of the Spirit, and of the seed of God within them; and the nature of the covenant of grace: from all which ariseth also the certainty and infallibility thereof.

"SEC. III.—Nevertheless they may, through the temptations of Satan, and of the world, the prevalency of corruption remaining in them, and the neglect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins; and for a time continue therein: whereby they incur God's displeasure, and grieve his Holy Spirit; come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts; have their hearts hardened, and their consciences wounded; hurt and scandalize others, and bring temporal judgments upon themselves."

Here the reader will notice the following dogmas as taught in the above sections.

1. The absolute impossibillity of the falling away of the elect from the state of grace into which they are introduced by regeneration. They "can neither totally nor finally fall away from a state of grace."

2. As regeneration itself occurs wholly independently of the will of the subject, and in opposition to all its previous choices and determinations, so "this perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free will," but upon the change of nature produced in regeneration, "the immutability of the decree of election," &c.

3. "Nevertheless they may, through the temptations of sa-

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tan, and of the world, the prevailing of corruption remaining in them," &c., fall into the most grievous, soul-hardening and scandalizing sins.

4. The only penalty to which they thus subject themselves is, not the loss of the divine favor, not subjection to the penalty of the law to which all other transgressors are subject in all acts of sin, but merely to "temporal judgments."

But this leads us to a consideration of another feature of the Confession of Faith, to wit, its teachings in respect to the *relations of the elect to the penalty of the divine law when they violate the precept.* On no one subject is the Bible more explicit than on this. The express design, for example, of the 18th chapter of Ezekiel is to reveal the solemn truth, that when a "righteous man turneth from his righteousness and committeth iniquity," he is subject to the same death-penalty that all other transgressors are, when they sin. It is there admitted and asserted, that were this not so, "the ways of God would not be equal." The same great truth is every where urged by the prophets, and by our Savior, and his inspired apostles. "If ye," says the apostle, addressing christians as such, "live after the flesh, ye shall die." Nor is there any thing, any where upon the sacred page, which looks at all in the opposite direction. But what are the teachings of the Confession of Faith on this subject? They are these. The law of God, in respect to all the elect, is forever abrogated, as far as the *penalty* is concerned. They may, and do violate the precept of the law "daily in thought, word and deed." Yes, they "may fall into grievous sins; and for a time continue therein." They may "grieve the Holy Spirit;" "have their hearts hardened, and their consciences wounded; hurt and scandalize others;" but all the penalty that they do or can incur in the perpetration of such abominations is, "to be deprived of *some measure* of their graces and comforts, fall under God's fatherly displeasure," and "bring temporal judgments upon themselves." By no act of sin, however, whatever its aggravations, or how oftensoever repeated, can they, by any possibility, forfeit their title to heaven, or "fall from a state of justification." That such are the teachings of the Confession on these points, the following sections from chapter xi, on Justification, together with those on Persevereance above cited, will undeniably evince. We give the sections in connection with the exposition of the same in the work before us:

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SEC. IV.—God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect, and Christ did, in the fullness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification: nevertheless, they are not justified, until the Holy Spirit doth in due time actually apply Christ unto them.

EXPOSITION.

This section is directed against the Antinomian error, that the elect were justified from eternity, or when the price of their redemption was paid by Christ. It is readily admitted that God from eternity, decreed to justify the elect; but till the period of effectual calling they are in a state of wrath and condemnation. Eph. ii. 3; John iii. 18. The righteousness by which they are justified was perfected in Christ's death, and the perfection of it was declared by his resurrection, and they may be said to have been *virtually* justified when Christ was acquitted and discharged as their head and representative; nevertheless, they are not *actually* and *formally* justified until they are vitally united to Christ by faith.

SECTION V.—God doth continue to forgive the sins of those that are justified: and although they can never fall from the state of justification, yet they may by their sins fall under God's fatherly displeasure, and not have the light of his countenance restored unto them, until they humble themselves, confess their sins, beg pardon, and renew their faith and repentance.

EXPOSITION.

"As justification is an act completed at once, so those who are justified cannot come into condemnation: 'There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.' Rom. viii. 1. The sins which they afterwards commit cannot revoke the pardon which God has graciously given them; but they may subject them to his fatherly displeasure, and to temporary chastisements. Ps. lxxxix. 30-33. Here we must advert to the well known distinction between *judicial* and *fatherly* forgiveness. Though God, in the capacity of judge, pardons all the sins of believers, in the most free and unconditional manner, in the day of their justification, yet that forgiveness which, as a father, he bestows upon his justified and adopted children, is not, in general, vouchsafed without suitable preparation on their part for receiving and improving the privilege. They ought, therefore, to humble themselves before God, make ingenuous confession of their offences, renew their faith and repentance, and earnestly supplicate the removal of his fatherly displeasure, and the restoration of his paternal smiles."

In the III section the believer is told, that his perseverance, and consequent final salvation, depend in no sense upon any choices or determinations of his own free will, but exclusively upon the immutable decree and agency of God. For him therefore to petition the throne of grace, or to put forth any efforts to secure his own final perseverance and salvation, is in reality, to attempt to take the work out of the hand of God, and exercise the divine prerogatives himself. He is then told that he may fall into the most grievous and aggravated sins, but that by no possibility can he, for a moment "fall from the state of justification" into which he has been introduced by regeneration, in other words, by no violations of the law of God, can he possibly subject himself to the penalty of that law. Now, as allevangelical christians admit, and from time immemorial have proclaimed, in all controversies with universalists, a law without a penalty, is no law at all.

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It is mere advice and nothing more. To abrogate the penalty of a law therefore is to abrogate the law itself. This, according to the express teachings of the Confession of Faith is true of all the elect, from the moment of regeneration. The church of Rome proclaims indulgence, with respect to particular sins, for special reasons. The Confession of Faith proclaims unlimited indulgence to all the regenerate, and that in respect to all forms of sin whatever which they may choose to perpetrate. For them the law has no penalty, with this slight exception; they may, "by their offences be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts," and subject themselves to "temporal judgments." The Bible affirms, that "when a righteous man turneth from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, for the sin that he hath committed he shall die;" in other words, that he is subject to the same penalty when he sins, that other transgressors are. The Confession affirms, that by no act of sin can a righteous man subject himself to the penalty of the law; that all the evil to which he can be thus subjected is a deprivation of "some measure of his graces and comforts," &c. A more unscriptural and pernicious heresy, we solemnly believe, the father of lies never invented, for the corruption of the heart of the church. Whatever may be true in respect to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, one thing is as manifest as inspiration can make it, that no man whether regenerate or unregenerate, can violate the precept of the law, without incurring the penalty, and remaining subject to it, till through "repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," his sin is pardoned. The opposite doctrine is Antinomianism in its worst and most licentious form.

We notice but one more doctrine of the Confession, that of *Infant damnation*, a doctrine now universally repudiated by the Presbyterian Church, but which is undeniably taught in her standards, as the following sections from the chapter on effectual calling most clearly show:

SEC. III.—Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word.

SEC. IV.—Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit; yet they never truly come unto Christ, and therefore cannot be saved; much less can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they ever so diligent to frame their lives according ro the light of nature and the law of that religion they do profess; and to assert and maintain that they may, is very pernicious, and to be detested.

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"The choice of some," says the Exposition, when remarking upon the doctrine of Reprobation, "must necessarily imply the rejection of others." "Election and rejection," says Dr. Dick, as quoted in the same work, "are correlative terms and men impose upon themselves, and imagine that they conceive what it is impossible to conceive, when they admit election and deny reprobation." To affirm the doctrine then, that there are elect infants, is to affirm its correlative, to wit, that there are infants who are reprobate; that is, to affirm the doctrine of Infant Damnation. To show that this doctrine is not taught in the Confession by mere accident or implication, we now cite the following sections from chap. xxi, entitled. "Of the church."

"SEC. I.—The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect that have been, are or shall be, gathered into one under Christ the head thereof: and is the spouse, the body, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all.

SEC II.—The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the gospel, (not confined to one nation, as before, under the law,) consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children; and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation."

Here, as the reader will perceive, the visible church is defined as consisting "of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children." It is then asserted, that out of this body, "there is no *ordinary possibility* of salvation." How could this be true, if all who die in infancy throughout the wide world, are finally saved. The doctrine of Infant Damnation is by no means an accidental or unessential element of the system of doctrines taught in the Confession of Faith. It was put there by design, and nothing but that spirit of Conservatism which reprobates the correction of even known errors and abuses, has preserved it there to the present time.

The doctrines of Imputation, of Physical Depravity, of Inability, of Limited Atonement, of man's passivity in regeneration, and of the abrogation of the penalty of the law in respect to all the regenerate, which we have considered in the present and preceding articles may be considered, and are in fact the foundation doctrines of the Confession of Faith. From these the entire system of doctrines therein developed, receives its form and dimensions. Take away these articles, or let them be supplanted by the doctrines to which they stand opposed, and we have another and a different system entirely. If we suppose, as some maintain, that the Confession affirms neither the one nor the other of these classes of doctrines, there is then in

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reality no system of doctrines developed therein, and to say that it "contains the system of doctrines taught in the scriptures," is to use words without meaning, or to assert what is in fact void of truth. To say that any work which neither affirms nor denies the doctrine of Imputation or of Physical depravity, of Necessity, &c., nor asserts the opposite doctrines, "contains the system of doctrines taught in the scriptures," is to affirm as great an absurdity as we can well conceive. To attempt to give the "system of doctrines contained in the scriptures," without affirming one or the other of these classes of doctrines, would certainly manifest quite as great a want of good sense, as a serious attempt to give to less than "airy nothing a local habitation and a name." To say, that such an end has been attained in any given system of doctrines is equivalent to the affirmation, that the Bible is one of the most unmeaning books that ever was written, that in reference to the most important of all departments of theology, it affirms neither the one thing nor the other.

The system of doctrines held by Presbyterians of the New School, as contrasted with that contained in the Confession of Faith, next claims our attention. In all the aspects under consideration, the two systems are direct and irreconcilable antagonisms. What one asserts as of fundamental importance to a right system of truth, the other rejects and repudiates as most pernicious error. The Confession of Faith, for example, maintains the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to all posterity. The New School universally repudiate the doctrine of Imputation, as the embodiment of injustice and tyranny, and maintain, as the only principle of righteous legislation, that no being is, or can be accountable for any thing but his own personal acts. The Confession asserts the doctrine of a corrupt nature derived from our first parents, a nature which is in "itself, with all the motions thereof truly and properly sin," and for the bare existence of which the subject, though in respect to its production, he had no knowledge, choice, or agency whatever, "deserves God's wrath and curse not only in this world, but in that which is to come." The New School admit the fact, in a certain form, of a corrupt nature consequent on the fall. At the same time they most strenuously maintain, that for the bare existence of this vitiation, the creature can, upon any principles of wise and righteous legislation, no more be held responsible, than for any form of disease, which, without his knowledge or agency, has been entailed upon him by natural generation. Sin, they

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maintain, in all forms and degrees, is "a violation of known duty," and that nothing but voluntary transgression, ever is or can be sin. The Confession of Faith teaches that in consequence of this original corruption of nature, all men while unrenewed by divine grace, are "utterly indisposed, *disabled* and made opposite to all good." The doctrine of Necessity, in opposition to that of Free Will, together with that of the total inability of all the unregenerate to do any thing morally right, is a fundamental doctrine of the Confession of Faith. The new School denounce the doctrine of Inability as the perfection of absurdity and oppression. Liberty as opposed to necessity, they regard as an irreversible condition of moral obligation. It is a fundamental article of their creed, that obligation can, in no instance, transcend the ability of the subject. They admit of no corruption of nature which "utterly disables the creature to all good," and yet leaves him under obligation infinite to perform the good. The Confession of Faith teaches, that in regeneration the subject is "altogether passive." The new School maintain, that regeneration is a change, not of the nature of the soul, but of fundamental principles of action, a change in which the subject is consequently as free, and as active as in any of the acts of his life. The Confession of Faith teaches the doctrine of Particular Redemption or Atonement. There is no error which the New School hold in deeper abhorrence and reprobation than this. They denounce it as directly contradicting the plainest teachings of inspiration on the subject, as rendering all the offers of grace, invitations, and entreaties to accept of mercy, of which the bible abounds, addressed to all men without reserve, the most solemn mockery conceivable, and the infinite evils which are to descend upon the finally incorrigible for rejecting mercy which, according to this doctrine, was never provided for, and consequently could never have been sincerely offered to them, as the height of injustice and oppression. In respect to all the fundamentally characteristic elements of a system of christian doctrines, the doctrines of the New School are diametrically opposed to the teachings of the Confession of Faith. What the latter proclaims as essential truth, the former reject and reprobate as destructive error.

Such are the relations of the New School to the Confession of Faith. Their character, as theologians will appear in totally distinct and opposite lights, according to the standard by which they are tried. When arrayed at the bar of

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Reason and the Bible, in all the respects in which they have departed from the Confession of Faith, they appear as the advocates of the only true and consistent system of christian doctrines. When tried by the Confession of Faith, which they have "sincerely(?) received and adopted as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures" they stand justly chargable with holding most essential error, if such a charge can be made out against any class of men whatever. How they can be acquitted on the score of moral integrity, in thus receiving and adapting the Confession of Faith, when they have already renounced the fundamentally characteristic elements of the system of doctrines therein developed, we leave it for those to decide whose consciences seem to be less tender on such points than our own. For ourselves we think that we have made the declaration for the last time, that we "sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith, as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures."

It is common for this class of theologians to justify their acts, adopting the Confession of Faith, by the assertion that they hold the *doctrines* taught in the instrument, but reject the *philosophy* on which the system of doctrines therein developed is based. But the charge brought against them is, not that they have rejected the philosophy, but the essential doctrines of the instrument, and that the reason, and the only reason why they have rejected its philosophy is, that they have rejected its essential doctrines. The doctrine of Imputation, Constitutional Depravity, of Passive Regeneration, and Limited Redemption, or Atonement, constitute and determine not only the essential elements of the theology, but equally of the philosophy of the instrument. We venture the affirmation, that no individual who resorts to such a device for self-justification, can tell us what he means by this distinction between the doctrines and philosophy of the Confession of Faith, or show that any ground whatever exists for such a distinction.

The appearance of the Exposition from which we have quoted so largely, has devolved upon the New School a most sacred responsibility to do one of the following things—To show by an appeal to the laws of language, that the explication given in this work of the system of doctrines taught in the Confession is wrong—or to acknowledge that they have, in most essential particulars, departed from the teachings of the instrument which they profess "sincerely to receive and

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adopt as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures." The first they never have done, and we are quite sure they will never attempt to do. In all their controversies with their brethren of the Old School, this one issue they have steadily avoided, to wit, are we orthodox according to the essential teachings of the Confession of Faith? After the celebrated exscinding act which resulted in rending asunder the Presbyterian Church, for example, a general convention of New School men met in Auburn, N. Y., for the purpose of consultation, and adopting measures demanded by the crisis. In that convention it was deemed expedient to make some declarations pertaining to the orthodoxy of the ministry and churches therein represented. The first proposition submitted was, that the convention should publicly avow their firm and sincere adherence to the Confession of Faith. This proposition met with the most decided opposition from the lay representation particularly, on the avowed ground, that the churches they represented did not believe in the system of doctrines taught in the instrument, and would rebel, if it was pushed upon their adoption. The proposition was therefore abandoned. What expedient was then adopted? Articles of faith, such as the convention and the part of the church therein represented agreed in, were drawn up, and the churches were requested to decide in view of them, whether or not individuals holding such sentiments were orthodox? The verdict of the churches might have been anticipated before hand. The Old School answered the question in the negative, for the reason that the articles set forth did not, in their judgment, correspond with the teachings of the Confession of Faith. For different and opposite reasons, the verdict of the New School was in the affirmative, to wit, these articles set forth *our* views, not of what the Confession of Faith teaches, but of what *we* believe to be true. The Convention agree with us, in other words, we agree with ourselves, therefore all subscribing to these articles are orthodox. This, as far as our knowledge extends, has been the uniform resort of the brethren of the New School. Will they now, when their brethren who differ from them have presented a full exposition of their construction of the teachings of the instrument which both alike profess to "sincerely receive and adopt as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures," even attempt to show that that exposition is not correct? In failing to do this, will they, as moral honesty in that case requires, confess before

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the world, their own real position, in respect to this instrument? Will they then confess their own aggravated sin, in deposing from the ministry holy men acknowledged to be preeminently such, and deposing them for no other reason than departures from the instrument which they, in their consciences knew, that the accused had departed from in particulars no more essential than they themselves had done? If the public do not require them to meet such questions, we doubt not the Judge of all the earth will do it. It may occur to some perhaps, that we have seemed severe in judgment, in intimating, that those who deposed the individuals referred to were aware of the fact, that they themselves were at as essential a remove from the Confession as the accused. On what other supposition, we ask in reply, can we account for the refusal of the Synod of New York and New Jersey to hear the case argued on this point? If the New School part of the church before whom the accused were arraigned were in the attitude to the Confession which the accused affirmed them to be, they certainly had a just right to avail themselves of the fact in their defence; inasmuch as it would have shown that the Confession of Faith was not in reality, a standard of doctrine in such a sense, that individuals could be legally condemned on the simple ground of non-conformity to its teachings. Had they been conscious of agreeing with the teachings of the Confession, they would have been glad, under the circumstances in which they were placed, of an occasion such as was then offered them, to have asserted and established the fact.

> "There is none whom the truth would impede,
> But they whom the truth would indict."

It is with melancholy interest that we reflect upon the fact, that an instrument setting forth such a system of doctrines as that which we have been considering, is now the authoritative standard of doctrine in the Presbyterian Church. The nineteenth century may well blush for shame, that at this era of the world's progress and history, one of the most learned and influential of all the various christian denominations should, on every occasion when one of its ministers or elders is inducted into the sacred office, make the public declaration, that it has made no progress in theological knowledge, since the Assembly of Divines, who held their sessions in the mere twilight of the Reformation, was dissolved. There is another position from which this subject presents itself in a light of more melancholy interest still.

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To the consciences of the entire mass of the clergy of the New School, it is, and can be nothing else than a continued snare. What must be the influence of making the asser on before God and the world, that we "sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this church, as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures," when the system which we actually hold, has no other relation, in all its characteristic elements, to the one referred to, than that of direct opposition. Then the fact, of the existence of which we are well assured, that this declaration, in the case of a large portion of ministers of the New School, is made in almost total ignorance of the contents of the instrument thus adopted. Many who have been born and educated in New England, (we express our belief of the fact, without fear of contradiction,) never even look into the instrument at all, before they thus receive and adopt it. Let any minister from any other denomination also go into any of our New School churches, and having given an undeniably correct and impartial exposition of the essential doctrines of the Confession of Faith, hold up such doctrines as the real sentiments of Presbyterians, and he will be accused, at once by the minister and church both, as a gross slanderer. Yet that very minister in the presence of that very church did make the solemn declaration that he did "sincerely receive and adopt this Confession of Faith, as containing the system o doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures." What must have been the influence of such a declaration upon the conscience of that minister. It is high time that this fearful incubus was thrown off from the conscience of the church. We think, that in what we have written, we have had a solemn regard both to her purity and peace.

The attitude in which the theological discussions of the past few years have placed the brethren of the New School deserves the special attention of an attentive observer of the signs of the times. New Schoolism, in the form in which it now stands before the public, has manifestly lost its power. The zeal of its advocates in its behalf has strangely declined, and in many instances totally died away. On the part of many, a decided tendency back to the cold and soul-withering absurdities of Old Schoolism is apparent. The cause of this singular state of things may be very readily detected. Old Schoolism has one merit, that of self-consistency. New Schoolism, in its present form, involves the elements of the most palpable contradiction. To give it form and consistency one new element must

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be introduced into it, the doctrine of Full Salvation through the redemption of Christ. No one, without manifest self-contradiction, can maintain the fundamental principles of New Schoolism, and deny this doctrine. Of this fact its advocates are becoming painfully aware, and hence the state of things of which we are speaking. To show that we have not made these remarks unadvisedly, we present our readers with an extract from the reply to the celebrated articles of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass., on this subject. The articles were published in the American Biblical Repository. The reply appeared in the Oberlin Evangelist, in 1841. The extract contains the sentiments of Dr. W., as set forth in his articles, and embodies the creed of all New School men on this subject. All the propositions here presented they do, in fact, maintain. Nor can they deny any one of them, without an abandonment of their fundamental principles.

"Permit me here to express freely my views of what appears to me to be the inconsistency and absurdity of admitting what you have admitted in your articles, and still denying the doctrine of Entire Sanctification. There is always something absurd and contradictory in error, when all its elements are distinctly apprehended. Truth, on the other hand, is perfectly beautiful and lovely in itself, and harmonious in all its proportions. I will suppose that you rise in the house of God, and propose, as the subject of your discourse, to establish the following propositions:

1. Perfect holiness in this life is definitely required of us in the Bible.

2. Perfect obedience to every command of God all are naturally able to render.

3. Provisions abundantly adequate are revealed in the gospel, to render us in this life, "perfect and complete in all the will of God."

4. We are authorized and required in the Bible, by promises "exceeding great and precious," to look to the "very God of peace" to be "sanctified wholly, and preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."

5. To render us thus perfect in this life is one great and express object for which the Holy Spirit was given, the church organized, and the ministry and ordinances appointed.

6. That we may attain to this state in this life, we are required by the express example and instructions of Christ and his inspired apostles, constantly to pray, and to "pray in faith nothing wavering," and at this state we are required as constantly to aim.

7. This state is, in this life, actually attainable by us.

8. No one is authorized in view of the truth of any one of these propositions, or all of them taken together, to pray for, aim at, or set his heart upon attaining a state of complete sanctification in this life, with the rational expectation of doing it.

9. No man ever did or ever will, in this life, attain to this state.

Would you be willing to undertake to sustain, before any intelligent audience these nine propositions? Would a full belief, apprehension and appreciation of the import of the first seven, at all prepare their minds for the reception of the last two propositions? Would not every intelligent hearer, who was ignorant of your real views, by the time you had announced the seventh proposition, be fully convinced, that you were an advocate of the doctrine of Christian Perfection? Would he not be astounded at the announciation of the last two, after he had listened to the preceding propositions? To lay a proper foundation for the last two, should not almost all the preceding ones be reversed? On the other

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hand, what better foundation conceivable could be laid for the establishment of the doctrine of Christian Perfection, than the admission of the first seven propositions as affirmed by the word of God? Let these propositions stand, and reverse the last two, so as to make them affirm this doctrine, and then your discourse presents a perfect and beautiful consistency throughout. Does truth carry upon its face palpable and undeniable marks of absurdity and inconsistency; while error bears throughout, features equally distinct and manifest, of beauty and consistency?"

Such is an unvarnished exhibition of the position of all New School men before the public. Who can wonder, that they stand appalled at the difficulties involved in their own position. Old Schoolism, on the other hand, presents no such difficulties. However unscriptural and absurd it principles may be, it has the merit of self-consistency. To the fundamental principles of Reason and the Bible, it stands, in all its essential elements, in palpable contradiction But it does not contradict itself. It is every where true to its own absurdities. Now the mind can endure almost any thing else in a received system, better than palpable self-contradiction. Hence the general tendency of New School men who deny the doctrine of Full Redemption to the absurdities of Old Schoolism. Did our limits permit, we should here state some of the facts which lie before us, pertaining to this subject.

In our remarks hitherto, we have said nothing of the merits of the Exposition from which we have quoted so largely. As presenting a correct exposition of the teachings of the Confession of Faith, it deserves a place among the works which the student in theology may peruse with profit. In respect to the manner in which the argument in favor of the truth of those teachings is conducted, we are not able to express so favorable an opinion. The odium theologicum is the principle argument appealed to in large portions of the work. Its author and revisers seem to have been aware, that the readers of the work generally are under a fearful horror of every thing bearing the name of Arminianism, Socinianism, and Pelagianism. Hence the teachings of the Confession are almost every where placed in opposition to these affirmed systems. Such and such, the reader is first told, are the teachings of Arminians, Socianians and Pelagians, on this point. But "our Confession," it is then added, affirms thus and so in respect to it. The reader would almost think that there are no other forms of christian doctrine, but those held by Arminians, Socinians, and Pelagians, on the one hand, and *our* Confession on the other. Nothing almost is permitted to stand upon its own intrinsic merits. Such a mode of argument in our judgment deserves the deepest reprobation.

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The reader throughout the work, we think, will not find a solitary paragraph the perusal of which will draw a tear from his eye; unless it be the reflection, that such a system of doctrines as that can command the belief and blight the moral sensibilities of so large and respectable a body of professing christians, for more than three centuries after the great reformer confronted the man of sin in the Diet of Worms, and the Bible has been proclaimed throughout the world as the text book of Protestants. As he travels through the work, on the other hand, its great subjects rise up around him like mountains of ice, to chill his sensibilities and bring the pulse of spiritual life within him to a perpetual stand still. Nor does he meet with a single sentiment which brings home to his heart the conviction, I ought to be a holy man, or to awaken within him any deep aspirations for the attainment of holiness. Not a solitary aspect of the divine government meets his eye which prompts the spontaneous exclamation, "True and righteous are thy judgments, O Lord, thou King of saints." The cause of all this lies in what is intrinsic in the system of doctrines developed in the Confession itself. In the presence of such a system, the heart can no more be melted into love and tenderness, than if surrounded with

> "A sea of stagnant idleness,
> Blind, boundless, mute, and motionless."

A universe of intelligent beings doomed to the unmitigated endurance of "all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal," for the single act of one solitary individual, an act perpetrated long before they existed. Then this same universe of miscalled moral agents doomed to a still more aggrevated and endless endurance of the "wrath of God, and curse of his law," for the mere possession of nature in the production of which they had, and could have had no more agency than in the creation of the world, and for actual transgressions which the possession of that nature rendered it absolutely impossible for them not to perpetrate. We will not go on with the picture. How is the heart melted at the conviction, that upon such principles as these the entire system of Christian doctrine is based. How true and righteous, in their light, do the divine judgments appear. This, reader, is the gloomy soulless specter to the horrid embrace of which new school men are flying, to escape the conviction of the truth of the glorious doctrine, that even in this life, the believer is "complete" in Jesus Christ. On a subsequent occasion, we design to enter upon an investigation of the fundamental principles of the Presbyterian form of government.

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ARTICLE LVII.

The Law of Right.

By Rev. J. M. Williams,
Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Springfield Pa.

Man is the conscious subject of law. There is a rule in the mind usually called the Law of Right, which he holds himself bound to observe; one which he feels approved for obeying, and condemned for violating. Its existence is one of the most incontestable and universally admitted facts of humanity. It is evinced by the confidence with which man pronounces some actions right and others wrong. For manifestly such judgments are possible, only on the condition of his having first compared the actions with a rule in the mind. It is evinced also by the use of such phrases as "I ought" and "I ought not." Such expressions are an acknowledgment, that we are the subjects of obligation—that we are under law. This fact is too palpable to need either proof or illustration.

This 'rule of right,' found in the mind, is not a product of the understanding, the result of any process of reasoning, but an *intuitive, moral judgment.* It belongs to the Reason, and differs entirely from those truths acquired by observation and experience. The most uninitiated certainly understand this distinction—the distinction between such truths for example, as "Paris is the capital of France," "Autumn and winter succeed the summer," and such as "Duration has no limits," "Space is unbounded." The *former* are learned through the intervention of the senses; the *latter* the mind sees by its own intuitive power of perception. The *former* are contingent, they may or they may not be so. The *latter* are absolute. The mind affirms that they must be truths, with a positiveness which incapacitates us to doubt them, or conceive the opposite.

The 'law of right' belongs to this latter class of truths. The child does not know he ought to do as he would be done by, in consequence of having been taught it. He has a higher

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knowledge than this. His Reason sees intuitively that it must be so. In proof that this rule, in the sense explained, is a rational conception, we remark,

1. Were it not such a conception it would be impossible to feel obligation to obey it, or guilt for violating it. We might learn from *experience* that some actions are useful, others injurious, but from this source we never could obtain the idea of obligation. It must be imparted by a power within; for there is nothing without to represent it.

2. It is universal. The rational being does not exist who has not a pervading everpresent sense of obligation. The civilized and the savage—all men 'live and move and have their being' in its immediate presence. The most benighted red man of the forest, though he may never have heard of the Bible, talks about right and wrong, and trembles at the recollection of violated obligation. This idea is the ground work of accountability, and it must be as extensive as moral agency. Men therefore are not dependent for its acquisition upon any of their senses, upon their skill at induction, or upon their facilities for obtaining instruction.

3. This law is imperishable. Were it acquired, it might be forgotten. But though a man forget the scenes of his childhood, it remains. Though he sink never so deep in crime, he cannot efface it. Make the most bewildered drunkard understand that some one, taking advantage of your ignorance, has defrauded you of all you had, so soon as he can articulate the word, he will pronounce the deed wrong, thus demonstrating that law sits enthroned, even in his degraded and chaotic mind.

The imperishability of this law, rather its everlasting presence in the soul, is a characteristic, which distinguishes it with certainty from all empirical cognitions. Thus we distinguish other rational intuitions. We rank the truth of the Divine Existence among the number, because it is one of which men cannot divest themselves, one from which consciousness can not avert her eye. The Atheist, though he may convince himself, as he supposes, for the thousandth time of its untruth, yet when sudden fear makes him honest, will present his requests to God. This characteristic, belonging to the Rule of Right, identifies it as an intuitive truth.

4. This law, as it exists in all minds, is precisely one, and the same. Wherever found, it is identical. Were it an empirical truth, it would vary with the customs, habits, and religions of different individuals and nations. But it does not.

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The Asiatic and European, North American and African pay homage to the same law.

Men *appear* to differ. Of this fact we are aware. The same action is by some regarded as right, and by others as wrong. But this difference respects the *application* of the rule, not the rule itself. Those who justify the action, refer it to a principle which all admit to be binding; while those that condemn it, deny that it falls under that principle. Here is the issue. The great Law of Right is never brought into discussion. In reference to it, there is a perfect agreement. The pagan mother, for illustration, if reproved for immolating her child, will tell us that the highest good requires the sacrifice. This we deny. Now what is the point at issue? Manifestly neither the nature, nor the authority, of the Law of Right. Here there is no dispute. All admit she ought to do what the highest good requires. But does it require her to sacrifice her child? This is the question at issue. It respects not the *law*, but its *application*. The same, we think, will be found true in all discussions about right and wrong. All men admit the sacredness and authority of the same law.

5. We assume the identity of this law, in the judgments we are necessitated to pass on the conduct of others. All men judge others by the rule they find in their own minds, thus assuming that all are under the same law.

The truth to which we wish especially to call the attention of our readers, is this. The Law of Right, which we have shown to exist in all minds, and to be a rational intuition, *is the moral law* contained in the Bible. The moral law enunciated by the Son of God is simply a transcript of this law of the reason. It is simply a copy of the rule inscribed upon the tablets of every soul. The Supreme Governor, when about to give a law, casting his omniscient eye upon man's moral nature, copied its dread demands, and these he then promulgated as the rule of human conduct.

An illustration, perhaps, would make our meaning more apparent. Our physical constitution has demands. It requires nourishment, exercise, and sleep. It requires exemption from severe exposures to heat, cold, and fatigue. Now should our Heavenly Father write out a perfect code of physical laws—should he prescribe the exact amount of food, exercise, repose, &c., requisite to our highest good—these laws would be to our physical natures, just what the moral law is to our moral natures.

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We said, that God copied the moral law from man's Reason. We might with greater truthfulness have said, that God made man in his own image, and so fashioned his moral constitution, that its behests are in perfect coincidence with the rule of eternal rectitude, which he imposes upon himself, and upon every other intelligence within his domain.

In proof of our position, we might, in the first place, quote every text in the sacred scriptures in which the terms *right* and *righteousness* are used in the sense of holiness or obedience to the divine law. What is righteousness? Conformity to the law of right. If this be holiness, as the Bible everywhere assumes, the law of right and the moral law are identical.

We might also quote that class of texts which charge the heathen with sin, and threaten them with punishment. What is sin? "A transgression of the law." But the heathen have never seen the Bible. How came they in possession of this law? The answer is plain. The moral law is the law imposed by the human conscience.* It and the law of right are identical.

In 1 John 3: 20, 21, we find a divine declaration having a very important bearing upon the point we are endeavoring to establish. "For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our hearts and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God." We are taught in this passage that if our own heart condemns us, God condemns us also. If it does not condemn us, God does not. In other words, if we violate the rule of right, as revealed in our minds, we transgress the law of God: if we do not violate this rule, we do not transgress that law. The passage assumes, and by manifest implication affirms, that the two are one and the same.

The bible teaches the great truth we are endeavoring to establish, however, not by implication alone. If we understand Rom. 2: 14, 15, it directly asserts that the Gentiles who are destitute of the written moral law, by obeying it, show that it is written on their hearts. No other intelligible meaning can be made out of the passage.

[A critical examination of this passage, would, we think, disclose a meaning which has a more important bearing up-

*We use the terms reason and conscience in this article interchangeably. Reason acting within a certain sphere—affirming a particular class of truths, is usually called conscience. The latter may be defined thus—Reason within the field of obligation.

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on the point under consideration than the construction which the writer has put upon it. The original words, here rendered "contained in the law," literally translated, would read thus, the things of the law. To do the things of the law, may mean to perform the things which the law commands, or to do the things which the law itself does; that is, to impose the same principles of duty which the law imposes. This last, we suppose to be the true meaning of the passage. Thus understood. and rendered according to the original, it would read, "Inasmuch as the Gentiles who have not the law [the revealed will of God recorded in his word] do by nature [through the idea of right and wrong which their own natural reason reveals to them] the things of the law, [that is, impose upon themselves the same principles of moral obligation which the law itself imposes,] these having not the law, [the written law,] are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law [the precepts which the written law requires] written in their hearts [revealed to them as interior lights and guides,] their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another;" that is, the great truth, that the duties imposed by the law of God, are revealed to the heathen is manifest in the fact, that their consciences impose upon them this law, and their own thoughts condemn or acquit them as they obey or disobey it. The common explanation makes the apostle assert three things which he by no means intends to assert—that the heathen, in their unenlightened state, do, in fact, sometimes actually obey the law—that when and only when they thus obey, they are a law unto themselves, that is, have any rule of duty at all—and that it is in the sense of their coming into a state of confirmed obedience to the law that they reveal the fact in their obedience, that "the work of the law is written in their hearts." Now the apostle never designed to assert the truth of either of these propositions, but in all essential respects, the opposite of them all. No man according to Paul, is or can be a sinner against God, who has not violated God's law. But God has, in reality, but one law. If the heathen are sinners, they must have violated *this* one law. They can not have violated this law however, unless it has, in some form, been revealed to them. The object of the apostle, is, to show, that this law is in fact revealed to them, though the written law, called "the law," never has been. To prove this he asserts in the first place, that by means of the natural light which they enjoy, the heathen do

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in fact, impose upon themselves the same principles of duty which the law [the written law] imposes, and that they are consequently a law to themselves, and may be justly held responsible for their conduct relatively to it. The heathen, the apostle argues still further, through the universal action of their consciences demonstrate the fact, that "the work of the law is written in their hearts," that is, that the very duties which the written law requires, are revealed to them, and that they do and can not but affirm their obligations to obedience. Their consciences always affirm their obligation to obey this same law, and their thoughts condemn or acquit them as they obey or disobey it. The direct object of the apostle, therefore, in the passage under consideration, is to assert and argue the perfect identity of the moral law, and the idea of right as revealed in the universal Reason of man. ED.]

The same truth might be substantiated by an appeal to the *statute books* of heathen, who have never seen the Bible. Among such enactments we find, "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. Honor thy father and thy mother." Now whence this similarity between their codes and that of the Bible? But one answer is possible. The heathen more or less accurately translate the law of their higher nature into their statute books. Hence their codes resemble that copy of the same law, found in the Bible.

The identity of these laws we remark further, is a simple matter of fact of which any individual may satisfy himself, by an appeal to his own consciousness in connection with a mass of facts which lie every where within and around him. So obvious is this identity, that many have been rescued from infidelity by it. They have found the Moral Law to be so perfect a translation of the demands of their inner being, that they have been constrained to confess it to be divine, and the religion of which it is the corner stone to be the religion for man. Who can read this law, as enunciated by the Savior, and not feel that it voices forth the deep wants of his moral nature? Read to the savage the divine mandate, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself"—and it challenges his assent. He cannot withhold it, if he would. His reason bows before its awful authority, and affirms his obligation to obey. The authority of this law has never been honestly questioned by man or devil.

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Whatever *theories* also men may adopt, however deeply schooled they may be in the dogmas of involuntary, constitutional, or propagated sin—it is their irrepressible conviction, that *doing right*, and nothing else, is *obedience* to God—that *doing wrong*, and nothing else, is *disobedience*. The common sense of the world has ever testified to the identity of right and holiness, of wrong and sin, of the law of conscience and the law of God.

It might be shown too, were it not so difficult to prove first truths, that nothing can be obligatory, except what Reason imposes, that her mandates constitute the Rule of Right (either as an abstract principle, or in its applications,) and consequently, that nothing else in opposition to it, is or can be binding.

We would not be understood to deny that a thousand applications of this rule could never have been known, had they not been revealed from heaven. We only mean to say, when any duty is enjoined, it must, either by virtue of its perceived nature, or by virtue of the authority of the being who enjoins it, receive the sanction of Reason, and thus be brought within the Rule of Right, in other words, be affirmed as duty, by the conscience of the subject himself, or it can not be binding.

It is an indisputable fact, we remark finally, that obedience to the Moral Law produces inward peace. Why is this? How can we account for the peace passing understanding, which reigns in the heart of the Christian? Why is there "no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus?" The reason is obvious—in obeying God, they obey the laws of spiritual life, as revealed in our own nature, and affirmed by our own consciences.

Why, on the other hand, is there no peace to the wicked? What makes the murderer so wretched? At midnight he has imbued his hands in the blood of his fellow. He has buried the corpse, and to the best of his ability concealed the evidence of the deed. Now he retires to rest, but how restless! How like an angry maniac he tosses on his pillow! His conscience shrieks in agony, and every feeling of his soul is in insurrection. Ah, let me lie on a bed of fire rather than feel what wrings his heart!

> "Sin is a pang where more than madness lies,
> A worm that can not sleep and never dies."

"He that sinneth against me, wrongeth his own soul." Why such facts as those above referred to in the unvarying

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history of humanity? The answer and the only true answer is this, When we obey the Rule of Right, we *know* that we have rendered obedience to the law of God, and conversely when we have obeyed the law of God, inward peace proclaims a corresponding conformity to the Rule of Right. When we transgress the Law of Reason, we know we have disobeyed God, and when we disobey God, inward pangs testify, in no dubious language, that the laws of the soul have been trampled upon. This is demonstration that the laws of God and the laws of our inner being are identical. There is the same connection between the transgression of Moral Law and mental pain, that there is between the transgression of physical law and physical pain. The former belongs to our moral nature, in the same sense in which the latter belongs to our physical nature. Moral law is simply the demands of our spiritual nature written out. To the doctrine which we have endeavored to establish the following objections may be urged—objections demanding a passing notice.

This doctrine, it may be said, is inconsistent with that of Total Depravity. If any one faculty of our nature is true to God and his government, the whole being is not depraved. This objection would indeed be fatal to our doctrine, if the depravity ascribed to the sinner were not moral but constitutional. This however is by no means the case. The sinner is not to be called into judgment for his constitution, but for "the *deeds done* in the body." On this subject the Bible is perfectly explicit. No other depravity for which man is held as morally responsible, is therein spoken of, or implied, but that which consists in "the transgression of the law." Now were our doctrine untrue, total moral depravity, in the Bible sense, would be an impossibility. "Where there is no law [when the rule of duty is not in some way revealed to the subject] there is no transgression." Either all mankind are not, in the light of God's law, totally depraved, or that law has been revealed to all, and they in all their moral acts, have violated it. Our doctrine, therefore, in respect to the identity of the moral law, and the idea of right, as it exists in the minds of all moral agents, must be true, or the doctrine of universal total depravity can not be true.

The inspired Apostle, it is urged again, informed Agrippa that previous to his conversion he "verily thought he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." Here, says the objector, we have an instance of a manifest discrepancy between the edicts of Reason and those

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of the Moral Law. The former requires what the latter forbids. Is our opponent serious in this objection? Will he maintain that it was *right* for Saul of Tarsus to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth? Certainly not. Then what discrepancy between *right and God's requirements* does this case afford? Will he say conscience required him to do what was not right? But this is absurd, for the demands of conscience are the very things, universally designated by the term "right."

The true explanation of the difficulty we suppose to be this; The Apostle intended to express merely an opinion which he had entertained in the days of his impenitency—an opinion which had no connection with his conscience. The word translated "ought" means 'expedient, fit, necessary.' He said he thought it necessary, (perhaps to support the religion of his fathers) to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. There is no evidence that he acted with the least reference to conscience or duty. Blinded by rage and passion, he was doubtless entirely reckless of both. As in case of other wicked men, in doing what they think proper, the voice of obligation was not heeded. Other principles had usurped their place, and controlled the will. Had he listened to the silent admonition of his conscience, he would have done far otherwise.

It is urged still further, that the same apostle affirmed to the Jewish council, that he "had lived in all good conscience before God until that day." It is contended that he here meant to assert, that he had never, during his life, violated his conscience. But this construction makes the apostle assert what no honest, much less divinely inspired man would assert. What then did he mean to affirm? The answer is plain. On the preceding day he had given to the same tribunal a history of his experience up to the time of his conversion. Here he resumes the narrative, and intends to be understood that since that event, and in respect to the questions then in controversy between him and his accusers, he had lived in all good conscience before God. This was evidently his meaning, for it was his life as a *Christian* that he was endeavoring to vindicate. With his previous course his accusers found no fault. Of that consequently, he had no occasion to speak at all.

If any inference relating to the subject in hand, can be deduced from this assertion of the apostle, it is favorable to the position we have taken. He had obeyed God's law, since

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his conversion. If he had obeyed the law of conscience too, there was certainly no discrepancy between them. He subsequently affirmed, that he "exercised himself to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and toward man." Would he have done this, had he believed that the dictates of conscience ever contravened the Moral Law? Would he have done this, had he not believed that they never disagree?

This view, it is still further objected, renders the Bible unnecessary. If the rule of duty be found in the Reason, there is no need of a special revelation of God. Will the objector say that no communication from heaven is needed, except a law—that no light relating to the objects and limits of human existence, the nature of God, and the conditions upon which he can be reconciled to offending man, is important? Will he deny that the law of Right itself needs to be unentombed from the depths of the soul, separated from every thing else, and brought with greater distinctness before the mind—that it needs to be clothed with Divine authority and rendered sacred by Divine sanctions—that light is especially needed relating to its endlessly diversified applications?

But can we not, according to this theory, it is asked, reach heaven, by following the dictates of Reason unaided by the Bible? Certainly, we answer, had the Bible never fallen within our reach. Enoch, Abraham and Job were never blessed by its heavenly light, yet they are among the redeemed. From the fact, that heathen may be saved without a special revelation, however, it by no means follows that they will be. Such a revelation is requisite, not to render their salvation possible, but to render it probable, and more especially certain.

The admission made above, however, affords no encouragement to the infidel and transcendentalist, who, repudiating the Bible, think to secure a happy immortality, guided only by the star-light of Reason. Enoch and Abraham never rejected the Bible. They availed themselves of all the light within their reach; so must all do who would follow the Rule of Reason. It requires us, for example, to do all we can to relieve suffering. This implies a command to do all we can to ascertain where suffering exists. Can we turn our back upon light relating to this point, and at the same time follow this rule? No, the idea is absurd, but no more so than the idea that we can follow Reason and reject the Bible. Would he who claims to do this, enter into a candid examination of himself, he would see, we think, that he comes far short of conformity to the Law of Reason. It requires him to do all

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the good within his power. Is he willing honestly to enquire whether by becoming a missionary to instruct the degraded inhabitants of Tunis, or Algiers, he could not do more to benefit his race than by living in ease and luxury at home? Is he willing candidly to investigate this subject, and then to follow the dictates of his Reason? Probably not. An examination doubtless would convince him that he is covering up a deeply dishonest heart—that *inclination* not *reason* is his guiding star.

This view, it is objected finally, makes conscience an infallible guide. In one sense, we answer, conscience is, and in another, it is not an infallible guide. The Divine law, and the law of conscience are a single identical principle, requiring supreme love to God and equal love to man. It is susceptible, however, of applications to all the exigencies of life. Some of its specifications are written out in the Bible; but in most cases we are left to our own honest judgments, in the use of all the light falling within our reach, to determine the forms of duty which the great law of love devolves upon us. Now in *applying* this law, we may err. From partial views of truth, we may feel conscientiously bound to take a course which more light might have shown to be injurious. In this sense conscience is *fallible*. But here is *error*, not *sin*. It is absurd to suppose any other course under the circumstances could have been obligatory. Left as we are to follow our own best judgments in applying the Law of Love, we certainly can not be involved in guilt in doing it. A conscientious sin, then, is an impossibility. The man who follows his conscience does no moral wrong. In this sense conscience is *infallible*.

The great truth which we have attempted to elucidate and establish, leads to many important suggestions. With a brief notice of a few of these, we shall close this article.

I. No sentiment is more untrue or dangerous than that which makes Religion and Reason antagonisms. So far as this sentiment obtains, men will reject religion; for implicit reliance on the decisions of the Reason, is a law of humanity never to be violated. Reason is and must be the final umpire of appeal. God so treats it. "Come now and let us *reason* together," is his language, meaning, let us bring the controversy before the bar of Reason and abide its judgment.

There are facts of infinite moment revealed in the Bible, and consequently fields opened for the application of the Law

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of Love, which unaided Reason never would have discovered, but there is nothing therein contrary to Reason. If there is, men must reject it. If there is any thing in our creeds manifestly unreasonable, we ought to expunge it, for it has no counterpart in the word of God. We can not ourselves ever have confidence in such dogmas. How then can we expect others to do it? It is too late to dole out our absurdities and comfort ourselves by supposing the disgust they create in men's intelligences, to be the opposition of their hearts to the truth.

Nor is the sentiment which divorces Religion and Reason true. From eternity they have been twin sisters and have never fallen out by the way. We are aware that infidels, in their crusade against Christianity, have always claimed Reason as an ally. To follow Reason is to reject the Bible, according to their creed. One of their number writes a book making war upon the sacred volume and entitles it 'The age of Reason.' Infidel France proclaims 'there is no God' 'the Bible is a lie,' "death is an eternal sleep," and then falls down to worship at the shrine of Reason. But all this is founded upon unadulterated puerile error—error which would only excite a smile, were it not so intimately connected with human destiny. The infidel in warring against Christianity wars against his own moral nature. He dethrones Reason when he casts down the Bible; he buries both in a common grave; for both are everlastingly linked together. The fact of the Divine existence is unceasingly echoed from the depths of the soul. The Divine Law is inscribed with a pen of iron upon the tablets of the heart. Every pulsation of man's inner being beats responsive to the truths of the Bible. What nameless folly then to reject that sacred book, while pretending to follow the spontaneities of human nature.

Whatever else may be true of infidels, it is certain they have never deeply studied themselves. We would as soon believe the man who denies the two sides of a triangle to be greater than the third, a good mathematician, as the man who denies the great facts of Christianity, a good mental philosopher.

2. Those who suppose religion to consist in involuntary feelings, and in the belief of abstract truths—those who believe it to be disconnected with such subjects as war, temperance, slavery and politics, labor under a stupendous error. Religion and right are identical and coextensive. They fill the whole circumference of human action and human ac-

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countability. That religion which is too abstract, refined, lofty, or circumscribed, to acknowledge intimate relationship with the reforms of the age, is poetry, not religion. The man who thinks himself a Christian, while transgressing the common principles of justice, carries a lie in his right hand.

3. The benevolence of God in giving man a law, and hanging over it the dread sanctions of heaven and hell, is conspicuous from this point. His law was copied from man's moral constitution. Its design is to protect his immortal nature. "Do thyself no harm," is its heavenly injunction. The mind is a "harp of a thousand strings." Patterned after the Uncreated Intelligence, it is "fearfully and wonderfully made." Its capacities and susceptibilities, its delicate and awful strings, its surpassing beauty, its endless duration, fit it for companionship with the Eternal One. This mind God would have rise and expand forever, with angelic energy and in angelic bliss. But its laws must be obeyed, or its beauty will be changed to deformity, its bliss to agony, its very existence to an insufferable evil. It will become

> "A wandering mass of hopeless flame,
> A pathless comet and a curse;
> The menace of the universe,
> Still rolling on with innate force,
> Without a sphere, without a course."

To prevent such ruin, God, blessed be his name, has written out its law, and enjoined obedience by the amazing sanctions of a future world. Who will not exclaim, "Just and righteous are thy ways, thou king of saints!"

4. Our subject presents the religion of Christ in an interesting aspect. 'His commands are not grievous' nor arbitrary. Religion is not gloomy, unnatural, ghostly. It is health in the soul. While impenitence is disease and derangement, among the mind's faculties, Religion is blessed, deep, infinite harmony. The one is a transgression, the other an observance of the laws of spiritual life. The question the gospel propounds to the wretched, unhappy sinner is this—'Wilt thou be made whole,' 'wilt thou have the life streams of immortal health coursing through the channels of thy soul?'

5. Christianity is from God. The Moral Law is the echo of man's moral nature, and must be the offspring of the same parent. It is the corner stone of the Christian edifice, and as it was laid by our Creator, we may safely repose in the fact that the whole super-structure is his handy work. Christianity is the religion for man. While every other system

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is unnatural and exotic, it is just what he needs. It reaches down into the depths of his wants, and with a soothing, heavenly hand, heals all his soul's maladies. "Great peace have they that love thy Law, and nothing shall offend them." It can say,

> "Come ye disconsolate where e'er ye languish,
> Come to the mercy seat, fervently kneel,
> Here bring your wounded hearts, here tell your anguish,
> Earth has no sorrows which heaven can not heal."

Or in the more melting language of the Son of God it exclaims, "Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden and I will give you rest." Christianity, reader, is *founded upon a rock.*

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ARTICLE LVIII.

Rom. Vii: 14—25—Not Christian Experience.

By Rev. Edward Weed,
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The most important inquiry suggested by reading this passage is, whether the state of mind here described is that of a Christian, in the exercise of pure Evangelical faith, or that of a convicted sinner, seeking sanctification, or deliverance from the power and dominion of sin, *by the Law ?*

This question has agitated the Christian World some fourteen hundred years. On each side of it, have been arrayed some of the ablest biblical scholars, and some of the best and purest of men. Unlike that of many other religious questions, which have agitated the church equally long, and which have been even more warmly contested, *this is one of the highest practical moment.* It respects the standard of Evangelical piety, and consequently the purity and efficiency of the christian church. Indeed it involves to a greater or less extent the salvation of a multitude of the professed disciples of Christ. It is this view of the matter, which has led the writer to present his convictions and reasonings upon the subject, and not, either the love or desire of controversy. Upon a very little reflection, it will be perceived that the difference of view between the parties in this controversy, is radical—pertaining not to the meaning of a few terms, or phrases, but to the whole state described. The one class of interpreters take the ground, that the description here given is an accurate map, or picture of the regenerate heart; whilst the other class deny that it applies to christian character at all. They aver, that the state of mind here portrayed differs wholly from that of believers, who have received the spirit of adoption, whereby they cry "*Abba, Father.*"

We are aware that some have attempted to steer a middle course between these extremes. The attempt however in our estimation has been wholly unsuccessful. The passage, as we understand it, does not describe, either a low, or high form of Christian experience. The portrait is neither that of a babe in Christ, nor of the man who has arrived at the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ; but it is that

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of the convicted sinner, struggling by his own unaided powers, from legal considerations alone, to deliver himself from "the gall of bitterness, and the bonds of iniquity." It may be, and undoubtedly is true, that the back-slidden christian, who has fallen from the *evangelical state of faith*, into the slough of legality, has an experience like to the one here described. But let it be remembered, that the experience of a backslider *is not christian experience.* Unless his backslidings are healed he will be lost.

In substantiating our view of the subject, we will in the first place, present and answer the arguments usually relied upon to establish the other side of the question. These may all be reduced to three.

1. The apostle throughout the whole passage speaks in the present tense—therefore, it is said, it may be legitimately and fairly inferred, that he describes the state of mind which he possessed when he wrote it.

2. It is alleged, that many of the terms which are used in the description are applicable only to the renewed heart.

3. It is said, that the state of mind here described accords with the common, if not with the universal experience of christians.

We begin with the first of these arguments, which is the inference drawn from the use of the present tense in the passage, that the apostle describes the state of mind, which he possessed at the time in which he wrote. If this inference is correct, it conclusively and forever settles the question. For there can be no doubt, that the apostle Paul, when he wrote this epistle, was possessed of a high matured christian character. As to when and where this epistle was written, there is very little difference of opinion. It is generally believed, and on good evidence, that it was written at Corinth, in the latter part of A. D., 57, or the fore part of A. D., 58. At this time the apostle had passed some twenty years in the minstry—had performed with great success three missionary tours through Asia Minor, and was near the completion of his second in Macedonia and Achaia. More than fourteen years before, he had experienced that glorious vision, described 2 Cor. 12: 1, in which, he was caught up to the third heaven, the paradise of God, and heard unspeakable words. It was also but a few weeks after his long and successful labors at Ephesus, in reference to which, he could say, he had not "shunned to declare the whole counsel of God," and that he was "clear from the blood of all men."

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If any one should wish to examine the proof, as to the time and place of writing the epistle, they may compare the following passages:

1. As to the time—Rom. 15: 18, 19, 23—27. Acts 19: 21; 20: 22; 24: 17. 1 Cor. 16: 1, 2. 2 Cor., 8: 1; 9: 1, 2, 12.

2. As to the place of writing. Rom. 16: 23. 1 Cor., 1: 14. Acts 19: 22. 2 Tim., 4: 20.

That the apostle was not in a backslidden state of mind at the time of writing, the whole epistle bears ample testimony. Not relying however on a general vague statement we will adduce a few passages to show, that his mind at the time was in the full fervor of gospel love. 1. Chap. 9: 9—16. "For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his Son, that without ceasing I make mention of you always in my prayers, making request (if by any means now at length I might have a prosperous journey by the will of God) to come unto you. For I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual gift, to the end you may be established; that is, that I may be comforted together with you, by the mutual faith both of you and me. Now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that oftentimes I purposed to come unto you, (but was let hitherto,) that I might have some fruit among you, even as among other Gentiles. I am a debtor both to the Greeks, and the Barbarians, both to the wise and the unwise; so, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome also. For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ."

Who can attentively read this passage without realizing, that it is the language of a triumphant faith and love, of one who was filled with a burning zeal, to communicate to others what his own mind saw, and his own soul was experiencing?

We quote next, Chapt 9: 1—3 "I say the truth in Christ; I lie not; my conscience bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart. For I could wish that myself were acursed from Christ, for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh." Here is a three-fold testimony, that the apostle was in the enjoyment of the fullness of the blessing of the gospel at the time he wrote.

1. What he utters, he affirms, was done in Christ, that is, he did it feeling his union and communion with Christ, having the very spirit and temper of his heavenly master.

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2. That he is not mistaken as to the state, he declares himself to be in, he asserts that his conscience under the enlightning and guiding influence of the Holy Ghost, bears him full and clear testimony.

3. The spirit he possessed, was the very spirit of the great head of the church, who voluntarily took the sinner's place, and "sufferred the just for the unjust." He could wish, that the penal evil threatened against sin, might be inflicted upon his own soul, if by thus suffering, he could be instrumental of saving his Jewish brethren. Such disinterested love, such heavenly compassion is never possessed, nor felt by any one, who is not in full and sweet communion with his Lord and Redeemer.

The last passage we adduce upon this point, is Chapt. 15: 9. "And I am sure that when I come to you, I shall come in the fullness of the blessing of the gospel of Christ." No one in a back-slidden state would make such a declaration, without being guilty of the highest presumption. These passages, together with the whole tenor and spirit of the epistle, show beyond a shadow of doubt, that the Apostle, at the time of his writing the epistle, was in the full enjoyment of evangelical piety. Hence we affirm that if this present-tense argument is valid, it conclusively and for ever settles the question. The passage, in question, is not only descriptive of christian experience, but also of a very high form of the same; for no one probably, will have the hardihood to assert, that Paul at this time was a mere driveler in piety, that he was still wrapped in the swaddling clothes of christian baby-hood. Here let us remark in passing, that this view of the subject, entirely cuts off those, who would rest at the half way house, upon this question, who tell us, that though the passage is not a delineation of the highest state of christian experience, still it is, of a low form of it. Of such, we would ask, what becomes then of your present-tense argument? Do you maintain that Paul was in a low state of Christian enjoyment, when he wrote the epistle. If not, then this low form of Christian experience was not his at the time of writing, and the present-tense argument by your own interpretration, is cast aside. The passage then, if it is the picture of the Apostle's spiritual state, at the time it was written, is not only descriptive of Christian character, but also of that character in its maturity. It contains, not only the outline of the inheritance conferred upon the disciple of Christ, while here upon earth, but also, the delineation of the fullness of his possessions.

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Having thus stated what this argument, if valid, proves, let us, in the next place, examine its validity. It is very obvious that an argument carrying with it, such important consequences, should be well founded. It ought to stand upon an impregnable basis. *Does this stand upon such a basis?* Is it an uncommon thing for speakers, or writers of any age or nation, when personating a great principle or fact, to use the present tense, when at the same time, it is well understood, that the description given, is not a delineation of their present state or character? Take a familiar example. Often is an orthodox clergyman, in leading the worship of the congregation, heard to use, in his prayer, language like the following: "We are all sinners, we have gone out of the way. In us there is no worth, or worthiness. We are altogether polluted—from the crown of our head to the sole of our feet, there is no soundness." In such a case, are we to understand, that he means to affirm, that this is the then state of all present, comprehending both the converted, and the unconverted? Or does he mean to say that aside from divine grace, and the renewing and sanctifying influences of the spirit, this is the natural state of all? Undoubtedly the latter is the fair, and only legitimate construction of his words. To say that those, who are regenerated and walking under the Spirit's guidance, are altogether polluted, that in them is *no moral soundness*, would be manifestly absurd. It would be equivalent to saying, that the regenerating and sanctifying power of the Spirit, when fully exerted upon the soul, produces in it, no moral change.

Again, when the Apostle James, speaking of the tongue, affirms, that "therewith bless we God, even the Father, and therewith curse we men, who are made after the similitude of God," would it be legitimate to infer, that, because he uses the present tense, at the time he wrote, he was in the habit of cursing his fellow men? Such an inference all would pronounce the height of absurdity.—Still further, when the Apostle Paul writing to Timothy declares, "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of *whom I am chief*," because he uses the present tense, are we to understand, that he meant to assert, that at the time of writing, he was not only an actual sinner, but also in *rebellion and opposition of heart to God*, he was ahead, or took the lead of all other sinners? Horrible conclusion!—Who is hardy enough to maintain it? If the above reason-

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ing is correct, and if the illustrations adduced are to the point, then it follows, that the simple fact of the use of the present tense in the passage under consideration does not prove it to be descriptive of the then state of the Apostle's mind. There must be other reasons conjoined with it, in order to establish such a conclusion. Is there any thing in the context which demands such a construction? Let us see. In the seventh verse of our chapter, the Apostle commenced illustrating the effect of naked law, upon the depraved human heart by an appeal to his own experience, or in other words, according to a manner peculiar to himself, (see 1 Cor. 13: 1–3, 11; Phil. 3: 4–12, &c.,) he impersonates a great and universal truth.—Pursuing his description, in the eleventh verse, he asserts, that sin, taking occasion by the law, had both deceived and slain him. In the next verse he proclaims the perfect holiness of the law, and then in the thirteenth, states, and explains the seeming paradox involved in these two declarations.—"Was then," exclaims he "that which is good, made death unto me? By no means. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." The subsequent part of the chapter is an illustration or rather a description of the manner in which the commandment, or law coming in collision with the depraved heart, developes the extent and strength of its opposition to holiness. It is introduced by what Prof. Stuart denominates, *gar* illustrantis et conformantis. "For," says the apostle, "we know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin." When? How? In his natural, unregenerate state, destitute of, and undelivered by grace. Here let it be observed that in the first clause of the verse, there was a necessity for changing the tense.—The apostle could not have said, "We know that the law *was* spiritual." Such a declaration would have implied, either, that the law itself had ceased to exist, or that it had lost its spirituality. In all the previous descriptions, the law had been so referred to, that the past tense could be appropriately used, but as now referred to, it could not be so used. Having thus changed the tense in the first clause of the verse, nothing was more natural, than for a lively, forcible writer like Paul, to make a corresponding change in the latter clause, and having begun with the figurative use of the tense, it was equally natural, and according to rhetorical rule, to continue it through the whole description.

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In the above argument our simple aim has been to show that the use of the present tense does not necessarily prove that the passage is descriptive of the Apostle's spiritual state at the time in which he wrote. Neither the laws of language, nor the subject matter, nor the context, absolutely demand such an interpretation. If such a construction is not necessarily, or absolutely demanded, it may not be demanded at all. Farther if not absolutely demanded, it may be an utter perversion of the truth. Hence the argument drawn from the use of the present tense is wholly inconclusive, and establishes nothing.

We do not however, intend to rest with simply invalidating this argument. We will now proceed to prove, that the state of mind, here described, could not have been the apostle's state, at the time, when he penned the passage. It is a good rule of interpretation, and especially applicable to the inspired writers, never to make the statements of an author to conflict with each other, unless the *usus loquendi*, or the laws of language absolutely require it. Now we assert that the interpretation which makes this passage descriptive of Christian character, directly conflicts with all that the apostle elsewhere declares of himself as a Christian. In proof of this, let us analyze the state of mind, here described, and compare it with other declarations of the apostle in reference to his character, and experience as a Christian. There are five distinct and prominent characteristics portrayed in the passage.

1. It is a carnal, as opposed to a spiritual state. "*I am carnal.*"

2. It is a state of bondage and captivity as opposed to spiritual liberty. "*Sold under sin.*

3. It is a state abhorrent to the conscience, and at which, the whole moral man revolts. "What I do, I allow not: but *what I hate*, *that* I do."

4. It is a state of moral helplessness. "For to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not."

5. It is a state of great spiritual misery and wretchedness. "O wretched man that I am, *who* shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Resurveying this analysis, one can scarcely refrain from involuntarily exclaiming, Is this all that the grace of God proposes to do for man on earth? Does regeneration leave the soul in a carnal state, sin's captive, the abhorrence of reason, impotent to

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good, and as miserable as the death agony can make it? Is this destroying the works of the devil, binding the strong man armed, opening in the heart the fountain of salvation that wells forth the perennial streams of eternal life? Is it giving rest to weary, way-worn souls, healing the broken-hearted, and setting at liberty them that are bruised? Do these carnal, manacled, helpless, wretched slaves of sin constitute that "chosen generation," that "royal priesthood," that "holy nation," that "peculiar people," who are to show forth "his praises, who called them out of darkness into his marvelous light?" Our soul sickens at such an obscuration of the glorious gospel of the Son of God. We proceed now to our argument. It has already been shown that Paul at the time of writing our epistle, was a mature christian, in the full exercise of the evangelical spirit and graces.

1. We assert that there is no scriptural sense in which such a man can be said to be carnal. There are but two cases in which the scriptures apply this term to the spiritual state of men. One is, when they are in the flesh; (See Romans 7: 5; 8: 9, first clause:) in their impenitent and unregenerate state, given up to self-gratification, and under the dominion of lust, the appetites and passions. (See Romans 8: 5—8, 13; Gal. 5: 19—21. The other is, when they profess to be the disciples of Christ, but in their lives and conversation do not manifest the light, spirit, and power of the gospel. (See 1 Cor. 3: 1—4.) Was Paul in either of these senses carnal? If not, in what sense was he carnal? Will some one answer? He declares Gal. 6: 20, that by the cross of Christ he is crucified unto the world, and the world unto him. What does he mean here by the world? Certainly not the circumambient atmosphere in which we live and breathe, nor the mountain's height and the ocean's depth, nor the fountains and rivers of water—the hills and valleys of earth, clad in their beautiful vesture, and teeming with their myriads of animated forms. In no such sense as this, does man need to be crucified to the world. This is nature with open volume standing, to be read and known of all men. It does however mean the pursuits, lusts, passions and motives of that selfish world, in which ungodly men live, move, and have their being, and which the apostle John has so graphically described. "For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life is not of the Father, but is of the world." If a man be wholly dead to these and they to him so that they *seldom tempt*, and *never*

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rule him, in what sense, can it be said that he is carnal? Again, Gal. 2: 20, the apostle declares that he is crucified with Christ, that nevertheless he lives, yet not he, but Christ lives in him. How did Christ live in him? The answer is obvious: as in other believers by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. But in Romans 8: 9, it is asserted that those in whom the spirit of God dwells are not in the flesh; that is, they are not carnal. Here then is double proof that Paul was not carnal. In leaving this point, we have a request to make of those who may hereafter insist that the passage under consideration is Christian experience, that they will please tell us, in what sense, in his mature christian state, the world crucified to him, and he to it, and Christ dwelling in him, Paul was carnal.

2. Was the apostle, when he wrote, in spiritual bondage—*Sin's captive and slave?* All that has been said under the other head goes to prove his emancipation from the service of sin. If a man is not *carnal*, but *spiritual*, if Christ lives in him, and his life is a life of faith, how can it be said, that *such an one is a slave to sin*? But Paul tells us in the passages quoted above that he lived thus, and therefore it is manifest that he was not sin's captive or slave. Sin never rules over man, except through what is denominated in the scriptures "*the flesh.*"

In I Cor. 9: 26, 27, he declares to his Corinthian brethren, "I therefore *so run, not as uncertainly, so fight I, not as one that beateth the air*, but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away." This is not the language of a cringing manacled slave, but it is the voice of a conqueror, who walks the field of battle in triumph. Mark, he does not say I *ought* to keep my body under, I *endeavor* to do it, but *I do it.* Again, what does body mean here. Undoubtedly the whole man. By a figure of synecdoche, which is very common in the Scriptures, a part is put for the whole. See the same use of the term body, Rom. 12: 1. It would be a strange interpretation to suppose that the apostle would be very busy in subduing those propensities more immediately connected with the bodily organs, while he neglected the more subtle and deadly ones, having their lodgement in the spirit. Add to all this his declaration, Rom. 8: 2, "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death," and the proof is complete that Paul, in his christian state was neither the captive nor the slave of sin.

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3. Did the apostle live in a state of mind at which his conscience continually revolted, so that what he did he allowed not, but even that which he hated, he performed? Let the following passages be compared with the statement of Romans 7: 15, and see if it be possible to harmonize them with it, on the ground that they describe the same state of mind.

Acts 23: 1; "And Paul earnestly beholding the council said, Men and brethren, I have lived in all good conscience before God until this day." 24: 26; "And herein do I exercise myself to have always a conscience void of offence towards God and man." 2 Cor. 1: 12; "For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with *fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God* we have had our conversation in the world, and more abundantly toward you." In these passages three things are affirmed, which if true, utterly preclude the idea of a man, in whom they all meet, living in a condemned state—his reason and his doings being constantly at war with each other.

1. He declares that he had lived, and was living *in all good conscience before God.*

2. That it was his practice to keep a conscience void of offence towards God and man. The word translated exercise in the second verse quoted, means to do or practice, rather than to try or endeavor. Perhaps our word *train* would more exactly express the idea.

3. In the strongest language possible, he declares that his conscience testifies to the perfect probity and godliness of his life.

(1.) Their walk was in the simplicity or integrity, and the sincerity or purity (for the word means this, see Robinson's Lexicon.) of God; that is, as we understand it, in that integrity and purity which God by his Spirit has imparted to, or begotten in us, as opposed to these qualities as the mere results of nature, constitutional bias, habit, or impulse.

(2.) "Not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God." This may refer to the standard of the integrity and purity mentioned in the preceding clause, and then its meaning will be, not that measure of integrity and purity dictated by man's unaided understanding, but that measure supernaturally revealed to the mind by the divine Spirit. On the other hand it may refer to the term conversation; then the meaning will be that in all they did, they were supernaturally directed and governed, instead of being led by the simple light of their own intellects, unillumined by the divine presence.

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The term usually translated *conversation*, in our version of the New Testament, all are aware, in the original relates to the whole course, or conduct of the individual, and not simply to his converse with his fellow men. Fleshly also is frequently used to denote that which is the mere product of nature, and grace that which is supernaturally communicated. For example, see Matthew 16: 17. "And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: for *flesh* and *blood* hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." The simple import of this is, that the fact that Jesus was "Christ the Son of the living God" had not been communicated unto Peter through the ordinary natural channels, but by direct divine revelation. The point of his blessedness was not the knowledge that he had, that Jesus was the Messiah, but the manner in which he had received that knowledge, and the proof that it affords that his spirit had come into direct communication with the living God. To be a fleshly and a natural man is the same thing. To be a spiritual man, and a man of grace is the same thing also. In this light of the subject, let us paraphrase our text. For our glorying is this, the testimony of our conscience, that we have lived and walked in this world, in the integrity and purity of heart which God imparts unto the soul, and have been directed in our measures and doings, not by the wisdom of mere human ingenuity, but by that wisdom which the Divine favor bestows through illumination of the Holy Spirit. Could any man's conscience testify thus, whilst he was uniformly doing that which he disapproved, and even abhorred? We will only add upon this point that the apostle Paul uniformly taught, that the state of mind, which in these verses he asserts himself to have lived in, was the only true evangelical state. In 1 Tim. 1: 5, 19, he says, "Now the end of the commandment is charity out of a *pure heart*, and of a *good conscience*, and of *faith unfeigned*." 19th verse—"Holding faith, and a *good conscience*, *which* some having put away, concerning faith have made shipwreck." Now who does not see that the view here set forth directly conflicts with the interpretation, that makes Rom. 7: 15, descriptive of the apostle's christian state. *They are palpable opposites.*

4. Was Paul as a christian morally helpless? In Rom. 7: 18, 19, in the character which he personates he declares, "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but

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the evil which I would not, that I do. "If this be applied to him in his christian character, it directly conflicts with all the other statements made upon this point, in reference to him as a christian. Phil. 4: 11—13. "I have learned," says he, "in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know both how to be abased, and I know how to abound, every where and in all things, I am instructed both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need. I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me." Surely here is a manifestation of some little moral power; some degree of capability of performing as well as willing. In 1 Cor., 6: 12, he is heard saying, "All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient; all things are lawful for me, but *but I will not be brought under the power of any.*" Here too is the indication of moral strength. Chapt. 9: 19—"For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more." This is a most remarkable passage; remarkable both for the conception and realization of a most pure and lofty sentiment, whilst at the same time it proves its possessor to have been acting upon the most exalted principles of benevolence and have exercised great if not perfect self-control. He was conscious that such was the reigning love of God in him, that no man nor set of men, nor all men together could either persuade or force him to do that which his conscience or God forbade. In this respect he was free from all men. He was not the servant of their lust, or power. Yet, on the other hand, such was his love for men, his devotion to their good, that he was voluntarily yielding up himself with his entire energies in the most toilsome and self-denying labors to promote their welfare. In this respect, he was the servant of all men. Has not the man in such a state of mind as this moral power? Is he not *performing* the good as well as *desiring* it. If not pray tell us what moral power, and what good are? Again, in Chapt. 10: 33 he says, "Even as I please all men in all things, not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved." The comparison upon this point might be extended much farther. It is however unnecessary. In the passages quoted, the apostle declares substantially, that such was his state of mind, that he was not depressed by hunger and nakedness, nor elated by fullness, that he was swayed neither by the fear nor the favor of men; yet through love to them he pleased not himself, but was wholly devoted to their good, that though living in the flesh he did not war after the flesh, but that he brought eve-

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ry thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ. Could he declare these things of himself, and at the same breath exclaim, "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not." I trow not. There remains a fifth inquiry. Was Paul in his christian state spiritually wretched? That he endured a great fight of outward afflictions no one disputes, that he shed the tears of benevolent sorrow, and had all the anxieties of a benevolent solicitude is abundantly evident. But that his soul dwelt in a death-agony in consequence of the continued triumph of sin in the heart, who can believe? All that has been said under the other heads go to disprove this supposition. If Paul was not carnal, not the slave of sin, not under the ban of his own conscience, not morally weak; but on the contrary, if he was spiritual, free from the bondage of corruption, possessed of an approving conscience, and clothed with spiritual might, how could he cry out, "Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The fact is he was not spiritually wretched, contemplate the scene in the jail of Philippi. Listen to the midnight song of praise from the cold, damp, dark dungeon of that prison. Are they the notes, or words of sad, wretched hearts? Hear one of his statements upon this subject, 2 Cor., 1: 3—5: "Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, and the God of all comfort; who comforteth us in all our tribulation, that we may be able to comfort them which are in any trouble, by the comfort wherewith we ourselves are comforted of God. For as the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so our consolation, also aboundeth by Christ."

We will here rest our argument under the first head, by simply stating what we have proved.

1. We have shown that there is nothing either in the use of language, or the context of the passage, which demands that the present tense should be literally rather than figuratively construed.

2. We have shown that in this instance, a literal construction would bring the passage into direct conflict with many other plain and obvious statements of the same writer, and thus violate one of the most sacred and common-sense canons of interpretation. In conducting this part of the discussion it will be seen, that we have gone into a careful analysis of the passage, and instituted a somewhat laborious and extended comparison of statements; yet by no means, as every one familiar with the apostle's writing will readily perceive,

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exhausting the subject; that is to say, the comparison, under each question raised, might have been carried much farther with accumulating evidence. We ask the advocates of this present-tense argument to harmonize, if it be possible, these conflicting statements. If it be not possible, then let it be no more advanced.

We now come to the second argument, which is, "That many of the terms used in the description are applicable only to the renewed mind."

Here we boldly join issue, and declare that the strongest terms used in the passage are not necessarily applicable to the regenerate heart. We go farther and say, as qualified here, they are never so applied in the Sacred Scriptures. We will begin with the strongest, "*For I delight in the law of God after the inner man.*"

In this passage, two words, "delight," and "inner man," are relied upon to prove that the statement it contains is applicable only to the Christian. The first term, it is said, is stronger than could be used in reference to any impenitent sinner; the second, it is said, evidently denotes the *new man.* Perhaps Mr. Barnes' comment upon this verse, presents the argument upon this side of the question with as much force and clearness as any statement that has been made upon the subject. He says, "The word used here, *(sunedomai,)* occurs no where else in the New Testament. It properly means to rejoice with any one, and expresses not only the approbation of the understanding, as in the expression, "I consent unto the law" in verse 16, but more than that, it denotes *sensible pleasure in the heart.* It indicates not only *intellectual assent* but *emotion*—an emotion of pleasure in the contemplation of the law, and *this shows* that the Apostle is not speaking of an unregenerate man. Of such an one it might be said that his conscience approved the law; that his understanding was convinced that the law was good, but never did it occur, that *an impenitent sinner found emotions of pleasure in the contemplation of the pure and spiritual law of God.* If this expression can be applied to an unrenewed man, there is, perhaps, not a single mark of a pious mind, which may not with equal propriety be so applied. It is the most obvious and usual mode of denoting piety. *An assent to the divine law, followed with emotions of sensible delight in the contemplation.*" As proof and as parallel passages, he quotes Psalm 119: 97; 1: 2; 19: 7—11; Job 23: 12.

In what Mr. Barnes says here of the meaning of the word

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we concur. It certainly denotes more than a mere intellectual assent. It does express on the part of the *inward man* not only convincement, but also an emotion of complacency —of strongly felt approbation. But *does this show*, as Mr. Barnes immediately adds, *that the apostle is not speaking of an unrenewed man? Is it true*, that no impenitent sinner ever felt emotions of pleasure "*in the contemplation of the pure, spiritual law of God?* To assert this, in our estimation, is to fly in the face of all human consciousness, and shows great lack of discrimination and analysis of the laws of the human mind. "Every body knows, or at least ought to know, that there is but one respect, in which man is free, that this attribute can be predicated only of the executive, willing power —that the laws of our intellectual and sensitive nature are just as fixed and determinate as the laws of our bodily organism, or as the laws of the material universe. It is not optional with us when a plain proposition, and the data for resolving it are placed fully and clearly before our minds, to decide what shall be our convictions in reference to it. The proposition and data once before our minds, the convicton follows aside from and independent of all willing. Could Galileo after the evidence of the motion of our earth and the heavenly bodies was clearly before his mind, have dispossessed himself of the conviction which that evidence had produced in his mind. He could no more have done so, than he could have created the earth and those heavenly orbs, and appointed them their respective places and motions. The same is true of our sensibility or the feeling part of our nature. It is not dependent upon our volition what sort of emotions, the contemplation of a lovely water-fall, a beautiful landscape, a majestic mountain, or a sweeping tornado shall produce in us. Neither is it optional with us what effect the morally right, proper, beautiful and sublime shall have upon our moral sensibilities. When correlated with their appropriate objects, they necessarily flow out, and there is produced in the mind not only a cold assent of the understanding, but also a feeling or emotion of complacency toward them which may very properly be termed delight, and this effect is produced independent of our willing or nilling. What is stated here, is, and must be true of all moral beings, whether saints or sinners, angels or devils. O could wicked minds destroy their moral sensibilities, how speedily would it be done? It would be the extraction of the sting of conscience—the destruction of the worm that never dies. It would quench ninety-nine hun-

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dredths of the flames of hell. Put this power within the reach of wicked mind, and there would be a universal jubilee among all the alienated from God. For then this moral sensibility is by far the most susceptible part of man's sensitive nature. When roused by its correlated object, the truth in reference to moral distinctions, it far out-distances every other feeling of which the human mind is susceptible. Bodily and intellectual pleasures or pains are nothing in comparison. Now we ask, if it is not a great practical error fraught with the most direful consequences for eminent theologians and teachers of religion like Mr. Barnes to make this natural action of the moral sensibilty, a marked evidence of true piety. Has mere emotive complacency in the pure and the good, or emotive displacency or hatred of sin any element of true virtue or holiness in it? If so, then all men are virtuous and holy. For all men have therein a higher or lower degree. Standing alone, they are only proofs that the light of truth is shining upon the individual's mind—that the man is in a convicted and not a converted state—that the truth is blazing upon his understanding and not that his heart or will is subdued. How we ask, upon the theory we are combating, could that state of mind properly termed conviction ever take place? This state of mind, it is well known, widely differs from conversion on the one hand, and from the ordinary state of the impenitent man on the other. The convicted state differs from the converted in the fact that all the feelings of the mind are produced in it by the simple and natural action of the truth upon the moral sensibilities, wholly independently of the will and in themselves have no more moral character than the flowing of the blood in our veins. In the converted state, there are not only these powerful emotions, occasioned by the attention being fixed upon the excellency and purity of the divine law, and the odiousness of sin, but the will is also yielded up to the obedience of that holy law, and through it the whole being. The unconvicted state is that in which the mind may intellectually assent to all the truth apprehended, the reason or conscience "Consent unto the law that it is good, but the attention not being fixed upon it the moral sensibilities are but slightly affected. It is the state, not necessarily of infidelity or scepticism, but of indifference. Now if Mr. Barnes' view upon this subject and that of those who hold with him be true, we see no place for the convicted state for the phenomena of that state are taken by them as the highest evidence of the converted state. This ac-

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counts for the great and melancholy fact, that many, if not a majority of professing Christians in our evangelical churches are nothing more than convicted sinners, dragging themselves along in a hard and slavish service under the torturing lash of conscience. Our soul weeps over this state of things. How strange it is, that men celebrated for piety, talent, and learning, will at this late day maintain that men in their natural and unregenerate state are incapable of feeling emotive delight, or complacency in the pure spirituality of the law, and in the moral perfections of God? Were it not for these moral susceptibilities, what adaptation would there be in the truth to convert the soul? Strip man of these, and we might as well preach to the stones of the streets, or the beasts of the field. The writer of this article is as distinctly conscious of having from his childhood up experienced what is described in the verse under consideration, as he is of his existence. He does not recollect any period of his life, when he could not say that he delighted in the law of God after the inward man. And even now, he is often carried away to the highest point of emotive delight of which he is capable by the contemplation of the divine perfections and the glorious government of God as modified by the Atonement, when at the same time, he is deeply conscious that this excitement is purely natural, and no more dependent upon grace or religion than though it had been produced by the contemplation of the beauties of nature, the sweet tones of music, or the narration of some thrilling event. How very easy it would be to convert the world, and subdue the depravity of the heart, if all that was required was to excite these moral susceptibilities. In our whole ministry, we have met this phenomenon of mind, and have often been obliged to drive the deceived soul from this imposing shelter. We could fill volumes with cases of men, who, while in the practice of open and habitual sin, were still indulging hopes of heaven on the very ground that they were conscious of this action of their moral sensibility. We doubt not that thousands and tens of thousands of souls in our land are at this moment hiding behind this refuge of lies.

We will now briefly review the texts quoted by Mr. Barnes to confirm his interpretation, and in reference to them we remark first, that they lack an important quality as proof texts, that is, parallelism. Take for example the first passage quoted, Ps., 119: 97—"Oh how love I thy law; it is my meditation all the day." Is it parallel with, "I delight in

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the law of God after the inward man." Observe the one has no limiting phrase like the other. David's delight in the law of God was not merely after the *inward man*, but *with the whole man*. His love was not simply the action of the *moral sensibility* but of the *will also*. He exercised towards it not only *emotive delight* or *complacency* but he *was also practically devoted to its requirements*. The next passage quoted is equally inapposite, Ps., 1: 2—"But he delights in the law of the Lord; and in his law doth he meditate day and night." How does this good man "delight in the law of the Lord? "After *the inward man*" merely? by a mere inoperative emotive complacency, or with a practical good will? Is it not strange that skillful critics should quote so loosely? These are the passages, which are always brought forward, and relied upon to prove that "delighting in the law "after the inward man," is a truly religious, or virtuous affection, and therefore predicable only of the Christian. They prove no such thing. The passage from Job 23: 12, is still less to the point. "Neither have I gone back from the commandment of his lips; I have esteemed the words of his mouth more than my necessary food." Does Job mean here simply to say that he had felt in contemplating the words of his Maker a greater and higher pleasure than he derived from his daily food?

The next point to be considered is the term "*Inward man.*" Mr. Barnes says, "It is used sometimes to denote the rational man, as opposed to the sensual, and sometimes the mind as opposed to the body."—"But here," he adds, (referring to the passage under consideration) "It is evidently used in opposition to a carnal corrupt nature, to the evil passions and desires of the soul in an unrenewed state, what is called elsewhere "the old man," which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts." The inward man is elsewhere called the new man, and denotes not the mere intellect or conscience, but is a personification of the principle of action, by which a christian is governed, the new nature, the holy disposition, the inclination of the heart that is renewed." Dr. Scott says "By the inward man" the apostle must mean the soul, as renewed by divine grace." The same is substantially asserted by all the commentators, who follow the Augustinean gloss put upon this passage. It is however a complete begging of the question. Of course, if "inward man" is synonymous with "the new man" there can be no controversy, as to whether the apostle is describing christian character. The very use of this term settles the question. If the apostle says, as this interpretation

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would make him to say, "I delight in the law of God after my renewed nature," what further reasoning could there be upon the subject? But where is the proof that the phrase "*Inward man*" is used by the apostle Paul, or any other of the sacred writers, as synonymous with the regenerate, or new man? Mr. Barnes says "Here *evidently*, '*The inward man*," is put in opposition to the carnal, corrupt nature," &c., &c. Dr. Scott says, "It *must* mean" &c., &c. Now we wish to know from what source the evidence is obtained, which produces this *evidently* and necessitates this *must?* Not a word of it is brought forward by either of them. The whole is naked assumption, round and unqualified assertion. The truth in the case is that the phrase in question, and its synonym "*Inner man*," are used but three times in the New Testament, and in every instance by the apostle Paul, and as we think always in one clear and determinate sense, viz: to denote *the moral self* as distinguished from *the carnal self*, or in other words, the moral powers and susceptibilities of man, as distinguished from those, that are merely animal. The places, in which the phrase occurs, are Rom. 7: 22. 2 Cor. 4: 16. Eph. 3: 16. The first quotation is the passage which we have under consideration. In it we understand the phrase "*Inward man*" to denote the moral powers and susceptibilities, or the conscience. In the entire passage there are three words, or phrases which we suppose to be used by the apostle synonymously, or to denote precisely the same thing. They are in Greek, *Ego*, *eso-anthropos*, *nous*: in English "*I* "*Inward man*," "*the mind*," That these words are used synonymously, our opponents do not deny. They interpret them all, as denoting "*the new man*," we, *the developed conscience.* They understand the whole passage as descriptive of *the christian warfare*, we of *the enlightened sinner's.* They make the contrast in the verse under consideration between *the new* and *the old man*, *the spiritual* and *carnal mind.* We on the contrary understand the contrast to be between the *demands of the reason* or *conscience enlightened and developed by the truth*, and *the demands* of *the carnal lusts*, *appetites and passions.* These latter always demand gratification, and that alone without any regard to right, law, duty, or to any of the relations which human beings sustain. The enlightened conscience, on the other hand, demands that right, or duty should be made paramount to all things else, and that every feeling, power, and susceptibility should be made subject to its behests. These two classes of powers, and susceptibilities, with

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their respective demands, exist in all men. In themselves alone, they are pure *naturalism*, and possess no moral character whatever, in the sense of being either praise or blameworthy. Now it need only to be studied, in order to be clear to every mind, that "the *old man*," as contrasted with "*the new man*," is not, on the part of man, the mere possession of an animal nature with its powers and susceptibilities: neither is the "*new man*" as contrasted with "*the old*," the mere possession of an enlightened, or developed conscience with its powers, and susceptibilities. But the "*old man*." is the will yielded up or subjected to the animal man, or in other words to the obedience of the mere impulses of nature, the lusts, appetites and passions. The new man on the contrary is the same will yielded up or subjected to the moral or spiritual man, or in other words to the demands of the conscience. The change from one state to the other is regeneration, or being born again. The death of "*the old man*" is not, as many suppose, the destruction of our animal nature, but the simple emancipation of the will from bondage to it, and subjecting the same to the law, or demands of our rational or spiritual nature. Neither does entire sinfulness, or total depravity imply the annihilation of any of our moral powers or susceptibilities, or their demands upon us. Now, that the term "inward man," in the text under consideration, is used to denote the *moral self* or *conscience* instead of *the moral state* of the individual, will be manifest by a careful examination of the context. We will quote verses 21—23. "I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin and death, which is in my members." It is very manifest that the 22d and 23d verses are epexegetical, or explanatory of the 21st. "I delight in the law of God," &c., in the 22d verse evidently is designed to explain what the apostle meant by, "when I would do good," in the 21st. And "the law in his members bringing him into captivity to the law of sin and death in the 23d explains what is meant by "evil being present with him" in the 21st. It will be seen also that "the law of the mind" in the 23d verse is used synonymously with "delight in the law of God after the inward man" in the 22d. In reference to this 23d verse, there are six very important inquiries.

1. What is meant by the members? 2. By the law of the members? Why is this law identified with the law of sin? 4.

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What is meant by the mind? 5. By the law of the mind? 6. Why is this law identified with the law of God?

1. By the members are not meant the bodily organs thus denominated. It would be absurd to speak of any mental law dwelling in the eyes, hands, feet, &c. The term is used figuratively, to denote the various powers and susceptibilities of man's animal nature, as sustaining an inferior, and naturally subjective state to this spiritual, or moral nature. The figure is very beautiful, and forcible. The members *should always serve* and *not rule*. It is their natural position, one in which, where no perversion has taken place, they are always found. This explains Pauls use of the Ego, or the I, in the whole passage, it denotes the moral self, that which constitutes man's personality, the head, or body of the human soul, and that which separates him heaven-wide from the merely animal creation. It makes it proper also to say, that when the will is subjected to the law of the members, the man is enslaved. Should we visit a ship making its way upon the ocean, and there find the captain and his under officers driven about, and subject to the common mariners, we should at once exclaim that they were in bondage, that the whole order of things was subverted. But on the other hand, should we visit that same ship, and find all the officers in their proper places issuing their orders, and the whole crew yielding cheerful and prompt obedience, we should not think of there being any slavery, or bondage there. It would be the simple, and natural order of things. So when the will is yielded up to members, or the animal man, sin reigns, and the whole man is in bondage. But when the will is subject to the moral, or spiritual man, order reigns, and perfect freedom ensues. It should be understood then, that *the members here mean the merely animal powers* and *susceptibilities of the soul, as distinguished from those that are moral and spiritual.*

2. By "the law of the members" is meant the demands of man's animal nature, which, as has already been stated, is bare gratification, without any reference to right, or wrong. What is the cry of lust, hunger, thirst, or of any of the mere impulses of nature, but give, give, give?

3. This law of the members is identified with the law of sin, because it is the exact law, or rule of action, adopted by every sinner. It is sin's sole law, the fountain of every abomination, and of all iniquity. No sin, however heinous, or trivial, was ever committed for any other end, than simply self-gratification. For this the assassin points his dagger; the

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robber siezes his neighbor's goods; the covetous man overreaches in his bargains; the licentious man tramples on the law of chastity, and despots sway the sceptre of oppression, and, all other selfish indulgences are allowed.

4. As "*mind*" in our verse is contrasted directly with "*the members*," it must denote their direct opposite, which is the rational, moral, or spiritual powers. So we understand *nous* or the mind as used in this verse and the 25th and other places frequently by the apostle Paul. In this interpretation Profs., Stewart, Tholuck, Dr. Bloomfield, and many other eminent biblical writers concur.

5. By "*the law of the mind*" is meant the demands of the developed or enlightened reason which always is, that right and duty should be made paramount to all things else, that the gratification of any of the susceptibilities, or impulses of nature should never be allowed only in consistency with the highest, or universal good.

6. This law of the mind is identified with the divine law, because its demand is precisely the same, which is that every act should flow from a benevolent heart, or from a supreme regard to the highest good. This is the sole law of righteousness, the demand alike of the ever, living God and of universal reason. If this view of the subject be correct, then it follows, that "*the inward man*" means *the moral* and not "*the new man*," and its delight in the law of God, the *natural action* of the moral sensibilities in view of the requirements of the reason or conscience.

"*Inward man*" as used in 2 Cor., 4: 16, is acknowledged by Mr. Barnes himself to mean man's moral powers, and susceptibilities. In Eph. 3: 16, it is equally evident, that it is used in the same sense. The apostle prays that his Ephesian brethren may be strengthened with might by his Spirit in "*the inner man.*" In the sinful state, "The inner man" has no effective power. It is captured and enslaved, and all that it can do under the circumstances is to enter its earnest protest against what *is*. But when emancipated, it is instated into its own proper authority. Then its demands become actual law, and its authority over the entire being may continue ever to increase in strength, or in other words, it may daily become more firmly seated on its throne. From the above reasoning, we are fully convinced that the phrase "delight in the law of God after the inward man" does not apply to *christian character*, and that thus to apply it is great practical error, ministering consolation to thousands of deceived souls.

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There are two other expressions which are said to be applicable only to Christian character.

1. "*What I hate, that I do.*" It is said that no impenitent man ever hated his own doings. We reply that hate here is evidently used in its emotive, and not in its practical sense, and refers to that strong feeling of disapprobation, and ever loathing which sin often excites in the moral sensibility of every enlightened man. To affirm that impenitent men never have this emotive hatred even to a degree of self-loathing, betrays great ignorance of the workings of sinful mind; and is kindred to the error so fully exposed in our reasoning upon the phrase "delight in the law of God, &c. Indeed it is the opposite, or counter-part of that feeling. The contemplation of the beauty and excellency of holiness naturally excites in the moral sensibility the emotions of delight, whilst at the same time, the contemplation of the odious nature of sin produces feelings of disgust and loathing.

2. The other phrase which is said to apply only to christian character is, "with the mind, I serve the law of God" In reference to this it is said, "Of no impenitent sinner could it ever be affrmed, that 'with his mind he served the law of God.'" Our reply is, show us any man, who does not to a greater or less degree do this very thing, and we will show you one who is an idiot, or insane, or one who has been placed in circumstances which have prevented the ideas of right and wrong being developed in his reason, and who is therefore absolutely without law, and in no sense a sinner. Where is the man who with his mind or conscience does not serve the law?

Did not the wretched Judas serve the law of God with his mind, when under the writhings of his excited moral sensibilities, he returned the thirty pieces of silver? What was it that led him to the performance of this act, but the moral complacency which he felt in the character of the innocent and holy man, whom he had betrayed? What was it, when he saw the natural consequences of his deed could not be averted, but the self-condemnation and horror produced in him by "*this law of the mind,*" that led him to go and hang himself? Surely had it not been for this subjection of his mind to the law of God, no such phenomena would ever have occurred. Examples of this sort could be multiplied "*ad infinitum,*" but we forbear. Passing strange is it to us, that learned and acute theologians, can assert, that no impenitent sinner ever served "the law of God with his mind," or which

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is the same thing, with his conscience. Were it not for the fact that all men are obliged thus to serve the divine law, neither preaching, nor any other mode of exhibiting the truth would have the least tendency to convert the soul.

There would be no adaptation in the means to accomplish the end. Were not the law written in the mind of man, vain would it be to inscribe it upon tables of stone, or print it in books. Thus we have minutely examined all those phrases which it is asserted apply only to christian character, and found that, rightly interpreted, they canno tbe so applied, and that thus to apply them is an exceedingly pernicious error leading to the most fatal delusions. We cannot leave this part of our argument without stating our firm conviction, that the greatest and most destructive theological error of our day is making religion and sin to consist in a state of the sensibiltity instead of a state of the will. The evils growing out of this error, and the obstacles which it throws in the way of the progress of true holiness, and ethical knowledge, are legion, and the man, whom God in his providence shall raise up with strong hand, and clear vision, to attack this error, searching it out in all its windings and secret lairs, and exposing all its abominations, will become one of the greatest benefactors of the church.

We come now to the third and last argument adduced in proof that the passage under consideration is descriptive of christian character. It is, that the description harmonizes with the common, if not the universal experience of Christians.

That it is the exact and only experience of many professors of religion, there can be no doubt, and that some who have once had a truly evangelical experience, may through backslidings have relapsed into the legal state here described, we do not dispute. Undoubtedly in very many instances this is the case. But while this is the case, they can say

> "Where is the blessedness I knew,
> When first I saw the Lord?
> Where is the soul refreshing view
> Of Jesus, and his word?"
> What peaceful hours I once enjoyed!
> How sweet their memory still!
> But they have left an aching void,
> The world can never fill."

Who will contend that a backslider's experience is christian experience—or in any way acceptable to God? That the passage does not describe christian experience, we assert,

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1. Because it is directly at variance with christian character as described throughout the entire scriptures.

In this passage the individual is represented as *carnal—sin's captive and slave—morally helpless—a loathing to his own moral sensibilities, and in the extreme of spiritual wretchedness*, whereas other portions of the scripture represent the christian, as *dead to sin, emancipated*, or "freed from the law of sin and death," *crucified as to the flesh, walking in "the newness"* or "*freshness of the Spirit*," and *not in the oldness of the letter*, clothed with moral or spiritual power, *filled with peace* and *holy joy*. Surely here is a striking contrast. In proof that this is not mere assertion, or imagination let the following passages be carefully pondered.

Rom. 6: 2, 4. "How shall we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein!" "Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father; even so, we also should walk in newness of life." Gal. 5: 24. And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts."

1 John 3 : 6, 9. "Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not. Whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him."

"Whosoever is born of God, doth not commit sin ; for his seed remaineth with him ; and he cannot sin because he is born of God.

Chap. 5: 4, "For whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world; and this is the victory, that overcometh the world, even our faith."

How can all this be said of one who is still "carnal, sold under sin," and when he would do good, evil is present with him? Can it in any proper, or even tolerable sense, be said, that such an one is dead to sin ? That he walks in newness of life? That the change, wrought in his moral character, may be aptly compared to that which took place in the body of the Lord Jesus Christ, when by the resurrectionary power, it was changed from a mangled, corrupting corpse to a living spiritual body, radiant with all the glories of heaven? How can it be said of one, that is constantly doing what he would not, and that which he hates, that *he has* "*crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts*," that "*he has overcome* the world;" that "*he sinneth not*," that "*he cannot sin?*" The one who can harmonize these declarations, as descriptive of one and the same state of mind, must have a marvelous skill and dexterity in bending, and twisting human language.

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Again, in this passage the individual is represented as in spiritual bondage, but the scriptures represent the Christian as walking in spiritual liberty. Rom. 8: 2, "For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law of sin and death." 6: 18, "Being made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness."

Rom. 8: 12—15, "Therefore brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die. But if ye, through the spirit, do mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live. For as many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the Sons of God. For ye have not received the Spirit of bondage, again unto fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption whereby ye cry Abba Father." Does this harmonize with the declaration, "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not."?

Again, throughout the scriptures, Christians are represented as being spiritually happy, obtaining rest to their souls—great peace, and unspeakable joy. Says the Savior, Matt. 11: 28, 29, "Come unto me all ye that labor, and are heavy laden, and *I will give you rest;*—learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and *ye shall find rest unto your souls.*" Jer. 6: 16. "Stand ye in the ways and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein and *ye shall find rest,*" Ps. 119: 165. "Great peace have they who love thy law, and nothing shall offend them."

Isa. 32: 17, And the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness, and assurance forever." In Isa. 61: 3, it is said that one part of the mission, or work of the Lord Jesus, would be, "To appoint unto them that mourn in Zion, to give unto them beauty for ashes, *the oil of joy for mourning*, the garment *of praise for the spirit of heaviness*, that they might be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified." Again, Isa. 35: 10, it is said that "The ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with songs, and everlasting joy upon their heads."

Matt. 5: 6, "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness *for they shall be filled.*" John 14: 27, "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you; not as the world giveth, give I unto you."

1 Pet. 1: 8, "Whom having not seen, ye love, in whom beleiving, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory." How can all this be harmonized with that state of mind, which

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forces its possessor to cry out, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death." ? Once more, the state of mind described in our passage is not only opposed to christian character, as elsewhere delineated in the scriptures, but is also, entirely at variance with the conditions of salvation, as every where laid down in the bible. Isa. 55: 7, "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon." Let it be observed that the conditions of salvation are laid down here in plain, absolute terms. It is not said "Let the wicked *try to forsake his way*"—*endeavor* to give up his unrighteous thoughts (or *purposes*) and *aim* to return unto the Lord, but *let him do it.* O! It is a *fearful taking away* from the word of God, when man puts in *try—endeavor —aim, where God has said* DO.

Matt. 7: 21, "Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven," but who? the one who knows he *ought* to do the will of his Father which is in heaven? *desires* to do it? *trys* to do it? but cannot? Not quite! "*But he that* DOETH *the will of my Father which is in Heaven!*" See verse 24th, also: Who is the wise man that digs deep and builds his house upon the rock? Is it the one who "hears those sayings of mine" and *approves* them, *feels great emotive complacency in them? endeavors* to do them, but finds them so hard, he can not? The soil is so thick, and impervious, he cannot get down to the rock, and therefore lays his foundation in the direction of it but not upon it! NO!!— The great teacher says, "He that heareth these sayings of mine and *doeth them,*" is like unto the wise man. It may be that his views were contrary to the popular theology of the nineteenth century. It may be, that he did not believe that his sayings were so *sublimely pure*, and *so far* above the powers of men and all the grace he could give, *that it would be the height of presumption*, and *great heresy*, for them to suppose that they *could do them.* It is possible also, that he did not appreciate the present mode of honoring God, and his law—that he did not hold, that his Father which is in Heaven, after making the heavens and earth, and all things in them, giving to all, laws exactly suited to their powers and relations, promulged to man, his only representative on earth, as a rule of action, a law far transcending his power or any grace he designed to bestow upon him. If such were his views we find no trace of them in the divine-

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ly inspired record. Wherever he lays down the conditions of salvation, or presents the tests of discipleship, absolute and unqualified obedience is always brought to view. We will adduce a few more examples. Luke 14: 33, "So likewise, whosoever he be of you, that forsaketh not all that he hath, he can not be my disciple." Who is the one that loves the Savior? John 14: 21, "He that hath my commandments, and *keepeth them*, he it is that loveth me, and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and *I will love him and manifest myself to him.*" 23, "*If any man love me, he will keep my words.*" Chapt. 15: 3, "Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you." Luke 6: 46, "And why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?" Matt. 5: 19, Whosoever therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whosoever shall DO, and TEACH them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." Now take these conditions of salvation and these tests of christian character, and how can they answer to one who is "carnal, sold under sin," habitually doing what he approves not, one to whom to will is present with him, but how to perform that which is good he finds not, but when he would do good evil is present with him. Is such an one *doing* the will of God? performing the sayings, and keeping the commandments of Christ? Take the whole portrait of the Christian as drawn in the Bible, and find if you can in this Romans 7: 14—25, a single feature of it? Is the Christian's garment spotted with the flesh? Are the chains of sin about his soul? Is his heart the abhorrence of his own conscience? Is he feeble to do good, and mighty to do evil? Is he miserable and wretched as a man who is bound to a putrid corpse? If these are not the lineaments divine of the child of God as portrayed in his own word, why call the experience of those who are in this state *Christian* experience?

It must be evident to all that the interpretation which makes this passage descriptive of Christian experience places it in direct opposition to all the delineations of Christian character as elsewhere given in the scriptures. They are irreconcilably at variance. No fair interpretation can harmonize them. In further substantiating our ground we shall briefly appeal to the matter of fact in the case, by referring to the experience of those who have given unequivocal evidence of piety.

1. We say then it was not the experience of David, when appealing to God under divine inspiration he could say, "I

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have refrained my feet from *every evil way*, that I might keep thy law." "The wicked have laid a snare for me, *yet I erred not from thy precepts.*" "Thy testimonies are also my delight." "The law of thy mouth is better to me, *than thousands of gold and silver.*" "I rejoice at thy word as one that findeth great spoil." "How sweet are thy words unto my taste, yea sweeter than the honey unto my mouth."

2. It could not have been the experience of the primitive Christians when it was said of them, "And they continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart;" that "believing, they rejoiced with joy unspeakable and full of glory."

3. We will pass the case of the Apostle Paul, as that has already been so fully commented on, and come down to modern times, and ask, Was it the experience of Philip Doddridge? when he could say, "When I awake in the morning, which is always before light, I address myself to him, and converse with him. I speak to him while I am lighting my candle and putting on my clothes, and often have more delight before I come out of my chamber than I have enjoyed for whole days, perhaps weeks of my life. He meets me in my study, in secret and family devotion." Was it the experience of Whitefield? when he could say, "sometimes I would be so overpowered with a sense of God's infinite majesty, I would be constrained to throw myself on the ground, and offer my soul as a blank in his hands to write on it what he pleased." And again, "I walk continually in the comforts of the Holy Ghost." "My heart is melted down with the love of Jesus. I want a thousand tongues to set off my Redeemer's praise. I am daily waiting for the coming of the Son of God. Every morning I feel my fellowship with Christ." "The sight I have of God ravishes my soul. I would leap my seventy years, and fly into his presence." Was it the experience of President Edwards, when he could adopt the language of the Psalmist and say, "My soul watcheth for the Lord more than they that watch for the morning." "And when the light of the morning came, and the beams of the sun came in at the windows, it refreshed my soul. It seemed to me to be some image of the sweet light of God's glory." Was it the experience of James Brainerd Taylor? when he wrote, "The peace of God which passeth all understanding, keeps my heart through Jesus Christ. A solid peace like a smooth

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tranquil sea has flowed into my soul, as I have glided sweetly down the still waters of consolation. O that all might dwell in God, for all that dwell in him, dwell in love."

Time would fail us to quote the recorded experiences of Luther, Melancthon, Fenelon, Madam Guion, Lady Maxwell, the Wesleys, Fletcher, Bramwell, Carvosso, and others without number, who have lived and triumphed over "the world, the flesh, and the devil," through faith in him who came to save his people from their sins. They were not "carnal, sold under sin." They did not do what they hated, and when they would do good find "evil present" with them. They were not, in the depth of wretchedness, constrained to cry out, O wretched men that we are! But through "the Law of the Spirit of life which is in Christ Jesus," they were "made free from the law of sin and death," "the righteousness of the law" was fulfilled in them; they walked in the joys of the Holy Ghost, and wielded those mighty spiritual weapons, by which they were enabled to cast down "imaginations and every high thing that exalted itself against God" and to bring into captivity "every thought to the obedience of Christ." This we believe is, and has been the experience of all God's dear little ones. For ourselves, we would not rest short of it, for the whole material universe.

Having thus carefully examined, and replied to the arguments relied upon to sustain the application of this passage to christian experience, we proceed to present those which go to prove its application to legalists. Here, as our article has already transcended its bounds as to length, we must content ourselves with giving a mere synopsis.

1. Our first argument for the proposed application is, the exact agreement of the description given in the passage, with the state of mind in which every legalist finds himself. Suppose one entering a house, should observe hanging upon the wall of the parlor a finely executed portrait, and sitting over against it the person for whom it was taken; would he need any information as to whom the likeness was designed to represent, but the obvious correspondence between the two presented to his own vision? Precisely so with our passage. It is a portrait of a spiritual form, drawn by an artist divinely inspired, and one too, who probably better understood every feature and lineament of legalism, than any other man that has lived. Now we ask, where is the man that has attempted to fulfill "the, *righteousness of the law*," depending upon his own sense of duty, and resolutions, unaided by the

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grace of the gospel, who has not found this passage a most graphic, and forcible description of his experience, much more so than any one, which he himself could possibly embody in language? This correspondence, then, between the description and the heart of the legalist is a strong argument in favor of our interpretation of the passage. *Like answers to like.*

2. This interpretation perfectly harmonizes with the argument which the apostle was pursuing. He was endeavoring to show the weakness of the law as a means of sanctification, or its utter inadequacy by any influences which it could exert upon the mind to deliver the soul from the power and dominion of sin. In his argument upon justification he had shown that no flesh could be justified by it. In chap. 5: 20, he had incidentally stated the end for which the law and legal dispensation were introduced. They were not introduced either as a means to justification or sanctification, but to develop and expose the odious and hideous nature of sin. "*Moreover the law entered that the offence might abound.*" This thought so forcibly but briefly expressed in chapter 7th, is taken up and expanded unto the 13th verse when again it is embodied in language that more clearly explains the meaning of the writer. "Was then" he asks, "that which was good made death unto me? By no means. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." Now if we understand the remaining part of the chapter as explaining how sin works in us death by the law, or "that which is good," and how "the commandment" developes the exceeding sinfulness of sin, then all is plain, truthful, and wholly intelligible, and at the same time harmonizing both with the previous and subsequent context. But if at verse fourteenth, we turn aside, and apply it and what follows to the christian, a chasm in the reasoning ensues, and all is confusion, and inharmonic. Every word and phrase descriptive of the terrible power of sin, when once seated in the heart and as developed by the law, must be softened down, and those describing the action of the enlightened conscience and its sensibilities against this power greatly exaggerated, and thus the portrait is wofully disfigured by the expositor's brush.

3. This interpretation does not conflict with the plain import of other portions of the inspired record, but perfectly accords with them.

4. It is the one which was universally put upon the passage by the christian church until the time of Augustine, and

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has been contended for, ever since by many of the most pious, able and learned divines that have flourished. At the present day our ablest and most skilled biblical critics adopt it.

5. The other interpretation was introduced first to meet an exigency in an overheated theological discussion, waged by two fiery eastern men in a dark age, when it was more common to leap a difficulty than to remove it, to cut a knot, than to untie it.

6. This interpretation, thus introduced, has ever stood more upon the ground of its supposed harmony with the Augustinian theory of original sin, than upon any thorough exegesis of the passage, rigidly conformed to the acknowledged and indisputable laws of interpretation.

In conclusion, it is proper to say, that whilst we fully believe that the application of this passage to christian character has been and still is a fruitful source of deception to many souls, perhaps more so than any other false gloss that was ever put upon the sacred writings; yet we do not hold that all who take this view of the subject are deceived men, or that all who take the opposite view are good men, and far excel their fellow-christians in their religious attainments. We are well aware that some men are much better than their theories, and others not so good. Nevertheless theoretical error is always pernicious. In thousands of ways it does harm, and should be most vigilantly guarded against. Especially is this the case where such error respects the standard of true holiness. Hence we feel an inexpressible interest that right views should obtain upon the subject which we have discussed.

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ARTICLE LIX.

Simplicity of Moral Action. No. 4.

By the late Rev. Wm. Cochran.

III. A preliminary remark is here demanded. The phases of the intensity theory hitherto examined, in so far as they are different from the one now introduced, had, in our opinion, either been virtually refuted, in our former numbers, or were scarcely deserving of refutation in an inquiry of this nature; and in so far as they are identical with this last phase, for obvious reasons, their examination was deferred till this time. Hence, we have passed them over slightly, and should have entirely omitted them, but for the hope that by a few suggestions and inquiries, we might render more apparent, than we had hitherto done, the intrinsic absurdity of attempting to extend the sway of the moral law, beyond the acts of absolute freedom, into the chaos of necessary phenomena, where unity is impossible, and concord a mere accident; and also, that, by showing the impossibility of inferring, with any certainty, the character of the governing intention from the mere intensity of its outward manifestations, we might rebuke a practice of censorious judging which is alike sinful and injurious. But here we meet a view of a moral action, which, as it includes no elements of necessity, will allow of no skirmishing and random shots of picket-guards; but will compel a a death struggle of the opposing theories, and decide the fate of a long popular doctrine. We are therefore entering upon a question of vital interest, and no pains should be spared to secure a fair issue.

Our position, it will be remembered, is, that when our intention terminates upon what the law requires us to choose, (and, we add here, *upon nothing else*, for we have not yet proved the impossibility of choosing two ends at once,) it is whol-

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ly free from all blame; and generally, *that the character of an ultimate intention varies as the object of its selection.*

The opposite position alleges that an intention, although terminating upon the object required by the law, (and upon nothing else,) is not therefore wholly free from blame; but must, in addition, possess a certain degree of intensity; and generally, that *the character of an ultimate intention varies as the object of its selection, and* ALSO *as its subjective force.* In other words; the law, according to the former view, requires nothing but the choice of an object, and when an intention is *objectively* right it is wholly so: according to the latter, it requires both the choice of an object, and that a certain amount of *vis volendi* (not now determined) be communicated to this choice; so that an intention, *objectively* considered, may be perfectly right, and at the same time, *subjectively* considered, more or less blameworthy, on account of being more or less deficient in intensity.

Whether it be possible to yield any obedience at all to the objective requirements of the law, without perfectly obeying them, is a question which yet remains to be discussed; but its decision can have no bearing upon the present debate, for the supposition on which we are now reasoning, is that an intention, as a matter of fact, *is* objectively right.

It will be seen at a glance that the only possible basis of this intensity theory is the supposition that less than all the *energy* of the *moral will* may, at any time, be exerted in the choice; and that this deficiency is cognizable by the law, and morally reprehensible. To remove this foundation, it must be shown, either that the whole energy of the moral will of necessity passes into its intentions, or that, if the reverse is true, MORALITY can take no note of it. We hope this issue is now both comprehensible and satisfactory to all our readers; and that we shall be able to lead them, with little difficulty, through what would otherwise have been a dark and tangled labyrinth.

Our first proposition relates to sinful deficiences for which this theory contends. *We allege that, by a law of absolute necessity, whatever of moral energy the will at any time possesses, passes into its ultimate intention.*

1. To establish this proposition, we remark, in the first place, *that when that object, which the law requires us to choose, is consciously present to the mind, the will cannot avoid choosing or refusing it.* Total quiescence is impossible. We hold that it is just as much the nature of the *Will* to *choose* as of the

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Intellect to *think*, or of the *Sensibility* to *feel*; and that it is just as impossible, when the conditions of its acting are supplied, that choice should not take place, as that, when the conditions of thinking and feeling are supplied, these phenomena should not exist. The only difference between them, worthy of notice here, is that the conditions of thought and feeling determine also their *kind*, while the conditions of choice leave its *kind* or quality wholly contingent. The *existence* of each is alike *necessitated*, and purely *spontaneous*. When their conditions are supplied, reflection never does or can *intervene* to decide whether they shall exist or not. Choice follows in all instances, upon the presentation of an object of choice, by the same necessity and immediateness, which marks the connection of the explosion of a magazine with the application of a match, or the roar of heaven's artillery with the ignition of the electric fluid.

In this view, the advocates of the doctrine of the necessary determination of the Will are obliged to concur. For holding that the Will has no self-determining power of its own, and that motives are the only and true causes of its choices, they must allow that whenever motives are present to the mind, choice, their appropriate effect, must inevitably follow. And no other person can hold a different opinion, if he implicitly confides in the spontaneous and necessary convictions of his own mind. Who believes that quiescence of will is possible in presence of an object of choice? Who does not find it impossible to preserve it? Who believes that his neighbor is, at any time, destitute of all present moral character? Who does not assume, and constantly act upon the supposition, that the presentation of an object of choice always begets choice, and that all rationals, at each moment of their conscious agency, are aiming at one or the other of those rival ends which divide the moral universe? Not only, therefore, are a large proportion of our opponents bound to grant us the truth of our proposition, or abandon their favorite theory of *necessity;* but all persons of every creed are behooved to admit it, or deny a primitive and necessary judgment of their own intelligence. We are therefore warranted in assuming its truth as a first principle of Reason. But being aware how frequently such principles are called in question, where their admission is likely to draw after it the overthrow of a long cherished doctrine, we will try to set the matter in a stronger light before leaving it.

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Kant has discussed this question in his "Theory of Religion," and, in our judgment has shown incontestably that quiescence of the Moral Will, is, during consciousness, an impossibility. We will lay his argument before the reader. After quoting sundry opinions from the ancient poets and philosophers relating to the primitive, or natural moral character of mankind, he proceeds to say—Since however, nothing is more likely than that both poets and plilosophers are in the wrong, it would at once occur to any bystander, to inquire if no medium could be found betwixt the two extremes, and if there were not room to say, that mankind, as a race, are neither good nor bad; or, otherwise, that man is as much the one as the other, being in part good and in part evil. * * * * At the bottom of the two just stated hypotheses there lies a disjunctive proposition—"*Man is by nature either morally good or morally evil*"—and it will immediately occur to every one to ask if this disjunction be correct. Some one might say, that there is room for maintaining that "*man is by nature neither one nor other*," and a third party might contend that "*he is both at once.*" * * * * The answer to that disjunctive interrogatory, if it is to fall out agreeably to a rigorous method of deciding, bottoms itself on this remark, which is of the most vital moment in ethics; namely, that the freedom of the will is endowed with this peculiar property, that it never can be determined by any spring to any act except in so far as mankind hath himself adopted and taken up that spring into his maxims; that is, hath transformed it into a universal rule, according to which he wills to conduct himself. In no other manner can a spring, be it what it may, consist with the absolute spontaneity of a free choice. Again, the moral law is [ought to be] (our own reason being judge,) itself the only originary spring, and whoso makes it his maxim is *morally good.* But if, notwithstanding, the law does not determine a person's choice, then some contrary spring must influence the will; and since, by hypothesis, this can only happen by a man's adopting this spring, and along with it its necessary effect; namely, the swerving from the law, into his maxim, (in which latter case the man is evil,) it follows that his inward mindedness to observe or depart from the law is never in a state of equilibrious indifference, and that mankind never can be neither good nor evil."

We take no notice now of his answer to the other member of this disjunction, inasmuch as it is not connected with the subject immediately before us.

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To those who are sufficiently well acquainted with Kant's philosophy and peculiar technicality to comprehend this argument, it must have all the force of absolute demonstration. The reasoning is irrefragable; but, if we mistake not, it turns not wholly upon the peculiar view of the author, that the first act of freedom consists in choosing a maxim for its future conduct; but will apply equally well, though no intermediate were found between the will and some actually existing good. Its force is derived from the essential conditions of the will's activity, and from its relationship to the moral law.

The same, or at least a similar argument may be exhibited in a form comprehensible by the most ordinary capacity and scholarship: The moral law requires of us, during each moment of accountable agency, the choice of that object which our own intelligence shall prescribe as in its own nature worthy to be made an ultimate end; and, by consequence, it prohibits every choice or state of will, which in the mind's judgment, is inconsistent with, or antithetical to that former choice. But, in every moment of accountable agency, we know precisely what the law requires of us, and what it prohibits; and we cannot but be aware, that the *not-choosing* of the legal object is inconsistent with the *choosing* of it, and is therefore a prohibited state of will. It is, besides, a conscious state; and therefore, since the will is endowed with that absolute freedom by which it can immediately pass out of this state, and is constrained by no cause *ab extra* to remain therein, it follows that it must be a voluntary state. Hence, choice is an unavoidable necessity during each moment of responsible agency. But every choice must have an *object*. It hence follows further, that, wherever the apprehended good of the universe is not chosen, the rival end is of necessity made ultimate. Throughout the entire domain of the moral law, there can be no such thing as a state of equilibrious indifference. "He that is not with me, is against me; and he that gathereth not with me, scattereth abroad."

It being thus established that the will is necessitated to choose whenever the claims of the law and the objects of moral election are before it, the *onus probandi* is fairly thrown upon our opponents; and we are not obliged, by the rules of debate, to take any farther notice of their position, until they have clearly shown that some portion of the will's energy is exempted from this necessity. We will, however, waive our logical rights, (for our object is truth and not mastery,) and proceed to show that that position can never be established.

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In the first place, then, we remark that its direct opposite is involved in the conclusion of the argument just presented. The impossibility of not choosing in the presence of an object of choice, (which we have just proved to exist) is no abstraction; it is no foreign force applied to the moral will; it is grounded in its own essential *nature* and in the *conditions* of its activity. It must therefore extend to the whole energy of that will, and call it into action at all times when these conditions are fulfilled. In other words, whenever a choice of an ultimate end is made, there remains no moral energy which at that time might have been either added to that choice or embodied in another. Otherwise, it does not partake of the nature of the will, and is not subject to its conditions of action, which is absurd and a contradiction. Thus the foundation of this last fortress of the intensity theory is found to be nothing but sand. There can be no such thing as an intention sinfully deficient in subjective force.

Analogy, at first sight, seems to cast some doubt upon this conclusion. The Sensibility, although necessitated to feel, yet feels at different times, with very unequal degrees of intensity, and perhaps, seldom with all its inherent vigor. In like manner, the Intelligence, though compelled to think, thinks not always with the same force, and seldom with all it is capable of; and why then may not the Will, although necessitated to choose, exert, at any time, less than all its moral vigor? A moment's inspection will show that this is a very superficial view of the matter, and, as analogical arguments in relation to metaphysical questions are wont to be, wholly fallacious.

The phenomena of both the Intellect and the Sensibility are caused, not by those powers alone, but by their correlation with other things. In a state of total insulation, they are incapable of giving existence to any of their respective phenomena. But when they are correlated with objects adapted to move them to action, these phenomena cannot be avoided, and their kind and intensity are fixed by absolute fatality. Hence, *they never have power, at any time, to give existence to phenomena in any respect different from, or more intense than those which actually appear.* True, if they were differently correlated, different, and perhaps more intense phenomena would be possible. But, with their present correlation, to say that either different, or more intense phenomena are possible, is to utter nonsense. The first member of

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the supposed analogy therefore has thrown aside all hostile appearance, and wears a friendly guise.

The will, on the other hand, is the sole cause of its own moral actions; and the inherent energies of this cause therefore—since surrounding circumstances or motives can neither increase nor diminish them—*must at all times, be the only and exact measure of the intensity of its phenomena.* Consequently, if at any time, this cause be necessitated to act, it is impossible, (since it is an integral unity,) that its whole energy should not be embodied in that action. No power remains latent, as in the former instances, which different circumstances or correlations may subsequently arouse into action. Thus it appears that the absolute freedom of the Will—its independent and original causality—is inseparably allied to an absolute necessity of always acting with its whole energy, whenever the objects of moral election are before it. It is, so to speak, compelled to choose with all its moral force, because it is an independent and self-determining power, and on the other hand, the fact that this is the invariable law of its activity, proves that it is absolutely free. Whatever is free, is compelled to use its whole energy. Whatever cannot but use its whole energy, is cause in itself and free.

Says Macaulay, in replying to the apologists for Charles I, "We are, on this point, (the policy and justice of the treatment he received,) so confident of superiority, that we have no objection to imitate the ostentatious generosity of those ancient knights who vowed to joust, without helmet or shield against all enemies, and to give their antagonists the advantage of sun and wind." With equal confidence that truth is on our side, we will imitate this great writer so far as to abandon the impregnable rock which we have just gained, and give our opponents battle on the level plain of their own assumptions.

Let it then be granted that Will is not necessitated to choose, or, at least, that it is not necessitated to choose with all its moral energy, and we are still ready to prove that this liberal grant, bestowed upon the intensity theory, may, like the dagger, given in kindness to a madman, be turned with fatal effect against itself. If then it be supposed that the will is not at all necessitated to choose, the only limits that can be legitimately assigned to the possible variations of its exerted energy, are, on the one hand, absolute quiesence, and, on the other, total strength. If it is at liberty to exert somewhat less than all its energy, it is plain that this liberty must

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be consistent with, or rather inherent in, its essential nature and the conditions of its activity. This supposition is not consistent with Necessitarian or Old School philosophy. For according to that, the will itself is not the cause of its choices; but either motives alone, or in correlation with our constitutional susceptibilities. They are, moreover, necessary causes. *Hence, at no time can either more or less energy be exerted than actually is.* We are, therefore, only concerned, in this place, with that view which regards the will as the self-determining cause of its own actions. Hence the supposition before us is, that there resides in the will itself, separate from all motives and extraneous influences, the power of exerting, at any time, less than all its energy. Now, if this supposition be true, no reason can be assigned, *a priori*, why still less energy may not be exerted in the next choice. Should one, who is unacquainted with the physical sciences, see, for the first time, mercury descend in a tube from one hundred to ninety degrees, he would naturally infer that a still lower descent was possible; and, with good reason, he would reject, as without foundation, any assurance to the contrary, which was not derived from satisfactory experiments. And were he told in addition, that the rise and fall of the mercury are not at all influenced by the changes of the atmosphere, or any other causes external to itself, but result wholly from the exercise of a self-determining power inherent in its own nature, he would be so much confirmed in his former inference, as to look upon all attempts to fix *a priori* any limit, short of zero, to its fall, as pretty sure evidences of lunacy. So of the Will. If its energy can fall somewhat below its extreme height, and this fall is wholly regulated by itself, it is nothing but sheer dogmatism to affirm, *a priori*, that it may not fall as low as absolute quiesence, and mere folly to attempt to prove it without experiment. And when we come to experiment and induction, as will be shown in the sequel, they can give us no light on the subject. As the matter now stands, therefore, and until absolute demonstration is furnished us, that the descent of the Will's energy must meet some impassable limit, created by its own nature, before it reaches total quiescence, we are authorized to assume that as its only possible limit. Moreover, variations are not possible on one side only of 0. As many different degrees of energy may be exerted in the choice of the end prohibited by the law, as in that of the end required. Let 100 deg. therefore mark the highest possible energy on one

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side of 0, and 100 deg. on the other: and let it be assumed that the Will *may* pass through all the points between, and we are compelled to adopt one of two suppositions, namely, either 1, That so much of the energy of the will as is at any time unexerted in the choice of good, is exerted in the choice of evil; or 2. That it is wholly quiescent. The first supposition will give us 100 deg. or 99 deg. plus 1 deg., or 98 deg. plus 2 deg., or 97 deg. plus 3 deg., or 50 deg., plus 50 deg., 1 deg. plus 99 deg., or 0, or any other number between 100 deg. and nothing, increased by such a number on the other side of nothing as shall make it equal 100: and hence it renders possible every shade of moral character, from the perfection of highest heaven, to the depravity of deepest hell, and bridges over completely, or fills up the intervening gulf between the two, which the Gallilean Teacher supposed, mistakenly it seems, to be impassable. If in the nethermost abyss there reigns a mournful gloom, "pierced by no star;" and if the summit of the celestial world rises, towering high above the regions of shadows and clouds, and bathes itself in the pure radiance of eternal light, in vain shall we hope to find a similar exclusiveness of either darkness or day at any intermediate point—every where else they mingle and combine in equal or unequal ratio. A dramatic character, in a moment of suspicion and irritation, occasioned by the supposed perfidy and cruelty of her lover, thus vents her contending emotions:

> "Beautiful tyrant! fiend angelical!
> Dove-feathered raven! wolfish ravening lamb!
> Despised substance of divinest show!
> A damned saint, an honorable villain."

This long list of contradictory epithets is but a nursery tale in comparison with what might be predicated of a moral agent whose choice may be represented by 50 deg. plus 50 deg. He is alike the friend and foe of God and Satan—in league with heaven and with hell—a denizen of the light-kingdom of Ormusa, and a dweller in the darkness of Ahreiman—the subject of reason and the slave of sense—a practiser of the virtues, but equally of sins—thrilled to tremulous delight by the benedictions and smiles of God and conscience, and tortured to agony by the scourge of the furies, and the sting of remorse.

The impossibility of such a quality of choice remains to be proved. For the present, we can only say that the possibility of two contradictory choices, either of equal or enequal

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strength, inevitably flows from the supposition now before us, and we pledge ourselves to show the intrinsic absurdity of this supposition in its due place.

The second hypothesis gives us 100 deg., or 99 deg., or 98 deg., &c., down to zero, without any addition from the negative side. At 0, all choice disappears, or else we have a choice which embodies no energy whatever, which is a palpable contradiction. Now every degree of exertion, in so far as it falls below 100 deg., is either sinful or not. If it is not sinful, there must be a large portion of unappropriated territory lying between the rival kingdoms of *good* and *evil*, in which it is possible for every rational agent in the universe to secure a dwelling, and thus absolve himself from all allegiance to both. In the exercise of freedom he has superinduced a moral paralysis and total inaction of will from which the awful thundering of Sinai and the clamors of exciting passion are alike unable to arouse him. Absurd and shocking as is this conclusion, it is scarcely more so than the alternative which our opponents have chosen to adopt, namely, *that every deficiency of exertion involves the agent in a degree of sin and guilt which is exactly proportioned to its amount.* Deficiency of right choice, since, by our present supposition, no wrong choice exists, is identical with passivity. This in fact is here admitted to be the case. But sin consists in wrong action of some kind or other. Hence, at 0, the will is both active and passive at one and the same time; and at every degree that intervenes between that point and 100 deg., it is both active and passive in the self-same thing for which it is blameworthy; for in so far as any degree of right intention exists it is not at all blameworthy.

A closer inspection will evolve an absurdity of a different nature. In saying that all deficiency of energy is sinful, the advocates of this theory must mean, either that the deficiency itself is sinful, or that it is the result of another act which is sinful. But to be consistent with themselves and reason, they must grant that wherever sin is found, a free act is also found. Hence, if the defect of energy is sinful, it is a free act. But, by hypothesis, it is no act at all; for so far as the will is active, it is active in choosing the right end and nothing else. Consequently, a voluntary activity and a total passivity meet in the self-same thing, a portion of the will's energy is both active and passive at one and the same time. It hence follows that no sinful deficiency of right choice can exist unless a portion of the will's energy be ac-

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tive in the choice of an opposite end, and therefore, that, whenever choice takes place, all the will's energy is exerted.

The supposition that the sinful deficiency is the result of an anterior act to which all the guilt involved must be imputed, is only a disguised statement that two contradictory intentions are co-existent: for all sin, as well as all holiness belongs to intention. But an intention is impossible without an object. We have hence the contradiction that the object required by the law *and nothing else is chosen*, and yet that another end, forbidden by the law, is chosen at the same time. Besides, it makes the will's moral energy *object* to itself, and hence removes it to the realm of ends, or things that may be chosen. To say, therefore, that the end required by the law and nothing else is chosen; and that a deficient amount of energy is exerted, is to affirm and deny the same thing—for one thing surely which the law forbids is chosen—a deficiency of *vis volendi*.

Doubtless many other absurdities might be deduced from this position. But we know these subtleties must be wearisome to the reader, and we can testify that they are not very interesting to the writer. Sufficient has already been done, for victory, and little glory or emolument is to be reaped in such a field. We will therefore sum up what we have proved and pass to a more interesting topic.

If, at any time, when the right end is chosen, less than all the moral energy of the will is exerted, the residuum must be either active or passive. If active, there are two contrary and co-existent choices, which in the sequel will be shown impossible. If passive, it is either sinless or not. If sinless, every moral agent may voluntarily place himself beyond the boundaries of the moral world; since by the supposition his whole moral energy is under his control and may all be rendered inactive. If sinful, the same phenomenon is both active and passive at the same time—for all sin is action. The supposition that this passivity is the result of an antecedent sinful choice is only a disguised assertion, that two contradictory choices are possible; and besides makes the moral energy of the will both subject and object at one and the same time—and involves the contradiction that nothing, and yet something which the law forbids, is chosen.

These consequences unavoidably follow from the intensity theory. They can neither be evaded nor answered. They are monstrously absurd, and at war with the first principles of ethics and with the interests of morality. That theory,

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therefore, cannot be true, and since no third supposition is possible, it follows that, whenever the apprehended good of being is chosen as an ultimate end, the will's whole moral energy is by a law of necessity embodied in that choice.

We will now examine such arguments as have been urged with most confidence against this conclusion, and show that neither they, nor any others that can possibly be framed can possess any real validity. This task would be unnecessary but for an opinion quite too prevalent that by logical subtleties direct opposites may be demonstrated; and the practice of tenaciously clinging to a position after the contradictory has been established, until all the arguments on which that position rests have been swept away.

1. We have already shown that although the *kind* of thought and feeling we indulge, and the *kind* of external actions we may perform, may often be a pretty sure, and sometimes even a certain index to the *character* or *kind* of the existing intention; yet nothing can be inferred from their *degree* respecting the strength of that intention; since were the will capable of exerting only one hundredth part of its whole moral energy at any time, nothing hinders that this small ratio should not be followed by as vigorous exertion of all these powers as the whole. All arguments, therefore, derived from this source against our conclusion, are utterly worthless.

2. The *failure* of a right purpose, whether occasional or frequent, proves nothing respecting its antecedent strength. It would seem at first sight as if the opposite must be true. When we have, on the one hand, a man so tenacious of a just purpose that,

> "Si fractus illabatur orbis,
> Impavidum ferient ruinæ,"

and on the other, some Reuben, "unstable as water;" and particularly when in successive years of the same man's life, a similar contrast is displayed, the inference seems forcible that right purpose may embody less than all the moral energy of the will. But a close examination, like the potent wand of Prospero, cannot fail to dissolve "the insubstantial pageant."

(1.) Choices, which are admitted to have been as strong as they ought to have been, are also admitted to have failed in innumerable instances. Our first parents, both perfectly holy, sinned in Paradise! Legions of angels disturbed the repose of heaven by a foul revolt against the government of God. An intention, therefore, which embodies the whole

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energy of the will (for we suppose no less will form a wholly right choice) may fail as well as any other, were *they* granted to be possible. Consequently from mere failure of choice, no inference hostile to our position can be derived.

(2.) This conclusion will stand in a much stronger light, if it is remembered that the will is the absolute and only cause of its own choices, and that motives are only *occasions* of their performance. For in this view of the matter we have not, as in the collision and antagonism of physical forces so much attraction or compulsion on the one hand, and so much resistance on the other partly or wholly balanced thereby; but two terms between which no causative relation exists and no comparison of strength and weakness is at all admissible. Hence, were the will divisible into a thousand degrees of energy and could one of these degrees act and all the rest remain quiescent; we are compelled to admit that it is just as *absolutely able* to resist the strongest array of motives that can be brought to bear upon it as the whole will, and just as able to preserve its possessor from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit to his dying day. Lapses into sin, therefore, whether frequent or only occasional, always taking place when there is, so to speak, *infinite power* of avoiding them, can throw no light whatever upon the subject before us. Were it admitted even that repeated failures of intention afforded a probable inference of its weakness, when both the subjective energy of the will and the motive force exerted upon it are the same; little reliance could ever be placed upon an inference derived from failures, when it is totally unknown what demoniacal influences may lure to sin, and by what state of health and nervous excitability, what trains of thought and kinds of feeling awakened by circumstances beyond our control, such influences may be aided; and whether the will itself is an unvarying quantity from youth to age, in sickness and in health. Besides, such an admission must be based on the Necessitarian Philosophy, which, as we have seen, does not allow us to suppose that less than all the moral energy of the will can, at any time, be exerted.

3. Much less can any thing be learned from the comparative tenacity or fickleness which men are wont to display in the pursuit of ends that are not absolutely ultimate. For here we have passed beyond the narrow confines of moral action, and the changes of purpose we meet are not only destitute of character themselves, but they by no means indicate corresponding changes where all moral character resides.

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Fouché and Tallerand who could swear allegiance and pledge their services to one monarch to-day, and be equally devoted to-morrow to his successful rival, without seeming to think that any thing remarkable or humiliating had occurred, were no less constantly and strongly devoted to self-interest and the god of ambition than the inflexible Napoleon himself whose maxim, *toute ou rien*, changed not when combined Europe thundered at the gates of Paris, and on whose iron soul, yet fearless, fell the ruins of his crumbling empire.

4. We are possessed of no faculty by which we can inspect the substance, or essence of the soul itself, and, anterior to, or back of all action of the will, ascertain what its physical abilities may be. The intimate nature or essence of the mind, as of all things else, is inscrutable to mortal ken, and its latent causative force must be learned, if at all, by its out-goings into action.

5. If it is not certain, *a priori*, that all the energy of the will must pass into intention, consciousness can never inform us whether any, or what proportion is latent, and hence can never throw any light upon the question before us. For what is consciousness? Considered as a fact or phenomenon, it is nothing but the knowledge of one's mental states, as manifestations of the *I*. Could we conceive those states to exist without our being aware of them, or knowing them, they would be *unconscious states*. When they are known to us, as ours, they are *conscious states*, or apperceptions. Consciousness, then, does but reveal to us what exists. It has no additional function to fulfill, or communication to make. Consequently, unless some judgment of the mind is yielded up to it which has taken the exact measure of the *vis volendi* of the intention, it can never inform us any thing about the matter. Now, by hypothesis, it is not certain, *a priori*, that all the energy of the will must, at any time be exerted; and we have shown that we are unable to learn any thing by direct introspection, from the changes of intention, whether frequent or occasional, or from the degree of thought, feeling, or action, by which they are accompanied and followed: and there is no other source whence material for a judgment in the premises can be derived and transmitted to consciousness: hence it gives us no light whatever on the subject. It may tell us that an intention terminating upon a right or wrong object exists; but, if it is uninformed antecedently, by the Reason, that this intention of necessity includes all the moral force of the will, it is in no condition even to guess what,

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or whether any deficiency exists, or, which is the same thing, the agent is in no condition to form such a conjecture. Take, for example, our first moral act: How in the circumstances supposed can we determine by consciousness whether all or how much less than all our moral vigor is embodied therein? We can know nothing about it—and the supposition of the opposite is as absurd, as that Caspar Hauser could tell by experience of the first motion of his foot, after leaving prison, whether its whole physical energy was embodied in that motion. Without intuition of our own strength, without any *a priori* light to guide us, consequently without any test or measure of our ability, how by any possibility can we decide on such a question? Shall we be in more felicitous circumstances when the second is originated? We cannot see how this is possible; for if the consciousness of the first act left us in profound ignorance of what degree of our whole moral energy was exerted, we are still utterly destitute of any exact test or measurement of that energy. What we at first exerted may have been all, or it may not have been a millionth part, and if retained in consciousness, being itself a totally indeterminate quantity, it can never serve to determine any thing else. Whether, therefore the second exertion shall exactly equal the first, or differ somewhat from it, it must be equally uncertain to us what ratio of our whole moral power it is. The same will hold true of a third, and of every other action that shall subsequently be performed. Hence, if we have no means of deciding this question antecedently to or independently of all action, if its solution must be derived from *a posteriori* sources, we can never obtain it. This conclusion will be much more forcible, if it is remembered, that the mind, can fix no meaning to less and more, when applied to the operations of the moral will (their number excepted); that if its exerted eneregy may be a ranging quantity, its inherent energy may perhaps also range from childhood to old age, diminish or increase as our health declines or approximates perfect soundness, be sensibly altered by the stimulus of a drug or a glass of brandy, and perhaps never be exactly the same during any two successive hours of our existence. Experience and induction, applied to the solution of such a question, resemble a lever, that without prop or fulcrum, would aim to overturn the world.—Our position, therefore, is proof against all assault from the empirical world, and all arguments thence derived must be abandoned as good for nothing.

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6. Can it be shown, *a priori*, or independently of all experience, that it is a mere matter of contingency, whether all or only a part of our whole moral energy, shall at any time be exerted. Before any valid argument can be derived from this source, it must be shown that deliberation and conscious preference intervene between the will and its choices of ultimate ends, by which their intensity is, in all cases, determined—that this intervention is every where recognized and assumed in the spontaneous judgments of mankind—and that the supposition of the opposite involves a contradiction, or an absurdity. For, without deliberation, there can be no freedom or contingency; and when a judgment, or conviction, is not both universal and necessary, it is not of *a priori* origin, and cannot form the basis of such an argument. Now the human mind does not universally, nor at all, except by force of will for the behoof of a perishing theory, assume that we are voluntary in fixing the intensity of our ultimate intentions; and it is so far from being absurd to suppose that no liberty is exercised therein, that it involves no contradiction, rests on an immutable basis of reason, quadrates exactly with the unstudied judgments of the mind, and nicely fits into the frame work of moral science. The opposite supposition, on the contrary, as we have shown, is fraught with the most glaring absurdities, and at war with itself; and it will hereafter be shown that it can never find a place in a system of ethical science, or be admitted into the framework of moral law. If therefore the empirical world is *unable* to furnish any valid arguments against our position, the pure Reason spurns the demand made for such, as an insult upon its dignity and immutable veracity. It is nothing short of an attempt to draw it into a contradiction of itself. Philosophy wots of no other sources of information, and hence the canvass is ended. This third phaze of the intensity-theory is "of imagination all compact"—"an airy nothing," which unfortunately has secured "a local habitation and a name" in the Westminster creed, and the writings of Puritan Divines.

We will now assume a different position. Granting, for the present, what we have just proved to be untrue—that it is wholly a matter of contingency whether or not, in any instance, the whole moral energy of the will shall be exerted, we shall undertake to prove that a moral agent can neither be required to exert either the whole or any definite ratio of it, nor be held guilty for exceeding or falling below any specified amount: or, in more general terms, even were not the

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exertion of our whole moral energy at all times provided for, and secured by a law of necessity, morality could never make the amount, at any time exerted, a matter either of requirement or prohibition. The choice of the right ultimate end must exhaust its demands.

According to this supposition, even were it *a priori* certain that the alleged contingency exists, we are shut up to the necessity of learning the whole strength of the will, if at all, by experience. For, to know that less than all our energy *may* be exerted is one thing: to know how much *is* exerted in any case, is another and quite a different thing—a thing which, on the present supposition, can never be learned but by experience. Now, to suppose that we know any thing about the strength of our will before our first moral act, is to suppose that we have acquired knowledge by experience, before experience has ever commenced, which it is needless to call a contradiction.

We have already shown, that there is for us no law, any further than we know what it and its applications are. It must be known, too, previously to the acts which it requires, as well in the case of our first act as of any other. So far, therefore, as we are under law, before all moral action as well as after it has commenced, we know precisely *what* is required of us, and all that is required of us; in short, we are in a condition to yield a perfect obedience without any possibility of mistake. Can we therefore be required to exert our whole moral strength in our first intention? Clearly not; for as yet we are totally ignorant what it is. Can we be required to exert any definite ratio of it? No; for unless we know what the whole is, we can never tell what is the half, the third, or any other ratio of it. Are we in any condition to yield a perfect obedience without possibility of mistake, if the law requires us, not only to choose the good which may lie before us, but to embody our whole strength, or any definite ratio of it, in this choice? It were absurd to affirm it. It results therefore, that in our first moral act, at least, the law can take no account whatever of our *vis volendi*, and that its whole meaning is exhausted in the enunciation—*will the apprehended good as ultimate;* for as soon as we go farther than this, and add—"with all your strength," or "half of your strength," or any other proportion of it, we are using words to which no idea can be attached.

If to this conclusion, it be objected that we are not required to exert absolutely the whole, or any ratio of the will,

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but only what we *suppose* to be the whole, or some required ratio, just as we are not required to choose that which is absolutely and only good, but only what we judge to be so, our reply is, that we cannot even form a *supposition* in the case. Never having had any *experience* of our moral strength, and yet being dependent upon experience for all our knowledge and even notions respecting it, we can no more form a supposition respecting it than respecting the objects of a sixth sense, only in so far as the knowledge of freedom implies the knowledge of some degree of power.

If it be further objected that the power of choosing an ultimate end, must be unknown, until it is exercised, as well as the intensity of which it is capable, and that therefore our argument proves too much, since it renders all law impossible, until after moral action has commenced; we deny the assumption. The power of choice and its absolute freedom are not learned by experience at all, but are given wholly *a priori*. As soon as we have a knowledge of the objects of moral election, the law of obligation immediately and necessarily arises in the mind, and with it, as the only basis of its possibility, the rational affirmation of our perfect freedom. To be under obligation without being free is impossible. To affirm obligation, without the previous affirmation of freedom, is equally so. No room therefore is found for legislative enactment in relation to the intensity of the first moral act. But may it not be otherwise with regard to the second? May we not be required to exert in this either the whole, or some definite part of our moral force? To this, we answer, if the consciousness of the first act has exactly determined the amount of possible moral force in our possession, this requirement may be made; if it has not determined that amount, it cannot be made. Now we have formerly shown that it is not certain, *a priori*, that all our energy must be at all times exerted when a choice is made, and if we have not a measure of our strength antecedently to action, we cannot tell by consciousness whether we exert a millionth part of it, or whether we did not exert it all. Consequently, we are just as ignorant on the subject after its performance as we were before; and consequently again, the law can no more require us to exert in our second act all or any definite ratio of our strength, than it could in the first. If, to this conclusion, it be objected that we have at least learned from the consciousness of the first act that we have some degree of strength, and may be required to use this, we answer that we knew

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before all action that we have power to choose—that knowledge being as we have seen *a priori*. A marvelous discovery then truly has been made by the consciousness of the first act, namely, that *we have power to choose with some degree of strength!*—for to choose at all is to exert some degree of strength. What additional information has been gained? How much more strength has been exerted than that which is necessarily exerted in the faintest choice? Has any more? What ratio of the power of the will? No wise man can undertake to answer these questions, and till they are answered, no wise man will pretend that the law can be made intelligible in so far as it shall concern itself with intensity of choice. To say—*choose with* SOME *degree of strength*, is only to say, choose, and nothing is added to our former *enunciation*, until it can be told with what degree of our whole strength we are to choose. But this, alas! for the intensity theory, can never be an intelligible command, and therefore can be no law at all.

To make the matter still worse, even could the amount of energy embodied in the first act be exactly retained in the consciousness, (which we by no means believe,) and could it be rendered probable that it was something more than the intensity necessarily embodied in the faintest choice, still we could not rationally demand as much in the next choice. For, how do we know that the will itself does not vary from hour to hour in its strength? and how, if it is a constantly varying term, can we make the exertion of to-day any criterion of to-morrow? or rationally demand the same quantum of intensity at all time? Not only therefore can experience shed no light upon the question what ratio of our whole energy is at any time exerted, but if it could, the knowledge it gives, being acquired *after* the act, could not be recognised in the law which commanded it, and could as little be recognized in the law which commands the ensuing act, since the will may, by the time it is performed, owing to cerebral conditions, have lost or acquired a very considerable amount of available vigor.

By recurring to our former arguments, it will be seen that we know as little of our whole strength of will after the performance of the second act, and shall after the third, fourth or even the ten thousandth as we did after the first; consequently no definite amount or ratio of *vis volendi* can ever be required of us, whether all we are capable of or somewhat less. No place is left for a computation and requisition of intensities

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in a system of moral legislation. There is therefore no such thing possible as amount of intensity below our whole moral strength, and if these were, the moral law cannot concern itself about it.

This investigation has suggested a few observations which seem to us worthy of a place here.

1. All that we have proven in respect to this last phaze of the intensity-theory will of course apply equally well to the first and second so far as they are identical with this, that is, so far as the will's energy is concerned. In other respects they were shown to involve matter to which the moral law could have no application, and to be ineffably absurd and ridiculous. Their central life is now extinguished in common with that of the third.

2. The perfect contrast displayed by the two theories of adaptability to moral law and moral uses must forcibly strike the reflecting mind. According to the theory which we advocate, the whole energy of the will passes into every intention by a law of necessity. It therefore no more requires our oversight or attention than the beating of the heart, or the circulation of the blood. We have only to concern ourselves with its direction, and when that is once fixed, nature takes care of the rest. Whether it suffers any variations from youth to age, in sickness or health, perhaps we can never decide; but even if it does, we are not at all concerned with them, since, at all times, all we have of energy is necessitated to act, just as our whole current of blood, be it great or small, is necessitated to flow. We are therefore entirely relieved from the painful embarrassment of introspection which is so fatal to all moral enterprise, and may give our whole attention to the good to be willed, and the best means of promoting it, taking for granted that it will be willed hard enough. It is besides certain that we can never experience any exhaustion or weariness from choosing the right object; for the energy embodied therein *being a pure spontaneity* and therefore no object at all of our will, and in fact lying wholly out of the sphere of our action, can by no possibility bring with it weariness. Hence we are just as able in sickness as in health to choose the glory of God and the good of man; and we shall experience no more difficulty or exhaustion in doing so upon a dying bed than in the vigor of perfect health.

But according to the opposite theory, it being a matter of contingency whether all the will's energy shall, at any time, be exerted or not, and yet a matter for which we are held re-

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sponsible, our constant over-sight and attention are necessary. We are concerned, not only with its direction, but its volume. If variations are caused by the advance of years, and the changes they bring, these must be faithfully registered and accounted for. We are hence doomed to never-ceasing and painfully agonizing, because fruitless introspection; and instead of acting with the freedom and efficient concentration which characterize us where the quantum of will may be wholly neglected, we waste most of our energies in striving to get up an intensity of choice—about as foolish a business as if we should attempt to climb to the moon on stairs of empty space. It is to us a great marvel how a theory, so utterly unfit for application in a system of moral legislation, and so hostile to virtuous effort, ever obtained a place in the theological world. As to a foundation, it has none in reason; as to esthetic beauty, or any charms for the imagination, it is wholly destitute of them; as to the absurd consequences it involves, they are absolutely insurmountable. To what accident then is its birth to be ascribed? We know not, unless it be to the confusion of the sensibility with the will, which

> "Breeds
> Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
> Abominable, unalterable, and worse
> Than fables yet have feigned, or fear conceived;
> Gorgons and hydras and chimeras dire."

Different persons will doubtless make very different inferences from this contrast, but, for ourselves, we are ready to say, if there were no other reasons for rejecting totally this intensity-theory than what this simple contrast presents, we should not hesitate a moment. When once it is understood that the law, and all the conditions of knowing and perfectly obeying it, must be known before the performance of the acts it commands, no man in his right mind, can ever regard this theory in a more favorable light than as an exploded folly of by gone days.

3. The dogmatism of the quotations by which this theory was introduced is also a matter of astonishment. By what right can Dr. Beecher affirm that "love to God is in its origin feeble compared with what it ought to be according to the moral law." It has been shown that even if such feebleness of love were not an impossibility, its existence can never be ascertained. By what right can Pres. Edwards teach that "there may be more defect of love than strength of love"? that "there may be true love to God which neverthe-

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less may not be one half as strong as it ought to be"? This assertion is sheer dogmatism; nay worse, it is proved to be downright absurdity. By what right can the common pulpit echo and re-echo, in every variety of form, and with still unabated certainty, this miserable dogma? By what right can they affirm that sin is mixed with their holiest performances? For ourselves we think it high time there were some abatement in the positiveness with which this ridiculous absurdity of the past is re-echoed at the present—some examination into the grounds on which it rests if it has any; and, if we are not mistaken, the time is not far distant when its reiteration without an exhibition of those grounds will be somewhat offensive to the common sense of mankind.

[The author of the above article, as our readers are doubtless aware, has now passed to his last account. The doctrine elucidated in the articles entitled, "The Simplicity of Moral Action" was the last subject in theological and moral science to which his thoughts and his pen were devoted. His design was, to perfect these articles so that they should contain a complete elucidation of this great subject. For accomplishing this end, he expressed a strong desire for strength to think and write, *one more half day*. But this privilege was not granted. His manuscripts, however, were left in such a state, that his brother, Rev. S. D. Cochran, will be able to get the remaining article in readiness for the next number of the Quarterly. The present and preceding articles have been occupied with the discussion of the essential preliminary questions bearing upon the subject. The next and final article will contain the direct argument. Those who would understand this great foundation doctrine of true christianity, are earnestly desired to give all the articles on this subject, a very careful perusal. The next article will probably be accompanied with a brief notice of the character of the author, by Rev. S. D. Cochran.]

A M.

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ARTICLE LX.

Reflections on National Literature applied to that of England.

By T. B. Hudson,

Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in O. C. Institute.

To understand aright the character and worth of a nation's literature, we must contemplate it as the product of that nation's mind. We need of course to understand the character of a nation's mind before we are prepared to sit in judgment on its literary manifestations. Accordingly in presenting to our readers an estimate of the character and worth of British literature, we deem it an indispensable preliminary not only to inquire into the general relations which the literature of a nation must sustain to its character, but also to determine what has been the particular character of British mind. If these points are satisfactorily settled, the way will be open to a just appreciation of the literary triumphs and treasures of our mother isle. These remarks will suggest the order which we are to pursue.

What then is the relation which the literature of a nation sustains to its character? We answer that it is necessary and quite uniform. In every civilized nation, and in some that are but partly civilized, wherever mind has made any considerable progress in improvement or thought, there is a literature, the off-shoot and growth of that mind—bearing a very faithful resemblance in all its features to the parent that gave it birth. As is the national mind, so will be the national literature.

The origin of national literature will serve at once to prove and illustrate this point. The mind is always active. When free, it is ever on the wing. Or if it folds its pinions, it is but to attempt the heaven of undiscovered thought in a more adventurous flight. It seeks to make known the results of its labors to others. Benevolence which aims to diffuse the good it has attained—ambition which labors to build an

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undecaying monument to its own glory—patriotism circling the name of father-land with a halo of splendor—friendship decking with flowers the grave of departed worth—religion multiplying in ten thousand forms, its one solemn message to man, are but so many motives impelling man to speak from his heart to the hearts of other men. The result is a literature; and the more mighty the impulse under which the mind of a people may act in the birth of their literature, the more spontaneous, earnest, and truthful that literature will be. In any probable circumstances, the grand features of a nation's character will be as fully disclosed in its first literature as the energies of a virgin soil are revealed in the verdure of its prairies, or the primeval forests which have shadowed it from before the memory of man.

Another consideration which will show how a national literature is the index to the national character is the mode in which such a literature is extended and perpetuated. When a nation's character has become definite and known, when its taste can be made the subject of calculation and reflection, a large majority of writers will work to gratify the demand which they find to be the reigning demand. The principle of "supply and demand" becomes now as applicable to literature as to any other article of commerce. Writers furnish what the people demand, and furnish most readily and in largest amount, what is most rewarded in fame and gold. Thus a national literature not only tends to perpetuate itself, but also most faithfully represents the prevailing condition of the masses of the people.

Our proposition is not the less true, when great changes are wrought in the character of a national literature. These changes, whether for better or for worse, begin with a few. They speak out their convictions. They diffuse their sentiments through the popular mind. If they are received, the public mind undergoes a transformation. It demands a new literature and its demands are no sooner heard than ten thousand pens are busy to supply them. Thus a change in the popular mind works almost at once a corresponding change in the literature on which that mind feeds.

But if the attempted change fails of success, if the small corps of writers who may have tried to stamp their new views on the public mind find that it will not yield to the impress which they have labored to fix upon it, the attempted revolution of course stops. The old literature occupies its

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place of honor as before. It holds its throne, because it is the best exponent of the state of the public mind as it was and still is.

If there are apparent exceptions to this rule they are only apparent. A national literature may be struggling into being. Its voice will falter and its utterances will be broken and contradictory. But even here the contradiction and weakness in the literature will exist because of the weakness and contradiction in the public mind whose state it embodies. A literature which has borne sway for an era, for centuries even, may seem to be withering away; and no strong literature of fresh growth may appear at once to take its place. Here too the literature will be an unerring index to the state of the public mind. The idols of its old worship have crumbled and fallen from their holy places; and no new divinities yet claim its offerings and its adoration. Such, we say, *may* be the condition of a national literature. Such at that very time will be the condition of the popular mind and heart.

Thus literature in its nature, its origin, its maintainance, in the various forms which it assumes, in the manifold changes which it undergoes, is only the shadow in the mirror, the counterpart and resemblance of the public thought and feeling. If we would learn a nation's progress or decline, its growth or decay, we may question its literature for an answer. The answer will not long deceive us. On the other hand, we may safely infer the character of a national literature from the known character of the nation itself, The savage has no literature. We know from his condition, that a literature is with him impossible. Among a half civilized people we expect a stunted and shriveled literature, for there mind has but a stunted and shriveled growth. Beneath a despotism whose cheerless winter blasts every plant and flower as it springs in the soil of free thought, we look for a waste in literature, for the soul is there frozen to rock and ice. Among a free and enlightened people on the contrary, where art has given shape to the idea of the beautiful, where science has pierced to the heart of things, and dragged forth the mysteries of nature to the gaze of all, where the hope of triumphant achievement nerves every power to its fullest exercise, where invention yokes the energies of the outer world to the car of human progress, where government, morals, and religion are most profoundly studied and most faithfully applied, we expect to find a literature rich, varied and profound, beautiful, eloquent, sublime—a literature in short which shall reflect the

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character of the mind of the people, which shall record its triumphs, which shall throb with its emotions, and be attuned to all its sympathies and hopes. Such are our spontaneous expectations in surveying the condition of various nations. Nor will they be disappointed. The truth is, that having once ascertained the necessary relation between the literature and the character of any people, we may infer its literature from its character, or its character from its literature, as may best suit the purpose we have in hand. If the relation be a natural and fixed relation, (and this we think has been proven,) one of the terms, when known, will give us the other.

We come now to inquire what has been the character of British mind and what has been the consequent character of British literature. And here we may well exclaim, "our inheritance is a noble one!"

The English language and literature are a mine of rich and almost exhaustless resources. Through its medium the great and good of our ancestral island speak to us with voices whose mighty echoes fill the tract of six hundred years. The sons of sea-girt Albion have conquered for themselves an empire on which the sun never sets, washed by the surges of the Pacific, and enriched by the swelling of the Ganges. The cross of St. George waves amid icebergs that never melt, and amid flowers that never wither. The keels of Britain plow every sea, and pour into her lap the products of

"Earth's remotest bound, and ocean's wildest shore."

The thunder of her ordinance rebounds from the heights of Archangel, and from the crags of the cape of Good Hope. The Lord of the Celestial Empire trembles at her frown, and opens the untravelled recesses of his sacred domain to the gaze of her children. Hindostan, with her hundreds of millions of people, owns Britain as her lord, and with her cities and temples, her mountains and her plains, with the unbounded exuberance of her yearly harvests, and with her uncounted treasures, the hoardings of many generations, becomes a trophy of Britain's prowess Her literature is the record of these vast labors and conquests. That literature is our inheritance. It is a noble one.

Englishmen—and this appellation we apply to all who are heirs of the Saxon blood and the Saxon tongue—have been the greatest patrons of the arts and sciences which belong to practical life, and among the greatest discoverers in

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all departments of philosophy which dignify or bless the race. Her agriculture has made the wilderness to blossom like the rose, and the bleak mountain-top to wave with harvests and be vocal with the bleating of many flocks. Her manufactures have chained the wheel to almost every hill-side, and made the steam engine, a Briarcus, not of a hundred arms, but of ten thousand arms, to work with unceasing toil, and to shout with a cry that reaches her farthest nooks, the triumph of human genius over the powers of nature. Railroads bring Johnny Groat's house within a few hours ride of Land's End; and the Electric Telegraph charges the lightning with messages of love or business, of commerce or diplomacy, borne by the flaming courier on wings of fire whenever his human masters bid him fly. The literature of England and her sons, tells the story of these munificent benefactions which art and science have strewn along the daily path of man. That literature is our own inheritance. Is it not a noble one?

England has been the theatre of some of the mightiest struggles which man has ever made for the truths and Liberties, whose enjoyment has always been the object of his longings. Her literature records these struggles, and gives us at once their causes, their characters, their continuance and their consequences. That literature is our inheritance. It is indeed a noble one.

Through the lapse of six hundred years many a child of song has listened to the voices of nature, and has echoed them from the depths of his soul in Poesy that will not die. In England and America eloquent men have uttered "thoughts that breathe and words that burn," though the minds that conceived those thoughts have left us forever, and the tongues that uttered those words have long ago mouldered to dust. Her literature tunes again those unstrung harps, wakes again those mighty thunderers from their slumbers, and gives again to our ears those strains of melody and of eloquence that melted to softness or filled with awe the men of other generations. That literature is our inheritance. We do our readers no wrong when we repeat "it is a noble one."

Benevolence in England has devised her plans of charity, and gone forth to bless the needy. Taste there has studied the beautiful, and recorded the principles which guide her impulses. Religion has drawn from the heart of man, and more than all from the Bible, the great ideas which embosom his life and destiny. English literature is the grand Reposi-

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tory in which we may avail ourselves of the outcome of all these labors. That literature is our inheritance. Once more we ask, Is it not a noble one?

Let no one suppose us unconscious of the blemishes or defects to be found in our literature. Let no one imagine that we undervalue the monuments of classic genius which antiquity has bequeathed to us, or the progress made by the nations of continental Europe in the creation of a literature for themselves. We are aware of all this, and we accept with joy whatever contributions may have been made from whatever source to the common inheritance of the race. Yet we have strong reasons for preferring our own literature to that of every other nation on the globe. Let us attend to some of them. Compared with classic literature our own is far more copious and rich, more varied, is the exponent of far greater triumphs of mind, is more practical, more benevolent, holds the glass up to nature, whether external or internal, with far more fidelity, and with the exception in favor of classic literature, of a certain fastidious delicacy of finish, is really far more beautiful. Compared with the literature, of continental Europe, it is in almost every desirable feature, superior to the French, and though less profound and voluminous than the modern literature of Germany, it is more symmetrical, because more imbued with common sense. Its philosophy is not pushed into absurdity—its religion is not ground into atheism—its poetry does not flaunt out with unrestrained extravagance—its works of mere sentiment do not abound with characters "whose likeness is not in the heavens above nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth," to such an extent as is pitiably true of the literature of central Europe. It would be a pleasure to expand each of these topics to an essay instead of bestowing only a glance on them all. But we must pass on.

Some deductions from the principle which has been illustrated, will close the present article.

1. If it be true that a national literature takes its features from the national character, the foundations of a noble national literature must be laid in a noble national character. This is a remark which emphatically concerns our own country. We have as yet hardly emerged from our childhood. Burke once remarked "America is yet in the gristle." The remark is as true now as when he uttered it. We have broken away from the old systems of Europe, and tried the experiment of self-government. If we succeed, it will be the first

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instance of successful democracy the world's history furnishes. On our soil the battle between man's right to himself and chattel-slavery is begun. and is yet to be fought out. The most terrible struggle is to come. The hundreds of thousands and millions of tyranny's wasted and plundered victims are pouring in from Europe to mingle with our children and help shape our destiny. Infidelity and Christianity, Protestantism and Romanism, Consolidation and extreme Democracy, High Church, Low Church, No church, Presbyterianism, Congregationalism, Independency, and other agencies and influences, whose name is Legion, are here waging their unequal and doubtful struggle. What shall the end of these things be? We can only answer—*the end is yet to be.* That is to say, our *settled national character is yet to be formed.* Let this be what it ought to be, and our literature will spontaneously embody the lineaments of our national excellence. What a field here for the exertions of the Christian patriot! It is his privilege to help lay the foundations of a temple which centuries may be expended in building. Our work is the formation of the national character. Its literature as such must be the product of another generation. Let us understand our mission. Let us know that in shaping our national character we are doing more to shape our permanent national literature than any one of the masters of thought and language who may hereafter rise to electrify and astonish posterity. He may agitate their hearts. We may, in a high sense, create their hearts. He may mold the minds around him. We may mold him too. All may aid in this work—all *must* aid in it. Whether we will or not, we are shaping the character of our future literature by shaping the character of our future people. What it shall be depends largely on us who are now living.

2. We may just remark in passing, that our subject furnishes an answer to those who in our own country or abroad, complain that we have no national literature. How could we? We were born but yesterday. We have just remarked that we have as yet no settled national character, and can of course have properly speaking no national literature. It would be preposterous to expect it. The farmer who should look for a rich harvest of fine fruit from the scion of a year's growth would be pronounced a fool. And yet Americans blush for their country, and foreigners speak swelling words of vanity, because the infant literature of America, planted but yesterday, does not vie in richness and abundance with

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the literature of Europe, which has enjoyed the culture of twenty generations. When our national character shall have taken a definite shape—when the chaos that is now heaving and surging to the "tempest wing" of social discord shall have been composed to order—when the forests shall be felled—our cities built—canals and rail-ways constructed—when the web of lightning wires shall be woven over the continent, when the grand problem of our government shall be solved—when "the fetters shall be broken, and the slave shall be a man," when religion shall have triumphed over every foe, and all hearts shall own her mild sway—then we shall have a literature, that will record the history of these great achievements, and a poetry that shall hymn in fitting numbers their praise.

3. If national literature is but the reflection of national character, then we have a standard by which to compare the literature of one age with that of another age in the same nation. All that will be needful is to ascertain the mental and moral condition of those periods as compared with each other, and the character of their literature as compared with each other may be generally inferred with considerable certainty. If for example we should be told that the reign of Henry the II, was a period of mental gloom and depression —that ignorance rested like night over the masses—and that the few cultivated minds held little intercourse with each other, and found themselves imprisoned on all sides as with a wall of iron; and if at the same time we were informed that the reign of Elizabeth was one of boundless inquiry, that mind had awaked as it were from the sleep of ages—that the great birth-right of the human soul, freedom of thought, was beginning to be acknowledged—that philosophy was adding new domains to science—that eloquence found its applauding audience, and poetry its widening circle of charmed, yet discriminating admirers—we should hardly need to glance at the literature of the two periods to satisfy ourselves that the literature of the former age, was almost worthless, while that of the latter was so rich and varied, so beautiful and profound, as scarcely to have a parallel in the world's history. This principle it is obvious may be applied in the comparison of any age with another in the history of the same nation.

4. If we wish to determine the relative merits of the literature of different nations, a fair estimate of their relative national character will furnish us with the data for an accurate judgment. How may we decide on the relative mer-

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its of French, German, Spanish and Italian literature? We may, if we please, wade through all their authors, and from personal examination of each arrive at our general conclusions; or we may pursue a more compendious and perhaps equally satisfactory course. We may from a general survey of their history ascertain what has occupied their powers, what features the discipline of ages has impressed on their character, what questions have been mooted among them, what national tendencies and sentiments have been fostered, what, in short, is the *tout ensemble* of their character. And by comparing these with each other, we may infer the relative merits of their literature, with a considerable degree of exactness.

5. We may apply this principle to the oft-mooted question whether the classic literature is superior to that of our own language. We have already intimated our opinion on this point. But a remark or two further on the same subject may not be out of place here. The principle which we are here applying resolves the question whether the literature of Greece and Rome is superior to that of England, into this: Was the moral and social condition of Greece and Rome superior to that of England? Did mind then struggle as successfully with the great practical questions which affect man's happiness? Was science then cultivated as assiduously? Were the relations of man to man as clearly understood? Was there then even in respect to literature itself, the same enlarged and well-balanced apprehension of its true mission? Was there the same just and natural taste, free alike from vulgar rudeness on the one extreme, and from painful bondage to artificial rules on the other? To all these questions we are compelled to give answer in favor of the mental and moral condition of England? But if these questions be thus answered, the literature of England is superior to that of Greece and Rome, and such we believe to be the truth. We do not underrate the classics. Some of them were the idols of our boyhood Some of them are now the honored companions of our manhood. The great men of the heathen world wrought nobly in their day. We are proud to behold in them the fathers of much that is noble in our own literature We believe that there are important reasons why the study of some of their works should make a part of a liberal education throughout our land. But still we believe that were the classic literature swept at once and forever into oblivion, the world would suffer a loss, great indeed, perhaps incalculable,

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but yet incalculably less, even in the department of polite literature than it would suffer were the elegant writers of our mother tongue to experience the same fate. We should be loth to part with either. But were we compelled to choose between them, our choice would be soon made. Who would not give up a garden for an empire, an empire too of widening limits and increasing wealth and grandeur? But we must dismiss this topic perhaps to resume it when time and space may permit us to devote to it the attention it deserves.

6. The principle that literature is the exponent of the minds which give it birth, will aid us greatly in judging of the relative merits of the different departments of literature of which our general literature is composed. While it is true that a bad man may write a good book, it is not likely to be true that a whole host of bad men will simultaneously and without concert spend their lives in writing good books. If then the aggregate character of a certain class of writers, is corrupt, we may infer that the aggregate character of their writings will both be corrupt and tend to corruption. We could come to no other conclusion without reversing every rule of judgment which the experience of ages has furnished us. So much for the principle. It has a thousand applications. We wish now to make but one. We refer to the ocean of fiction which is whelming at the present moment the whole civilized world. We can judge, we admit, of the character of these works in many other ways. We may see its results in the blighted hopes and wasted fortunes, and rotten morals and crushed character of the increasing multitudes of those who yield to their influence. We may learn it from actual inspection, carving through huge masses of putrefaction which load the air with poison, and whose contact is almost certain pollution. But we may pursue a safer course. Learning from authentic sources the character of the authors, we may calculate with almost entire certainty, the character of their works. Now it is our opinion that almost all the writers of fiction fall into one of the following classes—persons who are destitute either of noble minds, or of upright hearts—or of both these claims to consideration. Exceptions we freely admit. The number of honorable exceptions is perhaps increasing. But making ample allowance for all these, our remark still holds true. We believe there are few classes of writers—after we leave the conductors of the lowest county papers, and perhaps we ought not to except even them—who have less claim to the homage due to

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greatness and goodness than the novel-writers of the present generation. To prove this assertion by references to the well known character of multitudes of them would be easy, but would occupy too much space. The charge will be admitted by almost all the candid even among the advocates of this class of literature. We may safely proceed on this assertion as true. But if it be true, then the fictitious literature of the present generation ought as a whole to be eschewed and abominated. For the men who are its authors have to a frightful extent a character which every lover of his species must eschew and abominate. The maxim that a literature will be as the moral character of its authors, applies with peculiar force to fictitious literature, and to sentimental literature in general. In a scientific work, its author embodies only his thoughts on the subject which he expounds. A bad man may write an excellent essay on Banks or on Fluxions. But in fictitious literature we have the unbosoming of the author's thoughts, feelings and sympathies, in short of his tendencies and sentiments as a man. Of course we may expect that the man will live in his book. "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." This principle bids us lift our voice of warning to our young readers. We should betray our trust, if we did not say to all the devotees of modern fiction—"The apples you are plucking grow on the trees of Sodom." "You cannot gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles."

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ARTICLE LXI.

Liberty and Labor.

By Rev. James A. Thome,

Professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, in O. C. Institute.

It will be remembered by the readers of the Quarterly that they were favored some fifteen months ago with an article on Learning and Labor,* in which the worthiness of Labor to be elevated to so noble an alliance was triumphantly vindicated. It could not fail to strike the reader of that article that labor had taken a forward step, and a glorious one too, by being held up in such an honorable association. The simple announcement of *Learning and Labor*, was the placing of a garland on the swarthy brow of labor. So unheard of a juxta-position of terms usually deemed contradictories, but when brought together so palpably homogeneous, could not fail to start new trains of thought. What before appeared absurd, then stood forth self-evident truth—and labor was instantly elevated from the sphere of brute force, to the realm of enlightened industry, where illuminated intellect presides. Suffer me to add that we have here a fine exemplification of the tributary relation of learning to labor, in the fact that this high tribute to labor came from one of learning's sons—it could have come from no other. The starting of this idea is equal in merit to the discovery of a new chemical compound in which we see with admiration two antagonizing agents combining to form one invaluable element. An idea of such a character once originated, becomes fruitful of suggestions in other minds. These in turn, though they may not claim the credit of originality, may nevertheless be highly valuable. We are about to present the reader with an association thus suggested. Originality of course we do not arrogate. To magnify the law of labor and make it honorable, is our aim. We do not however for

* See Oberlin Quarterly Review for August, 1846, Article 26, Learning and Labor, By Rev. J. H. Fairchild, Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy.

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this purpose court for labor splendid alliances, which are illegitimate and unnatural. Labor needs no meretricious aids. We simply assert for it those connections which properly pertain to it, but of which it has usually been denied. We publish therefore the bans of *Liberty and Labor!* LIBERTY AND LABOR!!

In some quarters such a proposal would, no doubt, encounter a host of staring exclamations and startled interrogations. What repugnant extremes! some would exclaim. What a shocking amalgamation! Worse than the dreaded intermarriage of the whites and blacks! Matrons and misses would pronounce it a most unsuitable match. "Labor," they would insist "is an old, stiff, hard-handed, brown-faced, stoop-shouldered, rough clad farmer;—while Liberty is a young, fair, beautiful, bewitching creature, in the bloom of life, of high descent, and princely fortune, worthy of a royal alliance. Peradventure some bar-room guardian of liberty would be sufficiently shocked to commit to the flames an article which urged so foul and treasonable a sentiment. But we congratulate ourselves that our readers will sympathize in the nuptials of Liberty and Labor, that they are prepared to enter fully into the spirit of the transaction, that they will be proud to kiss both bride and groom.

The Devil—who at an early period signalized his opposition to agricultural interests by destroying and spiriting away Job's immense stock, and his laborers besides—the devil must, we are persuaded, have had a main share in fixing the hitherto family and conjugal relations of labor, and of liberty, too, for these have really been no better. Labor has been herded with ignorance, meanness, insignificance, obscurity, poverty, filth, vice, brutality, and to crown its infamy it has been *married to Slavery!* Liberty on the other hand has been associated with wealth, idleness, loaferism, genteel dissipation, coffee-house-caucuses, political partyism, street-bralws, mobocracy. duelling, war, oppression; and to whom has it been wedded? (We speak now of liberty in America.) To the slaveocracy, Now we contend not only that this is Satan's work, but that it is his *master piece.* What scheme could have been concocted in pandemonium itself better calculated to degrade labor and to defame liberty, to make the one a loathing and the other a hissing, to convert the former into a beast of burthen, the very dromedary of the desert, and the latter into a beast of prey, the very hyena of the battle-field. Alas, for the cruel wrongs which have been committed upon these natural

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allies. Destined of God to be joined together, they have not only been kept asunder, but foully forced into most revolting unions. "But from the beginning it was not so;" neither shall it be so in the end. The vile, coerced alliances of both are henceforth to be dissolved, and hearts long severed to be blent in one. You have heard occasionally of those cases of romance in real life in which parties between whom there has subsisted from childhood a pure affection, and whose hearts have been naturally bound by plighted vows, have nevertheless from some disparity of family connection, or to favor some ambitious project of the friends on one or both sides, been discountenanced in their cherished affinities, and finally, after the ineffectual employment upon them of every possible inducement to gain their consent, have been compelled, literally forced, to wed others whom they could never love. Long and dismal years of silent agony, of living death, ensue, during which they are widely separated, perhaps never hearing from each other. The last hope of realizing the golden dreams of youth is relinquished, and they resign them to their fate. By a wonderful concurrence of events however their respective consorts die contemporaneously, and then, in advanced life, yet with the fires of first love still glowing in their faithful breasts, they arise to seek each other's embrace. Seas may separate them; different hemispheres may hold them; but they traverse continents and oceans, they *rest not* till they meet, the sorrow-wasted remnants of themselves, to mingle their true hearts together. Such is the melancholy story of Liberty and Labor. God gave them to each other. Man has torn them asunder. Governments have sanctioned the separation. They have been forced into positions of mutual antagonism and horrible strife. But for a quarter of a century Liberty and Labor have been partially freed from their hated connections, and have been seeking each other, and now they have met! *They have met*,—LIBERTY AND LABOR! Not however, as the comparison might indicate, way-worn and grief-worn, not haggard and withered and trembling on the verge of dissolution. They meet, if we may be allowed to change the figure, as meet the streams from the western mountains, and the river from the northern lakes, the one having rushed from rock to rock, and the other from vale to vale, and both having gathered fresh strength from a thousand obstacles, to pour with a shout and a shock their tireless floods in one mighty tide, the glory of a hemisphere and the

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highway of the commercial world. Such will Liberty and Labor united be, the glory of the new world, and the renovation of the old.

Before passing to the details of our theme, suffer us to call your attention to the fact that the great ultimate inquiry of all those utilitarian inquiries which are now exciting the public mind, is by what means shall labor be redeemed from its condition of abject drudgery, and placed "but a little lower than" the learned professions, if not upon a level with them? We cannot step out into the awakening world without meeting this great inquiry in some form or other struggling for solution. Our township, county, and state fairs, our industrial conventions and associations, our mechanical institutes, our artisan's processions, our national printer's conventions, our agricultural papers, and last, not least our manual labor schools and colleges are indices pointing to the same central question, *how shall labor be ennobled?*

We cannot but regret that some of the most zealous efforts to realize this object have been so egregriously misdirected. We refer particularly to the Associationist movement. The cardinal principle of this scheme is that labor is to be dignified by rendering it *attractive*, and this is to be effected by changing the word labor, into the phrase *attractive industry*, by painting the plow-tails, varnishing the hoe-handles, and furbishing the tines of the manure-forks, and especially by pulling down the barns and dwellings and building greater! Now whether this system took its cue from the furbished muskets and glittering bayonets and flashing swords and all the attractive sheer of war, and determined to start a competition by way of imitation, or whether it derived the hint from the navy-yards where old ships are made attractive by being repainted, and called by new names, we cannot determine. However this may be, we do not at all fancy the project. We regard it in fact as a libel upon labor, and upon man too; upon labor as implying that it is not susceptible of any higher refinement than that of dress, of any deeper polish than that of varnish, and upon man as implying that he cannot be attracted by any more sterling quality of labor than its surface lustre. This attraction-theory is on a plane with the insulting method of elevating woman by *calling her lady*, and be-decking her person with gorgeous apparel. No tinsel trappings, nor tricks of speech can avail to dignify woman, so long as her actual condition is that of servile degradation or contemptible imbecility.

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Labor and Ladies then (another shining alliance by the way) are to be elevated in the same manner, by giving them *learning and liberty.*

Behold then the sole method of honoring labor—*making it free.* Establish, as by a decree of the Medes and Persians, the irrepealable alliance of Liberty and Labor. Write it down, proclaim it everywhere. Let learning endorse it, let literature illustrate it, let art emblazon it, let piety and philanthropy magnify it. Unfurl the banner, LIBERTY AND LABOR. Let it float among the free winds, which love to kiss the bronzed cheek of labor. Let it be inscribed on the walls of every farm house, that our children may learn to lisp together the names of LIBERTY AND LABOR. Let it be the watch-cry on every inch of free American soil. Let the sower speak it to the plowman, and the plowman pro-long it to the reaper, and let the reaper mingle with the shout of the harvest-home; Liberty and Labor. Let its thunder-call roll over the slave cursed South, till labor there, crushed, degraded, manacled and brutalized, shall leap up unfettered, and claim its birth right, liberty.

I propose now to show that Liberty and Labor have a *joint mission*—that liberty cannot accomplish its high aims without labor, and that labor cannot fulfill its noble destiny without liberty. Let us brush from our minds those cob-web notions of sentimental liberty which our local and itinerant orators have been spinning with spider fertility for half a century, and look at it as sober practical men. What is liberty? It is the free possession and exercise of our minds and our bodies. Had we no minds and no bodies, it is mathematically certain that liberty would be to us a nullity. The same would be true if we had no occasion to exercise mind or body. It is then amid the exercises, that is, the activities and susceptibilities of mind and body, that liberty lives, moves, and has its being. Here is the sphere of its beneficent influence, and whatever it does for man it does within this scope. What now are its aims? *The highest development and well being of mind and body.* We are speaking of course of the *individual* aims of liberty. The national aims however are perfectly analogous. The nation is but the aggregate of the individual, and what promotes the true substantial interests of the individual secures the prosperity of the nation. As for government, it is but the machinery which Liberty employs to attain her ends, and to maintain her necessary authority and power. When we define liberty —"the free possession and exercise of our minds and bodies,"

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we speak of it subjectively—as a blessing enjoyed. It may be also considered objectively, as the power, the personified principle, the superintending presence by which man is *preserved* in the unmolested use of his natural and acquired possessions. We shall freely use the word in both these senses—though chiefly in the latter, that is, as the *guardian of rights and interests.* In this view it will be readily seen that liberty is a plain matter of fact utilitarian principle—allowing, indeed, a holiday now and then, a cattle show, a fair, or a procession, once a year—but decidedly addicted to the graver pursuits of life. Look cautiously here, and you will discover the precise points at which liberty has been turned from her appropriate sphere, and her peerless orb of light and blessing been converted into a portentous comet. These tangent points are two. One is the point of junction between the mental and the physical—the other embraces the physical with the mental, but excludes the sterner responsibilities of both. The first we say is the point of junction between the mental and physical—that is, liberty has been confined to the realm of mind, to thinking, feeling, willing &c., and their correlatives, speaking, writing, worshipping the divine Being, acting morally, &c. These high functions of the mind have been consigned to liberty as her honorable charge, while the bodily activities have been deemed too mean to engage her attention. The other case of departure may be thus described. It begins at the point where the amusements, diversions, pomps and displays of life, whether mental or bodily, join with the toils, burdens, and drudgeries of life; and while it assigns the former to liberty, it closes her door against the latter, as too low bred and servile to enter even the vestibule of her temple. The fullest liberty, for example, is vouchsafed upon this principle, to the cultivators of polite literature and profound learning, the Scotts and the Bulwers, the Coleridges and Erasmuses; but he who would Luther like or Lovejoy like, employ his talents in exposing corruptions, in denouncing oppression and proclaiming universal freedom, is no son of Liberty. So in the physical department, by this principle, the inalienable right is guarantied to all *white* men, to be lazy, to get drunk, to stand at the street corners every hour of the day, and talk state politics or village scandal, to race horses and play cards, to act the gentleman and fight duels, to brandish bowie knives at home, and bayonets in Mexico: all this is respectable, genteel, glorious but hard labor, with its heraldry of horny palm and sweaty

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brow, every day labor, aspiring to nothing higher, but minding its own business, though on its brawny Atlantian shoulders rests the whole race, has been barely tolerated, and that only on condition that it would keep its place, and submit to be yoked to the ox and harnessed with the mule. And labor has meekly bowed to its fate! "Issachar is a strong ass, couching down between two burdens." What a monstrous perversion of Liberty from its legitimate aims, making it the scourge and curse of man. Let us now see in what consists its restoration to its appropriate sphere. Revert then to the *aims* of liberty as above defined, viz. the highest developement and well being of mind and body. *What* this development and well being are, liberty does not determine—this is not her province. It is man's duty, with the light he has, to know these, and knowing them, to choose them, and *then* it is his right to demand liberty, as the condition of securing these ends. So long as the mass of men are willfully ignorant or regardless of their substantial interests, so long as they contemn sober pursuits, and exalt in their estimation puerile frivolities and "inexplicable dumb show," so long will liberty be only a license to man to transform himself into a brute or a demon. Let mankind respect the true interests of mind and body—laying sense and folly under ban—and then will they be prepared to restore liberty to her proper sphere. What then are these interests? Interests are the correlatives of wants. Our mental interests are determined by our mental wants, and so of our bodily interests. Knowledge for example is a want of mind: consequently the acquisition of knowledge is an interest of mind. Good is also a mental want, not only private, but public good; therefore the prosecution of universal good is an interest of mind. On the other hand, health, food, raiment, shelter, are bodily wants; consequently the acquisition of these is a bodily interest.—The sphere of liberty then is clear—its province plain, namely, to protect man in the lawful acquisition of his wants.—

We are now prepared to point out the relation of liberty to labor. It is an admitted truth that in the acquisition of all the bodily wants, and also of many of the mental, labor—physical labor—is the grand agent. There are numerous instruments, such as brute force, steam power, machinery, and implements likewise, as axes, hoes, spades, plows—but the *grand agent* is labor. In the vast and complicated machine now in operation over the wide world for supplying human wants, the motive power is intelligent *human labor*—

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Now let us bring liberty and labor together. The province of the former is to protect man in the lawful *acquisition of his wants.* The province of the latter is to *acquire these wants.*—Liberty and Labor then have a *joint mission.* Their aim is one and the same, so far as they go together, which is, as far as physical labor is concerned, in the acquisition of human wants, and this we have seen, embraces all the positive bodily wants and a large share of the mental directly—and *indirectly*, all of them. Liberty and Labor, we repeat it, have a *joint mission.* Thus has our main proposition been clearly demonstrated.

But there is a much simpler process of arriving at the same conclusion. Within the domain of Liberty, are various classes, the learned, the scientific, the professional, the devotees of the fine arts, music, painting, sculpture, poetry, the mercantile class, and *laborers.* We exclude the aimless, the unprofitable, the lazy, the devotees of pleasure and of fashion for in liberty's domain these are contraband classes. Enumerate now all the individuals who range under the several classes above mentioned—all who are devoted to strictly scientific pursuits, all who are enlisted in benevolent and moral enterprises, all who belong to the professions, all who cultivate the fine arts for gain or fame, all mercantile and commercial men, usually called capitalists, and finally all who are engaged in labor, in agriculture and horticulture, in the numerous mechanical branches, and in the thousand nameless avocations of industry, and the latter will preponderate over all the rest, in the proportion of a thousand to one. This calculation brings us, you perceive, to the same conclusion; and the conclusion thus obtained derives incalculable force from the consideration that *all classes* of useful people are ultimately dependent for their subsistence upon the laboring class. So also are the drones and dandies, of both sexes, for labor showers its blessings upon the evil as well as upon the good. Of *all* classes then, *laborers* have first, the paramount claim to liberty. And of all classes the last and lowest claim belongs to those usually called the "upper crust." We certainly would say, if any are to be *slaves*, let it be those female gentry, yclept exquisites, who lounge in ice-cream saloons and walk behind cigars, twirling canes or sun shades in their lily fingers. For of what possible service can liberty be to those who are of no earthly service, to themselves or to any body else? Nevertheless, since we are for "the largest liberty," we will not withhold it even from such.

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'We would ask the labor-hating, chivalrous champions of liberty to point out one important physical interest which liberty can secure, unassociated with labor. Will it furnish bread for the hungry, or clothing for the naked? Will it string the nerves or knit the bones and muscles with strength? Will it cause health to glow in the cheek and flash from the eye? Will it excavate cellars, and lay foundation stones, and rear the massive timbers for the residence of man? Will liberty make the desert flourish and blossom as the rose? Will it dig canals, lay iron roads, construct steam-boats, and enwrap the globe in a web of lightning wires? Or can it impiously bid these things into being—or scare them into terms by threatening to dissolve the union? Not a whit sooner than the Eagle upon our national flag will annihilate John Bull or set the Atlantic on fire with those painted thunderbolts which he holds in his talons. Divorce labor from liberty, and you have divested the latter of its right arm, yea of its body; and all that remains of it is *moonshine*, a vapor, a rainbow, a fairy floating on a summer cloud, a goddess in the realm of dreams. Conceive of a people who should banish labor, as France religion, and deify Liberty. Would liberty bless such worshippers? Not "in their basket or their store" I ween: she would probably bless them, as she blessed atheistic France. We have only to alter slightly this supposition, and we have before us the present actual position of *one half of our own country*. Liberty is there dissociated with labor. The latter is not indeed banished, but it is branded and doomed. Between it and liberty there is a great gulf fixed. Every possible device is resorted to in order to mark the relations of Liberty and Labor as those of unmitigated contrast. Liberty is white; Labor is black, the former is educated, the latter degraded; the one Christianized, the other heathenized.—Liberty is clothed in purple and fine linen, and fares sumptuously every day,—Labor, emaciated with hunger, wan with toil, and "full of sores," caused by the bloody scourge, cannot even lay itself at the palace gate, but must languish in the lone quarters or faint on the sultry glebe. Southen Liberty claims to be the quintessence of liberty, a superfine article, at least fifty per cent above par—while Southern Labor is made the slave of slaves, subjected to the filthy supervision of mercenary and cravan drivers, degraded to a drudge—sunk to a soulless kitchen scullion. O Labor, with thy lion strength, and lion tread, and lion voice, how art thou crushed, broken, tamed, and covered with an ass' hide!

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But what is the working of this superlative social system —this model economy? Does the country thrive under it in any remarkable manner? In a most remarkable manner truly. What feeds and clothes these nabobs of liberty? Not their own slave labor, but northern free labor. From it they get their bread stuffs, and the very corn on which they feed, or rather starve, their labor. From it they get their oats, their hay, their butter, cheese, potatoes, apples; from it they get their beef, pork, lard, poultry, eggs; from it they get their horses, mules, cattle, including the whole caravan of domesticated animals, save the blood hound, which southern chivalry contrives to cultivate at home. From northern free labor the slaveholders get their hats, coats, vests, and various unmentionable et ceteras, even to their shoes and stockings; from it they get their saddles and saddle-bags, their carts and carriages, horse-whips and slave-whips, hoes and hand-cuffs. Even their rifles, pistols, dirks, sword cases, and bowie knives, with which they shoot, stab, and hack each other, are the product of northern labor! But their glorious cotton and sugar! Well, their cotton and sugar, of which they are so proud, do not enable them by nearly one-half, to foot their northern bills; and to make up the deficit they have recently introduced the cultivation of a third great staple—whether an article of food, or a beverage, or a material for clothing, we have not yet learned; however it certainly must be classed among the luxuries of life—it is called *repudiation!*

What a glorious system! And then—think of these chivalrous knights asking the northern laborer to pay their postage bills! Again we ask, where are the manufactures, the labor-saving, or rather labor-honoring machinery, the macadamized roads, the rail-roads, the canals of this land of liberty? Where are its myriad villages, springing up as by magic? Where too are its literature, its periodicals, its books, its steam-power presses? Where are its common schools, academies, colleges? "The colleges at the south," said a young gentleman to me, recently, who had been teaching in one in Lousiana, for a year, "might do very well, if the slaves could only be made *by dint of flogging*, to do the *studying* for their young masters; but as yet slave labor has not been successfully applied in this direction." The only alternative, therefore, is that northern freemen must do the *studying* for the southern chivalry, as well as the *working*.

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It is a providential arrangement, for which the friends of Liberty cannot be too thankful, that one of the great public highways of the nation runs for a distance of nine hundred miles between enslaved labor and free labor. You will understand me to allude to the Ohio river. The results of the two systems are there exposed to the gaze of the world; and "the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err therein." Indeed the *fools* across the river are beginning to be made wise by the spectacle. It is beginning to reach their sensorium that however nice a thing it may be to make slaves of men, it will never answer to make a slave of labor. The traveller on the Ohio river, viewing the amazing contrast between its northern and southern border, might readily imagine that he was plowing the waters of the fabled Styx, which flows between the world of life, and the regions of death.

Such is southern labor and such its results. But what is southern liberty? Have not our southern brethren such an extra allowance of glorious liberty, as will more than make amends for all other deficiencies? Who would not say—give me *liberty and leanness*, rather than labor, larded with its bacon and beef? It must be confessed they have "the largest liberty." Instead of liberty and labor, they have liberty in a variety of admirable relations—as liberty and leisure, liberty and loaferism, liberty and lust, liberty and lynch law. They have proclaimed liberty to the sword, and liberty to the lash. They have liberty to do every thing in the world but to *think*, to *labor*, and to love mercy. They can play or fight, drink or dance, smoke or swear; they can be merchants, doctors, lawyers, preachers, politicians, gentlemen planters, or rowdies—and they will be "all—all honorable men;" but neither planter, preacher, printer or politician, dares to think or utter or publish according to the dictates of enlightened conscience.

How clearly the present condition of the slave states demonstrates that where liberty and labor are separated, there can be neither liberty nor labor. Liberty, debarred from its own congenial sphere, prohibited by terrific penalties from inspiring the heart and nerving the arm of labor, itself surrounded with enclosures, and subjected to espionage, its lips of fire fettered, its pulpits and presses overawed by an imperious censorship, its mail bags, burthened with its own utterances, ripped open, and their contents committed to the flames amidst the fiendish shouts of rabble-republican-

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ism; Liberty, really left *nothing* to do but to spout fourth of July orations, drink toasts to the patriarchal form of government, dies amid her desecrated shrines, her profaned priesthood, and her treacherous worshippers. So it must always be. If labor is enslaved, liberty will be in bonds with it. *Una spes, una salusque ambobus erit.*

Let us now turn to Labor. Labor as we have seen, is the grand agency in securing and promoting the temporal wants and interests of man. The law of labor is the primal law of the human economy, written with the finger of God in the sweat of the brow. It is not a Cain-mark there, a frightful scar upon the human face Divine. Labor is the glory of man. It makes him a producer, a creator of wealth. Labor is the back-bone of all true independence. Labor is not only the spice of food, the elixir of health, and the balm of sleep, but it is the hand-maid of virtue, the companion usually of a good conscience, and more effectual than all the amulets and horse-shoes in the world to keep off the devil. "It is the idle man, who is the devil's work-shop." Labor is the ally of religion. He who is "slothful in business" cannot be "fervent in spirit, serving the Lord." Indeed labor has a most extensive family connection. You can scarcely mention an interest or an enterprise to which labor does not stand god-father. He builds and endows our colleges, sustains the gospel, supports the missionaries, maintains all the benevolent operations, executes the gigantic schemes of internal improvement, upholds manufactures, tariffs or no tariffs, diffuses commerce, and bears up the huge pillars of government. We cannot go forth at any time of day with our eyes open, without seeing two grand sights, the sun walking through the heavens, and labor walking over the earth. We see him in the fields waving with green and gold. We see him on the hill slopes amid clambering vines and purple clusters bursting with nectar. We penetrate the primeval forests, and there we encounter labor swinging his axe amid crashing trees. We look out upon yonder lake and lo *labor*, with his water palace dashing westward like a thing of life. We follow on to the glorious west, and there is labor, reaping his magnificent wheat savanahs with "a coach and four" *under whip!* There is labor and the lash to some purpose. Labor is your only miracle-worker in these days. He says, "let there be cities, and villages, and smiling farms," and they appear. He says to the mountains be "removed," and they disappear. He, says to the impotent man, to the invalid, ready to die, to the sickly wretch, who

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has spent all his substance upon physicians and is no better, but has rather grown worse, "take up thy spade and work," and health paints the pallid cheek, and vigor knits the renovated frame. With a few bushels of wheat which he has scattered broad-cast over the soil, he feeds the thousands at home, and sends off ship-loads of the fragments to rescue from starvation *millions abroad!* Labor is the reality which corresponds with the fabled Titan, giant offspring of Heaven and earth; but Liberty is his soul, without it he is but a giant corpse.

A brief train of observations will serve to show the reasons of the dependence of Labor upon Liberty. And first of all it must be remembered that labor is not simply physical force in exercise. It includes also the *voluntary element.* The mind from within must bid the body put forth its energies, and must continually second and sustain its exertions. Then you have *true labor.* It is not superior physical force which makes man the prince of working animals. In this attribute he is vastly inferior to the horse and the ox. It is the electric energy of *will* which imparts to man his vigor of application, his celerity of movement, his tireless activity, his intense vehemence, his indomitable perseverance, his god-like *executive* power. Therefore if you paralyze the will, you palsy the arm of labor.

It is the same indestructible, energizing agent that *labors* and that *thinks*, the *only* difference lying in the instrumentality employed; in the latter case the brain is the instrument, in the former the body. Liberty then, which all acknowledge to be a condition of thought, must also be a condition of labor. There may indeed be *work* without a free will, but it will be the product of a *machine*, and *as* a machine, to be moved from without, man is not to be compared with the *steam engine.* But surrender the physical frame, to its own inward motive power, to the God-inserted main-spring, *the will*, and then you behold man—*the laborer*—the maker and manager of steam engines, the tamer of tigers, the master of matter, the prince of the power of air, earth and water. Liberty then is the requisite of labor.

1. Because it is the essential condition of the will's efficient action upon the body. We here take for granted the enjoyment of bodily liberty, liberty of limb, and liberty of locomotion, and speak of liberty in its higher sense.

2. Because it is the necessary protection to labor, in its efforts and in the enjoyment of the fruits of its efforts. Labor

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must be left unmolested and without foreign dictation, to prosecute its own enterprises, and to appropriate and dispose of the products of its industry. And when labor needs repose it must be free to sit under its own vine and fig-tree, with no one, driver, overseer, or master, to molest or make it afraid.

3. Liberty is requisite in order to redeem labor from degrading associations, and to place it in its appropriate rank. In fact when we claim for labor that it be free, we are but demanding that it be recognized as the offspring of the mind primarily, instead of the body exclusively. Only let the products of labor be regarded, not as the mere effects of muscular strength, but as the achievements of the will, and labor will be honorable. Hannibal's immortal passage of the Alps, Xenophon's famous retreat of the ten thousand, Bonaparte's invasion of Russia, were cases involving excessive bodily labor; but they are never viewed solely or mainly in the light of that fact; they are contemplated as prodigies of the human will, and hence they excite the same sentiments of admiration and sublimity which are awakened by the productions of Homer, Shakspeare or Milton. Why may not the achievements of the will in the department of useful labor be regarded from the same point of view. Impart full liberty to labor and it will be so. Rightly considered human labor with its results is among the most wonderful phenomena of which the mind takes cognizance. Place the human biped—five feet and six, by the side of some of his industrial monuments, a massive stone edifice, a magnificent city; or place him in the midst of a splendid farming district, only give him the privilege which Zaccheus once found it convenient to avail himself of, let him climb a tree, or we shall lose sight of him in the o'ertopping grain; or take him to yonder sea-port, and put him down among the mammoth warehouses groaning with the accumulating products of his labor, or station him on the wharf where flour, wheat, corn, pork, beef, lard, butter, iron, lead, sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, tar, lie in interminable piles, with drays, carts and trucks crowding and clashing between, giving the whole scene the aspect of a struggling mass of life, and then reflect that the little creature before you, having only two hands and a single pair of legs, has accomplished all this—by labor! You will scarcely be able to repress the outburst of admiration. You would spontaneously exclaim—"Honor, honor to labor." Had Nebuchadnezzar been himself a laborer, methinks God might

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almost have overlooked his pride in exclaiming "Is this not great Babylon which I have built." But in truth the haughty monarch not only arrogated to himself the glory due to God, but the credit due to labor, and therefore he was hurled from his throne to a condition lower than that of the laborers whom he wronged.

Fellow Citizens, We may be justly proud of our great Ohio. What a noble specimen is this young State of the wealth, the energy, the elastic spring, the irrepressible soul, the indomitable enterprise, which are the results of liberty and labor. Traverse this state from the lake to the river, and what monuments of free labor will you meet at every step.

From this general view we proceed to some observations upon certain particular things which are implied in the freedom of labor; we shall then unfold briefly the extent and variety of bearing of this principle. It will thus be seen that our view is not entitled simply to the credit—a questionable credit—of being a plausible theory, but to the substantial merit of being eminently practical.

And first, when we claim for labor an alliance with liberty, let us not be understood to inculcate the frivolous abstraction that labor may be free, while the laborer is a slave. The condition of the laborer determines that of labor. In demanding then liberty for labor, we of course demand liberty for the laborer. The laborer must be free. This is the only position which the friends of labor can consistently occupy. It is idle mockery to shout hosannahs to liberty and labor, while we enslave or sanction the enslavement of labor's own sons. Let no one say that we are traveling out of our way to deal a gratuitous blow at Slavery. The obvious truth is that this monstrous system is more directly the antagonist of labor than of any other interest, though it is the foe of all interests, whether individual or national. It is not the children of science or of fortune from among whom Slavery selects its victims; but the children of labor. *Two millions of laborers*, tillers of the soil, and mechanics, living too in this land—this magnificent domain of labor, are *in chains for life!* And why? *Because they are laborers!* How can such an outrage upon labor be winked at by men whose enthusiastic outcry is Liberty and Labor?

Again, when we contend that labor must be free, we mean that it must be exonerated from all unnecessary State burthens. Taxation to support government in its legitimate functions

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can never interfere with the interests of labor. It is but the penny which labor owes to Cesar. But it is well known that the sum levied for such purposes is *but a penny* compared with the millions which are exacted from labor for purposes foreign from the just aim of government. Taxation to pay the triple salaries of bloated party office holders, taxation to defray the vast expenses accruing from Congressional sessions, and sessions of State legislatures more than needlessly protracted, taxation to support monied monopolies, taxation to pay the postage bills of the slaveocracy, and what is still worse, if worse can be, taxation to pay off "the glory bills" accruing from the prosecution of nefarious wars, taxation for such purposes—inimical to the industrial interests, is decidedly oppressive, and so long as it is maintained, labor can not be wholly free. Even in our country it may be truly said of imposts their name is legion; and they fall with a crushing weight upon the head of labor. The *inequality* of taxation is a special count in the charge. The professional classes, the prosecutors of science and the fine arts, the capitalists and tradesmen have been *comparatively* exempt from taxation, while the laboring classes have staggered under the burthen. This distinction is as odious as it is oppressive. It would appear that the most liberal and enlighted governments had conspired with the most despotic in persecuting labor. This policy may serve the purposes of despots, but it can not be otherwise than suicidal in a republic.

Again when we insist that labor must be free, we mean that it must be fortified against the usurpative encroachments of capital. Money, according to the prevailing sentiments and habits of the world, is the foe to labor. This originates we think primarily in the fact that labor has been consigned to an humble grade, while wealth aspires to the highest rank. A change in the position of the former would relieve it in some measure of the injurious influence of the latter; yet it can not be denied that capital is the natural foe of labor. Money loves monopoly. It monopolizes power, and of course is jealous of every principle which tends to the accumulation of power. Such a principle undoubtedly is labor. Wealth fosters the spirit of caste which labor instinctively recoils from; for the spirit of caste has always been to labor the spirit of proscription. The distinction of capatalist and laborer must be jealously watched in our country, or it will soon become in effect identical with that of noble and peasant in Europe. An aristocracy of wealth would be as fatal to the freedom of labor as an aristocracy of blood.

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Again, when we say that labor must be free, we mean that commerce must be emancipated from governmental protective restrictions. This we say not as a party politician, but as the advocate of liberty and labor. Commerce is to labor what the arteries and veins are to the physical heart. A restriction upon commerce is a restriction upon labor. Give labor free seas and free ports. Put no hooks into the nostrils of his leviathans. Why tax water carriage any more than land carriage? The ocean belongs to labor, no less than the dry land. His "march is on the mountain wave," though his home is on the plain.

In a word, all governmental interferences with labor, save for legitimate revenue purposes, whether intended for State aggrandizement, or for the more plausible end of *protecting* labor itself, are infringements upon the rights of labor, and ultimately hurtful in policy.

Again, when we contend for the freedom of labor, we mean to assert the inalienable right of labor to its own gains. We fully recognize the principle, "tribute to whom tribute;" but this principle itself teaches by implication the inviolability of labor's right to its own. Government, to which the tribute is due, is instituted to secure to labor the unmolested enjoyment of its fruits. This is the ground of its title to tribute. Government therefore has no right to appropriate or dispose of the possessions of labor. Its province is to maintain the rights of labor, not to wrest them away. "The laborer is worthy of his hire." The poor man, unblest with a free hold, who works by the day or by the job, must have his wages against the world. If denied it, his cry will reach the throne of thrones. The widow-seamstress and the toiling laundress must have their wages, (not the pittance which they are compelled to put up with, but what they earn in the eye of Justice,) or Heaven will be waked to vengeance. Who that has a soul will not cry out against the base policy of begrudging labor its due, of grinding the face of the poor laborer by *razeeing* his wages to the *lowest living line!* "Behold the hire of the laborers which have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, *crieth;* and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."

Again, our doctrine of the liberty of labor, embraces that policy which opens to labor the widest field and the most ample facilities, as opposed to the baronial policy of hemming in

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labor and giving princely range to deer and partridges, as also opposed to the slave policy of verging the many arable farms into vast grazing estates, overspread with mules and cattle. Labor must have "ample scope and verge enough" or its irrepressible energies will ultimately break out in the fury of rebellion or the force of revolution. The historians of the French Revolution enumerate among the causes of that terrible outbreak of passion, the oppressive operation of the old game laws upon the peasantry. Says Mr. Allison, "the most important operations of agriculture were fettered or prevented by the game laws, and the restrictions intended for their support. Game of the most destructive kind, such as wild boars and herds of deer, were permitted to go at large through spacious districts, without any enclosure to protect the crops. Numerous edicts existed, which prohibited hoeing and weeding, lest the young partridges should be disturbed; mowing hay, lest the eggs should be destroyed; taking away the stubble, lest the birds should be deprived of shelter; manureing with right soil, lest their flavor should be injured. Complaints for the refraction of these edicts were carried before the manorial courts, where every species of oppression, chicanery and fraud was prevalent."

The quickening spirit of labor in England, is clamoring for admission into the immense parks, whose primeval forests have for ages sheltered hares, and frowned defiance and death upon the mortal intruder. Those forests must soon fall before the axe of labor, or the British throne will fall before the axe of rebellion.

The beautiful but neglected plains of Kentucky, the overgrown but reclaimable wastes of Virginia, and the thousand miles of coast laved by the southern waters of the Ohio, must be surrendered to the dominion of labor. They are demanded, and they are responding to the demand, and the hills of Tennessee too are responding, and the heights of North and South Carolina, where slavery cannot thrive, are rolling back their loud response. Indignant Labor is menacingly claiming his confiscated estates over the entire south.

Again, when we plead for the freedom of labor, we mean to protest with heart and voice against that sentiment which regards and treats labor as ignoble. This feeling is as vile and detestable as negro prejudice, its twin sister. It is the worst and most crushing form of oppression to which labor can be subjected. Labor can bear taxation, and prosper in spite of the swarm of imposts which suck its blood—but it

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"withers beneath the cold shade of aristocratic scorn." Labor must be held in esteem. Wealth must honor it; government must honor it; learning, refinement, religion must honor it; public sentiment must honor it. Its homely symbols must be regarded with sincere complacency. Men and women too must learn to look with pleasure upon the homespun garb of the farmer or the mechanic. Ladies must not go into spasms if an humble artizan appear at their door; nor eye him from head to foot with a look of surprise which says to him "you certainly must have called at the wrong house." We must habituate our minds to such associations that we shall really feel a glow of pride when we grasp the rough hard hand that pushes the plain or steadies the plough. Labor's sons and daughters must have their proper places in the social circle. The rich and the professional must teach their children that it is not beneath them to go to the same school and mingle in the same sports with the humbler clad children of honest laborers. Our sons must form those true estimates of relative values which will prompt them to turn from the ephemeral butterflies and wasps of fortune and fashion, to seek for wives among the labor-trained, thoroughbred daughters of the dairy and the loom. Our high-born maidens too, must be taught among their other accomplishments, *this lesson*, that they are "looking up in the world," that a rare chance is afforded them of "bettering their condition in life," when they are wooed by the stalwart yeomen boys.

In a word, there must be a total revolution in our views, habits, associations and treatment, as regards labor and the laborer. We must exchange for a better our standard of social respectability and moral worth. Dandies have had their day. Laziness has flourished long enough. Let the wheel turn and let labor come up! Is it not time? Has not labor long enough worn an abject and state's prison look? Has it not stooped low enough, seeming to "beg pardon of every body it passed for being in the world"? We can see nothing to prevent this change from being effected. There is nothing in the accompaniments of labor to forbid its being respectable. The fact for example that it employs brute force, that it works the harnessed horse, should be no bar to respectability. Is not traveling respectable? Is it any less so because it goes horse-back, or in the stage-coach? The *ton* in the traveling world is to roll along in one's own carriage, drawn by one's own horses. They call this traveling *with*

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one's own establishment! But it is nothing after all but vulgar horse-flesh. The warrior rushes to battle on his fiery steed, deals death about him like a demi-god, wins the day, and returns covered with glory—nor is his panting charger who seems almost a part of the hero, forgotten; they are immortalized together in the collossal equestrian statue. History speaks in one breath of Alexander and Bucephalus, of Murat and his white war-horse. In that sublimest position which Napoleon ever occupied, painting represents him mounted on his rampant steed, and pointing to the frozen summits of the Alps. And the greatest of modern poets closes a description of the greatest of modern battles with

"Rider and horse—in one red burial blent."

If travel and war can elevate the horse to an honorable companionship with man, why may not labor? Why in this case should the rule be reversed, and man be dragged down to the level of the brute? We contend that it is perfectly practicable to make labor honorable. Ally it with liberty, and the work is already more than half accomplished. It is its alliance with liberty which has given American slavery its high character, and its tenacious hold on life. But slavery is doomed to fall, because it cannot make good its claim to the alliance. It is only by fraud and force, by dogmatism and intimidation that it has maintained the connection thus long. It is falling from its high estate. What it loses, labor will gain, and what labor gains it will never lose. It is the observation of Thiers, the distinguished French historian that labor, or to use his own word, "industry is the primary source of wealth and liberty." Its union with liberty rests upon an enduring basis; and once give labor the inheritance of liberty, and you instal it among the *institutions* of the age. It will take that place from which the *peculiar institution* is falling *that it may go to its own place.*

Let us now contemplate some of the results which will follow the exaltation of labor to a position of respectability. And first of all it will undoubtedly be seen that labor, asinine as it has been deemed to be, knows how to sustain its elevation without giddiness, how to wear its long withheld honors, how to move and how to shine in its exalted sphere. It will be found *at home.* The world has been afraid to enfranchise labor and do it honor, lest it should become self-inflated and throwing down its implements on one side, and its habiliments on the other, transform itself into fashionable loaferism. But this is ridiculous nonsense. Where is

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labor most devoted to its duties, most abundant in its activities and most fruitful in its achievements? Where it is partially free, or where it is wholly enslaved? Where it is most honored, or where it is most despised? This objection originates in precisely the same stupid blunder with the objection often brought against the emancipation of the southern slaves, namely that they will refuse to work and be a burthen upon the community. The objection in both cases is a pretended induction from facts. The facts are that in proportion as laborers or slaves have been allowed liberty and been noticed and made something of, they have manifested a disposition to get out of their places. But what has been the reason of this, so far as it is true? Why for example has there been a tendency to abandon the ranks of labor among those to whom wealth, or talent, or education has opened other pursuits, as the learned professions? The reason most obviously has been the want of respectability in the sphere of labor. Make labor respectable, and you present a most powerful inducement to such minds to remain in that sphere. The alleged facts then upset the objection which was based upon them. But to the specific results of labor made respectable. One will be this—labor will no longer resort to grog-shops and bar-rooms for society denied it elsewhere, nor drown in the dissipation of the bowl the growing sense of its own degradation. Such has been the intimacy for years between labor and intemperance that mankind have naturally enough concluded that there must be some *blood relationship*. But the conviction has been superinduced by putting labor under the ban of social outlawry, by dooming it to a virtual ostracism. Throw open to labor the avenues to virtuous and enlightened social intercourse, and it will soon leave the haunts of dissipation to the idle and the vicious, the fit victims of intemperance.

Labor, raised to its proper rank, will no longer seek its diversions at the gambling table, in the banjo dance, in the midnight revel, or in the fisticuff affray. The nocturnal brawls, the boisterous merriment, the fierce menacing yells that swell along the city and village streets, "making night hideous," are the ominous outbreaks of the giant labor, who has been turned out of doors by "gentlemen of property and standing." With pious horror and with pallid lips these gentry pronounce such demonstrations "*the disorderly conduct of the lower classes.*" Talk to such people about elevating labor and making it respectable, and they will stare at you just as

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if you were proposing to introduce a wild bear or a street swine into their parlors!

But respect labor and it will seek its amusements in the resorts of virtuous and innocent spirits, in gentle and dignified recreations, in the twilight promenade, in the strains of music, in the social excursion arm in arm with beauty or learning, in the Saturday afternoon stroll over the verdant meadow, book in hand, in the evening lecture or the weekly debating club. From such rational entertainments labor would return to its toils "like a giant refreshed with new wine."

Labor respected would be no longer proverbial for swinish filth, and boorish manners. "The Great Unwashed" would undergo such a lustration as would effectually reveal the veritable cuticle and demonstrate the genus of the animal. The boorish bumpkin would be transformed as by magic into the dignified man.

Labor elevated would no longer be the impersonation of block-headism. Labor has really seemed to have no use whatever for knowledge or wit. Its great brawny frame has been its stock in trade, and its sole care to keep that in good working order, by due appliances of pork and grog. Man animalized—a sort of two-legged ox—has been the ideal of a laborer. Who has not blushed for his race, when he has beheld one of these regular-built working bipeds, the product of several generations of growing animalism and receding intellect, with bull-neck, low, thick head, forehead lost in a twist of fleshly folds, with small twinkling eyes, almost concealed by an environment of protuberant fat, with a motley nose sitting "squat like a toad" upon the broad field of the face, and with a great mouth eloquent of provender!

But respect and honor labor, and there will be an inducement to the laborer to cultivate his intellect. The strong man will not glory in his physical strength alone. He will perceive that there is a higher glory, not only compatible with his sphere as a laborer, but incalculably promotive of his efficiency and prosperity in that sphere—the glory of educated mind. Then labor, which has hitherto been building academies and colleges for others, will build them for itself, and it will no longer be the enviable distinction of a solitary collegiate institution in the United States that it is "The People's College." By the introduction of the Manual Labor System, by plainness of dress and general economy on the part of the students, a thorough education will be brought

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within the reach of the people. At the same time the *annual savings* which reformed labor will realize from its disuse of alcohol and tobacco, from its abandonment of circuses, horse-races, gambling halls and nocturnal haunts, and also from a worthy repudiation of expensive style in slavish imitation of "the upper crust"—will constitute a fund sufficient for all educational purposes, sufficient to procure a substantial family library, and to furnish the fireside with the best agricultural, mechanical, literary, political, moral and religious periodicals of the day. Mechanic's Institutes, Agricultural and Horticultural Societies, and courses of scientific and practical lectures will not as now be confined to the cities and chief centres of learning. The industrial interests will demand and secure their establishment throughout the country.

Again, labor being free, enlightened and honored, we shall cease to see such a rush of talent and enterprise into the professions, into trade and speculation, into the army and navy. Our staid old farmers will not have such occasion to complain that they have nourished and brought up sons, who in spite of substantial inducements, have broken away from them, one after another, to seek their fortunes in the remote city or adjacent town, where in hope of future preferment they submit to be bar-tenders, store-sweeps, hangers on at the county court-houses, party politicians, or petty office-seekers. The over-crowded professions will be relieved. The marts of business, now thronged with sellers, will be thronged with buyers. The bowling grounds, nine-pin alleys, faro tables, billiard saloons and other resorts of profligate idleness will be forsaken. The towns will give back the exhausting conscriptions of youth which they have been so long drawing from the country. Labor will be justified of her children!

Again, parents will no more be doomed, by the decree of infatuated customs to wear out their own strength in accumulating *fortunes* for their children, whereby they may be placed above the necessity of labor. Few things have caused more evil than this senseless, slavish practice. It has multiplied sots, it has filled our states' prisons with precocious felons, it has given a premium to idleness, it has pampered the spirit of caste, it has been labor's seal and signature to its own degradation. And in what has this practice originated? Not in the fact that labor is toilsome, but in the fact that it is disreputable, unfashionable.

Again, Labor will no longer employ its energies in fabricating and furbishing the weapons of war—only to see them

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belch ruin amid the abodes which its hands have reared, and desolation over plains which its hands have tilled. War cannot subsist without the co-operation of labor: this has been well understood. It must now be understood that labor cannot thrive without the abolition of war! Even now labor stands waiting impatient for the promised era, when the sword and the spear shall be laid upon his anvil—and with a right good heart and a strong right arm will he beat them into the ploughshare and the pruning hook. Labor thenceforth will be clothed with the authority of Commander in Chief of all forces "raised or to be raised"—and with such a host as never echoed the shout of battle, will labor wage such a war as has never illuminated with its records the page of history; it will be a war of extermination upon all forests, a war of conquest over all stone-quarries, coal and ore mines, a war of desolation upon all mountains which intercept the march of rail-roads from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a war of subjugation of soil, water, steam and lightning to the uses of mankind.

Lastly, labor enfranchised, enlightened and respected, will give to an admiring world new proofs and prodigies of its gigantic power. The vessel that labors in the gale, or welters in the surgeless calm, acknowledges the favoring breeze with twanging cordage and bellying sails, and as she darts ahead dashing from her prow the sparkling waves, and kindling a waste of fire in her wake, we exclaim, behold the wondrous difference between adverse and friendly winds. Labor has weathered a thousand storms, and weltered in a thousand calms of cold neglect—now give it free winds and approving smiles, and if it does not set old Ocean on fire, it will only be because it needs his future services. But figures and facetiousness aside, labor must be indefinitely invigorated and stimulated by the proposed improvement in its condition, and the schemes which it will project and execute will be on a proportionably magnificent scale.

The *subjective* efficiency of labor depends, as we have shown in a former part of this discussion, not so much upon physical force, as upon mental energy. We would now add that its *objective* efficiency, as exhibited in what it really accomplishes, will depend not so much upon its actual mental energy as upon the degree of it, which is, for the time being, in exercise, and this will be in part determined by the surrounding influences, whether they are favorable or unfavorable, whether they stimulate or depress.

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Under disheartening influences, a large amount of energy is sacrificed by being as it were *paralyzed*, another share is withdrawn from direct service to *combat* the circumstances; and what remains for the appropriate objects of labor must be small compared with the aggregate. The last Governor of Jamaica prior to the abolition of Slavery in the West Indies, in his farewell Address to the Colonial Assembly, who were almost in arms against the measure, made this memorable declaration, "*Not one tithe of the resources* of this Island have ever yet been developed under the influence of slavery, and it is reserved for *freedom* to develop the whole." It would be difficult to say just what proportion of the resources of labor have been yet developed; but we have no hesitation in saying that it is reserved for *labor fully emancipated* to astonish the world with the grandeur of its enterprises and the splendor of its achievements.

All things are conspiring to usher in a new Age. Light and Love are wedding, Liberty and Labor are wedding, Despotisms are waning, Slavery is dying, War is cutting its last antics. The true idea of Christianity as a *union of piety and philanthropy* has been promulged, the doctrine of the Human Brotherhood has been proclaimed, the policy of Free Trade is beginning to prevail. What does all this betoken? This simultaneous decadence of old principles, and this upspringing about us of new and potent elements? Lo, these be the dawnings of a new Age! An Age whose presiding genii shall be LIGHT AND LOVE, LIBERTY AND LABOR.

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Notices of New Works.

Review of Lysander Spooner on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery. By WENDELL PHILIPS. pp. 93.

This pamphlet is intended as a refutation of the arguments of Mr. Spooner. Its authorship and gentlemanly tone entitle it to a candid perusal. We do not believe that the author has invalidated the conclusions at which Mr. Spooner has arrived. But let each one read and judge for himself. An article on the subject of both these essays may appear in some future number of this Review.

Slavery condemned by Christianity By ANDREW THOMSON, D. D. Edinburgh. pp. 138.

The lamented author of this valuable little volume is no longer living. But "being dead he yet speaketh." We wish all the ministers in America would read this book, and catch its noble and manly spirit. Were the pulpits of this country to thunder forth such sentiments as these, slavery in our land would soon totter to its fall.

Grosvenor's Review of Fuller and Wayland's Correspondence on Slavery.

In the "Correspondence" of which the above is a Review, the half-hearted defence of man's inalienable rights to liberty, put forth by Dr. Wayland, and the assurance—almost insolence—only half hidden beneath the cloak of professed politeness, betrayed by Dr. Fuller, could hardly fail of striking the attention of most reflective readers. In the "Review" both are subjected to severe scrutiny. Good will be effected by it. We wish its tone were more elevated, but as it is, we deem it more than equal in truth and vigor to the work which called it forth.

Narrative of the Sufferings of Lewis and Milton Clarke among the Slaveholders of Kentucky. pp. 144.

A truthful story of suffering, letting the light down into the dungeons of oppression. None who buy and read it will probably regret their purchase.

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Life, Travels, and Opinions of Benjamin Lundy. Philadelphia, 1847.

The philanthropist never works in vain. He may live unknown or despised; he may labor in gloom and die in want and distress. But if he has been true to himself and to his race, some one will rear his monument and embalm his memory. And what is of more consequence than memory or monuments, his principles will be the watchword of myriads, and the realization of his plans the struggle and glory of a whole generation. The life of Lundy proves this. A poor, obscure, and comparatively unlearned man, he was the father of the present anti-slavery movement in the U. S. He traversed the country, lectured, conversed, and published his paper at different times as his means permitted. He visited Hayti and Texas in the prosecution of his work. Time, money, reputation, family joys, and at last life, were freely sacrificed, almost without the thought that they were sacrifices, in the cause of the slave The "Life" sets forth substantially in his own language, these labors and perils. We heartily commend its perusal to all who take an interest in the liberation of our enslaved brethren.

Remonstrance against the course pursued by the "Evangelical Alliance on the subject of American Slavery, by the Executive Committee of the American and For. Anti-Slavery Society.

We are glad to see this able and timely protest in pamphlet form. Published originally in the news papers, it might be glanced at and forgotten as a mere trifle. But it is the voice of thousands who love Christianity, and who for that very reason detest its perversions and counterfeits.

Quite a number of other new anti-slavery publications have been laid on our table. Among the rest are Nos. 1 and 2 of the tracts published by the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery—"Shall we give the Bible to the slave?"—Hague's Review of Wayland and Fuller—Eulogium on Clarkson—Picture of Slavery *for the young*—Facts for the People. by Loring Moody—Annual Report of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, May, 1847—Letter to Bishop Ives of North Carolina, by a Protestant Episcopalian.

We rejoice in the appearance of these works. They are evidence that the public mind is awakening to the subject of slavery. When the nation is once awake, we have unfaltering hope that emancipation will be achieved.

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ARTICLE LXII.

Simplicity of Moral Action. No. 5.

By the late Rev. Wm. Cochran.

Another modification of this intensity theory, confounding moral action with other phenomena, sets forth that we are responsible for the same amount of love and service which we might have rendered had we never sinned, and thus debilitated our powers, and for all which we might have rendered had Adam never sinned, and our constitution been derived from a perfectly healthful and holy ancestry, reaching back to the birth of time—that consequently the capability of the unimpaired powers of Adam in Paradise is the true measure of perfect obedience, and that, in so far as we fall short of this, we are convicted of the law as transgressors.*

Of this theory, we need say but little in this place. For, if it is impossible to make intensity of choice and its sequents a test of right action where reference is had to our own powers alone, *a fortiori*, it must be impossible, when we have to pass over the gulf of six thousand years, and compare ourselves with an ideal man whose capability exists for the eye of fancy alone, and when we can form no rational conjecture how much debility we have inherited from Adam, and how much it has been increased "by numberless actual transgressions." How great were the powers of Adam? How great would ours have been, had he persevered in holiness? How much of our present infirmity is owing to our own wickedness? To all these questions, absolute silence, or a frank "*I know not*," is the only answer an honest mind can make. But, if we were able to answer them explicitly, could we meet the demands of the law? No; for, by hypothises, we are incapable of doing what Adam could, and nothing short of this is perfect obedience. We are thus under the twofold difficulty of not knowing what the law requires, and of not being able to obey it if we did! But we must terminate these remarks, or we shall be in danger of violating a positive

* See Geneva Presbytery on Oberlinism.

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injunction of Scripture; for it seems clear to us that if a case can be found when the fourth verse of the twenty-sixth chapter of Proverbs is imperative, it must be when such utterly unreasonable and God-dishonoring dogmas are uttered in the name of Christ, and as a part of his glorious gospel.

Another phaze of the intensity theory, or else an independent one, informs us that "some remains of corruption, derived from Adam," lie back of all volition, and will still continue to mingle their taint with our most holy performances till they have been consumed in the crucible of death, or separated in the alembic of the grave. For the present we will content ourselves with commending this theory to the attention of physiologists and chemists, and when the scalpel, or the tests of the laboratory have detected this sinful residuum of inherited depravity, if we still survive, we shall honor the discovery with a humble recantation of our present position that all sin consists in voluntary action!

Still another theory maintains that, not our perceived, but our *real* relations to God and the universe, are the measure of our obligations. We might here say much of the obscure and confused notions of moral law and moral obligation which begot such a misshapen monster as this; and might show that something *consequent* upon the absolutely ultimate object of choice was before the minds of its authors, and not the end itself; and we might enter into a formal argument to prove it false, unfounded, and absurd. But it forcibly strikes us, that the same defectiveness, or perversion of intellect, that at first enables any one to embrace a theory which requires as perfect a knowledge of men and things of an infant as of a man, of one man as of another, of all of us as of angels, and of men and angels as of God, and damns them eternally for the lack of it, is proof against all argument that would conduct them to a more rational faith.

There are other tests of the character of an intention which differ in words, but none, we are persuaded, after a careful examination, which differ in reality from our own. We may therefore assume it as demonstrated that whenever an intention terminates upon the right object, and on nothing else, it is wholly free from moral delinquency, or perfectly right.

There remain but two additional questions to be discussed, viz:

1. *Can the will choose any part of the end which the moral law requires us to will, without choosing it all? or, in other words, whenever there is any choice of it, must it not be universal?*

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2. *Can the same will, at the same time, choose both this end and its opposite?*

The full discussion of the first of these questions we shall adjourn until we have discussed the second. The reason of this adjournment will be seen as we proceed. All we deem it expedient to add here is, that so far as we know it is no question between us and orthodox divines of any school. In what are deemed standard authors of both the Old and New School, the position is most unequivocally taken that no true piety at all exists where there is not respect for all God's commandments. Says the venerable Stoddard—"If there be a great change in a man's carriage, and he be reformed in several particulars, yet if there be *one* evil way, the man is an ungodly man: *where there is piety there is universal obedience.*" (Stoddard's Way to know Sincerity from Hypocrisy.) This position plainly rests on the supposition that there is some one end, the choice of which will, while it continues, inevitably draw after it the choice of all means and conduct deemed wise and possible to promote its realization. On this supposition it is true that if any one duty is neglected, or means of doing good unimproved, "the man is an ungodly man," since, were there a choice of the right end, this neglect of duty and misimprovement of means would be impossible. But on the supposition that there is no common ligament which binds all choices to one central choice, this statement is wholly gratuitous. For, in that case, the neglect of one duty by no means proves total hollowness of heart, and destitution of all right purpose.

With equal clearness Prest. Edwards expresses the same sentiment—"What makes men partial in religion is, that they seek themselves, and not God, in their religion, and close with religion, not for its own excellent nature, but only to serve a turn. He that closes with religion only to serve a turn, will close with no more of it than he imagines serves that turn; but he that closes with religion for its own excellent and lovely nature, closes with all that hath that nature: *he that embraces religion for its own sake, embraces the whole of religion.*"—(Religious Affections.) This is explicit. The neglect of any known duty, proves that the agent is self-seeking; since were he otherwise, this neglect would be impossible.

Says Prest. Davies—"Another distinguishing characteristic of the new birth, is *universal holiness of practice*, or conscientious observance of every known duty, and an honest,

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zealous resistance of every known sin. There is no known duty, however unfashionable, disagreeable, or dangerous, but what the true convert honestly endeavors to perform: and there is no known sin, however customary, pleasing, or painful but what he honestly resists, and from which he labors to abstain. This necessarily follows from what has been said; for when the principles of action are changed, the course of action will be changed, too."—(Sermon on the nature and Author of Regeneration.) Among the Old School divines we know of none who hold a different view on this subject.

Let us for a moment turn our attention to the New School divines. Says Prof. Tappan—"All good purposes are comprehended within *one great purpose* and that is, to fulfil the great law of God, the great law of love to God, and man."—(Moral Agency p. 261.) This he calls the *governing* purpose of the regenerate. It would seem that this author agrees with Kant that the immediate object of this all-embracing purpose is the law itself. Or that it consists in making the law our maxim for all future time. If this is the case, there is one central life—which runs through all duties. And even if his opinion be different from Kant's in regard to the immediate object of the governing purpose of the regenerate, his language does not allow us to suppose that he ever so much as dreamed of laws and duties which like bricks of the same kiln, or beads of the same string, have no necessary connexion with each other.

With this view the New School divines universally seem to agree, for they every where and invariably represent conversion as consisting in a change of the governing purpose [ultimate intention] of the mind. We need not therefore trouble the reader with any additional quotations.

And with both Old and New School agrees the Bible in relation to this point. "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."—(Jas 2, 10.) This passage cannot mean that he who violates any one command of the decalogue, the 4th for example, does at the same time violate in form the 6th, and all the rest. This were absurd. But on the supposition that the law is an absolute unity, of which all the commands of the decalogue and all moral precepts in the Bible are only applications to particular relations of moral agents, or that the end which it requires us to make ultimate, is but one, for the sake of which all other objects which we are required by any moral precepts to choose are to be willed and valued, this absurdity is

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avoided and the text is perfectly intelligible—**Example**, let that object be the well-being of the universe: the whole meaning the whole law is exhausted in the command, *choose the well-being of the universe.* Now while such a choice exists, it is plain that all other choices required by the decalogue must be made, as from time to time circumstances shall seem to us to demand them. They require the application of means to secure that end. Consequently if one yields an external obedience to all the commandments (for this is possible for impenitent and selfish men) save one which he violates, he has broken the whole law, because he has not willed the well-being of the universe. Neither murder, nor adultery, nor covetousness, nor theft, can spring from such a choice, and be regarded as fit means to promote such an end. Consequently, the choice of this end does not exist, and the whole law is transgressed.

Hence, it appears, that on this first question we have no issue with either Old School or New School Divines, and can have none with any others who will allow the sacred writers to be competent judges of truth and falsehood in relation to moral subjects.

No farther investigation therefore, however much demanded by strict science, could place us in better circumstances to argue the second question with all such persons, than we now occupy.

Can then, the same will, at the same time, choose both the end which the moral law requires to be chosen, and that which it forbids?

Preliminary to a correct answer to this question, let it be observed,

1. That a choice is the will's preference of one thing rather than its contrary. Thus says Prest. Edwards—"In every act of will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another, it chooses something rather than the contrary." When we move the foot we prefer its motion to its rest, and *vice versa.*

2. Whenever therefore we choose one thing, we do at the same time refuse the opposite. So says Prest. Edwards—"So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused, the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative." If I choose the motion of my foot, I refuse its rest, and *vice versa*; and the like must happen in every case of opposition of ends or objects of choice.

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3. The ultimate ends of moral election are by definition directly opposite or antithetical to one another. The one is that object which reason prescribes to the mind as the absolute good. The other is any thing else, whether self-gratification, universal misery, or what you please. It is what the mind perceives to be antithetical to the former, when made by itself an ultimate end.

From these considerations, it follows that to choose the former is to refuse the latter, and to choose the latter is to refuse the former. Choosing one of them is selecting it rather than the other—is saying *let it be*, rather than its contrary; and no greater absurdity could be embodied in language than to say we choose, or can choose them both at the same time. We prefer them both to each other, at one and the same time! Choose and refuse them both at once! Choose and refuse each—choose and not choose each at the same time! The will chooses against its present choice; chooses what it don't choose, and chooses not what it does choose! Whoever can believe that, can affirm that 2+2=4, and that 2+2 does not equal 4, but 3, or any other sum. The fact is, to say that both are chosen at once, is to deny, or lose sight of the very conception of choice, which is preference of one thing to another. But here no such preference has been exercised. If, to save the appearance of consistency, it is asserted that both are preferred to nothing, this only makes the matter worse. *Nothing* is not an object of choice, and, if it were, lies out of, is antithetical to the conception of the absolute good. And hence, to say that the absolute good and its antithesis are both chosen at the same time rather than nothing, is the same thing as to say that they are both chosen rather than one of them, or, at least, that both of them are chosen, and part of one of them not chosen—which again, is the double absurdity of choosing and refusing both these ends, and of choosing *all* and not all of one of them at the same time! So plain is this absurdity, that it has not escaped the notice and rejection of the strongest advocates of mixed action themselves. Says Prest. Edwards—"Indeed, will and endeavor against, or diverse from *present* acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is."

"For so long as prior inclination possesses the will, and is not removed, it binds the will, so that it is utterly impossible that the will should act otherwise than agreeably to it.

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Surely the will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the will. To suppose, otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose that the will is *inclined* contrary to its present prevailing *inclination*, or contrary to what it is *inclined* to. That which the will chooses and prefers, that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the will to choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination, as it is to *prefer* contrary to its own present *preference*, or *choose* contrary to its present *choice*. The will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at liberty for a new free act, or any act that shall now be an act of self-determination. The act which is a self-determined free act, must be an act which the will determines in the possession and use of such a liberty, as consists in a freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the will, at that time, should be otherwise than that way to which it tends.

"If any one should say, there is no need that the indifference should be perfect; but although a former inclination and preference still remains, yet, if it be not very strong and violent, possibly the strength of the will may oppose and overcome it:—This is grossly absurd; for the strength of the will, let it be never so great, does not at all enable it to act one way, and the contrary way, both at the same time. It gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice.

"Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way." (See also pt. 3, sect., 4, 5.)

This language can leave no doubt on the reader's mind, that, in Edwards' opinion the supposition of co-existent contrary choices is a glaring absurdity.

These passages suggest other remarks, which, although they may not be strictly connected with the special point before us, are notwithstanding, with our general design; and at all events will not be altogether an uninteresting episode in this place.

I. This author teaches explicitly that the will alone is subject to precept and command, and can alone obey or disobey the moral law.—(See Ob., Qr., Review, Vol I, p. 407.)

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In the quotations before us, he has taught with equal explicitness that it cannot at the same time originate contrary choices. He has also taught us that the end chosen is one, or, which is the same thing, that any right choice is universal. Now let these statements be combined, and the conclusion is inevitable that every intention must of necessity terminate, either upon the good of being, and nothing else, or on its opposite; and must therefore be of unmixed moral character, except so far as intensity is concerned, and that we have proved to be out of the reckoning. But this is a downright contradiction of the quotation previously introduced in this article, which admits, as we have seen, *that in the same mind, love to the world may be greater than love to God.* What is love to God, but a state of the will? It can be nothing else for two reasons:

(1.) The will alone he tells us can obey the law. But love to God is obedience to the law. Therefore love to God is an exercise of the will.

(2.) Will, in his philosophy, includes both the will proper, and the sentiments or affections. Love must consequently, in his view have belonged to the will. We have therefore two contrary and co-existent choices, in the same will, at the same time, which it appears from his own showing is a contradiction and an absurdity. As if to make the contradiction more glaring, he has introduced this most striking sentiment:—"Therefore, if there be the *least degree* of antecedent preponderation of the will, it must be *perfectly abolished* before the will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way." That is, *disobedience* must *perfectly cease*, before obedience can begin, and *vice versa.*

2. This passage cuts up by the roots the position that the emotions, or any phenomena of the sensibility, can be moral action. For every one knows that its phenomena may be diverse, and draw us in various directions at the same time. What may be denominated our moral sentiments, or that unavoidable approbation of the moral law, and that admiration of the character and government of God which is felt in the depths of our moral nature, and that yearning of soul for the protection and society of the Deity which spring from the sense of our finite and dependent nature, and that approval of virtue and abhorrence of vice which belong even to the vilest —all these and similar sentiments draw us heaven-ward; while bodily appetites, avarice, ambition, pride, envy, hatred, revenge, and such like feelings draw us earthward, in most cases

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even more strongly. Thus says St. Paul, Rom 7: 22, 23,— "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." If we are to regard the phenomena of the sensibility as moral actions, we have here two contradictory, choices. But this certainly can never be the case if one choice, must be perfectly abolished before a contrary choice can come into being.

3. It is also equally opposed to the popular exposition of the 7th of Romans, which represents the warfare there described as a veritable conflict of virtuous and vicious purposes. For, if the will alone be capable of obeying or disobeying the moral law, and is absolutely unable to originate rival choices at the same *punctum temporis*, no such contest of good and bad purposes can be thought without a contradiction. It is, in a word opposed to the whole scheme of mixed action. We leave the admirers of Edwards to explain these difficulties as best they can. Meanwhile, we claim the more weight for his striking confirmation of the position which we are laboring to establish, because it is wrung from the heart's blood of the author's whole system of theology and philosophy by the strong hand of absolute conviction of its truth.

But to return. The assertion that both these ends may be chosen at once is a plain denial that any choice is made at all, between *them*. For, if they are both chosen, it is absurd to maintain that one of them is chosen in preference to the other. This we have already sufficiently proved. To say that they are both chosen at once is to deny that any choice at all has been exercised.

A more minute examination will set the absurdity of two rival co-existent choices in a stronger light.

1. In the first place then, to choose any end as ultimate, is also, at the same time, to predetermine the employment of all the means which may be deemed necessary to its realization, and (if the thought be at all different,) the removal of whatever things may lie in the way of its realization. In a word, the will, in selecting an end, as ultimate, does, at the same time bind itself to make no choice inconsistent with it. Now, if A be selected as ultimate, not—A, which is a rival and cannot, by any possibility, be chosen in subserviency to that end. And, if not—A is chosen, A cannot be chosen in subserviency to it. The choice of either is the rejection of the other, and all the means of its promotion.

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2. To say that the apprehended good of being, whether happiness be all or only a part of it is chosen as an end, or for its own sake, involves the position that it is chosen *impartially*. Now, if the only reason for choosing it is found in its own nature, then that reason must be equally strong for choosing it *wherever* it *has* or *may have* an existence. To say that we choose it for what it is, or as an end, and that we choose it impartially, are, if not the same, at least inseparable things. Consequently, with such a choice in existence, it is impossible to regard our own happiness, or that of our special friends, or immediate neighbors, above our honest conviction and estimate of its relative value. If we bestow more thought and labor upon it, than upon that of mankind in general, it is because we know that that is the best way for us and each to secure the good of all, and not because we detach it from, and prefer it to, the general good. To choose less than the good known to us would be to choose *partially;* and hence to choose our individual gratification and the means of it, or that of our friends, as an ultimate end, at the same time that we choose the apprehended good of being, would be to choose both *partially* and *impartially* at the same time!

3. When the choice of the apprehended good of being exists, it involves or results in the purpose to be governed by the known will of God; for God is both all-wise and perfectly good, and hence his will, whether learned from the Bible, or natural theology must be a perfectly safe route to the end we have chosen. "Thy will be done," is the unceasing prayer of a benevolent mind. But "my will be done" is just as necessarily the prayer of one which is not benevolent. To say, therefore, that the choice of these two opposite ends at the same time, is possible, is to say that it is possible, at the same time, to resolve to make God's will our guide in all things, and not to make it our guide at all, but simply to consult our own wishes or caprice—to be governed by it in *all* instances, and to violate it, at least, in *some!*

4. The choice of the apprehended good of being, as an ultimate end, will inevitably beget a resolution in the believer in the Divine authority of the Scriptures, to yield implicit obedience to the moral precepts they contain. And the same choice would lead a rational theist to adopt the same precepts and obey them, for they commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. Hence, if the choice of both these ends, at the same time, is possible, it follows that we can adopt the resolution *always* to forgive our enemies, and

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sometimes, if not always, to cherish revenge and wreak it upon them—to speak the truth *always*, and *sometimes* to lie—to be *always* just, and sometimes unjust—to be meek and forbearing under *all* injuries, and *sometimes* impatient and resentful—to be *always* humble, and *sometimes* proud and aspiring—and so on through the whole series of virtues and their opposite sins!

5. In fine, let the former of these ends be chosen, and it follows from what we have before proved, that all the subordinate choices and executive volitions which we deem necessary to realize it, are also necessarily predetermined; and while the choice remains, they must be put forth as our varying circumstances seem to demand. The same is also true of the choice of the latter of these ends. Hence, if they can both be chosen at the same time, it is possible to resolve *never* to speak any thing but truth, *never* to be idle, nor intemperate, nor unchaste, nor uncourteous, nor neglectful of any social, civil, or religious duty; and to be *occasionally*, if not habitually, idle, unchaste, intemperate, uncourteous, and neglectful of every duty—*never* and *sometimes* to swear, *always*, and *not always* to pray; and to originate, as may seem necessary, the contradictory volitions necessary to accomplish, or promote each of these discordant subordinate ends! Now, if an absurdity can be stated in language, it is this; and it is as monstrous and shocking as it is absurd. But, contrary to Scripture, reason and common sense, as it is, it is nothing else but the received doctrine of mixed action, stripped of the ambiguous phrases, and arbitrary limitations which conceal its hideous inconsistencies and deformities, and set forth somewhat as it is. Indeed it has been sometimes presented in well nigh as hideous an aspect even by its own adherents and advocates. As a specimen take the following morceau:

> "As all amphibious creatures do,
> I live on land, and water too,
> To good and evil equal bent,
> I'm both a devil and a saint."

We do not claim to have read this delectable effusion. It was repeated to us by a friend, as part of a Gospel Sonnet! But we decidedly doubt whether any modern Doctor could state the common notion of believers in mixed action much better. Now we do not stop to point out how grossly contradictory this is to the Sacred Word, which says—"No man can serve two masters"—"Whosoever shall keep the whole

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law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."—"Whosoever will be the friend of the world, he is the enemy of God." Nor do we now enquire to what kingdom such an ambiguous character would belong, whether to heaven or hell; nor how God and Satan would adjust their mutual claims to the double-hearted monster; nor whether a separate world, half heaven and half hell, should be fitted up for the special accommodation of such *peculiarities* from earth, where their two actually half-served masters may deal out to them, in equal proportion, reward and punishment! For the present we simply call attention to these difficulties, and suggest that either the Bible is false or this whole theory is a lie! Who has not heard of the celebrated donkey that expired of hunger, midway between two stacks of hay, equally good, because, being equally attracted by each, he could choose neither? The agent of two co-existent choices of opposite ends must often find himself in like unfortunate circumstances. He has but one intelligence, and one physical organism, through which these rival choices may manifest themselves, or promote their ends. One intention concentrates all the powers of the intelligence upon the end of its adoption, while the contrary one, with an equally imperial sway, summons them around that which it has chosen:—One, through its sequent volition, may require the motion of the foot church-wards, while the other directs it to the gambling-house or the grog-shop: One may demand the motion of the lips to utter a prayer: the other to vent an oath: One may order the opening of the purse to aid the beggar; the other may prohibit it to gratify avarice. In what a plight he is placed! he is not

> "*Like* a man to double business bound
> Who stands in pause where he shall first begin,
> And both neglects:"

he is that very man himself. His long-eared prototype died because he could choose no stack; and he must do the same because he chooses two opposite ends: for his two choices are equal to none. Motion can never take place except when one volition pulls harder than the other; or, when both happen to draw in the same direction, and these two directly contradictory reasons can be assigned for it! What shall we call the man who can hold a theory pregnant with such nonsense?

In our former quotation from Kant this same question, which we are laboring to establish, was proposed, and the same conclusion arrived at; and, as his demonstration is

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brief, we will lay it before the reader.—"Neither can man be in some points good, and at the same time in others morally evil. For is he in any one point morally good, then has he made the moral law his maxim; but should he at the same time be in some other points bad, then would,—since the moral law is but one and yet universal,—the maxim referring to it, be at once a general and a particular maxim, which is a contradiction." This demonstration amounts to this: We either are resolved to obey the law in all instances, or in some to disobey it. The adoption of the former resolution, since it refers to all acts that we can perform is absolutely inconsistent with the latter which excepts some actions from its sway. We cannot therefore adopt both; and, since we must of necessity adopt one or the other, and this adoption is a moral action, it follows that no mixed action is possible.

Many attempts have been made to evade this conclusion. We will notice such as seem to be worthy of this distinction.

1. It has been maintained by some that, as an intention may, and often does result from a variety of motives both of good and bad tendency, so it must itself be both good and bad. Prince Talleyrand once said, that "the principal object of language is to conceal the sense." According to this observation, the framers of this proposition richly deserve the praise of a very skillful employment of words—if, in fact, they had any *sense* to conceal: for, to say the least, it is absolutely necessary to remove a great mass of superincumbent ambiguity before we can even venture to guess what it precisely is. We will undertake the labor; since there are those to whom it has all the force of an oracular response. We therefore remark that the word motive, as used in this objection, is ambiguous. Sometimes it signifies the inducements, found in the convictions of the intelligence and the promptings of the sensibility, which are the *occasions* of action, right or wrong. Thus the desire of wealth, honor, power, or fame, or the admonitions of conscience are motives. Sometimes also, it means the final end of actions. It is then identical with the ultimate object of an intention. Thus the question may be asked—"What is your motive in coming to the house of God?" The obvious meaning of this question would be—"What object, or end, did you propose to attain, or promote, by coming to the house of God?" Now, if, in the proposition before us, the word is used in this latter sense, it turns out to be nothing but this miserable *petitio principii*:

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"An intention may have both good and bad objects, or an intention may be both good and bad, and *therefore* it *may* be both good and bad!" A right convenient mode of answering our position, provided only we are as ready to *grant*, as they are to *beg*.

But this we cannot consent to do, however much we may commiserate the hard fate, and humbled condition of the mendicants. If, on the other hand, the word is employed in the former sense, no proposition could possibly be more false, and few more inimical to the interests of morality and religion. Motives, in this sense, may be regarded either as the *causes*, or only as the *occasions* of the moral acts of the will. If the former view be taken, it must be confessed that the proposition rests on a secure basis! For let it be once granted that a fixed and necessary causative relation is established between the phenomena of the will and the motives which call them forth, and the conclusion is inevitable that the character of our actions is as absolutely determined by our circumstances as are the hues of the chameleon by the varying light, and that, whenever we are subjected to contrary tendencies, it must possess a mixed nature. Let all the organs which phrenologists enunciate, or all the susceptibilities which psychologists recognize, be equally excited at the same time, and the resultant choices, like a body moved by numerous converging forces, must receive an impulse and a direction from them all. However securely the proposition may seem to rest on such a basis, the basis itself is as great an absurdity as ever shocked a Christian's feelings or offended his common sense. Man is reduced by it to a mere thing of circumstances, in soul, as well as in body; and the color of the negro's skin is not more necessarily determined by physical causes than is the whole texture of his moral character by the causative motives! If the latter view be taken, you can never certainly infer the character of an intention from the motives which *occasioned* its existence, since it is possible that the purest impulse of Reason and the Spirit of God may be resisted, and a wrong intention ensue; and, on the contrary, that the vilest impulse of passion, and the worst suggestion of Satan may be resisted, and a right intention ensue. A good motive may occasion either a good or a bad action, and so may a bad one; for the will itself gives both existence and character to all its intentions, no matter by what means or motives they may be occasioned. Should all the motives conceivable exert, at the same time, their combined

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influence upon a moral agent—should his fears be aroused by all the terrors of hell, and his hopes excited by all the allurements of heaven—should physical appetites and groveling passions draw him earthward, while admiration of virtue and chidings of conscience urge him towards the celestial life—should conjugal tenderness, a parents affection and the bonds of friendship, all stimulate their appropriate modes of developement, while promptings toward anger and revenge and envy and ambition agitate and toss the soul—and in addition to all these, should Reason and conscience, enlightened from above, enforce their high behests—still, not all, nor any of these, but the will alone is the *cause* of its own moral action and its character. The best or worst of motives, a single one, or a million combined would be alike incapable of adding a single ingredient of virtue or sin to that character: they come not nigh it: they are separated from it by the impervious barriers of an intervening causality which they have no power to surmount. The conclusion, then, is, that the character of an intention is as the object on which it terminates; and whatever the number and variety of the motives may be that occasion its existence, it can have no more than one object, either the apprehended good of being, or that which is incompatible therewith.

2. There is another position which may justly claim a higher degree of respect for two reasons: (1.) It is almost, if not quite, universally held by the advocates of the doctrine of mixed action: (2.) It is defended by men whose philosophical talents have obtained no small commendation both in this country and in Europe. We are anxious to place this position, in all its strength, before the reader, and therefore we quote from Prof. Tappan, its clearest and ablest defender. "We here lay down," says he, "this thesis, which we think is sustained alike by Scripture and true Philosophy: *Whatever be the governing purpose of an individual, it is possible for him to perform particular acts, not comprehended within that purpose, without absolutely renouncing it.*" Following this, is a paragraph in which he maintains that unregenerated men, remaining such, may "reverence truth for truth's sake"—"practice honesty for honesty's sake"—"perform deeds of benevolence for the sake of benevolence"—and do many other things that are *morally* right and praiseworthy. He then proceeds "to consider the case of the regenerate, who, justified through faith, are imbued also by the Holy Spirit with *the governing purpose of living wholly for God.*" "With

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this new purpose, &c., * * * the regenerate never do apostatize." (Moral Agency, pp. 262—267.) These quotations involve the following propositions: (1.) The sinful purpose of the unregenerate remains unchanged from the dawn of moral agency, till the moment of conversion, the change of this purpose being that in which conversion consists: (2.) During this period, however, the unregenerate man performs many actions which *are morally right and virtuous:* (3.) From the moment of regeneration till death, the governing purpose of the righteous man never changes: (4.) Nevertheless, during this period, he commits many sins: (5.) Therefore, other acts of the will, besides governing purposes, or ultimate intentions, may be moral actions, and possess a character directly opposite to that of the governing purpose or intention with which they co-exist.

Let us now, in the first place see if we can draw from the Professor himself a satisfactory reply to these propositions. In his "Appeal to Consciousness," p. 73, we find choice and volition thus distinguished.

"Volition, or the primary *nisus*, is the first action, or the first giving forth of cause to effect: choice, as used in contradistinction to volition, precedes the primary *nisus*, and is equivalent to predetermination or intention. I will suppose again the basket of fruit before me. My friend, who is entertaining me, asks me, "Which kind of fruit do you choose?" I reply according to my taste, or according to my judgment as to the wholesomeness of the fruit, "I choose the peaches, or I choose the oranges." Now this is really an act of choice, really a determination to take the fruit before the will has as yet exerted its causative *nisus*, or volition. Accordingly I hold myself in readiness, and when the fruit which I have chosen is put upon a plate and handed to me, I exert the *nisus* of my will, and receive the plate. The choice precedes the actual volition, or *nisus*, by which I take the fruit: it is the determination what to do when the moment of action shall have come."

According to this quotation, choice is the same thing as intention, governing purpose, or predetermination. On page 77, he teaches us that every *deliberate act* or volition is *predetermined.*

"Choice implies the perception of various possible actions, or exertions of the causality of the mind, together with the qualities of these actions; deliberation on the part of mind respecting these various possible actions or exertions of caus-

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ality; and finally the determination in what direction to make the causative *nisus*. The perception and the deliberation belong to the reason; the determination or choice belongs to the will or causality itself. From this, it appears that every causative *nisus* which results from deliberation, must be predetermined; that is, every deliberative act is predetermined."

From the sequal of this same paragraph, it appears that an act which is not deliberative is necessary, and hence not responsible. Those acts, therefore, which have moral character, and are not comprehended within the general purpose with which they are co-existent, must be found among *deliberated acts*. Now, if "every deliberate act is predetermined" by our "governing purpose," and if all *responsible* actions are deliberate, what is it but an utter contradiction, to say that there may be *moral* acts which are not comprehended within our general purpose, and that sin may co-exist with a good purpose, or virtue with a bad one? It is a positive denial of what has been asserted positively and without qualification.

If these quotations be compared with those which assert the theory under consideration, this contradiction will manifest itself in many points.

(1.) The latter positively declare that all responsible and deliberate acts are predetermined in the governing choice, purpose, or intention: The former, that there are responsible, and of course deliberate acts, that are not predetermined, or determined at all by the governing purpose! If, as the latter teach, every moral act is predetermined by choice, purpose, or intention, then no act can differ in character from that choice, purpose, or intention: But the former set forth that sin co-exists with a good, and virtue with a bad purpose? According to the latter, the purpose which the sinner forms, when he consecrates himself to the service of God, is the first right act he ever performs; and, from the time he forms it, no sin is possible while it remains: According to the former, good acts are often done before such purpose is formed at all, and bad ones while it remains in existence! Contradictions more palpable, it would be difficult to find in any other philosopher, ancient or modern. And what is worse, these contradictions are found, not only in successive volumes, but in the same section, and even in the same paragraph, of the same volumes. In the same section, which teaches the possible co-existence of sin and holiness, in the same mind, we are told that "*all* good purposes are comprehended within

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one great purpose, that is, to fulfil the law of God, the great law of love to God and man;" that "this is an *all-comprehending purpose* of making the law the *absolute* rule of its choices and volitions." Now, if a purpose is "all-comprehending," and has adopted the moral law as *an absolute rule* for both choices and volitions, what acts are not comprehended? and what shall arise from the law of impulse? It is not strange therefore that in explaining the difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate, he uses language which virtually denies all he has asserted in respect to the mixed character of both.

"It is just here that we perceive the difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate man. The regenerate man makes Christ and his kingdom the chief objects of his being; every other purpose is merged in the one great purpose of following Christ; when he took up the cross, he determined to sacrifice every thing for it. The unregenerate man may appear very religious, as long as the duties of religion run parallel with his absorbing pursuits; but let them cross each other, and at the point of divergence he follows out the line of his own stern selfishness and worldliness."

If the account here given of the regenerate does not preclude the possibility of sin, while he retains the regenerate character; and if that of the unregenerate does not preclude the possibility of virtue, while he retains the unregenerate character; we have yet to learn the meaning of language.—Not an act, by his own showing, is set down to the account of the latter, that is not perfectly consistent with, and even fairly deducible from supreme devotion to self; and in merging "every other purpose of the former" "in *the one great purpose* of following Christ, and representing him, sacrificing *everything* for his cross," he has rendered the supposition of sin an inconsistency and an absurdity. The fact is, it is quite certain, that if the latter quotations examined be true, the former must be false, and Tappan has satisfactorily refuted himself.

But it is not on a mere *argumentum ad hominem* that we mean to rest our refutation of this popular, but dangerous position. We fear, that, after exhibiting the contradictions into which our author has fallen, his undesigned defense of the truth will not have the weight with the reader which could be desired. And had an angel spoken, instead of a mortal, we would not willingly stop by showing merely that, in accordance with his admissions and inculcations, he could not con-

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sistently avoid admitting the absolute simplicity of moral action. Our object is achieved only when we have shown that our common reason does not admit of any other doctrine.—We therefore proceed to inquire *what the character of that governing purpose or intention is, in adopting which regeneration consists?* Speaking in the language of philosophy, *we* should say, it is the choice of the apprehended good of being as the ultimate end, involving the pre-determination to use at all times, all means in our power, according to our best judgment, to advance that end. Tappan and others would say, it is the adoption of the moral law as our only and absolute rule of duty, involving the pre-determination to do all things, at all times, which our best judgment shall decide to fall within the circle of its requirements. Speaking in the language of theology, we should both perhaps say, it is the renunciation of all sin, and the unconditional consecration of all our energies to the service of God, now, henceforth and forevermore. We might enlarge the description, so as to include faith on the Lord Jesus Christ, a humble depending on the gracious aid of the Holy Spirit, submission of our will in all cases, to the known will of God, &c. But, however much might be added, it is all involved in, and cannot be different from the philosophical enunciations already made.

Now, while a purpose, thus characterized, remains, is sin a possibility? To answer in the affirmative is to utter a contradiction. For sin is an act or choice which is known to be *inconsistent* with the good of being, or the requirements of the law. Are we doing all, that, according to our best judgment, we are able to do, to promote the good of being, when we are, by hypothesis, doing that which we know to be *inconsistent* therewith? While doing such things, is the purpose to do no such thing, but just the opposite, still in existence? Can we knowingly violate (there are no unknown violations.) the law of God, and yet retain the purpose to obey it in *all* things, at all times, and under all circumstances? It would really seem that, when there is either sufficient obtuseness of intellect, or tortuosity of heart to return an affirmative answer to these questions, further argument is folly.

But this conclusion may be hasty; and we will present the subject in a new aspect. Some time since a distinguished advocate of the theory before us, and one whose views correspond with our own, had a controversy, the substance of which we will present as the best means of illustrating our argument. "What," says my friend, "are the characteristics

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of the purpose by which the sinner consecrates himself to God?" "Why," replied the other, "it is a total surrendry of himself to God and his service, and involves an unqualified abandonment of all sinful ways." "The sinner, then," said my friend, "resolves to abandon *all* sin?" "Yes." "To consecrate all the energies of his body and soul to the service of God?" "Yes." "To do it now?" "Yes." "To serve him faithfully while he lives, never to do any thing which he knows him to have forbidden, and never to omit any thing which he knows him to have commanded?" "Yes." With a purpose thus characterized, is it possible for him to sin a month, a week, a day, an hour, or even a minute?" "Undoubtedly it is possible, as the case of David plainly shows." "You are begging the question, in assuming that, during David's sin, his purpose remained. Let us first settle principles which will enable us to judge of this matter on more certain grounds than those of mere conjecture. Can I resolve to go to New York, to start now, to go as fast as I possibly can, and, in carrying this resolution into execution, can I unnecessarily tarry a week, an hour, or even a minute by the way? In doing so, would I not necessarily abandon the purpose with which I started?" "Of course, he could not stop, and still retain his purpose; but this is no illustration of the matter before us." "Why not? Wherein do they differ? By your own admission, the sinner resolves to serve God, to serve God with all his powers, and at all times; to commence now, and to do it while he lives. Now, a cessation of this service is just as absolutely an interruption of that purpose as delay on the road to New York would be an interruption of the purpose to reach it without delay." "Well Sir, I have got your theory, and that is all I desired in this conversation. Please excuse me; I have some writing to do." Now, how fair a report of this conversation was given, we do not pretend to say; but it must be manifest, that if it was at all as reported, there was pressing need of doing that writing just at that time! Nor was he routed by any false issue. The definition of the governing purpose on which they reasoned differs not at all from that of Tappan, and of all orthodox ministers. And he failed in the argument, for the same reason that Tappan has contradicted himself, and that is, there is an absurdity involved in the theory he was laboring to sustain—an absurdity which no skill can conceal, and which precise language and logical consecutiveness, though enlisted in its defense, render all the more glaring.

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(2.) But, in the second place, let us look at some of the consequences involved in this position. If one sinful act may be performed without interrupting a right intention, no reason can be shown why two, or ten, or one hundred, or a thousand, or ten thousand, may not. If one hour's sin may consist with a right intention, so may two, three, or ten hour's, or a year's, a lifetime's, an eternity's. The sin, or series of sins of David, which Tappan has referred to, as an illustration and proof of his position, was protracted through some months. First, in the horrid catalogue, stand the crimes of seduction and adultery. To conceal these, follow deception, and base trifling with an innocent, and most loyal subject; and then, to cap the climax of his iniquity, when Uriah's lofty sense of duty and honor prevented him from acceding to the measures by which David sought to conceal his own past guilt, he orders him to be set in the fore-front of the battle, that, through his very loyalty and heroic devotion to his king and country, he may perish, and thus leave the way open for him to possess the fair Bathsheba, his wife! How long after this event David was met by the rebuke of the Prophet is not perhaps distinctly known. It is quite certain that these transgressions were protracted through several months. But bad, and long-continued as they were, our philosophic author does not hesitate to say they were consistent with a purpose to serve God in all things! Be it so; and what follows? This, plainly: If so many months' sin were co-existent with a right purpose, as many years' would have been equally so; and if so many years might be, why not an eternity? Hence, we have a purpose to "sacrifice every thing for the cross of Christ," which results in, or is consistent with the existence of an eternal series of transgressions, the worst that depravity ever perpetrated, seduction, adultery, treachery, murder, and making another a partner in his guilt! Murderers may have eternal life abiding in them; liars may escape the lake that burns with unquenchable fire; and those that work abomination and pollute the earth may enter into the Holy City! The Bible is convicted of falsheood, in teaching that "without holiness, no man shall see the Lord," for, provided only a man has once formed a good purpose, it is not possible for him to become a renegade so devilish, that he may not still "read his title clear to mansions in the skies," and with blasphemous Burns aspire to "a seat at Davy's hip yet!"

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But without pushing the theory to this extreme, taking it just as it comes from the hands of its author, without either hiding or exposing a single one of its deformities, what can be more dangerous and licentious in its tendencies? Tetzel's indulgencies were innocent, and their legitimate results mere nursery tales in the comparison. Its broad mantle can indeed cover beneath its ample folds "a multitude of sins" as numerous as the stars of heaven, and "as black and grimed as hell!" Falsehood, impurity, murder, may exist, but the good purpose of serving the Lord lives on, and will live on, till death sever the thread of existence! True, the author hints that there may be a sin of such magnitude and aggravation as to involve its cessation; but when the reader reflects that David's offences did not reach that damning extreme, he will not be likely to be much alarmed at his own peccadillos! His fears, if not his conscience, may quietly repose on beds of rose and myrtle, even till the summons of death arouse them!

And then too, look at the absurdity of calling the good purpose a *governing* one. What does it govern? Not the external conduct, for that is wrong; not the volitions, for they are executing a contrary end; not the thoughts and feelings, for they are engrossed and prostituted to the vilest uses. Truly, it has but the cipher of a function, if such is its sway! In all such cases as that of David, it must have forgotten that it was born to command, and have retired into the dormitory of the soul, and resigned itself to a sleep which is the very image of death! It is a pity, indeed it is a pity, that it is not dead, buried and out of the way!

(3.) But in the third place, the theory is intrinsically nothing but absurdity. We have shown in a former essay that, while an ultimate intention exists, all the volitions and subordinate choices, deemed necessary to its realization, must follow by an unavoidable necessity, as circumstances seem from time to time to require. We have also shown, that but one general purpose is possible; and this is admitted by Tappan himself. From these grounds, it follows that no *volition* can either be a moral act, or be contrary to a governing purpose. This Tappan himself seems to teach—Moral Agency, page 28.

"And universally, the merit and demerit of an agent is as his actual choice or intention. His volition depends upon his choice, and hence all the sequents of his volition, as far as he can be responsible for them, depend upon his choice. However, he may be judged by beings who have no other

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way of estimating the principles by which he regulates himself, than the sequents which appear in connection with his volitions; in the court of his own conscience, and in the court of all-seeing truth and justice, he shall be judged according to his choices or intentions—according to that which he determined and aimed to do."

But we meditate a different proof of our proposition.

1. Tappan agrees with us in his position that every sinful act is a deliberate act. It is determined on after reflection.

2. It is plain that every such act must either terminate on an ultimate end, or on some means to such end. For every thing that can be chosen is either an end or a means; that is, it is either chosen for itself without any ulterior reference, or it is chosen because of something else; or thus, every choice is either an ultimate purpose or intention, or it is an executive volition, or subsidiary purpose. Now the sinful acts, under consideration, it is contended, are not ultimate intentions. Nor are they subordinate to the governing purpose to serve God, or the choice of the apprehended good of being; for, by the hypothesis, they are sinful, and not comprehended therein. They cannot be subordinate to the choice of the opposite end, for it is admitted that there is no such end chosen. We have therefore, choices which are neither ultimate nor subordinate; neither the choice of an end, nor of the means of securing any end. But this is both absurd in itself, and contrary to fact. Moreover they are deliberate; that is, resolved on and selected after reflection. We have, therefore, a moral agent putting forth a causative "nisus" by deliberation, to secure—*nothing!* employing means to no end!

But we cannot let it rest here. David's volitions to seduce Bathsheba—to intoxicate Uriah, and to secure his murder, were originated with a definite design to compass his own *gratification*, not in subordination to, but inconsistently with the general good. Now this end was chosen, or not. If not, then means were selected to secure what was not chosen, which is absurd. If it was, then the good purpose of David either had no existence, or it is possible to choose two ultimate ends at the same time, which we have shown, and Tappan admits to be absurd.

It is perhaps expedient to add that there is a sense in which few individuals absolutely repudiate their ultimate intention of doing good. Most men mean to do right at some indefinite period in the future. But it is plain that

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there is nothing in this purposed amendment which is inconsistent with absolute selfishness. The worst sinners have it, as well as the least guilty. It is the mere dictate of prudence, or the language of the instinctive feelings in favor of virtue, or our own future well-being, which are common to all men.

3. Failing to make good any objection to our theory that reposes on a theoretical basis, many content themselves with the simple assertion that it is untrue, because it is contradicted by the consciousness of mankind. Now it is meant by this assertion is, either that consciousness attests the fact of mixed action—that this and that particular act were of a compound character, or that it reveals to us *a priori* judgments which render mixed actions a possible conception. We have already shown that consciousness differs from the judgments of the mind essentially—that it is simply the light in which they are revealed to us—that it has no independent affirmations of its own to give. To say therefore that a mixed action *has* occurred, is only to say that in some one's judgment he has performed one. But this gives us no information respecting his judgment. It may be right, or it may be wrong, and consequently can never be admitted as evidence on one side or the other of a scientific discussion of this question. We are brought then to the last supposition, viz: that the spontaneous and necessary judgments of mankind render the conception of a mixed action possible. But this is precisely the question which we have been discussing; and now, under the ambiguous name of consciousness, are we to be politely told that all our investigations and argumentations are false? When they are overthrown by scientific discussion, we shall take it for granted that the principles employed in the refutation were seen in the light of consciousness, even though the fact be not mentioned; but until then we must contemn the objection. It is, in fact, no more to the purpose before us than it would be to attempt to falsify a mathematical demonstration, if we should say it is false, because, it is contradicted by consciousness.

Nevertheless, this objection has suggested to us an important way of arriving at the spontaneous judgments of mankind on this subject, of which it may be well to avail ourselves. I refer to the unstudied, and yet true utterances of these judgements preserved in human languages. If the position we are maintaining, and the conclusions we have arrived at

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respecting it, be correct, it must always have been among the radical truths developed by reason, and we should anticipate that its unmistakable foot-prints would be found, on examination, in those words, in every language, which express the distinction between right and wrong; and we should also anticipate that we would find in those words which express acts and states external to the sphere of intention, or morality, indications of conviction or belief that they might be mixed, or of different degrees of intensity. It requires but little labor to verify these anticipations. We have examined the Lexicons of the Hebrew, Greek, Latin and French, English and German Languages, and find a complete concurrence of them all in using terms which admit of no degrees to express the idea of virtue or sin, of right or wrong; they imply absolute existence or non-existence. [My Brother here commenced and indicated a detailed exhibition of all the words in the various languages mentioned, corresponding to the words right, wrong, upright, sincere, love, &c., in our own language, for the purpose of showing that they excluded all conception of intensity or combination from the idea they represent; but he failed to finish it. S. D. C.] But feelings are in all these languages spoken of as more or less intense—judgments as more or less sound—actions as more or less vigorous—and *character*, meaning by the term outward or phenomenal character, as more or less just or good. [Here also he merely indicated a detailed examination of the Lexicons. As to him, that night came on in which no man can work; and he has left this point to be examined by every man for himself. S. D. C.]

Having now, as we think, demonstrated the impossibility of choosing the end required by the moral law and its antithesis at the same time, we return to the question which we waived until this might be decided—viz:

Can the will choose any part of the end which the moral law requires us to will, without choosing it all?

We regard this question as already sufficiently answered, and think it must be as manifest as the issue of a mathematical demonstration to every mind which has understandingly traced our investigations, that it cannot possibly be that any one can choose any part of the ultimate end required by the moral law, without choosing it all—that the choice of any of it, *must be* the choice of all of it. But a position has been taken by some, which seems to demand a more extended discussion.

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The position is, that, in morality there is no such indissoluble unity of end and law and choice, as our theory assumes; but, on the contrary, the ends, which may be virtuously chosen, and also the obligations to choose them, are manifold and distinct. It is alleged that each particular relation of man to his fellow men, or to his Creator, creates an obligation entirely distinct from that which is created by every other relation: so that obedience to one obligation, does not at all imply obedience to any other, nor does a violation of one imply a violation of another; but a man may, at any time, or habitually, obey one, and violate all the rest; or violate one and obey all the rest. Every end, every obligation, and every choice, is totally independent of every other end, obligation, and choice.

Now, as far as the philosophical merits of this theory are concerned, it has none; it is, in fact, a thing of mere mist and moonshine. Nevertheless, it is an opinion to which many are wedded, and we must therefore treat it as respectfully as possible. It is, moreover, an opinion impenitent men are fond of, affording as it does, an ample screen from the imputation of total and life-long depravity. It is therefore of some importance to dissipate it.

1. We begin by referring the reader to what we have previously established, viz: that the end and the law are necessarily the same for all moral agents—that consequently both are given *a priori*, and are therefore absolute unities. Now, while this position remains unanswered, we are under no obligation to notice any assertions to the contrary.

2. But waiving all logical rights, we proceed to show that according to this theory no science of *the* end or ground of moral obligation is possible, there being many such ends. Nor can there be a science of *the ends;* for a strict science not only exhibits absolutely necessary conceptions, and, if they be various it exhibits them in a totality of mutual relationship and dependency. If there is but one absolute unity, science is reached when it is shown on *a priori* grounds that all men do of necessity hold themselves bound to will this. If there be in one sense, more than one end, in another, there can be but one; that is to say, there must be a conception of a whole in which all these parts unite and to which they belong; and this conception must be *necessary* and therefore *a priori*, and *therefore* again anterior to any parts that it embraces—else there is no science. Now, on the supposition before us, the ends are manifold and distinct, having no indissoluble con-

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nection. We arrive at the knowledge of them, only as experience from time to time reveals them. Consequently, we add one to another and can never know when we have them all, till the last shred of life is worn away. No two persons can tell whether they have arrived at the knowledge of the same number of ends, and *therefore* the whole business of morality is reduced to a whirlpool of chaos and distraction. Against this position universal reason protests. All men know it to be false.

3. It is withal exceedingly shallow. It tells us that each particular relation imposes a distinct obligation. But what is relation? And it imposes an obligation to do what? To will something of course. But what? Here is darkness visible. But craving the pardon of these theorists, we say that their distinct obligations are inexplicable, except on the supposition of an end and law given, *a priori*, by reason. We never could number things but for the idea of number, nor tell whether they are straight or crooked, causes or wants without the previous existence of conceptions in the mind with which to compare them; and so, if there is not, *a priori*, in the mind the idea of *law* and *end*, these distinct obligations would not be imposed or felt.

4. If, as this theory assumes, there are many ends to be willed by every one, it cannot be that they are inconsistent with each other, else reason contradicts itself, and sets one obligation in array against another, when it imposes the duty of willing each of them. Nor can they be *so distinct* that we cannot, at any time, choose all of them which, at that time, we ought to choose. But, if they are neither incompatible, nor so distinct that we cannot choose them all at once it follows that they are capable of unity—nay, more, that there is a sense in which they are, and must be one, a point of view in which they are reduced to unity, and set over against all ends of an opposite nature. Thus the universe of ends are reduced to simply *two* classes, and each class is a *unity*.

5. According to what we have before proved, if there be many distinct ends, not resolvable into one, there must also be many distinct moral laws, not resolvable into one. Either therefore there are many distinct moral laws, existing as independent precepts, and by no means constituting a whole, or there are not many ends, nor many possible choices. But such distinct moral laws, incapable of reduction to unity do

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not exist; therefore many ends do not. Hence, the isolated choices supposed by our theorists are impossible.

6. But, we must push this further, even though it be supererrogatory. We affirm then that there is an eternal and irreconcilable opposition between any virtue whatever, and any and every sin, so that while the one exists in any mind, the other is impossible. If any one virtue exists there eternally, it will of necessity eternally exclude all sin, and *vice versa;* and this is true, whatever we may hold to be the ultimate end of right choice. In the first place, suppose happiness be assumed as the end. If so, it is willed *for its own sake*, and not as a means to any thing else. But whatever is willed for its own sake, must of necessity be willed without limitation. Wherever it is, or can be, the same reason exists for choosing it, viz; its own nature. If therefore we will it in any case *as an end*, we must in every case. We cannot therefore but will the happiness of the sentient universe, whenever we will the happiness of a single individual *for its own sake.* Hence, in the very nature of the case, our choice must be *universal* and *impartial.* But to choose an end, is to choose the course of conduct and the means which have a perceived tendency to promote it. Hence, we cannot will, and promote the happiness of one for its own sake, and at the same time, will against, and invade the happiness of another. We cannot, for example, will the happiness of the white man, *for its own sake*, while we will against, or invade that of the negro, and *vice versa.* We cannot sacrifice that of all to one, nor one to all; we cannot therefore violate any command of God, or omit any known duty to him, or our fellow-beings, while we actually will the happiness of any one being as an end, or for its own sake. Hence, such distinct and incompatible coexistent choices as the theorists we are opposing contend for, are utterly impossible, and the supposition of them absurd.

But suppose it be assumed that the reason we comply with any obligation is because it is right. Rightness then is the ultimate thing aimed at. Now, if the rightness of any one act is the reason for performing it, how is it possible that it should not be made the reason of performing every act in which it is concerned? Why do you give A his dues? Because it is *right.* Then the rightness is the thing intended. Is it possible, at the same time that rightness is intended for its own sake, in giving his dues to A, to refuse D his, or God his? Rightness must be *universally* regarded, or it is not regarded at all.

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By the same process it is easy to show that no rational being can choose virtuously in some things, and sinfully in others at the same time, whether moral order, or fitness, or Kant's maxim, be assumed as the reason for virtuous acts. The end therefore of all virtuous choice and action must be *an absolute unity*, which admits of no division into parts. Suppose that end be the good of being. It is an *a priori* conception. As fast then as we learn by experience, the number of beings that exist, and the kinds of good of which they are capable, we will inevitably arrange them under this conception. Reason cannot give *discordant ends;* it can leave out nothing which naturally falls under a principle of unity; and we venture the assertion that if our conception does not embrace in an absolute unity all that is proper to be willed at all, morality is impossible. Contemporaneous right to A, and wrong to B—revenge towards C, and forgiveness towards D—impiety towards God and benefactions towards man, bear not one lineament of true virtue. There must exist between any virtue whatever, and any sin whatever such an irreconcilable antagonism that if either of them dwells in a heart, the other cannot possibly be there.

The theory we have been combatting, owes its existence to the confusion which arises from pure heroic want of thought. Looking at the external conduct, or phenomenal character of men, there is perhaps no one so base as not to exhibit sometimes acts which seem virtuous—the offspring of mere spontaneous impulses, or of selfish policy. Denis Didero declared he would never see a poor man suffer while he had power to relieve him, and seems to have been as good as his word; but, at the same time, he was faithless to a most devoted wife, and a ring-leader in wickedness. An Irish robber found a widow in tears, and, on asking the cause, was told that the tithing men had taken her only cow because she was not able to pay the tithe. He immediately pursued the officers, overtook and robbed them, returned and gave the woman more than sufficient to purchase another. Now, here was a generous act, and externally considered, a just and benevolent one; but was it in fact virtuous? He must be a shallow philosopher indeed, who can conclude that either of these men were in heart what these specific outward acts would indicate them to be, or virtuous in them, while they might be sinful in other contemporaneous acts. The same act may be done from one of two *reasons*, and in fact there are but few acts that are not done daily by some for one of

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these reasons, and by others for the other. The question therefore must be asked always why was it done? for what reason? If they be moral acts at all, there is some reason—what? Ordinarily, we can only conclude respecting the reason of individual acts, by referring to the general tenor of a man's conduct; but this, the theory we are noticing would not admit of. In the case of the Irish robber, for example, his sympathy may have been stirred, and under its impulse he may have gone and robbed the government officers and replaced the widow's cow. But this would not be a right act, morally speaking, any more than if he had followed some other less amiable impulse in perpetrating some other illegal deed. Was his act probably any thing else but obedience to a mere impulse? Happiness could not have been its end, or he could not have violated the 8th commandment, and set an example which he could not but know would militate against general happiness. Right could not have been the end, for the same reason; nor could moral order, nor fitness, nor Kant's maxim. It could not therefore have been a virtuous act.

We hold it then to be demonstrated that there is one and only one absolute end of all virtuous choice—one and only one absolute moral law, of which all specific moral precepts are but applications—one and only one ultimate choice possible in right moral action.

[At this point, the pen of the writer was dropped, with the presentiment that it would never be resumed again, and with the wish on his lips for strength to wield it for at least *one half day more;* the current of his argument terminated with that of his life, and he has ceased forever to communicate his thoughts to his fellow-men. It is one of the unaccountable things in Divine Providence, that such a light should have disappeared from the earth, ere well it had reached its meridian power and effulgence. But God saw its removal to be best, and we acquiesce without murmur, but with a bleeding heart, in the dispensation.

A few words to the reader:—It has been no slight task to collect and arrange the fragments, the *disjecta membra*, in which most of this concluding portion of my departed Brother's Treatise on the Simplicity of Moral Action was left. What he could have done in a few hours has cost me several days. I am not sure now that I have been able to arrange the parts according to his maturest plan. It is probable, for example, that he either at first or last designed to introduce most of the

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concluding argument near the beginning of his discussion of the question whether it is possible to choose two contradictory ends at the same time. But I was doubtful which was his latest purpose, and accordingly choose to place it where I have. This prevented the necessity of making any alterations of importance in what he had written.

It will doubtless strike the tasteful reader who has perused his previous articles, that there is not in this last one that literary finish and elegance which have characterised them. Had he lived he would doubtless have given it equal excellence; but, as it is, it is by no means destitute of these merits, being stamped throughout with the marks of his gifted and cultivated mind.

One further remark: The subject is unfinished. It will be seen that he had about concluded the metaphysical part of the subject; but, on the Scriptural argument, he left nothing but a brief program. It is to be regretted that he could not have executed this part of his profound and important work. But he has done enough in what he has written on the subject to settle the matter forever, that the whole theory of mixed moral action, whatever form it may assume is an absurdity, and a pernicious error in ethical science. Nor will the results of his labors on this essential point soon die from among men.] S. D. C.

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ARTICLE LXIII.

Light and Love.

BY REV. WILLIAM GOODELL, OF HONEOYE, ONTARIO CO., N. Y.

THE readers of the Oberlin Quarterly Review cannot but remember two connected articles in this periodical from the pen of Prof. THOME, the first entitled LIGHT AND LOVE, and the second 'COME-OUTISM AND COME-OUTERS.'*

It is the design of the present contributor to present, in two successive articles, a somewhat different train of thought on those subjects, embracing substantially, the views of a considerable class of the friends of Christian progress and reformation, whose sentiments have seldom or never found expression in the Literary and Theological Reviews of this country, and who conceive that their views and their position are very commonly misapprehended and misunderstood. In the course of the discussion proposed, the articles above mentioned may come, perhaps, more or less directly, and in some particulars, under review.

The subject, then, of consideration, in the first place, is LIGHT, and the relation it sustains to LOVE.

By the term Light, in a literal sense, we mean the medium, composed of etherial or luminous matter, through which all visible objects are beheld, by the organs of vision. In a figurative use of the term, we express by it, the medium through which the mind, in a healthful and proper condition, perceives the objects, intellectual, moral and spiritual, which are presented for its inspection. Truth is light. The fundamental principles of philosophy, of morals, and of religion, are light, because they consitute the proper medium through which all the objects coming before the mind, in the investigation of those sciences, should be seen and examined. Strictly speaking, the objects themselves, the facts or things presented for inspection are not light, either in the natural or moral

*See Oberlin Quarterly for August, 1846, Article 28, and for November, 1846, Article, 32.

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world, though a proper collection and arrangement of those objects, facts, or things, may be very essential to a proper use of the organs of vision, through the medium of *light*.—Men do sometimes speak of collecting and of diffusing light, on a certain subject, when they only mean the collecting and dissemination of information in the form of statistics, or facts, which are to form the *objects* of mental and moral vision. But this is, evidently, a lax and somewhat improper use of the term. A man may arrange, in his appartments, the best collection of the proper *objects* of vision, without introducing into them, for the benefit of his guests a single particle of *light*. The use of light implies *organs* of vision, and *objects* of vision, but neither of these are to be confounded with the *medium* of vision, the *light*. It may be well to notice and bear in mind these distinctions, to prevent needless confusion; though, if any one should question the propriety of them, the writer will not insist upon them, as vitally essential to the discussion. He will consent to include facts as well as principles in the definition of light. It is only necessary that the term should be defined.

Our definition is yet incomplete. "Whatsoever doth make manifest is light." Eph. v: 13. Truth exists, independently of the human mind. Fundamental first principles are fixed, and changeless, whether men welcome their presence or not.—The objects of mental and moral vision, the *facts* of the moral world, (if we choose to call these a part of the moral light communicated to us,) are not changed by our apprehensions of them. We may shut our eyes upon them, or our eyes may be diseased, or the medium of vision may be illusory, but the facts are the same still. *Thus far*, our definition of light includes only what is *out* of ourselves.

In its highest, its most spiritual sense, the term *Light* expresses much beyond and above this. The soul of man is gifted, not merely with the *organs*, so to speak, of intellectual, moral and spiritual vision. It has, within itself, to a great extent, the power of furnishing and of modifying the *medium* through which, in the proper use of its powers of intellectual and moral vision, the *objects* of the moral and spiritual world are to be perceived and inspected. It is not enough that we have the light of truth—the light of the fundamental first principles of theology and ethics to guide us. In addition to this, we need the light, (that is to say, the *medium* of spiritual perception,) furnished by a right state of the mind itself, especially by a right state of the *affections*, the *volun-*

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tary exercises, the HEART. Whatever the mind *sees*, on moral and spiritual subjects, it sees through the *medium* of the affections, the desires, the aims, the purposes, the volitions—the will, the HEART. I use all these terms, so as to cover the whole ground, and ensure the expression of my meaning, to men of all metaphysical schools, if it be possible, neither affirming nor denying the precise identity or synonymous import of all of them, nor aspiring to be metaphysically exact in their use.

We have then, a two-fold definition of the word *Light*, when used in a figurative, or moral sense. By the first definition, men have light when they have clear intellectual perceptions of moral and religious truth, of the first principles of theology and ethics, whatever may be the state of their hearts, their moral and spiritual condition, in God's sight—By the second, additional definition, we say men have *light*, when, over and above their intellectual perceptions of fundamental moral and religious truth, they have hearts in harmony with truth, thus furnishing them with a transparent *medium* through which moral and spiritual objects may be seen.

The Scriptures recognize our first definition when they say that "Light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil." And they recognize the second when they say, that "if the eye be single, then the whole body shall be full of light."

The relation subsisting between light and love, therefore, may be readily understood. Light, in the sense of the first definition, "comes first in the order of time" (at least in the order of nature,*) "and comes to wake love." "Light is in order to Love." So says Prof. Thome. And he urges the absurdity, of "making love chronologically antecedent to light." [August number, 1846, page 98.] There can be no love without light. In this sentiment of Prof. Thome, I concur. And it is a point in my argument, of too much importance to be overlooked. Whatever may be said concerning light, of a certain description, as existing without love, there can be no such thing as love without light.

In the sense of our second definition, Light becomes *synonymous* with Love. In every point of view therefore, Love must imply Light. A "loveless light," in a modified sense,

*I would not affirm of Adam, before the fall, or of angels in heaven, that they ever possessed *light*, for any perceptible space of time, without *love*. The two may have been simultaneous, but certainly they never could have possessed love, for a single moment, without light.

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there may be: but in a proper use of the term, there can be no such thing as a "lightless love."

Bearing these things in mind, we approach the great practical problems—(1.) Whether or no professors of religion, churches, and ministers, in this country at the present day, are in possession of the Light requisite to guide them in disposing of great and important questions of fundamental morality and religion, such, for example, as those involved in the alternatives of continued slaveholding and slavery, or of immediate and unconditional emancipation and abolition; and (2.) Whether or no the *want* of such Light, if it be found wanting, is to be regarded as an excuse or palliation, so far as to warrant us in giving credence to their christian profes sions.

To solve these problems understandingly and correctly, two other questions must come under consideration—first, *what* light do all real christians of necessity possess, and without which they could not *be* christians! Second, what pecu liarities, if any, in respect to the Christians, or professors of Christianity, in this age and nation, should be taken into the account, in forming an estimate of the light possessed by them, or which they might possess if they would?

We take up the first of these questions. What Light, of necessity, do all true Christians possess, and without which they could not *be* Christians?

In order to be Christians, men must have of necessity, all that Light which is necessary to constitute them free moral agents, accountable to God for their actions. Whatever of Light, the scriptures attribute to man *as* man, to the race, to the species, must be predicated, most assuredly, of all Christians. Truths self evident in themselves, and apprehended by all mature and sane men, truths that whole nations, *en masse*, with united voices, with beaming eyes and throbbing bosoms, will declare to be self evident, must, of course be apprehended by all christians. A christian cannot be less than a man. In becoming christians men do not put off manhood. Christians have consciences and common sense. They know what all other people know, to begin with, whatever of *additional* light they may or may not possess. Christianity does not dwarf them. Regeneration does not dishumanize them. Thus much, without incurring the imputation of extravagance or ultraism, all may be bold to affirm, though in doing it we should assume a position altogether decisive of the whole controversy.

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What then, is that moral Light that is common to all men —that enters into every definition of a moral being—that the scriptures, every where, ascribe to man *as* man, and on the ground of which they base the divine claims, the divine law.

"There is a spirit in MAN, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." [Job. xxxii: 8.] "Yea, and why, *even of yourselves*, judge ye not what is right." [Luke xii: 57.] It is implied here, that there is such a thing as Right, to be understood, otherwise men would not be expected to understand it. And it is further implied that there is a faculty in man; call it conscience, if you please, the Moral Sense, or the organ of moral vision, by which light and darkness, right and wrong, are distinguished. Sweet and bitter, light and darkness, are the very figures employed in the scriptures, to express the opposite natures, of virtue and vice, of holiness and sin, and the adaptation of the Moral Sense in man, to distinguish them, just as the natural eye distinguishes light from darkness, and the natural taste, distinguishes sweet from bitter.

Without this, man could not be a moral being, nor the subject of moral approbation or blame. Without this, there could be no foundation for moral science and all pretensions to it must be vain; for all the sciences have their elementary principles that are self-evident to our powers of perception, either physical or mental, and without these, there could be no starting point for scientific investigation.

Without this, there could indeed be no moral light, or rather there could be no use for it, and therefore no reason to believe in its existence. If there be not in the nature of things, a *Right* and a *Wrong*, an *ought* and an *ought not*, then there are no moral objects to be perceived, and it were unphilosophical to suppose any *medium*, any moral light, by which moral objects might be perceived, if there were none. Take away the idea of a fundamental right and wrong, in the nature of things, and we should have to relinquish the idea of a moral light to discern them. We should then be compelled to admit that there might be Christians, (if any body could define the term,) who were destitute of the light requisite to reveal to them the moral turpitude of slaveholding, and the duty of its immediate and unconditional abandonment. It should excite no special wonder that a philosophy and a theology that supposes Christians may be destitute of the light necessary to detect the inherent sinfulness of slaveholding,

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should begin to distrust or doubt the fact of inherent and self-evident moral distinctions. And this seems to be the case in some quarters. So that we cannot well discuss the question whether Christians possess of necessity, the requisite amount of moral light alluded to, without glancing, as we pass along, upon the question whether there be any moral objects, or any moral sense to perceive them, that should call for any moral light, or medium of moral vision, in the christian or any one else.

Upon so wide a field of remark, we must not enter largely, now, and yet a few hints may be thrown out, indicative of a train of argument that might be urged. Ideas of right and wrong are common to all nations and all ages. These ideas are among the first received and manifested by young children. They are found to lie back of all ideas of a superior being, a supreme God. The scriptures themselves, in displaying before us the true God, introduce him by his moral character, and found his claims upon his rectitude, as the God that "doeth right:" "A God of truth and without iniquity—just and right is he"—"For the ways of the Lord are right"—"Lord God of Israel, thou art righteous"—"The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."—All this, in a written revelation for man, must have been utterly and forever unmeaning and unintelligible to him, if man *as* man, did not know, before hand, and prior to any written revelation, that there was a right and a wrong in the nature of things—nay, further, if he did not know *what* was right.—On no other ground could God challange men, as he does, all sorts of men, good and bad, to judge concerning his moral conduct, whether it be right or wrong. Imagine to yourself, if you can, a race of moral and intelligent beings, incapable of knowing whether the practice of chattelizing human beings were right or wrong; and then believe, if you can that to *such* a race of beings God would appeal, as to arbiters qualified, by their knowledge of right and wrong, to sit in judgment, as he invites men to do, upon their Creator's moral conduct.

The same God who gave to man a physical nature, and and intellectual nature, gave to him likewise, a *moral* nature, otherwise he could not be a moral being, or capable of becoming such, by any course of moral and religious training, any more than a brute. In giving man a physical nature, God gave him the outward or physical senses. In giving him an intellectual nature he gave him the intellectual powers,

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perception, memory, reason, imagination, and judgment. In giving him a moral nature he gave a moral sense, to discern moral objects. Without this moral sense, men could know nothing of right or wrong, they could neither approve or condemn, they could neither feel self-approbation or remorse, they could neither be holy nor sinful.

In all communities, in all nations and ages, the language which expresses moral distinctions is in common use, among the learned and the unlearned. All men, whether civilized or barbarous complain of injustice and condemn the wrong doer, while they extol the merciful and the righteous. This could not be, if men had no moral perceptions, to distinguish the right from the wrong. Men's selfishness may lead them to exalt the selfish and unjust, like themselves, and to persecute and villify the just and humane. But in this they do violence to their own moral sense, and are self-condemned as soon as they are compelled or incited to a scrutiny of their own conduct and motives. And the characters of good men who have suffered persecution are uniformly and universally approved, afterwards, both by good and bad men, of other nations, or of after ages, when no selfish interests or motives stand in the way of a correct judgment. False education, bad habits, evil propensities and vile affections may do much to *stifle* and *pervert* the moral sense; but the very fact proves not only the *existence* of the moral sense, but its *power*. If men had no moral sense, they would have none to mis-educate and pervert. Were they not sensible of the power of conscience to arraign and punish them, they would not take so much pains to stifle, to pervert it, to impose upon it with false evidence. A corrupt heart, pleading its own cause before the bar of conscience, is the personification, the definition, the source, of all the moral sophistry in the world. All moral sophistries the Bible calls lies, and attributes them all to the father of lies who abode not in the truth. And no moral sophistries in the world are more clearly and indisputably of this character, than those by which the apologists of slavery, the opponents of immediate and unconditional emancipation, seek to hide and entrench themselves. It is no more uncharitable to say this than to say the same of other impenitent sinners, for in both cases, uniformly, they themselves confess it to have been their case, whenever they are thoroughly converted from their sinful delusions.

The ancient Spartans, it is alleged, taught their children to steal, and enrolled theft among the virtues. From this it

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is inferred, that the moral sense, in the Spartans, if there be any such faculty, differed radically from the moral sense, among us: that the moral sense is a mere product of education, and that there is no absolute distinction between right and wrong, in their own natures. But the truth is, the Spartans, misled by selfishness, which is sin, did violence to the moral sense which God implanted in their bosoms. The evidence of this is seen in the artifices they employed to deceive themselves and their children. It was not from his own family or tribe that the young Spartan was taught to purloin. To do this was reprobated as a vice, and called theft. But they accounted it no theft to take from their neighbors, their rivals, of other families and tribes. They kept the idea of original and inherent *justice* as much as possible, out of sight. [Perhaps the philosophy of utility, taught by Epicurus or others of a similar school, had instructed them that there was no original and inherent Right.] They magnified, at the expense of original EQUITY and JUSTICE, the circumstantial virtues of patriotism, love of country, and care of kindred. Thus were they forced to strip the vice of its own proper name and garb, and deck it with the robes and the honors of virtue, before they could persuade either themselves or their children to do it homage. By the same process, our own countrymen, at the present day, who abhor murder and rapine at home, are ready to plunder and murder the Mexicans, and cry out—"Our country, right or wrong"—a motto never to be erased from the escutcheon of a people who are not religiously educated in the theology of original, inherent, immutable, self-evident Right.

All moral perversion may be traced to the same source. The *image* of virtue has to be set up at the altar of *vice*. The seductive literature of romance befools and corrupts our youth because it dresses up virtue in the garb of vice, and clothes vice with the robes of virtue: prodigality is made to pass for generosity, lawlessness becomes manly doing, licentiousness speaks in the accents of love, a plunderer is magnified into a hero, and a band of plunderers becomes a gallant company of brave and courageous adventurers; while the christian virtues are belittled by caricature, religion is identified with superstition, meekness transformed into meanness, and all the heavenly graces distorted into the images of some of the vices or foibles that are made to appear like them.

The natural history of all bloody persecutions for righteousness' sake teaches us the same lesson. The godly of all

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ages, must first be traduced, and their virtues caricatured into vices, their seriousness is moroseness, their integrity, stubbornness, their moral principle, bigotry, their moral discrimination of character, uncharitableness, their love of the right, narrow mindednesss—their faithful warnings, vituperation and bitter denunciations—their opposition to wickedness, fanaticism—their zeal, fury—their condemnation of evil doers, malignity and hatred. Until men can first impose upon themselves and others in this manner, no violent persecution against good men can be roused. Not Nero, clothed with absolute power, could exterminate the Christians, or undertake such an enterprize, till they had first been maligned as incendiaries, and then dressed in the skins of wild animals.—Christ himself suffered crucifixion by a similar process.—The multitude were made to believe that he was punished for crime.

The inference we deduce is this. Persecutions are always inflicted as punishments. So far therefore, from proving that persecutors are devoid of the moral sense, they prove the reverse. They are the testimony of human nature, in its worst state that crime *deserves* punishment:—that even wicked men must first persuade themselves and others that their victims are criminals, before they can embrue their hands in their blood. The most horrible of all human excesses, in times of violence and anarchy are *perversions* of the moral sense, and furnish evidence, we repeat it, of its existence and its power. If men did not writhe with agony, under the goadings of conscience, and the faithful reproofs of God's messengers, who assail their darling sins, they would never be disturbed by them. They would never be called to exercise their ingenuity in deceiving themselves and others in respect to their character. It is a deceived *heart* that turns them aside. The defect is not in the power of moral vision—it is not in the absence or the indistinctness of moral objects—it is not in the failure of an appropriate medium of vision—the want of light so far as the intellectual perception of moral truth is concerned. It lies only in that impurity of the medium—that false light—that comes through the intervention of a selfish, a corrupt *heart*. "Out of the heart are the issues of life."

In despite of all these moral perversions, (which confirm and attest, after all, instead of disproving, the power of moral perception in man, the consequent reality of moral distinctions, moral objects, and the necessary light or medium of moral vision, in all men,) there remain, in all nations, in

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all ages, in all sorts and descriptions of men, a sufficient uniformity of moral perception, judgment, verdict, and declaration, to justify the belief that—aside from a selfish heart the moral and religious sentiments of men would correspond together as nearly as do their apprehensions of the truths and objects of the natural sciences in general. In all nations, in all ages, in all languages, in all literature, under all religions, under all philosophies, under all modes of education and habits of training, you shall find, on examination, that benevolence, equity, justice, truthfulness, magnanimity, kindness, gratitude, patience, mercy, quietness, self-denial, heroism, honesty, sincerity, are enrolled among the virtues; while the opposites, selfishness, malignity, injustice, falsehood, meanness, unkindness, ingratitude, impatience, cruelty, asperity, self-gratification, cowardice, treachery, dishonesty, insincerity are included among the vices. Describe a character by attributing to its possessor these virtues, or by recording of him the acts that most naturally express them, and you will find that character to be universally admired. Take for example the character of Jesus Christ, as described by the four evangelists No intelligent heathen can read the narrative without expressions of admiration. The infidel Rosseau, becomes as eloquent in its commendation, as a Massilon or a Saurin. Describe another person by attributing to him the opposite vices, and you will find that character as universally condemned. Procure a new Testament in the Malay language, carry it to the coast of Sumatra, open it at the fifth Chapter of Matthew, the commencement of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, put it into the hands of the first naked Malay you meet on the beach, with his deadly creese by his side, and ask him, if he be able, (as many of them are) to read. Hear him, in his unknown tongue, as he gives audible utterance to the sublime sentiments of the Savior. Mark the kindling glow of his eye, and the new lines of thought on his face, as he reads: then see him, as he lifts up his hands in admiration, turns to you, and asks the book as a boon, or inquires of you its price.—Try this experiment, as the writer has tried it, and then say whether the power of moral perception is not inherent in universal man; whether there is not in the nature of things, a right and a wrong to be perceived, whether the candle of the Almighty is not in the bosom of his offspring, even in their uttermost degradation and darkness. Call back that semi-barbarous Malay. Describe to him the tenure of human chattlehood as it exists in America, describe its workings and its

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features, or point him to the nearest approximation to it that can be found in the European settlements in India. Ask him to admit that such a practice can be just and merciful: that those who practice it are merciful and just men, in harmony with the Sermon on the Mount, and with the golden rule, and you shall perceive by the curl of his lip and the glance of his eye, before he finds words to utter his thoughts, what his answer will be. He demands to know whether he is to regard you as a knave, or whether you regard him as a fool! Perhaps a fair and candid estimate of modern abolitionists, including seceders from pro-slavery churches, would not brand them as fanatical, ultra, extravagant, or disorganizing, for assuming that professors of christianity in America, possess as much light on moral subjects as the Malays of Sumatra and Java. And if they do, they have light sufficient to reveal to them the inherent wickedness of slaveholding.

The degree and kind of moral light here claimed for man *as* man, for barbarians and for heathen, argues nothing against the evangelical doctrine of the entire moral depravity and spiritual blindness of all who are not born again, from above. That blindness lies in the heart, rather than in the intellect—that depravity is of the affections, not in the Moral Sense.—Human depravity is only another term for human selfishness and sin. There could be no such thing as human sinfulness or depravity, if human beings were destitute of the moral perception, the moral light, here attributed to them. Were there no such light, there could be no law, and where there is no law there is no transgression or condemnation. The condemnation of mankind is, that "light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil." "If ye were blind," said the Savior, "ye should have no sin, but now ye say, we see; therefore your sin remaineth."

All this agrees with Paul's account of the heathen world, in the beginning of his letter to the Romans. In connexion with the darkest picture, perhaps, ever drawn, of human depravity and of heathen degradation, he affirms distinctly the presence, in their bosoms, of all the moral light we have described, and insists strongly, not simply on their powers of moral perception, sufficient if rightly improved, for their guidance, but upon the *fact* of their *actual perception*, not only of right and wrong, as between man and man, but of the being, perfections, and just claims of the invisible God, whom they had not seen, as they had seen their fellow men.

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"For the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, *who hold the truth in unrighteousness:* Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, *for God hath shown it unto them.* For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead, so that they are *without excuse;* Because that when they *knew God*, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations and their foolish *heart* was darkened."

This light, the apostle afterwards traces distinctly to their "conscience" and to the "law written in their hearts." With this knowledge of God and of their relations to him, we cannot suppose them to have been more ignorant of their fellow men and of the relations they sustained to them, and they were therefore "without excuse" for their violations of the obligations growing out of their relations. Of course they had too much light to be otherwise than "without excuse" when they were guilty of oppressing and enslaving one another.

And yet, consider that all this light was in the possession of heathen, who are described as "being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperes, back-biters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventers of evil things, disobedient to parents; without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." "Burning with lust one toward another, men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet."

The problem before us, now is, whether these persons, as thus described, were in possession of *so much more moral light* than Christians are in the United States of America, in the nineteenth century, that while the former are to be held "without excuse," the latter are to be excused, so far at least as to leave their Christian characters unimpeached, while committing, upholding, palliating, or apologizing for the most terrible oppressions and abominations ever committed on the face of the earth?

Which side of this question shall we take; in order to escape the charge of extravagance, ultraism, and abusive *vituperation* towards a large portion of the Churches and ministry in this country? Shall we say that they are *not* "without

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excuse," because they have *less* moral light than the heathen whom Paul describes? Will those who now complain of us, be better pleased, if we take the only remaining horn of the dilemma? By what process of logic, by what standard of ethics, by what principles of theology, by what theory of metaphysics, by what system of philosophy, are we to give credence to the Christian professions of such men, (and on the ground of their lack of moral light,) without giving them a rank, in point of intelligence and powers of moral perception, below the most degraded, specimens of heathenism? To what part of the world shall we look, to what period of human history, to what portion of the species, for a class of men whose consciences do not reveal to them the inherent sinfulness of slaveholding? Shall we find them in Africa where a barbarous petty monarch confesses to the missionary William Raymond, his constant dread of the divine judgments for the crime? Shall we find them in our own southern states, where slave holders sleep with fire-arms under their pillows; prohibit by statute, the entrance of the Word of Life to their slaves, and of anti-slavery publications among themselves? Shall we find them among our own population, not a man of whom was heard to question the wickedness of the practice, until it was imagined that northern interests were endangered by the discussion, and until theological defences of slavery were invented, a few years ago? Shall we find them among those theological writers themselves who having labored to prove that God and the Bible are in favor of slavery, resented it, instantly, as an aspersion upon their own characters when charged with being in favor of slavery themselves? Have we evidence that any men's consciences do not condemn slavery, when we listen to the loud protestations of the most bitter opposers of abolition, and of anti-slavery discussion, that every body, at the north is opposed to slavery, and that the slaveholders intend to get rid of it as soon as they can make it convenient? Have we evidence that Churches do not know the inherent sinfulness of slavery, and that they stand aloof from the cause of the enslaved, simply because they need more moral light on the subject, when they resolutely bolt their church and pulpit doors against the exhibition of that light?

Were the people of Egypt in such moral darkness, in the time of Moses, that they did not know the wickedness of Pharaoh, and their own guilt in sustaining him, though his oppressions fell short of chattle slavery, and their own co-

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operation was less distinct and emphatic than that of the republican ballot box? If God did not excuse them, heathen as they were, on the score of their lack of moral perception and moral light, will he excuse professing Christians in America, or shall we so excuse them as to give credit to their Christian professions, on the ground that *they* lack moral perception and moral light? How much below the ancient Egyptians, in point of moral discrimination and spiritual discernment, shall we place our own countrymen, of this nineteenth century, whom we recognize as Christians? Or how shall we vindicate the justice of God, in his terrible plagues upon the Egyptians, and his drowning them in the Red Sea, on account of their tacit support of Pharaoh in his oppressions, if we suppose them to have been destitute of the moral light necessary for their guidance? Does the same God who destroyed the benighted Egyptians, without the light of the Christian Revelation, for their indirect support of a milder form of oppression, receive now and recognize, as his own dear children, entitled to the holy communion of all the faithful in Christ Jesus, those communities who, under the blaze of Gospel light more directly and intelligently support more grievous and intolerable oppressions? "Shall not the Judge of all the earth *do right*"? And while the modern Egyptians, the disciples of Mohammed, are beginning to proclaim from their high seats of power, the inherent right of man, as man, to personal freedom, and the wickedness of slave holding shall it be counted an indication of "fanatical hate" and "Christless zeal" that "tramples down the law of love" when men insist that Churches claiming the name of Christian, shall so far show their faith by their works as to come up to the moral level of Mohammedans?

Such are the outlines of this branch of our argument. We are so "disorganizing"—we are so disrespectful to the Christian Church and the Christian ministry as to maintain that Christians are not inferior to all the rest of the world in their intellectual perceptions of moral truth—we insist that all true Christians have at least, as much moral light as all other men have, and that, consequently they have moral light enough to teach them the inherent sinfulness of slaveholding; moral light enough to guide them, in disposing of the great problem of slavery and emancipation. And consequently, we must refuse to excuse their derelictions of duty on the ground that they want more moral light.

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On a review of the argument, we can conceive of but one way in which it could be overthrown; and that way would be by disproving the reality of all moral distinctions, the existence of a moral RIGHT, and a moral *wrong*. The modern philosophy of Utility, we admit, were it sound, defensible, and trust-worthy, might perhaps enable an opponent of our views to do this. He could then deny the existence of moral objects, of the moral sense, of moral perceptions, of moral light, in any proper meaning of these terms. Or, (retaining or not retaining the terms) he might resolve all moral Right into Utility, or rather, displace moral Right by it: he might resolve fundamental morality into a mere estimate of consequences, duty into expediency, godliness into gain, virtue into advantage. It might not be difficult, perhaps, then, to make it appear that there might be religious professors, religious teachers, and religious communities who (without any moral objects before them, without any organs of moral vision, or moral medium) *might not be able* to calculate consequences, to foresee events, to estimate advantages, to ascertain results with sufficient accuracy and skill to know for a certainty, whether immediate and unconditional emancipation would be safe—whether abolition, on the whole, at the present time, and under existing circumstances, would "do more hurt than good."—It might thence follow that there were Christians and Christian Churches—yea! thrones and principalities in heaven, seraphs, saints, and arch angels, around the throne of God, *who had not light enough* (in the depths of such moral darkness, and without a ray of moral science to guide them) to tell whether immortal spirits should be unchattelized, whether christians should permit christians to read the Bible, whether the purchase of Christ's blood should be sold at auction by the pound, whether Christians should vote for slaveholders to enact slave laws, or for just rulers to abolish them; whether church and pulpit doors should be closed against the advocacy of the claims of the poor, when recognized Christian brethren and Christian teachers are desirous of presenting them. Mere calculations of consequences, (very suitable in their place,) might perhaps, without the use of the higher *moral* powers of the soul, be insufficient to guide any created beings in the disposition of the pending slave question; for He only who sees the end from the beginning and balances all causes and effects with absolute precision, might be able to arrive at satisfactory conclusions, in this way; a method which the infinite intelligence cannot need, and in which no

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finite intelligence can safely confide. Without something beyond this, there could be no moral science, no fundamental principles of morality, no moral law. Moral perception, and *moral light*, properly so called, could then have no place, and American Christians might be as destitute of moral light as they are sometimes represented to be. But if all this were true, then all the rest of mankind would be equally devoid of moral perceptions, which does not appear to be the fact; if Paul's picture of the heathen is a correct one.

We advance another step, in our estimate of the degree and kind of moral Light which all Christians must, of necessity, possess. Hitherto, we have only claimed for them the light which they possess in common with *all* men. We now adventure to affirm (however "uncharitable" the sentiment may be thought to be) that all Christians, nay, that *professors* of the Christian faith, in general, who are able to read, and have Bibles, who have places for public worship and religious instruction, enjoy *more* moral light than what has already been described. Professors of religion, in this country, have this grand advantage over the heathen, on the score of moral light, that they understand, to some extent, the peculiar revelations of the Scriptures. They have read more or less of the Sacred pages, and are familiar with Divine instructions to which the heathen are strangers. And we hope it will not be thought an indication of special hostility and contempt for the Ministry, in this country, when we venture, further, to allege, that the moral and religious instructions they communicate, however defective and even erroneous, in some important particulars they may be, are such as to place the mass of religious professors who listen to those instructions, in a somewhat elevated position, in comparison with the heathen, in respect to the moral light, and the intellectual perception of moral truth, in their possession, and which they might bring to the examination of the slave question, if they were disposed to do so. On this point we shall not enlarge, conceding, as candor obliges us to do, that this argument would be more weighty, if the instructions of the pulpit, in general, were as well adapted to exhibit, impress, and apply the great principles of the Christian religion as they ought to be. Thus much we have to say of professors of religion in general.

We now come to consider what *further* light is to be predicated of all *true Christians*, who have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit. And here an entirely new field opens be-

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fore us, over which we must pass hastily, as we proceed. *Real* Christians, in this country, (slaves excepted) not only have Bibles, but they *study* them. All true Christians are students of Divine truth. It is the truth that has made them free. The great truths of morality and religion constitute their spiritual nutriment. They are the food of their souls, upon which they feast, and grow, and from which their spiritual strength is derived. There are no true Christians who do not love and study the truth, and make advances in their knowledge of the truth. They were convinced of sin, by the power of Divine truth, unfolding to them the nature and the claims of the Divine law. They were converted by the instrumentality of the truth, perceived, and embraced. So far as they are progressively sanctified, they are "sanctified through the truth." And the process is no mystic, arbitrary, or passive one. At every step they examine, they understand, they intelligently and cordially receive the truth and make it the rule of their lives. Now these are the very *same* truths that must guide men, in the disposition of the slave question. If they understand, love, and obey these truths, they cannot help arriving at safe and just conclusions on this, as on all other questions of fundamental morality and religion. Perplexing and difficult questions there may be, in regard to ceremonies and outward forms, where a critical knowledge of language or a minute acquaintance with local circumstances and history may be necessary in order to ascertain the facts. And there may be obtruse and difficult questions of metaphysical theology. Not so, in respect to plain questions of justice and mercy between man and man, and where the main facts cannot be disputed nor misunderstood. The man in America who knows least of the facts of slavery, knows enough to dread it in his own case, more than any other earthly calamity that can be described. This knowledge, put by the side of the "golden rule"—the law of equal love to our neighbor is sufficient data on which to settle every important question of duty respecting the slave. Do as you would be done by, and all difficulties will vanish. The political question, the Church question, we readily settle here. Imagine yourself, your wife, or your child, in slavery, and the whole problem is solved. Nothing more is wanting than this. It is too simple to admit of hesitancy or debate. If the truths of religion cannot guide men here, they can guide them no where. The man who is not taught by these truths the inherent sinfulness of slave holding, the

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duty of immediate and unconditional emancipation, the duty of pleading the cause of the oppressed, the duty of executing justice between a man and his neighbor, the duty of delivering the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, or the duty of choosing just rulers who will do this; the duty of having no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reproving them—the man, I say, whose knowledge of divine truth does not teach him these simple lessons, can have little benefit from those truths in disposing of any other subject. We cannot conceive that these truths should illumine the consciences and transform the hearts of men, without showing them their duty in respect to the slave, especially, when, as for many years past, the subject is pressed upon the attention of all who do not stop their ears. The truths of religion constitute its light and its power. They are nothing distinct from the *principles*, the *doctrines*, the *testimonies*, the *statutes*, the *commandments*, which are to guide, govern, and protect christians. But if they cannot guide nor guard nor govern them on the simplest and yet the most important practical moral questions, what becomes of their light, and where is their power? Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in Burmah, whisper it not among skeptics and scoffers at home, that the great principles of the Christian religion cannot guide even those who earnestly study and truly love them (as all Christians do) on great and yet simple moral questions which men *not* Christians, all over the world, including even the heathen, have been able, with singular unanimity, to decide—to decide too, in accordance with truth. [For in the present argument we have to do with those who admit, nay, maintain, that this universal decision of the human conscience against slavery, *is* in accordance with truth.] What then are we to say of such declarations as these—"The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul: the testimonies of the Lord are *sure*, making wise the *simple!* The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, *enlightening the eyes!*" "Wherewith shall a young man cleanse his way? By taking heed thereto, according to thy *word*." "I am a stranger in the earth, hide not thy *commandments* from me." "Thy testimonies, also, are my delight, and my *counsellors*." "The law of thy mouth is better to me than thousands of gold and silver." "Thou through thy commandments, hast made me wiser than mine enemies, for they are ever with me; I have more understanding than my teachers, for thy testimonies are my meditation; I under-

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stand more than the ancients, because I keep thy precepts." What mean these declarations, if they do not mean that those who love and study Divine truth shall be guided and protected by it? Vain boasts, all of them if true Christians are in moral darkness, on questions of fundamental morality and religion—groping their way, not knowing a man from a brute —"waiting for *more light*"—before they can decide questions already mastered by infidels, by Mahomedans, by the heathen!

Christians are men of prayer. They pray constantly, "Lord what wilt thou have me to do."—And God promises to give them wisdom, liberally, without upbraiding—What shall we make of these promises, if Christians are still groping in midnight, on the plainest of all moral subjects?

Christians hold converse with God. They walk with him daily, and he walks and converses with them. They enter into his sympathies and he into theirs—His aims become their aims—his work is their work. He dwells in them, and becomes their life and their light. Their wills are swallowed up in his will. Their God is the God of the oppressed: the refuge of the poor and needy; their Savior in time of trouble. He will arise and set them in safety from them that puff at them. He knows the proud afar off. He will break in pieces the oppressor. Can it be true then that Christians are "in want of more light" on the subject of oppression, insomuch that they despise the oppressed, will not hear those who plead their cause, elbow them off from the walk, cage them up in the negro pew, confederate themselves with the proud, and elevate the oppressor to power? and all for want of better instruction, and because "they want light?" Is it thus that they profit by intercourse and converse with God? Are we ready to dishonor God by admitting that such persons walk, and converse, and sympathise with him, and enter into his aims, and are nevertheless so brutally ignorant as all this?

Christians are "*all taught of God.*" Is this a specimen of his teaching? "The meek will he guide in his way." And is it thus that he guides them?

Christians love God with all their hearts, and their neighbors as themselves. This is true, *not* of a few who have made unusual attainments in holiness—it is true of all Christians. Such, at least, is the general character, the habitual spirit, of each and every one of them.

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What then, is the nature of that love, what its effects—what its relation to spiritual and moral light? "Light comes first in the order of time, to waken love." "Light is in order to love." "Light is the food of love." "Making love chronologically antecedent to light is absurd and impossible—as impossible as that vision should precede natural light." So says Prof., Thome, and in saying it, sufficiently settles the great point at issue.

If there cannot be Christians without love, then there cannot be Christians without light. And all pleas for professors of religion, for Churches and ministers, in favor of their being recognized as true living Christians, while walking in moral darkness—and on the excuse that they only *want more light*, become self-confuting and futile. He that wants light, the antecedent and the indispensible condition of love, must, of necessity, want love itself, and consequently cannot be a true Christian. This conclusion we fairly reach, without going beyond our first definition of light, namely, the medium, consisting of fundamental moral and religious truth, through which moral objects are to be perceived. A person wanting in *that* light, is not yet in a position even to *become* a Christian: he *cannot* possess Love!

But Love (and this was our second definition) is, of itself, and in the highest spiritual sense, moral light: insomuch that he who has this, in *addition* to intellectual perceptions of Divine truth, has in kind all the light there is, in the moral universe; all that the soul of man can receive; all that God can bestow. Let us see what the beloved disciple says, on this subject.

"If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." 1 John 1: 6. "He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now. He that LOVETH his brother, abideth in the LIGHT, and there is *none occasion for stumbling*, in him; but he that *hateth* his brother is in *darkness*, and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes." Ib., 2: 9—11. "Little children, let no man deceive you, he that *doeth* righteousness is righteous." Ib., 3: 7. "Whosoever doeth *not* righteousnesss is *not* of God." Ib. --16.

According to these plain declarations, no man can have fellowship with God, and walk in moral darkness. No man can have spiritual light, while he is selfish—at enmity with his brother. Love secures moral light. And finally, as a

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consequence of all this, no man is more righteous than his actions are. He is not to be credited with having any more love than he has light. Let us look at these propositions, in their order.

1. No man in fellowship with God remains in moral darkness, because, as John adds—"God is light, and in him is no darkness at all." And—"If we walk in the light, as *he* is in the light, we have fellowship one with another." Of course, we shall understand our relations to God, and to one another, with the duties growing out of our relations. What further "light" on moral subjects can we need, conceive of, or desire? Hence, it is impossible, as John affirms, to have fellowship with God, without truly acquiring spiritual and moral light. To profess that we walk with *God*, while we walk in moral *darkness*, is to utter a mischievous and hateful falsehood; a lie. To lack spiritual light is the same thing as to lack fellowship with God, to lack holy love! The excuse set up for professors of religion, for churches, for ministers, who, on vital and fundamental questions of morality and religion, are guilty of palpable, habitual and gross departures from the plain path of duty, as revealed in the relations man sustains to his fellow man—and this, too, in the face of repeated and long continued entreaty and remonstrance, as repeatedly and as continuously spurned—the excuse, we say in such cases, that they "*want light*" when rightly interpreted and understood, amounts only to this, that they want fellowship with God—they want holy love! This is their condemnation, and cannot suffice for their excuse.

They must be recognized as Christians, it is said: "they only want Light!" But what, it may be asked, is the nature of that light which *they* want, being *Christians?* Do they want the light of moral principle? the light of divine truth? the light of Christian doctrine? the light that "comes first, in the order of time, to waken love"—the light that is in order to love"—that is, "the food of love" that is, "chronologically antecedent" to have the *sine qua non*, the previous and essential condition of its existence? If they want *this* light, then they want that which is necessary to make them capable of *becoming* Christians, and it is quite too early to speak of them as *being* Christians already. The thing is "as impossible as that vision should precede natural light!"

Do they want, then, the light that consists in holy love? If you persist in calling them Christians, you claim for them that they have already this light! Yea, moreover, you claim

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for them all that precious light, or intellectual perception of truth, which was essential to their becoming Christians! You say they have both these kinds of light, and yet, you plead in excuse for their derelictions that they "want light!" What light is it, that they still want! In what language shall it be described? From what quarter of the universe is it to come? What further light has the Father of Lights himself to bestow? He has given them the light of divine truth, revealed in their own consciences, in his works, and in his word. He has also given them (for so runs the supposition) the light of holy love! The love of God has been shed abroad in their hearts, by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. They have been brought out of nature's darkness into God's *marvelous* light." God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness hath shined in their hearts, to give them the light of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ!" And yet, hear it, ye heavens, and be astonished, all ye angels that excel in wisdom—they nevertheless "*want light!*" Alas! for them! What shall be done, in their case? Who shall ascend into heaven, to bring down light to them from above? Or who shall descend into the abyss to bring up light to them from beneath? And of what quality and nature shall this light be, that must come in addition to, and in distinction from, Divine Truth and Holy Love? A light that shall reveal to them what Divine Love and Holy Truth are unitedly insufficient to reveal to them, the relations they sustain to their crushed brethren in bonds, with the duties those relations impose! A light that shall tell them, as Truth and Love cannot tell them, whether it is best, on the whole, to lift their heels from off their brother's neck, or to continue treading him into the dust! "They want more light!" Say, where this side the lightnings of the last judgment, can it be found?

If by "want of light" be meant ignorance of the facts of the case, let us be told why the knowledge of those facts is contemptuously spurned aside? The facts are within their reach: nay, they are already known. Were it otherwise, "the cause he knows not," the good man "searches out." The most ignorant, we repeat it, know enough of the facts to know what they would desire, were it their own case.

It may be said that there are degrees of light, and that all Christians are not gifted with it in equal measures. It is admitted that the capacities of men differ, and that Christians have different degrees of that light which consists in love. But the weakest Christian, the veriest babe in Christ, has

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moral light enough to perceive moral distinctions and understand essential human relations and duties. And the most imperfect Christian has that love which is the fulfilling of the law. We speak not of idiots or of insane persons. We speak of accountable moral agents, and it is known that the weakest of these have been found capable of understanding and obeying the truth on such plain moral subjects. Superior wisdom is the common boast of those on whose behalf we hear the plea that "they want more light!" They know too much to be instructed by fanatics and madmen, like Hopkins, and Wesley, and Edwards. It needs not gigantic intellects to arrive at just *moral* conclusions on plain moral subjects which are reached, *not* by calculations of consequences and estimates of advantage, but by the response of a loving heart to self-evident truths.

2. No man can have moral light, or spiritual illumination, in its highest sense, while at enmity with his brother. Partiality and prejudice, which are forms of selfishness, exclude spiritual light. As love is only another name for light, so selfishness is synonymous with darkness. This is that blackness of darkness forever, reserved for the selfish and sinful. And this is all the darkness that prevents men from perceiving and understanding plain moral truths. The most learned and accomplished scholars of our times, men of the most gigantic and comprehensive intellects, stumble and fall on the simplest of all moral questions because the spiritual darkness of selfishness has blinded their eyes. Nothing else can account for their blindness.

3. Love, on the other hand, always *secures* light. It implies the light of Divine truth. It is identical with the highest spiritual life and light of the soul. Hence, Paul says to the Ephesians—"Ye, who were sometimes darkness, are now light in the Lord." And John says to all Christians—"Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." This is that spiritual illumination of which the Scriptures treat so copiously, and which they, every where, identify with spirituality itself, and with spiritual attainment, always representing the *light* of the soul to be commensurate with its *love*. Christians are every where described as those who actually, and as a matter of fact, walk in the way of righteousness; not as those who *would* walk in the way of righteousness *if* they only had *light!* "But the wicked" are those who "walk on in darkness." If love be the fulfilling of the law, it must, of necessity imply, carry along with it or gene-

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rate or secure all the light that is necessary to a clear revelation of what the Divine law requires.—"If the light that is in thee, be darkness," (if the possession of it leaves thee still in moral darkness) "how great is that darkness," and how strongly does it contrast with the light that guides the true Christian! Progression in holiness is progression in light, as the absence of holiness is the absence of light, and hence "the path of the just is as a shining light, shining more and more unto the perfect day." And so the prevalence of holiness in the millennium is represented as the prevalence of light. "The light of the moon shall be as the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, even the light of seven days," so that "the watchmen shall see eye to eye and lift up the voice together." Christians will have light enough to agree in all that any of them will consider essential, when they are all made perfect in love. The apostles contended with each other, and Paul had to reprove Peter, because there was a defect in Christian "simplicity," in holy love. Men's spiritual attainments never exceed their spiritual light. It is only because men are but imperfectly in fellowship with God, that they are but partly illuminated, (according to the measure of their capacities) with the Divine light, and are beclouded by remaining in moral darkness. Just in proportion as men are selfish and hard-hearted, just n that degree, and no farther, are they, or can they be, in moral darkness, in respect to any plain question touching their relations and duties to their fellow men.

On no other principle could Christians be called "the light of the world" or could the propagation of Christ's religion be the diffusion of light. Such is the doctrine of John.

4. And finally, as a deduction from all this, John teaches us that no man is more righteous than his actions are—that men's hearts are never illuminated with holy love, while they continue to want moral light! "Little children let no man deceive you" with a philosophy that thus separates Light from Love! exclaims the loving and sharp-sighted disciple! "He that *doeth* Righteousness *is* righteous!" Not he of whom it may be pleaded that he has Love, but wants Light, and that he *would* do Righteousness, if he only had light to guide him! "If we say we have fellowship with *Him*" (that we have love to God and mankind) "and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." "Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt." Either say of the man who persists in keeping his heel on the neck

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of his brother, that he is a good man and doing a good work, or else say that he is a wicked man, and is working wickedness!

We have now shown, as proposed, what that light is, which every Christian must have, in order to *be* a Christian. Whether any peculiarities in the case of American Christians or professors of religion, should be taken nto the account, in forming an estimate of the light in their possession, is a question at which we have glanced only incidentally, and it may come under review, in some form, when we come to speak, in a future number, of "Come-outism and Come-outers."

NOTE BY PREST. MAHAN.

We welcome to our columns such articles as the above. Our publication is a place in which thinkers are invited to express their thoughts on subjects that need to be discussed, and this whether in all respects they agree or disagree with us. We do not hold ourselves responsible for the truth of all that appears in our columns. We suppose our readers capable of trying thoughts as well as we. We ask them to read carefully what appears, and then having "proved all things, to hold fast that which is good." We make not these remarks because we dissent from what appears in the above article, but to let our readers fully understand the principles on which our Quarterly is conducted. The writer of this notice is alone responsible for what appears in the last and present number, on account of the health of Prof. Finney.

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ARTICLE LXIV.

Solomon's Song.

BY PREST. ASA MAHAN.

"THERE is perhaps no book in the whole Bible," says Prof. Robinson, "which has given rise to such a variety of interpretations, as the Canticles." Of these different modes, however, there are but two that have any extensive currency in the church at the present time. The first is that which has long been current in the christian church. According to this mode of interpretation, the Book is altogether an allegory, the design of which is to illustrate, under the figure of a marriage union, the relations of Christ or Jehovah, to the church, or to each particular member of the same, together with a revelation of the mutual love which connects their hearts together. According to the second mode of interpretation, the Book throughout contains nothing but an inspired description of conjugal earthly love. From both these views we feel constrained, after careful reflection, to dissent. In our review of the book, we shall proceed first to present the grounds of this dissent. We will then state what, as we suppose, its real design, as a part of the sacred canon, is.

As preliminary to the attainment of our object, we will notice, in this place, the enquiry pertaining to the authorship of the poem, and the two principal characters presented therein. Of its authorship, there can be but little rational doubt.—Solomon stands at the head of it as its author, and without the highest reasons to the contrary, its authorship should not be referred to any other individual; nor have any such reasons ever been presented. The united testimony of antiquity, Jewish and Christian also, is in favor of the supposition that Solomon is the author of the Book. On this point therefore, we forbear any further remarks.

Equally manifest is the fact, that the principal characters presented in the work, are Solomon himself, as the bridegroom, and the daughter of Pharaoh, as the bride. On this point also, there is an almost universal agreement among

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commentators of note. That the bride is the daughter of Pharaoh, (the fact that Solomon is the bridegroom, being almost if not quite universally admitted,) is quite evident from many circumstances and allusions which we meet with in different parts of the work itself. For example, in the commencement of the poem, the bride speaks to the daughters of Jerusalem, in language such, as an Egyptian princess, and she, only among the wives of Solomon, would be likely to utter in respect to herself.

"I'm black but comely,
O ye daughters of Jerusalem,
As the tents of Kedar,
As the curtains of Solomon.
Look not upon me because I am black,
Because the sun hath looked upon me."

There are allusions too in the conversation of the bride, wholly Egyptian. In Chap. 6: 12, we have an example of this character. We give the translation of the stanza, from Prof. Stowe in the April number of the Biblical Repository, a translation which any one who will consult the original will perceive to be the only correct one.

"Ere I was aware
My soul was as the war chariot
Of my noble people."

The two words rendered in our translation, "Aminidab," literally mean "my noble people," and cannot properly be made to mean any thing else. Such an allusion clearly marks out the bride, as a princess of a foreign nation, and no less distinctly, as of Egyptian origin.

The bridegroom also, Chap. 1: 9, compares the bride to the horses of Pharaoh's chariots.

"I have compared thee, O my love,
To a company of horses in Pharaoh's chariots."

Nothing could be more acceptable and appropriate, than such an allusion, in the estimation of the bride, were she an Egyptian princess, and nothing more out of place, did she belong to another nation. These citations are abundantly sufficient to settle the question, who the bride is. The two principal characters who appear in the poem, then, are Solomon and his Egyptian bride, the daughter of Pharaoh. If then the poem is, as it is now commonly supposed to be, an allegory, designed to elucidate the mutual love of Christ and his church, the nuptials between a Jewish king and a heathen princess, have been selected for the elucidation of this great

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truth, the most important and precious truth revealed in the scriptures. Now against such a construction we urge the following, to us, insuperable objections.

1. This is a perfectly arbitrary construction, wholly unauthorized by any thing to be found in the production itself, or in any other part of the Bible in respect to it. If this is its design, why have we not somewhere in the poem itself, or in some other part of the sacred volume, some intimation of the fact? This construction has no other basis whatever, than the mere unauthorized assumptions of commentators. That it was not inserted in the sacred canon without some design, they very properly assume; and as they could conceive of none other but that under consideration, which appeared worthy of inspiration, they have assumed for no other reason, that this was and shall be its meaning. Now against any such mode of interpreting the sacred oracles we enter our solemn protest. If such a principle be admitted as valid in this instance, we see not what valid objections can be brought against the principles of Swedenborg, by which a literal, spiritual, and celestial meaning is made to attach to each passage of Holy Writ. Inspiration needs no such expedient as that to vindicate its character before the world.

2. A moment's reflection will convince our readers, that it is absolutely incredible, that such nuptials as those under consideration should be fixed upon by Inspiration for such a purpose, as is here supposed. We put the question to our readers: Is it credible, that Inspiration would fix upon a marriage union between a worshiper of the only living and true God, and a heathen woman, a devotee to one of the worst and most degrading forms of heathenism that ever disgraced humanity, as a proper medium through which to illustrate the most precious truth ever revealed to man, to wit, the union between Christ, or Jehovah and his church? Nothing is more severely condemned and reprobated in the Old Testament than such marriages. Above all others, therefore, would the spirit of inspiration condemn such an act in Solomon, the sovereign of the nation, on account of the resistless influence which his example would exert over the mass of the people. Besides, the union of Solomon with foreign wives is most conspicuously held up, not only as a sin in itself, but as the sole cause of his flagrant apostacy in the latter part of his reign. Neh. 13: 26, "Did not Solomon, king of Israel sin by these things? yet among many nations was there no king like him, who was beloved of his God, and God made

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him king over all Israel: nevertheless even him did outlandish women [foreign wives] cause to sin." His marriage with the daughter of Pharaoh was the first of the series of sins referred to, and the prominent one which led to all the others, and finally landed him in gross idolatry and open apostacy from the worship of the living God. Can we suppose that Inspiration has fixed upon this first act in the fearful drama that followed—an act on account of its relations to the rest, more to be reprobated than any of the others—as a theme at all fitting to illustrate a union so hallowed, so pure, and sacred as that existing between Christ and his church? Human depravity even, never put things more incongruous together. The spirit of inspiration, we hesitate not to say, has never done any such thing.

3. The manifest relations existing between the bridegroom and the bride in this poem, as far as religion is concerned, is also wholly inconsistent with the construction under consideration. Nuptials which would at all represent the union between Christ and his Church, must have their basis in religion, and be hallowed with religious sentiments. Nothing conceivable can be more unlike such a union, than nuptials from which all religious sentiments and allusions shall be wholly excluded. This is pre-eminently true of the poem before us. The name of God even in any form, or the most distant allusion to any religious sentiment of any kind, cannot be found in it. Nothing is more evident than, that in the marriage between Solomon and the daughter of Pharaoh, there was a perfect compromise, as far as the parties were concerned, between true religion and heathenism. Each was to enjoy his or her own religion without let or hindrance from the other, while in all their intercourse with each other, religion in any form was to have no place. Has the spirit of inspiration fixed upon such a connexion as that, as a fit emblem of the union existing between Christ and his Church? God forbid, that such an idea should be entertained by those who regard the scriptures as given by inspiration of God.

4. The sentiments existing between the parties, relatively to each other, in this poem, are fundamentally unlike those existing between Christ and his Church. In the scriptures, Christ appears, to be sure, as the husband, but at the same time, as the infinite benefactor, lord, and protector of the church. The church, on the other hand, yields herself to, adores and loves him, as her benefactor, lord and protector. In this poem the bridegroom as well as, and not less than the

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bride, appears as a mere adorer, overcome by the charms of the other. The union between Christ and the Church is a rational principle, to which impulse of every kind is held in strict subordination. In the production before us, the parties appear as wholly subjected to the principle of earthly love, the creatures of impulse, in whose conduct the rational principle has no place whatever. The union between Christ and the church, has its basis in benevolence and is consummated exclusively for rational, benevolent ends. The union here presented has its basis in mere personal attachment, and is consummated for mere personal gratification. Internal purity, and moral perfection, mutually perceived, is the bond of union between Christ and the church. External charms are the almost if not quite exclusive bond between the parties in this poem. In all its fundamental features, it is a union wholly unadapted to represent that consummated between Christ and the church.

In our general strictures, we have said nothing of particular parts of the production which cannot but be regarded as grossly indelicate. Many, and perhaps all, deeply spiritual minds have found much of the language here presented of the bride towards the bridegroom adapted to express their feelings and sentiments towards Christ. But who would not be more than shocked at the conception of Christ using such language towards the church, as the bridegroom is often in this production represented as using towards the bride?—Whether we contemplate the work in reference to its general features, or descend to its particular parts, we find it wholly unadapted to represent the relations of Christ to his church.

5. We now come to our last and most conclusive argument. If the construction we are combatting is the true one, the Canticles occupy a place in the sacred canon altogether peculiar, a place however no less important than that assigned to any other book of the Old or New Testament. Of its design, all the prophets, and especially Christ and the apostles must have been fully aware, and to that high purpose they must have been all alive. Now on the supposition that the design of the production was to illustrate the union between Christ and the church, how can we account for the fact that no prophet, (all of whom wrote subsequently to the writing of this book) nor Christ himself, nor any of the writers of the New Testament ever make any citations from the book, nor any allusions to it, in any form whatever, either

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direct or indirect? In our judgment such facts can never be reconciled with the construction under consideration. A more unauthorized construction, one more manifestly contrary to reason and palpable facts, we venture to affirm, was never given to any production, inspired or uninspired.

The objections adduced against the allegorical construction of this poem, lie in general, with all their weight, against the supposition that it is an inspired elucidation of *conjugal love*. We freely admit, that this is a theme in itself by no means unworthy of the pen of inspiration. If inspiration, however were devoted to such a theme, it would elucidate it in a form in which it ought to exist, if it exist at all, a union cemented by piety and consummated for a holy and benevolent end. This is, in all respects, the reverse of the form of the principle presented in this book. It is a form of union which inspiration most strongly condemns and reprobates, a union in which piety and benevolence have no place, and the exclusive all-controlling principle of which is, mere worldly impulse. Inspiration surely has never fixed upon such a union, as a proper medium through which to elucidate conjugal love. Nothing more, therefore, needs to be added on this part of our subject.

We have now stated our main objections to the two distinct and opposite expositions given by different classes of commentators, of the poem before us. These expositions have been adopted, because Biblical critics have rightly assumed, that it was not inserted in the sacred canon without a reason, and as they were unable to discover any other than one of those above specified, they have, each class, for itself, adopted one or the other as the only true exposition. As we dissent, and as we judge for reasons abundantly sufficient, from each of these modes, our readers may very properly require us to present some other and more satisfactory exposition. This we will now attempt to accomplish. If we should fail, however, the objections above adduced to the common expositions will remain, in all their force, and we should simply be left in a state of ignorance of the design of the insertion of the production in the canon of inspired writings. We hope that our readers will not be left in this painful condition, but that a satisfactory explanation will be given of the design of the book, an explanation which will reveal a design altogether worthy of the high purposes of Inspiration. In accomplishing this object, we remark,

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1. That the poem contains a real revelation of the attitude of Solomon's mind, and that of his royal bride in relation to each other. In their early union at least, they loved each other to absolute idolatry, and this production reveals the fact in all its naked deformity, just as it is. As such a revelation, it answers the purpose of any other veritable record of an important historical fact.

2. The state of mind here revealed, constituted the first great sin of Solomon's recorded life, and that which led to all the other melancholy and gross abominations which characterized his old age. He sinned, first, in the selection, contrary to the express teachings of inspiration, of a heathen wife, and then in surrendering himself to an idolatrous worship of the woman he had thus unlawfully taken to his bosom. Here also was the "breaking forth of waters" which desolated the latter part of his reign. Hence we remark,

3. That the manifest design of Inspiration, in the insertion of the poem into the sacred canon, was to give to the world a revelation of this state of mind, constituting as it did the first great sin of Solomon's reign, the sin which was the basis and cause of his subsequent apostacy into the grossest abominations of heathenism. Solomon had written a poem in which he had himself given a full and glowing representation of this state of mind just as it was. Inspiration directed its insertion in the sacred canon, as a revelation of that state. There are three great eras in the recorded life of this individual—the period of his wisdom and piety—the period in which he lost his wisdom and piety both, in his love and adoration of "outlandish women"—and that of his open apostacy consequent on those sinful alliances. Proverbs represent the operations of his mind in the first era: Canticles those in the second, and Ecclesiastes those in the last.—Such, as we suppose, is the true exposition of the spirit and design of Solomon's Song, the true exposition of which has been a subject of so much embarrassment. We have been led to the adoption of this construction for the following reasons, among others.

1. Objections absolutely insuperable lie against all other principles of exposition hitherto proposed. This has been abundantly shown in the preceding part of this article.

2. This exposition is perfectly obvious and natural. The book does, as a matter of fact, contain a revelation of Solomon's idolatrous love of "outlandish women." This exposition makes the work a revelation of that melancholy fact.

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In other words, it explains the production just as it is, what all other and different principles of exposition have totally failed to do.

3. In this exposition we have a reason worthy of inspiration for the insertion of the production in the Sacred canon. The sin of Solomon, in thus yielding to such unhallowed indulgences, was a crime in itself of infinite aggravation. Its influence, as developed in his own, and the subsequent history of the nation over which he was appointed of God to rule, was no less fearful. How important that the world should possess a revelation of that sin, just as it was. How becoming the spirit of Inspiration to direct the insertion of the book containing that revelation in the Sacred canon.

4. This exposition, while it is in itself perfectly natural, is also wholly free from those fundamental objections to which other modes of exposition are subject. Much, that is found therein, may, it is true, be applied to express and elucidate the love of the believer to Christ, as well as the nature of conjugal love in its appropriate forms. Very much that is found in the production, however, every one is shocked at applying to the elucidation of such sacred subjects. In our explication both classes of passages have their appropriate place. A mind such as Solomon's never gives utterance to its thoughts on any subject, without adopting many forms of speech in themselves exceedingly beautiful and proper. At the same time, the attiude of his mind towards the objects of his unhallowed attachments was such, that he would not fail to express thoughts and adopt forms of speech perfectly revolting to any pure mind, when applied to the elucidation of subjects sacred and important. All such thoughts and forms of expression have their appropriate place according to the exposition which we have given. Indeed the book is, in all respects what we should conceive it to be, were the design of its insertion in the Sacred canon what our exposition supposes. The common exposition makes Inspiration directly responsible, for the truth and intrinsic propriety of all that is found therein. According to the exposition before us, Inspiration is responsible for no such things. The passion, the unhallowed attachment therein developed, it holds up only as an object of reprobation, just as it does most of what is found in the book of Ecclesiastes. This is just what every pure mind, whatever its theory pertaining to the book may be, cannot but feel ought to be the case.

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5. Solomon's Song, we remark finally, has a very important moral attached to it, according to this exposition. Instead of teaching us, as the common exposition makes it, what that love which constitutes the basis of the marriage union, ought to be, it teaches us precisely the opposite lesson. It teaches us what it cannot be, without a loss of the Divine favor. By our Saviour we are taught, that if we love husband or wife, or any finite object more than Him, we cannot be his disciples. Let any one read Solomon's Song in the presence of those solemn declarations, and he will have distinctly revealed to him a state of mind, into which he cannot come in respect to any creature or finite object, without having other gods before Jehovah.

> "Whatever passes as a cloud between
> The eye of faith and things unseen,
> Causing that brighter world to disappear,
> Or seem less lovely, or its hopes less dear,
> This is our world, our idol, though it wear
> Affection's impress, or devotion's air."

A question demanding a passing notice naturally arises in view of the exposition under consideration, to wit, was Solomon inspired when writing this Song? For ourselves we think not. We suppose he wrote it for his own gratification, and that of the inmates of his harem, particularly that of the daughter of Pharaoh. Inspiration performs no work of supererrogation Solomon's natural powers, and state of mind being given, is all that is requisite to account for the existence of the Song. But as it revealed a great fact in the history of its author, a fact which the world needed to understand as it was, Inspiration directed its insertion in the Sacred canon, to preserve the record for the instruction and warning of mankind.

Such, as we suppose, is the design of the Canticles, together with the lesson which it teaches. If this exposition together with that given of Ecclesiastes in former numbers be received as the true one, then, as we have said above, we have a clear understanding of the relation of the recorded writings of Solomon, to his eventful, and in many respects, melancholy history. In Proverbs we have a revelation of the operations of his mind in the days of his purity and peace: in Canticles, when the love of God was supplanted in his heart by the love of "outlandish women:" and in Ecclesiastes, when the evil was consummated in open apostacy from the worship of the true God.

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Before closing this article, we have one request to present to all our readers. It is this, that they ponder maturely what has been written, before dissenting from its truth. "*Prove* all things; hold fast that which is good." We are not at all insensible to the surpassing beauty of much that is found in this poem. It does not fall in with our present design, however, to descend to an elucidation of particular passages. All that we now propose is to put our readers in full possession of what we suppose to be the true idea in the light of which the whole book is to be explained.

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ARTICLE LXV.

Piety and Philanthropy.

BY PROF. J. A. THOME.

Our present theme embraces two cardinal facts; one is, that in all earth-born religions, and in all hell-born corruptions of the true religion, Piety and Philanthropy have been set forth as irreconcilable antagonisms; the other is that in the Christian religion these principles have been harmonized and conjoined as the two essential elements of one system: and this junction of Piety and Philanthropy in religion we present as not only the peculiarity but the glory of Christianity.

There have been two very diverse ideals of religion prevalent among men. According to one it is a *system of worship*, with its cumbrous rites, its interminable genuflections and rigorous austerities: according to the other, it is *a principle of mercy*, with its tears and its tenderness, with its humane devisings and its tireless benefactions. The one makes religion a thing of forms, the other of feelings—the one condenses "the whole duty of man" into lofty sentiments and sound doctrines, the other affirms it to consist in sweet sympathies and good deeds. The one finds its proud embodiment in the robed Priest; the other points complacently for its exemplification to the good Samaritan. Both claim exclusive right to the Lord Jesus Christ, as their divine exemplar and prophet. Of course these religions must be mutually adverse. Each engrosses the entire ground—each excludes the other. The one is all God-ward, and the other is all man-ward. The God-ward is too lofty to notice the low concerns of mortals, too pure to sit down at meat with publicans and sinners, too deeply absorbed in its devotions to be diverted or disturbed by the cries of suffering humanity. The man-ward is too active to be devout, too busy to pray, has too many irons in the fire of benevolence to bestow a thought upon the worship of the Most High. To its votaries the Sabbaths are a weariness, the solemn assemblies they cannot away with. *They want to be up and doing!* The costly perfume

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which meek-eyed homage sacrifices at the shrine of Divinity, they would sell and give the proceeds to the poor. This suggests, by the way, that these man-ward religionists are sadly unfortunate in their patron saint! Judas the founder of this Eleemosynary system, was a THIEF. Rough language to use in the present connection, where we are speaking of the disciples and apostles of an improved scheme of religion. But peradventure it will appear in the progress of this discussion that this religion—robbing as it does the fanes and altars of Piety to enrich Philanthropy—is nothing better than thieving!

We have then before us two distinct and variant religions. We have designated them, and shall in this article, by the terms Piety and Philanthropy. Piety is the name we give to the religion which is God-ward in its aspect. Philanthropy designates that of the man-ward eye.

The course which we propose now to take, and in which we humbly invite thee, friendly reader, to follow us, is to trace the origin and progress of these two religions, to consider the grounds of their mutual hostility, and to view them united in a divine economy by the fusing energy of Christianity.

The only pure source of religion is Revelation. But proud man rebels against this intimation of his incompetency to fabricate a religion for himself. Why should he, the great discoverer of hemispheres, planets and satellites, the inventer of the arts of civilized life, and the framer of systems of philosophy, be deemed inadequate to the task of devising a scheme of religion? Why should not he, who, with the sufferance of Deity, has usurped the dominion of the elements, who has made fire, vapor, winds, waves, magnetism and electricity the vassals of his imperial will, who has stretched his steam tracks across oceans, pushed them through the rocky hearts of mountains, and suspended them, wire-hung, over frightful chasms and rushing torrents, and who, grander still, from his terrene observatory, pilots the comet as he bickers through the etherial main, and curves the aphelion cape, jutting into the stormy deep of Chaos and Old Night—why should hot he, ascending the awful mount and surrounding himself with thick clouds and thunders and lightnings, write upon tables of stone religion's code? Verily, man has not shrunk from arrogating this most sacred and most guarded of the divine prerogatives. He has made unto himself systems of religion; nay he has not hesitated to take the last step that

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mortals can take; he has framed gods corresponding with his depraved ideals of Divinity.

Man-made religions will be only the reflections or objective forms of ideas previously held, and these will be as the character of those with whom they originate, or by whom they are assimilated. The image of Deity which lies enshrined in substantial perfection in the intelligence, suffers so many distortions in its passage to development through the perverted will and the vitiated sensibility, that it bears at last scarcely a lineament of its original loveliness. To use, with a slight adaptive alteration, the celebrated comparison of Burke—"The ideals of religion passing out of unregenerate minds into practical form, like the rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and volitions, the primitive ideas of the reason undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original directions."

In all unrenewed minds the religious principle will sustain some kind or degree of perversion—differing in different individuals as the general moral tone is more or less depraved, or as its depravity takes some particular type. One whose veneration is vigorous, and whose social sentiments and sympathies are either naturally defective, or are dwarfed by habitual disregard of his fellow men, or are poisoned by a cherished misanthropy, will frame for himself a religion modified by these peculiar conditions. On the contrary one whose veneration is feeble and inoperative, while his social susceptibilities are uncommonly great, will have a religion of corresponding characteristics. And since the majority of mankind, including the enlightened who are unregenerate, are in their moral structure misshapen, or disproportionately developed in some one direction, it will follow that their religion will be one-sided, partial. In one you will see the bodying forth of the God-ward religion; in another, of the man-ward. Veneration, an inborn sentiment, modified by selfishness the grand controller of the natural mind, originates the God-ward religion—a gory system, in which Piety is seen, vampire-like, fattening upon the life's blood of humanity, while "her pinions fan the wounds she makes," till deluded humanity deems the sacrifice a passport to the skies.

It has been truly said that man is "a religious being;" but it has been vainly hoped by such fair speeches to conceal the

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deeper truth that man is *a selfish being*. He is both. In sentiment he is religious—in heart selfish. These are his two natures, which, through a gross misconception of their respective characters and reciprocal congenialities, have occasioned so much perplexity in reference to the true character of man. His religious nature has been to many superficial minds the ground of a fond persuasion that he is not destitute of the principle of true virtue; but unfortunately for these complacent eulogists of human nature, man shares his religious sentiments in common with "devils damned"—he possesses them because he *cannot extinguish* them, any more than he can put out the light of his deathless being.

Man then has a religious and a selfish nature. His religious nature demands or exacts from him services and ceremonies, of the *nature of worship*, due to a Supreme Being. His selfish nature, jealous of its own, stands by to give character, and to prescribe limits, to the exercise of his religious nature. So long as it can control the religious principle, it has no objection to its existence or exercise; it rather prefers them, just as the world prefers the existence of the Church to its extinction, provided it will be conformed to the law of the world. The selfish nature in determining the character of the religious, denies to it entirely the attribute of benevolence, together with all those charities and humanities which flow therefrom. It also prohibits all self-denial for others' good. In a word, it excludes man wholly from the scope of the religious sentiments, save as it makes him their victim. God is not only the Supreme, but the sole object of this religion; and even God is not the object of love. Selfishness will not admit of love at all—in fact it is not capable of it. God is to it the object of *fear*. His righteous law with its awful penalty, his almighty power, his omnipotence, his omniscience, make him an object of fear. Therefore he is an object of worship—selfishness, terrified but unsubdued, presiding over the gloomy rites. Here is the God-ward religion. It is strengthened by the views which a selfish heart entertains of God's position toward his creatures. Selfishness makes a God after its own image, and he is one who regards man just as it does. He is the august enthronement of selfishness. His supremacy he employs in subsidizing to his own aggrandizement all creatures and things. He is an Infinite Exacter. The universe is his estate, the angels his overseers, and men his plantation-slaves. Their groans, tears, blood, their services, sacrifices, and sufferings are but his rightful

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revenue. He exacts every thing—he gives nothing. He is utterly indifferent to the happiness of his creatures; he made them for a far different end—an end which extinguishes the hope of happiness—he made them to bow and cringe in servile homage at his feet! This hideous demonology, baptized with the name of Piety, is promulged far and wide as a holy religion.

To account for the other form, the rival system of religion, we must introduce another principle. Man is a *social*, as well as a religious and selfish being. In his unrenewed state the selfish principle is always present and predominant, whatever else co-exists with it. But while all are characterized by the selfish, all do not possess in full developement *both* the religious and the social. These, as they exist in the natural mind, are at variance, and the stronger excludes or suppresses the weaker. The religious sentiment we have just seen is based upon fear. Now fear "casteth out" love, turns to stone the heart of flesh, and strikes dead those generous sympathies which appertain to the social nature. The votaries of the religious nature will therefore be deficient in the social. They will grow more and more so. Their piety will consume their philanthropy. Those on the contrary who respect their social nature, and cherish the kindly sympathies which bind them to their fellow-creatures, will be strongly averse to that God-ward religion, which freezes the fountains of benevolence and paralyzes the yearnings of compassion. All the man-ward tendencies of their being, emboldened to speak out by the smiles of approval which have ever rewarded their exercise, will testify their unconquerable repugnance to *such a religion*. The religion of Piety thus being repudiated, the social nature will construct a religion for itself, the elements of which it will draw from its own amiabilities and activities. Its religion will be Philanthropy. Man will be the object, sympathy the fulfilling of the law, tender sentiments the creed, tearful sensibilities the devotional exercise, and charitable deeds the sum and substance of holy living. This is the religion of the social nature. True it is a religion without a God; but this difficulty is easily removed, thus—God either regards man, or he does not regard him; if he does not it is futile to worship him, and if he does he will be well pleased with a religion which regards man, and will accept devotion to his creatures as true consecration to himself. Moreover hath not the Lord said—"I will have mercy, and not sacrifice?"

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Thus out of the social nature arises a system of religion, of seemly garb and benignant mien, of melting speech, and pitying heart. This religion however like its rival form, has its limitations in the selfish nature. Selfishness imposes various restraints which materially mar this fair religion. It enjoins loving in word and in tongue, but forbids loving in deed and in truth, save what is indispensable to keep up appearances. Is it not really humiliating, that both these boasted religions, Piety and Philanthropy, should hold their commissions under the seals and sanctions of selfishness, that they should be subject to its dictations, and amenable to its decisions, that they should be the veriest vassals of its dark empire, maintained only to strengthen its dominion and give lustre to its conquests? They are Herod and Pilate, princes in their respective provinces, and rulers in the Holy Land, but both the creatures of a Pagan Monarch.

Let us glance at the progress of these religions in the world. From the nature of the first form we should infer that it would be more likely to prevail among savages and heathen; accordingly, in barbarous and semi-civilized countries, we find the social nature scarcely discernible, and the degraded human creature divided between the selfish and the religious principle, both existing in their grimmest development. Here religion is a concentration of fear, and its bloody altars smoke with human offerings. Where civilization diffuses refinement and brightens the links of the social chain, the other form of religion will appear, and gather about it its votaries—few indeed among the mass of fear-besotted demon worshipers. Even in enlightened communities, peculiar temperaments, and various other circumstances will incline different individuals different ways; those with a propensity to fanaticism will favor Piety, while those given to enthusiasm will naturally fall in with Philanthropy. Usage will influence many; the form which is in vogue will draw to it the mass, at least until by its intolerable abuses they are driven to seek a refuge in the opposing form.

At the period of our Savior's advent the first form of religion held undisputed empire. Paganism and Phariseeism, sustained by Roman arms and Rabinical arts, divided the world. The Jupiter of mythology and the Jehovah of Judaism, were worshiped under substantially the same terrible character—that of the Thunderer. The Priests of the Pantheon and the Temple offered alike the sacrifices of fear. There was worship enough in the earth, but it was devil-

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worship. Love inspired not the bosom of the worshiper: Faith wafted not the incense to the skies: sweet Mercy with her man-ward eye, came not forth from amid the altars, with heaven-sent blessings for the desolate race. There were religionists enough, the world was full of them, but they were such religionists as Cain—they "brought their offerings unto the Lord," and then fell upon their brother-man. It was time for a voice from Heaven to be heard in the high places of worship—"WHERE IS THY BROTHER?"

Christ came, and with that simple interrogatory startled the world. "*Where is thy brother?*" sounded in synagogue and temple. "*Where is thy brother?*" thundered from the Holy City, and rolled over the land, far as the sea of Galilee. "Am I my brother's keeper?" was the indignant response of priest and people. Christ reiterated the question—the devout worshipers rushed from their knees to slay him. He escaped out of their hands. Soon his voice is heard again urging the hated question; Piety is shocked—"he hath a devil." Still he pushes the inquiry; Piety can endure no longer—it drowns his voice in death. He is crucified. Piety pierces his sacred side—with a Pagan spear! Blood divine now flows and mingling with "all the righteous blood, shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, *slain between the porch and the altar*," it cries to Heaven against a religion which blends murder with worship. This one theme may be said to constitute the burthen of the Messiah's teachings. When denouncing his woes upon the Scribes and Pharisees, the charges he brings against them are such as this, "for ye devour widow's houses, and for a pretence make long prayers, therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation;" or this, "for ye pay tithe of mint, and anise, and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith." When the Pharisees were shocked at his performing miraculous cures on the Sabbath day, he announces to them the shocking doctrine that "the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath," and to shock them still more he exclaims "go ye and learn what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice;" and when to crown the whole he concluded "wherefore it is lawful to do well on the Sabbath days," and actually proceeded to perform a work of mercy—"Then" we are told "the Pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him." We shall have occasion hereafter to remark how frequently and earnestly the Saviour in-

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sisted upon this principle in his instructions to his disciples, and how often he rebuked them for their practical violations of it, or amazed them by going out of his way to honor it. The great prominence which he gave to the law of humanity has led not a few to conclude, though erroneously, that the Savior intended to place it intrinsically above Piety. While this does not follow, one conclusion is inevitable, namely, that he meant to place our duty to man only below our duty to God. But to this subject we shall recur again.

Since the Christian era, as before, the pietistic type of religion has greatly predominated over the other, both in numbers and influence. From this we can only except the age immediately succeeding that of the blessed Redeemer. True religion soon degenerated. In spite of the Savior's warnings, the leaven of Phariseeism crept in, and the church became corrupt. The Catholic Church has been the great embodiment of the religion of Piety. It has made God a Moloch, worship a frightful orgy, the gospel ministry a Sacerdotal banditti, and man a hapless victim—doomed if in the Church, and damned if out of it. It has been a religion of servile fear God-ward: while it has been "drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus." Human interests have been swallowed up in the magnificent pomps of a ritual service. The sacrifice of the Church, has been literally and emphatically the *sacrifice of the mass!* The religion of Papal Rome has been Piety propagated from Pagan Rome, with only a change of costume, the scarlet instead of the purple pontificals.

Such was the religion of Christendom up to the period of the Reformation. Since that era there has been a gradual relaxing of the bondage of fear, and human interests have been slowly emerging from the dead sea of spiritual despotism. The great principle which the Reformation called forth from the grave of centuries was—*individual independence, man and his Bible without the intervention of the Church, man and his God without the intervention of the priest.* This principle contained the germ of a new and glorious system—not new either, it was as old as the cross, it was the gospel system. But the principle was yet feeble—it laid off the cerements of the tomb to battle with a world of death. Its appearance among men was like that of Christ. The priesthood, whom it was destined to exterminate, strove to crush it. Even the people, whom it sought to emancipate and exalt, rose in their chains to trample it in the dust. But it lived, and gathered strength.

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Its vital influence began to be felt. One of its earliest fruits was *Puritanism* in England. This resulted in the settlement of New England. This led to the American Revolution; and then for the first time the principles of human rights were nationally announced to the world, and proclaimed so sacred as to be worth dying for, so sacred as to leave, when wrested away, nothing worth living for. From the assertion of human rights there was but one step to the acknowledgment of human interests, and from this directly flows the inference that both the State and the Church should be organized and administered so as to be the most effectually promotive of human well-being. This would work the total subversion of the God-ward religion. Indeed the American Revolution was a religious as well as a civil revolution. Ever since there has been an accelerated progress toward the complete realization of man's rights and interests.

Coming down from this survey to the present age, we alight with a sense of relief, as from a painful flight through lowering clouds and dismal scenes. We rejoice in the spirit of our times—it is the *spirit of humanity*. Human rights and interests are the watchword. Talents, learning and sound piety are enlisted, to an extent and with an intensity unparalelled in any age, in advocating and disseminating these principles. No effort, nor expenditure of means, is counted dear to secure to every living man his civil and religious rights. Life itself has been staked—and the heart's blood freely poured out, in the true spirit of martyrdom. Aye, the ages to come, from their eminences of freedom and faith, where they

"Summer high in bliss,"

will look down grateful upon this Era of the birth-throes of their glory—and pronounce it the martyr-age. Then our Lovejoys and our Torreys, our McDowalls and our Phelpses, will be enrolled among the Martyrs of Humanity.

Man is now the prominent object. To the illumined vision of the age he appears invested with a new and wondrous interest. Stript of his disguises and cleansed of his defilements, the slow accretions of centuries of debasement, he stands revealed—the Image of God! He is but a little lower than the angels. His *name* is dignified with a high association. Formerly it stood—Man, four-footed beasts, and creeping things; now it is—God, Angels, Man! He is a Prince of Heaven in disguise—an heir of an immortal crown.

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His rights are sacred. His interests are the high care of governments—his safety and prosperity worthy the legislation of God.

The *tendency* is to make humanity every thing, to deify man, and call philanthropy religion. *For the first time since the creation of the world, has this been the prevailing tendency.* It has taken eighteen hundred years for Christianity to effect this result. There will be but one grander this side the millennium, the perfect union of Piety and Philanthropy in religion—and that Christianity is destined to accomplish. The present danger is that devotion to human interests will be made the sum of religion. Such is the imminent liability of passing from the gloomy extreme of soulless Piety. Shocked at the discovery that man has been discarded from the hitherto prevalent religion, and glowing with the enthusiasm of the neophyte in view of the illustrious origin and destiny of this Lord of creation, it would be very natural to become idolatrously devoted to him as an object whose worth on the one hand, and whose wants on the other present a double claim to our religious regards.

While we deprecate such a transition from one fatal extreme to another, we nevertheless do rejoice that the tendency of the present times is so strongly away from the religion of Piety. Unloosed from such a fierce extreme, the pendulum may swing furiously by the centre of gravity, and certainly no human arm can stop it, but a mightier power will at length regulate its oscillations within the terms God and Man —Piety and Philanthropy!

We may expect a short reign of the religion of Philanthropy. At present the two forms co-exist. They incline not to coalesce, but to conflict; Each feeling strong, the one in the experience and authority of hoary age, the other in the vigor and heroism of early prime.

We will now consider the grounds of the mutual hostility displayed by these two religions.

The God-ward system we have seen is essentially a religion of *fear*. By being associated with the exercises of religion, fear, under any circumstances a potent passion, becomes omnipotent. It controls the soul, excluding what it cannot subjugate and subjugating what it cannot exclude. It is wholly incompatible with confidence and love toward any being. Whom it does not fear it hates. If those around the Fearer are also the victims of fear, he rejoices; if they are not, he abhors them, for, miserable himself, he cannot endure to see

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others in a fair way to be happy. Hence the disciples of the other type of religion are the peculiar objects of hatred and envy, because they openly renounce all allegiance to fear.

There is another ground of hostility to the philanthropic religion. Fear ever seeks to propagate itself. Its victim, cowering under the awful object, strives to drag others into the same baleful Presence, or failing in this, endeavors to make himself an object of fear. He strikes terror into those beneath him, just as the wretched slave finds a grim pleasure in playing the petty tyrant among scullions. It will hence be seen that the religion of fear must exclude man—save as it seizes upon him to fill all the chambers of his soul with its own hell-torments. This religion has but one passion—fear, but one sentiment—piety, but one act—worship, but one object—God, or rather the Devil.

The man-ward form is on the other hand a religion of sympathy. Of course God cannot be directly its object, since he is not subject to those infirmities which are the special care of sympathy. Indirectly however, he is the object, for, having made his creatures with their liabilities to want and suffering, attentions to human interests must be well pleasing to him, and the scriptures most explicitly teach us that it is so, particularly in those remarkable words of Christ, which conclude thus, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these, my brethren, ye have done it unto me." So far this religion is nominally not without a God; while at the same time *Man* is its immediate and primary object. Its heart, that is its sensibility, is exquisitely tender toward all who are in distress, and it finds occasion enough to exercise its tender feelings. There would certainly seem to be a demand in this world of sorrow and sighing, for such a religion. Accordingly, it feels that it has a mission, that it is called of God, and of humanity too. Here is its sphere—this is its meat and drink. "I mourn for millions" is the motto of this lachrymal religion. It wants no other employment. As for praying, psalm-singing, and such like—they are idle ceremonies. It would enter the solemn assemblies, if it durst, and drive out with a scourge all the sanctimonious worshipers, and disperse them over the world on missions of benevolence. It would convert every sanctuary into a hospital, and make every alter smoke with a bubbling caldron of charity-soup.

It seems unnecessary to add that two religions of such widely opposite principles and measures must be inveterately

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hostile. Their respective disciples must be more bitterly antagonistic than were the Jews and Samaritans. The adherent of the old form sees in the new, a religion without *piety*. With holy horror and words of execration, he accosts the sacrilegious intruders upon the hallowed mysteries of religion,

"*Procul hinc! procul este profani!*
Conclamat vates, totoque absistite luco."

The advocate of the new, sees in the old, a religion without Philanthropy, and straightway denounces it as a doctrine of Devils!

Again, the devotees of the God-ward form have established in their own minds, such an association of ideas in reference to the terms *religion* and *humanity*, as being terms of disagreement, that their devotion to the former produces and perpetuates an indifference to the latter. What their religion excludes, their piety must eschew. With them deadness to the world of wants and miseries passes for absorption in God, the more profound the one, the more perfect the other, and when the petrifying heart becomes 'hard as the nether millstone,' the unearthly being is proclaimed a saint, and canonization crowns the consummation! Now when that which is rejected from the idea of religion, as constituting no part of it, is taken up by another class and made the very essence of it, there must be an intense hostility. Our national history furnishes a forcible illustration of this principle. The idea of liberty, as originally held by our fathers, was *exclusive of the slaves*. In this view both slaveholders (among whom were some of the most ardent advocates of liberty,) and non-slaveholders were agreed. With them liberty and slavery—perfect opposites as they abstractly are—stood in no relation involving incompatibility, inasmuch as they applied to entirely different classes, whose respective conditions, as of right established, they truly denoted. The negroes were destined to be slaves, or at least must be so for the time being; and consequently the declaration that "all men are born free and equal" could not be construed as having any reference to them. Let now an association of men arise, and maintain, upon the principles of our constitution and declaration of Independence, the slaves right to liberty, and, by implication, call in question the consistency of the framers of those documents. There will be war at once. The very fathers of liberty are impeached. Shocking! With what abhorrence will they and their reverential descendants regard the upstart expounders of

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human rights. They will be the first to reject the claims of the slaves. *Their very attachment to freedom* will be the soul of their opposition to the freedom of the negro! In perfect accordance with this representation have been the facts in the history of the anti-slavery movement. There have been no enemies more bitter or unsparing than some of the boldest champions of human liberty.

Such is the attitude of the friends of the two forms of religion at the present period. The Pietists behold the man-worshipers—prayerless busy-bodies—waking heaven and earth to liberate a few millions of slaves—denouncing curses upon the church, 'speaking evil of dignities,' and they regard it all as a most impious assault upon their 'holy religion.' They mourn that Zion has fallen upon evil times. In their deep, self-righteousness, they exclaim—"If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do!" They sigh for the former days when religion was suffered to maintain its holy elevation above human concernments, when it was left to its own loved employments, of swinging censers and saying masses. On the contrary the zealous disciples of the religion of humanity look upon all this as downright diabolism—and in some cases they almost forget their zeal for humanity in their warfare against so monstrous a perversion of religion.

We ask now, where is the hope that these variant religions will ever be united? Is it in their becoming better acquainted with each other? This will but aggravate the hostility. Should they meet to compare notes, it would be but to part with fierce words and fixed enmity. It would be as the meeting of the Prophets, Matthias and Joe Smith. They had heard of each others fame, as prophets of the Lord; they determined upon an interview, they met, they sounded each other's pretensions, they examined each other's commissions. It was a severe scrutiny—prophet proving prophet! At length the investigation closed. Matthias called for Joe's judgment.

"I pronounce you an Impostor" said Joe.

"And I pronounce *you* an Impostor and an arrant scoundrel," retorted Matthias. The interview ended. The Prophets never sought another.

We repeat the inquiry—where is the hope of an alliance between the belligerent systems? We answer—it is in Christianity. It proposes, yea it purposes, to effect a perfect union. The gospel is in theory a scheme of religion in which these polar extremes blend and fuse with equatorial intensity.

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What the gospel is in theory, religion will be in fact; for the gospel is the wisdom of God and the power of God. What it devises, it can and will accomplish. The time will be when the Lion and the Lamb shall lie down together, when Piety and Philanthropy shall meet, when Sacrifice and Sympathy shall kiss each other. To effect this is pre-eminently the *object* of Christianity; and its achievement will be its crowning glory.

The genius of the gospel is both God-ward and Man-ward. This is manifest in all its inculcations and announcements. How beautifully is it set forth in the angelic chorus which charmed the shepherds of Bethlehem the night the Savior was born; "Glory to God in the highest—and on earth peace, good will to men." Piety had gone over the earth, shouting "Glory to God;" Philanthropy had faintly whispered, "good will to men;"—Christianity harmonized both in a sublime anthem, and sent "a multitude of the heavenly host" to teach men how to sing it. The genius of the gospel is seen too in the bi-une commandment, in which with the same positiveness of precept and the same severity of sanction, are enjoined *love to God*, und *love to Man*, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as thyself." The genius of the gospel is displayed with an awful brightness in the Incarnation. Divinity conjoined with Humanity! The Son of God, and the Son of Man! How clearly does this indicate that the religion of which this God-man was the founder, was to embrace *both God and man*. Man alone could not originate it, God alone could not establish it. It was a religion for both—both therefore must participate in its establishment; and accordingly both were represented in the incarnate God. Who would have conjectured that such a religion could ever be perverted into an engine of the most cruel oppression of man under the sacred name of Piety!

The genius of the gospel appears in the double mission of the Saviour; namely, the vindication of God's law, and the salvation of the violators of that law. It is exhibited also in the Savior's actions. While upon him devolved the stupendous work of founding a kingdom, which should ultimately displace all other kingdoms, and spread its dominion from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth; yet it is recorded of him that he went about doing good! It would almost seem to have required two separate beings to have accomplished such very different undertakings, to have carried on at the same time such distinct enterprises. The genius of

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the gospel appears in his wounderful example, in which are so illustriously combined Piety and Philanthropy. What devotion, what heavenly mindedness, what communion with his God in secret places!

"Cold mountains and the midnight air,
Witnessed the fervor of his prayer."

Yet we find him in the highways of the busy world, we meet with him in the market places, we step into the synagogues—he is there, we look out upon the sultry plain and there he walks wearily along, we behold him among the fishermen, we discover him sitting at meat with publicans and sinners, we hear him preaching on the mount and by the sea shore, we find him compassionating the multitude and feeding them, we track his footsteps over Judea, Samaria and Galilee, we behold him pressing upon the woman at the well of Sychar, the water of life, till he forgets his own bodily thirst, and at the grave of Lazarus we find him drowning his own mighty sorrows in the little griefs of Mary and Martha!—How too is the genius of the gospel set forth in the death of Christ. He died for God, and he died for man. He died himself both God and man! Hear him one moment say, "Father forgive them," and the next, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me." And when he gives up the ghost, the darkening heavens and the rending earth attest the partnership of God and man in the awful transaction. The Resurection too, proclaims the genius of the gospel. Although the work is finished, the Redeemer cannot ascend to the "glory which he had with the Father, before the world was," till he has shown himself to his disciples, ate with them, comforted them, chased away their fears, and given them their great commission. And what was that? Go into caves?—Build convents? Climb pillars? Retire from the world, and spend life in pious meditations?—"Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature; and lo I am with you alway, even to the end of time." There goes Christianity over the earth, God-sent and God-attended—the impersonation of Piety and Philanthropy!

But the *teachings* of the Savior deserve special attention. We have already alluded to his denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees for their inhuman religion. The disciples were not a little infected with the prevailing notions of religion, as consisting in worship and austere observances. The Savior did not so much need to set up a system anew—as would have been necessary where there was no religion. It

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was his province—recognizing the existence of a religion, and retaining what was good in it—to add what was deficient. Thus he lays his finger upon the two departments of religion, and says "*this* ought ye to have done, and not to leave the *other* undone." It would be natural and proper however to dwell chiefly upon that branch which had been neglected, and which it was his object to callattention to, until it was incorporated into the hearts and the lives of his disciples as a cardinal part of their religion. This was the precise course which Christ took. In the passages which follow, it will be seen how he runs across the cherished views, and religious habitudes of his disciples, greatly no doubt to their surprise, if not mortification. Religion with him, as illustrated in these scenes, is evidently a very different thing from what religion is with them.

The first passage to which we call attention presents the case of Bartimeus—the blind beggar; see Mark 10: 45–52. We quote from want of room but two verses. "And many charged him that he would hold his peace; but he cried the more a great deal, thou Son of David, have mercy on me. And Jesus stood still, and commanded him to be called. And they call the blind man, saying unto him, Be of good comfort, rise, he calleth thee." Upon this case we remark, that a multitude were accompanying Christ and his disciples on their way to Jerusalem, they were following him with a sort of religious enthusiasm, which shortly after broke out in extraordinary exhibitions, such as casting clothes and branches of trees in his way, and shouting a triumphal pean in his honor. Their religion was at it highest pitch. A miserable beggar, by the way side, cries for mercy. Their *religious feelings* are shocked—it is an intrusion, an annoyance. If he had cried "Hosannah to the Son of David!" and fallen upon his knees to worship as they passed, it would have been most grateful to their devotional frame of mind. But no! the ill-bred wretch cries for mercy. They *charge him to hold his peace.* In their pious indignation they would have trodden him into the earth. Here is man's religion. Now see the Savior's religion. "And Jesus stood still and commanded him to be called." Jesus *stood still*, and made all that multitude stand, arrested the stately procession, not to make some sturdy rebel bow, with bared head, at his approach, but to grant the request of a blind beggar! What must have been the amazement of the multitude, and of his disciples at this violation of the *proprieties* of a grand occasion.

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Our next quotation will be from Matt. 15: 22–23. "And behold a woman of Canaan came out of the same coasts and cried unto him saying, Have mercy on me, thou Son of David! My daughter is greviously vexed with a devil. But he answered her not a word. And his disciples came and besought him, saying, send her away, for she crieth after us." How *could* the disciples be so cruel! It was their *religion* made them so. They feared to have their Lord and master molested. How different was his reception of the poor woman. Theirs was a religion which had no bowels of mercy. His was a religion which overflowed with the yearnings of compassion. Theirs was a religion which repulsed the suppliant in the name of piety—His was a religion which in the name of *pity* gave even this stranger her request.

Mark 10: 13–14. "And they brought young children to him that he should touch them; and his disciples rebuked them. But when Jesus saw it, he was much displeased, and said unto them, suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of Heaven." Here is a still more striking case of contrast between the religion of the disciples and that of Christ. The religion of Piety has a special abhorrence of little children. Its harshness, its haughtiness, its heartlessness induce this feeling. The sweet, joyous, fearless, trusting, affectionate nature of childhood is a dagger in the very soul of Piety.* Hindoo piety, throws children to the crocodiles. Piety nominally Christian, flings them to the world, as unfit subjects for religion. Christ taught his disciples that they must not only receive little children, but become such themselves, in order to possess true religion.

Thus we are presented in the teachings of Christ with three cases representing respectively the very classes which the religion of Piety has always treated with especial neglect and heartlessness, namely, the poor, friendless women, and children. At the first establishment of his kingdom, Christ drew the attention of his disciples to these classes, and taught them explicitly, that by their treatment of them the genuineness of their religion was to be tested. He established a religion in which the poor, the feeble, the helpless, were ever to find a refuge. He transmitted to

*Some time ago, one of these grim-visaged Pietists, seeing some children laughing out their glee, addressed them, with a sternness which almost petrified their little hearts, in the following language—"Children, if you don't repent of that you will be damned!"

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them the same privilege which he had given them in his day —the privilege of calling upon his disciples for help and comfort as they had called upon him. And such has been their understanding wherever Christianity has extended. Ever since blind Bartimeus lifted up his voice for mercy, the wretched poor of earth have been crying, "Disciples of Jesus have mercy on us," and if repulsed, they have cried so much the more. Ever since that woman of Canaan sued for mercy for her suffering daughter, desolate mothers have stretched forth imploring hands for mercy for themselves and their degraded daughters. Alas that the professed followers of Christ should ever have turned away these applicants unblest! But they have. At an early period the disciples of the new faith adopted the very view of religion which Christ had so sterly rebuked in his followers—they came to regard all such drafts upon their *humanity* in the light of spiritual annoyances, of draw-backs upon their piety. *Then* they began to discourage them, and to send away the applicants, not without a rebuke for their obtrusion of their carnal wants and sordid griefs upon *their religious hours*—all this they did IN THE NAME OF GOD! This has been too much the course of things even down to the present time. Christianity has been perverted. Its history, save as we trace it to the retreat of some obscure disciple, or discern its primitive purity in the self-denying life of an occasional individual, is the history of pompous rites, of iron creeds, of ecclesiastical establishments, of the outward and the God-ward. Such especially is Popery, of which, perhaps a more characteristic account cannot be given than that it is a religion of piety, dissociated from philanthropy. Where this system prevails, humanity "withers under the cold shade" of religion. It makes no account of human interests, it repudiates the doctrine of human rights, it tramples on individual conscience, anathematizes freedom of inquiry, frowns upon the spirit of independence, discountenances general education, and forces conformity to creeds and rituals. Its withholding of the Bible and the Cup from the laity is the symbol of its genius; for it is a system of exactions on the one hand, and of withholdings on the other. Its monachism is the living proclamation of its essential misanthropy. Its entire round of observances—in which is its life —is crushing, benighting and degrading to humanity.

The same vitiated form of Christianity has obtained among the protestant churches. While they have combated the grosser corruptions of the Catholic Church, they have

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copied the very principle whence all those corruptions flow—the principle of loveless piety. They have rejected the mummery of her worship, but they have retained its formality, its cold elevation above the cries of human distress. We ask with grief and shame, what has Romanism done more monstrously inhuman than the countenancing and carrying on of slavery, of war? This has been the execrable work of protestant christianity, that too, in the nineteenth century, and in the most enlightened nation of the world! In the name of God and in the name of humanity we must speak aloud against these misrepresentations of Christianity. Where do we see Religion to-day? and in what work is she engaged, in pursuance of the orders of her high priests? See her opening, in the name of Heaven, the sluices of human wretchedness! See her taking the lead in the direst modes of human torture! See her radiant form moving to and fro over the battle-field, beckoning on the embattled hosts, enfuriating man with the passions of hell, drinking in the shouts of the victors and the shrieks of the dying, wading in man's blood, and then after the dreadful work is o'er, behold her opening her venerated temples to return thanks and give praise to the *God of battles!* See Religion sanctifying the African slave-trade, shielding American slavery from the shafts of unregenerate philanthropists, opening her cities of refuge to the slaveholder fleeing from the reprobation of the world, making her altars and shrines the retreats of those who are allowed no quarter by an indignant public opinion, and administering the sacred balm of Gilead to soothe and heal wounds inflicted by the sword of truth! See religion with her own breath, blowing the fires of martyrdom, till the flames crackle around the consuming bodies of men "of whom the world is not worthy." See Religion devising inquisitorial racks, sitting grimly at the wheel, smiling at the cracking of the dislocated joints and fractured bones!

Says an eloquent writer in a late English Review:

"If there is one spectacle more odious than another of all which history presents to us, it is this; to see men practising all the brutalities of war, treading down their enemies, doing all that rage and the worst passions prompt, and doing all amid exclamations of piety, devout acknowledgements of submission to divine will, and professions of gratitude to God. The *pious* soldier carries with him to the battle field, to the seige, to the massacre, not one even of those generous feelings which war itself permits towards a foe. He chooses to

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call his enemy the enemy of God, and kneels before he fights, *that the inexpressible mercy may be granted of cutting his throat!*"

We are constrained to ask where was true Christianity when but a few years since the pulpits throughout this land proclaimed, and the religious press re-echoed—Negro prejudice is invincible? when the editor of a widely circulated commanding religious paper, printed in Boston, could teach, by way of opposition to anti-slavery principles, that *men have no rights*, that they lost them in the fall? When a New England divine, in a public meeting, (an Association of ministers we believe,) could apply the scripture "if thou art called, being a servant, care not for it" to the American slave, and accompany it with the heartless comment "and if he should not care, *why should I care*"?

These are but too humiliating evidences that Christianity has not yet effected, generally, the harmonious union of Piety and Philanthropy. Nor should this excite our astonishment. This is the grand mission of Christianity; and when it is fully accomplished the millennium will be at the door. Christianity is one thing, the Church another. The one is perfect, the other progressive. The Church was indeed designed to be a perfect exemplification of Christianity, but it has not been; on the contrary it has always been imperfect, and for the greater part of the time grossly so. While in every age a few have lived out religion in its purity, embodying its Piety and its Philanthropy, the commanding influences have separated the two elements of religion, and the Church as a whole has been an extremely defective exponent of Christianity. There has however been some progress from age to age. The religion of the Reformers, of the Covenanters, or of the Puritans would not suffice for the religion of the present day. Even the Christianity of a half century ago, with its gloomy dogmas, its bigotry, its sectarian strifes, its persecuting spirit, its intolerance, its deep slumber over prevailing immoralities, yea its participation in them, its destitution of the reformatory, the revival and the missionary spirit, would not be countenanced now. With all that is to be deplored in the present condition of the Church, it cannot, we think be denied that its position is more advanced and its prospects more encouraging than those of any previous period of its history. True, the *peace* of the last century is broken—but we bless God for it, it was the peace of the tombs. True, the *unity* of the great denominations has been disturbed—but we bless God

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for this, it was *ecclesiastical unity*, that foe of Christian union, freedom and progress. True, we have universal agitation, an endless diversity of opinion, and an unheard of boldness in the utterance of thought—altogether forbidding, one might think, the hope of uniformity and co-operation. But we fear not the issue. Time, truth, and He who said to the tempest and the sea, "Peace, be still," will bring a calm; and when the calm does come, it will be a sound and safe one. True, again, there are those who are abandoning the Protestant Church and shamelessly seeking the harlot embraces of Rome —we bless God for this too, they are retreating, borne on the wings of owls and bats, from the dawning light into thicker darkness. True, once more, there are mighty influences in the Church, which are laboring to drag her back into the arms of that ghastly peace and unity from which, like a poor panting fugitive slave, she is making her escape; but we bless God that they are likely to have such miserable success. We certainly envy them not their inheritance of shame, in the coming noon of Zion's freedom and glory. Eighteen centuries of toil and conflict, of battles alternately lost and won, have been spent in bringing the Church where she now stands—where her sons are demanding the universal recognition of *philanthropy as an essential element in religion.* This is the distinction of our times; and it is full of promise. From this proud eminence the Church can never be dragged down, her course is upward. Religion can never more be a system of formalism, of man-contemning Piety.

But how does Christianity propose to effect the union of Piety and Philanthropy in religion? In prosecuting this inquiry we shall see that from the outset Christianity pursues a course wholly different from that of every other system of religion, that this course is the only one which can possibly effect the desired union, that *it* can and must effect it, and moreover that Christianity possesses the very resources requisite to enable her to accomplish this object.

Christianity begins with eradicating selfishness from the heart. This we have seen is the corner-stone of the two opposing religions. Selfishness originally sundered God and man, it has ever been the "perverter of the right ways of God," and so long as it has the framing of religions, it will rob both God and man. Selfishness has always been willing, on the whole that God should be worshiped and dreaded, that his temples should be thronged with soulless votaries. It is willing too that humanity should have its devotees, who will

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"give all their goods to feed the poor and their bodies to be burned," yet without love. Above all, selfishness is willing that the two religions should "bite and devour one another" in their zeal to establish their respective claims. This strengthens her dominion. But selfishness never can nor will consent to their union and co-operation. This would be fatal to her interests. Selfishness must therefore be dethroned and banished. This Christianity does.

It also releases the mind from the bondage of fear, the only principle of the God-ward religion, as constructed by selfishness. No other religion save Christianity has ever declared against the slavery of fear, hence no other has been able to unite Piety and Philanthropy, an impossible thing where fear is. Christianity most effectually breaks this bitter thraldom.

It also introduces into the soul, as the basis of all religious action, the new and noble principle of Love. Here is the fundamental distinction between the Gospel and every other scheme. Love casteth out fear, it beholds God as a Friend, it chooses him as its supreme adorable Object. In Him love sees the Father of all mankind, and at once it becomes the disinterested friend of humanity. Love equally inspires the devotions of the worshiper and sustains the activities of the philanthropist. In both spheres—diverse and remote as they appear from each other—love is perfectly at home. It is a great exhaustless orb whose rays shine both God-ward and Man-ward.

Christianity also reveals to man a God of love. To sustain its religion of fear, selfishness forms a God who delights in sacrifices and homage, but is indifferent to the well-being of his worshipers. The gospel presents a God whose name is Love. The soul that truly apprehends the God of the gospel, can never be imposed upon by a religion of inhumanity.

Christianity also enjoins a piety of love—a worship of love. Her sacrifices are those of a *broken* heart, of praise and thanksgiving, and *before they are offered* she requires her votaries to be at peace with all mankind. "If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there remember that thy brother hath ought against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; *first* be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." Beautiful Religion! When too, the knee is bent in prayer, and penitence asks forgiveness, it is taught to pray, "Forgive me my sins, as I forgive those who sin against me."

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Again we say—beautiful religion! From its altars to its footstools it is redolent of humanity.

Again, Christianity exhibits the august Object of worship as a Supreme Philanthropist. The best friend man has, his tenderest sympathizer, his most patient counsellor, his most generous benefactor is God. To commune with this Being is to become imbued with the spirit of universal benevolence. To worship him is to be filled with compassion for the suffering. Piety cannot burn long in the presence of her God, without rushing away to bless a dying race.

Again Christianity reveals the cross, inscribed with these effaceless words "God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." There, from that dear Cross, shines the humanity of religion! There hangs, and bleeds, and dies, the Incarnate God! Humanity is joint sufferer with Divinity; and it has its full share in the blessings. The Cross is the magna charta of mankind. If ever religion proves traitor to man, and seeks to bury his interests beneath her proud temples of Piety, he can point her to the Cross, and bid her hear those dying words, "behold thy son." Christ came both God and man that by being at once the object of Piety and Philanthropy, he might cultivate simultaneously in his disciples these different principles, and thus give a right direction and thoroughness to their religion.

Finally, Christianity decides the question between the rival religions, and blends them in one, by making Philanthropy the test of Piety.

Such is the religion of the Gospel, and the Gospel has ample power and resources to establish this religion among men. Its power is in the Cross, its agency in the Holy Ghost. He has been sent to "reprove the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment." In the selfish heart he works convictions, thence flows repentance, selfishness is renounced, love is embraced—then the Kingdom of Christ is set up in the heart—then Piety and Philanthropy meet and dwell together.

To maintain this holy alliance, and perpetuate its fruits, provision is made by the gospel for the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the heart, sanctified and adorned for his temple. God dwells with man. This is the crowning provision for saints on earth. Thus taken into sacred union with God, filled with his spirit, the individual is a living exemplification of Christianity. He loves God and he loves man. He is a

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living epistle read and known of all men. He is an acknowledged demonstration of the practicability of Piety and Philanthropy being harmonized in one bosom, and exercised by one being. One such Christian is a great light in the world—a great light in the Church. His influence will be felt till the union which he exemplifies prevails.

But we must express the conviction that nothing will complete the alliance of Piety and Philanthropy, but a *mighty revival of pure religion.* This must be the work of the Holy Ghost, in answer to prevailing prayer; for this great triumph of Christianity must especially redound to the glory of God. The era of revivals, say some, is past. If they mean, revivals of precisely the type of the last great series, we shall not dispute with them. Such revivals are not the demand of the present times. They well met the wants of that day. They exploded certain errors pertaining to divine and human agency, human ability, the freedom of the will &c., which almost nullified the power of truth, and palsied the arm of the Church. They made religion a practical reality. They transformed man from a machine into a moral responsible being. They imparted to Christianity a vitality and a vigor to which it had been for many gloomy centuries a stranger. The great truth which they settled, and settled forever, was this—man may, if he will, repent, believe, and be saved. It was the question of salvation which was then involved. To push this issue now, with the expectation of seeing renewed the revival scenes of twenty years ago, would we think result in utter disappointment. Who believes for a moment that similar revivals could now roll over the Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist and Methodist Churches as those did? We shall have revivals, more powerful and glorious than any yet recorded, but they will be somewhat different in character. Here opens too wide a field for our present survey, though a more interesting one could scarcely be expanded before the Christian mind. We can only say briefly that the first achievement of the revivals to come will be the awakening of the Church to the almost total want of the element of humanity in the prevalent religion. This will be a discovery overwhelming in its character; it will excite a horror only less than that which would be felt should it be known that the Church had actually apostatized from God. It will be followed by profound humiliation and repentance, by bitter tears and groanings that cannot be uttered. The toleration of slavery, of war, and of other giant crimes against humanity will

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be confessed as sin of the darkest hue. The attempts now made by General Assemblies and other religious bodies to maintain a dignified silence on these questions so vitally involving human interests, will be viewed with unmitigated abhorrence. The most advanced position yet taken by any Churches in the benevolent movements, will be regarded as little better than a mere mockery of the claims of humanity. The missionary enterprise, as hitherto conducted will excite surprise and sorrow. The annual contribution of funds, the number of missionaries annually sent, and the measure of missionary zeal existing among the Churches, will in the light of a truly awakened Christianity be facts perfectly astounding. What startling revelations will be made when the Holy Ghost shall open all eyes and all hearts to the frightful wastes of human wretchedness over which the Church has been slumbering! The work of the Spirit will begin at the sanctuary; and the digging in the wall and the exposure of corruption will be awful. But the result will be glorious. Christians will awake to their duties. They will feel that upon them rests the Savior's last commission. They will go forth. They will carry salvation around the globe. They will be boldly aggressive upon the empire of darkness. They will do and dare to the death for God and humanity. They will elevate the standard of holy living and self-denying action. They will reject all compromises with sin; they will repudiate all worldly policy; they will renounce ease, spurn proffered honors, bid adieu to the circles of self-righteous moralists, and go into all high ways and hedges with the invitations and compulsions of the Gospel.

But finally—the union of Piety and Philanthropy in religion will be the glory of Christianity. It will be the full display of the genius of Christianity. It will vindicate it from the charge of being a system of intolerable exactions and crushing burthens, as all other religions have been. What a beautiful representation of essential Christianity is contained in the saying "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." Well may the Savior enjoin upon mankind to "go and learn what this meaneth"—this peculiar feature of his religion. Other religions cry—"Sacrifice, sacrifice, blood, blood," but his cries "Mercy, mercy."

> "Jesus' blood through all the skies,
> Mercy, free, boundless mercy, cries."

It will be the glory of Christianity that it presents to the world a religion, one province of which is to watch over and

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promote *human interests*. It will be the glory of Christianity that it blesses the world with a humanized piety and a sanctified philanthropy; both entirely different from the exercises which have borne these names, both emanations from the same principle, love, each aiding the other, piety sustaining philanthropy, and philanthropy kindling piety; piety bearing to the throne of grace the causes in which philanthropy is toiling, and philanthropy rejoicing, in the midst of her labors, in the assurance that piety is no longer dooming her to hell, but is bidding her God-speed, and praying for her largest success. It will be the glory of christianity that she furnishes man with a well balanced religion, not all piety, not all philanthropy, not a part but the whole. One-sided religions have been the curse of the world.

Great changes and improvements, amounting almost to a remodelling of the entire fabric of religion will be the effect of the evangelical alliance of Piety and Philanthropy.

The *creeds* will undergo important modifications The systems of doctrine now in vogue may be substantially sound, yet far from perfect. The cast of one's theology will be as the cut of his religion. A religion of fear engenders one set of doctrines—a religion of sympathy quite another. Both contemplate the same object, but through the medium of entirely different mental states. The priest and the young lady gazed together upon the face of the moon, and saw there two objects inclined toward each other, the priest thought it must be two steeples bending together, the young lady was quite sure it was two lovers kissing. Many Christians, and Christian teachers, are so exclusively God-ward, that neither the Bible, providence nor grace reveals to their minds any doctrine but that of the Divine Sovereignty. A minister of this stamp once arose to make some remarks in a prayer meeting, where spirits of congenial mould were gathered, and after a pause, broke the awful silence by saying in an indescribably solemn manner—"GOD IS A SOVEREIGN." If his Bible had presented that single truth in characters of blood on every page, invested with the pictorial pomp of Sinai, engraven by an awe-struck seraph, it could scarcely have more fully possessed his mind, or burned more deeply into the hearts of those who heard it. On the other hand there are many of such different views and habitudes, that this truth scarcely takes hold upon their sensibility. Both occupy extreme positions. A well balanced religion, with one foot upon piety and the other upon philanthropy, will afford a stand-point from which new or

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greatly modified views will be obtained of God, of his character, his attributes and relations. From this point the doctrine of God's Sovereignty will be seen in an unspeakably interesting light.

Great revolutions will be effected in *Church Government.* Ecclesiastical polity will be framed in accordance with the sacredness attached by Christianity to human rights and interests. The Christian more than the Church, the individual above the organization, government for the man, not man for the government—these and such like will be the recognized principles of a better dispensation. Upon these church government will be constructed. Of course every element oppressive, or tending to oppression, will be rejected. Great ecclesiastical establishments, leading to consolidation, hierarchies and high church judicatories, involving spiritual despotism, will be utterly repudiated. The plea of spiritual lordship, namely, that the people are not qualified to administer the government of the church (the very same which secular tyrants use) will then sound strange enough, especially as coming from men who have declaimed so loudly against the Pope for withholding, *on precisely the same ground* the Bible from the laity.

The *institutions and ordinances of religion* will be very differently regarded and observed. The Sabbath for example, will indeed be viewed as the Lord's day, but in another sense from what it now is. It is Christ's day; "the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath." *His observance* of it ought to be an authoritative guide to his Church. With him it was a day of mercy as well as of worship—of good deeds as well as of prayers and praise. All the ordinances of our religion, while they are external in their mode, have a close relation to the genius of Christianity itself, and have much to do with both our piety and our benevolence.

Again, the *sanctuary services* will be regarded in a new light; that is, not as being exclusively of the nature of *divine worship*, (as the common phrase is,) but a blending, in the most affecting forms, of Piety and Philanthropy. How remarkably are these united in every part of public worship. **Praise* is the sweet incense of happy hearts rejoicing in God

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* Since penning this sentence, we have met with a quotation from Jeremy Taylor in which the reader will perceive a striking coincidence of sentiment. "God is pleased with no music from below so much as in thanksgiving songs of relieved widows, of supported orphans, of rejoicing and comforted and thankful persons. This part of our communion does the work of God and our neighbors, and bears us to heaven on streams made by the overflowing of our brother's comfort."

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and celebrating, in the harmonies of holy song, "his goodness and his wonderful works to the children of men." *Prayer* is mingled sacrifice and supplication. Its lips are full of ascriptions and full of petitions. Piety and Philanthropy flow out together at the throne of grace. Amid the prostrations of devout homage, the yearnings of compassion have a large place. Though God is there, needy man is there too. The poor, the afflicted, the suffering, the oppressed, the neglected, the obscure, the tempted, the bereaved, the benighted are brought to the mercy seat; and the minister is their mouth-piece. The sick upon their couches, the lame, the blind, the dumb, the dead in sin, are laid at the Savior's feet, that he may heal them. *Preaching* is of God and to man, vindication and invitation. It is the ascension-gift to humanity. "To the poor the gospel is preached." "Preach the gospel to every creature." Preaching is the message of Philanthropy from the lips of Piety.

When such views of sanctuary worship shall prevail, christians will be ashamed of the scruples which they have so devoutly cherished in regard to the *proprieties of the house of God.* What resistance has there been on the part of church members to temperance and anti-slavery lectures in the church, especially on the *Lord's Day;* what an annoyance to the devotional feelings of many if the claims of the poor are urged from the sacred desk, if the contribution-boxes pass round for the missionary cause, if the political duties of christians are enforced, or if war is rebuked.

Lastly, the *range of pulpit discourse* will be indefinitely extended and diversified. Public sentiment has curtailed the preacher within exceedingly barren limits. Ministerial usage has prescribed its bounds to gospel exhibitions. Individual ministers assign to themselves still narrower ground. We knew one preacher who dwelt almost entirely upon the Final Perseverance of the saints, another who confined himself chiefly to what he loved to style "the unfrustrable decrees of God," another whose favorite gospel announcement, as above stated, was "God is a Sovereign." But such cannot be called *gospel preachers!* To the minister of Christ, "the field is the world"—his themes are as wide as the claims of God and the interests of mankind. All immoralities, all crimes and vices, all sins elementary and 'organic,' all oppressions, private and political, all fightings, personal and national, all wrongs local and general, all moral enterprises, all reforms, all institutions common and 'peculiar,' and

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all subjects, from *divine sovereignty to human freedom*—the two walls of fire fixed by Jehovah within which all truths and topics lie—are the themes of the gospel minister.—"Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, the minister must think on these things," yea and speak out upon them!

Many over the land are just now crying out for more "doctrinal preaching!" We echo the call "more doctrinal preaching;" but we cry out for more *practical* preaching too. Bible doctrines and Bible duties go together. Let them not be disjoined in the pulpit nor in the church. Let us have the whole gospel—Christianity in its glory, the sublime embodiment of Piety and Philanthropy.

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ARTICLE LXVI.

History of the Doctrine of Original Sin.

From C. G. Bretschneider's Manual of Dogmatic History.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, BY PROF. H. COWLES.

Since Gen. 3: contains nothing respecting the origin of entailed sin, it should not surprise us that no part of the Old Testament makes any use of this chapter, and that it speaks only in general of the sinfulness of man without any particular explanations of the subject.

Moreover death is presented throughout the Old Testament as occurring in the course of nature and not as a consequence of Adam's sin. First during the exile the Jews began to reflect upon the origin of moral evil, and to find historically the source of sin and death in Gen. 3. Probably their reflections on this subject were prompted by the teachings of Zoroaster.*

Yet were their opinions not more remarkable for being few, than for being harmonious. Sirach does not indeed deny the sinfulness of men, (chap. 8: 5,) yet he knows nothing of original sin, but believes that men are not born morally ruined, (chap. 10: 18, 19, & 51: 13) and holds to free will, (chap. 15: 14–17.) The fall he passes over, (chap. 18: 1,) in

* The doctrine of Zoroaster concerning the fall, bears some resemblance to the Mosaic account, yet differs from it very widely. According to Zoroaster, heaven was pledged to the first human pair on condition that they persevered in virtue, and would not worship any demons. At first, they were virtuous; but Ahriman (Satan,) caused a demon to suggest to them evil thoughts, as e. g. whether himself was not the Creator of the world. Through their belief of this lie, the first pair became like Ahriman, wicked and wretched. They went out to hunt and found a white goat whose milk they ate and found it very stimulating, but it was a poison to their bodies. The demon now gave them fruits which they ate and thereby lost a hundred fold of blessings and reduced themselves to a single one.

Immortality, Zoroaster does not ascribe to the first pair. Of original sin and its punishment, death, he says nothing.

[Note.—Zoroaster, the celebrated reformer of the doctrines and worship of the Magi, flourished among the Medes probably from B. C. 650 to 600. His writings are comprised in the Zendavesta.—Tr.]

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total silence, and regards death, (chap. 17: 1, 2,) as something original and natural.

On the other hand there appears in his book another view of this subject according to which the beginning of sin and of death are derived from Eve;* a proof that opinions on this point among the Jews were various. Proof of this may be seen also in the manner in which Philo and Josephus† understood the Mosaic passages.

The author of the Book of Wisdom also recognizes no inherited sinfulness, originating from the sin of Adam. He does indeed mention the fall of Adam, chap. 10: 1, and affirms, chap. 2: 23. ff, that death originated through envy of the devil; but he understands by the term *death*, not the death of the body, but the eternal death of the soul.

We have moreover no ground to regard the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin as the common doctrine of the Jews before the time of Christ, and therefore to explain Rom. 5: 12. ff, accordingly; for although this doctrine may be found at an older period in the writings of some of the Rabbies, yet it does not follow with certainty that Paul already had it.‡

On this point also, opinions in the most ancient christian Church were not very harmonious or settled, and yet some points were held by the church with sufficient firmness. Origen says expressly that the church taught that every human soul has free-will so as to choose either good or evil, but that the church doctrine did not determine whether the soul is propagated by the course of natural generation, or what its mode of coming into existence may be. This view is con-

*Chap. 25: 24. "From the woman is the beginning of sin, and through her (or *it*,) we all die." These words obviously look towards Gen. 3, but it remains uncertain in what way Sirach derived sin from Eve's transgression, and whether the original Greek words, translated, *through her*, or *through it*, refer to "*Eve*," or to "*Sin*." The former is more probable.

† Josephus knows nothing of original sin, but on the contrary affirms that the posterity of Seth were in the highest degree virtuous and wise *by nature*. He derives from the fall not even one evil affecting the whole race, and attributes to man before the fall only this, that God had pledged to him a happy and *long* life, wholly free from evil.

‡ Wetstein in his commentary on Rom. 5: 12. ff, has quoted a multitude of Rabbinnic passages to show that all men have sinned in Adam and therefore must die; but these passages do not prove all they are adduced to prove, and are for the most part too recent to be used in explaining Rom. 5. 12. ff. To prove this to be the sense of the passage it must be shown that the term "sin," as used by Paul denotes universal sin-guiltiness, which sense of the term, however, is forbidden by the expressions, "sin entered the world," "sin is not imputed," "not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," and "where sin hath abounded," &c.

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firmed by the writings of the oldest christian teachers, which contain nothing about Augustine's original sin and its propagation. Hence John Damascenus (died A. D. 760) does not reckon this among the doctrines held by the Church.

With the same harmony of sentiment the oldest church fathers ascribe to man freedom of will in the exercise of which he can choose either good or evil; and it should be especially noted that they ascribe this to him, not as he may perhaps have been before the fall, but as he is still,* and that they find herein the ground of the occurrence of sin, inasmuch as they distinctly notice the fact that God is hereby vindicated from all blame in view of the occurrence of sin in the race.

Hence they know absolutely nothing of the dogma that man is born contaminated with a deadly original sin and is obnoxious to damnation by reason of his very nature; but on the contrary they represent new-born infants as pure, guiltless, and pleasing to God.†

* The passages on this point are superfluously abundant. See Recognitions of Clement of Rome, III. 23, V. 8, IX. 30. "For no other reason does God punish the sinner either in the present or future world, except because He knows that the sinner was able to conquer but neglected to gain the victory."

Justin Martyr in his Apology to the Roman Senate, page 71, represents it as impious to deny the freedom of the will. He recognizes the fact that without freedom there could be no retribution, in a passage where he says—"If the human race have not the power by free choice to fly from the base and to choose for themselves the noble and the good, then are they guiltless of their own deeds however done. But that they can of free choice either walk uprightly or barely wrong, we show thus."

Origen, in a passage in his commentary on Romans chap. 3, in which he applies the term "law" used by Paul, to the moral law of the reason, and illustrates the waking up of the consciousness of law in developed minds, says, "Now they are under the law who are passing the period of life in which they already have the power of discerning moral good and evil. Surely God has given to man all those sensibilities and powers of voluntary action, which are requisite in order to strive successfully for virtue, and has moreover added the faculty of reason, whereby he may know what he ought to do and what avoid. These qualities, accordingly, God is found to have given in common to all men. But if man, having received these endowments, shall neglect to walk in the way of virtue—man to whom nothing has been wanting from God—then will he be found to be wanting himself in the use of those faculties which have been given him by God."

†Shepherd of Hermas, Book 2d, command 2; "Have simplicity of heart and thou shalt be innocent; and be as the infant who knows nothing of that malice, which destroys human happiness."

The same author, Book 2, similitude 29, in a passage which describes the mountain of the blest, says—"The twelfth mountain which gleams in brightness is the abode of those who have believed as pure infants do, whose sensibility no sin has ever reached, nor do they know what sin is, but they have always continued in purity. Men of such a character without any doubt shall dwell in the kingdom of God. For all infants are held in honor before the Lord and hold the first rank."

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In respect to the fall of Adam, all the early fathers did not indeed hold precisely the same views, yet they all differed widely from the later church writers. Looking to the freedom of the will for the intrinsic ground of the rise of sin, they regarded the agency of demons as pre-eminently its extrinsic occasion and exciting cause. In the Recognitions of Clement (1: 29,) the dominion of sin over the race is by no means derived from Adam, but from the fact that in the eighth generation after Adam, the righteous and men leading a life of angels, enticed by the beauty of the women, had indulged in illegal and promiscuous intercourse, whence human passions became so impetuous as to draw all the race thenceforward into sin. This first sinning generation which begat the giants, was wholly swept off by the flood.

The golden age, moreover, was not located in Paradise, but comprised all the first eight generations; for then, even wild beasts obeyed man, and old age did not come on before the thousandth year of life. This long period of enjoyment and repose seduced men to forget God as the great Giver of good, and to withhold from him all further reverence, and consequently they became fearfully depraved. Hence God suffered physical evil to attach itself then to human nature, for the purpose of bringing man back again to himself.

Just so little also do the Homilies of Clement know (see Homilies 3: 22,) of the fall in consequence of eating of the tree of knowledge. On the contrary, they, like "The Recognitions," derive sin from that ingratitude which originated during the golden age, and from the influence of angels and demons.

Justin Martyr also derives the origin of sin from the passions of men together with the influence of demons. He

See Athenagoras on the resurrection of the dead, pg. 55.

Clement of Alexandria, [Pedagogue I. 2,] affirms that all men have the endowment of reason (logos) which would lead them to truth and goodness. As well among Christians as among the heathen, the wise who follow the light of reason do not sin intentionally, and if sin does occur, it quickly passes over. All men are, by reason of the circumstances of their rational nature, the beloved of God. Clement does indeed say (Pedagogue III. 12,) "Only the Logos himself is sinless, for to sin is inborn and common to all; but after sinning to recoil and return appertains not to every common man but to the good alone;" yet he expresses in this passage only what occurs customarily, not what must occur of necessity, and he ascribes to every man the ability to be a *good* man. Hence also his affirmation that the heathen become blessed through philosophy—the christian, through faith in Christ.

See also Origen's homily on Jer. 14, 10. "Every man is endowed with reason; but though all men receive the gift alike, yet in the case of some its moral power grows stronger, but in the case of others it dies away."

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does indeed in several passages mention the transgression of Adam, but does not suppose that either moral ruin or guilt passes over from that transgression to subsequent generations. On the contrary he holds that each man brings eternal death on himself whenever he sins as Adam sinned. With him also idolatry is the greatest of sins.

Theophilus teaches that man was not yet perfect in Paradise, but must first become so, and thus be transformed to the likeness of a God and ascend to heaven. The tree of knowledge and its fruit were not noxious, but imparted knowledge; yet Adam, being still a child, did not know how to use this knowledge right, and hence God forbade him its fruit. After the transgression of this command, God drove man out of Paradise and subjected him to death, that under the influence of labor and sorrow he might again learn obedience, so that he might be restored to Paradise, after the resurrection. By sin, man brings on himself death, but by virtue, he attains eternal life. But the devil enticed Eve in order to introduce idolatry.

Athenagoras comprises all sin in idolatry, and this was introduced by the demons. These demons he supposes to have come into existence through the intermarriage of incarnate angels with females of the human race.

Clement of Alexandria speaks in very strong terms against the opinion that man is by his birth, sinful and condemned, (Strom. III. p. 556 ff.) and seeks for the origin of all sin in the freedom of the human agent—a doctrine which he held most firmly. The Mosaic account of the fall and of paradise, he explains as an allegory to show how sin originates in the case of every man, and affirms that the devil i. e. the old serpent, seduced Adam into idolatry, and does the same yet continually with other men, by which means they incur the punishment of spiritual and eternal, but not of temporal death. Since death results from ignorance and irreverence of God, so on the other hand does immortality ensue from knowing and revering him. He was very far from concurring in the opinion held by later theologians that Adam before his fall was perfect, but that he and with him all the race lost by his fall their concreated perfection. He affirmed on the contrary that Adam had, as all men now have, the capability of becoming perfect, only they do not use it aright.

Just so little does Origen know of any original sin. He not only defends the free choice of men between good and evil in the remarkable passage (peri archon III. §2 ff.) and very explicitly

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in other places; but he also recognizes the fact (Contra Cels. IV. 45) that men differ widely by nature in a moral respect, and that so long as man is in childhood and knows not the distinction of moral good and evil, his offences against the letter of the law are not reckoned against him as crimes.

He does indeed in some passages appear to affirm that the whole race sinned in, and with Adam; but it should be considered, first, that we have those passages only through the faulty Latin translation of Rufinus who often makes Origen speak after the style of the later theology; and secondly, that according to the explicit illustrations of Origen and the scope of his whole system, he could have meant only this, that souls might be punished for the sake of Adam because they were born as men on this earth through him.

In consequence of his opinions concerning the pre-existence of souls, he held that the souls of all men existed originally in a heavenly paradise, and that the fall consisted in this, that they, having already sinned, came into human bodies and were born as men upon this imperfect world—a state most opposite to that of the heavenly paradise—and consequently were far from God, in whom alone is all life. He considers the fall of Adam as a type of that which shall occur again in the case of every human soul, and by the term "death" he understands not bodily but spiritual death. In his cardinal passage (Com. on Rom. 5.) he says that the Apostle Rom. 5: 12, understands by "*world*," the children whose reason is yet undeveloped, and by "*all men*" those whose reason is developed, upon whom sin comes, since even the righteous experience from it at least some slight contagion, and well may sin come upon all men, inasmuch as the birth of the soul has already been to every man a source of moral pollution (Commentary on Matt. 15,) but not of spiritual death which befalls only "the many." The sins, however, which are actually committed are propagated not so much by natural birth as by example and education.

The discussion of Archelaus with Manetes also teaches (chap. 29,) that because the divine law written on the heart of man was not at all times sufficiently present to all minds, therefore God caused a transcript of it to be made by Moses. By this means the power of eternal death was broken so that it does not have dominion over *all* through sin; for it affects only those who do not obey the law.

On the other hand, Lactantius understands the scripture narrative of the fall more in the spirit of the African church,

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yet he ascribes to all men, even the heathen, the ability to do good if they only will it, ("since it is the easiest thing possible to be virtuous if men only choose to be,") and he represents all men as having by their natural constitution an impulse towards wisdom; but he also teaches that sin first originated through the fall of the angels and the procreation of the giants who introduced idolatry; that idolatry is the chief sin and the fountain of all evil, and that the death which results from the fall is not that of the body which is natural and necessary, but that which the scriptures call "the second death."

Ireneus also affirms that we lost the divine image and became subject to death in consequence of Adam's disobedience. God had given the first man immortality, who however held it as a natural and inherent quality of his constitution, and was in this respect like God. This author defends the infliction of death on the ground that God ordained it out of his compassion for man, to prevent his sinning forever.

But he not only recognizes the fact that already some among the fathers had kept the law, (Her. IV, chap. xv., sec. 3,) but he also ascribes to man, after the fall, the freedom of choice between good and evil, and says expressly that the guilt of those who do not make themselves better when God calls them to repentance, is wholly their own.

On the contrary, Tertullian, led on by his Traducianism, is the first who not only derives from Adam the death of all men as a result of the fall, but also affirms—(a thing of chief importance,) that a moral ruin descends from Adam by ordinary generation, because the devil has introduced into human nature an element which is utterly hostile to the reason. This he does indeed regard as something foreign to human nature, a perversion of the work of God, for Satan is in his view "an interpolator" as to the works of the Deity, yet is every human soul afflicted with it by consequence simply of birth in the line of Adam's posterity.

Yet while he regarded this something which comes upon us from Adam as hostile to reason, he did not conceive of it as absolutely fixed and changeless, but he believed that the children born of pious Christians who had discarded this anti-rational element were by virtue of such a birth already better off than the heathen. Still he held (with a less degree of faith however,) that the entire nature of man is ruined by means of this entailment from Adam. His faith in the latter point must have been of the weaker sort, for he

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not only ascribes to all men after the fall freedom of will and represents new-born infants as guiltless, but he expressly reserves to man ability for good along with this element which conflicts utterly with reason.

Cyprian, that great admirer of Tertullian, has left behind for us no very specific explanation of his views. We may well suppose that they coincided in all important points with Tertullian's. He only remarks that Adam by his fall lost the image of God and became subject to death, without explaining his views any further. He appears to have believed that no guilt passes over from Adam to his posterity as "the contagion of death" does, inasmuch as he expressly mentions only the latter, while he represents new-born infants as being guiltless.

To this doctrine of the first three centuries, the subsequent church fathers universally adhered. They affirmed the freedom of the will—a view which Augustine also maintained in his earliest writings; but they all agreed that the death which originated from Adam is physical mortality, according to the view of Ireneus, Tertullian, and Cyprian. Such were the sentiments of Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil the great, Gregory Nyssen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and Hilary of Pictavium. But the Greek church fathers come no nearer to the views of Tertullian than this. Chrysostom expressly resists the opinion that in consequence of Adam's sin any thing is imputed to us. Indeed he held that before Adam's fall, and while as yet mortality had not attached itself to his constitution, his passions were all in due subjection; but subsequently, in consequence of physical mortality, the impulses and passions became more powerful. These were obviously his views, inasmuch as he yet maintained that man can control these passions by the power of his rational soul.

The Latin church fathers, Athanasius, Hilary, and Ambrose, derived from Adam's sin not only physical death, but also, with Tertullian, a seed of evil, a contagion of sins, which attached itself to human nature in consequence of the fall.

We might perhaps be compelled to leave the doctrine of original sin in this indefinite form, if a controversy on these very points had not arisen in the fifth century between Augustine and Pelagius. Pelagius, a British monk, and his pupil, Celestius, denied that we have lost any thing earthly by reason of Adam's sin, or that this sin can be imputed to us,

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or that an original sin came into existence through Adam. On the contrary they maintained that death is an original and natural arrangement, and not in any sense a punishment of sin; that the divine image has not been lost, but that the race are to this moment born as guiltless and as truly possessed of free will as Adam was by his creation; and that we can call Adam the author of sin in our race only in view of the fact that he sinned first, and also seduced others to sin by his example; for the allurements and the imitation of bad examples are the only fountains of sin.

Augustine, bishop of Hippo in Africa, opposed this opinion with the utmost energy, and in opposition to it taught not only that physical death results from Adam's fall, but that the whole race thereby lost utterly both the divine image and free will; and that in their stead there now came into action a decided and resistless propensity to sin which has its seat principally in the soul and is perpetuated by ordinary generation. This original sin which shows itself in vicious desires, or the preponderance of sinful inclinations, brings down eternal damnation upon man although he may have committed no sins, and hence must also involve infants from their very birth. Original sin must thus affect the whole race because it is imputed to all men as a sin, causes them to lose the grace of God, and subjects them to the power of the devil. Hence no unbaptized person can be blessed. Original sin and death may have been imposed upon us by God as a punishment for Adam's sin which is imputed to us. That with these views Augustine must hold that men since the fall are wholly incompetent to any good, have utterly lost free will, and are enlightened and converted only by an act of Divine grace, was as natural as it was opposed to the common doctrine of the earlier Christian teachers.

Neither the doctrine of Pelagius, nor that of Augustine, coincided entirely with the views of the ancient fathers. For the later Greek fathers had at least explained physical death to be a consequence of the fall, and some of them had admitted a growth of moral deterioration originating from it; but it is also true that the Latin Church fathers had at least taught no imputation of Adam's guilt, no loss of free will, and no damnation of the race, already experienced in consequence of this birth from Adam. Pelagius and Augustine were both in the wrong when they each maintained that he had only followed the already established Church doctrine; but the greater wrong was on the side of Augustine. We

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must pardon him however for this because, being ignorant of the Greek language he had never read the Greek fathers.

Although in the Council at Ephesus A. D. 431, his theory gained a transient victory over Pelagius, yet it did not in consequence find the least access to the Greek Church, and even in the Latin Church, it secured no permanent approval. On the other hand the system of the so-called semi-Pelagians, which in truth was not new, but had been hitherto the common doctrine, made itself very soon the controlling sentiment in the Latin Churches. Especially some monks at Marseilles, (for example, Cassian, Faustus, Vincent and Gennadius) taught that there does indeed result from Adam a certain moral weakness and inclination to evil, which is coincident with the infliction of physical death upon the race, but is not to be regarded as a punishment for Adam's sin. They also taught that man has evermore a free will, and can at least commence his own moral improvement in his own strength, but that he then needs grace to carry the work forward.

The Scholastic writers followed universally in the wake of these opinions. They soon held original sin to be a mere condemnation of Adam's posterity to physical death, yet without innate guilt; next they held it to be a mere depravation of the lower faculties of the soul; and finally, as something negative, viz: a want of original perfection which as a supernatural gift of God, had wrought out the divine image whereby human nature might itself remain wholly unimpaired.

The vigorous controversies between the Dominicans and the Franciscans concerning the stainless conception of the virgin Mary, the doctrine of good works, and the consequent disputes carried on with the Reformers, were the reason that the doctrine of original sin did not maintain a more definite form in the Catholic Church down to the time of the Reformation; yet the Catholic Theologians adhered for the most part to Semi-Pelagianism.

Luther in his work on the bondage ofthe will (de servo arbitrio) taught the strongest form of Augustinism. The defense of his own yet stronger opinions led Flacius to affirm that original sin is the *substance* (not merely an attribute or quality) of man—an opinion which was rejected in the Formula of Concord as a Manichean error. Calvin also and his followers held the strong form of this and of its kindred doctrines, and must of necessity have held it in accordance with their views of predestination. It also passed over into the

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symbols of the Reformed Church although Zwingle had previously expressed milder opinions on these points.

But the Anabaptists had already denied the existence of original sin, and the Socinians and Arminians utterly rejected the doctrine and maintained the views of Pelagius which in modern times had found a growing number of friends, of whom we might name Eberhard, Steinbart, Stark, Cannabich, Wegscheider and others. Already had Michaelis, Morus, Starr and Reinhard claimed that man after the fall has yet the power of knowing the good and admitted as the results of the fall only a wayward preponderance of sensuality over the reason. Doderlein, Eckermann, Henke, and Ammon considered this preponderance, which they called *innate vitiosity*, as something natural, not as something which springs up accidentally. Hence accrued what is called by Kant a radical evil in human nature.

The system of De Wette, which borrows the philosophy of Fries, and considers freedom as the intelligent action of a free will, represents the innate ruin as something originated in time, inasmuch as he locates it in this, that the intellectual conception of the rule of life is in part not a pure determination of the will, and in part it has not always, in point of power and vivacity, equal weight with the sensual conception of sensual motives, so that the rational free will cannot always determine according to its own taste. But the conscience, which always presupposes that we should and can withstand the sensual impulses, imputes to us this weakness as a free choice and as guilt.

Still farther do the Schelling school recede from the views held by the Church and taught in the Scriptures.

Since the doctrine of an inherited sin and sin-guiltiness is not grounded upon the New Testament, one need not restrict himself to the popular views of the unscriptural expression—original sin; and the same might be said of the extravagant representations made of the greatness of the moral ruin thence resulting and of the incompetency of human nature for good. Much more must we notice, in accordance with the New Testament teachings on this point, that the Divine law is written on the heart of man, and that this can and should prove efficient for his moral training. But together with this we must also observe that according to the Scriptures, no man continues wholly free from sin; that no one performs all he should and that the hindrances to moral development which arise in the social and religious life from sin,

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perpetually strengthen the dominion of sin; whence they become exceedingly perilous as well to the temporal as to the eternal welfare of man. This view of the doctrine will have a good influence, on the one hand, not to crush the spirit of moral improvement by means of the disheartening notion that human nature is utterly ruined, and on the other, to make us keenly alive to the power and ruinousness of sin. This will guard us against a dangerous confidence in our own good estate; will arouse us to the consequences of sin in reference to distant generations; and thereby will instill a yet stronger abhorrence of sin, showing the necessity as to the state of religious institutions for the moral and physical education of the people and the danger of moral indifferentism; will make useful the value of that redemption from sin, which is prepared through Jesus, and will lead us to appreciate the love of God; and consequently will awaken us to a yet more hearty obedience to the institutions of God for our salvation and to the great truths of the Gospel.

[The following note may be convenient for reference to some of our readers, and the translator therefore inserts it here at the request of the Senior Editor. It respects the period when the several ancient Christian fathers flourished whose testimony is cited by our author.]

Barnabas, Hermas, Clement of Rome, (author of the Recognitions and Homiles.) Ignatius and Polycarp, are supposed to have been contemporaries with at least the last of the apostles. Justin Martyr died A. D. 164—Origen, 253—Theophilus 181—Athenagoras flourished about 177—Clement of Alexandria died 222—Archelaus flourished 228—Lactantius died in old age 330. Ireneas lived A. D. 97—202. Tertullius lived 466—220. Cyprian died A. D. 258. Athanasius, Cyrus of Jerusalem, Basil, the great, Gregory, Nyssen, Chrysostome, Jerome, Ambrose and Hilary, all lived in the fourth century. Augustine, Pelagius and Celestius flourished in the early part of the fifth.

The subsequent writers alluded to by Bretschnider belong to the era of the Reformation, or to yet more modern times.

F.

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ARTICLE LXVII.

Sanctification.

Essay XVII, Princeton Theological Essays.

BY PRESI. ASA MAHAN.

THE essay above named was originally published in the Biblical Repository and Princeton Review in 1842. At that time we did not receive the Review, and as a consequence never heard of this article until about a year since, when we obtained the volume of Essays in which it was re-published. This will account for the fact of its not receiving an early notice from us. Nor do we notice it now, because it presents any new aspects of the subject, but because an article on such a subject which does not receive a formal answer will be regrded by its authors and abettors, as unanswerable. This essay also, presenting, as it does, the Old School side of the question, completes the circle of argumentation against the doctrine of Sanctification. Our readers are already in full possession of the arguments of the New School on the subject. They will, therefore, not be uninterested, in being put in possession of the arguments and objections proceeding from the opposite School. Without any further preliminary remarks we proceed at once to our task of introducing our readers to this hitherto unanswered essay.

The introduction comprising between three and four large and closely printed pages, is wholly occupied with an *argumentum ad invidiam.* After affirming that "contrary as this doctrine is to Scripture and experience, it is too deeply radicated in man's selfishness, not to find apologists and advocates among the conceited, the enthusiastic, and such as are unaccustomed to an impartial scrutiny of their own hearts," they go on to give a professed succinct history of the doctrine. "A kind of perfection," they say, "has been claimed for Greek and Roman sages, for Hindoo devotees, for Mahommedan saints; and even for the savage warrior, smiling in death

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at the impotent efforts of his enemies to extract from his agonized nature the shriek or the groan of suffering." Pantheists, we are further informed, prior to Christ, and heretics of the apostolic age, such as the "Nicolaitans and Simonians, held similar views." The Gnostics of the first and second centuries and the Manichaeans of the third," together with new Platonists of Egypt "held substantially the same views." Again, "Manichaeus, Preccilian. Evagrinus, Hyperboreus, Flavineus and the Menalians of Syria, were Perfectionists." So also were "Pelagius and Celestius, in the fourth century, who denied the innate sinfulness of the human heart and consequent necessity of efficacious grace in its removal." The following is the keystone of the arch. "The primitiye Quakers, the French prophets, the Shakers, Jemima Wilkinson, Joanna Southcott, and the great body of mystics in every communion, held to perfection in this life, as the attainment of the privileged few." In respect to the manner in which the doctrine has been introduced into Congregational and Presbyterian churches, we will permit the Princeton brethren to speak for themselves without abridgement.

"It is not till lately that Perfectionism has been professed within the pale of Congregational and Presbyterian churches. By our fathers it was accounted heresy, inconsistent with the express testimony of the Scriptures, contradictory to Christian experience, and subversive of the entire scheme of the Gospel. But, in consequence of certain Pelagian speculations concerning moral agency, human ability, and the divine influence in sanctification—errors that have become extensively popular—individuals, once reputed most zealous for revivals of religion have been led to join Pelagius and other kindred spirits, in their views of the attainableness of perfection in the present life. Such, as we believe, is the philosophical origin of Perfectionism, as held by the professors at Oberlin and their theological friends."

How fully prepared the readers of this essay must have been, by such an introduction, for a *careful* and *candid* examination of the subject to be examined in the remaining portion of the article. How much like the spirit of Christianity is it, to place a Christian opponent in such an attitude before the public, ere he has had any opportunity to speak for himself, or an attempt has been made, to state or answer any of his arguments. We have studied morality in a different school from our brethren at Princeton. Without a violation of conscience *we* could not, upon such principles, argue any question of Christian doctrine. Here we may also be permitted to ask our brethren, why they did not present the opposite view of the subject? While they have informed their readers that the doctrine of Perfection has been the standing faith of Heathens, Mahomedans, and heretics in christen-

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dom, why did they not also present the well attested fact, that it was also the standing faith of the holiest men in the Christian Church, from the time of the apostles down to the Reformation? They tell their readers, that this doctrine was held by the Nicolaitans and Simonians of apostolic times. Why did they not inform us, that it was held by Barnabas, Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, in common with the church, generally of the same age? They tell us, that it was held by Pelagius and Celestius of a subsequent age. Why did they not inform us, that the same doctrine was also held by such men as Athanasius, Chrysostom, Ambrose and Turtullian of that and previous eras? They might have presented the doctrine in the very words of Athanasius himself, one to say the least, of the most influential of all the Christian fathers since the apostles, to wit, "there have been a great many holy men who have been free from all sin." While they have referred us to the great heretic Pelagius, as holding this doctrine, why did they not inform their readers, that in a trial of this same individual for heresy, before a council of Bishops at Jerusalem, a council denominated by Augustine himself "the Holy council of Jerusalem," this same doctrine was pronounced, by said council, the orthodox faith of the church? In the year 1844. we published, in the Oberlin Evangelist, a series of essays designed to establish the fact, by an appeal to the writings of the ancient fathers, that the doctrine of Entire Sanctification was generally, if not universally the received doctrine of the primitive Church, for the first three or four centuries of the Christian era. We know of a distinguished minister of the Presbyterian Church, who affirmed, that he would give the subject a full examination, and then prove our position false. His articles have never appeared, nor has any one attempted a reply to what we then wrote. We shall not, in this place, present the passages we then cited, but, as an example of what the primitive church did hold on this subject we will present our readers with a few passages from a single author, Macarius. He was born about the year 301, and died 391. For many years, he presided over one of the colleges and schools of the prophets. Moshiem says of him, that he "undoubtedly deserves the first rank among the practical writers of his time, as his works displayed, (some few things excepted,) the brightest and most lovely portraiture of sanctity and virtue."

HOMILY 5.—"Concerning those things that happen to Christians in time of prayer, and concerning the degrees of perfection."

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"As another reason the light that was shining in the heart has disclosed a yet more inward, profound and concealed light, insomuch that the whole man being absolved in that sweetness and contemplation, was master of himself no longer, but was to this world as a mere fool and barbarian, by reason of the superabundant love and sweetness of the hidden mysteries; so that the person being for that time set at liberty arrives at such degrees of perfection as to become pure and free from sin. But after all this grace has withdrawn itself and the veil of the adverse power has come upon him; it appears in part, however, and he stands in one of the lower bounds of perfection. And one that is rich in grace, at all times, by night and by day, continues in a perfect state, free and pure, even captivated with love and elevated to God."

HOMILY 10.—"Concerning the treasures of Christians; that is Christ and the Holy Spirit variously exercising them toward perfection."

"Whoever therefore possesses with himself this heavenly treasure of the Spirit, he fulfils in this Spirit all the righteousness of the commandments and the complete practice of the virtues, without blame, and in purity; moreover without compulsion, or difficulty. Then let us beseech God and seek diligently unto Him, and pour out our supplications before him, that he would freely grant unto us the treasure of his Spirit, that we may be enabled to walk in all his commandments without reproof and without blemish and fulfil all the righteousness of the Spirit in purity and perfection.

It behooves every one therefore to oblige himself by force to petition the Lord, that he may receive the heavenly treasure of the Spirit, so as without difficulty to be able to perform all the commandments of the Lord, blameless and in purity; which before even with violence he could never do. For being poor and destitute of the communication of the Spirit, how should it come by such spiritual possessions? But the soul, which by faith and much patience, hath found the Lord, the true treasure, produceth the fruits of the Spirit and performs all the righteousness and commandments of the Lord, which the Spirit hath commanded, in and by her, with purity, and free from blame."

HOMILY 14.—Concerning the truth and excelling of the Lord; and how it is tempted by Satan and obtains deliverance.

Ques.—Is the natural concupiscences rooted out by the coming of the Spirit?

Ans.—Sin is rooted out and man receives the original formation of Adam in his purity. Through the power of the Spirit he comes up to the first Adam; yea is made greater than him.

"Christians are clothed with the Spirit and are at rest. And the war ariseth from without, they are inwardly fortified with the power of the Lord, and are no more concerned for Satan. Just so when he tempts our Lord in the wilderness 40 days; what real hurt was it that he could approach outwardly his body? For within was God. In like manner Christians, though outwardly they are tempted, yet inwardly are they filled with the Divine nature, and so nothing injured. These degrees if any man attain to, he is come to the perfect love of Christ; and to the fullness of the Godhead. But he that is not so, still inwardly retains the man. He is one hour refreshed in prayer and another in a state of affliction. And there springs up in him both light and darkness, and rest and affliction. And that whatever gifts he hath; for many of the brethren have had the gifts of healing and revelation and prophecy, however not having attained to perfect charity, the war came upon them and they fell. Indeed, if any one comes to perfect love, he is forever after bound and captivated by grace. But if any one make but small advances towards this, he is in bondage to fear and to war and to falling."

The reader will notice the following characteristics of the above extracts. The writer does not, at all, speak of the doctrine of perfection, as a question in controversy in the

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church, but as an admitted truth. In a similar manner do the ancient fathers generally speak upon the subject. Now if our brethren in Princeton, in holding up this doctrine, as the belief of enthusiasts, fanatics and heretics in all ages, had also informed their readers, that it was the received faith of the wisest and best men in the church from the time of the apostles down to the Reformation, if while they informed us that it was held by the French prophets, they had also confessed that it was the doctrine held by the immortal Fenelon of the same nation, and by him demonstrated to have been the standing faith of the wise and good in the church in all preceding ages, they would simply have done justice to a doctrine which they have attempted to bring into general contempt, by an unrighteous appeal to prejudice. Taking the facts as they are, how evident is it that the idea of Perfection, instead of being a delusion held only by a few, has in fact, from the beginning been one of the great ideas of universal humanity, an idea held alike by Heathen, Mahommedans, Heretics and Christians. Such an idea surely deserves our profound respect whether ever realized in actual experience or not. Having induced, or attempted to induce in their readers the desired attitude of mind relative to this doctrine, our brethren now proceed to a direct argumentation of the subject. In doing this, they propose the following method:

"We shall begin with noticing the principal arguments, which are commonly adduced by perfectionists of different descriptions, in support of their views of this subject. We shall next exhibit direct evidence of the sinful imperfection of the heart of the saints, in this life; and lastly, we shall show the great practical importance of the doctrine for which we contend, in opposition to the error which it controverts."

In their reply to the "arguments of the perfectionists," they begin with the commands of Christ, and thus state our argument on this point:

"The command of God requires perfection, is one of their arguments. Answer. It is doubtless true, that the Most High does command us to be perfect, and to enjoin anything less than perfection, would be inconsistent with his own purity, and those eternal principles of rectitude, according to which he governs the universe. The law expresses his feelings towards moral objects; but it leaves wholly undetermined the question, whether his rational creatures will acknowledge, or reject his authority. His command, in any instance, neither supposes that it will be obeyed, nor implies any insincerity in him, provided he foresees that it will not be obeyed. The contrary supposition would be incompatible with some of the most undeniable facts of revealed religion. Does the divine command to be perfect, prove that some may, or will obey this righteous precept? Then, for the same reason, the divine prohibition of all sin in mankind equally proves that some of them may pass through a long life without a single act of transgression."

We are weary of correcting our brethren on this one point. We have never in any single instance, argued from the fact,

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that all are required to be perfect, that therefore some will be. The argument which we do urge, (we repeat what we have often asserted and re-asserted, and what our opponents seem determined not to know, that we have asserted at all,) is this: The fact that God requires perfection of all, proves not only that some, but that all *may* render the required obedience. This is the only form in which we have ever argued the question from the mere commands of God. Why will not our opponents in their replies to us, consent to meet the argument just as we present it?

There is another and different form of the argument based upon the commands of God, which our opponents universally refuse to look at, the very form on which we avowedly place the chief reliance. It may be thus stated: There are certain circumstances and connections in which a precept is never given, when obedience to it is not expected. Christ, for example, in the sermon on the mount, utters the command, "Be perfect," and then referring to the same precept among other of his sayings adds, "Whosoever therefore heareth these sayings of mine and *doeth* them, shall be likened unto a wise man who built his house upon a rock." "And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man who built his house upon the sand." Now we affirm, that our Savior never did issue a command, and then immediately, and without any qualification, affirm that any one who should hear that command and obey it should be saved, and every one who should hear and disobey it should be damned, when he as peremptorily required all men to believe, as a revealed truth of God, that no man ever did or will obey that command for a single day, or hour, or moment of his life. What would that be but teaching the doctrine of universal damnation? We cite but one passage more, together with our comment upon the same, which has been long unanswered before the public:

"1 Timothy vi: 13, 14—"I give thee charge in the sight of God, who quickeneth all things, and before Jesus Christ, who before Pontius Pilate, witnessed a good confession, that thou keep this commandment without spot, unrebukable, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ." The commad here referred to, as any one will see, who will read the context, includes every thing required of Christians. Let us suppose that Timothy had answered this epistle, informing Paul that he had read his charge with solemn interest, and that, by the grace of God, he expected to keep it. What should we think, if, in Paul's second epistle, such a rejoinder as this were found? "Timothy, your letter to me has filled me with amazement and sorrow of heart. You have become a wild fanatic—a *Perfectionist*. How could you have misunderstood me so much, as to suppose, that I ever dreamed, that you would expect to keep that awful charge?" Why should we be shocked at such a reply? Simply because we cannot believe

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that such a charge could be dictated by the Spirit of God, not only in the absence of all expectation that it would be kept, but with the intention of impressing the subject with the opposite belief."

Why have our opponents universally evaded this argument in this form, instead of taking it directly by the horns, that they might see with what force it would push them? The manner in which this argument is evaded in this essay is very singular. They quote the first sentence of the paragraph from which the above extract is taken, omitting the following sentence, in which we explain the form in which we wish to be understood, and thus attribute an argument to us, totally different from the one which we really urged. "Mr. Mahan says," they say, "I infer that a state of perfect holiness is attainable in this life, from the commands of scripture addressed to christians under the new covenant." Here they stop, and thus present us to the public as arguing simply from the mere fact that perfection is required, that it may or will be attained. If they had only cited the following sentence, their readers would have seen, that they were required to answer a very different argument from that which they have attributed to us. The sentence wrongfully omitted is this: "I refer here, not mainly to the fact, that perfect holiness is required of christians, but to the *manner and circumstances* in which these commands are given." We ask our reviewers, in their rejoinder, to meet the argument in the form in which we have presented it.

The reply of the reviewers to our argument based upon the revealed provisions of grace for the entire sanctification of believers, was quite unexpected to us. We have laid down the proposition that such provisions are revealed, and have fortified the position by the citation of many passages of scripture, bearing directly upon the subject. Our brethren of the Old School have always charged those of the New with the greatest inconsistency in admitting the fact of revealed provisions for this end, and then denying the conclusion which is based upon it, to wit, the truth of our doctrine. We expected therefore, that when called upon themselves to meet the argument, our brethren of the Old School would boldly deny the fact upon which our conclusion is based, to wit, the revelation of provisions for the entire sanctification of believers in this life, and would then attempt at least to explain the passages cited by us, in consistency with such denial. But they do no such thing. Their only reply is that they know not what we mean, when we assert the existence of such provisions. As we have

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not defined our terms, no particular reply is demanded. They never complained of obscurity in our language, when fastening the charge of inconsistency upon the New School. But when called upon themselves to meet the argument, what is their reply? Why this. "The loose manner in which Mr. Mahan expressed himself, makes it difficult to say what he does mean," &c. Why did they not suppose, that we used the term provision in the same sense in which they themselves have done, when they have charged inconsistency and absurdity upon the New School, for admitting, with us, the existence of such provisions, and then denying our conclusion based upon that admission? And on that obvious assumption, why did they not attempt to show that the passages cited by us, do not prove our proposition? It is in this identical sense that we have ever used this term, and as our brethren now know what our meaning is, we ask them to meet the argument as we have presented it.

The following is their reply to our argument from the promises of grace:

"Mr. Mahan also affirms that 'perfection in holiness is promised to the Christian in the new covenant under which he is placed.'

"If it be true that God has promised that his people shall become perfect in this life, the question is settled. But what are the proofs adduced of this fact? Why, he cites a number of passages, which, if they are at all relevant to his design, prove that all Christians become completely holy at the moment of their regeneration. The promises he mentions belong to all under the new covenant.—These are contained in such passages as Jer. xxxi. 31-34, and Heb. viii. 8-11; Deut. xxx. 6; Jer. l. 20; Ezek. xxxvi. 25-27; Isaiah lix. 21, and Luke i. 74, 75, &c.

The apostle informs us that it is by the promises that we are to be "made partakers of the divine nature" and "escape the corruptions that are in the world through lust." But we are here told that when we pray for grace to do what is required of us, there are no promises whatever on which our faith can fasten, as the ground of hope in respect to an answer to our petitions. All that is promised in the passages above referred to are accomplished in every one "at the moment of their regeneration." Let us examine one or two of these passages and see if this sentiment is correct. The fulfilment of promise recorded in Deut. 30: 6. "The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the hearts of thy seed, to love the Lord with all thy heart, and with all thy soul," the fulfilment of this promise, we say, is conditioned expressly, as we learn from verses 2 and 10, of the same chapter, upon the fact, that we "turn to the Lord our God with all our heart and with all our soul." "Circumcising the heart" as here

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promised, is a different thing from conversion, and is a blessing offered to our faith subsequent to regeneration. Else the impenitent sinner prior to conversion, "turns to the Lord," and obeys his voice, "according to all" that "is commanded of him," and that "with all his heart, and all his soul," and conversion is a blessing conferred for having complied with that condition. What else then does this promise proffer to the faith of the Christian, but that which its language necessarily imports, a state of entire, and confirmed sanctification? After giving the promise also in Ez. 36: 25–27, the Most High affirms that He will "yet for this be enquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them." This promise then is not fulfilled in regeneration; but proffers a good to be received by faith, subsequently to that event. If language means any thing, that blessing can be nothing less than entire permanent sanctification. The same holds true of all the promises pertaining to sanctification. They are addressed to christians as such, and proffer to their faith, a state not implied in regeneration, a state which can be obtained only by specific acts of faith in such promises. The overlooking of such obvious facts, facts which lie upon the very surface of the scriptures, demonstrates the most singular want of carefulness, in making up their opinions on this subject.

Let us now attend to the reply of our reviewers to an argument drawn from the fact, "that inspired men made the attainment of this particular state the subject of definite, fervent, and constant prayer."

"So" they reply, "we have examples of inspired men, praying for the purity and blessedness of the heavenly state. But do believers, while sojourning on earth, ever literally become companions of the glorified? Paul was continually pressing toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus; the acquisition of this prize was the object of his most earnest labors, of his most fervent prayers; and Mr. Mahan supposes that the 'mark' at which the apostle so strenuously aimed was the 'resurrection of the dead.' But was Paul actually raised from the dead, during the period of his abode in this world? Or, does it follow, because he continued to sigh and groan, being burdened, that he did not pray in faith for a glorious resurrection?"

Let us ask our reviewers, to cite a solitary instance in which inspired men ever prayed for the enjoyment of the "blessedness of the heavenly state" *in this life?* They did, however, under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, pray for entire sanctification in this life. Here lies the wide and fundamental difference in the two cases. What strange theological logic is that, which puts under the same category two such cases as these?

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

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Select passages of Scripture considered.

Gen. 6: 1—4. "And it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born unto them, that the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose. And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh; yet his days shall be a hundred and twenty years.—There were giants in the earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bear children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown."

To understand this passage aright, we must first determine what class of persons are referred to, by the phrases, "Sons of God," and "daughters of men." To accomplish this, we need to go back to a clause which we find in Chap. 4: 26. "Then began men to call upon the name of the Lord," or, as it might be rendered, Then began men to call themselves by the name of Jehovah. Whatever else may be conveyed by this declaration, one fact is evidently revealed by it, to wit, that at the time here referred to, a visible separation took place, between the righteous and the wicked, the worshipers of the true God, and vicious men who probably became idolaters. The former class called themselves after the name of Jehovah, just as the followers of Christ called themselves Christians. Hence they were known and designated as the Sons of Jehovah. The phrases, the sons and daughters of Jehovah, and the sons and daughters of men, became the appellations by which the two classes above referred to were known and designated. With this assumption which we cannot but regard as having more than an air of probability about it, we can readily designate the classes of persons referred to in the text, by the phrases, "sons of God," and "daughters of men." The former phrase designates the class of men who were the professed worshipers of Jehovah; the latter the class of women who were idolaters, or open non-worshipers of the true God.

For ages after the separation above referred to took place, indeed as long as true religion maintained its supremacy over its professed followers, intermarriages on the part of the "sons of God" with "the daughters of men," would be regarded by the former as a thing unhallowed and prohibited. Hence the general occurrence of such connections marks the time of the great apostacy of the professed worshipers of Jehovah, as well as the cause of such apostacy, together with the total corruption of the race which followed that event. That this apostacy, together with the consequent universal corruption and violence which followed is referred to such inter-marriages as its cause, is evident from verse 3, and onward.

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"And the Lord said [in view of the facts previously stated,] My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh," that is, wholly surrendered to fleshly indulgences, &c.

A question might arise here, how shall we account, from the above exposition, for the fact, that from such intermarriages, a race of men, such as are designated in verse 4, would result? To such an inquiry, a ready answer may be given. The men from among the "Sons of God," who would first seek such alliances, as is always the case, would be the first men of the age among the class to which they belonged, men especially of the highest *physical endowments*, this being the characteristic most regarded in such an age. The women also selected by such men would be, and as we are informed, were, of the class among the "Daughters of men," persons of the highest physical accomplishments, among which superior physical vigor would, of course, be one. Hence a union of the first individuals of the race physically considered was accomplished. The result could not fail to be as affirmed in verse 4. Nor could the moral corruptions and violence described in the verse next following hardly fail to arise as the final result. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."

The design of Moses, in recording these fearful occurrences for the instruction of the Jewish nation may now be readily explained. This nation was at the time in which the record was made separated from the rest of the world, as the worshipers of Jehovah, as the "Sons of God" were at the time above referred to. The great peril to which that nation was exposed, of being drawn from the worship and service of the true God, into the abominations of heathenism, was precisely the same as that which had lead to the total corruption of true religion in the antideluvian age, to wit, intermarriages of the "Sons of God, and the daughters of men." Moses points the nation back to the fearful destruction of the race, by the general deluge, (one family who had preserved themselves pure excepted,) as occasioned by the universal corruption and violence caused by this very sin to which the people of God would be strongly tempted in their settlement in the land of promise, and made the record, as a means of preserving them from the destructive influence of this sin. Such, as we suppose, is the meaning and design of the passage before us. In regard to its application at the present time we would simply add, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

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THE

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ARTICLE LXVIII.

A REPLY TO THE "WARNING AGAINST ERROR,"

Written by the Rev. Dr. Duffield, and approved and adopted, first by the Presbytery of Detroit, and subsequently by the Synod of Michigan.

BY PROF. C. G. FINNEY.

To the Synod of Michigan,

REVEREND AND BELOVED BRETHREN:

I have received a pamphlet entitled, "A Warning against Error, being the Report of a Committee, adopted by the Presbytery of Detroit, at their Session at Northville, Mich. Approved by the Synod of Michigan, at their Session at Kalamazoo, Oct. 18, 1847."

Sickness and death in my family, my own ill health, together with the loss of our press by fire, have hitherto prevented a reply. I see nothing in this pamphlet intrinsically worthy of a reply and should take no public notice of it, but for the extraordinary manner of its appearance before the churches. Its author has, in some way which I can not explain, obtained for it the endorsement and sanction of the Synod. On perusing the pamphlet I have been constrained to doubt whether the members of the Synod had, to any considerable extent, made themselves acquainted with my published volumes of theology. I must also doubt whether the writer of the pamphlet had patiently and understandingly read my work *through;* for I can not conceive how a discerning mind could have fallen into so many strange misapprehensions and misrepresentations if he had really read and pondered the positions taken in the work reviewed.

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Two reasons mainly induce me to reply. 1. The present relations of the Synod of Michigan to the pamphlet. They, it seems, have made themselves responsible to God and to the world for the truthfulness of this "*Warning against Error*," and pledged their christian and ministerial characters in support of its positions. This gives to the pamphlet an importance that seems to demand a notice from me. Silence on my part under such circumstances might be deemed either a contempt for the Synod, or a tacit acknowledgement of error. I am unwilling that either of these inferences should be drawn, because neither is true, and either might injure the cause of truth. 2. My second reason for replying is, that it will afford me an opportunity to state in few words my views upon the points considered as erroneous. Such a statement may be read and understood by many who may never read my theology entire.

Before I enter directly upon the work of reply, I must notice a few of the many peculiarities of the pamphlet before me.

1. I have been struck with the remarkable manner in which the writer of the "*Warning*" has quoted from my book. He has seldom, if at all, done more than quote isolated sentences, leaving their connection out of view. Suppose this should be done with the Bible or any other book, what could not be made out of it?

2. The writer has seldom, if at all, so much as noticed the proof of my positions, as stated in my book. He has found it convenient to pass my arguments unnoticed and has quoted the Confessionof Faith in reply as if it were of Divine authority. He also *appears* to quote scripture in opposition to my positions, but with what success we shall see.

3. The writer of the "*Warning*" seldom takes issue with my real positions. He almost uniformly misapprehends and misrepresents my views. He seldom grapples manfully with my positions, but dodges the real question.

4. The "*Warning*" abounds with *false issues* and consequently with most impertinent argumentation and quotations of scripture.

5. Another peculiarity of the "*Warning*" is that it is very ambiguous. Much that is said may read almost equally well two or three ways. It may be so read as to be old school, or new school, or no school at all; so as to be orthodox, heterodox, or mere nonsense. If my limits will permit, I may call attention to some instances of this ambiguity.

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I am made happy by the consideration that it is not for me to sit in judgment upon the intention of this writer, but that in this I may leave him to the judgment of God and attend only to his *opinions*.

Again: in reading the "Warning against Error," I have been struck, as often before, with the fact that the brethren abroad are not opposing so much the *real* as the *imputed* views of Oberlin. To make us out heretics, our opponents must impute to us sentiments that we do not hold and which we abhor as really as themselves. I wrote and published my theology to avoid this, but it seems to be impossible to speak so plainly that certain men will not misapprehend us, and by their blunders mislead others. How long shall this be? Of what use is it to misrepresent us and fight a man of straw?

In reply I must, 1. Condense as much as possible. 2. I must omit lengthy quotations from scripture and rely in general upon the memory of my readers to supply them. 3. I might in almost every instance quote a complete reply to the writer from the work reviewed; but for brevity's sake I must content myself with stating in as few words as possible my views, as contained in my published volumes of theology, and leave those who are disposed, to examine that work for themselves.

The writer has occupied the first twelve pages of his pamphlet in defending himself against the charge of having himself departed from the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. I will not trouble myself nor you with remarks upon this prolix introduction to his "Warning." It is only the old story about the "FORM OF SOUND WORDS," accompanied with the admission that these "*sound words*" are not the words in which he should always prefer to express his doctrinal belief, and also with the admission that much latitude is allowed to Presbyterians in *construing these* "*sound words*" so that opposing schools may each properly express their doctrinal views in these "*sound words*." These words it appears, are *so* "*sound*" that they may be understood with about equal propriety, to mean one thing or the other, according to the psychological views of opposing schools and different individuals. Alas for these "*sound words*," the true interpretation of which has cost the church so much division and disgrace. But I would not speak disparagingly of the Confession of Faith. In the main I think it true; but in

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no instance do I acknowledge it as an *authoritative* exposition of the word of God. I claim the right to examine the "lively oracles" for myself, and am not bound to take the Confession of Faith as a conclusive exponent of the Bible. Be it understood, however, that in my reply to this pamphlet, I make no war with the Confession of Faith. I have only to deal with the author.

I will now attend to the *pretended* issues of the "Warning."

I. His first issue is as follows, page 12, 13, 15:

THE FOUNDATION OF FAITH.

"The erroneous system assumes and teaches, as the true philosophy, certain metaphysical views of the nature and foundation of moral obligation, which it makes the key to unlock the mysteries of our faith; or in other words, the postulates by which human reason may explain the doctrines of the Bible, and reconcile the differences among professing christians in point of doctrinal belief. It claims philosophy to be the legitimate expositor of Bible theology.

"But we protest against any man's metaphysical theory or definitions, or philosophical views of the nature and foundation of moral obligation, being made the arbiter of our faith, and the interpretation of the doctrines of the Bible, however great may be his pretensions to holiness, or whatever his fame and reputed success in preaching the gospel.

"We warn you against all attempts to make metaphysics, or philosophy, the arbiter and interpreter of the facts affirmed by the Spirit of God in the sacred scriptures. We are bound to believe the facts when once, and as, God affirms them, even though we cannot explain them by our philosophy."

The point of my alleged offence here is, that I appeal to philosophy or reason as the legitimate expounder of the Bible. But is there really any issue between this writer and myself upon this point? No, indeed. Why does he warn the churches against what he holds as really as I do? to wit, that we *must* appeal to reason; 1. In sitting in judgment upon the evidences that the Bible is of divine origin? and 2. In ascertaining what the Bible means? In interpreting the language, the doctrines, and facts contained in it? Without the aid of mental science we can form no definite idea of what the most common terms in the Bible mean. The terms sin, holiness, regeneration, repentance, faith, and the like, are all expressive, not of muscular action, but of acts and states of the mind; and without assuming the great truths of mental science, no man can rightly understand these terms. This *this writer admits*, and this is that for which I contend. He admits that it is the appropriate business of the schools to interpret these and similar terms in the light of mental science. He constantly does this himself, and so does every minister. Where then is the issue? Brethren of the synod, has this writer made you be-

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lieve that I hold that reason or philosophy is higher authority than the Bible? I hold no such thing. The *meaning* of the Bible once ascertained, its teachings are with me an end of all controversy. But the Bible must be *expounded* by reason or philosophy, or we can have no *opinion*, even, of what it means. All men do and must expound the Bible by and in accordance with their views of mental science. The difference among theologians is founded in their different views of mental science. Who does not know this? Why, then, does this writer exclaim against reason and philosophy, and talk about receiving the simple facts and doctrines of Christianity, by faith, without philosophisings, &c.? Why does he repudiate philosophy, and yet constantly obtrude his own philosophy upon us? The fact is he and I differ in our philosophy, and consequently in our theology. The issue between us *is not* as he here represents it. It is not whether we may, or must, or do of necessity appeal to reason and philosophy in our exposition of the language of scripture. This he repeatedly admits. This I also maintain. The real issue between us respects our views of mental science, in the light of which we respectively interpret the language of the Bible. Here then, is a *false issue* in the outset. It is more convenient for him to exclaim against philosophy as an expositor of the Bible, and then surround himself with the smoke of his own philosophy in combatting my views, than it is to take issue with me upon those points of philosophy upon which our diverse theological views are founded. He exclaims against my appeal to philosophy, and yet glaringly *assumes* the truth of his own, and that of the framers of the Confession of Faith.

Every one knows that the framers of the Confession held a peculiar philosophy which gave shape to that whole document. Why, then, does this writer protest against philosophy as an exponent of the Bible? Such protests are nonsensical. Had I space I might quote enough of the philosophy of this writer both from this pamphlet and from his other published works, to silence a modest man, and prevent his exclaiming against interpreting scripture in the light of mental science. I conclude this head then, with repeating that the writer has here made an issue where there is none. He professes to differ with me as it respects the *relations* and *use* of philosophy, when in fact we agree in this, and differ only in our views of what *constitutes* true philosophy.

II. His second issue is as follows, pages 15, 16, 17:

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THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

"The facts, that we are free agents, possessing powers to know and obey the will of God, and that He has given his law for the regulation of our conduct, are generally acknowledged and felt to be a sufficient *ground* of that moral obligation which binds us to do his will. His right to command and require our obedience, men generally trace to the facts that he is our Creator, and made us for himself; our Proprietor, and claims us for his own; our Sovereign, and possesses authority to command; our beneficent friend, and in every way best fitted and qualified, by his own excellence and resources, to exercise dominion over us. The Bible speaks plainly on this subject, and in accordance with such views. When God commanded Abraham to walk before him and be perfect, the chief reason he assigned for it was, 'I am the Almighty God,' God all sufficient. All the holy obedience and adoration of heaven is referred to this source. 'Thou art *worthy*, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power, *for* thou hast *created* all things, and *for thy pleasure* they are and were created.' The will of God, expressed in his law, is every where, in the sacred scriptures, recognized to be, as well the reason for, as the rule of our obedience. Thus, the Savior speaks of himself; 'I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.' It is given as a distinctive trait in the character of him whose morality is acceptable, that 'he doeth the will of God,' and 'keepeth his commandments.' God has required it, therefore we are bound to obey. The expression of his will as to our actions or conduct, as to what we are, or are not, to do that is, his law, is a sufficient, and indeed, a paramount reason of obedience.

"The error against which we warn you, teaches that 'the right of God' to exercise moral government 'cannot be found in the fact that God sustains to (us) the relation of Creator.' As counterpart with this, it teaches, that 'the fact that God is the Owner and sole Proprietor of the universe, is no reason why he should govern it.' It further teaches, that his right to govern, 'cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses all the attributes, natural and moral, that are requisite to the administration of moral government;' but that 'the necessity of government is the foundation of the right to govern.' So far from moral obligation being founded in the will of God, it teaches, that 'it is a responsibility imposed on the moral agent by his own reason,' and that 'there can be no law that is or can be obligatory upon moral agents, but one suited to and founded in their nature, relations and circumstances."

Upon this point I would remark: 1. That the utmost confusion seems to have reigned in the mind of this writer upon certain points of fundamental importance in theological investigations, and hence he continually misapprehends and misrepresents me where I have been careful to make those discriminations prominent.

I have throughout made an important distinction between the *conditions* and the *foundation* or *ground* of moral obligation, the *conditions* and the *ground* or *foundation* of justification, &c. In the first sentence under this head, he has fallen into the error of confounding this distinction. I represented moral agency and ability, &c., as *conditions*, but not as the *ground* or *foundation* of it. *Without* free agency and ability we could not be subjects of moral obligation, but then free agency and ability are not the *ground*

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or *foundation* of the obligation. I have shown that the *fundamental reason* why men ought to will and to do *good*, is *the intrinsic value of the good*. Their *ability* to do this is a *condition* of their obligation to do it, but their *ability* is not and can not be the *foundation* of the obligation. Ability is, of itself, no more a reason for willing *good* than *evil*. The *fundamental reason* for doing *good* must be the value of the good, and the *ability* only a condition of the obligation. This is made so plain in the book reviewed, that it seems hardly possible that such a man as Doctor D. can have overlooked it. In his first sentence he represents ability, &c., as the *ground* of moral obligation and this confusion reigns throughout the whole pamphlet, and fatally vitiates, as we shall see, his whole work.

I have taught that the fact that God is the creator, and that He possesses perfect and infinite attributes, natural and moral, are *conditions* of his *right to govern*, and of our *obligation* to *obey Him*, but that his relations and attributes are not the *foundation* of our *obligation* to will or to do *good* rather than *evil*. There must be *something in the nature of good and evil* that is the fundamental reason for our obligation to will and to do one rather than the other. It must be the intrinsic *value* of the good, and the intrinsic *evil* of the evil, that constitutes the fundamental reason for God's requiring the one and prohibiting the other; and that also constitutes the fundamental reason of our obligation to choose the one and refuse the other. But here is the utmost confusion in the Doctor's mind. He seems to be either unable or unwilling to perceive a distinction at once so plain and so important, and hence he wholly fails in his showing. It is surely ridiculous to affirm that the relations and attributes of God are the foundation of our obligation to will and do good, and to avoid evil, rather than any thing in the nature of the good and the evil, for this would be obligatory upon us, whatever God's relations and attributes might be. We, being moral agents, should be under obligation to will and do good, even if God should forbid it.

2. The Doctor under this head, as we shall see elsewhere, at first appears to take issue with me and afterwards, by contradicting himself, annihilates the issue, and concedes what I claim. On page 16, he represents the will of God, as he does elsewhere, as the *reason* manifestly in the sense of the *ground or foundation* of moral obligation. The connec-

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tion and strain of reasoning show that by *reason* he means the fundamental reason or ground. Here then is the *appearance* of an issue. But on page 19, he says:

"In so saying, we mean not that the law and constitution of God are mere arbitrary enactments, that is, emanating *wholly* from a *capricious* volition; nor that they can be so changed by any capricious act of the divine will, as to make that right, which according to our intelligent powers and the nature with which God has endowed us, may be, under present circumstances, wrong, or that wrong which is now right."

He knew very well that I had shown that if God's will is the foundation of moral obligation, rather than the intrinsic value of the good, it would follow that if God had willed or should will the direct opposite of what he does, it would impose obligation upon us; that if his will be the *foundation* of our obligations, he might, by willing it, change our obligations and render it obligatory upon us to will evil instead of good. But the Doctor is on his guard and takes both sides of this question. The will of God is the *ground* of the obligation; yet he does not mean by this that God could by any arbitrary or "capricious volition" change the nature of virtue and vice, and render it obligatory to will evil rather than good. But why not? This is getting out of the difficulty or escaping from the consequences by a denial of his premises. It is undeniable that if the sovereign will of God is the foundation of the obligation, he can by his sovereign will change the nature of virtue and vice. If his willing that we should will and do good is *the reason* why we should will and do good rather than evil, and the intrinsic nature of the good and the evil is not the fundamental reason of the obligation, certainly it follows that should he will the opposite of what he does, his willing would impose obligation and of course change the nature of virtue and vice. I insist upon the Doctor's taking one side or the other of this question; that he either make a real issue and abide by it, or that he relinquish all pretence of an issue. I must protest against his appearing to make an issue, and then in anticipation of my answer, turning round and virtually denying the very position upon which, alone, the appearance of an issue rested. If God by an arbitrary choice cannot change the nature of virtue and vice, he cannot change moral obligation of course. Hence it follows that his will is not the foundation of moral obligation. Why does not the Doctor admit this at once? Why has the Doctor italicized *wholly* and *capricious?* Does he mean to imply that God's enactments do or may emanate *partly* from a *capricious volition?* So

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it would seem. But this I deny and maintain that God has no more right to will or to legislate *unreasonably* than we have. But the Doctor will have it, that it is because *God is what he is, &c.*, because he possesses infinite perfections, moral and natural, that his will is the *foundation* of moral obligation. But the fact of these perfections is by me represented, not as the *ground*, but as the *condition* of our obligation to obey him. He commands us to will and do good *because* good is valuable, and for that reason. But it seems that Doctor D. will have it that we are to will and do good not for good's sake, or because good is good or valuable, but because God wills it. We are to will good to God and to our neighbor, not that we care for their well being for its own sake, but we are to will it because God commands it! This he insists is the teaching of the Bible and of the standards. We are to love God and our neighbor and seek the glory of God and the good of our neighbor, not that we care for these things for their own intrinsic value or importance, but because God wills it. And God wills it, not for its value, but because he does will it. Marvelous! But the Doctor informs me and his readers, of the origin of my error, page 18 and 19.

"The error originates in losing sight of God's sovereignty in the original creation of man, with the powers and in the relations, in which he was constituted, and adapted to His law, or the law to him. The nature and fitness of things cannot be apprehended by us or correctly spoken of, as though some eternal constitution, or as the preacher called it, fate, existed, irrespectively of God's will, in the exercise of His wisdom and benevolence, originally planning the whole system. The scriptures speak explicitly of 'the mystery of His will, according to his good pleasure, which He purposed in Himself' and of His constitutions being '*according to the purpose* of Him who worketh *all* THINGS *after the counsel of his own will.*' To assume an eternal fitness in the nature of things, anterior to, and irrespective of, His original, wise, good and holy ordinations, and to affirm that God adapts his moral law to it, is to impugn his sovereignty. It is to make both God and his creatures, dependent on a state of things out of Himself, or something other than 'the counsel of His own will,' AN ETERNAL FATE!"

This is a wonderful discovery! The universe originated in the sovereign good pleasure of God, and therefore his will and not the nature and relations of things is the foundation of obligation. He created the nature of things and therefore his will, and not the nature of things is the foundation of moral obligation. Had he pleased he could have so constituted things that what is now virtue, would have been vice, and what is now vice had been virtue. That is, he might have so constituted moral agents, that benevolence had been sin, and selfishness virtue; that it would have been

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duty to prefer our own good to that of God, to prefer a less to a greater good, to love ourselves supremely, or to hate God, and adore ourselves. If this is not what he means, what does he mean, and what does the paragraph just quoted amount to? If the Doctor means to affirm this, I greatly wonder that the Synod should endorse a sentiment so preposterous.

The fact is, God's eternal and self-existent nature, and not his willing, has forever settled the question of the nature of virtue and vice. His eternal and self-existent reason has imposed law upon his will and no willing of his can change this law. But more of this in another place.

Why does the Doctor represent me as holding that the nature and fitness of things is the foundation of obligation? I hold that things being as they are, that is, that our nature and relations are *conditions* of our obligations, but deny that they are the *foundation* of obligation. The *foundation* of obligation I hold to be the intrinsic value of the good we ought to choose and do; that the intrinsic value of the good is the *reason* why God requires us to will and do it, and of course the *fundamental reason* why we ought to will and do it. I hold that the intrinsic value of the glory of God and the well being of the universe is the *fundamental* reason of our obligation to will it, and seek it. Now suppose the Doctor to deny this and to maintain that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of the obligation. Then the matter stands thus. We are under obligation to be benevolent, that is, to will and do good not because good is valuable in itself but because God wills it. But why does God will it? If for its intrinsic value, we ought to will it for the same reason. The Doctor, page 19, admits that our obligation is not founded in the mere fact that God wills thus and thus, but in the fact that he is an infinitely good being. Now what does this mean? Does it mean that the obligation is founded in the fact that God wills *what he does?* that is, that he requires us to will and to do that which we ought to will and do, and that which he ought to require us to will and do, on account of the nature or value of that which he requires us to will and do? In other words, is the obligation to obey God founded in the fact that his will is wise and good? I admit that this is a *condition* of our obligation to *obey him*, but I deny that his goodness or his will is the *foundation* of the obligation to will and do good and maintain that God's willing and his goodness are so far from being the founda-

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tion of our obligation to will and do good, that we should be under obligation to will and do good if God forbade it, and if he were perfectly wicked. I say again, that his being good or his willing as he does is the *condition* of our obligation *to obey him*, but is so far from being the *foundation* of the obligation to do that which he commands, that the obligation would exist if God should forbid that which he now commands. Should God forbid us to will and seek his good and the good of the universe, it would be our duty to will and seek it notwithstanding. I go farther and affirm that God could not possibly create a universe of *moral agents* and render it obligatory upon them to be selfish. I utterly deny that God by his sovereignty could, by any possible constitution of things, render benevolence a sin and selfishness a virtue. Brethren of the Synod of Michigan, do you hold with Doctor D. upon this point and deny the position which I take? I can not believe it. I must believe that you adopted this pamphlet on a bare hearing it read and that you do not and cannot endorse it, on a more thorough understanding of it. But we shall see.

But again, page 19, the Doctor says of God:

"His own glorious nature, His own infinitely exalted excellence, and not any thing conceivably existing apart from, independent and irrespective of God, is that which determines His will."

What does the Doctor mean? Does he mean that God is a necessary as opposed to a free agent? That his will is necessarily determined by his self-existent nature? If he means this, what virtue is there in God? His nature is necessarily self-existent. No one can suppose that God is deserving of praise for possessing a nature which he did not create and which he cannot annihilate or change. God is not praiseworthy for having this nature, but for the voluntary use or exercise of it. It is his *benevolence* and not his *nature* for which he deserves praise.

But what does the Doctor mean by "God's infinitely exalted excellence?" Does he mean *moral* excellence? He says that God's excellence determines his will. What is this excellence, I inquire again? Is it *moral?* And what is *moral excellence?* I had supposed that Doctor D. and the Synod of Michigan were at least so far new school as to hold that moral excellence consists in voluntary action, that is, in choice, benevolence, love. But here it seems you all hold that moral excellence *lies back of choice* and determines it; that God's moral excellence according to the Syn-

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od of Michigan, *is not voluntary, but necessary*. It does not belong to or consist in choice or volition, nor in any action of the will, in any free or voluntary state of mind, but lies back of all actions of will and determines them. This then is your idea of the moral excellence of God. And is this moral excellence in creatures? And you, brethren, feel solemnly called upon to warn the churches against believing in the *free agency of God* and in his *voluntary moral excellence*, and charge them to believe that God's moral excellence lies back of all voluntary states of the will and determines them. They must believe that God's moral excellence *does not consist in benevolence*, but in something back of good will that determines the will to good. And this is orthodoxy in your churches? My dear Brethren, you cannot mean so. But what do you mean? Do you say that by excellence, you do not mean *moral* excellence? But how does this relieve you? What is this excellence? It must be moral or physical. If the former, then moral excellence is involuntary, which is absurd. If the latter, that is, if this excellence be that of his self-existing and necessary nature, then he is a necessary being and his will is determined to benevolence by his immutable and self-existent nature. Is there, can there be any virtue in a *necessary benevolence*? I had supposed that God *freely determined* his own will in accordance with the law of his eternal reason; that God is free, and in the sovereign exercise of this freedom, yielded a voluntary obedience to the moral law, or law of benevolence, as it is affirmed by his reason. But you hold, it seems, that it is some natural or substantial involuntary excellence that determines his will. God's virtue then, must consist, not in voluntary conformity to the law of his reason, but in his will being determined by some involuntary excellence. What can this excellence be, and would it be virtue in a creature?

Under this head the Doctor repudiates the idea that the necessity of government constitutes the condition of God's right to govern, and maintains that God has this right by virtue of his own infinite excellence, or, as it would seem, by virtue of his sovereignty. Now what does the Doctor mean by this? Does he mean that God's being infinitely great and good confers on him the right to govern his creatures even if they *need no government*? Or if there is no good reason, either in himself or in them, for this government? I have taught that God has no *right* to do anything without a good reason. Is this heresy? That unless there be a

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good reason for government existing, either in God or in his creatures, or in their relations, or in all these together, God has no right to govern.

I maintain that government is a necessary means of securing the highest glory of God and the highest well being of the universe and that the *intrinsic value* of this glory and well being is the ground of the obligation and right of God to govern. God's attributes and relations, together with the necessities of his creatures, are *conditions* of the obligation and right to govern. Why should God's attributes, natural and moral, give him a right to control his creatures, or to exercise any government over them, if there is no good reason for it? Is God unreasonable? Has he a right to be unreasonable? Has he a right to exercise a capricious and arbitrary sovereignty, in administering a government of law with its terrible sanctions, when government is not at all necessary? when no good end is secured or even proposed by it? If God has such a right it must be because his "capricious volition," makes right. But this cannot be. The truth is, that if God's arbitrary and capricious will does not make right, it must be that he, as well as all other moral agents, must have some good reason to authorize him to do any thing. What! will Doctor D. gravely maintain that God has a right to govern the universe when there is no need whatever of government? When there is no necessity for it in His own nature and relations nor in the nature and relations of his subjects? If he maintains this, what is this but holding that God has a right to exercise a perfectly arbitrary and capricious sovereignty. But if the Doctor does not hold this, why does he pretend to disagree with me upon this point, and gravely sound the alarm of heresy? Let him, if he thinks best, proclaim it as orthodoxy in Michigan that God's right to govern, is founded, *not in the necessity of government as a means to an infinitely valuable end*, but that His right is founded in an arbitrary sovereignty. But, brethren of the Synod, will you endorse for him?

Observe, my position is, that the *intrinsic value of the end* to be secured by moral government, is the *foundation*, and the attributes of God, moral and natural, together with his relations to the universe, are *conditions* of his right to govern; that neither his attributes or relations could of themselves confer on Him this right, except there is good reason for the existence of government. If the Doctor ask why we may not as well say that the attributes and rela-

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tions of God are the *ground*, and the intrinsic value of the end to be secured by government the *condition* of the right, the answer is plain. The *ground* of the right, that is, the intrinsic value of the end to be secured by government would exist and be the same, even were God's attributes changed. But this change in his attributes and relations, while it would not dispense with the necessity and importance of government, would nevertheless affect *his* right to govern. I would ask Doctor D. if he holds that God would have a right to govern the universe, if he were a wicked being, although he might have been its creator? If the Doctor says no, what is this but admitting that his goodness is a *condition of the right?* If the Doctor will still insist that his goodness *confers* on Him the right, and is the *foundation* of this right in such a sense that the right would exist although the end to be secured by government were of no value, and although there were no good reason for government whatever, what is this but saying that God's goodness confers on Him the right to do that which is perfectly unreasonable and capricious?

III. The Doctor's third issue is as follows:

THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF MORAL LAW.

"On this subject, the system of error, against which we warn you, teaches that 'moral law is not and never can be the will of God or of any other being.' It affirms, that the will of no being can be law, but that 'moral law is an idea of the reason'—'the law of nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself'—'the rule imposed on us not by the arbitrary will of any being, but by our own intelligence.' Human reason is thus enthroned as lawgiver to the human conscience. The authority binding to obedience 'is nothing else than the reason's idea, or conception of that course of willing and acting that is fit, proper, suitable to, and demanded by the nature, relations, necessities and circumstances of moral agents.'"

What I hold and teach upon the subject of this paragraph is this. Moral law is given by the *reason of God* as the rule of *his* own conduct and the conduct of all moral agents. Moral law does not originate in the *will*, but in the *reason* of God. It is and must be his own rational conception, apprehension, idea, or affirmation of the course of willing and acting, that is fit, proper, right, in Himself and all moral agents. It is ridiculous to affirm that moral law has its *foundation* in the will of any being. God's *expressed will reveals* law, but the law *consists* in the rule of action imposed by the reason and conscience upon the will of God and of all moral agents. God is a law to Himself. That is, his reason imposes law upon his will, and his virtue must

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consist in his will's obeying the law of his reason. Does not Doctor D. admit this? God has created mankind in his own image, that is, moral agents like Himself. Consequently they necessarily have the idea of moral law and moral obligation. They necessarily affirm their obligation to be benevolent. They have the idea, conception, apprehension, or affirmation, that to love God and their neighbor, is fit, suitable, proper, right. Thus, as the Bible says, they are a law unto themselves. Thus God's law, the law of his own intelligence, is revealed to all moral agents in the necessary ideas of their own reason. This is not exalting reason above God, nor enthroning reason as lawgiver in any other sense than that it is through and by their reason that God reveals his law to moral agents. This is what is intended by moral law being an idea of the reason. Does not Doctor D. know this? Does he need to be told that moral law must be a rule of action, conceived, or apprehended and affirmed by the reason of a moral agent? This rule or law may be *declared* and enforced by the expressed will of God, but it is utter nonsense to say that it originates in his will and not in his reason. God's self-existent nature is the source or foundation of moral law. He is necessarily a moral agent. Possessing this nature, benevolence is his duty. That is, benevolence is fit, proper, right in Him, and selfishness would be wrong in Him. He must be a subject of moral law and moral obligation, or virtue is impossible to Him. His reason must impose upon his will the obligation of benevolence. He is his own law-giver, and the law-giver of all moral agents. He has so created them that they can not but have the idea, and affirm it to be their duty to be benevolent. This law God has revealed to them in the necessary laws and ideas of their own reason. The Bible also declares it to the reason, and imposes it upon the conscience through the reason. The reason is the only faculty that can have the *idea of moral law*. This is what all writers on moral law mean by its *subjectivity;* that is, the law is not merely *objective*, something without the reason and contemplated as an object apart from the mind, but it is an idea, a conception of the mind itself. It *lies in the reason of the subject.* And is this error? Do you, brethren, feel called upon to warn the churches against this teaching as error? Do you seriously sympathize with Doctor D. in his alarm and can you declare this deliberately to the churches in Michigan?

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I have said, a few pages back, that God's self-existent nature had forever settled the nature of virtue and vice, so that he can never change them. We are now prepared to see what is intended by such language.

His reason is self-existent, and of course infinite and immutable. This eternally and necessarily affirms that benevolence is virtue and selfishness vice. So that God never did settle the nature of virtue and vice by an act of will or by ordaining and establishing any constitution of things whatever. His eternal, self-existent and necessary reason has settled this from eternity. No sovereignty of God was concerned in settling, creating or establishing the intrinsic nature of virtue and vice, nor in creating, or establishing moral law. Moral law and the nature of virtue and vice are and always were as independent of God's will as his self-existent and eternal nature is. Neither his reason nor its necessary affirmations, are subject to his will. He can not affirm differently if he would. That is a shallow and an absurd theology that represents moral law, moral obligation, and consequently the nature of virtue and vice, as dependent upon the sovereign will of God. Why, if moral law were, or ever was, dependent upon the sovereign will of God, he could by willing it, have made selfishness in himself and in all moral agents virtue, and benevolence vice. Do you believe this? Doctor D. is terrified with this view which I have taken, as being the doctrine of an "ETERNAL FATE" or as something above God. But what nonsense is this. Fate separate from God! No, indeed; it is God's own nature, his own reason that has given moral law to him and to all his creatures. It is not fate, but the infinite and perfect reason that has forever settled the nature of moral law, of moral obligation and of course, of virtue and vice. This is not an eternal fate, but an eternal God. Cannot Doctor D. see this?

It is the grossest error to maintain that God's sovereign will originated moral law or established the nature of virtue and vice. This would render virtue in God impossible. If there were no law obligatory upon his will, then virtue would be impossible to him. For what is virtue in God or in any other being but conformity to moral law? But all this and much more is in the work reviewed, and it is wonderful that Doctor D. can so utterly misapprehend and misrepresent me on this and almost every other point upon which he attempts to warn the churches. Brethren of the Synod, have you attentively examined what I have said in my

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work upon this subject? I cannot believe you have. Do you, can you believe that what I have just now said upon the nature of moral law is heresy or merely "*philosophy falsely so called?*" I cannot believe that you do. But we shall see. On the 21st page the Doctor says:

"How unlike is this philosophy to the unerring testimony of God, which makes His will, made known to men for the regulation of their conduct, to be the law! In the first instance God *gave* to Adam an expression of His will and this was law—His command. In the same way, He spake the law, by an audible voice in the ten commandments, which all admit to be the moral law, thus making known His will for the regulation of our conduct. Every where in the scriptures, we are referred to God's will, expressed in His command, as law binding us to obedience."

Now, does the Doctor believe, and do you believe that I deny this? God's will is the law in the sense that it expresses and enforces the law or rule of his own reason as the law of all moral agents. His will is always *declarative of law* but never *creates* it. He gave particular laws to Adam and to the Jews; not arbitrary enactments, but his will declared the affirmations of his own reason relative to their conduct under particular circumstances. He declared that which he saw to be required in their circumstances.

God's declared will *is always law in the sense of being obligatory*. It invariably declares the decisions of the divine reason. So that we need no other evidence of what is obligatory than the expressed will of God. But God's will is not law in the sense that law originates in his will as distinct from his intelligence. His *arbitrary* will can never be law. His expressed will is always law, I say again, because it reveals what is the law or decision of his own reason in regard to the conduct of his creatures. The whole that Doctor D. has said of my teaching under this head is the result of misapprehension.

IV. The fourth issue is as follows, page 22, 23:

THE NATURE OF OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

"The system of error against which we warn you, affirms the moral law to be 'the rule of action, which is founded, not in the will of God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents,' and 'prescribes the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and relations.'

"Obedience to moral law, therefore, is made to consist in 'acting conformably with our nature and relations;' 'and sin in being governed by the sensibility instead of being governed by the law of God, as it lies revealed in the reason.' It teaches, that 'as the moral law did not originate in (God's) arbitrary will;' as 'He did not create it,' and cannot 'introduce any other rule of right among moral agents;' so, 'nothing is or can be obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his nature and relations.'

"This, it is obvious, is very vague, and very liable to mislead. It is the very doctrine of the refined sensualist, who, in acting according to the de-

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mands of appetite and the dictates of affection and passion, claims that he is actuated by enlightened reason and is fulfilling the law of God. The depravity of man has utterly perverted his nature, and his judgment as to his relations, and disqualified him to judge by his reason, as to what is duty and obligation. He needs a more distinct and definite rule. This, the Bible and our standards teach us, is the declared will of God."

Upon this, I remark:

1. I have already shown in what sense I regard the moral law as founded, not in the will of God, but in the nature of God and of moral agents.

The law or rule of action suitable for moral agents is of course that which is agreeable to their nature and relations. That is, they ought to will and do just as is fit and proper with their natures and in their relations. The rule of action is *conditionated* upon, or grows out of, or is a consequence of their nature and relations. This is true, first, of God. His nature being what it is, it is fit and proper that he should be benevolent. Thus it also is with all moral agents. Their natures and relations being what they are, it is fit, and proper, and right; that they should love God supremely and their neighbor as themselves. God pursues this course himself and enjoins it upon all moral agents, not as an arbitrary enactment, but because or upon condition that his nature and relations, and their nature and relations, are what they are. Their being moral agents, and not the will of God, is the reason why this rule is their law. This law would be binding upon them whether God willed it or not. God wills this or commands it, because this course is demanded by the value of the end which he requires them to seek, and not because his will can create law. Does Doctor D.—does the Synod doubt or deny this? If you do, say so. Would God's will be *moral law* should he require moral agents to will and do *contrary to their natures and relations?* No, indeed. Nor, as I have before said, is it possible for God to create moral agents, and impose any other law upon them than that which is suited to their nature and relations.

2. The Doctor, as he well knows or ought to know, seeing he has assumed the responsibility of a reviewer, has made a *totally false issue.*

He objects to the idea that moral law is founded in, or grows, so to speak, out of the nature and relations of moral agents, that this is a vague rule and liable to be misunderstood, and that therefore, the declared will of God is necessary to reveal to us our duty, &c. Now the question *is not*, whether man needs a *revelation of the moral law* by the expressed will of

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God, but, in what is this rule based? Is the *law founded* in the will of God, or in the nature of God and in the nature and relations of moral agents? When God reveals the moral law to men, does he reveal to them, and require of them a course of willing and doing which is *naturally and necessarily fit and proper* for them, their natures and relations being what they are? Or does he publish an arbitrary edict which is not *naturally* obligatory upon them, but which is rendered obligatory, merely by his willing it? This is the question. *I* no more believe than he does, that man in his present blinded state would perceive in multitudes of instances, what his nature and relations require of him, or what is fit and proper for him, seeing he possesses this nature and sustains these relations, without a revelation and an injunction from God. Man needs, to say the least, to have the *true application* of the great principle of moral law revealed to him through the expressed will of God. But the question is, *what is the law when it is revealed?* Is it an arbitrary enactment sustaining no natural and necessary relation to the nature and relations of moral agents, and whose obligation or authority is founded in the sovereign will of God? Or is it a law *founded* in the eternal nature of God, and in the nature and relations of moral agents, and enforced by the authority or command of God, not as an arbitrary enactment, but as a rule necessarily growing out of and founded in his own nature and the nature and relations of his subjects? Will Doctor D. and will the Synod of Michigan affirm that the moral law is any thing else than that rule of action which is in accordance with the nature and relations of God and of his moral subjects? Remember the question *is not*, whether man *needs a revelation* of this, at least in its specific applications, but *what is this law* and on what is it based? Is it founded in the sovereign and arbitrary will of God? Or in the eternal and immutable nature of God, and in the nature and relations of moral agents? This is the question. Will Doctor D. or the Synod answer it? It is perfectly impertinent to quote scripture as Doctor D. has done to settle this question. Who doubts or denies that God's expressed will is law and imposes obligation? *I* do not doubt this, as the Doctor very well knows. But this is all the passages prove, which he has quoted. There is no issue between us on this point. The question is not whether God's revealed will is law. This is conceded on all hands. This the Bible every where

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affirms and implies. But the question is, why is God's revealed will *law?* Is it simply because *God wills something*, or because he wills *what he does?* Would his will be law if he willed in every instance the opposite of what he does? This is the question. Is it upon condition that God wills in accordance with the nature and relations of moral agents, that his revealed will is moral law? Or would his will be moral law if he willed contrary to the nature of God and to the nature and relations of moral agents? If the Doctor admits the former, this is what I have taught. If he insists upon the latter, let him say so. But will the Synod go with him? We shall see.

3. Again, pages 23, 24, 25, the Doctor says:

"The actual doing *of* what the moral law requires, and that too out *of* respect to the divine command, is that alone which the Saviour accepts as obedience. 'Ye are my friends,' says he, 'if ye do whatsoever I command you,' In like manner we are explicitly assured, that he alone is accepted 'that *doeth the will* of our Father which is in Heaven;' that 'not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the *doers of* the law, shall be justified.' It is only 'he that *doeth* righteousness is righteous.' But 'cursed is every one that continueth not in all *the things* which are *written* in the book of *the law* to *do* them.' The intention or will to do is of value in estimating our obedience, but it is not all. The law of God goes beyond the will, and looks also to the action; nor is obedience to it complete till that is consummated.

"In opposition to this, the error we condemn teaches that 'moral obligation respects ultimate intention *only*, that the law of God requires *only* consecration to the right end.' By the ultimate intention is meant the choice of an end for its own sake, and by consecration to that end, the supreme controlling choice. The highest possible aim of a rational creature is affirmed to be the greatest good of the universe. The choice of this, for its own intrinsic value, that is, 'choosing every interest according to its value as perceived by the mind,' it teaches is the law, is the sum and perfection of obedience to the moral law. This it calls holiness, which it defines 'to consist, in the supreme ultimate intention, choice or willing of the highest well-being of God and the highest good of His kingdom: and nothing else than this is virtue and holiness.' This, too, is what it calls the love which Christ says is 'the fulfilling of the law.' It avers that sincerity of choice, or honesty of intention, here, 'is moral perfection;' '*it* is obedience to the law;' and 'insists that the moral law requires nothing more than honesty of intention.' But the Bible teaches that sincerity in error, good intention in wrong deeds, change not the character of the act."

With reference to these paragraphs,

1. I would inquire whether Doctor D. means to assert that the Bible does not regard the *motive* or *intention* of the agent in any given act? If he does, I affirm that this is as great a heresy as ever was taught. But if the Doctor does not mean this, what does he mean, and where is the issue between us? He insists that the Bible requires the *doing* as well as the *intending*. So do I, and he knows it full well. I insist that the outward act follows from the inten-

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tion by a *law of necessity*. This the Doctor knows. I hold that when the Bible requires *doing*, it requires that the specified act shall be done with a *benevolent intention;* that the *spirit* of the requirement regards the *intention;* that God does not accept the *outward* doing unless the intention is right. But if the intention is right, God accepts the *will* as the deed where the outward act or deed is impossible. The doing will and must follow the willing unless something renders the outward act impossible. But where there is a *right willing or intending*, and the outward performance is rendered impossible, God accepts the intention as obedience. So of sin—if the willing or intending evil exists, God regards the crime as already committed although the outward performance or doing should be prevented. What reader of the Bible does not know that this is every where taught in it? Does Doctor D. deny this? He appears to do so. Nay if he does not do so, why does he find fault? Where is the issue between us upon this point? What does the Doctor mean by *doing* when he says that this doing *alone* is accepted as obedience. Does he mean the *muscular action*, or the *willing*, or both? If he means the first, I deny it and call for proof. Does the Doctor really intend to teach that the Bible represents God as accepting as obedience nothing but the *doing*, and that he does accept the *doing* as distinct from the intending? I deny that the Bible does teach this, and affirm that if it did, the human intelligence would and must reject its divine authority, by a law of necessity.

2. The Doctor says,

"But the Bible teaches that sincerity in error, good intention in wrong deeds change not the character of the act."

To this I reply that the Bible no where teaches or implies that wrong deeds can proceed from *good intentions*, or that *good deeds can proceed from wrong intentions*. But the Bible every where teaches that the character of the deed is as the intention is. The doctrine of the Bible is that the intention gives character to the deed; that good fruit can not grow upon an evil tree, nor evil fruit upon a good tree; that the intention is known by the deed; that the outward life reveals the nature of the intention. What? Does Doctor D. and does the Synod of Michigan believe that the outward or muscular act can be right or wrong *per se* in opposition to the intention? Certainly you will not gravely assert this. And yet the Doctor has charged this absurdity upon the blessed Bible!

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I omit quotations from scripture, on points so plain, to save space, and because every reader of the Bible will readily supply them from memory.

But can it be that a D. D. should gravely assert that the Bible teaches or implies that moral character belongs, *not to the intention*, but to mere muscular action, in such a sense that the muscular action can be right or wrong irrespective of or contrary to the intention? Really such teaching merits the deep rebuke, rather than the sanction of a Synod. And the churches must be gravely warned against the dreadful error that moral character belongs to the intention that necessitates muscular action, and not to the muscular action itself! If much of the teaching of this "Warning against Error" be not itself the most pernicious error, I know not what it is.

But the Doctor labors to show that the Bible requires more than good intention, that it requires good deeds. Now does the Doctor mean or expect to make the churches believe that I deny this? He knows that I do not deny it, but that I hold it as strongly as he does. I repeat that I hold that good deeds or outward actions are connected with good intention by a law of necessity. If I will or intend to move my muscles and to do a certain thing, the action follows by necessity unless the established connection between willing and muscular action, is by some means suspended. When the Bible requires outward acts, the *spirit* of all such requirements is that the subject shall *will* that which he is required to *do*, and if the outward or muscular action does not follow the act of the will, but fails on account of inability in the will to cause the outward act, God in this case, accepts the will for the deed. "If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not." If the will or intention exists, the outward act follows of course and of necessity, unless it has by some means become impossible for the will to cause or perform the outward act. In all such cases the act of the will or the intention is regarded as complying with the spirit of the requirement. Similar things are true of sinful intention. Does the Doctor deny this? Who does not know that this is the doctrine of the Bible, of common law, of equity, of all schools of philosophy and of theology? I am distressed with the Doctor's affecting to prove so often by scripture, either what nobody denies or what no body believes. If the Doctor does not really deny what I have

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taught in this paragraph and the same in my theology, what does he mean by pretending to differ with me upon this point? I should lose all respect for the Doctor's theological ability and even for his common sense, if I supposed that he really held that moral character belongs to the outward act as distinct from and opposed to the intention. But if he does not hold it, but admits, as he must or deny both reason and revelation, that the commands of God respect *directly in their spirit*, the intention, why does he profess to differ with me and cry heresy?

V. The fifth issue which the Doctor takes is as follows, pp. 27, 28:

THE SPIRITUALITY AND EXTENT OF THE MORAL LAW.

"The system of error, against which we warn you, teaches, 'that moral law requires nothing more than honesty of intention,' and 'that sincerity or honesty of intention is moral perfection.' By this rule it graduates the claims of the law of God, so as to make it a most convenient sliding scale, which adapts itself to the ignorance and weakness of men. It utterly perverts men's notions of that high and absolute perfection which the law demands, and makes moral perfection a variant quantity, changing continually, not only in different persons, but in the same individual. It reasons as follows, namely—Moral law respects intention only. Honesty of intention, or sincerity, is moral perfection. But light, or knowledge of the ultimate end, is the condition of moral obligation. Consequently, the degree of obligation must be just equal to the mind's honest estimate of the value of the end!! Thus, to love God with all the heart, soul, mind and strength, means nothing more than 'that the thoughts shall be expended in exact accordance with the mind's honest judgment of what is at every moment the best economy for God.'

"But the Bible teaches plainly, that the law of God reaches further than the ultimate intention, even to the actings of the moral agent, in the exercise of all the various faculties of the mind, in all the purposes, choices and purposes of the will, in all the inclinations and desires, the passions and affections, of the heart, and in all the members of the body. So far from making obligation to vary with light or knowledge, and the moral ability of the individual, the law and word of God hold men responsible for their ignorance; and attribute the deeper degrees of depravity and obnoxiousness to punishment, to those who have blinded their minds and hardened their hearts, so as to have destroyed or lost all power of perceiving and feeling the truth. 'It is a people of no understanding, therefore, He that made them will not have mercy on them, and He that formed them will shew them no favor.' 'That servant which neither knew, nor did his Lord's will, was beaten, it is true, with fewer stripes, than was he who knew it and did it not,' but he was beaten. His ignorance did not render him innocent. 'The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of Christ, and bringing into captivity *every thought* to the obedience of faith.'"

I sum up my teachings upon this subject as follows:

1. The Bible requires no natural impossibilities.

2. Honesty of intention, with those states of mind, and those outward acts that are by a natural law connected with, and consequently flow from it, is all that is naturally possible.

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3. All acts and mental states that are directly or indirectly under the control of the will, are proper subjects of command or prohibition, and are accordingly either commanded or prohibited.

4. But no act or mental state is either required or prohibited by the Bible, which in no sense is either directly or indirectly under the control of the will. These truths I have argued at length in the work reviewed; but upon this, as on most other points, the Doctor takes no notice of my argument. He finds it convenient to pass my proofs and arguments by in silence and keep his readers in ignorance of my reasons in support of my opinions, and even treats my opinions as if they were mere dogmatical assertions without even an attempt on my part to support them by reason or scripture. He merely quotes some single sentences and parts of sentences from my work, and seldom more in any one place, and then affects to array the scriptures against me. But in no instance does he show that my opinions as I hold and teach them, are inconsistent with the Bible.

But does the Doctor deny the truth of the above propositions? If he does, let him say so. But if he does not, why does he profess to disagree with me and cry *heresy?* But as is usual, the Doctor quotes the Confession of Faith. He quotes from your Confession as follows, page 25:

"Good works, or holy obedience are only such as God hath commanded in his holy word; not such as, without the warrant thereof, are devised by men, out of blind zeal, or '*upon any pretence of good intentions.*'"

I have italicized this just as I find it in the pamphlet before me.

In reply to this, I would say that I fully accord with this sentiment, as I do with most of the sentiments, of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. But what does it teach on this point?

1. *Not* that the Bible has no regard to the intention.

2. *Not* that the character of an outward act can be opposed to the intention.

3. *Not* that the character of an act is not invariably as the intention is.

4. But it does teach that good works are not those that are devised by men without a warrant from the word of God under the *pretence* of good intentions. Now why does not the Confession say, as the Doctor will have it, that good works are not always such as flow from good intentions, instead of carefully saying a *pretence* of good intentions?

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The framers of the Confession knew that good works must flow from good intention, but that evil works flow from a mere *pretence* of good intention. The plain teaching of the passage is this: Works to be good must have the sanction of the Bible, and not a mere *pretence* of good intentions. Have I taught that a *pretence* of good intentions can justify any course of conduct whatever? No indeed, but as far from it as possible. This the Doctor knows. What then has his quotation from the Confession of Faith to do with my teaching? I hold that intention must be honest, that is, that it must be such intention as God requires, and that when the intention is as God requires it to be, the outward deed must follow by a necessary law unless something is interposed that renders the outward act impossible, in which case God invariably accepts the will or intention for the deed. I might support this teaching by abundant quotations from scripture and from the wisest and best of men, as the Doctor ought to know. It is truly remarkable that the Doctor should so often quote scripture and the Confession of Faith with no just application to the point in debate. In the present instance the Confession does not at all support his position, but implies the position which I hold. To hold his position it should read, "good works are only such as God has commanded in his holy word, not such as, without the warrant thereof, are devised by men out of blind zeal or *from good intentions*." But instead of this it says, "*upon pretence of good intentions*," plainly implying that works that have not a warrant in the word of God can only proceed from *pretended* good intentions. This is what I teach. Does the Doctor deny this? If so, let him say so. If not, why does he pretend to differ with me?

VI. The Doctor's sixth objection is as follows, pp. 29, 30:

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.

"By the divine sovereignty, the supreme authority and right of God to govern, has been generally understood by Presbyterians. The entire constitution of nature is referred, by the Bible, to the sovereign will of God as its proper cause. It is as it is, because God so ordained it should be; 'who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.' Why angels and men, and other creatures, with all their varied powers, exist, is to be resolved into the sovereign will of God. 'Thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.' Why this man, wise and prudent, perceives not, and is left to reject the truths of salvation and the overtures of mercy, and the other man, simple and ignorant as a child, receives them, believes, and is saved, is referred by our blessed Redeemer to the same adorable sovereignty of God. 'In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit and said, I thank thee oh Father, Lord of Heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, even so Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.'

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But this sovereignty, the system of error we condemn, denies. For it teaches, that the obligation of moral law is 'entirely independent of the will of God,'—'does not, and cannot, originate in (His) will'—was not created by Him—binds God Himself, is as entirely independent of His will as His own existence, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, grows out of, and consists in what is fit, proper and suitable to the nature, relations and circumstances of moral beings, and that 'every thing else that claims to be law, and to impose obligations upon moral agents, from whatever source it emenates, is not, and cannot be law, but must be an imposition and a thing of nought."

The Doctor seems to be so horrified at the denial that the arbitrary will of God is the foundation of moral obligation that he does little else than repeat the objection over and over. Here we have his objection again. I have fully discussed this subject in the work reviewed and showed conclusively that God's sovereign will can not be the foundation of obligation. I have also shown it fully in the preceding pages, but by no means so fully and to so great length as in my Theology. The Doctor takes no notice of my argument nor apprises his readers that I have any in support of my position, but only professes to be shocked at the impiety of such teaching. But does the Doctor himself believe that God's will is the foundation of obligation? Does he believe that God's will would impose obligation did he will the contrary of what he does? Does he believe that God's will would impose obligation if He had no good reason for willing as he does, or if He willed contrary to right reason! Does he deny that God wills *as* he does because there is the best reason for his so willing? But if God wills as he does because he has good reasons for so willing, how is his will the foundation of the obligation? God wills good, and requires us to will good. Is He under an obligation so to will and so to require? If so, how can his will be the foundation of the obligation? I have shown that moral law is founded, not in the *will*, but in the *reason* of God; that he is as truly under obligation to be benevolent or to obey the moral law as we are. Does the Doctor deny this? If so, let him say so.

Under this head again, the Doctor insists that the nature and relations of things must be ascribed to the sovereign will of God. I admit this in some sense. But in what sense?

1. *Not* in the sense that God had a right, or that it was possible for him to have created moral agents in such a way that benevolence should have been vice, and selfishness virtue. It was not possible for God to create a universe of moral agents and render any other than the law of benevolence obligatory on them. He might have abstained from

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creating moral agents, but if He did create them, or having created them, he could give them no other law than that of benevolence which his reason imposed upon himself. Nor could He possibly have so created them *as moral agents* that another law could have been binding upon them. His eternal reason from eternity affirmed the law of all possible moral agents, and God can never by willing it change this ordinance of his own intelligence. Does Doctor D. deny this? If not, why does he pretend to differ with me upon this point and continue to ring changes upon different statements of this objection which I have so fully and so often answered?

If I am guilty of repetition in my reply it is only because I have to follow the Doctor.

In volume second of my published Theology, in lectures five and nine I have considered fully the question of the sovereign will of God being the foundation of moral obligation. If I am not mistaken, the reader of those lectures will, if he duly considers them, be convinced that the heresy lies on the Doctor's side of this question, and that it is a most injurious blunder in theology to hold that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of moral obligation. Will the reader consult also what I have written in volume third on the purposes and sovereignty of God.

VII. The Doctor's seventh head is as follows—pages 31, 32, 33.

THE NATURE, AND GROUND, OR REASON OF JUSTIFICATION.

"Justification is the acquittal from guilt, and acceptance as righteous, of an individual, either on the part of man or of God. Among men, it is founded on the individual's innocence or freedom from crime. The justification of a sinner can never take place on this ground. He has offended, and therefore the sacred scriptures declare, "By the deeds of the law, (that is, our personal obedience,) shall no flesh be justified in His sight.' If ever a sinner of the human race shall be treated and accepted as righteous or justified before God, it must be by an act of grace; that is, it must be an act of unmerited favor. The ground or reason for God's doing this in any case, is not because of the sinner's return to obedience; nor because of his repentance; nor because of any moral perfection or virtue in him; nor because he is in any sense morally perfect; but simply and solely on account of the obedience unto death of Jesus Christ.

"It is not the sinner's own personal obedience to the law, nor the believer's, which, properly speaking, forms *the condition* of justification before God. By condition, we understand and mean, that which is to be performed previously by one party, in order to entitle to something promised, stipulated, or engaged to be done by another in return. It is in this sense the word is commonly understood and employed, in the ordinary transactions of life. There is, it is true, another sense in which the word is used by some theologians—its philosophical meaning—who express by it, simply, the state or position in which things stand connected with each other, as when, having said that faith and holiness are *the conditions* of salvation, and when called to explain

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themselves, affirm that they by no means intend that these are the meritorious grounds, but merely that they will be found invariably connected with, as they are indispensable evidences of, a state of salvation."

I have defined gospel sanctification to be pardon of sin, and acceptance with God, as if the sinner had not sinned.

I make a broad distinction between the *conditions* of justification and the *ground* or *foundation* of justification. I use the term *condition* in the sense of a *sine qua non*, a *not without which*. The *ground or foundation* of justification I regard as that to which we are to ascribe our justification.

The following I hold to be *conditions* of pardon and acceptance or of gospel justification in the sense just explained, that is, not in the sense of the *ground or foundation* of justification, but in the sense that justification can not take place where these are wanting. Men are not justified *for* these things, but they can not be justified without them, just as men are not justified *by* good works, but can not be justified *without* them. I regard this distinction as fundamental. I regard and teach the following as *conditions*, but not as the *ground*, of justification.

1. The atonement of Christ.
2. Repentance.
3. Faith in the atonement.
4. Sanctification, or such repentance and faith as imply present obedience to God, or present entire consecration to Him. I make a distinction between *present* and *continued* and *final* justification.

I *conditionate present* pardon of past sin, and acceptance or justification, upon *present* faith and obedience, and future acceptance upon future faith and obedience. The Doctor denies this and maintains that *one act of faith* introduces the sinner into a state of unalterable justification. We shall attend to his teaching soon, but for the present, I must present my own.

I have just said that I hold perseverance in faith and obedience to be a *condition* of *continued* justification.

With regard to the *ground* or *foundation* of justification, I hold and expressly teach, as the Doctor well knows, that the following are *not grounds* of justification.

1. Not the obedience of Christ for us.
2. Not our own obedience either to the law or gospel.
3. Not the atonement of Christ.
4. Not any thing in the mediatorial work of Christ.
5. Not the work of the Holy Spirit in us.

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These are all *conditions* of our justification in the sense that we can not be justified without them.

But the *ground or fundamental reason* of our justification is *the disinterested and infinite love of God.*—"For God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, should not perish, but have everlasting life."—*John* 3: 16.

Now, how does the the Doctor treat this teaching? Why, he knows that I make the important distinction between the *conditions* and *ground* of justification, and admits that *some writers* make this distinction, but he does not say that *I* make it and treat me accordingly, but proceeds to take issue with me, and to represent me as if I did not make it.

But the Doctor perfectly misrepresents me upon this subject. Page 39:

"But the system of error against which we warn you, plainly and avowedly makes justification before God to be on the ground and condition of man's personal obedience to the law."

Here, as all along, the Doctor confounds the *conditions and ground* of justification, and represents me as teaching that obedience to the moral law is both the *ground and condition* of justification. Let any one read my lecture on justification, Vol. 3d, beginning page 96, of my Systematic Theology, and then say whether the Doctor has fairly represented my views.

From what the Doctor says in regard to the *conditions* of justification, it *appears* as if his charge against me on this point was not an oversight. It *seems* as if he saw clearly that I made the distinction above explained, between the *conditions* and the *ground* of justification, and it also *seems* as if he intended to cover up this distinction and keep the fact that I had made it, out of view. It is plain, that the distinction in the sense above explained, is an important one, and too obvious to be reasonably disputed. It is also clear that the only *appearance* of error in my teaching, as it respects *the ground* of justification, is found in the overlooking of this distinction. I must confess that I have been distressed with the *apparent dishonesty* of this writer in this and several other parts of his review. There is, in this review, as a whole, so much of the *appearance* of a spirit of fault-finding, as almost to agonize me. But, as I said, I must not sit in judgment upon his intention, but leave him to the judgment of God.

Dear brethren, will you consider the injustice, I may hope unintentionally done to me and to the cause of truth, in this

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gross mistake made by Doctor D., and endorsed by you? I think I may safely say that I never for a moment, at any period of my christian life, held that man's own obedience or righteousness was the *ground* of his justification before God. I always held and strenuously maintained the direct opposite of this. In my published theology I have insisted upon it at large, and yet Doctor D., has charged me with that which is as untrue as possible, and you reiterate the charge. "Tell it not in Gath."

Do not understand me as accusing the Doctor of designed misrepresentation. I make no such charge. I am aware of the power of habit as well in thought as in other things. The Doctor has so stereotyped his trains of thought and has so long been accustomed to a certain way of thinking and to a certain phraseology, that he does not readily understand what is said when it varies much from his accustomed track.

VIII. But let us attend to the Doctor's teaching, pp. 40, 41, 42, 34.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF JUSTIFICATION, OR ADOPTION INTO GOD'S FAMILY, AND PERSEVERANCE UNTO LIFE.

"The eternal continuance of the true believer in a state of justification before God, and his perseverance in the way of faith and holiness, so as never to come under the damnatory sentence of the law of God, as a broken covenant of works, are essential points of faith.

"The sacred Scriptures clearly teach, that God, by one gracious act, once passed, and forever immutable, releases the sinner who believes, so effectually and fully, from the penalty of the law, that he is removed from under its dominion, and never more comes into condemnation.

"But the system of error, against which we warn you, utterly repudiates such a release from the condemnation of the law, and such a filial relation to God, except in so far as it may exist simultaneously, and only in connection, with what it calls, at one time, 'present full obedience,' at another, 'entire sanctification,' and again, 'moral perfection.' It affirms that the christian 'is justified no farther than he obeys, and must be condemned when he disobeys, or antinomianism is true.' It does not distinguish, between the offending christian's displeasing God as his heavenly Father, and the condemnation of the impenitent sinner by God as his Lawgiver and Judge; between God's *parental* discipline administered to his erring children, and the infliction of the penalty of the law as moral governor upon the guilty—between forgiveness as a Father, and pardon as a Prince. A system of parental chastisement which is disciplinary, reforming, and not penal, is very different from a moral government armed with penal sanctions. Chastisement aims to reform and save: penalty does not; but to protect society and promote the public good. This distinction is very important; but it is wholly lost sight of in the erroneous theory which we condemn. It identifies these things, and confounds all the gracious relations and offices of God through Jesus Christ, with that of the high executive functionary or moral governor of the universe, boldly affirming, that "when the christian sins, he must repent and do his first works, or *he will perish*—until he repents he cannot be forgiven.' 'Whenever he sins he *must*, for the time being, cease to be holy—he *must* be *condemned*—he *must incur the penalty* of the law of God."

"Justification is an act of God's free grace, which takes immediate effect in this mortal life, and by which the relation of the sinner, who believes on Jesus Christ,

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is so thoroughly changed to the law, that through the acting of his faith, he passes from under the condemnation and penalty of the law; and being accepted as righteous, only for the righteousness of Christ, is adopted into the family of God's children. It is one act of God, once done and forever, and begins immediately to produce its fruits."

Here then, we have the Doctor's views of justification.

1. *That one act of faith so changes the relation of the sinner, that he never again comes under condemnation, however much he may sin!*

He is removed from under God's *moral* government, and is only under a *parental* government. In this state he may sin, but the *law* does not condemn him. God no longer sustains to him the relation of moral governor, but only that of a father. Now I should like to know where the Doctor gets all this? Indeed! is a Christian no longer *a subject of moral government?* How does the Doctor know this? But what is a *parental government?* Is it not a *moral* government? Has God, *as a father*, no *law*, no *rule of action?* If He has not, what is virtue in his children? If He has, what is this law? Has it any penalty? If the Doctor says, No, then I affirm that it is no law. Penalty is an universal attribute of law. That is not, cannot be law, which has no penalty. It is only counsel or advice.

If the Doctor admits that the law of *God's children* has a penalty, I would ask whether his children incur this penalty when they sin? If the Doctor says *no*, I ask why then, do they need pardon, or how can they be pardoned, if not condemned? If he says *yes*, I inquire how this, that is, pardon, is consistent with the doctrine that Christians are justified, that is, pardoned, "*once for all?*" If justification consists in pardon and acceptance or a restoration to favor, how can it be "*once for all*," or perpetual, and yet pardon for subsequent sin be necessary or possible? Will the Doctor inform us? In this as in all other cases, the Doctor has found it convenient to pass *in silence* my whole argument against his views of justification, with all the scriptures I have quoted to sustain my position.

To go into a full refutation of the Doctor's errors upon the points at issue, were but to re-write the entire lecture to which I have referred the reader. I ask only that the reader may read and understand that lecture, and I cheerfully submit the points now at issue to his judgment, without further argument.

But think of it, reader, Christians not under the *moral* government of God! So far from it, that they can commit

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any number or degree of sins without condemnation—may backslide and not be condemned—might apostatize and still not be condemned by the law! If this is not dangerous error, what is?

But the Doctor says, page 33:

"The acceptance and appropriation of a gift, can, in no proper sense, be called a condition. The sinner is 'freely justified by grace.' He is not asked, or required, by God, to *do* any thing with a view to a *future* justification; but to accept of a free justification at present offered."

But is not this *accepting* of a free justification, a *doing* something, and doing something not as a *ground*, but as a *condition* of justification? In confounding the *ground* with the conditions of justification, the Doctor blunders at every step. What, are there no *conditions* of justification? Nothing for a sinner to do as a *sine qua non* of his justification? I affirm that the Bible every where represents perseverance in obedience as a *condition* of *ultimate* justification. The Doctor represents me as teaching that this perseverance is the *ground* of *ultimate* justification. In this he greatly errs. What can the Doctor mean by the assertion that "the acceptance and appropriation of a gift can in no proper sense be a *condition*"? Is it not a *condition of possessing the thing given?* Is it not a *sine qua non* of justification? Perhaps in reply the Doctor will give us a learned essay on the etymology of the term *condition*. If so, I will not dispute about the meaning of a word, while the sense in which I use the term is plain.

There are three points at issue between the Doctor and myself upon the subject of justification.

1. I hold that we are to ascribe our justification before God to his *infinite love or grace* as its *ground* or *foundation*. The Doctor holds that the atonement and work of Christ is the *ground* of justification. I hold that the atonement and mediatorial work of Christ are *conditions*, but not the *ground* of justification.

2. I hold that "breaking off from sin by righteousness and turning unto God" is a *condition* of justification; that repentance and faith that implies whole hearted consecration to God, that a ceasing from present rebellion against God is a *condition* of the *present* pardon of past sin, or of *present* justification. The Doctor, it would seem, (for he professes to differ with me upon this point,) holds that a *present* cessation from rebellion is not even a *condition* of pardon and acceptance with God, but the sinner is pardoned and justifi-

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ed upon the first act of a faith that *does not* imply present, entire renunciation of rebellion against God. Thus the Doctor holds that a sinner may be justified while he continues his rebellion. If he does not mean this, where is the difference between us upon this point? If the Doctor denies that a sinner can be pardoned and accepted until he ceases from *present* rebellion, let him say, that upon this point he agrees with me, for this is what I hold. I admit that the Christian is justified through faith, but I also hold that

> "'Tis faith that changes all the heart,
> 'Tis faith that works by love,
> That bids *all sinful joys depart*,
> And lifts the thoughts above."

But it seems that the Doctor denies this, and of course considers Watts, in the above stanza, as teaching heresy.

I hold that this purifying faith is a condition of present justification. The Doctor denies this. Who is right?

Is the Doctor old-school, or new school, or of no school at all upon the subject of justification? Does he hold strictly to the *imputed* righteousness of Christ as the *ground* of justification? I can not tell. Upon this as upon sundry other points he seems to be so loose in his phraseology, and so indefinite in his use of language that he may be understood as being one thing or another, or nothing, as you please. This whole review is characterized by such looseness and ambiguity of language as to preclude a rational hope of ever concluding controversy with the writer, except upon the condition that I consent to let him have the last word and say what he pleases.

3. A third point of difference respects the *perpetuity* of justification. I hold that the Christian remains justified no longer than he continues in faith and obedience; that perseverance in faith and obedience is a *condition* of *continued* and ultimate justification. I support this in my theology at great length by scripture and reason. This the Doctor denies, and holds that one act of faith forever changes the relation of the Christian, insomuch, that from the first act of faith, he is justified "*once for all.*" However much then, a Christian may sin, he is not condemned, and of course needs no pardon. For pardon is nothing else than setting aside the execution of an incurred penalty of law. Why then do Christians pray for pardon, and why should they offer the Lord's prayer?

Is not this teaching of the Doctor as plainly contrary to the Bible as possible.—"But when the righteous turneth

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away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity and doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." —*Ez.* 18: 24. "When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall surely live; if he trust to his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all his righteousness shall not be remembered; but for his iniquity that he hath committed, he shall die for it."—33: 13. "If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."—*John* 15: 6. "Who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them, who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, and honor, and immortality, eternal life."—*Rom.* 2: 6, 7. "For we are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end."—*Hebrews* 3: 14.

IX. The ninth issue which the Doctor *professes* to take, is upon the subject of Perfection, or Entire Sanctification. He says, page 43:

PERFECTION OR "ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION."

"We believe, according to the word of God, and our standards, that 'there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not,' that 'if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us,' and 'that no mere man, since the fall, is able, in this life, perfectly to keep the commandments of God.' We mean not, that the true christian, will or can, deliberately make choice of, and allow himself to do, what he knows to be sinful, or refuse to do what he knows to be his duty. The consecration of mind and heart to God,' 'with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience,' are what we look for, and affirm to be among the very first indications of 'effectual calling,' and a regenerate state,—not an attainment which is or may be made in a more advanced period of the christian life."

Upon this passage I would inquire, whether the Doctor means gravely to maintain that a person once regenerated does not and can not choose and do what he knows to be wrong, or refuse to choose and do what he knows to be right? This he affirms. But does he really mean it? and does the Synod of Michigan hold this too? Did not David choose to do what he knew to be wrong in the seduction of Bathsheba, and the consequent murder of her husband? Will the Doctor say that he was not a regenerate man? Or will he say that he did not act intelligently or "*deliberately?*" If so, what does he mean by "*deliberately?*" Will the Doctor inform us?

Again, the Doctor says, pp. 46, 47:

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"It is altogether a fallacy that men must believe in the actual attainability of perfection in this mortal life, in order to aim at it, and to stimulate to effort for it, which is the main, popular, and plausible argument, by which this system of error advocates perfection in this world. The artist and tradesman aim at perfection in their professions—the painter has a *beau ideal* constantly in view, and skill and improvement continually result from their efforts after perfection; but their constant imperfections, and failures, and yet conscious advancement, keep them humble, persevering, and diligent, ever pressing on toward it."

1. I was not aware that this was the "*main*, *popular*, and *plausible* argument by which the advocates of christian perfection endeavor to sustain their position."

2. I was not, and still am not aware of the fallacy of this argument. The Doctor's illustration will show the fallacy, not of the argument, but of his answer. He says, page 47:

"The artist and tradesman aim at perfection in their professions—the painter has a *beau ideal* constantly in view, and skill and improvement continually result from their efforts after perfection."

It is "*altogether a fallacy*" to assert that the painter aims at *perfection*. He knows it to be impossible, and all that can be truly said is that he intends to go as far as he can, and to reach as high an elevation in his art, as is possible to him. But he never for a moment intends or expects to attain to *perfection*. Nor does nor can a Christian really *intend* to be or do, what he knows or believes to be *impossible* to him.

But I must now attend to the *pretended* issue which the Doctor takes with me upon this subject. I must first get at his definition of Perfection or Entire Sanctification. He says, pp. 45, 46:

"There is a deterioration of our moral and intellectual as well as of our physical powers, consequent on the fall, so that the most exact obedience any mortal man ever rendered, comes far short of the demands, which the law of God made of our great progenitor, who was created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness and holiness, and in the full developement and perfection of all his moral powers. *Uninterrupted* obedience is the only obedience that can satisfy the claims of the law. To continue in his obedience, as perfect as God had made him, agreeably to the test which He had instituted, was the condition required for his justification, and to which the promise of eternal life was annexed. This, then, is the standard by which we are to judge of moral perfection, and not the fluctuating standard of the different degrees of moral power in different individuals—the endlessly deteriorated varieties of human ability, developed in man's fallen nature. Whoever is thus perfect, as Adam was required to be, will be justified by his own obedience to the law, and entitled to eternal life, as having perfectly kept the commandments of God. This, and this only, is perfection in the eye of God and of His law."

Again:—pp. 46, 47.

"It is altogether a fallacy that men must believe in the actual attainability of perfection in this mortal life, in order to aim at it, and to stimulate to effort

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for it, which is the main, popular, and plausible argument, by which this system of error advocates perfection in this world. The artist and tradesman aim at perfection in their professions—the painter has a *beau ideal* constantly in view, and skill and improvement continually result from their efforts after perfection; but their constant imperfections, and failures, and yet conscious advancement keep them humble, persevering, and diligent, ever pressing on toward it."

Again,—page 53:

"To affirm perfect holiness, or entire sanctification, therefore, to pertain to an individual, because of an ultimate intention, or purpose, or governing act of will, or faith, which has not been subjected to tests, nor been tried without failure or interruption through an entire life, is greatly to dishonor God's law, and to magnify human vanity and pride."

Again, page 56:

"What is 'entire obedience,' 'entire sanctification,' if these phrases mean any thing distinct and definite? and what else can it be, but perfect, absolute conformity in thought and word, in will and deed, in purpose and affection, in heart and habits, to every requirement of the divine law, from the very first moment of our moral existence, and without the least failure or interruption? This was had only by our first parents in their state of innocence.

In these passages we have all that I can gather of the Doctor's idea of what constitutes perfection or entire sanctification. In reply, I remark,

1. That, as has been usual, the Doctor makes a totally *false issue* with us. He has given altogether a different definition of entire sanctification from that which I have given and defended, and that too, notwithstanding my solemn protest upon this subject as follows: (*Sys. Theol.*, pp. 198, 199.)

"Here let me remark, that a definition of terms in all discussions is of prime importance. Especially is this true of this subject. I have observed that, almost without an exception, those who have written on this subject dissenting from the views entertained here, do so upon the ground that they understand and define the terms Sanctification and Christian Perfection differently from what we do. Every one gives his own definition, varying materially from others and from what we understand by the terms; and then they go on professedly opposing the doctrine as inculcated here. Now this is not only utterly unfair, but palpably absurd. If I oppose a doctrine inculcated by another man, I am bound to oppose what he really holds. If I misrepresent his sentiments, 'I fight as one that beateth the air.' I have been amazed at the diversity of definitions that have been given to the terms Christian Perfection, Sanctification, &c.; and to witness the diversity of opinion as to what is, and what is not implied in these terms. One objects wholly to the use of the term Christian Perfection, because in his estimation it implies this and that and the other thing, which I do not suppose are at all implied in it. Another objects to our using the term Sanctification, because that implies according to his understanding of it, certain things that render its use improper. Now it is no part of my design to dispute about the use of words. I must, however, use some terms; and

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I ought to be allowed to use Bible language in its Scriptural sense, as I understand it. And if I should sufficiently explain my meaning and define the sense in which I use the terms, and the sense in which the Bible manifestly uses them, this ought to suffice. And I beg that nothing more or less may be understood by the language I use than I profess to mean by it. Others may, if they please, use the terms and give a different definition of them. But I have a right to hope and expect, if they feel called upon to oppose what I say, that they will bear in mind my definition of the terms, and not pretend, as some have done, to oppose my views, while they have only differed from me in their definition of the terms used, giving their own definition varying materially and, I might say, infinitely from the sense in which I use the same terms, and then arraying their arguments to prove that according to their definition of it, Sanctification is not really attainable in this life, when no one here or any where else, that I ever heard of, pretended that in their sense of the term, it ever was or ever will be attainable in this life, and I might add, or in that which is to come."

Now hear what the Doctor says to all this, page 56:

"We warn you against its deceptive and jesuitical use of terms, as it makes the phrases 'entire obedience,' 'full present obedience,' 'honesty of intention;' 'sincerity,' 'entire sanctification'—its novel, peculiar and sophistical technics, synonymous with moral perfection or perfect holiness—perfection of moral character and conduct. The phrases are actually unmeaning, and ambiguous—mere vehicles for the most dangerous sophistry, and eminently calculated to mislead and deceive. What is 'entire obedience,' 'entire sanctification,' if these phrases mean any thing distinct and definite? and what else can it be, but perfect, absolute conformity in thought and word, in will and deed, in purpose and affection, in heart and habits, to every requirement of the divine law, from the very first moment of our moral existence, and without the least failure or interruption?"

I will not remark upon the *characteristic language* of this last paragraph.

I supposed I had a right to use such terms as I chose, to define my own position, if I was careful to define the sense in which I used them, especially to use Bible language. I took much pains to say what I did not and what I did mean by the terms I used, and protested against any one's overlooking my own definitions and substituting a totally different one of their own, and thus setting up the *pretence* of opposing my views, when they were only assailing a position which I did not occupy. But, after all, this is the identical course which the Doctor has taken. His definition of perfection or entire sanctification does not even pretend to be that of *christian* perfection or of *christian* sanctification. It is only a definition of what would constitute perfection in a being *who had never sinned*. My definition designates perfection or entire sanctification in one who *has been a sinner*. The Doctor well knows that there is no issue between us upon the attainability of perfection in this life in *his* sense of the term perfection. I no more believe in the possibility of

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attaining perfection in this life in *his* sense of the term, than he does.

Have our opponents no way to oppose us but to cavil at our definitions and make false issues with us? It would seem not.

But what are the elements of the Doctor's ideal of perfection? Hear him, page 56:

"What is 'entire obedience,' 'entire sanctification,' if these phrases mean any thing distinct and definite? and what else can it be, but perfect absolute conformity in thought and word, in will and deed, in purpose and affection, in heart and habits, to every requirement of the divine law, from the very first moment of our moral existence, and without the least failure or interruption? This was had only by our first parents in their state of innocence."

Here, then, he lays it down that entire sanctification in *his* use of the term, implies *uninterrupted and perfect obedience from the first moment of moral agency.* That is, to be sanctified in his sense of the term, one must have *never* sinned. If any moral agent has sinned, he can, according to this, never in this *nor any other world* be entirely sanctified. No saint in glory can be entirely sanctified, because he has sinned. He can never at any period of his existence perfectly obey the law of God, because his obedience has not "*always been perfect from the first moment of his moral existence.*" Marvelous! Brethren of the Synod, do you accept and endorse this definition of entire sanctification?

Again, let us hear what constitutes a second element in his ideal of entire obedience to moral law or entire sanctification. He says, pp. 45:

"There is a deterioration of our moral and intellectual as well as of our physical powers, consequent on the fall, so that the most exact obedience any mortal man ever rendered, comes far short of the demands, which the law of God made of our great progenitor, who was created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness and holiness, and in the full development and perfection of all his moral powers. *Uninterrupted* obedience is the only obedience that can satisfy the claims of the law. To continue in his obedience, as perfect as God had made him, agreeably to the test which he had instituted, was the condition required for his justification, and to which the promise of eternal life was annexed. This, then, is the standard by which we are to judge of moral perfection, and not the fluctuating standard of the different degrees of moral power in different individuals—the endlessly deteriorated varieties of human ability, developed in man's fallen nature."

It here appears that all mankind, whatever their age or education, or circumstances or ability may be, are according to him required by the law of God to render the very same service to God both in kind and degree that was required of Adam, "created as he was in the image of God, in knowledge and righteousness, and true holiness, in the full devel-

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opment and perfection of all his moral powers." Notwithstanding that, "there is a deterioration of our moral and intellectual, as well as of our physical powers;" so that the same obedience is impossible to us, yet the law still demands this impossible obedience of us all. And how does the Doctor know this? He has not informed us. Does the Bible teach it? No, indeed; that informs us that "if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath (according to his ability) and not according to what he hath not." The very language of the law as laid down by Christ restricts requirement to ability, whatever that may be. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all *thy* heart, with all *thy* soul, with all *thy* might, and with all *thy* strength. Now every one can see that the Doctor has taken no issue with me in respect to the attainability in this life of a state of entire sanctification in *my* sense of the term. And I take no issue with him on the attainability of such a state either in this or in any life in *his* sense of the term. Nay it is impossible for one who has ever sinned to attain in this sense entire sanctification as we have seen. The only point at issue between us upon this subject respects the *spirit* of the requirement of God's law. He maintains that it requires of man in his present state a natural impossibility; that it requires a degree of obedience that is no more possible to him than to undo all he has done or to make a world; that it threatens him with eternal death for not rendering this impossible obedience. I do not wonder that the Doctor vehemently opposes the idea that "moral law is a rule of action *suited* to the *nature and relations of moral agents*." Should he admit this, which reason and revelation equally affirm, he must of course give up his old school dogma that God requires of his creatures natural impossibilities. Brethren of the Synod, do you hold with Doctor D. the doctrine of natural inability? I supposed you did not. But it seems I am mistaken. Will all the new school Presbyterians go back with Doctor D. to all the absurdities of old schoolism to escape from our conclusions? We shall see.

Since the Doctor has given a definition of entire sanctification and of entire obedience to the law of God differing *toto cælo* from mine and indeed from any other I have ever heard or read, I will not follow him nor trouble you with a reply. It will be time enough for me to reply when he undertakes to show that entire sanctification in *my sense* of the term is unattainable in this life.

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The Doctor does indeed almost rail at my idea of entire sanctification. He vehemently urges that that is no entire sanctification at all. But on what ground does he insist upon this? Why, on the grounds above explained, namely, that the moral law requires impossibilities of man, and that no one can ever be justly said to be entirely sanctified who has ever sinned. Well, I will leave the Doctor quietly to enjoy his opinion.

X. The Doctor's next head is as follows, pp. 57,58,59,65:

THE NATURE OF MORAL DEPRAVITY.

"In the language of common sense, men attribute to the moral being, whose general state of mind manifests itself in uniform choices and prevalent governing emotions and passions, the same character they do to these its manifestations. Both the general state of mind and its specific manifestations,—as well in uniform or habitual choices, as in occasional ascendant passions, affections or propensities—are regarded as developments and attributes of character, which are to be predicated of the person or moral agent—strictly speaking of the rational, responsible mind or soul in which they exist, either as habitudes or as acts or events, rather than of the specific faculties, susceptibilities, affections or passions. Thus we denominate this one or the other, 'the debauchee and the glutton, (and the drunkard,) and the gambler and the miser, and a host of others, each in his turn giving striking and melancholy proof' of the man's moral depravity, rather than, as it is affirmed by this theory, 'of the monstrous development and physical depravity of the human sensibility.' This man and the other is called revengeful, malicious, lewd, lascivious, deceitful, covetous, avaricious and the like, according to the ascendant passion, affection, propensity or habit of mind, which determines his choices and conduct, and in so doing, develops his moral character. Hence it is common to speak of sinful dispositions, sinful affections, sinful words, sinful conduct, as well as sinful choices, not as sinful *per se*, that is, in themselves, by a mere necessity of being, but as related to sinful choice, that is to say, the dispositions, affections, &c., influencing the sinful choices of sinful beings."

"Hence it has been customary to predicate moral depravity of what lies back of choice or ultimate intention, that is, of whatever state of mind or feeling or both exists anterior to choice, and tends, inclines, impels and prevails to determine the moral and accountable being to sinful choice."

But a few pages back we hear the Doctor affirm that the *moral excellence* of God determines his will. Here he comes forward with the theory that *moral depravity* also "lies back of choice, and tends, inclines, impels, and prevails to determine the moral and accountable being to sinful choice." Here then the Doctor defines his position. *Moral depravity* is *involuntary*. It is not an action or voluntary attitude of the will, but is something back of voluntary action which prevails to determine sinful choice.

This is indeed ripe old schoolism. To reply to this were to re-write my whole volume on moral government, and to repeat what has been said in reply to this nonsensical philosophy a hundred times.

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Under this head the Doctor forgets all the *protests* he has filed against philosophising and plunges into a dense fog-bank of old school metaphysics, and assumes with the utmost assurance the truthfulness of all that has been so often refuted by new school writers. Most that he says under this head is high old schoolism. But, as is usual with him, he is often very ambiguous. Sometimes he speaks of *disposition* as distinct from the will and as determining its choices, and then again he speaks of it as if it were or might be a *voluntary* state of mind. Brethren of the Synod, do you understand the Doctor upon this subject and believe in his positions? For myself I can do neither. But since to reply to him upon this point were but to re-write all that myself and others have written to expose the errors of this philosophy, it cannot be expected that in this reply I should attempt it. Why does he dogmatically assume as true what has been shown to be false, and that too, without once attempting a reply to what his opponents have said? This might do for laymen and women who are not expected to have read much and entered into this controversy; but that he should succeed in gaining the sanction of a new school synod to his old and exploded positions, is surely marvelous. Brethren, I cannot believe that you had opportunity to understand this pamphlet before you adopted it. But we shall see.

XI. The Doctor's next head is as follows, pp. 73, 74, 75:

THE NATURE OF REGENERATION AND OF THE SPIRIT.

"The system of error, against which we testify, teaches that regeneration is 'a change in the attitude of the will,' and that it consists in the sinner's changing his 'ultimate choice, intention, preference.' A resolution, or purpose, or choice, or ultimate intention to seek the well being of God and of the universe, is the whole of it. This it calls, 'a change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness.' 'Regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly influenced by truth.' The agency of the Spirit in regeneration, is, indeed, theoretically acknowledged, and the passivity of the sinner, also; but the former is represented to consist in presenting the truth, and the latter in being a 'percipient of the truth (so) presented by the Spirit, at the moment, and during the act of regeneration.' An efficient determining influence upon the mind and heart of the sinner, causing and enabling him to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil, and to make choice of God, and Christ, and holiness, is denied and denounced. The perception of truth on the sinner's heart, according to the error against which we warn you, follows the law of necessity that governs intellect. The Spirit's presentation of the truth, it is admitted, is necessary; but only as a prerequisite to such perception. That perception, is but 'the condition and the occasion of regeneration.' The sinner, himself, is 'the sovereign and efficient cause of the choice' of his will. He solely originates, in a sovereign manner, his choices. Any other influence, 'than light poured upon the intelligence, or truth presented to the mind,' being beyond consciousness, this theory affirms, 'is and must be physical;' and that the Spirit exerts any other influence in regeneration, than that of divine illumination, it affirms to be a 'sheer assumption,'

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"In sustaining these views, this theory affirms, that the word heart, as used in this connection in the sacred Scriptures, does not mean the feelings, the sensibilities, or susceptibilities; but only the *ultimate* intention: and that of the latter alone, never of the former, can moral character be predicated. A change of heart is simply a change of will. This view is directly opposed to the language and spirit of the Bible. In it, the word heart is sometimes used to denote the sensibilities and feelings, the affections and passions, the susceptibilities and emotions, and not exclusively the supreme ultimate intention or governing purpose."

In remarking upon this extract I would say,

1. That I nowhere maintain, as the Doctor represents, that the term heart is used in the Bible *exclusively* to mean the ultimate intention or controlling preference of the mind.—This is sheer misrepresentation, for I expressly assert the contrary.

2. I would inquire what the Doctor means by "an efficient determining influence upon the mind and heart of the sinner *causing* and enabling him to renounce the flesh"? Now in what sense does the Doctor use the term heart in this sentence? What does he mean by *efficient* influence? What does he mean by *causing* the sinner, &c.? He has not told us what he means. The heart it would seem with him must be the sensibility, or something distinct from the will or from ultimate preference or intention.

Again he says, page 76:

"No bald purpose or resolution, or will to seek the well being of God and of the universe, will suffice as evidence of regeneration, or of that change which takes place when the sinner renounces sin and self, and begins to lead a new and holy life. It must be such an entire consecration to God, as bears along with it, mind, will, affections, and places every power of the body, soul, and spirit, under direction and control."

Here the Doctor gives his views of what is implied in regeneration. This also is what I hold to be implied in regeneration, and hence I hold that regeneration implies *present entire obedience* to God. Does not the Doctor's language here imply present entire obedience to God? If it does not, what language would?

The Doctor ought to know that I no where maintain that a "bald purpose or resolution or will, &c." constitutes all that is implied in regeneration. I hold that a change in the ultimate intention or ruling preference of the mind necessarily carries with it the whole man; that the affections, emotions, outward life, are all carried and controlled directly or indirectly by the will and hence a change in the supreme preference or ultimate intention of the will necessari-

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ly carries with it a change of feeling, purpose, desire, affection, effort and makes the regenerate man a "new creature."

The difference between us on this head does not respect the *greatness of the change implied in regeneration*, but simply respects the *quo modo* of the change.

Again the Doctor says, pp. 76, 77:

"While the sinner is active, and acts freely in this consecration of himself to God, he is nevertheless acted on. Motive influence, external to the mind itself, must be brought to bear upon it, to induce it to exercise its free will in such consecration to God. This is the work of the Spirit. It is the province of the spirit of God, and His office, as provided for in the gracious scheme of redemption through Jesus Christ, to help our infirmities, to come in with the aid of His motive power, to induce us to renounce our selfishness, and make choice of God and holiness."

I must confess myself unable to understand the Doctor upon this subject. He *seems* to hold that the sinner is active and free in this change, and yet he insists upon the Holy Spirit's exerting upon him a "*motive power*" inducing him, &c. Now what does the Doctor mean by this "*motive power*?" Not the influence of *motives or of moral considerations or truths* presented to the intellect and conscience by the Holy Spirit? This view he repudiates. What, then, does he mean by "*motive power*?" Not surely moral power or a persuasive influence. It must be a *physical influence*, for what else can it be? But the Doctor *seems* to repudiate the idea of a physical influence exerted by the Holy Spirit in regeneration. But is it neither moral nor physical? What is it? Will the Doctor explain himself? If he will, I can then say whether I agree with him as to the nature of this influence or not. The Doctor is really so loose and ambiguous that I can not understand him. It really seems as if the Doctor often intended to be non-committal and hence so expresses himself that he can be understood in either of several ways. But perhaps this is unintentional.

Sometimes the Doctor speaks as if he agreed with me that regeneration consists in a change of choice. He says, pp. 78, 79:

"But this He does by the influence of the Spirit, who brings the mind and heart into that state, which disposes and inclines it to make choice of God and holiness, to come to Jesus Christ for 'grace and strength to help in every time of need.' In doing so, the Spirit employs the truth as His instrument; and that, not at man's will, but of His own will. His office, in this respect, is more than the mere presentation of the truth. As a teacher, He does indeed enlighten; but he does more. He renders the truth 'quick and powerful.' It is

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'the sword of the Spirit,' and 'mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds.'

In what way precisely it is, that the Spirit gives energy to the truth, and renders it efficient, so that he becomes the author or the cause of the sinner's regeneration, it is in vain for us to inquire."

Here as elsewhere he seems to hold that regeneration is a voluntary change and consists in choosing God, in coming to Christ, &c. He also admits that in inducing this change the Holy Spirit uses the truth as his instrument; but he also insists that he does more than to present the truth. "He renders the the truth quick and powerful." It is admitted that he renders the truth quick and powerful. But how does the Doctor know that he does any thing more than *so to present it* that it shall be quick and powerful? He admits his inability to explain the *quo modo*, or to tell what the Spirit does more than to present the truth. Why then does he assume that he does any thing more than *so to present it* as to give it the requisite power? Why this assumption without proof?

I have endeavored to show the teaching of the Bible upon this subject, and why does the Doctor assume the contrary without noticing my proof? He all along does this with as much assurance as if he were inspired. Is this right? But I will not further reply to the Doctor upon this point, for really I can not be certain that I at all understand him. If you, brethren of the Synod, are edified by what he has said upon this subject, certainly you possess a happiness that is denied to me; for to me he seems to say upon this and sundry other subjects things totally inconsistent with each other. I will not say the fault is not in the obtuseness of my intellect.

Thus much, brethren, in reply to what the Doctor has written of what he is pleased to call throughout his "Warning," "*a system of error*." I am sorry to be laid under the necessity of replying to *such a production*, by the fact that the venerable Synod of Michigan have endorsed it, and thus committed themselves for its truthfulness, to God and the church. But for this fact, as I have said, I should have made no reply.

Had I time and room, I should not satisfy myself with standing on the defensive, but should go over and assail some of the Doctor's positions. Brethren, are you satisfied with his teachings in this pamphlet? If you are, I should like to meet with some of you, and have a fraternal conference upon certain points. If the Doctor has not laid down errone-

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ous and preposterous and self-contradictory positions in this pamphlet, I am surely very dull of apprehension. But I must for the present close. And may I not hope, dear brethren, if any *great man* feels called upon to raise the cry of heresy, that before you again suffer yourselves to be prevailed upon to endorse for him, you will hold him bound to at least understand and fairly represent me?

Your brother in the Lord,

C. G. FINNEY.

P. S. I have seen Doctor Duffield's review of my theology in the April No. of the Biblical Repository. That is little else than a repetition of this, as far as thought is concerned. All I need to say in reply to *such a production* is, that if he has enlightened any one by what he has written, I shall be happy to know it. C. G. F.

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ARTICLE LXIX.

"COME-OUTISM AND COME-OUTERS."

BY WILLIAM GOODELL OF HONEOYE, ONTARIO CO., N. Y.

The question, whether or no, the Christians of a given locality or region of country should "come out" of the churches with which they are connected, must be decided in view of the answers that shall be given to two other questions: namely,—(1.) What is the distinctive and essential idea of a christian church? (2.) Do the particular churches in question, answer to that idea? Are they churches of Christ?

The word church means assembly. A christian church is an assembly of Christians. The character of the church, in a moral and spiritual view, is nothing distinct from the character of the members of whom it is composed. No creeds, nor forms of worship, nor of organization, no regular succession from pious ancestors or predecessors can make an assembly a christian assembly, unless the membership, for the time being, are Christians.

A church, or asssembly cannot claim the character of Christian, on the ground that *some* of its members are Christians. In the darkest period of the Romish church, and at the present time, some of its members were, and are, Christians. So, probably, of most heretical and semi-skeptical churches. But this does not prove the churches, as such, to be Christian. Churches disowned by God contain some Christians, otherwise there would be no place for the admonition—"Come out of her, *my people*." Yet most persons seem to take it for granted that a church is not to be abandoned, so long as a portion of its members are Christians, a sentiment which condemns the Protestant secession, as well as those of the Waldenses and Puritans.

Under the former dispensation, God saw fit to set apart the family of Abraham, in the line of Isaac and Jacob, of whom he made a great nation, and constituted it his church, in a sense, until the time of the Messiah. Godly men could not come out of that church, as thus organized, however

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corrupt it might be, until the new dispensation arrived, and hence their responsibilities differed, in this respect, from those of members of christian churches. It was no expression of religious fellowship with wicked Israelites to belong to the same family and nation and national church, along with them. The case is otherwise, now. Under the New Testament polity, the ties of family, of nationality, and of location, give no claims to the privileges of Church membership. Trite as these truths are, they need to be borne in mind, but are often overlooked.

In the distinctive and essential idea of a christian church, namely, that it is an assembly of Christians, it is implied that the members of these churches do mutually recognize and fellowship each other as Christians. Otherwise, church discipline and excommunication would be unmeaning and worse than frivolous. The idea of a Christian church implies a distinction between the Church and the world, a distinction which denies church membership to all who do not give creditable evidence of christian character. To admit or to retain a member, is to say by acts more significant than words, that we give credit to the religious professions of that member, and hold fellowship with him, as a Christian. Were it not for some remaining consciousness of this truth, the churches would feel no sense of shame, before the world, in view of the characters of their members, however disreputably they might conduct themselves. A *denial* of this truth would be equivalent to a denial of any essential distinction between the church and the world, and the propriety of setting up any barriers between them. And if *this* be not "disorganization," and "no-church-ism"—by what marks shall they be distinguished or made manifest? Not only the honor, but the very *existence* of christian institutions hangs suspended on the practical preservation of this idea. Admit that christian churches may knowingly receive or retain ungodly men in their membership, and the distinction between the church and the world vanishes at once. In other words, the *Christian* church disappears.

We have said that a church is not proved to be christian, because *some* of its members are Christians. We now advance a step farther, and say, as Paul does, most emphatically and eloquently, in 1 Cor. v. that a church that knowingly retains an ungodly, unrepentant member in its fellowship, becomes itself contaminated and corrupted by the process. In direct reference to the incestuous person whom he

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admonished the Corinthian church to exclude, he demands—"Know ye not that a little leaven, leaveneth the whole lump?" that communion and fellowship with one "wicked person" taints and destroys the whole body?

Thus it must be, if fellowship with wickedness be wicked. Blot out *this* feature of church organization, and you disband the whole. The constructive principle is violated, the barriers are broken down, and the church no longer, "discerns between the righteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God, and him that serveth him not."

A christian church or assembly, is a church, or assembly, that, *as a body*, is engaged in doing *Christ's work*, in which, thus much, at least, is included, the work of "binding up the broken hearted, setting at liberty them that are bruised, proclaiming deliverance to the captive," and "destroying the works of the devil." As all Christians are doing Christ's work, so all christian *churches* are doing the same work; not merely tolerating in their membership *some* who are doing it.

If any one thinks this rule a stringent one, let him consult, with the help of any commentator he pleases, such passages of scripture as Isaiah, chap. 1; chap. 5: 1—7; chap. 58; and Jeremiah, chap. 7: 1—16. Let him notice what class of sins were the occasion of these declarations, and then ask whether New Testament church polity requires *less* than the practical application of this. Then let him listen to the Savior, when he says—"Ye are the salt of the earth, but if the salt hath lost its savor, it is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men." "Down with the churches," comes then, as a matter of course.

Christian churches are assemblies of Christians, associated together on the principles of equal brotherhood. Whenever that equal brotherhood is essentially perverted or violated, the constructive principle of the organization is violated, of course, and it ceases to *be* what it professes to be. To remain in *such* assemblies *is not* to remain in the assemblies instituted by Christ and his apostles. To remain in such churches is to make it impossible for us to honor *Christ's* institutions by *becoming* members of them. Now, suppose a church violates this equal brotherhood, and sets up a hierarchy contrary to God's word, or comes under such an anti-christian yoke, does it remain a christian church? And, if not, may a Christian remain in such a church? Did the Puritan seceders err in taking the practical negatives of

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these questions? Yea? or nay? Or suppose a church sets up *other* tests of church membership *besides* creditable evidence of christian faith and character, thus shutting out those who are acknowledged to be Christians, separating Christians from each other, and *authoritatively perpetuating the schism:* is not this an essential violation of equal brotherhood? And if so, has a Christian who sees and knows all this, a right to participate in the violation, by remaining all his life long, a member of such a church? Can any man or body of men, effect a schism between Christians, establish usages perpetuating the schism, and thus bind Christians, for centuries afterwards, to perpetuate the schism by remaining in such churches? May they not "come out" for the purpose of organizing *christian* churches, instead of *sectarian* churches, (Methodist, Baptist, or Presbyterian,) without being justly charged, for so doing, with the sin of schism? Are we shut up to the necessity of sustaining schism by retaining membership in schismatic churches, or else of incurring the charge of schism, by coming out of them to re-organize churches on christian principles? What authority is it, that thus ties up our hands, and places us under a necessity of sinning? Can sect makers, (as some dream of our first parents,) compel all their posterity to sin?

To meet the case as it is, in this country, (as understood by thousands of Christians,) we must bring these suppositions together, along with some additional features. Suppose most of the churches virtually disorganized, so far as the original and essential idea of church organization is concerned, by the known admission or retention of ungodly and worldly members, not merely the "little leaven" of one member in a church, but in sufficient numbers to cripple the church and control it, at their pleasure—a membership unsound, not on the slave question merely, but on other vital questions, and scarcely distinguishable from the world around them in any important particulars—suppose these churches, for the most part, to have come, in some shape, under the control of hierarchal arrangements, and with scarce an exception, to maintain usages which violate the equal brotherhood of Christians, compelling them to hold ecclesiastical connection with some of the very worst of men, while shut out from church fellowship with many whom they consider the salt of the earth.

The problem for solution is, what is the duty of conscientious Christians, under circumstances like these? And

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holding these views, are they to be held back from organizing christian churches on admitted christian *principles*, by the dread of "an inharmonious name," by any clamor against "come-outism and come-outers" that may be raised?

As for "come-outism in a modified form"—separating from an acknowledged christian church, on minor issues, and not for the preservation of christian freedom, and the essential and distinctive idea of a christian church, we leave the vindication of it to those who better comprehend its propriety, and who "have no controversy with it." By most of that class of "come-outers" whom we would hope to vindicate *such* secessions, except when houses are over crowded, or local inconveniences are to be avoided, would be accounted of doubtful propriety, and savoring of schism. It is on no such light grounds that *they* have been driven to secede, nor until all rational hope of relief has failed.

Nor have we occasion to vindicate that "species of come-outism which rests upon hostility to all organizations, even that of the local church." The disorganization that denies the propriety of any church organizations, springs so directly from that which consents to let the world into the church, for want of strict church discipline, excision, or withdrawal, and carries with it so many of the same moral features, that we repudiate them together, scarcely discriminating between them. The one, only says in words what the other says in deeds; namely, that a wicked world cannot be distinguished and separated from the christian church—that they are essentially one and the same—that men habitually guilty of the "highest kind of theft," are good enough to hold spiritual union and co-operation with Christians! Devoutly repudiating the sentiment, we take the position of "Come-outers" from all, whether in the sects or out of them, who express the sentiment, either in word or in practice.

The distinctive and essential idea of a christian church, settles the question of membership—the question of ex-communication—the question of withdrawal, or secession. The three questions are but one. Those who give and continue to give creditable evidence of christian character, by their faith, piety, and good works, these, and these only have a right to come into christian churches, or to remain in them. With such, and with such only, have Christians a right, by the laws of Christ, to hold church relations. Sweeping as this doctrine may seem, it is the doctrine of the Puritan sece-

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ders, of consistent Protestants, and of the great body of those who have withstood the Man of Sin, in past ages.

Christian churches are assemblies of equal brethren, mutually recognizing each other as such. The responsibilities of church discipline, rest on each and on all of them. Christ never gave them liberty to transfer these responsibilities to a church session, to a Presbytery, to a Synod, to a Consociation, to a Conference, to an Association, to a General Assembly, to a Bishop, to a Cardinal, or even to a Pope. Each Christian is himself responsible to God for the Church relations he holds, and for the discharge of the duties growing out of these relations. It was to the "church of God, at Corinth"—"called to be saints"—"when gathered together" in the local assembly, that Paul addressed the admonition to "put away from among themselves that wicked person," extending the rule to "*any* man that is *called* a brother," and who was nevertheless "a fornicator, a *covetous*, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an *extortioner*," "not to keep company with such an one, no, not to eat!" Here was no proviso that the offender had sufficient *light!* No implication of a moral distinction between the sin and the sinner, the act and the actor, to the condemnation of the one, and the excuse of the other: no discussion whether or no the sinfulness of the act were self evident—whether a man might commit an act without knowing it, might claim property without knowing that he claimed it, nor whether the sin lay in the character of the relation or in "other considerations." For such a critical "analysis of character" the tent maker appears to have had no technics and little taste. Perhaps he agreed with John, that "he that *doeth* righteousness is righteous," that "he that committeth sin is of the devil," or with the modern Come-outers, that, as the act is, so is the actor, as the deeds are, so is the doer, as the fruit is, so is the tree, "as slavery is, so is the slaveholder," as extortion is, so is the extortioner. Perhaps he might have gone as far as Jonathan Edwards the younger, had he lived in our times, and in the use of equally offensive language, in making the statements which other theologians "affirm" to be "fundamentally false."

Be this as it may, he did not invite the attention of the Christians at Corinth to the question whether "the character of the relation" held by the Corinthian offender to his "father's wife" could, "exclusively of other considerations, determine the character of" him who "held that relation."

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Nor did he intimate that his "character was determined by *the light* which he had or might have, and also by his having or not having reason in exercise." Educated as the offender had been, in the depths of heathenism, Paul seems to have taken for granted that he must have had sufficient light. And many now are fanatical enough to believe, as Edwards evidently did, that the sinfulness of slaveholding is as self-evident as the Declaration of Independence makes it to be; as self-evident and as aggravated as that of licentiousness. Nor did Paul intimate that the offender was not to be "put away" until it was ascertained that he was in a state of "irreclaimable corruption"—"*hopelessly* corrupt"—"delivered over by God to fierce plagues"—one "whose cup of iniquity had *long* been *full*." Of most impenitent sinners this is not to be ascertained nor affirmed, but they may not therefore have a place in the church, in the vague hope that they will be fit subjects for church membership, some time or other! It was sufficient for Paul to know that, with more or less light, and with more or less guilt, he had "done this deed"—that he had not repented of it or forsaken it—that the church, instead of mourning over the sin and putting away the transgressor, was "puffed up" with the vain notion that the "lump" could survive the presence of the "leaven." Paul knew that while impenitent, the offender could give no creditable evidence of being a Christian. He therefore directed that he should be "put away"—*not* because God had "irrevocably" doomed him, but in order that he might, peradventure, be snatched from that doom, by the startling and humiliating reproof, and his "spirit saved in the day of the Lord." And it would seem, from the second epistle to that church, that the process succeeded in that instance, though "judicious reformers," it is said, have preferred the policy of remaining in fellowship with transgressors to reclaim them. This may be "only a question of policy" with some; but Paul's language towards the Corinthian church shows, that with him it was a question of life or death—of the preservation or ruin of the church.

This is the process of excommunication, and the whole of it; a work that belongs to each individual church member, whenever the proper occasion occurs.—The process of excision, secession, coming out from a transgressing and impenitent church, is precisely the same thing. It is nothing more. It is nothing less. The occasion is the same, the work is the same, and the object and effect are the same.

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It bears the same testimony for God, for Christianity, and for Christian institutions. There is no more room for delay and indefinite procrastination in the one case than in the other. The mere incident of minorities or majorities, of official or private members, does not alter the matter. It demands little if any more time for a minority or for an individual, to determine the fact of transgression, and to ascertain whether the transgressors are penitent or impenitent, on a representation of their wickedness, in the case of large numbers of transgressors, banded together, than in the case of a single individual. And the case is vastly more urgent. If a little leaven soon leavens the whole lump, how promptly must the little fraction escape, when the whole lump itself, has become corrupt!

If it be said that extensive and complicated ecclesiastical connexions increase the difficulty of this action, beyond that encountered in the simple local church, then we demand—What right have Christians to be bound down and hampered with these obstacles to Christian duty, which Christ and his apostles never instituted, nor authorized any body else to institute? An additional ground of necessity for secession is found in all cases of this sort.

A careful examination of the New Testament will corroborate our identification of secession, or "come out-ism," (if people choose thus to term it,) with the process of church discipline. Quite as frequently, if we mistake not, occur such terms as "withdraw"—"come-out"—&c., as such expressions as—"put away."—There is no intimation that *numbers* or official station alter the position of the parties, at all. So Luther understood it, when he excommunicated the Pope and his adherents. The messages to the churches of Asia, show the same thing. Christ reproved some of them, for their continued fraternity with evil doers, without any reference to minorities or majorities, and reason and common sense commend this view of the case.

It is truly marvelous that at this late day, it should be claimed, among American Protestants, that the policy of remaining in fellowship with transgressors in the church to reform them, has generally succeeded best.—When, where, and with whom, did it ever succeed? Was it in the old Jewish church in the times of the Apostles? Was it in the christian churches of the second, third, or fourth centuries, while corruption was gradually creeping in? Was it with the Romish church a few centuries afterwards, when she was

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"foolishly" deserted by the Paulicians, the Albigenses, the Waldenses? Was it in the Lutheran period? Or in the previous age of Wickliffe, of John Huss, of Jerome of Prague? Was it witnessed in the Church of England, in the times of the Puritan Seceders? Were these, and their predecessors, already mentioned, and so back to the time of Novation and his fellow sufferers in the middle of the third century, so many specimens of the superior wisdom of remaining in the bosom of worldly and declining churches to reform them?

"The presumption"—says Prof. Thome, "is in favor of the course—[that is, "of remaining in a body to reform abuses in it,"] since mankind universally pursue it, and since, especially, it has been the uniform policy of the most distinguished and judicious reformers of every age, the exception, if any, being very rare."

"Mankind universally" are not much famed, we believe, for pursuing the wisest course in religious matters. We venture, however, to reverse the statement, so far as "the most distinguished and judicious" and successful reformers are concerned. From the age of Novation, A. D., 251, to the present hour, Christianity and christian institutions have survived the general apostasy, mainly by a series of secessions. During the whole period the process of "Come-out-ism" has been going on, in response to the command—"Come out of her my people." Secession churches, under various names, have existed, all that time. The "succession" has been unbroken. The Novationists reached on to the Donatists, these to the Paulicians, these run into the Albigenses and Waldenses, these into the Wickliffeites, the Lollards, the Lutherans, and so into the Puritans. Among these last, the seceders alone retained their integrity. The rest were absorbed and lost in the corrupt body to which they adhered. And New England Puritanism expired in the act of going back into fellowship with the Church of England.

A few bold reformers have indeed suffered martyrdom without a formal secession. But did they do any thing towards reforming the old church? Was their object reached by their successors, without secession? Whitefield left his converts in the old churches—and what became of them? Did they purify the church of England—or the churches of New England? Wesley organized a church within a church. His successors were obliged to complete the secession. Baxter, among the Puritans, did not secede, and lived to take a

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part in the *persecution* of the Puritans, reproaching Cromwell for his having tolerated the seceding Independents, the progenitors of the Plymouth Rock church. Such are among the best specimens we can recall to mind, of "distinguished and judicious reformers of every age," who did not secede. Along with these, we must place the thousands who, for sixteen hundred years past have remained in the Romish and Episcopal churches to reform them. Who are they, and what and where are their trophies?—the wiser ones, who remained in the old church to reform it, while Novation and his successors, the Waldenses, the Albigenses and the Protestants seceded?

D'Aubigne has preserved the names and characters of some of these "most distinguished and judicious reformers"—such as Erasmus—Briconnet, bishop of Meaux, and many other prudent gentlemen who might be named? What became of them, and where are the fruits of their wisdom? They saved themselves much persecution. Some of them saved their lives. But did they save the church—or even themselves? Some of them we may hope were "saved, yet so as by fire."

Perhaps, along with Baxter, Whitefield, and Wesley, we should have mentioned Fenelon, Massillon, and Thomas a Kempis. Well, add *them* to the catalogue, and let them have all due praise. But, were they more "distinguished and judicious reformers," remaining in the Romish church, than Luther, Calvin, Zuingle, Melancthon, Lefevre and Farel were in coming out of it? No marvel that "Tendimus in Latium" (We are moving towards Rome) is inscribed on the banners of every Protestant sect, when sentiments like these prevail and are issued from all the high places of Protestant learning. If it be true that the "most distinguished and judicious reformers of every age, the exception, if any, being very rare," have followed the "policy of remaining in a body in order to reform abuses in it," then Puritan secession, Protestantism, and the previous kindred secessions, are very likely to have been sad mistakes. How, in fact, could it have been otherwise? By *these* movements, the question of secession or of "remaining in a body in order to reform abuses in it," has been presented to the friends of reformation "of every age" and the statement says that the "most distinguished and judicious reformers" have chosen the policy of "remaining," "the exceptions being very rare." Of course we are to look for these "most distinguished and judicious

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reformers" in the the bosom of the Anglican and Romish Communions. And the present state of religion in those "bodies" vindicates the sound wisdom of their policy.

But Prof. Thome could not have intended to include these? We presume he did not. Of course, we must seek for his "most distinguished and judicious reformers" some where else. Whoever they may be, they are not the Puritan or the Protestant seceders—nor those of the Albigenses, the Waldenses, the Paulicians, the Donatists, the Novationists. And consequently they must be, (if not Romanists nor Anglican Episcopalians,) a very lean minority of "reformers" of *any* description—"from age to age."

Marvelous, we have said, is all this. The marvel vanishes, when we consider, that the writer had undertaken the task of persuading men to "do no such wicked and foolish thing" as to "come out immediately, and have no more connection with churches" and ecclesiastical bodies "called pro-slavery, because they are composed in part of slaveholders." If, after a fourteen years' agitation of the subject, it is not time to come out of such bodies, where else, but to the Romish and Anglican Churches can we look for the right kind of "distinguished and judicious reformers" to guide us? And, since it will not do for Puritans and Protestants to look exactly there, we are left to hunt after our exemplars where we can best find them! Shall we recognize them, in the scores of prominent anti-slavery clergymen who have so long "remained in pro-slavery bodies to reform their abuses" as to swim down the current with them, to cease pleading for the slave—to apologize for the slaveholder?

That bad men, eluding detection, might "creep into" christian churches, and hide themselves there, we do not deny. A Judas was among the twelve, and Christ did not *then*, any more than he *now* does, supersede the vigilant watch-care of his disciples, by revealing to them miraculously, the character of their associates. He means they shall learn to know the tree by its fruits—the man by his deeds —(*not* by what they think his deeds would be, if he only had as much light as the heathen!) Had Judas survived his apostasy, and had the brotherhood still retained him in their fellowship, with the divine sanction, a precedent adverse to excommunication and secession might have been made out from his case, (so often cited for the purpose,) though it would have been in harsh discord with the rest of the New Testament. "The tares and the wheat" might be cited to

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the same end, more plausibly than they now are, if Christ had said—"the field is the *church*"—instead of saying, "the field is the *world*." That "Judas and the tares," so available to the Romanists in Luther's time, and to the church of England, in the times of the puritans, should be called upon for similar services now, seems a matter of course. We miss them from the argument of Prof. Thome. He did not mean probably, to occupy exactly the ground of those who daily adduce them. Yet without a passing notice of them, in this connection, we should fear our readers, or some of them, would suspect us of incivility to those potent champions of the churches—"Judas and the tares." Rid us of these, or let it be understood and felt that Christians have no right, with their eyes wide open, to sit down quietly at the communion table with these, and there will be no further trouble with the naughty "Come-outers" and their "Come-outism." These will have done their work, or rather, the only species we care for will have quietly taken possession of the field, and that without resorting to any "*ex post facto* laws." The Christian's statute book was completed eighteen centuries ago, and no church member should be arraigned for anything not prohibited therein, nor tried by any other court than is there constituted, or by any other rules than are there laid down, or ascertained by reported precedents, in the same volume:

With these views of the doctrine and duty of "Come-outism" as ascertained in the light of New Testament church order, and the essential idea of a christian church, let us next approach the churches of this country, in general, and ask how they compare with that constructive principle, that essential idea? Are they in the main on the model? Or so near it, that they can be made to square with it without a breaking up and re-organizing? If so, very good. We shall thus be saved no little labor. If not, we must either "come out" of them, and re-organize or contrive to do without christian churches, the best way we can. The question is that of church or no church. To cling to bodies that are *not* christian churches is to be *out of* christian churches. It is to occupy "no church" ground. Many who retain a nominal connection with their old churches understand this to be their position. They say they have no confidence in their churches. They expect no benefit from them. They understand that whatever they do for God, for humanity, or for their own souls, must be done *against* the influence of

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their church, and in spite of it. They do not pretend that, morally or spiritually speaking, they *have* any church.—Nay, they feel it incumbent on them perhaps, to protest that the connexion is a mere nominal one—that they have no *religious* fellowship with those to whom they are *ecclesiastically* bound! And this is their excuse for not being "come-outers." This is the case with many professedly anti-slavery ministers over pro-slavery churches—"personally devoted to the interests of the slave," but most uncharitably charged with being "*ex relatione* pro-slavery," and contending in defense, that "ecclesiastical connection will never, in a sane mind, be construed into sympathy with the body on the question of slavery, *or any other*, when sympathy is disclaimed." Such an one, if he knows his own position and is an honest man, understands that for the time being, he occupies a "no-church" position, in practice. He has only to continue in that position till practice ripens into theory, (the way most theories are formed,) and he comes out an open and above board "no church" man. Thus it comes to pass that our most prominent and zealous apostles of "no-churchism" are commonly men who have been anti-slavery ministers or church members, attempting to stand up straight, in pro-slavery churches. We know a number such, and have in our mind's eye many more, who are in the process of training, and making progress. In conversation, a year or two since, with one of the strongest and most faithful and influential anti-slavery ministers in the country that can be found, (as he is,) pastor over a pro-slavery and part anti-slavery church—a man far enough from favoring *our* ideas of secession and re-organization, we found him, unconsciously to himself, perhaps, very far over, in his feelings, and habits of thinking, towards the "no church" ground. He thought there was little use in attempting to maintain any church discipline—did not care to know exactly who among the members of his congregation belonged to the church, and had entirely given up the idea of ever having the church become a reformatory or even a reformed body. The work of human progress must be done up by the voluntary societies, composed of Christians and worldlings, and by political action! An hundred ministers, perhaps, and thousands upon thousands of laymen, are nearly on the same ground. Political abolitionists, connected with churches not actively anti-slavery, raising a higher moral standard for the state than they attempt or expect in the church and seeking to christianize politics with-

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out any help from the institutions of religion, what can these men be preparing themselves for, but "no-church" men? The minister, unconsciously influenced by his support—the layman dreading the odium of secession, or not knowing how to meet the expenses and sacrifices of a new church organization, may hold on to their old church organizations for a time, and in many cases till the bad example before them constantly, has led them to look on all religious institutions in an organized form, with more than indifference—with distrust. This process has been going on, rapidly for the last three years, *especially* in regions where secession and re-organization have not been commenced or in contemplation.

This question of "church or no church" has got to be met and settled in some way. Only three alternatives present themselves to our mind. Abolitionists, ministers and laymen, may continue in their pro-slavery ecclesiastical connections and thus be led to give up all their abolitionism, as so many thousands have already done. Or they may hold on a while, and come out "no church" abolitionists. Or they may promptly secede and honor christian institutions by re-organizing. We see no other possible course, so far as abolitionists are concerned.

As for retaining anti-slavery principles or activity much longer, in the bosom of pro-slavery churches, it is out of the question. Equally futile is the notion *now*, of staying in pro-slavery churches and ecclesiastical bodies to reform them. Those who exhort us to that measure, should be respectfully informed that all that ground has been gone over long ago—that the experiment has been tried, in thousands of instances, and has almost uniformly failed—that the prospect in that direction has been growing more hopeless, for four years past—that thousands and thousands who three years ago, were prosecuting that experiment, have given it up in despair—that, of these, large numbers have now ceased to manifest any activity for the slave, that many others, either with or without retaining nominal church connections, are in reality becoming "no church" men. No arguments from any man living, can convince them that churches not actively engaged in the work of reformation and the cause of freedom, are christian churches. The mass of the community, pro-slavery as well as anti-slavery, rum drinkers as well as temperance men, do not and cannot believe it, in large sections of the country. The time for earnestly believing this, with thinking men, is rapidly going by, if not

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already gone. What is to be done, by such Christians? And what is to be done for such a community? That is the question. Churches or *no* churches is the problem.—Those who most hate abolitionists and most dread anti-slavery churches, have no confidence in pro-slavery churches. Their consciences and common sense will not suffer them to be thus deceived. While learned ministers are just beginning to discuss this question, the community, to a greater extent than is commonly understood, have decided it already in their own minds. The Report of the American Board, its defenses of "organic sin"—the "least of two devils" system of ethics—the common consent of the churches to one or both of these, or the like of them have been rapidly educating the public mind. All men who have Bibles, may know, and most who ever read them *do* know, that such churches are not christian. They would lose, of necessity, their respect for Christianity, could they think otherwise.

The very idea of a christian church involves a distinction between the righteous and the wicked. And here are slaveholders and pro-slavery voters in the church. Are these righteous men? Who believes it? The majority of pro-slavery voters, perhaps, out of the church do not. Ask them to vote for just rulers, as God bids them. They will tell you that they do not *pretend* to be Christians. If they did, they could not vote for a slaveholder. Hundreds of times has this been said, and thousands of times thought, but not said. The public conscience is vastly ahead of the position of the churches.

It is said that secession, on the ground of anti-slavery, and nothing else, is the "fabricating a new religion," that its Christianity has nothing but "devotion to the slave"—that its two tables of the law are love to the slave, and hatred to the slaveholder. Thus is "anti-slavery come-out-ism" described by Professor Thome.

But it does not follow, of necessity, that secession on the account of any one sin in the church, be it intemperance, licentiousness, or slavery, or sheep stealing, would imply a new religion founded on nothing but hostility to that one form of sin! As one sin indulged in, und unrepented of, will destroy the soul of the sinner, so one known sin cherished, unrepented of or sheltered, in a church, will destroy the spiritual life and christian character of the church. For he that keepeth the whole law, and yet offends in one point, is guilty of all. The Corinthians might as well have

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urged this objection to Paul, and on equally good ground. Excision and secession are the same. If a majority of that church, or all but one, had been guilty of licentiousness, and refused to repent, the one faithful disciple would have had to secede. Would *that* have been fabricating a new religion on the one command against licentiousness? Surely not. What would be thought of a minority of a church who should decline to secede from a majority of habitual and incorrigible sheep stealers, on the ground that sheep stealing was only one sin—and that secession, on that ground only, would be the fabricating of a new religion, with one sole commandment against sheep stealing?

Or why should it be taken for granted that those who for conscience' sake, secede from men stealers and their supporters, are their enemies, and "hate" them because they thus tell them the truth, which they must receive in love, or lose their souls? How is it—that it betrays so much worse a "spirit" to excommunicate pro-slavery sinners than it does to excommunicate any *other* impenitent sinners? What special immunity may this sin claim, over profane swearing or any other sin?

The Come-outers in Luther's time, had their eye on certain specific sins. Suppose Doctor Eck had drawn up a list of prohibitions of those particular sins and said, "On these commandments hang all the religion of the Lutheran Come-outers"—Would the inference have been logical? Would the representation have been just?

But, so far as we know, it is not true that secessions from pro-slavery churches, and the organization of new churches by the seceders, as a general fact, have been solely and exclusively on account of the pro-slavery position and character of the old churches. *That* has been only one of a number of kindred derelictions, all indicating something else, lying back of them as their cause, and revealing by their several yet concurrent testimony, the spiritual death that reigned within. Whereever there is spiritual vitality in a church it will be made manifest by christian inquiry, activity and vigilance, and these will secure, among other things, some approximation at least towards a creditable standard of morality, "in the sight of all men." Christians and christian churches have *as much* moral light as Mohammedans and Infidels. They have *more*. And they have the light of holy *love*. It follows that *christian* churches will promote moral reformations, in some way. At least they will not

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perseveringly and habitually set themselves against reformation, and discountenance it, when attempted by the virtuous portion of the community around them, by their own pernicious example, and for a long series of years. The application is easy. The adverse position of most churches, at the present moment, on the Temperance question, is too well known to be misunderstood. "Resolutions" of churches and ecclesiastical bodies can not rebut the accusation. "The road to the pit," as said the old divines, "is all paved with good *resolutions*." The PRACTICE determines the CHARACTER. When church members may sell rum, grant licenses to sell it, vote for those who license it, and who make or sustain license laws—when they raise grain for the distiller, and prefer a vile compound of logwood and alcohol to the unfermented fruit of the vine at their communion tables—to say nothing of the frequent use as a beverage—what progress can be made by the friends of temperance except in *opposition* to their influence? We know of no instance of secession from pro-slavery churches, in which there was not ample grounds for a secesson on the single score of intemperance alone, to say nothing of other vices.

When an indignant community roused itself to shake off the bloody cable tow of Free Masonry, with its names of blasphemy and its rites of obscenity, where did the monster find shelter but in the sanctuaries of these same pro-slavery churches, while it bade defiance to the laws of the land, ruling senates and courts of justice at its pleasure? And now, when similar angels of darkness are rising up anew, in our midst, as in mockery of the recent struggle, where, more successfully than among the members and ministry of these same churches, do they find their willing dupes, and bold and subtle impostors? The influences that crushed McDowall—the presses, the Grand Jurors that attempted the suppression of his testimony, whence came they, but from the high places of the same churches? Pray tell us, against what vicious practice can we bear testimony without encountering the frowns of the churches in general, of the principal ecclesiastical bodies, and the leading clergy that control them? Is it gambling? Ask those who have labored to suppress lotteries. Is it Sabbath-breaking? Let Harmon Kingsbury, if still living, answer that question. Who expects (with few exceptions) more honesty from church members than from the mass of citizens in general? Who expects more magnanimity—more benevolence—more

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self denial? First imagine the persecuted "troublers in Israel" to have "come out from among them," as God bids them, and then answer these questions, with those that follow.—What proportion of lawyers, of merchants, and of politicians, belonging to churches, will even profess when catechised on that subject, to be governed by any higher or holier maxims in their traffic, their business or their politics, than prevail among lawyers, merchants and politicians in general? Do they rise, in fact, above the ordinary usages of the Counting House, the Law Office, the Court Room, the Exchange, the Legislative Assembly, in their activities, as there exhibited? Who that moves among men will pretend to believe it? Go to our commercial towns and cities. Go to Washington, to the seats of our State Legislatures, to our county towns—make inquiry, and read the answer in the eyes that stare at your rusticity or simplicity.

The spiritual attainments of churches *may* be low, while their outward morals may be exemplary. But while their groveling ethics make them a by-word among moralists, while their corrupting example makes them the dread of prudent parents, and their vices a stench in the nostrils of a decent community, it is vain and absurd to inquire after their *spiritual* condition! A spirituality that can quietly nestle down in such churches and deprecate disturbance, comes under suspicion. The Protestant assailants of Romanism, in this country, were *once* in the habit of adverting to the proverbial licentiousness of the Catholic priesthood, in proof of the corrupt character of the Romish communion. *That* weapon of attack has now to be used more cautiously. And no marvel. To a Protestant Judicatory was it reserved, to shield a prominent clergyman charged with open debauchery on the plea of *moral*, (in distinction from *mental*) insanity, when, in no other respect was it alleged that there was any apparent derangement of his powers. The gentleman's *conscience* was unfortunately seared! When such an ecclesiastical body, connected with an entire denomination (the Presbyterian,) can publish its doings without ecclesiastical rebuke or loud demur from any quarter, it is time to "come out" from such a communion, or cease glorifying Martin Luther for his exposure of John Tetzel and subsequent secession. It was the corruption of morals in the Romish Church that first arrested the attention of Luther. When he saw the priesthood apologize for the corruption, he denounced them. When he saw the "highest court of appeal" sustain the

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priesthood he anathematized it—he withdrew—he excommunicated the Pope—he "came out" of the Romish church. Had Luther been an American Presbyterian, hating slavery as all good men do hate it, would he not have excommunicated the General Assembly, and come out from *its* Presbyterian church, or ceased to be Martin Luther?

"Not for a reason of faith, but on account of impurity of manners, and because the church in general had corrupted itself by unworthy members, and was no longer a body of godly persons"—was the flag of christian secession raised by Novation, A. D. 251, and just there and for that reason chiefly, has it been floating, ever since, in obedience to the divine mandate, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues." Let us listen to Thomas Scott's Commentary, on this passage.

"This summons calls upon *all persons, in every age;* they who believe in Christ, and worship God in the spirit, should SEPARATE from so corrupt a church, and *from all that copy her example* of idolatry, PERSECUTION, CRUELTY, AND TYRANNY, and avoid being partakers of her sins, even if they renounced her communion, or else they may expect to be involved in her plagues."

In the same connection, Scott alludes to the "traffic in human souls" adverted to in the sacred text, in connection with the foregoing mandate, and adds:

"It would be gratifying if we could say that this traffic has been peculiar to the *Romish* Anti-Christ." * * * *

"The vengeance of heaven is coming upon Rome, *not* for gestures, garbs, and ceremonies, though multiplied, ridiculous, and of bad consequence in themselves, but for idolatry, OPPRESSION, cruelty to the people of God, imposture, AVARICE, licentiousness and spiritual TYRANNY. *These* are the sins which have reached to the heavens, the iniquities which God remembers, and the evils FOR WHICH we must STAND ALOOF from her communion, and THAT OF ALL OTHERS RESEMBLING HER, or we shall be involved in her destruction."

There are no neutrals in religion and morals. "He that is not with me is against me, and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad." The "church north," so long as she persists resolutely in holding ecclesiastical affinity with the "church south," or religious co-operation and fellowship with her, is part and parcel of her in the sight of God, and of all seeing men. Thus we judge of the Romish church, as a whole, and condemn it *as* a church, whatever exceptions we may make in favor of individuals. We do not say a part of the church is corrupt, and a part is not, because there are

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some good men it. We take the body as a whole, and describe it by its general and prevailing character. Thus we judge of the Greek Church, the Sect of Universalists, the Mohammedans, the Mormons, or any other religious community, and determine the character of the body accordingly.

The pro-slavery churches of this country, northern and southern, are persecuting churches, and refuse to repent. Their church members, in Ohio, and all over the country, at the polls, in the State Legislatures, and in the National, enact and sustain the "black laws" in the Federal District and in the States, by which their brethren of the same religious faith are bruised and crushed. They do this without church remonstrance or rebuke. When the State Legislatures or Constitutional Conventions are asked to cease from these persecutions, they reply that they *cannot* do it, so long as the churches continue to maintain their "negro pew" arrangements: and they tell the truth!

For two long centuries "the souls under the altar" have been crying, "How long?" Members of the body of Christ sold, for the most beastly purposes, babes wrenched from their mothers, the Scriptures withheld, promiscuous concubinage enforced, and all under laws framed by members of the church—apologized for and defended by her Doctors of Divinity, especially and primarily those of the North: mob-law invoked by her leading religious journalists and without remonstrance except from the intended victims—riots raised by inflammatory harangues from titled dignitaries of the church—our Lovejoys murdered—our Torreys incarcerated and sacrificed by these means: and yet, it is not time to secede. Not quite long enough have we lent our influence to these persecuting churches by whom the principles we profess to honor are denounced, and fidelity to them accounted an offense. The first clamor against any agitation of the slave question came from the high places of the *Northern* churches, the Congregational, the Methodist, the Baptist, the Presbyterian—by their leading Journals was the "popular indignation" invoked—by these were the first inflammatory false charges circulated—by these and by their grave quarterlies was legislative as well as ecclesiastical proscription invoked, "the highest civil penalties and ecclesiastical censures," and all without church admonition or rebuke.—That mobs have grown unpopular, that legislative proscription has failed, we owe to the fact that the mass of the community was not corrupt enough to carry out the measures of

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the controlling influences of the church. It has not been owing to any change in the leaders of the church. No note of repentance or of retraction has come from that quarter. The "ecclesiastical censure" has not been wanting, nor has it yet ceased. The little finger of ecclesiastical proscription has been heavier than the loins of the legislators and the mobs. While the latter have tired, the former have only been gathering freshness and vigor. The ecclesiastical proscription and excision of such men as Lewis Tappan, Le Roy Sunderland and E. W. Goodwin, at an early period, was only the forewarning and the signal of the work that has been going on, ever since. Scarce a county, perhaps, in the middle and Eastern States, could not number its victims—obscure men, to be sure, most of them—and not always, nor frequently, perhaps, has the public heard the sound of the bow-string. In most cases a threat has sufficed to silence the offender. When leading abolitionists, among the clergy, decry secession, it is no time for rustic laymen to have tongues. The terrors of excommunication have had power to crush thousands of generous hearts. How few, even of those who, for a time, have seemed to breast the torrent of proscription, or have narrowly escaped the torture, have manifested signs of courage since!

If within two or three years, there have been fewer church persecutions, it is because there is little left in the churches to be subdued. In whole regions where the monthly concert of prayer for the enslaved was once well attended, where vigorous anti-Slavery activity was witnessed, where anti-Slavery minorities in churches had influence, all is now silent as death. "Order reigns in Warsaw," and all is in quietness now. The *majority* of anti-slavery church members have known little of all this. The burthen was not upon *their* backs. The masses of abolitionists were not, indeed, to be overborne by intimidation. *That* experiment would not do. *They* must be cajoled and wheedled. On a few ring-leaders and turbulent men only did the inquisitors pounce—and that, not for their abolitionism. Oh, no! "We are all abolitionists." Some vexatious and lying pretext has been used, and thus the sympathies of the mass of reformers withdrawn from their most faithful and sharp-sighted associates. Thus it has been in "all ages." The masses of "judicious reformers" who stay in the corrupt churches to reform them, "partake of their sins" by participating in their persecutions, and "receive of their plagues" by becom-

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ing insensibly blinded and hardened. While more than twenty thousand anti-slavery church members in the single State of New York, as we estimate, who "remained in their churches to reform them," have ceased even the profession of abolitionism, in any distinctive sense—never vote for the slave, nor are heard to pray or plead for them—not a single church, that we know of, has yet been reformed. And how should they be reformed by reformers who continue to endorse a pro-slavery religion? What reformatory power is there in the process? How strangely do these deluded men think they have reformatory power when their fellow church members are saying, among themselves, (as our leading religious journalists said, years ago,) "If these ranters were *sincere* in their tirades against slavery, they would have long ago quit the churches that they say are supporting it! If they hated the "*sin*" as they say they do, they would cease to walk in company with it!"

Aside from all these reformatory topics, what evidence do the majority of these churches give, of having any spiritual life? Twenty-five years ago, our revival evangelists called them "dead churches," and the pastors of them "dumb dogs." Have they improved any since? One of the most prominent of these evangelists, not unknown nor unappreciated at Oberlin, has said in print, within three or four years past, if we mistake not, that the majority of converts, in times of revivals, apostatized in the very act of becoming members of churches. Is the support of such churches a christian duty? Is it not murderous towards immortal souls?

If any credit at all is to be given to the statements of ecclesiastical bodies, continuously promulgated by the same leading minister, of whom we have spoken so freely, their churches contain very little spiritual life. They say so themselves, and certainly they ought to know. If *they* think this to be the fact, is it likely that they have drawn too gloomy a picture? If, by *their* standard, this is true, how much *more* so, by the standard of the "ultra reformers!" Among their standing complaints and confessions, the general prevalence of a worldly spirit is a stereotyped one. But "if any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." If any church loves the world, the love of God does not reign in and control it. If the love of the world prevails in the churches of this country, in general, as the principal ecclesiastical bodies of the country say it

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does, then all the specific charges we have brought against them are not only credible, but inevitably true. The love of the world could not characterize the churches, under their present circumstances, without producing just such manifestations. How much merit was intended to be manufactured out of the sorrow and humility put into these confessions, we cannot say. But we do say, that unless they are all to pass for mere cant, unless they are grossly slanderous and abusive, then the churches thus described can have but a very dubious claim, to say the least, upon the character of churches of Christ.

A more reliable testimony is at hand. Lay aside all thoughts of modern and agitating questions. Begin back thirty or forty years ago, before any of these exciting topics were broached, and come along down to the present time. Run your eye through the churches, and single out, of male and female, the best specimens of unobtrusive, humble, prayerful, devoted piety they contain. Could you ask them, in the intimacy of private friendship, one by one —"What portion of the members of the church you belong to, and of the churches around you, so far as your acquaintance extends, do you really think, in the judgment of a wide charity, should be accounted Christians?"—to such a question, what response, do you judge, would have been commonly given? What would probably have been the answer thirty or forty years ago? Twenty or fifteen years? What would it be now? Unless we greatly mistake, unless our reminiscences and observations are very erroneous, the common response of the most pious portion of the churches, by common consent admitted to be such, however reluctantly drawn out and tremblingly and tearfully given, would scarcely leave us the tythe, the tenth, as the estimate of real Christians. How can such churches be *christian* churches? How can it be a duty to sustain them? Or why should these lambs of Christ be penned up in such dens of wolves? Should the question be asked in respect to ministers, the proportion, probably, would not much vary.

Now we protest against being construed as prescribing secession as the sole or chief remedy of all this spiritual death. We know that *mere* secession neither proves nor secures spiritual life. It did not, in the time of Luther. It has not in any age. But we do insist, that a separation from the world, a separation from the ungodly, in church relations, is the condition—the *sine qua non* of spiritual life and

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holy progress. So the nature of the case teaches. So church history proves. So the divine mandate admonishes us. Be it ours to obey God, implicitly, whenever He speaks clearly, and leave it for others to find out, by their estimates, more correctly, if they can, "what policy will be best"—"what course will accomplish the most good." "Be not deceived." "Evil communications corrupt good manners"—"Can a man take coals in his bosom, and not be burned?" Shall we cling to the church, as to the "fold of Christ" when we see it under the control of its enemies? Can we afford to exchange the christian watch-care of the disciples for the contaminating influence of the worldly? Can we pray, "Lead us not into temptation," and run into it and continually remain there? What seductions can be more ensnaring than those of a worldly church? If we consent to be led by the blind, shall we not fall into the ditch? Are we stronger or more sharp-sighted than the millions, who in this way, have been wrecked?

There are exceptions to these sweeping representations, it may be said. Then treat the exceptions *as* exceptions, and remember the general fact. And see to it that the exceptions *are* exceptions and *remain* such, if you cast in your lot there. Can a church remain faithful that holds fraternity with unfaithful churches, and thus endorses their christian character? Are ecclesiastical ties merely nominal and unmeaning? Then ask that they be severed or laid aside as of no value. You shall *then* find whether or no they are unmeaning! It would be so "uncharitable" to break away from them! What does this mean if the connection does not contain a profession of religious fellowship? If there be sincerity in the profession, it *does* identify the religion of the two bodies. If it be *insincere*, in the name of common honesty, let it be abandoned. The truth is, all men know, and can not help knowing that ecclesiastical connection does imply and express religious fellowship. Thus the world understands, and must of necessity understand it. Were it otherwise, we should see no palliations nor excuses for delinquent bodies, on account of their want of light.

One church holds fellowship with another church "by exchanging letters of dismission and recommendation." No one can dispute this. The usage, as commonly witnessed, amounts to even more than this. It determines the membership of *one* church, its identity, its character, by the character and standard of *another* church. Those whom *one* church

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adjudge to be Christians, *another* church must receive as Christians! And this is necessary to the preservation of "comity" between the churches! A wide stretch for comity when I must see with my neighbor's eyes instead of my own! Why not take our creeds as well as our members, at the discretion of other churches? Were there no pro-slavery churches in the land, the usage could not be a safe one. As it is, the practice must place a professedly anti-slavery church in an awkward position. It might as well erase antislavery from its creed, if it be there, unless it would receive members on recommendation from Roman Catholic churches in the same manner.

If Churches and Church members, in this country, do not know that "He that ruleth over man must be just, ruling in the fear of God"—if they have not learned the duty of choosing such in all their gates, to "rule the people with just judgment"—nor the impiety of setting up the workers of iniquity—if they have not learned that slave-holders are not "just men," and do not rule with "just judgment"—to what teachers shall they go for "more light?" *Christian* Churches are not only the salt of the earth, but the light of the world. Shall reformers, with a "loveless light," and a "Christless zeal," be invited as brethren to "*come down*" and teach them? If they have Christian Churches deserving confidence and support, why not find light and instruction from them? Is the light *of* the world waiting for light *from* the world before it can get out of darkness? From the landing of the pilgrims at Plymouth, our American clergy have been politicians, especially the Congregational and Presbyterian, and the politics of Church members, nay, of the country, mainly, have been shaped and moulded by them. In political sermonizing they have been great proficients. That ministers must have nothing to do with civil affairs, that politics have nothing to do with religion, has been no doctrine of theirs, till recently asked to plead the cause of the enslaved. Up to that moment they had abjured all such dogmas as infidel. Their Beechers and Waylands had been eloquent in exposing the folly and atheism of the sentiment. Whence comes the change? And where, if not to *Christian* churches and ministers, are the community to look for the needed light? If such a Church and ministry are not in the field, is it not high time to set about the work of obtaining them?

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Either the religious community *have* the necessary light on these subjects, or else the *want* of that light betrays the utter incompetency and untrustworthiness of the institutions they have been confiding in, as Christian. *True Churches* are the depositories of Christian truth, and do not wait to be enlightened by voluntary associations, standing outside of the Church. This, the existing Churches and ministry understand, for the most part, and therefore maintain their pretensions by refusing to be thus taught.

The Churches are either sinning against light or else they are in the depths of moral darkness, without "the light that must *precede love*." How can such churches be Christian? Or what can the support of them be, but "empiricism and charlatanry?"

If responsibility be in proportion to light—if the South, and if the darker portions of the North are to be borne with, because they lack light, how great must be the responsibility resting on those who *have* the most light! And why should it then be incredible that the Northern Church member who casts a pro-slavery vote, especially if his church belongs to the "light of the world," is more guilty than the slave-holder—that the anti-slavery Church that maintains pro-slavery relations, notwithstanding all its light, is as guilty as even some slave-holding Churches may be, that enjoy so little light? This doctrine, so much insisted on, that the want of light is an excuse or palliation, is a two-edged sword to be handled carefully by those who are confident of walking in the light. Those can *already* see that the time has *now* come to withhold religious fellowship from slave-holders, and that the time *will* come to withhold fellowship from those who hold ecclesiastical fellowship with slave-holders, and they should be careful (walking in their *own* light, and not in the darkness of *others*,) to hold no ecclesiastical fellowship with ungodliness, *now*.

"Come-outers" who read the last page of Prof. Thome's article will be likely to congratulate themselves with the prospect that since "reforms are progressive"—that which is "purely a fanatical and a disorganizing movement" now, will be altogether warrantable and proper, by and by. The admonition—"Be patient, friends, and kind"—the invitation, "Come down and teach us," will strike them as quite remarkable, when addressed to persons "impelled by hate," and sustained by "Christless zeal!"

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But we must hasten forward. Many other things we had intended to say. We wanted to inquire on what principle so many abolitionists are insisting on anti-slavery Churches abroad, on missionary ground, while they can sit down in pro-slavery Churches at home. On the doctrine that there must be so much forbearance towards those who have so little light, we should like to know why the Choctaw, and Cherokee Churches are required to come up to a higher standard than Churches among ourselves, not excepting many of the Churches to which those belong who are insisting on this high stand among the Choctaws and the distant heathen?

We should like to inquire into the probability of *success*, in sending an anti-slavery gospel to the heathen while sustaining ecclesiastical relations or holding religious co-operation, with a pro-slavery gospel at home? And whether the logic and ethics of the far famed Report of the A. B. C. F. M. are any the less fallacious and unsound, when worked over again and applied to professors of religion in *this* country, than when applied to new converts in foreign lands?—If there may be Christians and Church members holding slaves, or casting pro-slavery votes, for want of more light among ourselves, why not be "patient," and allow the same privilege to members of the mission Churches, as the American Board exhorts us?

Another thing we are puzzled about. We must be patient with those who want light. Shall we carry out this maxim by concluding that abolitionists in fellowship with pro-slavery Churches lack light?

To lack light—what is it, but to lack the knowledge of Christian principles—or to lack holy love?

Would it be "charitable" to imply that our brethren lack these? As to the *facts*, the objects that the light must shine upon, we suppose they are sufficiently understood, already.

We know of no abolitionists who account infants and minors to be slave-holders. The community—the laws—except prospectively and by anticipation, do not so consider them. What then is gained to Prof. Thome's argument, by proving the absurdity of condemning these?

What if it be so, that "new accessions of light are new revelations of unsuspected depravity?" What if "self-progress be the signal for self-proscription?" What if "one point gained, the preceding one be lost?" Or as Paul hath it—"Forgetting the things that are behind, and reaching forth to the things that are before?" Is it not wise to pray—

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"Cleanse thou me from secret faults?" Is Christian progression in holiness to be otherwise made?

Prof. Thome's allusion to the progress of the Temperance cause, was an unfortunate one. The facts were the reverse of what he supposes them to be. The *first* pledges, in 1823–4, were against "all intoxicating liquors." "By great management" (but not "wisdom,") the standard was lowered down to "only distilled liquors." The pioneers found themselves in the minority and a "hard struggle ensued." Not an inch did they gain, but lost almost everything, till the dwindling remnant of "anti-wine men formed a party, on the principles of come-outism," and from that moment the movement went forward. Until the "old Temperance Societies" were shaken off, nothing could be done. We speak of the local Societies, in which the battle was fought and won. The State and National Societies were only the spectators, and weather vanes of the contest. In regions where the "old pledge" had never been carried, the anti-wine pledge went better than where the old Societies had operated. It was harder work to displace the old error, than to introduce the truth on entirely new ground.

"Truth is progressive." "Reforms are progressive." But this is because true men live up to all the knowledge they obtain. There is no occasion to lag behind our knowledge, for fear Reforms will not be sufficiently gradual. Nor may we walk in the darkness of others, instead of our own light, in order to keep company with them. In order to "draw" communities, we must be careful to keep before them, a maxim sadly forgotten by most of the ministers of our times. A half-truth can never have the power of a whole truth. Half-truths are the parents of the most mischievous errors.

We had intended to press more directly the inquiry—"What peculiar circumstances should make *American* Christians so much more excusable than all other people on the face of the earth, on the score of their destitution of *light!* In our former article we asked why they were more excusable than the Egyptians? We demanded whether the most ignorant among us would not know the duty of others, if he were himself enslaved? We asked how good men could be content, without "searching out" the cause "they knew not?" We have since asked whether or no they *have* reliable Christian institutions to educate them, and if not, what is the remedy? We add, *why*, if they hated not the light, because it revealed their evil deeds, do they so resolutely re-

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ject the light, and silence and persecute those who would bring it to them? Was it for want of light that the Presbyterian Church, in 1818 blotted out her own testimony against slavery? The Methodist—the Congregational Churches, with the testimonies of Wesley, of Edwards, of Hopkins, the most disagreeable truths of "modern abolitionism"—are they also without light? Compare the means used to enlighten them, for the last sixty years—nay for only the last fourteen, with the means used to enlighten the Egyptians during, probably a few months before their terrible overthrow. No miraculous plagues have been employed, to be sure. But did these convey more *light* than the Bible and all our religious teachers? The Egyptians had neither printing presses nor mails. Nor were hundreds of lecturers sent into all accessible parts of the kingdom. Were the families who shrieked at midnight, at the loss of their first-born, in possession of more light than is now found in our Churches? Are our communion tables shrouded with deeper moral darkness than covered the minds of the hosts of Pharaoh, when he entered the Red Sea? Have the wonderful Providences of God, for the last fourteen years, shed no corroborating light on the testimonies of reformers? What further testimony, short of secession, can they give? Be it so—(and who disputes it?) that all slave-holders and pro-slavery voters, are not involved in the same *degrees* of guilt, as the perishing Egyptians were not—how does that consideration affect the decision we are now called to make?

We cannot be confident of having, at all points, or even in respect to the main drift of his argument, apprehended correctly, the position of Prof. Thome. It may be, that he would differ from us less than would, at first, seem to be the case. He probably had partly, in his eye, a class of "Come-outers" whom we have no occasion nor desire to defend—the class who would "down with the churches" for their corruption, but would organize no better, nor other, churches in their stead, some of his remarks could apply only to these. Yet he was led into a course of argument that *seems* sweeping enough, in some portions of it, to overthrow the "Come-outism" we defend—the very same that in some of his paragraphs, he admits to be scriptural. It would be easy to select from his two articles, *concessions* enough, if we may call them such, to warrant substantially, our conclusions.

1. "There cannot be strictly, a lightless love."

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We infer that the churches and their members cannot be defended, or excused, or held in fellowship on the ground of their want of light, without convicting them of a want of love. And what sort of Christians are these?

2. There is a "Scripture doctrine of Come-outism" that is "holy, just, and good." Let us be cautious then, and discriminating in our satires upon "the kingdom and dispensation of Come-outism."

3. "Slavery is the sum of all villainies." What then is the character of the determined and impenitent slaveholder? Of Churches composed of such? Of Churches that can not be dissuaded from religious fellowship, fraternity, and co-operation with them?"

4. "The pro-slavery spirit exists, *extensively* throughout the free states, and is, if possible, more shameful, more diabolical than slavery itself." Then "Come-outers" ought not to be derided for acting accordingly.

5. "The churches are the bulwarks of Slavery." Then they are not the bulwarks of Christianity—"the pillar and ground of truth."

6. "An intelligent pro-slavery minister, in a free state, is a pre-eminently wicked person." "He is a pro-slavery minister who writes Bible arguments in favor of slavery." [Who? Hodge, Graham, Stuart, Spring, Hedding, and Wisner?] And "he is a pro-slavery minister who shields such an one from ecclesiastical discipline." What can, or does shield them, if holding continued ecclesiastical connexion with them does not? The spirit and pith of this concession extended to laymen as well as ministers, and applied in New England and the Middle and Western States, would make a broad sweep among the churches, including their anti-slavery members. We almost shrink back, ourselves, from the seemingly inevitable conclusion!

7. "There is now light enough upon the main question of slavery, to warrant us in withholding fellowship from the slaveholder."* (pp. 187.) "The time will come, and come soon," when "voting for a slaveholder must be deemed an immorality of such a nature as to exclude a person from the Church?" (pp. 177.)

* But how is this to be done, if it be "foolish and wicked" to "come out immediately, and have no more connexion with churches and ecclesiastical bodies, called pro-slavery because they are composed in part of slaveholders?"

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We may then ask—"What man or set of men is authorized to announce to the world that the day has" NOT "dawned?" And who shall deny to those who are convinced that it has, the right to express their convictions, and act in conformity with them?"

If "Come-outism" be perceived, by its *opponents*, to be so nearly correct, now, and destined to be altogether correct, so very soon," perchance it *may* be, *altogether* correct now; at any rate, a truth that is to be; a truth in the future tense, and rapidly hastening to be present, should be treated with a good degree of toleration if not respect, by the advocates of "light and love," and the friends of "progressive reform."

In conclusion, this is a great, a momentous subject, and the prayerful and earnest consideration of it should be no longer postponed. The friends of evangelical religion, of an elevated standard of christian holiness, of trustworthy christian institutions, *not less* than the zealous, and possibly, sometimes extravagant or impatient advocates of specific "one idea" reformations, have an interest, deep and broad as eternity, in the proper settlement of this question. The times require and *must have*, the RESTORED NEW TESTAMENT CHURCH. For this, the work of a world's renovation is lingering, while Atheism and the Man of Sin, are stalking over Emmanuel's promised possession, unrebuked. The whole creation groans, and travels in pain, until now, for the deliverance that is to come through the instrumentality of a pure church.

ERRATA.

February number:—Article "Light and Love," page 289, third line from bottom, instead of "*all* may be bold to affirm," read "*we* may," &c. Page 293, tenth line from bottom, instead of "manly *doing*," read "manly *daring*." Page 295, eleventh line from top, instead of "*quietness*," read "*gentleness*." Page 302, eighteenth line from bottom, instead of "*obstruse*," read "*abstruse*." Page 306, ninth line from bottom, instead of "to *have*," read "to *love*." Page 307, top line, instead of "*precious* light," read "*previous* light."

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ARTICLE LXX.

EXPOSITION OF HOSEA IV: 17.

BY J. R. JOHNSON, PASTOR OF THE CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH, ITHICA, N.Y.

"Ephraim is joined to idols: *let him alone.*"

When we examine a portion of the Bible, and propose to test some popular and long established exposition, we must guard against extremes. We must be cautious that our minds shall not be so influenced by a prior habit of thought, that we shall hastily reject all evidence which opposes our former view of the text. We must also be equally on our guard against a spirit of rash innovation, which, joined with some degree of originality, and an ostentatious affectation of more, and also with a desire for novelty and notoriety, may induce us to reject common-sense views of scripture, eagerly grasping after the phantom—transcendentalism: or, we may adopt most confidently, such a method of expounding the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, as shall not permit it to teach the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection of the dead!

I. We will state the popular exposition of Hosea 4: 17.

"No means should be used to bring them to repentance. Ephraim is joined to idols, is in love with them, and addicted to them, and therefore, let him alone, as in verse 4th. See what their end will be—Deut. 32: 20. It is a sad and sore judgment for any man, to be let alone in sin: conscience, let him alone; minister, let him alone; providences, let him alone. Let nothing awake him till the flames of hell do it. The father corrects the rebellious son no more, when he determines to disinherit him. (Matthew Henry in the Comp. Com.)

II. Does this exposition express a sentiment which is at variance with reason?

We can discover nothing of the kind. God has a right to abandon the wicked to their own way. If God himself give them up, he can consistently require all other benevolent

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beings, and reproving influences, to abandon them. He may give the universal command—"Cease all effort to rescue them from their deep and hopeless degradation." If, therefore, we should ultimately reject the popular exposition of this text, it will not be because of its promulgating any unreasonable sentiment.

III. This exposition contains nothing which is inconsistent with other parts of the Bible.

The Bible frequently teaches the sentiment, that God may abandon the wicked to destruction. "There is a sin unto death: I do not say that ye shall pray for it."—1st John, 5: 16. Here is a plain intimation that the sinner may be so far given up of God, that it may be the duty of good men to cease to pray for the forgiveness of his sin. The case of the Amorites is familiar to all of our readers. So God may give up others to fill up the measure of their iniquity. He may make the proclamation that He has thus given them up, and may require corresponding manifestation on the part of His people. The popular exposition of this text, therefore, is not to be rejected, because of its being opposed to other parts of the Bible.

IV. There is nothing in the context which requires us to adopt the popular exposition.

Henry refers to the fourth verse—"Yet let no man strive or reprove another." But Bishop Newton translates it, thus: "Yet no man contendeth, and no man reproveth." And he adds—"This is a natural rendering, and gives a very usual sense to the Hebrew future." That it is a "natural rendering," in accordance with the context, is apparent, if we read from the first to the fourth verse inclusive: "Hear the word of the Lord, ye children of Israel: for the Lord hath a controversy with the inhabitants of the land, because there is no truth, nor mercy nor knowledge of God in the land. By swearing, and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery, they break out, and blood toucheth blood. Therefore shall the land mourn, and every one that dwelleth therein shall languish, with the beasts of the field, and with the fowls of heaven; yea, the fishes of the sea also shall be taken away. *Yet no man contendeth, (remonstrateth) nor reproveth;* for thy people are as they that strive with the priest."

"Yet no man contendeth nor reproveth;" the degradation is so universal, and so complete, that none are found

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who have piety and decision enough to resist the demoralizing desolation.

V. The context requires an exposition which is distinct from the popular one.

See verses 15, 17: "Though thou Israel, (*Ephraim*) play the harlot, *yet let not* Judah offend; and come not ye unto Gilgal, neither go ye up to Bethoven, nor swear, The Lord liveth. For Israel (Ephraim) slideth back as a backsliding heifer: now the Lord will feed them as a lamb in a large place. Ephraim is joined to idols: *let him alone.*" Judah, go not with Ephraim—"*yet let not Judah offend.*" The Lord is willing to feed Ephraim as a lamb in a large place, but he is joined to idols—therefore, Judah, beware! keep clear of such a company: shun such a fearful destiny. The text teaches this sentiment, namely: STAND ALOOF FROM CONFEDERACY WITH THOSE WHO ARE JOINED TO IDOLS.

This interpretation accords with our Savior's instructions in the 15th chapter of Matthew. He gave instructions which counteracted the wrong teachings of others. "Then came his disciples and said unto him, Knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying? But he answered and said, Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up. *Let them alone:* [withdraw from them,] they be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch."

DEDUCTIONS.

If the exposition of which we have given of Hosea 4: 17, is correct, then,

1. We ought not to remain in connection with those political parties which sustain Slavery. Whatever anti-Slavery resolutions they may occasionally publish, they sustain Slavery, if they vote for Slave-holders for civil office, or for those who vote for such. There may have been some plausible arguments in days which are past, adapted to quiet the consciences of honest anti-Slavery men, who remained with pro-Slavery political parties, for the sake of reforming them; but all such arguments have now vanished. Both of the great national political parties of the United States are now joined to idols. They vie with each other to see which will make the most acceptable obeisance. We have no means of calculating which will ultimately excel. It is true that

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sometimes in a State, as in Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, &c., we find in the recorded doings of these parties, some indications of the remaining life of freedom. But in the national councils, however much proof some individuals may give, that their hearts yet yearn for a better state of things, these parties, as such, continually strive to rival each other in doing homage to the great American Idol—SLAVERY. For its glory they now vigorously prosecute an invading war upon Mexico. By this crowning act of abomination, they demonstrate before the universe, that they are joined to this detestible idol.

"LET THEM ALONE."

Do not cease to pray for them, nor to remonstrate with them by the way-side, and by the fire-side, at home and abroad, by night and by day, at the family altar, and at the ballot-box, from the press, and from the pulpit. But if you would unequivocally and effectually bear your testimony against their idolatry, "let them alone;" that is, leave them. Be not joined with them in sympathy and action. This remonstrance they will understand and feel. If you stay with them, as you may be disposed to plead, to do them good, you sanction their idol worship.

The influence of this, your sanction, is the more deleterious, in proportion as you have the reputation of being an anti-Slavery man. For, if such an one as you, with all your love of human rights, in your national politics bow down to Slavery—the legitimate retort of its determined supporters, and expedient apologists, will spontaneously burst forth in this scorching question—"After all, do you think Slavery so very bad?"

2. If the Constitution of the United States is pro-Slavery, then we ought not to uphold the government which is based upon it. If the Constitution is itself pro-Slavery, then an oath to support it, is an oath to support Slavery. Anti-Slavery men can not take such oaths, nor ought they by their votes to place their fellow men where they will be required to take them. A man may as well do the horrid work himself, as by his vote to elect another man to do it. Those, therefore, are consistent with themselves, who say, that because they regard the Constitution as being pro-Slavery, they can not aid in its support, and consequently, can not accept of office, nor assist in electing others to office

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under that Constitution. We do not admit that such are right in their premises: we only say, these act consistently with their conclusions. The principles which we deduce from the expression, "Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone," does sustain the consistency of those who argue, that as the Constitution and the government are both pro-Slavery in their fundamental principles—both thus joined to the idol, therefore, our duty is, "let them alone."

Though it may be deemed by some an objectionable digression, yet the writer can not consent that this article should pass from his hands, at this critical time, in the affairs of our country, without distinctly recording his own clear and deliberate conviction, that the Constitution of the United States is *not* pro-Slavery, but is a noble anti-Slavery charter; and if, as some claim, it does contain some implied concessions to Slavery, yet the prominent and indisputable principles of the preamble are such, that an oath to regard these, is in fact an oath to utterly disregard any construction of any part of the Constitution, which construction gives the least countenance to infringement on the inalienable rights of man.

3. We should not remain in such ecclesiastical relations, as at this day of light, continue to give countenance to Slavery. They sanction the system, if they extend christian fellowship to slaveholders. This endorsing of the church, is the strongest support which Slavery can receive. In a sermon preached in 1845, the Rev. Albert Barnes says—"That will be a slow work of reformation which will be undertaken against any thing that has the sanction of the church of the living God, for God meant that the church should occupy a prominent place in every effort to deliver the world from sin." It is evident, therefore, that when church organizations continue to fellowship the supporters of Slavery, and thus exhibit that in their organized capacity they are joined to this idol, it is our duty to let them alone—that is, to withdraw from such perverted organizations.

The Rev. Daniel A. Clark says, (Sermons, Vol. 1, p 123,) "Fast as any vice shall cease to have its abettors in the house of God, it must go down. And when the church shall use her whole influence she will be able to control the manners of the world, and make and rectify the public conscience."

4. We are to sustain no relations, nor sentiments, nor practices, by which we shall countenance those who obstinately cleave to sin.

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The fact that many good men have done so, or even are now doing so, is no excuse for us. If a man has evidence to satisfy his own mind, that a specific course is sinful, let him not encourage it by maintaining approving relations to it, though he may have the precedent of respectable usage for centuries.

5. This subject warns all to beware of being joined to idols: for destruction awaits such. If any are so joined to idols, that God in faithfulness and mercy, warns all good men not to have participation with them, it is because their overthrow is at hand. We must sever ourselves from every species of idolatry, relinquishing *self*, that idol of the unsanctified heart, and then will the Lord feed us as a lamb in a large place.

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ARTICLE LXXI.

SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF REV. WM. COCHRAN, formerly Junior Editor of the Oberlin Quarterly Review.

BY REV. S. D. COCHRAN, HIS BROTHER.

Rev. Wm. Cochran was born in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, May 4th, 1814. When about a year old, our parents emigrated to Ohio, and settled near Fredericktown, Knox County, where our mother still resides.

From a very early period in his history, he evinced the possession of those superior endowments, which, although still in the morning of their development when he died, had, notwithstanding, already displayed a power and brilliancy possessed by few. There was a readiness, a point, a spirit, a peculiarity in his remarks, his questions, and his replies, which elicited general attention and numerous predictions of future distinction.

It is somewhat remarkable that, although his earliest intellectual developments were so marked, and he was taught to read at a very early age, yet it was not till about his 14th year that he assumed a love for books. Previous to that period, he seemed almost wholly indifferent to any kind of reading, and spent most of his leisure time in constructing, or attempting to invent various kinds of mechanism. About that time, a Lyceum was organized in Fredericktown, of which I was a member. My brother accompanied me to its meetings but two or three times till he began to feel the stirring of his genius within him. One evening he heard a young friend of mine declaim Phillip's Speech on the Character of Napoleon. As soon as the Lyceum was adjourned, he went directly up to the young declaimer, who had a volume of Phillip's Speeches with him, and purchased it on the spot, paying for it about all the money he had in the world. For weeks, this volume was literally his *vade mecum*, it was in his hands late and early; it went with him to the fields, and was read and re-read till it was nearly all committed to memory. As we used to thrash in the barn, the end of which stood directly against the road, hundreds of times, long before they arrived opposite, and after they had

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gone past the barn, did those who went along the road hear Phillip's Speeches thundered within. From the evening referred to, he was always an insatiable reader; everything else was abandoned for knowledge. He and some other boys about his own age, forthwith organized a Lyceum of their own, which they sustained wish great interest and improvement, declaiming, debating, speaking extempore, until, perhaps about two years afterwards, they disorganized and joined the original Lyceum. Here, his keen insight into the various questions discussed, his logical ability and skill, his facility of expression—all beyond ordinary for his years—soon gave him rank among the most interesting and valued of its members.

In reflecting on the influence and results of that Lyceum, I cannot refrain from pausing to express my conviction respecting the utility of such associations. Of those, at that time connected with the one referred to, a majority of the young men have since become educated and highly valuable members of society. Four at least of them became ministers, one of whom was my brother; four or five, lawyers; two or three, physicians; while the other members generally are highly intelligent and worthy citizens. But, beyond the circle of its own members, its influence extended to the general community, stimulating a desire for knowledge, and habits of inquiry, reading and reflection. I believe that Lyceum still continues. Let it be perpetual.

But to return; in the course of a year or two, my brother's mind began to take a critical direction. Made aware of his powers, he soon began to cherish high aspirations. He believed himself capable of the highest attainments, and the eye of his youthful ambition rested on nothing lower than the summits of political eminence. Dazzled by the gorgeous glories which, to such an eye, crown those summits, it was not long that he had gazed on them, before he resolved to reach them. Being under the necessity of laboring on the farm for at least two or three years longer, he devoted his spare time principally to study and reading in reference to his chosen career, looking forward to the day when he would be at liberty to give himself wholly to its prosecution. But ere that day arrived, he had substituted for it an infinitely nobler pursuit.

From the period when he determined on pursuing the course referred to, he almost wholly discarded reading the Bible, and rushed rapidly into scepticism. This was, doubt-

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less, partly the result of wishing to disengage himself from the restraints and hindrances in reference to his chosen course, which an acknowledgment of its authority and inculcations might help to keep in his way; and partly for other reasons. One thing is certain, it was not to prepare the way for, or justify himself in, any sensual or vicious conduct, as is generally the case; for he had already prescribed for himself a life of high morality, at least so far as outward exhibitions were concerned. His ideal manifestly was derived from the Bible, but pride was the basis on which he constructed it. He literally scorned any thing low, passionate, or vicious; he resolved to evolve a fairer character than he saw exhibited by professed christians. In this, as in his chosen pursuit, he aimed as high as those who aimed highest; and except that he refused to read the Bible, and spent his Sabbath hours in reading other books, not comporting with their sacredness, he clothed himself with as spotless an exterior as the most saintly around him. It was for other reasons, therefore, that he became a sceptic. The ultimate reason, as in all such cases, was the perversity of his heart; but this was aided and encouraged by the validity of his intellect. Our father was a firm believer in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and as able a defender of its tenets, as most of its adherents that I have known, lay or clerical. He had taught us the Shorter Catechism in our childhood, calling us and the rest of the family together every Sabbath evening to examine us in it. But the arbitrary and partial aspect of the doctrines it contains, revolted our reason and common sense, and we often used to protest against them. Of course, when we did so, our father would quote the passages of Scripture, (and few could quote more of the Bible than he,) and present the arguments which seemed to support the tenet in question. Thus had we often discussed over every characteristic point of the catechism. We were *never indoctrinated*, that is, we were never satisfied that those doctrines could comport with the justice, benevolence, and impartiality of God; but still they were identified in our minds with the actual inculcations of the Bible—a sad evil! There were but two courses that minds in such a dilemma could take: one was, to assume that, probably, after all, such were not the *real* doctrines taught in the Bible, to suspend a final decision respecting them till after future examination, and, in the meantime, to yield allegiance to those inculcations and truths which constituted the main current

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of the Scriptures, as Divine communications:—the other was, to assume that these absurd and opprobrious dogmas are actually taught in the Bible, that they are inconsistent with the Divine character and government, and that therefore the Bible is not of Divine origin. The latter was the attitude assumed by my brother; and, had not God, in his all-gracious Providence, brought things to pass that he might hear the doctrines alluded to, presented according to what is called the New School Theology, he probably would have lived and died an infidel. Alas! how many have been impelled to adopt infidel sentiments by being taught that the doctrines of the Confession of Faith, on the points referred to, are those of the Bible, and have lived and died in the delusion! Alas, that men will not see the tendency of such doctrines on minds of a vigorous and independent mould! Alas, that any human being should pretend to believe them!

In 1832, a new measure was adopted by a number of Presbyterian ministers in some of the interior counties of Ohio, namely, the holding of a Camp-meeting in the woods, in August or September. The good which resulted induced them to repeat the measure in 1833, and again in 1834. Having attended the meeting in 1832, and having witnessed its happy results, I felt extremely anxious that my brother should attend the next one, which he was persuaded to do. The preaching was, in general, so different from any he had ever heard before; it appealed so much more to reason and conscience—it was so much more direct, and free from obnoxious dogmas, that he was interested, and despite his efforts to the contrary, compelled to evince awakened conviction and deep solemnity. He returned home, giving indications of a renewed life; but it soon proved otherwise, and he seemed more confirmed in his scepticism, and ambitious aims than ever. The next fall, he was with difficulty induced to go again; and now the crisis had come. He had heard several sermons without seeming at all specially influenced by them. At length the late Benjamin Higbee, one evening took the stand and preached from the words: "God is love." He so discoursed on the subject, as to develop the true conception of the nature and end of the moral government of God, divesting it of all aspect of arbitrariness or partiality, and demonstrating that the Divine claims originated in the nature and relations of moral beings. This was placing the whole matter on an entirely new basis; a basis which gave it its full power over a mind constituted like his. No

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sooner was the true conception lodged in his mind, than his rapid logic traced out its main and magnificent issues; his whole intelligence bowed to the truth; his scepticism expired. But now came the question, on the decision of which his temporal and eternal destiny depended; the question whether he would consecrate his heart to God, according to his convictions, or prosecute his chosen worldly career. Nearly all night he revolved it, in restless distress; the next morning he was for going home, but was prevailed on to stay; all day the inward struggle went on; in the evening, Mr. Higbee again preached; his text was: "The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved." At the close of the sermon the struggle ceased—my brother was A CHRISTIAN. May Heaven speedily restore the day when ministers shall preach, and Christians pray, as though they believed the conversion of sinners a practicable thing! and that the faithful presentation of the truth is adapted to secure it!

My brother undertook and prosecuted nothing by halves. The ardor of his sensibility fully corresponded to the force of his intellect. Accordingly, he had no sooner devoted himself to the kingdom of God, than all his energies were concentrated and directed to its promotion. I have, in preservation, a regular correspondence with him, commencing soon after his conversion, and continuing till within a few weeks of his death. It would give interest to this sketch if I could present extracts occasionally from his letters, expressive of his views and feelings; but this is impracticable as our correspondence is in New York.

Very soon after his change, he was informed respecting the Institution at Oberlin, its origin, design and theological character; and I think it was in less than four weeks that he was there. He had been studying under Rev. John McKinney, then pastor in Fredericktown, previously, so that he was prepared to enter Freshman, which he did. His connection with that Institution, as student in both the Collegiate and Theological departments, and afterwards as Professor, continued until sometime towards the close of 1845—about 11 years, when, in consequence of some measures of the Trustees which he believed to be objectionable, he resigned his Professorship.

When he first connected himself with Oberlin Collegiate Institute, the anti-slavery movement was in its incipiency, and was generally embraced throughout the Institution and

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community. Every one knows that the foundations of this most important reformatory movement of the age, were laid amidst tumults and tempests, and that it demanded a moral courage transcending that required in the field of battle, to aid in their construction, despite all the vehement antagonism that beat upon them. Many a coward shrunk from the struggle. It was not so with my brother. As soon as comprehended, this great cause commended itself to his heart and head, and was warmly adopted. He subsequently spent two winters, those of 1836 and '38, in lecturing on the subject, in the interior of Ohio, several times amidst perils which greatly endangered his life. On two occasions particularly he almost miraculously escaped the grasp of infuriated mobs. His services thus rendered, did much to promote the spread of anti-slavery sentiment through the sections in which he labored.

In September, 1835, I returned home from Florence Academy, Pa., where I had spent a year, and found him just returned from Oberlin. We spent nearly three months together that fall. During that period, we prayerfully devoted most of our time to an examination of the Bible on the various leading doctrines of theology, assuming as our starting point the freedom of the will, which we recognized as a fundamental truth. Our investigations conducted us to a full conviction that *moral action* is always and necessarily *simple*. This was to us a *discovery*; for although Dr. Emmons had developed and maintained the same grand truth, years before, yet we were wholly ignorant of the fact, and did not know that the position had ever been assumed or advocated by any one. Having arrived at this ground, we at once assumed the implied doctrine that perfect obedience to the moral law is not only to be admitted as a *possible* thing, but as a thing *actually rendered by every true Christian*, as often, and as long, as he renders any obedience at all. The doctrine of the *practicability* of moral perfection, or entire sanctification, was adopted at Oberlin, in the fall of 1836, but in entire distinction from that of the "simplicity of moral action." I think it due to my brother to ascribe to him, a very prominent part in the developement of this latter doctrine. He advocated and inculcated it frequently, and in various ways; but he first presented it publicly before the Society of Inquiry, and afterwards in an address to the Alumni, in 1842, which was published in the Oberlin Evangelist. It was his constant conviction that the admission of

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this doctrine was essential to correct views of religion, and that where it was denied or overlooked, there could be no sound basis for ethical science. It was the strength of this conviction that induced him to resume the subject, and give it that extended and thorough investigation, the result of which is the series of articles published in the Oberlin Quarterly Review—a series constituting one of the most able and valuable contributions to ethical and theological science, which has appeared in our times. It is greatly to be lamented, if any such event ever is, that he did not live to complete it according to his ideal and preparation. Like his life, it is but the fragment of a broken column.

During the latter part of his College course, his application to study was entirely excessive, and almost precipitated him into the grave. So much was his physical system impaired that he was obliged to suspend study during the latter part of his senior year, and a large proportion of the year following. From this almost fatal injury he never but partially recovered, and it probably prepared the way for his early exit. His nervous excitability was so great, that the least sudden noise would shock and start his whole body, and extort an outcry. Very little excitement during the day would turn most of the night, and sometimes all of it, into a wakefulness which defied sleep. Hour after hour, would his mind, with intense energy, grapple with the most difficult questions, or range the universe on the wings of associated thought, till sometimes he felt himself on the very verge of distraction. Thus his disease would often aggravate itself until exhausted vitality could hold out no longer, and days of prostration would succeed before he could safely undertake any vigorous mental efforts. Two or three times, he suspended all study, and endeavored by relaxation and moderate exercise to recover his health. But it availed little; for his love of study was so intense, and the spontaneous activity of his mind so great, that he experienced a wear and tear of body, little less than what would have resulted from direct application. It was thus that his vitality was in the process of self-consumption, when he was assailed by the fever which so unexpectedly took him away. Had he escaped the fever, he might have survived for years—possibly to a moderate old age; but he hardly expected it. In several letters to me, during the four or five concluding years of his life, he expressed a strong presentiment that his earthly course would be short, and that

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he should fail to accomplish more than a fraction, at farthest, of what he had projected. It was this presentiment, doubtless, which led him, in the very beginning of his final sickness, while the pen yet trembled in his faltering grasp, to utter the wish, for *one half day more*, that he might prepare what he had then in hand so that another could readily arrange and publish it. Indeed, it had been long manifest to himself, no less than to others, that his mind was entirely too vigorous for his body, and that by the force and fire of its action, it was jarring to pieces and consuming it. The assault of death, therefore, so far from being unanticipated, was probably but slightly startling to his expectations.

While the intemperate prosecution of his studies, towards the close of his College course was so essentially impairing his health and constitution, it was also accompanied by a fearful revolution in his moral history. Hitherto, since his conversion, he had prosecuted his studies in preparation for preaching the gospel. But several months before his graduation, he began to evince a strong repugnance to that hallowed and self-denying office; and, as the time wore towards that point, the manifestations of that repugnance grew more and more emphatic, assuming occasionally, when obligation was urged upon him, and he was somewhat off his guard, an air of scorn for such a life. Such manifestations, however, were carefully secluded from the public eye, and probably made to myself alone; and although it might be seen that his heart was no longer what it had been, yet it was known only to himself, till he afterwards disclosed it, to how great an extent he had gone in aberration from "the truth as it is in Jesus." It then appeared that, during the period referred to, and some months following his graduation, he was in a state of spiritual departure from God; and much of the time was wandering bewildered, without a clue in the dark and tangled labyrinths of a profound scepticism.

His mind was philosophical from constitution, and it was as independent as it was philosophical. It naturally sought for the grounds of all inculcations and tenets presented for its adoption. It was not enough to satisfy him, that any tenet or belief had the sanction of high names, or extensive reception, in its favor; nor that it was banned and rejected by similar authority. He must examine it, and see for himself that it rested on what at least appeared to him to be ultimate principles, before he could give it his assent; and if, on investigation, it seemed to conflict with such principles,

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he would have rejected it, if all the world had proclaimed it true. Impelled by his strong philosophical tendency, he had, from an early stage of his education, given much attention to metaphysical investigations; but during the last term of his senior year, while completing and reviewing the course of instruction on Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, which is given at Oberlin, all the energies of his mind were mainly and intensely devoted to these favorite pursuits. This absorbing application necessarily involved a withdrawal of his attention from religious obligations, and resulted in backsliding. It also secured high philosophical attainments, of which he was by no means unconscious. What actually occurred, might have been easily anticipated. He was dazzled by what he perceived and imagined to be his own capabilities, and yielded his heart to the illusions of ambition. It was under the hallucination of those illusions, that he conceived and developed that repugnance to the office of preaching the gospel which I have already noticed. Viewed in its mere worldly aspects, as it must then have stood before his eye, what else could it elicit but aversion and scorn, when it demanded so much of labor and self-denial; and offered so low a stake for ambition to struggle for, and so restricted a scope for it to exert itself in? But when this function was contrasted in his view with the altitudes of worldly distinction, seemingly, especially in political life, so lofty and resplendent, to which his eye had begun to turn and his feet to aspire, it could seem to him no less than nameless folly, to dedicate his talents to its unrecompensed, honorless, spiritless routine of service, and forego all he might gain of honor and fame and power and emolument, by scaling those dazzling summits. But it was not long that his ambitious aspirings and complacencies were satisfied to hover around such heights. When he came to consider by what paths, and on what claims, they are usually attained—when he reflected how the power and tactics of party, the arts of unprincipled demagogues, or popular prejudices, avail to keep down the worthiest and exalt the basest—when he saw how little the loftiest stations depend on real worthiness, and that the greatest personal merits are hindrances, instead of helps, to the attainment of those elevations, his mind revolted from the career to which they had attracted him, as one of actual degradation. He had then reached the point where all the ends of worldly ambitions, but one, assumed a contemptible aspect: That sole remaining end was *knowledge*.

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It was before he reached this goal, that he became sceptical. In the midst of his metaphysical investigations, probably after his heart had wandered from God, he began to discover what appeared to him to be insurmountable objections to the validity of the claims of the Scriptures to be of Divine origin. These objections were of a philosphical character, and were in fact of a most formidable bearing; but, had his heart been right, they would never have led him to reject the Bible. *Scepticism, in all cases, owes its existence to a wrong will.* A truly spiritual mind may encounter great and serious difficulties, relating to the Scriptures and the religion they reveal, but it will find on every page of them such a stamp of Divinity—an air, and tone, and tendency, so sacred, that its *realization* of their *internal* evidences will more than suffice to hold in check all speculative objections that can arise, until more extensive study, or deeper thought can have time to assail and dissipate the menacing illusions. So strongly was he himself convinced of this, after his restoration to truth and rectitude, that he frowned condemnatory on all sceptical professions, regarding them as demonstrations of perversity of heart.

What those philosophical difficulties were, which occasioned his rejection of the oracles of God, and of course of Christianity, I will not here stop to state; suffice it to say that to him they seemed real and insurmountable. It would be of immense value to multitudes if they could know the actual history of his mind during its continuance in those unilluminated mazes—especially, after he turned with contempt from all other pursuits but that of knowledge. Such a mind as his could not assume a blank indifference to all those momentous questions which relate to the existence, and destiny of man. Having discarded revelation, it must attempt to achieve a solution of them for itself. With his usual ardor, he addressed himself to the task. All the elements of his moral state and mental constitution conspired to urge him on. But the spirit of scepticism used a terrible proscription through all the ranks of mere probability. It was inexorable in its demand for absolute demonstrations. Of course he entirely failed to solve satisfactorily the questions referred to. As might have been foreseen, he was agonized by his failures. Was he then to remain henceforth in the dark respecting these momentous matters? Had he reached the ultimatum of knowledge respecting them? With all its strength, his soul repulsed the abhorred conclusions, and redoubled its

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endeavors on the intractable problems; but still the oracles were dumb, the doors to truth were barred and bolted. He felt deeply the need of the knowledge he sought; all his nature cried out for it; doubt and uncertainty became the rack and the torture, and yet from them he could not escape; his ambition too was crossed, and his pride outraged. The value which he set on that knowledge which proved so unattainable, made all that he already knew, or believed others to know, seem quite contemptible; and he began to entertain a most hearty disgust for all that belongs to the present state. He contemplated his own material nature, and dispised it for what he regarded as its low and degrading adaptations and tendencies, and especially for its clogging effect on the mind. He surveyed mankind, noting their infirmities and follies, their prejudices and pursuits, and such like things, and contemned them. He hated life, characterized as it is "in this pin-fold here," and often longed for a release from its odious conditions. Nor did he always refrain from raising his thoughts, and occasionally his words in proud presumption against the wisdom and benevolence of God. Nothing in literature pleased him so well, as the glowing embodiments of pride, and misanthropy, and contempt for our physical nature, and ceaseless longing for knowledge impossible, and sceptical presumption, which abound in the emanations of the dazzling, but vitiated genius of the guilty Byron. A few remaining cords of affection still strongly bound his heart, and they were mainly all that held him to the world.

But his redemption came. He had been appointed Tutor when he graduated, and towards the close of the winter he returned to Oberlin, designing to discharge the trust for a few months only, and then to resign. One of those seasons of deep religious interest, with which Oberlin has been so often refreshed, was in progress when he arrived. The Spirit of God hovered over the place, and deep solemnity pervaded it. He could not of course avoid attending the meetings without avowing his sentiments, which, on many accounts, he was unwilling to do. It was not long before his conscience began to respond to the truth, and to acknowledge the claims and obligations which were urged on all, although his sceptical difficulties still kept their ground. At length, however, he resolved within himself to be perfectly candid, and to yield his heart up to all he saw to be true. Forthwith, his philosophical difficulties began to van-

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ish, and soon disappeared. His own words were: "As soon as I resolved to be honest, my scepticism was gone." His mind at once saw through all the fallacies of heart and head by which he had been governed; and in a short time he struck out one of the most original and able arguments in favor of the Divine origin of the Scriptures that has, at any time been developed. It was based entirely on the internal evidences, and it is one of the many things the world has to regret that he did not live to write out and publish it, as he designed to do. Respecting this argument Prof. Morgan says in some remarks published after his death: "He had for himself attained to a new and original view of the evidences of Christianity; and we count it a loss to the church and the world that he never put his views into a suitable form for publication."

Such is substantially the history of this critical and momentous period of his life. I have detailed it thus minutely on account of the moral lessons it so forcibly inculcates. I hope the detail will not weary the reader. I can now proceed more rapidly.

Having returned to the truth, he immediately resumed his purpose of devoting his life to preaching the gospel, and entered the junior theological class. But his religious character, during some ten months following, was far from corresponding with what it should have been. It was unstable, and was interrupted occasionally by a revival, not of his sceptical difficulties, but of the other characteristics of his season of departure from God and the Bible. Indeed, the developments and indications grew more and more ominous. Would he continue, or abandon his theological studies? Would he live for the glory of God and the good of man, or yield himself up to some selfish career? Who could tell?

We had a sister who "walked the world with such a winning loveliness," that she was to us both, well nigh as dear as life. All unexpectedly, Frances sickened and died, Nov. 17, 1840. He witnessed her intense physical sufferings; he marked her meek and patient spirit; he heard the utterances of her pure, self-forgetting benevolence; he heard her speak of glorious angels in waiting for her spirit; he saw her peacefully expire, as if falling asleep, while a beauteous smile gathered over her face, and lay there significant of her heavenly bliss; he passed through her funeral scenes; and while his heart was agonized with bitterest grief under the immense affliction, it also received the moral impressions, "the bal-

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samic truths and healing sentiments, which such a scene, and such a trial, were adapted to impart."

"Smitten friends
Are angels sent on errands full of love;
For us they languish, and for us they die."

At her bed-side, and over her coffin, renouncing with abhorrence the vanities which had so often seduced him, he humbled himself in the dust, he solemnly renewed his consecration to God. That stern bereavement dug the channel and directed the current of his following life, making it a stream of refreshment and spiritual health to hundreds of souls.

I cannot here attempt to recount his labors in public and private, in the praying circle and the pulpit, at Oberlin and elsewhere, from that time onward. They will be eternally rehearsed in Heaven, by hundreds saved through his strenuous agency.

Nor did he relinquish his ardent love for his former chosen studies, but he pursued them to the permanent gain of pure religion. His main attention was directed to them during all his theological course. At the end of that time, in 1842, he was appointed Professor of Logic, and Adjunct Professor of Intellectual Philosphy, in Oberlin Collegiate Institute. He was already highly qualified for the discharge of his functions in these important departments, but he spared no diligence to reach the ripest excellence. He perused and pondered all the works of note which it was in his power to secure, French and German, as well as English; and I have no hesitation in saying that, notwithstanding he was yet so young, he had reached a maturity of acquaintance with, and a penetration into metaphysical science, before he died, which has few parallels among the living, and that this most important science has sustained an irreparable loss in his early exit. He had projected a Treatise on Logic, which must in itself have been of immense value. He also designed, ultimately to develop a general system of Intellectual Philosophy, of which he had the outline in his mind. I have already mentioned his purpose to write on the evidences of Christianity. It is impossible to estimate the value which such works must have possessed. But the remorseless grave precludes them all.

His articles on the Simplicity of Moral Action, some eight or ten sermons, and a review of Byron's Poetry, constitute

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the sum of the writings he has left worthy of publication. These will make a valuable volume. His review of Byron shows the light in which he constantly regarded his works, after his return from his moral and intellectual wanderings from truth.

My Brother's main avocation was teaching, and it was one to which he was most happily adapted. He loved it; he possessed a most ready faculty of communicating his ideas on any subject, and of course in giving instruction; he secured from his classes a full exertion of their powers in preparing for recitation in the studies he taught; but he did it, rather by the control he had over them through their affectionate regards for himself, which he seemed to acquire without effort, and by inspiring them with his own enthusiastic love of learning, than by any direct exercise of authority. He deeply felt the importance of a high standard of education, and sought in every possible way to impress the same feeling on the Institution generally.

But, he excelled in another sphere of usefulness; he was a powerful preacher. What he had learned in his own history of the subtleties of sin, of the frightful self-delusions and infatuations to which it conducts, and of its fearful power to urge the soul onward from stage to stage of iniquity; what he had experienced of the workings of conscience, that Sinai within ourselves, as he called it; what he knew of the strong yearnings of every human soul after an immortality of bliss—his deep acquaintance with all these made him a terrible dealer with the selfish heart. Boldly tearing away all disguises, and revealing the very wheel-works of depravity to view, his preaching to the impenitent might in truth have been called a revelation of the thoughts and intents of their hearts. Hundreds of them bowed to the truth under his ministrations. His great facility of conveying his thoughts, of laying aside scholastic technicalities, and of giving to topics the most common or abstract, an aspect to interest and impress the most ordinary minds; his easy, but earnest delivery, often assuming an impassioned character; his convincing logic, his well-aimed charges, his ironical sallies, his faithful portraitures, his forcible illustrations, his solemn warnings, his moving appeals, and his urgent exhortations; all these conspired to make him one of the most effective of preachers.

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But the shattered state of his physical system was such that he seldom preached a sermon without its being succeeded by great prostration, more or less internal inflammation, and sleepless tossings during most of the following night. Few persons thought, as they listened with fascinated interest to his more impassioned discourses, that they came direct as it were from the very fountain of his vitality, and were frequently succeeded by bodily distresses which made life scarcely tolerable. His throat often became so inflamed and sore that, for weeks, he could not speak in public at all. In consequence of these physical consequences of preaching, he came to the purpose, several months before his death, to abandon it entirely, or, at least, while such a state of his system continued, and to pursue some less wasting avocation. He accordingly entered upon the study of law, and prosecuted it till near his end, but his heart was not in it, and on the 2d of July, 1847, he thus wrote me in the last letter I received from him: "I should greatly prefer another kind of life, better suited to my taste, and more healthful for my moral nature: I mean a literary one, or nearly so." He then spoke of a plan he had in his mind in reference to the adoption of this preferable pursuit. This plan, however, perished with his life.

As an item of importance in his history, it ought to be recorded that, while he so strenuously maintained the doctrine of the Simplicity of Moral action, and believed in the entire *practicability of living in continuous obedience to God*, he nevertheless did not believe in the *attainment* of a *state* of *permanent* sanctification. He thought the ideas attached to both the terms—*attainment* and *state*—highly objectionable: because, in the first is implied the idea of securing an object, once for all, at a given time; whereas, if obedience should be in any case perpetual, it must be *continuously exercised*, as much at one time as another; and in the second is implied a fixedness of character, resulting from one past attainment, of which it is unwarrantable to conceive, either in accordance with the freedom of the will, or the fluctuations and changes of the experiences of the sensibility, owing to its necessary correllations. He objected, further, that, believing in the attainability of such a state led multitudes to spend their time in abortive efforts to secure it, instead of committing themselves at once to God, and engaging directly in the performance of his will; and, furthermore, that these abortive efforts, sooner or later, produced in most

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minds disastrous discouragements and scepticism as to the possibility of rendering perfect obedience at all. For these and similar reasons, he regarded the advocacy of the attainability of a state of permanent sanctification as decidedly objectionable. I deem it my duty to say in this place, that, in this view of the subject, I cordially concurred.

My brother, on several different occasions, subsequent to our dear sister's death, was the recipient of those special baptisms of the Spirit, which are so essential to a rich religious experience, and have such a powerful effect on Christian character. His letters written at such times, abound in spiritual interest.

On the 8th of May, 1846, he was married to Miss Helen C. Finney, eldest daughter of Prof. C. G. Finney, whom he has so soon left to lament the loss of one of the most affectionate of husbands.

His earthly career is closed. He died at our paternal home near Fredericktown, Ohio, on the 15th of August, 1846, aged 33 years, 3 months and 9 days. He had been sick 10 days; first, with the Billious fever, which his physician had succeeded in breaking up; and afterwards, with the Typhoid, which set in, and carried him off in two days. The incidents of his death are already before the public. Suffice it here to say, that the shadows and gloom which his sudden, and seemingly premature departure spread over his friends, were intermingled with luminous points which shed a relieving light over the darksome scene. His physical sufferings, during his last hours, were, at intervals extreme, and his mind much bewildered; but when he first saw he must die, he declared himself "perfectly" willing to go, seemed perfectly happy to his last, never uttered a murmuring word, and in his wandering moments, saw heavenly visions, our dear sister Frances, and a world of splendors ineffable. Thus his sun went down on earth, but blessed be God! only to be transferred to a fairer clime, where, "with new spangled ore," it

"Flames in the fore-head of the morning sky."

I forbear protracting further this biographical sketch, which, I can assure the reader, has been prepared under no slight embarrassment—an embarrassment arising mainly from the nearness and peculiarities of the relationships between its subject and myself. We were BROTHERS; we differed in age not quite two years and a third; we had no other brothers whose ages

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were near our own; we were playmates in childhood, companions at school, co-laborers on the farm, and for six years, classmates in Collegiate and Theological studies; we had, in general, the same intellectual tendencies, the same tastes and views; we were the counsellors and confidants of each other; we esteemed, honored, and loved each other; in short, it is perhaps seldom that the bonds of fraternal affinity are stronger than they were between us. In retracing his history, ten thousand recollections, many of them full of profound interest to me, have revived at every step. When the pen moves under the influence of such relations and recollections, it is no easy task to adjust the balance between too guarded and too garrulous a detail of the incidents of a life such as my brother's. I have omitted many incidents and facts in his history, which I should have recorded, but for the fear of seeming to have forgotten too much that it is natural for affection to eulogize its objects, or for more weighty reasons.

It is less than three years since he wrote the introductory article of the first number of this Review, and I now commit to its pages this brief memorial of his life.

Mansfield, Ohio, January 8, 1848.

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ARTICLE LXXII.

PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

BY PRES'T. A. MAHAN.

It is quite common for individuals to assume particular declarations of scripture designed only to be applied to particular and specific cases, as giving universal rules to be applied in all cases of every kind. The result is that one part of inspiration is placed in palpable contradiction to others equally important and sacred. An error of this kind has, in our judgment, been fallen into by a large part of the church, in the assumption that the directions given, Matt. 18: 15—17 was designed as law universal for discipline in respect to all forms of offences whatever, whether individual or public; when in fact, as we shall see hereafter, it was given as a particular rule for specified cases, to wit, *individual* and *private offences*. The result of this assumption has been that directions equally sacred pertaining to offences of other kinds, have been totally overlooked. The church has also been left without any settled principles which she could intelligently apply to all forms of offences demanding discipline. Suppose for example, a member of a church has gone to distant regions and there become a notorious pirate, or robber. The church has proof the most absolute of his guilt. Yet she can, by no possibility get to him, so as to take the first and second steps with him. What must be done? If the passage under consideration be assumed as giving law universal for all forms of offences, the church must retain the wretch in her bosom till his dying day. She can pass no vote of censure or suspension in respect to him. Indeed, she can, as a body, take no cognizance of his crimes in any form whatever. For the offence, according to this view of the subject, is never to be so much as named in the church, till after the first and second steps have been taken. The church therefore has no right to consider any offence in any form. She has no right to appoint a committee to investigate evil reports, or to take the steps referred to. She has no right to do any thing about the offences of any of

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her members, till after the case is submitted to her adjudication, by those who have, as individuals, in their pirvate capacity, taken these steps and failed to bring the offenders to repentance. To do so, would be to set aside a *part* of the solemn direction of our Savior, and if a part may be thus set aside, why may not the whole be?

Further, let us suppose that the offender above referred to, should, every time the church is engaged in celebrating the Lord's supper, appear in her midst, and at the close escape without the possibility of individuals taking the first and second steps in a process of discipline. The church in that case, would be bound to distribute the elements to him, as a brother beloved, and continue to do so every time she celebrated the ordinance. She can know no individual of her body in any other relation, till after those steps have been taken. Such are the necessary and undeniable consequences of assuming this passage as law universal for discipline in respect to all forms of offences. More of this hereafter.

Special attention is now invited to a consideration of other passages of Scripture bearing upon our present inquiries, for the purpose of a clear and distinct understanding of the true principles of discipline to be applied in all cases. We will introduce the subject by a reference, as the basis of our elucidations, to 2 Cor. vii; 9—11.

"Now I rejoice, not that ye were made sorry, but that ye sorrowed to repentance: for ye were made sorry after a godly manner, that ye might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of: but the sorrow of the world worketh death. For behold this self-same thing, that ye sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you, yea, what clearing of yourselves, yea, what indignation, yea, what fear, yea, what vehement desire, yea, what zeal, yea, what revenge! In all things ye have approved yourselves to be clear in this matter."

Here we have the form which true repentance for a sin with which the apostle had charged the church at Corinth, in the preceding epistle, assumed, in consequence of the expostulations contained in that epistle. An individual, a member of the church, had been guilty of marrying the wife of his own father, the father being still alive. Compare verse 12 of the chapter before us, with 1 Corinthians, 5: 1. The church, instead of excommunicating the offender, as they were bound to have done at once, had not even commenced a process of discipline with him in any form. The consequence of such a sin persisted in on the part of the church,

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would be the destruction of the offender himself, in the first instance, and in the next, the fatal corruption of the church who should retain such a criminal in her bosom.

"For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have judged already as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such an one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. Your glorying is not good. Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us."—1 Cor. 5: 3—7.

"That the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus," that is, the only hope of saving the offender himself is his prompt excommunication. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump," that is, you will yourselves, if you do not put him away from among you, become as corrupt and guilty as he himself is. The reader will mark particularly the directions which inspiration required the church to pursue in the case referred to. It was not that they should take the first and second steps in discipline, and if these failed, then to pronounce sentence of excommunication. It was not that they should attempt his reformation in the church, and thus failing to proceed to extremities. One direction and only one was given, and that was, that as soon as the church should come together, to pronounce sentence of excommunication upon him.

"And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he that hath done this deed might be taken away from among. For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have judged already as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus."

The great reason urged for this course was, as we have seen, that it was the only means by which the individual could be reclaimed, on the one hand, and the church saved from corruption on the other.

For a more full understanding of this subject, we now turn to a consideration of the effects produced upon the church at Corinth, by the reasonings and expostulations of the apostle. The first result was deep sorrow and regret on account of the course which they had pursued relatively to

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the criminal. The next was, that this sorrow, which "was after a godly sort," induced in them a form of repentance in all respects approved of God, a repentance no elements of which they had occasion to repent of. This repentance was followed by a course of conduct in all respects what it should have been. The characteristics of the repentance induced by the godly sorrow exercised by the church, as enumerated by the apostle are the following. *Carefulness.* "What carefulness it [godly sorrow] wrought in you," that is, what haste, promptitude, earnest effort, forwardness to do the thing required, to wit, excommunicate the offender. "*What clearing of yourselves,*" that is, apologising. Those who had not partaken of the sin of the church in the flagrant neglect of duty, exposed the fact, and showed to Titus, Paul's messenger, that they were innocent in the matter. Those, on the other hand, who had sinned, confessed the fact, and condemned and reprobated the sin of the offender, and their own conduct relatively to it. *What indignation,* that is, what deep reprobation of the sin, and the sinner who had perpetrated the sin. "What fear," that is, as Mr. Barnes says, "fear lest the thing should be repeated. Fear lest it should not be entirely removed." It implies a fear, that the entire evil might not be corrected, and their duty in the case not fully complied with. "*What zeal,*" zeal to remove the sin by taking the offender from their midst, and doing all that duty required in the case. *What revenge,* that is, what prompt and ready execution of the sentence of excommunication upon the offender. "*In all things ye have approved yourselves to be clear in this matter,* that is, the entire state of mind induced by the godly sorrow which you exercised, and the course pursued under its influence is what it should have been. The following important principles pertaining to the discipline of offenders are clearly deducible from the case before us, as binding the church in all similar cases.

1. The first, and only thing for the church to do in all such cases, is to excommunicate the offender, his guilt being clearly ascertained.

2. Any other course, in such cases, tends to the destruction of the individual, and the corruption of the church, and to no other result whatever.

3. No church is in a state which God fully approves, who is not ready thus to avenge all such offences. The carefulness, the clearing of themselves, the indignation, the

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fear, the vehement desire, the zeal, the revenge excercised by the Corinthian church, is the only state of mind and course of conduct which God approves, and will sanction in respect to all similar offenders.

Now if we can clearly ascertain the characteristics of the offence under consideration, we shall have developed an important *principle* of discipline to be applied in all cases of a given character. What, then, are the distinguishing characteristics of this case?

One thing is quite evident in respect to it. It was an offence of such a nature, that it must have been perpetrated with a *distinct knowledge* of the fact that it *was sin*. No doubt could have rested upon the mind of the offender in respect to its character as sin. When he perpetrated it, he did it with a distinct knowledge of its criminality.

Equally evident is the fact, that it was *a deliberate offence*. The individual did not fall in consequence of having come under some sudden, unexpected temptation. The act was deliberately performed with a distinct knowledge of its character as sin.

It was, finally, a crime, perpetrated under such circumstances as clearly to indicate *established character*. The man had entered upon his career of crime with the purpose distinctly and deliberately formed to *continue* in it. Such a case differs fundamentally from crimes, however aggravated in themselves, which are committed under the influence of some sudden temptation. The latter may, and as we shall see in the progress of this article, do require a different course of treatment from the former. Now if we suppose, as all christians will admit, that the inspired direction of the apostle in the case before us is of any authority at all in respect to the church at the present time, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that whenever a case occurs bearing the same fundamental characteristics that this one does, the same course of procedure laid down for this one case, will also bind the church in the case supposed. To deny this is to assume that inspired directions for specific cases are not law for us in cases precisely similar. This would render entirely nugatory a vast majority of the precepts of the Bible; for they are given in this precise form. Inspiration affirms what is demanded in a specific case, leaving us to apply the principle thus revealed to all similar cases.

What, then, is the principle or law of discipline revealed in the inspired direction of the apostle in this one specific

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case, the law which binds the church in reference to all offences bearing the same fundamental characteristics? It is this. Whenever an individual professing godliness, is found in the *deliberate perpetration of known crime*, whenever he is detected in carrying out a plan of acknowledged wickedness, so that his *character as a criminal* stands revealed as established, as would be true in the circumstances supposed, then his reformation is not at all to be sought in the church. He is to be cast out of it at once, as soon as, on proper trial, his guilt is formally established. The adoption of any other course in such a case, tends not to the reformation, but destruction of the offender, not to the purity, but corruption of the entire church to which he belongs. If any use at all is to be made, as law in cases of discipline, of the inspired direction relatively to the case under consideration, this must be it. No other intelligent use can be made of it.

I will give one or two cases in illustration of the principle under consideration, as I understand it. A superintendent of a sabbath school in an eastern city blasted the virtue of one of his teachers, who till she fell a victim to his designs, had sustained a most unblemished reputation. On examination of the case, the church found that that fell deed had been the result of a plan systematically carried on for many months. What should be done in such a case? One, and only one thing. Prompt and immediate excommunication. All hope of saving the criminal himself from death, and the church from corruption, depends upon this one course being adopted.

An individual of high standing in the church and community in one of the towns of New England, had been accustomed for many years to spend a certain portion of each year abroad. Before leaving, he always invited the church to hold a special prayer meeting at his house, and ever took his leave of them with a solemn admonition to be all found walking in the ways of the Lord, on his return. The night following he would leave with one or more stolen horses of his neighbors, and all the treasures he would bring with him on his return were found to be the fruit of crimes rendering him a candidate for the penitentiary. What would be the inspired direction of the apostle to that church in respect to such a case? It would be this, and this only:

1 Corinthians 5: 3—7. "For I verily, as absent in the body, but present in spirit, have judged already as though I were present, concerning him who hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are

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gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. Your glorying is not good. Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us."

What carefulness, yea, what clearing of herself, yea, what indignation, yea what fear, yea, what vehement desire, yea, what zeal, yea, what revenge, will every church manifest towards all offenders of such a character, found in her bosom, —every church, we say, who is in harmony with the spirit and express teachings of inspiration relatively to sin. The church, as constituted and designed by its divine founder, is the asylum for the penitent, the poor in spirit and the broken hearted. In it, the bruised reed is not broken, nor the smoking flax quenched. But it is not the hiding-place of crime. The deliberate perpetrator of foul wrong is not to have a place there, no, not for a moment after his crimes have, through proper trial, been ascertained. Nor is the church the place to attempt the reformation of such men. They belong to the world. Among them therefore they are to be placed, and if ever re-admitted to the bosom of the church, they are to be received as those who have been converted from the world. The adoption of any other course in such cases, is not only contrary to the express teachings of inspiration, but its tendency is evil and only evil; evil to the offenders themselves, and evil to the church. If the church does not proceed to exercise discipline in such cases, she becomes a partaker of the sin which she tolerates, and her real moral corruption will be equal to that of the criminals whom she fellowships. If she attempts their reformation within her bosom, she presents a temptation to them, almost, if not quite, irresistibly strong to make hypocritical professions of reformation. An individual who has been perpetrating crime under the mask of religion, will be irresistibly tempted to repeat his hypocrisy in the form of professed repentance, if the church will hold out inducements to it, by attempting his reformation within her bosom. Such a course has no tendency to purify the church from criminals, one great object of discipline, but to fill it with hypocrites. The temptation to a hypocritical profession, it should also be borne in mind, is strong in exact proportion to the grossness of the offense of which the criminal has been guilty. The same is true also of the feeling of remorse, which is likely to be mistaken for repentance. The tendency then of

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attempting to reform offenders within the church, is to generate and then retain in its bosom the basest hypocrites on earth. Such a course tends to no other result whatever. It also tends to divide and distract the church itself. Many members will assume that signs of remorse, which will certainly exist, and professions of repentance, such as practiced hypocrites know well how to make, and certainly will make in the circumstances supposed, are indications of genuine repentance. Others, of course, will judge differently. Parties will be formed which will very likely bite and devour one another, until they are consumed one of another.

Contrast with the above the tendency of strict adherence to the apostolic injunction under consideration. Such a course at once frees the church from all imputations from the world, on account of any crimes perpetrated by her members. Any society, and above all the church of the Living God is honored by the exclusion of criminals from their association. Prompt exclusion of criminals from the church also tends to preserve the conscience and heart of the church in a proper state towards offences. Offences in the estimation of all her members become fearful things.

Nor is the influence of such a course of less salutary tendency upon offenders. Let those individuals, who, by practicing crime under the cloak of religion, have made her their refuge, be told, that no *professions* of theirs can have any influence to restore them to the confidence or fellowship of the church. Nothing will do this, but the fruits of holiness in lives of strict obedience to Christ, and the spirit of Christ thus manifested. All motives to hypocritical professions of repentance, the great sin to which they are exposed are taken away, and they are thrown upon the only influences adapted to secure their real reformation, to wit, the idea of restoration to a standing in the confidence and fellowship of the church, through a life of "righteousness and true holiness." The entire influence of the church is thus brought to bear upon the very point on which their salvation turns. If they can have any hope of restoration to confidence by professed repentance, such professions will certainly be made, and they will remain hypocrites still; yes, if possible tenfold more the children of hell than before. Their salvation depends upon this temptation being taken away. Let them be at once put out of the church, with the distinct understanding that professions of repentance will not avail to restore them to confidence or fellowship, either, that when

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they shall by their lives reveal characters worthy of confidence and fellowship, they will be most gladly restored to both, and this temptation is not only taken away, but they are placed in circumstances of all others best adapted to secure their salvation. The strong reprobation manifested in their prompt exclusion from the church, tends above all things else to break the power of their sinful propensities in the first instance, while the hope of restoration to full and cordial fellowship by a life of virtue and obedience, gives to all the motives and influences of the gospel the greatest efficacy in inducing real genuine repentance. This, I can not but think is the true idea of the apostle in the declaration, "to deliver such a man over unto Satan," that is, exclude from the company of the faithful, and place among the world, the followers of Satan where he belongs, "for the destruction of the flesh," (the breaking of the power of carnal propensities,) "that the spirit may be saved in the day of Jesus Christ," by his real conversion. I sincerely question the fact whether the real reformation of a confirmed hypocrite was ever secured upon any other principles.

An objection against the view of the subject presented above may by some be drawn from Titus 3: 10.

"A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject."

In this case the reformation of the offender is to be sought in the church. He is to be twice admonished, and that without reformation, before excommunication is to be resorted to. The reason for this direction, in this case, is obvious. The simple fact that important error has been embraced, is not in itself proof of total subversion of character. But remaining in such error, after proper means for recovery have been used, is. Hence such means are to be used until the fact of moral subversion has been ascertained. Then the delinquent is to be rejected, and put out of the church. The direction of inspiration in this case, as contrasted with that given in the case of the offender in Cor. 5: 1—5, developes therefore another important principle of discipline, namely: when an offence has been committed which in itself, and under the circumstances of its occurrence, does not imply total subversion, as the continued deliberate perpetration of crime does, then the reformation of the offender is to be sought within the church, and he is not to be cast out of it, till resistance to admonition proves that he is a sub-

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verted man. To this class belong those referred to Titus 3: 10, and all cases of offences under sudden temptation. In Gal. 6: 1, the church is directed by inspiration to reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with all long suffering and doctrine, making a difference between such and gross deliberate offenders, pulling the former out of the fire. The manifest fact that inspiration makes this difference between these classes of offences, demanding immediate excommunication in one instance, and patient, persevering efforts for reformation, before resort is had to extremities, in the other, shows clearly, that we had rightly announced the principles of discipline, thus far.

We are now prepared to consider the real meaning of our Savior in Mat. 18: 15—17. The class of offences here referred to are specific ones, to wit, *individual and private offences*. The design of our Savior is to reveal the principle which binds us as law universal for the redress of such wrongs. The principle here revealed was never designed as a law of discipline for the church in respect to *public* offences. The design of the Savior was, to designate a line of conduct which, as individuals, we are to pursue for the redress of individual and private offences. This I argue from the following considerations.

1. This is the identical case specified. "If *thy* brother trespass against *thee*, go, tell him his fault between *him* and *thee* alone." The case is a definite and specific one, and specific directions are given for its adjustment. Nothing is more contrary to all correct principles of interpretation, than the application of such a direction as law universal for all offences whatever.

2. On the supposition that this is the principle to be applied in all cases, the church, as we have seen in the commencement of this essay, can take no original jurisdiction of any offences whatever. She cannot even appoint a committee to investigate evil reports, or to reclaim offenders. This would imply a public adjudication of them, in some form, and in the case last named, would imply a positive judgment, that wrong has been done. Else why appoint a committee for the reclamation of the offender? The church, on the other hand, can take no cognizance of the conduct of her members, till after cases are submitted to her by individuals who have taken the first and second steps without redress. Now who can suppose that the Head of the church has left discipline in such a state as that? In

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case of public offences, the entire church are directly aggrieved, and who should take cognizance of the case if she does not.

3. It would, as we have also seen, be perfectly easy for the grossest offenders to put themselves in such relations to the church, as to render discipline absolutely impossible, if the passsge before us be underslood as law for the administration of discipline in respect to public offences. Suppose a member of a church has become a notorious pirate upon the high seas. Neither the church nor any of its members can get to him to take the first and second steps. Nor can they communicate with him by letter. What must be done? Must the wretch remain in the bosom of the church? He must, if he chooses to do it, according to this view of the passage under consideration.

4. But suppose that the church is permitted by this passage to take up public offences, but is required to take the first and second steps before proceeding to adjudicate upon it. This makes the command of our Savior the height of absurdity. The precept would in that case read thus:—If an individual trespass against the church, (as is the case in all public offences,) let the church go and tell him his fault between her and him alone. If he neglect to hear the church, through her committee if you please, let the church take with her one or two more, that is, one or two more churches. If he neglect to hear them, let the church tell the thing to the church, that is, to herself. Such is the real meaning of this command, unless we restrict it, as its language requires, to individual and private offences.

5. The case, if possible, is still worse, if we suppose that public offences are in the first instance, not to be taken up by the church as a body, but by individuals. According to this view of the subject, every member of the church is bound, though their number may consist of thousands, to commence a process of discipline. I cannot delegate my duty to another. The duty devolves, if not upon the church as a body, upon each individual in particular. Every one, whatever others may have done, or be doing, is bound to commence the process of discipline. Or if the fact that one is before the rest, binds them to suspend efforts, those who ought to be the last to interfere are most likely to be the first, and the whole process to be conducted as badly as it can be. Who can suppose that the Savior has given such directions as that!

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6. Finally, this view of the subject places the command of our Savior under consideration in palpable contradiction with other parts of scripture given also by inspiration of God, with 1 Cor. 5: 1—5, for example. Paul certainly would not have been inspired to give the direction he did in the above passage, if the command of our Savior in Matt. 18: 15—17, was designed for law universal in respect to all cases of discipline whatever. I conclude, then, that this passage, according to its obvious literal import, has to do with individual, private offences only, and should never be applied as law for discipline in any other cases.

The following then may be laid down as the principles of discipline which bind the church in all cases whatever.

1. Discipline is in no case whatever to be exercised, but for *moral offences*. Errors in doctrine, and external acts are to be subjects of discipline, only on the ground of indicating moral guilt. Discipline for any other purpose, is usurpation in the church of Christ.

2. For the adjustment of all private individual offences, the direction in Matt. 18: 15—17 binds us. Excommunication is to be resorted to, only when the efforts of the individual, and of the church superadded, have failed to reclaim the offender, and he remains incorrigible under them all.

3. In all cases of public offences which do not imply established character for crime, such as sin committed under sudden temptation, the reformation of the offender is to be sought within the church, in the use of all the means best adapted to secure that result. Excommunication is to be resorted to, only when the offender has, by resistance, revealed the character of incorrigibility.

4. In all cases of gross offences deliberately committed, especially when individuals professing godliness, are detected in carrying out *plans* of known wickedness under the cloak of religion, they are at once to be put out of the church, as soon as on trial had, their guilt has been ascertained. Trial is then to be held for one object only, to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused. Discipline then would indeed be a terror to evil doers.

Such, then, are the principles of discipline in the household of faith, as revealed in the scriptures of truth. The whole subject thus becomes plain, and of ready application. The want of such an understanding of the subject has occasioned many great evils in the church. Discipline, in the

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first instance, is commonly exercised for offences not regarded as involving sin at all. Perhaps a majority of cases, adjudicated in ecclesiastical courts, are of this character, as for instance, deposition on account of imputed errors in doctrine. All such acts are usurpation in the house of God, just as much as the denial of the scriptures to the brotherhood is in the Catholic church.

The next and greatest evil is, that discipline in the church has ceased in a very great degree to be a terror to evil doers. and a praise to them that do well. This will continue to be the case until the true principles of discipline are fully settled in the estimation of the church. For the same reason, excommunication is almost unresorted to for any offences in some churches. Instead of being regarded, as the apostle affirms it to be, a necessary means of grace, in desperate cases, excommunication is regarded by some as almost equivalent to the final reprobation of offenders. Hence, suspension, a form of discipline unknown in scripture has been substituted, in the place of the form of punishment directly prescribed for presumptuous sins. I was once very forcibly struck, with a fact that I witnessed, that clearly indicated how little the principles of discipline have been fundamentally understood in the church. When the question of excommunication once came before a particular church, the pastor, who is seldom in darkness on any such subject, expressed the greatest conceivable horror, at its being resorted to, even in cases in which it is positively required in the Bible. He spoke of this form of penalty, as placing the criminal in a state of almost hopeless reprobation, and adduced with manifest approbation, the example of a distinguished pastor, who, for that reason, never did resort to this fearful expedient. The case recorded in 1 Cor. 5: 1—5, was brought up, to show that inspiration prescribes the infliction of this penalty, in the cases when it is demanded, as a necessary means of grace to the criminal and the church both. The pastor started the inquiry, how delivering an individual over to Satan could be a means of his reformation. What not this the meaning? he asked. As God and the church both have failed to reform him, now turn him over to the devil, and see what he can do with him. The apostle it should be borne in mind, does not refer to any thing done after the offender is delivered over, as the means of his restoration, but to the *act* of the church in thus delivering him over. The deep reprobation thus heaped upon his crimes, operates to break the power of the flesh,

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and thus secure the salvation of the spirit in the day of Jesus Christ. It was this act which was effectual to the reformation of the offender, in the case referred to by Paul. "Sufficient unto such an one is the punishment inflicted by many." The united reprobation of the church poured upon his crime broke his proud, rebellious spirit, and that to such an extent that Paul subsequently called upon the church to show him special kindness, "lest he should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." Let discipline be administered upon proper principles, and it would always powerfully operate for the sanctification of the church, and the reformation of offenders. As now generally administered, it is neither, as I have before said, a terror to evil doers, nor a praise to them who do well.

We close this article, with a remark or two, on the *manner* in which the act of excommunication should be performed. On this point we have heard some things which we by no means approve. A series of Essays, for example, appeared upon the subject, some years since, in the Oberlin Evangelist. In these essays, it was very strongly urged that whenever such act was performed, there should not only be the avoidance of haste on the part of the church, but a day of fasting and prayer should be held, as preparatory to the act, and as a means of giving it solemnity and power. There is no question, but that the exclusion of an individual from the communion and fellowship of the church should be regarded as a solemn act, and should be performed in such a manner as to make as deep an impression as possible upon the offender, the church and the world. We are by no means persuaded however, that the expedient above referred to, if generally adopted, would operate to the production of such a result. Wicked men love notoriety. To obtain it, they will even perpetrate crime, as in the case where one of the seven wonders of the world was destroyed by an individual for the purpose of being known to posterity. Now let a church of many hundred members come together to hold a day of fasting and prayer, every time offenders in her communion become incorrigible, and it would operate to generate in them a sense of self-importance. Such individuals would be among the first to call for such a day when about to be put out of the church, and would be greatly offended, if they should not receive their exclusion through such ceremonies. Instead of being ecclesiastically buried with such pomp and

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circumstance, gross offenders, in most instances should rather be "dragged forth to the burial of an ass." In other words, the penalty of exclusion should be promptly executed, as soon as the offence stands revealed before the church. The highest efficacy of the act depends upon this. Thus the reprobation expressed for the crime is likely to be felt. If the church would hold days of fasting and prayer on account of offences, it should be, as a general rule, on account of their frequent occurrence, and not with reference to specific cases.

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ARTICLE LXXIII.

IDEA OF RETRIBUTION.

BY PREST. A. MAHAN.

In all rational minds, whether cultivated or not, there exists the idea that some actions are morally right, and others morally wrong.

Essentially connected with, and involved in the same idea, is that of obligation, and consequently that of moral desert, or of merit and demerit. From this last arises the idea of reward and punishment, or the idea of *retribution*. As the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, and moral desert are in all rational minds, so there is no idea with which the human mind is more familiar than with that of moral retribution. No man ever did or can contemplate an act of manifest virtue or flagrant wrong, without the spontaneous affirmation, the subject *ought* to be rewarded or punished according to the intrinsic merit or demerit of the act imputed to him. This conviction arises alike in the mind of the child and of the man, of the savage and of the sage. All men too, when performing such acts themselves, spontaneously anticipate such retributions, from intelligent beings around them, and especially from God, the Judge of all. Says Coleridge,

"How deeply seated the conscience is in the human soul is seen in the effect which sudden calamities produce on guilty men even when unaided by any determinate notion or fears of punishment after death. The wretched criminal as one rudely awakened from a long sleep bewildered with the new light and half recollecting, half striving to recollect a fearful something he knows not what, but which he will recognize as soon as he hears the name, already interprets the calamities into *judgments*, executions of a sentence passed by an invisible judge; as if the vast pyre of the last judgment were already kindled in an unknown distance, and some flashes of it darting forth at intervals beyond the rest were flying and lighting upon the face of his soul. The calamity may consist in loss of fortune or character or reputation; but you hear no *regrets* from him. Remorse extinguishes all regret; and remorse is the *implicit* creed of the guilty."

A company of young men were passing one morning into a city in an omnibus from a neighboring village, where they had spent the night in dissipation. They were of course exceedingly noisy and boisterous, a thing necessary to keep up their flagging spirits, and hush down the voice of that in-

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ward monitor with whom the guilty dread to hold converse. As the vehicle passed along by the abodes of that city's dead, one of the youth, pointing to the place, exclaimed,—there, boys, is what I hate; soon we shall be there; and where shall we be then? The words I quote from memory. The precise sentiment is here expressed. The question "Where shall we be then?" was indeed as a sudden flash from the pyre of the last Judgment upon the consciences of those young men. The voice of revelry was instantly hushed. All was silent, in that omnibus, as the house of death. So they passed on until the narrator of the incident under consideration left the vehicle. This was nothing but the awakening into distinct consciousness, in those minds, of the idea of retribution—an idea existing alike in the breasts of all intelligents, and which continually points to the solemn future for its full realization.

It is a matter of fact of which every one is conscious that when we have done right or wrong—when we have obeyed or disobeyed the law of justice, we judge that we deserve reward or punishment, according to the character of our conduct. "It is moreover," in the language of Cousin, "a fact that we do receive reward or punishment,

1. In the approbation of conscience, or in the bitterness of remorse,

2. In the esteem or blame of our fellow men, who, themselves moral beings, judge also of good and bad as we do, and like us, judge that right and wrong merit reward and punishment, and do punish and reward according to their notion of our actions, sometimes by the sentence of their esteem or blame, sometimes by physical punishments and rewards, which positive laws, the legitimate interpreters of the law of nature, hold ready for action;

3. If we raise our thoughts beyond this world—if we conceive of God as we ought, not only as the author of the physical world, but as the father of the moral world—as the very substance of good and of the moral law, we cannot but conceive that God ought also to hold ready rewards and punishments for those who have fulfilled or broken the law."

IMPORT OF THE IDEA OF RETRIBUTIONS.

Every fundamental idea in the human mind implies the actual existence of a corresponding reality. Else nature herself in her most sacred revelations is a lie, and nothing

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else. The question which here arises, is, what is the reality which the idea under consideration indicates and reveals? The idea is that the virtuous *ought* to be rewarded and the vicious punished. The reality which this idea indicates is that they will be rewarded and punished according to their real deserts. The question now before us, is, what is this reality? Various theories have been proposed, each of which professes to shadow it forth as it is. We will notice some of them.

The Doctrine of Natural Consequences.

The first that we notice is called the doctrine of *Natural Consequences.* According to this doctrine, all the evil that moral agents do or can deserve for the most flagrant acts of wickedness, is simply and exclusively the unhappiness they experience in the perpetration of the act itself. This idea expresses all that is involved in the idea of retribution as it lies in all minds. According to this idea, if an individual should perpetrate any act or series of acts conceivable, and should the next moment repent, he deserves no form or degree of punishment for what he has done, and can be deprived of no privilege or immunity whatever, without flagrant injustice. If he should continue ever so wicked also, no punishment can justly be inflicted upon him, no privilege or immunity taken from him, on account of *past* misdeeds. *Present* unhappiness naturally and necessarily resultingfrom *present* misdeeds, is all that moral agents do or can deserve for any forms of ill-doing actual or conceivable. It enters also as an essential element into this idea, that God and all other beings are bound to *treat* the most virtuous and the most wicked in all respects alike, and to continue to them,at all times and under all circumstances, the same facilities for good, or happiness. Any departure from this would be the infliction of retributions other than natural consequences. Such is the doctrine of natural consequences, according to its necessary and essential elements. We affirm that it does not express the idea of retribution, as it lies in all minds, and affirm it for the following reasons:

1. According to the fundamental principles of this doctrine, neither God, nor any intelligent being has any right to express, either in word or act, any disapprobation or abhorrence of the character or conduct of wrong-doers, whatever their crimes may be. This would be the infliction of positive pain upon them, over and above what they suffer

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as the natural consequences of their crimes. If it is right and the duty of all to give such expressions at all of their convictions and feelings in respect to wrong doing, it must be because the intrinsic demerit of the crime, and the public good, demand it. Now if these reasons permit and demand that this form of punishment be inflicted on wrong-doers, they permit and demand any form of punishment which intrinsic merit and the public good require; and the doctrine under consideration is and must be false.

2. According to this doctrine, no individuals have a right to expose to public reprobation, the character and conduct of any class of wrong doers, even when such disclosures are indispensable to save multitudes from falling into fatal snares which they are deliberately laying for the destruction of their virtue, peace and prosperity. This too would be a positive infliction upon the wrong doer over and above the natural consequences of his crimes. If this is permitted and demanded, so is any form or degree of punishment which justice and the public good require. Who would dare to take the ground that the crimes of the guilty shall not be exposed, even when the salvation of the innocent demand such disclosure?

3. According to the legitimate consequences of this doctrine, no one is bound, nor has God or the public any right to require the criminal to repair any injuries which he may have inflicted upon others. Suppose that an individual, who is worth millions has set fire to the dwelling of a neighbor and thereby stripped him of all that he possesses. According to this doctrine, the criminal is under no obligation whatever, nor has God or the public a right to require him to part with a single farthing of his great estate to repair the injury he has done. He has already endured, in the very act of crime, all the evil that crime deserves. He owes the injured man nothing at all, and to compel him to do anything to repair the injury he has done, is to inflict a positive penalty upon him over and above the natural consequences of his crimes, an infliction which would justify any form of penalty which justice and the public good demand. Who is prepared to embrace a doctrine legitimately and necessarily fraught with such consequences as that detailed above? We must adopt them or abandon the doctrine under consideration. If we do adopt them, we assume that necessary intuitions of the universal intelligence on the subject are false. For that intelligence affirms that the wrong-doer is bound to do all he

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can, and may of right be constrained to endure all that is requisite to repair injuries which by crime he has perpetrated.

4. According to this doctrine, the most virtuous agents in existence enjoy, and the most criminal endure, at every moment, amid all the circumstances of their being, all that they deserve. The martyr while actually enduring the tortures of the inquisition, and Christ himself upon the cross, enjoy, and the most flagrant criminal, in the very act of debauchery endures all that they merit. Who can believe that? Suppose that the virtue of the martyr and his torture under the most fearful rack of the inquisition were to continue on as they are forever. Is this all the good that the fairest forms of virtue in the universe really deserve? It is so according to this doctrine. So of evil-doers when their guilt and pleasures are at their greatest height.

5. If this doctrine is true, God and all other beings, as stated above, are bound to do all they can to render all the circumstances and facilities of the most virtuous and wicked, for the enjoyment of good, in all respects absolutely equal, the character of each continuing what it is. Any departure from this principle would imply governmental retributions, over and above the natural consequences of good or ill-doing. Now every intelligent being can not but know, that any doctrine necessarily involving such consequences as the one under consideration does, is not only false, but infinitely impious. Yet no one can consistently hold the doctrine of natural consequences, without receiving these conclusions in all their length and breadth.

6. If this doctrine is true, conscience also should never reproach an individual for any past act, however flagrant it may have been. The individual has, in the act itself, received all the punishment that his crime deserved. Not a pang, from any cause whatever, should be inflicted upon him. In accordance with this principle the Most High ought to have constituted the human conscience. But who is not aware that conscience has the same power to pierce the soul with agony for a crime committed many years ago, as it had the moment after the deed was performed. Every man can not but be conscious that the same desert of punishment attaches to the criminal now, on account of the crime, that did attach to him the moment after it was perpetrated.

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7. If this doctrine is true, no such thing as real merit or demerit attaches to the actions of intelligent beings, whatever they may be. To say that a consequent which can not but follow from a given antecedent, ought to follow it, is merely to use words without meaning. To say, then, that all the reward or punishment that right or wrong doing deserves, is the happiness or unhappiness which can not but follow from its commission, is to say that real desert of good or ill attaches to no acts of intelligent beings whatever; in other words, that the ideas of obligation and moral desert are chimeras, and nothing else.

8. This doctrine is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race. No individual can contemplate an act of flagrant wrong, without affirming the right and duty of God and the world to inflict corresponding punishment upon the offender, any more than he can conceive an effect without a cause. The doctrine of governmental retribution according to deeds is, if any is, a first truth of the universal intelligence.

9. This doctrine also is as palpably opposed to inspiration as it is to reason. It would be more easy to prove from the Bible that there are none but governmental retributions, than to deduce from any of its teachings the doctrine of natural consequences. The scriptures do not overlook either. But the former is the aspect of the subject to which the most of its teachings manifestly pertain. If this doctrine is true, God can legitimately be to no being an object of either hope or fear. All that deserves regard is the natural consequences of our conduct. How opposed to this are the entire teachings of the Bible.

10. Finally, if governmental retributions do not enter as fundamental elements into the divine government, God's character for wisdom and goodness can hardly be vindicated. Man, as a rational being, is evidently constituted to be influenced by such considerations, more than by almost all others. I do not here refer merely to the principle of hope and fear; but to the ideas of merit and demerit, and consequently of retributions according to deeds. Character developed in harmony with these ideas is the most beautiful and perfect of which the mind can conceive. Consequently, no ideas so strongly influence mind as the hope of good and fear of ill, resting upon the ideas of retributions according to deeds. If human nature demands any thing, it is such a form of government as this. If God has failed to institute such a government, He has failed to adapt his ad-

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administration to the fundamental laws of the minds to which He has given existence. How can his character for wisdom and goodness be vindicated on such a supposition?

The doctrine that punishment should be inflicted only as a means of reformation.

II. Another form in which the idea of retribution has been announced, is this. Retributions, as far as criminals are concerned, shall have a fundamental reference to the *reformation* of the offender, and shall be administered only as a *means to this end*. Whatever the crimes of the offender may have been, all the punishment he deserves, all that God or any intelligent beings have a right to inflict upon him, is merely what is necessary to restore him to happiness and virtue. In all punishment, according to this theory, neither the intrinsic demerit of the criminal, nor the interests of the public, are to be taken into the reckoning at all, but simply and exclusively the reformation and peace of the offender. If the former ideas are to be taken into the account at all, then we have another theory than the one under consideration. Punishment could no longer have even a primary reference to the good of the offender. Intrinsic justice and the public good involving a much higher interest than that of the individual, if these are to be taken into the account at all, retributions of course should have a *primary* reference to them, and only a secondary to the individual. Further, if the former are to be taken into the account, then *all* that intrinsic justice and the public good demand, should be inflicted, even though the interests of the individual should be wholly sacrificed thereby. If the great and less become incompatible, the former, of course, should supercede the latter. The doctrine of retribution, therefore, for the good of the offender can be consistently maintained, only to the exclusion of all fundamental reference to any other considerations. Against such a theory, we urge the following, to our mind, insuperable objections.

1. This theory totally excludes the idea of intrinsic merit or demerit, as attaching in any form, to moral action. To say that all that vice in any form deserves, is what is requisite to its own correction, is to affirm, that it deserves no form or degree of punishment as such. If an individual is afflicted with disease, and any remedy exists, it ought to be administered. What if we should say, for that reason, that the subject *merited* the remedy, and the disease *deserved* it? We should certainly, in that case, use words without mean-

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ing. Equally idle and unmeaning would it be, on the theory under consideration, to talk about crime as meriting its own remedy, and the criminal deserving to be restored to virtue and happiness. The truth is, that the fundamental element of the idea of demerit, is, intrinsic desert of punishment as such. Any theory that fundamentally contradicts this idea, as the one under consideration does, stands directly opposed to the necessary intuitions of the universal Intelligence.

2. According to this theory, if the offender should become perfectly incorrigible—reformation become hopeless, no punishment in any form or degree, could be justly inflicted upon him. On the other hand, he should be treated, in all respects as if he were purely and perfectly virtuous. Punishment according to this theory is in itself an evil, and is to be inflicted only as a means to an end, the reformation of the offender. If the end ceases to be an object of hope, this ceases to be a means, and cannot rationally be employed as such. All then, who are confirmed in virtue, and incorrigible in crime should be treated in all respects alike. If the latter should be treated with less kindness than the former, this would be punishment inflicted, not as a means of reformation, and therefore, according to the theory under consideration, unjustly inflicted. Need we add that any theory that in its necessary logical consequences, as this one does, requires that the best and the worst beings that do or can exist, should be treated in all respects, alike, must be false, and of most fatal moral tendency?

3. Punishment inflicted according to the fundamental principles of this theory, can have no reformatory tendency whatever, but must possess, in all respects an opposite tendency. Take from crime, as this theory necessarily does, the idea of *intrinsic desert* of punishment, and punishment in the estimation of the subject and public alike, becomes nothing else but tyranny and oppression. It can have no reformatory tendency, whatever; but must, in all respects, exert an opposite influence.

4. If this theory is true, let an individual commit any crime conceivable, and the next moment repent of it, he neither deserves any form or degree of punishment for what he has done, nor can he be justly deprived of any privileges or immunity on account of it, how much soever intrinsic justice and the public interests may require it. The end of punishment in every form and degree, has, in the case supposed,

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been answered. None, therefore is deserved, or can be justly inflicted. Now every one cannot but know, that the ill desert which attaches to crime, pertains exclusively to the *act itself*, and not at all to the conduct of the criminal after the deed has been perpetrated. His inability to public justice depends exclusively on the former, and not at all upon the latter circumstance. No principle in moral legislation can possibly be of more fatal tendency than this, that an individual may commit any crime conceivable, and then free himself, by an act after the deed, from all desert of blame or punishment, on account of that crime.

5. If this theory is true, all confession of ill desert, all petitions for pardon addressed to God or other beings for any offences whatever, when real reformation has been affected, are wholly improper and criminal. Ill desert, according to the theory, does not exist, after reformation is completed. To confess it when it does not exist is itself a crime. All confessions of desert of punishment, all petitions for pardon therefore, on the part of those who have truly repented are unlawful and criminal, if this theory is true. Now who is not deeply aware, that an essential element of true repentance is a hearty admission and confession of the fact of ill desert, as still attaching to the subject, notwithstanding his return to virtue, and a consequent earnest supplication for pardon? That does and must enter as a fundamental element into reformation, which, according to this theory is rendered unlawful and criminal by reformation. A theory involving such consequences, must, of course be false.

The True Theory announced.

III. It now remains to announce the idea of retribution, as it lies in reality, in the universal Intelligence. The idea will be found, on a careful analysis, to contain the following elements.

1. It has its basis in the idea of merit and demerit, as *intrinsically* attaching to right or wrong moral action. The conception of such action is always attended with the affirmation, that virtue creates, and vice or sin annihilates a right to good or happiness. No one can contemplate such action, without such conviction arising in his mind.

2. The ill desert attached to wrong doing is always in exact proportion to the *known claims violated*, and the *known interests disregarded*, in the act. This principle universally

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obtains in the judgments of all men in respect to moral action. Why do all men regard it, as a greater crime in a child to strike its parent, than a brother or sister? Because they do and must judge that the claims of the former are higher, than those of the latter. By the same principle we judge of the guilt attached to the violation of all claims, human and divine.

3. The ill desert attaching to wrong doing pertains exclusively to what is intrinsic in the act itself, and does not depend at all upon the conduct of the subject *after its perpetration*. The act in itself remains what it is, and consequently its ill desert, whatever the subsequent conduct of the perpetrator may be. This is a universal principle in all systems of wise and righteous moral legislation. No principle, on the other hand, can be conceived of, of more fatal and pernicious tendency, than the idea, that the criminality of an act, or the obnoxiousness of the perpetrator to punishment, can be done away with, by any acts of his subsequent to its perpetration.

4. All retribution shall have a primary reference, not to the good of the criminal, but to *intrinsic justice* and the *interests and rights* of the public. Whenever the good of the individual can be secured, in consistency with these latter and higher ends, it should of course be done. These latter however are the higher and supreme ends, and whenever the former are incompatible with these, it must be sacrificed entirely. Upon such principles, we cannot but affirm, all systems of moral legislation ought to proceed. The individual that wantonly tramples upon sacred rights, and disregards and sacrifices immortal interests, in the just judgments of all men, forfeits all the good, and becomes obnoxious to all the evil, the infliction of which is requisite, to guard and sanctify those rights and interests in public estimation. Such is the idea of retribution as it lies in the universal Intelligence. A few additional remarks are deemed requisite to its full elucidation.

REMARKS.

1. We now perceive what it is that distinguishes the idea of moral law from all other ideas. It is the idea above elucidated, that of retributions. Take this one element from moral law, and it ceases to be a rule of duty, a necessary conception of which is, that the desert of good or ill attaches and must attach to him who obeys or disobeys it.

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2. The doctrine of eternal retributions, as it stands revealed in the light of the idea above elucidated, next claims our attention. This doctrine when placed in the light of the claims of God upon the love and obedience and of his everlasting kingdom, upon the virtue of creatures, is a first truth of the universal Intelligence. When God reveals Himself to rational beings, he stands revealed as possessed of all possible perfections, and that in a degree absolutely infinite, and at the same time, as sustaining relations to them the most sacred of which the mind can conceive. The claims of God to their love and obedience must be as his known and recognized perfections and relations. But these are absolutely infinite. The violation of such claims must involve degrees of guilt absolutely infinite, that is, the forfeiture of all good, or it must involve no guilt at all. The claims of God, and consequently the guilt involved in violating those claims, if He has any claims at all, must be as his known perfections and relations. But these, as said before, are infinite. The denial of the infinite ill-desert of sin, in other words, of the doctrine under consideration, is equivalent to a denial that any guilt in any form whatever, attaches to sin.

The same conclusion we necessarily arrive at when sin is contemplated in the light of God's everlasting kingdom. The interests involved in that kingdom cannot but be recognized as absolutely infinite. Sin involves, in all its forms, a disregard of such interests. Its guilt must be as the interests disregarded, in other words, infinite. He that will not respect and seek as an end interests known to be infinite, must himself forfeit all claims to good. To deny this, necessarily involves the denial that any degree of ill-desert attaches to sin in any form whatever. For if ill-desert exist at all, it must be as the known claims violated, and the known interests disregarded. We have no other standard by which to measure the ill-desert of sin.

Nor will the realization of the idea of eternal retributions under the divine administration tend, as some aver, to render the pure and holy unhappy. In all such minds, the ideas of justice and the public weal are the most sacred of all others. Any dispensations necessary to their realization, will never mar the peace of such minds.

3. An important fact connected with our present subject deserves a passing notice here. It is this. Whenever the idea of retribution has dropped out of men's conceptions of the

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divine government, the idea of the *divine existence* itself has as a matter of fact, in a corresponding degree, faded from the human mind. The divine existence has either been formerly denied, or has evaporated into certain forms of idealism, pantheism, or nihilism, in which all conceptions of God as a real substantial existence have disappeared altogether. I state this as a striking fact which the history of human opinions fully verifies.

If an inquiry is made in respect to the reason, or ground of this fact, we would present the following suggestions as deserving consideration. If we entertain such thoughts of God as render Him worthy of our esteem and veneration, we can not but conceive of Him, as in the language of Cousin, "holding ready rewards and punishments for those who have fulfilled or broken his law." When men dissociate from their conceptions of God, the Idea of Retribution, they of necessity, in their inner being cease to entertain any sentiments of respect or veneration for Him. In the presence of flagrant crime, to lift our thoughts to the throne of the Eternal, with the conception that He will not render deserved retributions to the guilty, is so abhorrent to the internal sense of justice and truth which exists as a necessary law of universal mind, that under such circumstances, men will either wholly deny the reality of the divine existence or disrobe the Most High in their conceptions of Him, of all those attributes by which He is qualified to act at all as a moral governor. Reason as well as revelation affirm the the great truth, that when men entertain the idea that God will not require of creatures according to their deeds, they will, however wicked they may be, contemn Him in their hearts.

4. The idea of Retribution, instead of being naturally abhorrent to the mind, is in full harmony with the changeless laws of rational existence. The capability of conceiving of the idea and of the action relatively to it, is one of the distinguishing characteristics by which man is qualified to take his place among the great intelligences of the universe. Great virtues can exist only in its presence and under its influence. The idea of merit—how it elevates and ennobles mind. The idea of retributions too for evil doing, all men love to entertain in respect to all crimes but those which they themselves perpetrate, so congenial is this idea

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to universal mind. Any system of philosophy or religion which tends to obscure this idea, or weaken its influence over the mind, is of more pernicious tendency, than any forms of practical wickedness can be, while conscience is left to rebuke, and shadow forth approaching retributions in respect to it.

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ARTICLE I.

BROTHERLY LOVE.

BY PRES. MAHAN.

Duty, in all its varied forms and applications, is, as far as the *principle* of moral obligation is concerned, one and the same. Yet the *forms* of duty which bind us are endlessly diversified, ever varying as the relations in which, from moment to moment, we find ourselves existing, vary. We find ourselves also, at each moment of our existence, sustaining a diversity of relations to beings around us, relations on account of which a corresponding diversity of forms of obligation are continuously devolved upon us. At the same time that we are bound to the exercise of love, gratitude, and obedience towards God, a diversity of forms of obligation, growing out of the domestic, social, and civil relations, in which we find ourselves existing, bind us, in respect to our fellow men.

Of the various forms of duty thus devolved upon us, some are presented in the scriptures as of paramount importance, such, for example, as "repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ." Among this class, that which we have selected as the subject of the present article, stands conspicuous, to wit, "brotherly love." That our readers may have distinctly before their minds the light in which this form of Christian virtue is presented in the scriptures, we will here cite, without note or comment, a few passages in which this subject is referred to. "Behold, how good and pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity! It is like the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down upon the beard, even Aaron's beard: that went down to the skirts of his garments."—*Psalms* 133: 1—2. "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another. By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another."—*John* 13:

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34—35. "This is my commandment, That ye love one another.'—15: 12. "Neither pray I for these alone; but for them also which shall believe on me through their word: that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one."—17: 20—22. "For this is the message that ye have heard from the beginning, that we should love one another. Not as Cain, who was of that wicked one, and slew his brother. And wherefore slew he him? Because his own works were evil, and his brother's righteous. Marvel not, my brethren, if the world hate you. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren. He that loveth not his brother, abideth in death. Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer: and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him. Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."—1 *John*, 3: 11—16. "Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which cause divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned; and avoid them. For they that are such serve not the Lord Jesus Christ, but their own belly; and by good words and fair speeches deceive the hearts of the simple."—*Romans* 16: 17—18. "Let brotherly love continue."—*Hebrews* 13: 1. Not only a paramount importance, but an ineffable beauty attaches to this last precept, when contemplated in the connection in which it stands. While the command is given, "Let brotherly love continue," it is immediately added, "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers," and "Remember them that are in bonds as bound with them." The two utmost extremes of humanity are here presented to our contemplation, none being so near to us as those who with us belong to the "household of faith," and none naturally so remote from us, as "strangers," and those "that are in bonds." These precepts, then, are given as the extreme links of that golden chain which binds us to universal humanity, and as, consequently, comprehending every form of duty designated by the term philanthropy, when understood in its widest sense. He that, in the sanctuary of his heart, sanctifies "his brother," on the one hand, and "the stranger," and "them that are in bonds," on the other, will fail in no form of duty to those who occupy the intermediate relations.

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Without further introduction, we shall now proceed to the elucidation of the subject before us, assuming, as the basis of our remarks, the precept above cited, "Let brotherly love continue."

I. The question which we first raise in respect to this subject is, What is the *true basis* of this "new commandment?" To this question but one answer can be given, to wit, actual membership of the "household of faith." On what basis do the rights of brotherhood in the domestic relations rest? On one basis exclusively, *a common parentage*. The same holds true of the precept under consideration. To those, and those only, who have mutually been "born of God," does this precept pertain. No other reasons do or can exist for it but this one. Take away the fact that there is on earth a "holy nation, a royal priesthood, a peculiar people," "children of a heavenly birth," a people who have been really and truly "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God," a people purified from the grossness of sensuality, selfishness, and sin, and actually graced with the beauties of holiness, take away this one great fact, we say, and no basis whatever remains for the precept, "Let brotherly love continue."

No relations of kindred or country, no natural or acquired perfections, mental or physical, aside from the possession of moral purity, no external relations in church or state, constitute any part of the basis of this form of Christian virtue. For other reasons we may be, as we in fact are, required to love individuals as men, as fellow citizens, and as connected with us by domestic ties; but for one reason only can the command bind us to exercise towards individuals or classes of individuals, "brotherly love," the single fact that they have been "born of God," in other words, that with us, they have a common parentage that is really and truly divine.

All other relations existing among men, on the other hand, in the absence of moral virtue, constitute so many reasons against the exercise of the form of love under consideration. Two individuals, we will suppose, have a common standing in the visible church. One of them stands revealed to the other, as in all respects, the opposite of what he professes to be. What claims has he upon the other for the exercise of brotherly love? that is, to be esteemed and treated as the opposite of what he really is? The existence of the relation supposed, in connection with a violation of

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all the duties which that relation imposes, constitutes the highest possible reasons against the exercise of this peculiar form of love towards the subject. The same holds true in all other instances. The faithful discharge of the various duties growing out of the diversified relations of life, constitutes the only possible basis for the duty of "brotherly love." A violation of these duties, on the other hand, destroys wholly all reasons and grounds for its exercise. To those destitute of moral virtue, we owe other duties of the most sacred character. To be esteemed and treated, however, as morally pure, that is, to be objects of the peculiar form of love under consideration, they have and can have no claims whatever. Not being holy, whatever other relations they may sustain to us, they can have no claim to that peculiar regard due only and exclusively to the "pure in heart."

II. The next inquiry which we raise pertains to the *nature of the peculiar form of love under consideration.* We are naturally so constituted, that when we contemplate any form of excellence which we very highly esteem and value, an affection of corresponding strength and intensity is thereby generated towards the subject, an affection rendering him to us, personally, an object of strong attachment and delight. In the estimation of all the "pure in heart," holiness, or moral virtue, is a form of excellence which overshadows all others, actual and conceivable, and consequently constitutes a basis for a form of mutual regard, more strong and endearing, than any other, or even than all other relations combined. *Brotherly love is that form of affection for moral agents, which respect for moral purity generates in the hearts of the morally pure, towards those who are really and truly "pure in heart."* In principle this form of virtue is one and the same with all other forms, having its basis in internal respect for objects as they are in themselves. As distinguished from other forms of virtue, its nature and character are determined by the peculiar character of the object towards which it is exercised. The meaning of the precept, "Let brotherly love continue," is this. Let that form of mutual good will, attachment and delight, which respect for moral purity generates in the hearts of the morally pure towards the subjects of such purity, be perpetuated and perfected in its exercise, among those who have really and truly been born of God, one toward another. Thus a divine brotherhood is created unlike all others, and

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as superior to them as that which, in its nature, is unchangeable and eternal, is to that which is mutable and transitory, a divine brotherhood, very properly denominated in the scriptures, "a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people." Thus, too, a form of virtue is manifested to the world, more benign and attractive, and more indicative of its divine origin, than any other of which the human mind has ever conceived. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one toward another."

III. The next inquiry which arises is, *the conditions* on which we are required to exercise this peculiar form of love towards any individuals or classes of men. As the precept requiring its exercise has its basis in one fact exclusively, the actual existence of moral purity, so this precept binds us to its exercise relatively to particular individuals or classes of men, when and only when the actual existence of such purity in them has been *manifested to us in their visible conduct*. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Holiness manifested is the exclusive condition of obligation to exercise brotherly love towards any persons whatever. However holy and pure an individual may be, no obligation rests upon us to esteem and treat him as such, till we have the means of knowing his character as it is.

A profession of religion is, in many cases, strong presumptive evidence in favor of such heart purity in the subject. In others, it may be no evidence at all; and in some it may even be a strong presumptive evidence to the contrary, as, for example, a standing in a church known to be fundamentally erroneous in doctrine and practice both. However this may be, a mere visible profession of holiness is nowhere presented in the scriptures, as the condition of the obligation to exercise towards the subject "brotherly love," holiness manifested, in whatever circumstances it exists, being its exclusive object. Judas was, in Christ's regard, none the less a devil, because he had a standing as a disciple. It is the real "brotherhood" towards whom we are required to exercise "brotherly love," and not those who "have a name to live and are dead." On the other hand, we are required to beware of "ravening wolves," who come to us "in sheep's clothing," to "mark" and "avoid all who cause divisions and offences" in the church, "contrary to the doctrine" of Christ. We are positively prohibited keeping company, "if any man that is called a brother, be a forni-

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ator, or covetous, or an idolator, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner: with such an one no not to eat."

As holiness manifested is the exclusive object of the peculiar form of affection and regard of which we are speaking, and the only condition of obligation to its exercise, so nothing whatever in the subject, which may co-exist with such holiness, is to be any barrier whatever to the exercise of this love. No external relationships civil or ecclesiastical, the presence or absence of no ties of kindred or natural friendship, no agreement or diversity of opinion or practice, religious or political, which consist with manifested heart purity and integrity, have any influence whatever to create or annihilate, vary or modify, our obligations to exercise "brotherly love," when this one exclusive condition of obligation to its exercise has been fulfilled.

Among the morally pure holiness exists in connection with intellectual powers not only limited in their nature, but in endlessly diversified degrees of development. Hence, in every such individual, to whatever degree sanctified, there is a continued liability to erroneous judgment. Among the masses also, constituting the "household of faith," there is an equal liability to a wide diversity of opinion and forms of action, in respect to all subjects perfect agreement in regard to which is not essential to the existence of holiness itself. Each one will contemplate almost all objects of thought from a stand-point peculiar to himself, and that stand-point will occasion a corresponding peculiarity in many important respects, of opinions and sentiments in respect to it. Individuals, each and all alike under the exclusive influence of the most perfect integrity, may investigate the same subject, and no two of them perfectly agree, and many of them come to directly opposite conclusions in respect to it. No such differences are to constitute the least barrier to the exercise of brotherly love, while heart integrity stands revealed as co-existing with them. We will put an extreme case in elucidation of this principle. We will suppose that an individual, from no malicious intention, as we have evidence to believe, but in the honest use of the best light within his reach, has come to this conclusion, that we are "wolves in sheep's clothing;" while we are fully conscious to ourselves that we are approved of God as members of his church, and ministers of the everlasting gospel. Cases like this have actually occurred among Christians. How shall we regard such an individual? With the same confidence, esteem, affection,

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and delight, as if his judgment were ever so favorable in respect to us. Liability to error in judgment, in connection with even the most perfect goodness and integrity, pertains to character, our own not excepted, as well as to other subjects. Such error in no sense or degree diminishes or modifies the intrinsic beauty or value of the virtues with which it co-exists; nor should it diminish our respect for that virtue, or the individual who is the subject of it, when such virtue is manifested to us.

From what has been said, it will readily be perceived, that between individuals who are fully approved in the sight of God the exercise of "brotherly love" may for a time, wholly cease, and that without crime, on the part of either. The character of each may be presented to the other under a veil, and each may honestly suppose, that behind the veil which hides his brother's character from his view, a false profession lies concealed. Each, under such circumstances, will be to each other the object of benevolent regard, but not of "brotherly love," the exclusive object of which, being, as we have said, moral purity manifested. It is in itself a very painful thought, that individuals who have been really and truly born of God, and who are still the objects of his full approbation and delight, should nevertheless be to each other as strangers and foreigners. Such things, however, owing to the necessary limitations of the human faculties, may happen, and that without crime.

IV. The inquiry which next presses upon us is, how may the exercise of "brotherly love" *be continued* among the members of the "household of faith?" In the scriptures, independent thought in its highest and best sense, is required of each member of this household. Every one, as he becomes a member of it, is addressed with the solemn command, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." An evil, if it can be called an evil, incidental to a community thus organized, is a wide diversity, and even opposition, of thought, speech, and action, in respect to many important subjects. In full view of all such necessary attendants of moral virtue, in the only form in which it can exist in connection with limited intellectual faculties, we are addressed by the divine precept, "Let brotherly love continue." How can the exercise of this virtue be perpetuated among those who are "sanctified by the faith of Christ?"

1. Let each carefully cherish a respect for the overshadowing claims which moral purity and all who are revealed

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to us as the subjects of it, have upon our esteem, affection, and endearing fellowship. We should ever bear in mind, with full and perfect distinctness, that when moral purity ceases to attract us towards and attach us to individuals above all other qualities and excellencies combined, we ourselves cease to be pure in heart. On the other hand, let all who are themselves morally pure, continuously entertain and manifest this regard for moral purity and for every one who stands revealed as possessing it, and "brotherly love" will "continue" among those who are the proper objects of it, one toward the other.

2. As a necessary means of the continuance of "brotherly love" the sentiment should be carefully and distinctly entertained by all the members of the "household of faith," that while the subjects in respect to which there is a perfect unity of views and conviction, among all truly pure minds, are of infinitely greater importance than those in respect to which they differ, the union is permanent, the difference is transitory, and will soon disappear altogether, as the increasing light of the future dawns upon their minds. In respect to ultimate aims, and all forms of doctrine the belief of which is essential to the existence of moral virtue, there is among all such minds, an absolute unity. They differ only in respect to the *means* by which these common ends shall be realized, and in respect to forms of belief not essential, and relative to which a perfect harmony of views will ere long, with perfect certainty obtain. Let all minds, who are conscious of being internally pure themselves, entertain such sentiments in respect to all others of the same character, and especially when particular causes of disagreement arise among them, and the spirit of discord will have no place in the family of Christ. Within that sanctified circle, brotherly love will continue. A forgetfulness of this great fact is one of the chief causes of all the discord which ever obtains there.

3. As a necessary means of the continuance of the form of virtue of which we are speaking, the sentiment should be an omnipresent reality to all sanctified minds, that no forms of practice, no errors in doctrine, and no diversity or opposition of views on any subject whatever, the existence of which do not imply the absence of heart purity and integrity are, in the least degree, to weaken or modify our respect, esteem, and affection for individuals as "brethren beloved," nor to prevent our treating them as such before the

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world. We cannot will that our brethren should cease to "prove all things" for themselves, that is to be independent thinkers, without willing that they should cease to be really and truly pure in heart. They can not thus think, and act according to their own internal sacred convictions, without differing from us in many important particulars, in thought and action, Whenever such differences co-exist with, and result from heart integrity, it is virtue in them thus to differ from us. They can not harmonize with us, without ceasing to be "pure in heart." For us to cease to esteem and love them as brethren, for such differences, is to cease to render them the objects of "brotherly love," for the only reason on account of which they are or can be entitled to such love from us. Christian union should always be formed with the definite expectation, that a diversity of views will obtain among believers, and with the conviction deeply penetrating all minds, that no diversity or opposition not implying moral guilt shall, in the least degree, disturb that union and harmony. Under no other circumstances can "brotherly love" continue.

4. The frequent intercommunion of mind with mind, in respect to those subjects about which there is a perfect agreement among all the pure in heart, is also an indispensible requisite to the continuance of "brotherly love." When such individuals cease to meet in the circle of prayer, when their social intercourse turns mainly upon worldly objects, they will, as spiritual men, become as strangers to one another. When, on the other hand, "they that fear the Lord, speak often one to another," and especially when their conversation turns mainly upon those high ends and aims, and "deep things of God" in respect to which all such minds perfectly harmonize, they will hardly fail to know each other, and "to love as brethren."

5. When such intercommunion, as that above referred to, is accompanied with active self-denying co-operation in the direct promotion of the great ends of benevolence, in their varied forms, then the secret movements of sanctified hearts become most distinctly revealed, and "brotherly love" is called into the most vigorous exercise among minds thus associated. Its exercise can hardly fail to continue. Merely meeting together in the same house of worship from sabbath to sabbath, and putting contributions into the same box as it passes round, is not the form of co-operation to which we refer. All this may exist in connection with the

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widest remove, on the part of all concerned, from the spirit of benevolence, and consequently from the form of benevolent co-operation, demanded, as the basis for the mutual exercise of "brotherly love." On the other hand, when many hearts are separated, in spirit, from all selfish ends and aims, and with full devotion, are consecrated to to God and the temporal and eternal weal of humanity, and when, for the promotion of such ends, they have combined their energies and resources for the accomplishment of some specific purposes of absorbing interest, there arises a form of benevolent co-operation which will not and can not fail to be sanctified by the mutual exercise of "brotherly love," on the part of all concerned. Under such circumstances the benevolent intentions of benevolent minds become manifest to all, and an intercommunion of kindred hearts results, presenting the most perfect reflection that earth ever witnesses, of that intercommunion which is perfected above. "Brotherly love" can have no place any where, while this form of co-operation is wanting. Permit us here to ask, whether the want of this co-operation is not the main cause of the absence of any impressive manifestations of heart unity in the churches at the present time? "All seek their own and not the things of Jesus Christ." The general professedly sanctified heart, has enlarged itself, not to a "comprehension of the breadth and depth, and length and height," not to "know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge," that it may thereby be "filled with all the fullness of God," but to the love of wealth, to the spirit of pride, and to worldly sensual delights. How vain it is to exhort individuals, in such a state, "to love one another."

6. Mutual confessions, when wrong may have been done, is another necessary means of promoting the exercise of "brotherly love." Indeed, when it has ceased to exist, through a visible departure from duty, it can be reintroduced by no other means. Confession may be demanded for two reasons—acts of mutual wrong—and acts indicating a want of wisdom, which may yet consist with right intentions. The spirit of mutual confession, to whichever of the forms of action above named it may refer, tends more powerfully than almost anything else, to cement sanctified hearts together. The reason is obvious. Heart purity and rectitude is thereby most distinctly manifested.

7. We mention one and only one other means of the "continuance of brotherly love," the most important and

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indispensible of any, yes, more important than all others to which we have referred. The appropriate and exclusive object of this form of regard is, as we have seen, *moral purity manifested*. In its absence, "brotherly love" can, by no possibility, exist, and ought not to exist, if it could. The great obligation then resting upon us in respect to its existence and continuance, is to be in ourselves the appropriate objects of this divine virtue, that is, to possess, at all times and relatively to all subjects, moral virtue ourselves, and to exhibit it, in all its appropriate manifestations, before the world. Then, when located among individuals "like minded," we shall not fail to exercise "brotherly love" ourselves, or under ordinary circumstances to be the objects of it, on the part of others. None will then be straitened in us. If straitened at all, it will be in their own bowels. Nor will this long continue among those who are really and truly "pure in heart."

V. The last inquiry which claims our attention is, the things which impede or wholly suspend the exercise of "brotherly love" among the members of the "household of faith," one towards the other.

1. That which first of all demands notice, as the chief cause of such evil, is the cessation or absence of that which is the exclusive basis of obligation to exercise "brotherly love," to wit, moral purity manifested in all appropriate forms of benevolent activity. It is a contradiction in terms, to suppose, that "brotherly love" can co-exist with the absence of spiritual mindedness, as much so, as the supposition, that individuals remaining totally selfish, may yet act benevolently towards each other. When believers, too, have departed from the "way of holiness," repentance must with them, precede the exercise of "brotherly love."

2. Another very common and fruitful source of the evil under consideration, is the imputing of differences or opposition of opinion and action in respect to subjects in reference to which honest minds may differ, to a state of heart morally wrong. When we impeach the motives of an individual, whether rightly or wrongly, in any transaction, he becomes to us of necessity "a stranger and foreigner," till he manifests repentance. In whatever light we may regard him in other respects, he can not be to us an object of "brotherly love." To exercise it toward him becomes impossible. If he becomes aware of the attitude of our minds towards him, and is conscious of integrity

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in the matter referred to, he will be strongly tempted to regard himself the object not only of error in judgment, but of injustice. Hence we shall cease to be to him the objects of "brotherly love." Thus hearts have been sundered, each of whom may have preserved its integrity. We should ever bear in mind the fact, that because a subject most manifestly presents itself in a given light to us, it by no means follows that others will judge of it as we do. In consequence of viewing it from a standpoint the reverse of ours, their honest convictions in respect to it may be in direct opposition to our own. But when a subject appears very plain to us, how strongly tempted we are to assume, that all honest minds must view it as we do, and consequently that all judgments the opposite of ours must proceed from a want of internal rectitude. In consequence of such unauthorized assumptions, individuals cease to love each other as brethren, who are as dear to Him to whom the secrets of the heart are visible, as the apple of his eye. There is almost no department of Christian obligation in respect to which the church needs more careful instruction than this.

3. The exercise of discipline in the church for forms of belief and practice which do not, as all acknowedge, imply moral guilt, but may consist with moral virtue and integrity, is another cause and fruitful source of discord, and consequent extinguishment of "brotherly love" in the church of God. A church rightly instructed would as soon "touch the apple of God's eye," as to lay the rod of discipline upon the back of one whom she acknowledges to be an honest man, and for any acts or forms of belief in respect to which she believes him to have acted from heart integrity. The rod was never put into her hands for any such purpose. Rulers in church and state were "never appointed of God, to be a "terror to good works, but to evil." No man was ever the subject of discipline for any form of belief or practice, in respect to which he is conscious of having acted in "the fear of God" and is acknowledged to have done so by others, who did not regard himself as the object of oppression, if not of persecution for "righteousness sake." Many in the church also will, with almost absolute certainty, sympathize with him in such impressions. The majority also, will have the secret consciousness of having acted without authority from the head of the church. The result will be division and every evil work.

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4. The habit, so common, of passing judgment upon men in view of *what* they believe and do, and not in view of the reasons *why* they thus judge and act, is another quite common and fruitful source of discord in the church. When we have clearly ascertained that a given form of belief or practice is in itself erroneous, or accordant with truth, it by no means follows from such a fact, that all who do not symbolize with us, are guilty of moral wrong. If we make our own knowledge instead of theirs the standard of judgment in respect to their character in the case referred to, however approved they may be in the divine estimation, we shall not esteem or love them "as brethren." "Brotherly love" relatively to all individuals whom we have thus judged, will have no place in our hearts, however deserving of it they may be. "The unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace" can never be preserved, in any association where such a standard of judgment is adopted. Whatever a man holds from internal respect to truth, whatever he does from similar respect to the law of duty, after having honestly used the best means in his power to know what truth and duty are, it is moral virtue in him to believe and practice. The character of each moral agent depends upon his conformity or non-conformity to the light actually granted to him, and not the higher or dimmer light conferred upon others. "If I had not *come* and *spoken* unto them, they had not had sin."

5. Whenever a majority in the church make the subject of discipline, any forms of belief or practice, the believing or performance of which, honest minds do not regard as involving moral guilt, or when measures are carried, or attempted to be carried by discipline, which such minds sincerely regard as, in themselves, inexpedient or wrong, an almost insuperable barrier is thereby raised, to the exercise of "brotherly love." All the ends of discipline are not only defeated, when it is thus employed, but parties are formed, among whom the spirit of distrust and opposition is generated, rendering future harmonions co-operation almost impossible. All such measures appear to all who do not advocate them as oppression, and not as dictated by a regard to truth, justice, and the ends of benevolence. We would lay it down as a universal principle, that nothing should be made, in the household of faith, a subject of discipline, which honest minds do not unite in regarding as involving moral guilt. Any departure in any direction from

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this principle, tends to "make schisms in the body of Christ," and never to the promotion of "brotherly love."

6. On the other hand, the refusal or neglect to apply the rod or excinding power of discipline, to the correction of gross offences, "known and read of all men," as existing in the church, tends to precisely the same result. When by common consent, individuals unite in doing wrong, or in neglecting to do what the law of duty manifestly requires to be done, as is true in the case supposed, they mutually, though in many instances almost unconsciously, cease to respect one another, as morally virtuous. Thus in the common neglect of manifest duty, the exercise of "brotherly love" has totally ceased in many of our churches.

7. Practically treating individuals of known and acknowledged piety as "heathen men and publicans," is another too common a cause of the extinction of "brotherly love," in the church of Christ. We refer to acts of withdrawment or of withholding ecclesiastical or church fellowship from individuals confessed to be "good men, full of faith and of the Holy Ghost," on the ground of mere imputed errors in doctrine or practice, errors not regarded as involving moral character. All who unite in such acts, of necessity, though they may not be aware of it themselves, cease to respect one another, as actuated in such conduct by respect to the most sacred of all rights, the rights of character. They will, of course, cease to be among themselves even the objects, the one towards the other, of "brotherly love." When men unite in the doing of unauthorized acts, even in the midst of their apparent union they become to each other the objects of mutual distrust. It can not be otherwise. Much less can the bonds of of fellowship continue to unite our hearts to those whom we treat in opposition to our sacred convictions of their real deserts. The acknowledged fact that "God has received" an individual, must be to us an all authoritative reason for "receiving him" ourselves, or he will cease to be to us the object of "brotherly love."

8. We mention but one other impediment to the exercise or continuance of "brotherly love." We refer to a want of respect for the rights of others to judge, according to the best light they have, of our character, and to express, on all proper occasions, their honest convictions whether favorable or unfavorable, in respect to it. Character, our own not expected, is public property. So we regard and treat

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the character of others. Why should we be unwilling that our own should be subject to the same law? We regard ourselves, as having justly forfeited the esteem of no man, for having formed, and on proper occasions, expressed honest, and only honest convictions in respect to his character, whether such judgments be favorable or unfavorable to his reputation, or whether we may or may not have erred in judgment. No one, therefore, should cease to be loved by us, as a brother, whatever his opinions in respect to our character may be, who has judged and spoken of us in conformity with the principle just stated. Suppose he has erred in judgment. Thus to err is not only human, but the common frailty of all finite intelligences. We can not justly require all men to think correctly or favorably of us. We can, however, require them to think *honestly*. When we have evidence that they have thus thought, whether they have judged favorably or unfavorably, correctly or incorrectly, they are to be to us objects of the warmest moral esteem and regard. Now it is the want of this free toleration of opinion and speech in respect to personal character which sunders many hearts "which else, like kindred drops had mingled into one."

In the preceding remarks, it has been our object to elucidate and enforce subjection to a fundamental principle of Christian duty. It has not been our object to chide others for the want of "brotherly love;" but to lay out before our own minds and those of others, the great law which binds alike "all the family in heaven and on earth," one towards the other. It has long been a pleasing thought to us, that many hearts now kept asunder, through mutual ignorance of each other, will most sweetly and cordially flow together, as, in the midst of the light of the coming future, the present veil will be removed from character, and each will know his brother as he is. Nor will individuals love each other the less cordially or intensely there, because they failed to know each other here. "Let us not therefore judge one another any more: but judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall in his brothers's way."

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ARTICLE II.

LAMARTINE.

BY T. B. HUDSON,
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It is rare that the man who has distinguished himself as a poet and sentimentalist, becomes renowned as a man of action. There are several reasons for this. Among them are probably the following. To succeed as a man of action, one must study men as they are. He must govern them as they are. He has not time—or thinks he has not—to convert them, if he were disposed, to the lofty faith which communion with the spiritual may have revealed to his soul. His appeal must be to their passions and prejudices. His life must be, or pretend to be, an embodiment of their reigning thought or desire. So long then as mankind are selfish or vicious, his temptation to succumb to the depraved passions of the masses will be almost resistless. Under this influence the youthful anchorite is gradually—in some cases suddenly—transformed into the hard man of the world—the cool calculator of consequences. His lofty principles are abused to cloak a miserable selfishness. His pure visions of a happy social state are silently abandoned, or scouted as the dreams of ignorance. "To rule men," he reasons, "we must take men as they are," which translated into action, means in most cases, we must *be what* they are.

The habits of mind, too, fostered by the study of poetry and sentiment, are at antipodes to those demanded on the battle field or on the rostrum—in the council-chamber or in the arts of diplomacy. The poet seeks for beautiful or touching images to dazzle or to melt; the political debater for arguments to convince or sophisms to delude. The one aims to delight men, the other to bend them to his own will. The one, of course, draws largely on his own power of creating scenes that will amuse or thrill—that will transport

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the soul with rapture, or prostrate it, mute with awe, as in the presence of the Infinite. The other as naturally appeals to their interests. His eye glances over the whole field of their real or imaginary hopes and fears. He rouses these hopes. He alarms these fears. He deems that instrumentality best which best effects his purposes. If he be a man of real genius, he will, it is true, derive some of his power from the realm of poetry; but this he will do, not because poetry is beautiful, but because he sees that it will help him to attain his end. In short, the one seeks to develop the beautiful, the grand, the true. The powers needed for this are a lively fancy, a powerful imagination, great knowledge and love of nature and of subjective truth, with a power over language which will paint one's themes to the life, and a taste which will shape the portraiture with proper harmony and grace. The other struggles to secure, first power, and then its permanence. The powers to be used here are, a penetration which perceives the master-passions which sway the masses, the power to wield them whether good or bad for his own ends, craft, cunning, sophistry, deceit, an ability to create new and plausible issues of interest, actual or fanciful, and a manner which says to every human being, "I am your best and most devoted friend." With such objects, differing so widely, demanding such powers, differing so much in their nature and development, what wonder that so few have been successful in the pursuit of both?

Another perhaps equally powerful reason for the fact we have stated is, that each of the departments alluded to, is itself sufficient to task to the utmost the most gifted human mind. The sweetest bards have wept to find how poorly the tones of their harps answered the unuttered melodies of their souls. The best painters have thrust aside their masterpieces, because even their best attempts could not fix on canvass the vision brighter than the dawn which floated before the eye of their souls. One of the most powerful speakers we ever heard, once said to us, "O that I could devote my whole life to the study of oratory! I think I might make some progress." A distinguished inventor once said in our hearing, "How I long to give myself to the work of invention! What I have done seems as nothing." The remark readily suggests the similar one by Sir Isaac Newton, who near the close of his life, said of himself, "I have gathered a few pebbles on the shore while the great ocean

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of truth lies unexplored before me." The general conclusion to which these facts point, is the one which we wish here to apply. It is this. Every great department of human effort is itself enough, and more than enough, for the powers of a single man. He who aims at the conquest of any one of these, will have no time nor strength to become renowned in another. The great poet rarely becomes a great diplomatist. Napoleon is not Voltaire and Napoleon too—Milton does not superadd to the fame of a minstrel the renown of Cromwell's arms. We do not affirm that none of these could have changed places with those we have contrasted with them. But no one of them would probably have found life long enough—or his strength great enough, to place him at the head of any two of these great departments of human activity *at once.*

It is no wonder, then, that so few shine as poets and writers of taste, and at the same time as leading practical statesmen or warriors. Success in these contrasted departments requires moral states that are deemed incompatible. It requires, too, the development of powers that in most cases do not grow together. Besides, each of them demands the whole strength of its votaries, and together they impose a burden almost always too great for the strength of one man to bear.

The wonder is that any man should succeed at all in attempting both. Such a wonder is presented in the life of Alphonse de Lamartine. After holding the noblest minds of France in rapture for years by the magic of his verse, he now fascinates her masses by the power of his eloquence, and exerts a strong influence in her national councils. His success for the moment is extraordinary. Whether it will continue so, remains to be seen.

A brief sketch of his life and career may not be entirely useless.

M. de Lamartine was born in 1790, of parents who were attached to the old kings. His earliest recollections go back to a prison of which his father was an inmate, and to which he sometimes went clinging to his mother's hand, when she visited her husband's cell.

His father was afterwards released, and the family retired to an estate at Milly, where the childhood of our young poet glided calmly away. His remembrances of these happy scenes is vivid and touching. The old town, the linden grove, his aged father, his noble mother, his loving sisters, the mountains that bounded the horizon of his early home,

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are alluded to in his works with feeling and regret. His mother was a deeply religious woman, and the winning charm with which she impressed the great truths of Christianity on the heart of her young Alphonse, doubtless did much to make him what he is.

At a suitable age he was sent to the college at Belley. Here, the religious sentiments inculcated by his mother were strengthened and developed. And the purity of his manhood bears testimony to the benign influence exerted over him by the solitude and discipline of this secluded retreat.

After leaving school he visited Lyons, passed a short time in Italy—and came to Paris just before the Bourbons recovered the throne of France. Here for a brief season he forgot his early religious training, and plunged into dissipation. His time was divided between study and pleasure. Some of his partial biographers intimate that, though he was a votary of pleasure, he was saved from the grossness of vulgar crime. In 1813, he revisited Italy, and there doubtless drank in the inspiration which breathes through his poetry. He soon returned, and at the downfall of the empire, entered the service of the ancient race, and enlisted in a company of guards. After the Hundred Days he quitted the army. He became the subject of an attachment which was destined to rack his bosom with intense suffering. Little do we know of this early passion, except that its object, the loved and loving Elvira, was early snatched away by death. His afflictions made him a poet. His Meditations were soon after published. This was in 1820. The "Second Meditations" were published in 1823. His poetic fame was now co-extensive with France. His genius opened to him the career of a diplomatist. He was attach- to the embassy at Florence, and while in Tuscany, he became acquainted with an English lady of great wealth and beauty. They loved each other and were married. She is his present wife. He was soon transferred to Naples as Secretary of the embassy. Not long after he went to London in the same capacity, and then returned to Tuscany as "*Charge d' Affaires.*" His fortune meanwhile had been greatly increased by the death of a maternal uncle who made him heir. He continued to prosecute his poetical labors. The ode to Bonaparte and other works succeeded each other rapidly. The following couplet in one of these.

> "Pardon me, shade of Rome, for seek I must
> Elsewhere for men, and not in human dust."

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roused the ire of an Italian officer who sent Lamartine a challenge. They fought, and Lamartine was wounded nearly fatally. On his recovery he interceded warmly for his antagonist.

He remained in Italy till the year 1829. He then returned to Paris and in May, published the "Song of the Sacred." About this time he was received at the Academy, and just as the Revolution of 1830 broke out, he was sent to Greece as Minister Plenipotentiary. He acceded cheerfully to the new order of things, and hoped much for France from the new dynasty. Lamartine now aspired to a seat in the Chamber, but in his first attempt was repulsed. He owed this defeat, it is said, to a biting sarcasm with which he had annihilated the poet of the district whose suffrages he courted. In 1832 the poet decided to execute his long cherished intention of visiting the Holy Land. He chartered a vessel, employed a captain and crew to his taste, put on board every thing comfort and safety demanded and accompanied by his wife, and his only child Julia, now a blooming girl of ten—set sail from Marseilles on one of the most romantic voyages performed in these modern days. "*The Pilgrimage to the Holy Land*," the book in which he describes the incidents of that adventure, is one of the most fascinating works we ever read. We may speak of it hereafter. During this voyage their idolized Julia fell a victim to the malignant fever, and the heart-broken parents placed her remains on board the vessel that brought them to the East, and returned by land to France.

The legislative commission which he had sought in vain before his voyage, now came unsought. He had in fact been elected during his absence. On the 4th of Jan. 1834, he made his first appearance at the tribune. From that time to the Revolution of Feb. 1848, he was a member of the legislative body of France. Since that Revolution he has occupied various positions, and is now laboring with anxious solicitude in the National Assembly for the triumph of well regulated liberty in his native land. The remainder of his life must be lived before it can be written.

Meanwhile some remarks on his character as a politician, as an author, and as a man, must terminate what we have now to say.

LAMARTINE THE POLITICIAN.

The political system of Lamartine must be gathered from his position and from the scattered and fragmentary hints

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which the public journals furnish. We can not go far astray, however, with that position before us, and his own words to explain and confirm it. Born the foe of the revolution which imprisoned his father, and reared to adore the old dynasty whose misfortunes his family had shared, he was inclined to hope that the establishment of Louis Philippe on the throne would best consult the welfare of his beloved France. He looked to the citizen-king as the defender of public order and of public liberty—he was bitterly disappointed. He found that the new order was an order which prostrated the masses in debasement, and placed the heel of the tyrant-citizen upon their necks. He found that the new liberty was a liberty which gave to the strong the right to injure, and to the weak the right to submit and be dumb. He gradually disentangled himself from the support of Louis Philippe, till when the last revolution came, he was ready for its astounding explosions, and was among the first to aid in laying the foundations of the new republic. He is a moderate republican. He believes neither in monarchy nor in extreme democracy—a strong executive—a President elected not by the people but by the legislature—in short, a government which recognizing the popular sovereignty would restrain popular violence—which making the channels for the expression of popular feeling sure and unclogged, would make them so long and so circuitous that the lava of a people's excitement might not overflow to the destruction of a people's welfare—this is his ideal. We fear it will not be realized.

He advocates the abolition of the death penalty. France, whose capital was but yesterday deluged with the blood of her children, betrays by that gigantic massacre, that she is not prepared for the mild philosophy which tenderly, but mayhap unwisely, whispers to the assassin, "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood *never be shed*."

He has been called a disciple of St. Simon, but the passage in his journal which is quoted to prove his discipleship, hardly warrants such a statement. It does in fact deny his adoption of those features of St. Simonism which have always been most revolting to the great mass of sober and moral people, and expresses little more than a sympathy with their ultimate object, the elevation of the masses—an object surely which every well-wisher of his kind would rejoice to see attained.

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His European system is the thing, however, on which his heart has seemed most set; and its novelty and colossal proportions, as well as the fascinating eloquence with which Lamartine has clothed it, have fixed on it considerable attention. The following outline of it will suggest its principal features.

1. Europe has an over-crowded, and therefore idle and miserable population.

2. Asia has vast tracts of desolate and unoccupied land, which invite the possession and culture of the civilized laborer.

3. The Ottoman empire is tottering to its fall. It will soon be in the dust.

4. When this takes place, let the powers of Europe divide the territory and govern it under the form of protectorates.

5. Let colonies be formed inviting all who wish, to emigrate under the protection of these governments.

6. In a few years Europe would be relieved of her starving millions—Asia would receive nations of strong-handed vigorous men, who would bear back civilization, science, and religion, to the lands which gave them first to the world. "In twenty years," says Lamartine, "the measure which I propose would have created prosperous nations, and millions of men would be marching under the *ægis* of Europe to a new civilization." It does not seem to have occurred to the mind of the poet-statesman that Asia is already possessed by millions of men who would defend their prior right to the soil and to dominion by the sword—that the tide of emigration rolls toward the El Dorados of the setting sun, with a strength which it would not be easy to turn—and that the injustice of any scheme which proposes to rob a whole race of an empire and of homes which by consent of the world have been theirs for centuries, is felt to be much more flagrant and heinous, when the proposed victims have power to resist the aggression.

But Lamartine appears to the finest advantage when he stands forth as the advocate of truth and justice—of the brotherhood of man—the rights of intelligence,—and the law of Christian obligation, as applying to the acts and intercourse of nations. It is then that his soul, fettered and chafed by the narrow questions which occupy much of the time of every legislative body, expands to its full dimensions. It is then that he appears clothed with a mission

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next to inspired. In him the Orphean fable seems to have been almost realized. For the headlong torrent of human passion is arrested in its flow—the stoniest hearts are moved—old prejudices rooted in the soil of centuries bow—and all at the voice of Lamartine. History furnishes few examples of control so nearly omnipotent exercised over the passions of a maddened populace, as that wielded by Lamartine over the Paris mob during the revolution of Feb. 1848. In the faces of sixty thousand armed ruffians—he plucked down the red flag of carnage and butchery, and upreared the tri-colored flag of "Liberty and Public Order." For successive days and weeks the voice of Lamartine, floating with its rich deep tones over the agitated masses of the capital, sufficed to hush them to peace. It was not till his character was pronounced "*suspect*," and his influence for the moment lost by slander, that the rage of the people burst all bounds, and slaked itself in a river of blood.

Could the counsels of Lamartine become the law of France, she might be saved from the ills of anarchy and despotism. But like the Girondists of '89, he and his compeers have appealed to the populace. Like the same Girondists, they may be swept away by the tornado themselves have evoked.

LAMARTINE THE AUTHOR.

He has distinguished himself chiefly as a poet, though his Pilgrimage to the Holy Land and his History of the Girondists would alone have rendered him popular.

Of his excellence as a poet we can say nothing, for we know not that any of his larger works have been translated into English, and we have never seen them in the original. Of their success, however, there can be no doubt. His first work, called the Meditations, the offspring of affection weeping at the tomb of buried love—thrilled the heart of France. Its publication was on this wise. Lamartine, the obscure young author—weak from a recent illness—his face pale with sorrow—and ill concealing the despair of the bereaved lover, went from bookseller's to bookseller's, timidly offering a slender manuscript obviously blurred with tears. All bowed him politely away. At last M. Nicolle decided to accept the youth's proposal. The book was printed and thrown out to meet its fate. Its success was astonishing. Its author was unknown. It had no

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great names to support it. It had almost no title. Its theme was the woe of an afflicted lover. Yet in four years 45000 copies were sold, and Lamartine was the nation's poet. Byron was the demi-god of poetry in England, Goethe in Germany, and Lamartine in France, the rival of both.

It was a stanza in this work that bestowed on our author his charming and loving wife. During his first residence in Tuscany as a diplomatist, in the midst the splendors of an Italian festival, he heard by night, chanted from one of the balconies of a palace, the following lines from the Meditations.

> "An unhoped return of the bliss that has flown,
> Perhaps in the future is stored for me still;
> And perhaps in the crowd, a sweet spirit unknown
> Will answer me kindly and know my soul well."

The voice and accent were foreign, but was it strange that the young enthusiast thought them lovely? He was enchanted. He left the grounds, but not to sleep. He lost no time in forming the acquaintance of the mysterious songster. She proved to be, as already stated, a wealthy and beautiful English lady, who was sojourning in Italy. The passion was mutual. Indeed one account states that the lady proffered him her heart, hand and fortune, before the sensitive lover found words to urge his suit. When the garden of poetry yields such flowers and fruit, the temptation to cultivate it is somewhat powerful.

Of the general character of his poems, only a few remarks can be made, and those must be borrowed of course. They appeal to the more cultivated classes. A lofty strain of pure feeling is maintained throughout. They draw largely, like Byron's, from the heart of the writer, but unlike his, they flow a stream of transparent crystal. Their fountain is supplied by the dews of heaven. It is said, too, that they embrace a wide variety of subjects. "He has run," says M. de Cormenia, "through the vast poetical gamut, which flowing from reveries, mounted high as enthusiasm or descended low as despair."

The Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, is the journal kept duduring wanderings in the East. He embarked, as we have already stated, with his wife and daughter at Marseilles, in a vessel chartered by himself—visited the ruins of Carthage—tarried some days at Malta—and sailed around the

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Peloponnesus. He visited Athens—coasted the southern shore of Asia Minor, and landed at Beyroot. Leaving Madame Lamartine and Julia there, he made a flying journey through Palestine—sought out Lady Hester Stanhope, and returned to Beyroot only to enjoy the affection of Julia for a few brief days, and see her die after two days illness. After the first shock of this great domestic affliction, he visited Damascus with his lady, and on their return passed through Palestine. Thus he made the tour of the Holy Land in part, twice. They then embarked at Jaffa and after encountering a terrific storm at sea, touched at Cyprus. Thence they voyaged leisurely among the isles of the Ægean, and along the classic shores of old Ionia and Troy, and landed at Constantinople. After sojourning sometime there, he took the land route through Turkey in Europe and Servia to France The remains of Julia had been sent to France in the ship that bore them all to the place of her death. This journey was the pilgrimage of a poet among the most renowned scenes in the world's history—in circumstances of peculiar and painful interest to himself and family—when Greece had just won her independence and the blood had scarce dried from the battle fields, on which Mehemet Ali asserted his right to found a new empire. The Pilgrimage to the Holy Land is the product of all these influences.

This work is full of beauties and blemishes. He revels so much in his own poetic fancies, that the outer world takes its hues from the radiance of his own heart. He finds beauty and poetry every where. Of his style it may be said—"*nihil tetigit, quod non ornavit.*" On sea and on land—in the city or in the desert—on the heights of Lebanon amid the cypresses, or among the seas of undulating sand or dark ravines at its foot—in the wild enthusiam that lit the face of Lady Hester Stanhope, in the deep repose that sleeps on the features of an Arabian wife in the recesses of the harem, in the thunder storms that shatter the peaks of the holy mountains, in the ripples that dimple the sea of Galilee, in the burning glow of a tropical noon, in the soft beams of a midnight moon that shimmer dimly on the plains of Troy, among the moldering ruins of perished empires, where every step treads on a hero's dust, or in the crowded mart where the Babel of clashing dialects mingle their din—in the bright memories of childhood, in the rapture or despair of love, in the shock of life's daily battle,

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in the hopes that fringe the drapery of the tempest now beating on the bosom of his fatherland, in the great truths and awful solemnities of religion coming down from heaven "mighty to save"—in everything, in short, great and small, old and new, spiritual or material—he finds or creates subjects for the inspiration of his muse.

This predominance of the poetic tendency in the mind of Lamartine is the source at once of his strength and his weakness. It tempts him on the one hand to waste jewelry on unworthy objects, to prolong descriptions to the weariness of his readers, to take fire on the first glance at an object, and to fall into all the spasms of a poetic phrensy over what is manifestly but a partial idea of it. It leads him to utter as the oracles of a superior insight, the crude results of a momentary survey, and to build huge piles of speculation which are poetical indeed—especially so in the sense of being heaven-wide of both truth and fact. He tells us, for example, (Vol. 1, pages 193 and 194,) that he recognized at once the valley where David killed Goliath, without any help but the Bible description, read long previously, and suggests that the reason may be that we have lived twice or a thousand times before. In another passage he informs us that the Dead Sea is at one place thirty leagues *across*, and that he and his party traversed *three* sides of it; while from his language and from the dates of his journal, it is plain that their whole survey of it occupied but part of one day. A character so imaginative, which takes its own impressions for data, and rears as by magic on such a foundation a superstructure that scales the heavens, needs to be studied rather than trusted. When he gives us his impressions, we should take them as such, and remember that they are a poet's gilded dreams. What we have just said is not intended to weaken confidence in Lamartine's trustworthiness as a historian. When he says he has examined a subject, and assures us that he has done his best to portray the past as it was, we believe he may be relied on. When he takes his measuring line in his hand, we confide in the report he makes. When he guesses, we have learned to suspend our decision and wait for further light.

Lamartine's imagination is the source of his strength. Few paintings on canvas are more gorgeous or impressive than some of his pen and ink sketches. The coloring is often, we doubt not, too high—the work overdone. But

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when he finds an object that bears to be painted with sunbeams, he produces a portrait splendid indeed. The following extract will perhaps illustrate the intensity of his mind, and suggest the style of delineation which we may naturally expect from him. The passage describes the impulses which prompted his wanderings in the Holy Land.

"My imagination was enamored of the sea, the deserts, the mountains, the manners, and the traces of the Deity in the East. All my life the East had been the waking dream of my darksome days, in the autumnal and winter fogs of my natal valley. My body, like my soul, is the child of the sun; it requires light, it requires that ray of life which the splendid orb darts, not from the shattered bosom of our western clouds, but from the depths of that sky of purple which resembles the mouth of a furnace; those rays which are not merely a glimmer, but which descend burning hot, which, in falling, calcine the white rocks and sparkling pinnacles of the mountains, and which tinge the ocean with scarlet as if a fire were kindled in its waves! I felt a strong wish to handle a little of that earth which was the land of our first family, the land of prodigies; to see, to wander over the evangelical scene whereon was represented the great drama of divine wisdom struggling with error and human perversity; where moral truth suffered martyrdom to fertilize with its blood a more perfect civilization."—*Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Vol. I, p.* 39.

The extracts presented below are taken almost at random from the "*Pilgrimage*," and will convey a fair impression of the author's powers of description. They are placed together, rather than interspersed with remarks, for convenient reference. The whole work is almost a continued succession of highly colored pictures. While each for itself commands appropriate admiration, the impression of the whole is that of a too monotonous splendor.

IMPRESSIONS ON VIEWING THE RUINS OF ANCIENT CARTHAGE.

"The eye sees nothing but a naked promontory rising above a deserted sea; a few reservoirs, empty, or filled with their own fragments, a few aqueducts in ruins, a few moles ravaged by the waves, and covered by the surge; a barbarous city close by, where even these names are unknown, reminding one of men who live too long and become strangers in their own country. But the past suffices when it shines with such brilliant reminiscences. Perhaps I love the place better alone, isolated in the midst of its ruins, than if profaned and troubled by the noise and crowd of new generations! It is with ruins as with tombs:—in the midst of the tumult of a great city, and the filth of our streets, they afflict and sadden the eye; they are a stain on all this noisy, agitated life:—but in the solitude, on the seashore, on an abandoned cape, on a wild coast, three stones grown yellow by age and broken by lightning, make us reflect, think, meditate, or weep."—*Ib. Vol. I, pp.* 68—69.

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THE HERMIT.

"On the steep and inaccessible sides of the rock which forms the point of the cape—a point sharpened by storms and the surge—chance has suspended three blocks, detached from the summit, and arrested midway in their descent. They hang, like nests of sea-birds, over the foaming abyss. A little red earth, stopped also in its fall by these three rocks of unequal size, has enabled five or six stunted fig trees to take root there, where they hang with their crooked branches and their large grey leaves, over the roaring gulf that whirls at their feet. The eye can discern no path, no practicable way by which a person may reach this tuft of vegetation; yet we can perceive a little low house beneath the fig trees, gray and sombre as the rock it stands on, and from which, at first sight, it can scarcely be distinguished; above the flat roof of the house is a little open ogive, like those above the gates of convents in Italy, and a bell is suspended in it; on the right we observe the foundations, in red brick of antique ruins, in which are three open arcades; these lead to a little terrace before the house. An eagle would have been afraid to build his nest in such a spot, with scarce the trunk of a tree or bush to shelter it from the wind which never ceases to blow, and the eternal noise of the sea, which continually washes and breaks the polished rock, beneath a burning sun. However, a man has done that which the eagle would scarcely have dared to do. He has chosen his asylum here, here he abides; we can see him: he is a hermit. We double the cape so closely inland, that we can distinguish his long white beard, his staff, his chaplet, his cowl of brown felt, like those of the sailors in winter. He kneels, as we pass, with his face turned towards the sea, as if he were imploring heaven for the unknown strangers in this perilous passage. The wind which escapes from Laconia began, as soon as we had doubled the rock of the cape, to resound in our sails, and make the two vessels stagger and turn, covering the sea with foam as far as the eye could reach. A new sea opened before us. The hermit mounted, to follow us with his eyes as far as he could, on the summit of one of the three rocks, and again we saw him there, on his knees and motionless, as long as we were in sight of the cape." —*Ib. Vol. I, pp.* 68—69.

IBRAHIM KILLING THE SERPENT.

"An Arab was this day relating to me the entrance of Ibrahim into the town of Beyroot. At a short distance from the gate, as he was crossing a hollow road, the sides of which are covered with creeping roots and twisted bushes, an enormous serpent issued from the thicket, and, slowly crawling along the sand, moved onward till it came under the very feet of Ibrahim's horse. The affrighted animal reared, and some running slaves in the suite of the pacha rushed forward to slay the serpent; but Ibrahim made a sign to them to desist, and drawing his scimitar, struck off the head of the reptile, which stood erect before him, and trampled the trunk under his horses' feet. A cry of admiration burst from the crowd, and Ibrahim pursued his route, with a smile on his lips, indicating his delight at this occurrence, which is, amongst the Arabs, a sure presage of victory."—*Ib. Vol. I., p.* 126.

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INTERVIEW WITH LADY HESTER STANHOPE.

"'In regard to the future, I only believe in God and virtue.'

"She replied—'No matter: believe what you please; I see evidently that you are born under the influence of three fortunate, powerful, and good stars—that you are gifted with analagous powers, which conduct you to one aim, which I could, if you were willing, point out to you at once. It is God who has conducted you hither, to enlighten your soul; you are one of those men of a good disposition, *whom he requires as his instruments to accomplish the marvelous works which he will soon accomplish among mankind.*"

* * * * * * * *

"'Let your religious belief be what it may,' she continued, 'you are not the less one of those men whom I expected, whom Providence has sent to me, *and who has a great part to perform in the world that is preparing*. In a short time you will return to Europe. The fate of Europe is decided. *France alone has a great mission to accomplish.* YOU WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT! I do not yet know in what manner; but if you be anxious to know, I will consult the stars to night, and reveal it to you. I do not yet know the names of all; I see now three, at present—four—perhaps five, and there may be more. One of them is certainly Mercury, which imparts clearness and color to the mind and tongue. You must be a poet; it is legible in your eyes and in the upper part of your countenance. Lower down, you are under the influence of very different stars, almost in opposition; there is an influence of energy and action.'

"'What is your name?'

"I told her.

"'I never heard it before,' she said with an accent of truth.

"'Ah, my lady, you see what human glory is. In my life I have composed a few verses, which have caused my name to be repeated a thousand times by all the literary echoes of Europe; but even that echo is too feeble to cross your ocean and your mountains.'

* * * * * * * *

"She said—'It would grieve me much to include you in the number of those young Frenchmen who raise the popular fury against all the dignities which God, nature and society have formed, and who overthrow the edifice, in order to construct with its ruins a pedestal for the envious baseness of their extraction.'

"I replied: "I belong to the class of men who do not despise those who are below them in society, at the same time that they respect those above them, the desire or dream of whom it may be, to invite all men, independently of their stations in the arbitrary hierarchies of politics, to the same light of knowledge, the same liberty, and the same moral perfection.'"—*Girondists, Vol. III., Preface.*

ELIJAH.

"The history of Elijah is one of the most wonderful of sacred antiquity; he is the giant of the holy bards. To read his life, and his terrible denunciations, it would seem as if the soul of the man had been formed of the thunders of the Lord, and that the terrific element on which he was transported up to heaven had been his native one. This

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was a fine epic or lyric figure to throw into the poem of the ancient mysteries of Judaic civilization. Altogether, the era of the prophets, considered historically, is one of the least intelligible eras of the life of this fugitive people. One perceives, however, and particularly in the epoch of Elijah, the key to the extraordinary organization of the community of the prophets; they were evidently a holy and lettered class; always opposed to kings; the consecrated tribunes of the people, exciting or appeasing them with their songs, their parables, or their menaces, and forming factions in Israel, as the press and popular oratory does amongst us—struggling against each other, first with the weapon of their words, and next with lapidation and the sword—exterminating others from off the face of the earth, as Elijah exterminated hundreds, then falling themselves in turn, and making place for other dominators of the people. Never did poetry, properly so called, play so grand a part in the political drama, in the destinies of civilization, reason, or passion. There was no oratory like that of Greece and Rome; the orator is too much man! there were only hymns and lamentations —the poet is divine. What brilliant, what ardent imagination, must have been possessed by that people, to be so influenced by the song! and how surprising, that, independently of the high religious feeling contained in them, these songs were such perfect and inimitable monument of grace and genius. Society itself was then the prize of the poets—their inspirations subjugated the people. They led them as they pleased, either to heroism or to crime; they caused the wicked kings to tremble; scattered ashes on their forheads; lighted up the fires of patriotism in the hearts of their fellow-citizens—bidding them remember, in exile and in slavery, the hills of Zion, and the liberty of the children of God. I am astonished that among all the dramas modern poetry has drawn from the history of the Jews, the wonderful drama of the prophets has not yet been imagined. It is a splendid subject in the history of the world."—*Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Vol. I, pp.* 257—258.

DESCRIPTION OF ZION AND DAVID.

"To the left of the platform, the temple, and the walls of Jerusalem, the hill which supports the city suddenly sinks, stretches itself, and descends in gentle slopes, sometimes broken by terraces of falling stone. On its summit, at some hundred paces of from Jerusalem, stand a mosque, and a group of Turkish edifices, not unlike a European hamlet, crowned with a church and steeple. This is Zion! the palace, the tomb of David! the seat of his inspiration and of his joys, of his life, and his repose! A spot doubly sacred to me, who have so often felt my heart touched, and my thoughts rapt by the sweet singer of Israel! the first poet of sentiment! the king of lyrics! Never have human fibres vibrated to harmonies so deep, so penetrating, so solemn. Never has the imagination of poet been set so high, never has its expression been so true. Never has the soul of man expanded itself before man and before God, in tones and sentiments so tender, so sympathetic, and so heartfelt! All the most secret murmurs of the human heart found their voice, and their note, on the lips and the harp of this minstrel! And if we revert to the remote period when such chants were first echoed on the earth; if we consider that at the same period the

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lyric poetry of the most cultivated nations sang only of wine, love, war, and the victories of the muses, or of the coursers at the Elean games, we dwell with profound astonishment on the mystic accents of the prophet-king, who addresses God the Creator, as friend talks to friend; comprehends and adores his wonders, admires his judgments, implores his mercies, and seems to be an anticipatory echo of the evangelic poetry, repeating the mild accents of Christ before they had been heard. Prophet or not, as he is contemplated by the philosopher or the Christian, neither of them can deny the poet-king an inspiration bestowed on no other man! Read Horace or Pindar after a Psalm? For my part I can not!"—*Ib. Vol. I, pp.* 312—313.

ARABIAN TRADITION OF THE PLACE FOR THE TEMPLE.

"'Jerusalem was a ploughed field, and the ground on which the temple now stands, the joint inheritance of two brothers; one of whom was married and had several children, the other lived a bachelor. They cultivated in common the field which had devolved on them in right of their mother; at harvest time, the two brothers bound up their sheaves, and made of them two equal stacks, which they left upon the field. During the night a good thought presented itself to the younger: 'My brother,' said he to himself, has a wife and two children to maintain; it is not just that our shares should be equal; let me then take a few sheaves from my stack, and secretly add them to his; he will not perceive it, and therefore can not refuse them.' This project the young man immediatly executed. That night the elder awoke, and said to his wife, 'My brother is young, and lives alone, without a companion to assist him in his labors and console him under his fatigues; it is not just that we should take from the field as many sheaves as he does; let us get up and secretly go and carry a certain number of sheaves to his stack; he will not find it out to-morrow, and therefore can not refuse them;' and they did so accordingly. The next day both brothers went to the field, and each was much surprised to find the two stacks alike; neither being able in his own mind to account for the prodigy. They pursued the same course for several successive nights, but as each carried to his brother's stack the same number of sheaves, the stacks still remained equal, till one night both determining to stand sentinel to elucidate the mystery, they met, each bearing the sheaves destined for his brother's stack.

"'Now the spot where so beautiful a thought at once occurred to, and was so perseveringly acted upon by two men, must be a place agreeable to God; and men blessed it, and chose it whereon to build a house to his name.'"—*Ib. Vol. I, pp.* 330—331.

THE PLAIN OF TROY—AND THE ÆGEAN AT MIDNIGHT.

"It is midnight; the sea smooth as a sheet of ice, the becalmed brig hovering like a shadow upon its sparkling surface. Tenedos springing from the waves on our left, conceals the open sea; nearer, and to the right, extends, like a dark barrier, the low and indented shore of the plain of Troy. The full moon, rising over the snow capped summit of Mount Ida, diffuses a serene but uncertain light over the mountain tops, the hills, and the plain; then beaming upon the sea, tinges its

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quiet waves with her mild effulgence, under the very side of our vessel, converting its surface into a bright area upon which no shadow may dare to glide. We distinguished the tumuli or little conical mounds which tradition assigns as the tombs of Homer and Patroclus. The broad red moon glancing over the undulations of the hills, resembles the ensanguined shield of Achilles; no light is visible on all that line of coast, except a distant fire lighted by the shepherds on the ridge of Ida; no sound meets our ear except the dull flapping of the sail, which untouched by the lightest breeze, is occasionally beaten against the mainyard by the wavering of the mast; the image of the death which has passed over the ages of its glory, seems impressed upon this still and melancholy scene. Leaning over the shrouds of the vessel, that land, those mountains, those ruins, those tombs, rise before me, with their vaporous forms and undecided outlines, under the sleeping and silent rays of the planet of night, like the shadowy apparition of a past world evoked from the bosom of the sea, and vanishing as the moon sinks behind the summits of other mountains; it is an additional bright page to the Homeric poem; it is the consummation of all poems and of all history; unknown tombs, ruins without any certain names, a dark and naked soil, confusedly illnminated by immortal stars; and new spectators passing with indifference before those shores, and repeating for the thousandth time the epitaph of all things. Here lie an empire, a city, a people, heroes! God alone is great, and the thoughts which search Him out and adore Him are alone imperishable!"

We might multiply extracts, almost without end, but perhaps we have taxed the patience of our readers too much already. We would recommend, however, to those who have leisure, the perusal of that part of the Pilgrimage which describes the author's sojourn at Constantinople and its environs. It is full of historical reminiscences and displays at once the talents of Lamartine as a philosopher, poet, and historian.

Before we leave the "Pilgrimage," the work which first made its anthor known to the reading public in Great Britain and America, we wish to make a remark that may have been anticipated by every reflecting reader. The work is not to be judged as sternly, as if it professed to be dignified history. It is the hurried sketch of impressions caught from a flying journey over lands and scenes that require the deliberate study of years. Still the work ought to have been made more perfect. A little more care, a little less rashness, a good deal less extravagance, a little less protrusion of self, a little more pruning of his boundless luxuriance, and a little more regard to the relative importance of objects as to grouping and prominence, would have imparted to the work an excellence far more

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worthy of the author's powers and subsequent fame, and of the lofty objects he has described. As it is, however, it will be read with interest, and remembered with grateful delight by thousands who will respond to Alison when he ranks Lamartine with those world-renowned travelers Von Humboldt and Chataeubriand.

[Some remarks on the history of the Girondists and on the personal character of M. Lamartine, must be reserved for some future time.]

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ARTICLE III.

ANIMALCULES.*

BY REV. PHILOTUS DEAN.

GENTLEMEN OF THE SOCIETY OF INQUIRY:

Were it not that the name which you have given to your association betokens no restriction of your inquiries to particular departments of knowledge, I might feel some hesitation in presenting the subject which I have chosen. And even as it is, it has been a matter of question with me, whether your minds would willingly turn from those intellectual feasts which your former learned and eloquent speakers have set before you, to the simple detail of facts which must occupy the most of a discourse on any branch of Natural History. The heavy task is imposed upon me, of attempting to entice you, for the present, from the mazy labyrinths of mathematical lore, and the flowery land of classical promise. To do this, my subject does not allow me to introduce to your notice the operations of Nature on her grandest scale in respect to extension. I must not take you aloft in the fiery chariot of imagination, and while coursing over celestial fields, whisper in your ear about the sublimity of the objects which appear to your astonished eyes. I must not track the comet in his vast and cheerless wanderings; nor take you with me on a visit to those beautiful wanderers which compose our solar family—children of the sun, and doubtless inhabited by material beings of some affinity to ourselves. Nor can I introduce to you the huge behemoth, that made the ancient world feel its giant tread; nor the leviathan whose playful gambols

* This article appears in the form of an address to the Society of Inquiry, of the O. C. Institute. The popular style of the treatise, and the general interest connected with the subject make it appropriate for the pages of the Quarterly. Our readers will all be greatly interested and profited in its perusal.

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"made the deep to boil like a pot." Nor must I bespeak your attention to the majestic movements of the unwieldy elephant and rhinoceros, inhabitants of our existing forests and jungles. Nor can the snaky and monstrous boa-constrictor be the subject of our comment. But, with your permission, I shall speak of the mammoths, the leviathans, the elephants and the boa-constrictors, some of which are denizens of a world so small as to be invisible. For the *telescope* which ranges the fields of ether, we must substitute the *microscope*, an instrument not less wonderful than a wizard's wand to call up, not *spirits*, but *living forms* from the "vasty deep" of invisibility. In short I invite you to a consideration of the microscopic animalcules.

Although they rank, in respect to extension, the lowest in "the mighty chain of beings," yet the interest which, in a scientific mind, attaches to them, is not proportioned to their magnitude. They are the objects of earnest and curious inquiry. The powers of optical instruments have been taxed to their utmost to furnish details concerning such minute specimens of the wisdom of the Eternal Architect. In regard to the extent of power which men have been able to give the microscope, I would remark that they have found their limit at the twenty four thousandth part of an inch. It is said that objects smaller in diameter than this, are not made visible by our present apparatus. We may, however, rationally hope that the indefatigable labors of philosophers and artists will yet bring the microscope to greater perfection. Some of the results of those investigations which have been pursued with this instrument, I intend to embody in the following remarks. Let us then, in the outset, survey our field. Take if you please, an amount of matter equal in size to a drop of water, and imagine it a world with its continents and oceans, its hills and valleys, its woodlands and meadows. Descend with me into the depths of invisibility, and range with me in imagination the mountains and valleys of this diminutive world. Take a stroll with me upon the shores of its oceans. There you will behold the beings of which I speak. Here an invisible elephant will rub his sides against an invisible rock. There an invisible whale will plough the waters of an almost invisible ocean. In another place an invisible lion is in full chase after his invisible prey. Vast droves of invisible cattle crop the luxuriant herbage of an invisible meadow; while upon the branches of an invisible tree flocks

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of invisible birds carol their unheard song. We might indefinitely extend this fancy sketch, but this is enough to convey to your minds an idea of our field of observation. In speaking of the citizens of this minutely invisible world, I intend to consider their size, their shapes, their modes of life and action, their organization, their number, their reproduction, their utility and importance, the philosophy of their origin, aud the ultimate design of their creation.

I have already attempted to give you a general idea of the sizes of these curious beings, but must now enter more into particulars. But, before producing statistics to illustrate this point, it may be well to speak of what philosophers call "the divisibility of matter." It is a common mistake to conceive of matter as susceptible of division only to a small extent. So gross are our notions in this particular, that it is with difficulty that we allow ourselves to suppose particles of matter so small as to be invisible. In our common trains of thought, we reluctantly pass the vanishing point, and explore the regions beyond. This is doubtless owing to the fact that we become habituated to judging everything by sight, and we carry with us the vague impression that when an object becomes so small as to be invisible, it becomes *nothing*. All beyond is unknown, is untried ground. In order to correct this vague impression, we should make ourselves acquainted with the revelations of the *microscope*. In that we see an atom, as if by some mysterious power suddenly occupying the whole field of vision. Its invisible points become to us broad plains of investigation. More clearly to develop the extreme minuteness of particles of matter, let me here introduce a fanciful supposition. Suppose you were to take in your hand a microscope which is just able to make visible the twenty-four thousandth part of an inch. Apply now the instrument to the smallest particle of dust which can be made apparent by it. As far as you are concerned, nothing is seen but an exceedingly minute point. But it is doubtless true that this smallest visible point has a *half* and a *quarter*; nay, can be composed of billions of smaller particles. To go *still farther*; suppose an infinitesimal philosopher, one millionth as large as this particle of dust, seated on one part of it, and using a microscope of his own fabrication, equally powerful with your own; namely, able to reveal to him what would be a twenty-four thousandth of *one of his inches*. He would see another minute point, which again may be supposed to be

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divided, and so on until we get weary of the repetition. Although this is a mere fanciful illustration, yet it does not perhaps extend beyond *the truth.* Whatever may be said concerning the existence of elementary molecules in all substances, it is not within our power to determine their magnitude. But since we can no more arrive at a mathematical point by subdivision than we can reach *infinity* by *multiplication*, we are not necessarily absurd in supposing any degree of minuteness. But since this subject was broached merely to pave the way to a proper conception of the heroes of our story, we now leave it to attend to them.

Animalcules, although that name is generally applied to animals entirely microscopic, still vary from that size which allows us to discern their general form with the naked eye, to a minuteness eluding all calculation. One class sometimes attains the twelfth of an inch in size, while some of its species, even when full grown, do not surpass the two thousandth of the same measure. Some are about the fiftieth part of a hair's breadth in linear dimensions. Some are so small that a million of them would occupy less space than a grain of sand. Some are so small, that, if we allow each individual to be separated from his fellows by his own diameter, a single drop of water would contain one thousand millions of them: more inhabitants than there are human beings on the globe. A cubic inch contains the skeletons of forty one thousand millions of a certain species. The same space would contain the skeletons of some to the number of a billion, that is, a *million times a million.* Some sink so much lower in the scale of size, that a single *square inch* would contain millions of millions of them. Those animalcules called *monads*, which are by philosophers considered the lowest forms of animated nature, vary in their diameters from the twelve hundredth to the twenty-four thousandth part of an inch; and if we could make more powerful microscopes, we should doubtless see them shading away down beneath even this minute size. They defy all the powers of man to make them visible. We have evidences that there are animalcules, so small as to be beyond the reach of microscopic vision, in the fact that some species feed upon those still smaller than themselves, or are *carnivorous.* This has been subjected to visible proof. Their stomachs and digestive apparatus have been made visible by a peculiar contrivance. To demonstrate, in the first place, that they eat at all, Dr. Ehrenberg furnished them with coloring matter for nourishment. He

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made a very attenuated solution of indigo, and mingled a drop of it with the water in which the animalcules were found. The creatures, by means of their invisible organs, called *cilia*, excited currents in the fluid in all directions, and the particles of indigo were seen converging towards their mouths. Presently the bodies of the animalcules, which were before transparent and colorless, became dotted with distinct spots of a dark blue color, exactly corresponding to that of the moving particles of indigo. In some species the particles of indigo can be traced in their motion from the mouth through the neck to the internal cavities. On one occasion Mr. Lister was observing a specimen of the polypus, many of which class are microscopic, when a little globular animalcule swam rapidly by. The greater creature seized the less, and brought it to his mouth by means of his feelers. He then took off all his feelers but one, with which he held the animalcule in his mouth. The mouth instantly seemed filled with hairs, which closed over the prey, and in a few seconds the little victim was carried slowly down into the stomach, making a protuberance in the neck of his destroyer as he was on his way. In the stomach he was seen for a short time and then disappeared. Spallanzani observes that certain animalcules devour others so voraciously that they fatten and become indolent and sluggish by over feeding. After a meal of this kind, if they are confined in distilled water which furnishes no food, they become reduced; they regain their spirit and activity, and amuse themselves in the pursuit of the more minute animals which are supplied to them. They swallow these whole, for when swallowed, the lesser animalcule has been seen moving in the body of the other. These facts abundantly evince to us the inconceivable minuteness of some forms of animal life. How small must be the animalcule, which, being itself invisible in the most powerful microscope, is the food of another so small as scarcely to be discerned by the same instrument! How fine the elementary particles which make so fine a mechanism! How wonderful the wisdom and skill of its Contriver! The man who contrived and built the steam engine that worked freely within the compass of a thimble, was praised, and that justly, as an ingenious mechanic. But what was that in comparison with those exhibitions of skill which the microscope reveals?

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In regard to their *shapes*, it may almost with truth be said that there is an endless variety. Nature is ever fertile in producing different forms of animated existence, but hardly more so in any department of her operations than in the one which is the subject of present notice. Language cannot portray the various shapes which animalcules assume; for hundreds of species present no shape directly analogous to anything else, to which, for the purpose of illustration, it may be likened. Some of them, through our inability to magnify them sufficiently, seem like minute atoms. Some are like long hairs, one hundred and fifty times as long as they are broad. Some are shaped like the spire of a church or tapering obelisks; some like the cupola of some public buildings with small spires at the corners. Some resemble fishes, and some are shaped like vegetables. Some are almost spheres; and some are like those solid figures called in Geometry, "spheroids." Others resemble bells; others, wheels turning on an axis. Some are double-headed; some are like cylinders; some like pearly cups or vases; some, like worms; some, like eels; and some are horned. While one day using the microscope of this institution on a very small portion of the green vegetable in stagnant water, I chanced to bring into the field of view an orange colored *quadruped* which was feeding with great alacrity and apparent satisfaction on the luxuriant foliage around him. But a still more curious appearance is exhibited by another species. Who would think that the human face has a representative in a world so small as to be invisible? Yet so it is. An animalcule found in a solution of anemone, has, carved upon its back, in regular outline, the eye-brows, eyes, nose, mouth and chin, which grace the intellectual countenance of man. The tiny creature doubtless knows not, as he moves in his narrow sphere, that he wears the mask of the noblest of earthly beings. It ought also to be remarked, that many animalcules have the power of changing their form almost instantaneously. If, for instance, you are inspecting one which has a long, curved, swan-like neck, in a twinkling, if frightened, it will draw in its neck and assume the form of an *apple-seed*. If you watch it still farther, you will see a new and different kind of head begin to protrude itself. You may be inspecting one with a long body, having in front two appearances like circular saws, and in an instant the whole animal will become as round as

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a ball; on another occasion it will flatten itself into an entirely different shape, throwing out long pointed horns, so that no resemblance to its former shape can be seen. But, not to dwell longer on this point, I remark generally that he who would obtain the most correct conceptions of their various forms, must himself use the microscope, for words can convey no adequate idea of them.

The modes of life and action which the subjects of our remarks exhibit, are as various as their shapes. They are generally seen in a state of very great activity, evincing muscular energy to an extraordinary degree. Most of their manifestations of effort are made in obtaining their food. But in accomplishing this object they resort to different measures. One class stands upright in running water, and thrusts out two nets or fan-like protuberances, by which it takes its prey. When it has obtained enough, it folds up its nets with perfect nicety and exactness. Another class spins around with great rapidity like a top. Others are darting rapidly along, seldom remaining more than a few seconds in the field of view. When viewed by candle-light in the night they manifest the same activity as in the day. Ehrenberg states that they appear to be *sleepless*. But, notwithstanding this, they possess the curious faculty of remaining dormant for an almost indefinite period. Great quantities of them which appear like some mouldy substance, remain dried up, motionless and apparently lifeless for years; but when supplied with moisture they recover perfectly their former energy. Some have been alternately dried into a dormant state, and again revived *twelve times* without apparent injury. Professor Owen saw the revival of an animalcule which had been kept dry and dormant four years. Their organs of prehension and locomotion are exceedingly small, and bear the name *cilia*, from their resemblance to eye-lashes. These cilia are hair-like appendages, capable of astonishing celerity of motion. By their vibration, currents are excited in the surrounding fluid which is impelled through the cavities of the animalcule, thus affording it an opportunity to seize its food. Although there is evidence that these organs are to some degree under the control of their possessor, yet it is an interesting fact that in the hydra, or fresh water polypus, the ciliary motion sometimes continues long after death, and after the part containing the cilia is removed from the body of the animal. Permit me, for a mo-

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ment, to rise from invisible regions, and relate a fact or two in reference to the hydra. Its natural length does not much exceed a third of an inch, and it is an inhabitant of our ponds, ditches, and rivulets. It consists merely of a sack or stomach and ciliary organs to supply it with food. It is a kind of fleshy bottle, crowned with arms. It is very sensitive, but has the most marvelous power of sustaining injuries of all things known. In whatever manner it be cut in two or mutilated, the lost or injured portion is reproduced or healed; and if the whole animal be cut into many pieces, every piece becomes a perfect animal. If it be slit down half way the length of its body, each half grows into a complete hydra; and, what is more wonderful than all, if it be turned inside out, so that the outside of the body becomes the stomach, and the stomach becomes the outside, it will still carry on the process of digestion. This seems to surpass the story of that monstrous hydra, which Hercules had such difficulty in overcoming, when he was compelled to sear the neck with a hot iron, before the head grew out again! Another point to be noticed is, that however small the size of our invisible heroes they exhibit evidence of possessing a *will*. Their motions are as manifestly voluntary as those of the larger denizens of our world. Nor can it rationally be doubted that animalcules, in the exercise of their wills, manifest some considerable degree of intelligence. It would be interesting if we could determine whether any species go so far in the scale of social development, as to have a government like that of bees and fowls, both domestic and migratory. As an approach to this idea, I select the following fact from Mr. Baker's description of the hair-like animalcules. "A small quantity of the matter containing these animalcules having been put into a jar of water, it so happened that one party went down immediately to the bottom, while the other continued floating on the top. When things had remained for some time in this condition each of these swarms of animalcules began to grow weary of its situation, and had a mind to change its quarters. Both armies, therefore, set out at the same time, the one proceeding upwards and the other downwards; so that after some time, they met in the middle. A desire of knowing how they would behave on this occasion engaged the observer to watch them carefully: and to his surprise, he saw the army that was marching upwards open to

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the right and left, to make room for those that were descending. Thus, without confusion or intermixture, each held on its way; the army that was going up marching in two columns to the top, and the other proceeding in one column to the bottom, as if each had been under the direction of wise leaders."

The organization or constitutional structure of these beings, is also a matter of interesting inquiry. Some of them doubtless rank higher in the scale of development than some animals of larger size. Ehrenberg ranges animalcules under two classes according to their structure. These are denominated Polygastria and Rotatoria. The former class, as the name implies, are characterized by a digestive apparatus divided into many sections, or by many stomachs united by a common tube. In many species the existence of eyes has been ascertained; and there is much evidence to show that they have both the organs and the sensation of touch. One half of the species belonging to this class are *loricated*, or have, in other words, shields of various composition, and the other half have not. Some of these shields are flint or silex, and one philosopher has shown that our flint nodules are almost entirely composed of the silicious skeletons of these infinitesimal beings. Another class secretes iron shields, and it is said those great beds of bog-iron, found in some places, are made up of the aggregated skeletons of iron-shielded animalcules. Another class secretes shields of bone. The yellow film seen on the surface of stagnant water is composed of individuals of this class. The microscope reveals to us their fossil remains in abundance in silex and chalk. When they pass forever from existence they leave a most enduring tomb-stone to tell the fact, that though invisible, yet they once lived. They build a monument which commemorates their lives, labors and their end; and this monument is read ages after all that built it is gone from existence; after the joys and sorrows, pains and pleasures, which agitated its tiny organization, have ceased forever.

The structure of the class Rotatoria is better known and more complete than that of the Polygastria. The Rotatoria take their name from the zone-like and circular arrangement of their ciliary organs, which when in motion, resemble a wheel in rapid rotation. In this class the microscope has revealed a muscular system, of which the

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structure and situation have been distinctly visible. They have mandibles also, armed with teeth, which have been sometimes separated from the animalcule and viewed by themselves. It is a curiosity that the teeth of these beings are as much indices of their species as are the teeth of quadrupeds. The peculiar form of the teeth determines the family to which the animalcule belongs. Many of this class are also endowed with eyes, varying in number and usually of a red color. The question whether they have a *nervous system* or not, has not yet been settled by direct observation. But if we are allowed to reason from analogy and the nature of the case, we can safely arrive at an affirmative conclusion, without attempting the impossibility of opening the way by the dissecting knife. It is impossible, in our present state of knowledge, to conceive of animal motion without muscular fibre; and it is almost equally difficult to conceive of voluntary muscular motion without nervous influence: and to conceive of sensations of physical pain and pleasure without nervous susceptibility, and of course a nervous system. Since animalcules manifest the same phenomena as larger organizations, it is but a fair conclusion, until contradicted by evidence, that they are similarly endowed. It is, however, still an open question, whether they have also ganglia of nerves, forming a brain, or centres of sympathetic influence. The fact that many have heads, would seem to indicate analogically that they have brains. It is, then, probable that some have a sort of brain which forms the throne and temple of their little intelligence. How subtle, also, must be the vital principle which animates or is the product of their system. And how delicate and zephyr-like must be its influence, encased as it is in an invisible body! Since many are colorless, and nearly transparent, we are enabled to observe the operations of their vital machinery, with great clearness. In many species the heart has been seen to play with the systole and diastole movements like the human heart, and the number of its beats has been distinctly counted. It is, then, undeniable that some have *blood*, and of course, the whole apparatus of a circulating system, namely, arteries and veins, put together in the common anastomotic arrangement. Let us for a moment pause here and try to get a conception of the quantities with which nature deals; of the homœopathic magnitude of her operations. If, then, you should bleed to death 5000 mil-

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lions of some species, the aggregate of all their blood would not equal one drop. But if these creatures have blood, that blood must be the means of conveying nourishment to different parts of the body, thus renewing its strength. I leave you to make the calculation how many thousands of years a single meal of ours would last one of them. But some have also an osseous system. If, then, all the bony matter of fifty millions of them were put into one heap, it would be about the size of the head of a pin. But their bones are also clothed with flesh or muscular fibre. It would take the flesh of about one hundred thousand millions, to make a mouthful for an epicurean!

They have also the apparatus of a stomach and gastric juice by which their food is converted into blood. Here we have a specimen of chemical change in matter, wrought out in a laboratory on the minutest conceivable scale. How wonderfully small, therefore, must be the ultimate particles of matter, if such things exist! It almost seems as though we were surrounded with infinity in a double sense of the term. Stretch out your gaze into the illimitable regions of space. You sink back appalled and cry "boundless! infinite!" You gaze and think, and gaze again, and find no end. But contract now your observation, and, selecting any one point, dive into its immeasurable depths. The same boundlessness, though on a different plan, seems to mock your efforts to find an end. We seem to have infinite extension on the one hand and infinite *nothingness* on the other!

But we must hasten to treat of the next topic of consideration, namely,

The *number* of animalcules.

It seems to be an almost universal fact that the number of animals increases as their size diminishes. Take, for instance, our largest animals, and they seem fewest. Descend now through their various grades, pass man, and keep on in the descending scale. You will notice it as a *general*, though perhaps not a universal fact, that the individuals wonderfully increase in number, as they sink in the scale of size. This seems to be prominently true in the winged tribe. The largest birds that fly, as the condor, eagle, &c., by no means equal in number the smaller birds which frequent our forests; nor do the smaller birds equal in number the countless millions of winged insects which sport in the air, or creep upon the ground.

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As far as we can see, this is also true of reptiles. The huge boa-constrictor has but few representatives compared with our smaller snakes, eels, and worms. Our observation on fishes also has tended to confirm this idea in regard to them. There is a great disparity of numbers, as far as we can calculate, between whales and the various classes of smaller fishes. Indeed, if we should enter into an investigation of this philosophical point, we could doubtless bring forth reasons to show that this must be the law in a wise economy of creation. But we find that this apparent law clearly obtains in the case of animalcules. They inconceivably surpass, in number, every other order of animated existence. Creation literally teems with them. Mantell says, "wherever we turn, within the precincts of our own homes, in meadow or woodland, hill or forest, by the lone sea-shore, or amidst crumbling ruins, fresh objects of interest are constantly to be found; plants and animals unknown to our unaided vision, with minute organs perfectly adapted to their necessities; with appetites as keen, enjoyments as perfect as our own. In the purest waters, as well as in thick, acid and saline fluids, in springs, rivers, lakes and seas, often in the internal humidity of living plants and animals, even in great numbers in the living human body, nay, probably carried about in the aqueous vapors and dust of the whole atmosphere, there is a world of minute, living, organized beings, imperceptible to the ordinary senses of man. In the daily course of life, this immense mysterious kingdom of diminutive living beings is unnoticed and disregarded; but it appears great and astonishing, beyond all expectation, to the retired observer who views it by the aid of the microscope. In every drop of standing water, he frequently, though not always, sees by its aid rapidly moving bodies trom a ninety-sixth to less than a two thousadth of a line in diameter, which are often so crowded together that the intervals between them are less than their diameter." From Mantell and others, we draw the conclusion that the whole earth is literally *alive*, *animated* by these almost infinitely numerous infiniteismals. There is not a tree, plant, flower, pool, lake, stream, and scarcely a drop of water, but is pregnant with animal life, and forms the theatre of action of these mighty and yet pigmy nations. Every instant, countless millions perish and give place to their swarming posterity. Individual on individual, and species on species spring into existence in overwhelm-

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ing numbers, and swell the endless tide of being. But to enter into some more definite attempt to get a conception of their numbers, we must resort to our feeble capabilities of calculation. Let us, then, in the first place, take as a starting point, not individuals, but classes or species, which you know are few in comparison with the individuals which are ranked under them. Is was stated by Dr. Dick some years ago, that there were then known not less than one hundred thousand different species of animalcules invisible to the naked eye; and that new species were daily added to the list by the industry of the lovers of Natural History. Think, then, of more than one hundred thousand of *species* only of animalcules, each species comprehending by itself an almost infinity of individuals. They spread over almost every square foot of the earth's surface; they revel in every part of our vast oceans. Every ditch is peopled with its invisible and yet active nations. You hardly set down your foot upon the earth, in your daily walks, but you tread on the most delicate specimens of the all-pervading principle of *life*. You can not sail the many waters of our globe without plowing your way through their swarming population. Even the solid rock reveals to us the flinty proof of the former existence of untold myriads. Hundreds of square miles are thickly covered with the chalky, silicious, and ferruginous shields of the loricated classes. Extensive quarries, deep and broad, are made up of their aggregated remains. A writer in one of the foreign reviews, remarks, that "many and probably all, white chalk rocks are the produce of microscopic animalcules, possessing calcareous shells, of which more than one million are well preserved in each cubic inch; that is, much more than ten millions in one pound of chalk." The deepest soundings of ocean's waters have revealed the fact that animalcules live far down in their waveless grottoes. That world-wide phenomenon, the phosphoresence of the ocean's surface, is owing to their presence. Classes of them have been found sufficiently numerous to give color to great tracts of water. These beings, called Medusæ, give the sea an olive-green appearance for great distances, forming strips sometimes two hundred and forty miles long and forty-five broad. Captain Scoresby, who saw them, found that a cubic inch of water contained sixty-four. On the depth to which these creatures extended we are not informed. But allowing them to occupy several feet in depth as probably they did, we have not far from

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eleven thousand square miles *animated* by numbers perfectly inconceivable. Dr. Popping, giving an account of his voyage to Chili, says, that "from the topmast, the sea appeared, as far as the eye could reach, of a dark red color, and this in a streak the breadth of which was estimated at six English miles." As he sailed slowly along, he found that the color changed into a brilliant purple, so that even the foam which is seen at the stern of a ship under sail was of a rose-color. This purple streak of water was marked by a very distinct line from the blue waters of the sea, and through its length he sailed four hours at the rate of six miles an hour. He states that it was seven miles broad and twenty-four long. A microscopic examination of the water showed that the rose color of this one hundred and sixty-eight square miles, was owing to minute Infusoria of a spherical form and entirely destitute of the organs of motion. But we have other facts which may also be the basis of calculation. Should all the coralline structures which exist in ocean's waters be extended into a straight line it might possibly extend hundreds of thousands of miles. This calculation embraces all the great coralline islands and ocean beds, and all the various ramifications of those structures. Every square foot of this mighty wall of masonry is alive and creeping with thousands of the coralline polypi, constantly reaching out their arms and seizing those minute animalcules with which the water abounds. Think now of all the coralline mountains buried in the sea; of all the coral-beds of hundreds and thousands of square miles in extent; of all the coral-reefs which line ocean's shores for thousands of miles; and of the billions of square feet of surface which they present, literally *covered* and *permeated* by living beings, each one of which consumes vast numbers of animalcules in a day. Alas! who can take in the magnitude of these numbers! It is overwhelming! inconceivable! The mind groans beneath the accumulated burden of immensities, and it is discouraged in attempting to get a faint conception of their value! If seventy-five thousand persons had begun at the creation to count the number of medusæ in a single cubic mile, each one counting a million in seven days, it would have taken them all the past six thousand years to complete the enumeration! The stars themselves, even to the deepest soundings of the telescope, and the sands of the sea-shore, seem not more numerous. No human mind can estimate them. Arithmetic fails in its tardy operations, to keep pace with the ever-rolling tide of life. It

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seems as though God only, who numbers every thing in *his infinite Arithmetic*, can number the infinitesimals of creation.

Intimately connected with the *numbers* of animalcules, is the subject of their *reproduction*, as to its method and extent. Somewhat unlike their larger cotemporaries, they have four ways of increase. These are the viviparous and oviparous methods, and also peculiar processes called gemmation and self-division. It is well known that the animalcules which are found in all good vinegar, and which are popularly styled *eels*, reproduce their species in the viviparous manner. A single individual of these vinegar eels, produces more than a hundred at a birth, which gives us some idea of their extraordinary numerical increase. Some species of the Rotatoria are also viviparous, and all the rest of this class are oviparous. But notwithstanding the comparative slowness with which the Rotatoria increase, they still exhibit a fertility which is surprising. Dr. Ehrenberg succeeded in isolating a single individual, and subjecting it to continued scrutiny. He discovered such a ratio of increase, by ovipositon, as would make this individual, in twelve days, the progenitor of sixteen millions! But the Polygastria vastly surpass this genus, both in respect to method and fertility of propagation. They reproduce their species in the three ways of oviposition, gemmation, and self-division; and it is a remarkable fact that all these three methods are frequently going on at the same time in the same individual. The mode of increase by ova is very rapid; but it seems as though nature, not content with this, racked her ingenuity to devise some other means of peopling their diminutive world, and thus has presented us with a method of animal propagation like that of vegetables. Upon the exterior of the animalcule, *buds* spring up, which when arrived at a certain maturity, become themselves perfect animals. This is the process of gemmation. The most extraordinary method of all, however, is that of spontaneous self-division. When this is taking place, the little grains within the case of the animalcule, seem divided by a transverse line, which becomes gradually more apparent, until division occurs, and the parts, having each become perfect individuals, swim off in opposite directions. Those flinty beings, of which I have before spoken, have this method of reproduction. The animalcules themselves consist of a simple flinty covering, shaped like a cylinder, and

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they are arranged in a series as if you should put together short tubes in the place of links of a chain. Thus they form a cylindrical, chain-like appearance, which arises from the separation not being complete. As before stated, a cubic inch can hold forty-one thousand millions of their skeletons. Their fertility is so great that a single individual becomes in twenty four hours the primogenitor of one hundred and forty millions of millions. Ehrenberg, remarking on this astonishing fertility, states, that an "imperceptible corpuscle can become in four days, *one hundred and seventy billions*, or as many single animalcules as are contained in two cubic feet of the stone from the polishing slate of Bilin."

I should like now to direct your attention for a few moments, to the utility and consequent importance of these pigmy nations. We are apt, by a somewhat natural yet fallacious operation of mind, to judge of importance by size. Should we attempt to try all nature by this test, we should meet with many overwhelming objections, many severe rebukes. Every thing, when rightly appreciated, asserts and proves its importance. There is not a leaf that trembles in the forest, that is not connected with the greatest works, and the greatest interests of the natural economy. There is not an obscure rill, not a drop of water, but works out great results; not a pebble or grain of sand, but is fitted into just its place in nature's perfect machinery. Nor is a thing of no value because it is invisible. From the depths of diminution itself, rises up in majesty the refutation of the idea. Invisible agents, both organized and inorganized, are constantly changing the face of this vast globe. Not a day, not an hour, not a moment, but these unapparent agencies are at their sublime work. Invisible beings crumble the most enduring masses; they solidify our very oceans; they are involved as causes in producing nature's pleasing variety, an endless change. But let us, for illustration and proof, descend farther into particulars. The relations which animalcules sustain to the globe and its inhabitants are too numerous and valuable to receive a just expansion here. I shall therefore speak of but a few, and leave the rest to your leisure reflections. I remark then, in the first place, that animalcules doubtless subserve an important purpose in arresting the progress of vegetable and animal decay. The organized as well as unorganized portions of our world are all constantly undergoing destructive processes, and by that means giving

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way to their successors. This goes on, on a vast scale. The world is almost everywhere covered with the perishing remnants of its once vitalized organizations. Were the process of decomposition to go on unarrested, the health and happiness of man, as well as that of the larger animals, would probably be more sadly encroached upon than they now are. But the noxious exhalations of an almost universal decay, are wisely arrested in part by vegetable power, and in part by these countless myriads of infinitessimals, as they seize upon crumbling organisms, and tranfer their elements to themselves. Wherever the process of decay goes on, there we find these scavengers of the globe, reveling, to be sure, in situations on which our contemplations do not like to dwell, but yet fulfilling a *useful*, and consequently I may term it an *honorable* station in the world. Again, animalcules sustain the relation of *food* to millions of larger beings. The monstrous whale that sports in our oceans and furnishes many valuable articles for the use of man, feeds upon animalcules. Many other large fish also doubtless find a portion of their sustenance at this exhaustless fountain. We must here perhaps except those large carnivora, such as sharks, whose prey is clearly of a more substantial kind. How important to a great portion of mankind, are the living products of our waters! Yet animalcules are the pastures which feed and fatten for our varied use, the larger tenants of the deep. But there is another portion of the vast operations of nature, in which these puny beings have no inconsiderable share. It is now a matter of question whether the great limestone formations, which are so large and important a part of the structure of the earth, do not owe their origin primarily to the existence of animalcules. Linnæus advances this idea in his laconic remark, "*omnis calx e vermibus;*" "all lime comes from worms." It is confidently stated that "many and probably all white chalk rocks are the produce of microscopic animalcules, possessing calcareous shells." If this is the case we have only to look at the vastness of earth's chalk formations, to get some idea of the importance of the niche which these beings fill in sublunary cosmogony. Extensive deposits of their shells are constantly going on at the bottoms of rivers, lakes, seas, and oceans. In Sweden is found an edible earth, occurring in layers nearly thirty feet in thickness, resembling fine flour; and owing to its celebrated nutritious qualities, is used for food.

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These great strata are wholly composed of the shells of microscopic animalcules. They are also the food of the coralline polypi, whose wonderful structures strike us with awe. We see then, that by means both direct and indirect, animalcules are the source of that most important and extensive element of the earth, namely, its calcareous portion. Hence probably come those limestone quarries which furnish for man an article almost indispensable. Hence the beautiful marble which occupies so prominent a place in architecture and statuary. Hence much of that lime in soil which makes it productive of the staff of life. This is seen by attending to the way in which most soil is formed. The sedimentary deposits before spoken of, in the process of ages, become broken up, comminuted, and elevated by water and volcanic forces, and thus bring to the surface for our cultivation a mass of fine particles of clay, sand, pebbles, and last but not least, a large amount of lime. This lime, being taken up by esculent vegetables, becomes, as you know, an important element in our breadstuffs. Thus is it seen that for the lime in our *very bones*, we are indebted to animalcules. But, to pass over the relations of animalcules to iron and flint, I shall now attempt to show that the department of meteorology feels their influence. It may seem strange to you, should I say they have much to do with causing winds and fertilizing rains. Yet this is no more strange than true. You are doubtless acquainted with the fact that the cause of winds is the heating of the air in one place more than in another, so that the equilibrium is destroyed and motion ensues. With these attempts of the air to find an equlibrium are connected those needful supplies of rain which fertilize the earth and give food to man and beast. Besides this, the purity and healthiness of air, as of water, depend on its agitation, and by this also the mariner fills the sails of his richly freighted vessel for another port. Thus you see at a glance that anything that touches this long chain of causes, touches the dearest and greatest interests of earth. The inquiry is, then, "do animalcules do this?" The celebrated M. Arago has replied in the affirmative. It is evident that these large patches of ocean, occupied by such a multitude of Medusæ, as before mentioned, must render the water less transparent, and, of course, more liable to be heated by the sun, than clearer water. Ten thousand square miles of such a surface must be no mean agent in disturbing the equilibrium of the atmo-

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sphere. The effective power of this cause is greatly enhanced by the fact that not a solitary portion only, but several tracts of ocean are sometimes thus affected. We see, then, that these little beings act the part of Æolus in his fabled cave, letting loose the winds to scour the sea, and terrify the trembling sailor with his storms. It is also stated as probable, that some of the most serious maladies which since the curse have afflicted mankind, are produced by peculiar states of invisible animalcular life. At certain periods, when the conditions of development are favorable, invisible beings, beyond the reach of the microscope, may suddenly spring into swarms, and by floating in the air or being in the waters, find access to the internal membranes and fluids of the human frame. There exerting some specific injury, they probably produce those fearful epidemics which bear the dreadful names of cholera, influenza, and others of equal celebrity. This however, is but a surmise; but from our ignorance of invisible causes, may be considered as probable as any of those suppositions by which philosophers have attempted to account for those terrible scourges of God.

We have now arrived at a portion of our subject of no ordinary importance. We allude to the *philosophy of the origin of animalcules.* The discussion of this point could not fail to arise, after the microscope had opened to the view of philosophers the wide fields of facts. Nor is it unnatural to expect, that on this, as well as upon other subjects, the desire of progressive speculation would leave behind the tardy advance of truth. All men are not content with the sober and cautious deductions of logic; they must mount on the angel-wing of *speculation;* they must satisfy their cravings for *progress.* It seems not essential to some whether that progress be real or imaginary; it must have the desirable quality of persuading its votaries, that, instead of the earth's slipping beneath them, their flying feet are in reality bearing them onward. Plumed with fancy, and winged with imagination, they pass in contempt the staid old sobrieties of *absolute knowledge.* To them it is superfluous to scrutinize the correctness of a syllogism; a glorious vision lights up their eyes, and what care they for the dull grindings of *Reason* in the prison house of ignorance? I have been led to this train of remark by the fact that writers on animalcules and other branches of natural history, have exhibited the failing of which I speak.

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Stepping beyond the bounds of cautious philosophizing, they have assumed and exhibited the dogmatism of the theorist. With the little time now allowed me, I must discuss with brevity the facts and inferences touching the subject before us.

The facts, then, are these. Wherever fermentative or putrefactive matter is found, there are found various forms of microscopic life. If a little vegetable or animal matter be allowed to macerate in distilled water, under the influence of the sun's rays, in a few days that water will swarm with perfect animals, too small for ordinary vision to detect. A wisp of hay placed in these circumstances, will give birth to millions of these creatures. Infusions of grass, hair, black pepper, and a host of other organized substances, will bring forth the same results. Nor is this all. Various organs and tissues of larger animals are the theater of existence to hundreds of animalcules. From them the human body is by no means exempt. Many of these Entozoa present phenomena, both as to character and situation, which are somewhat marvelous, and which have not yet received a demonstrative solution. Not only do they inhabit tissues which it seems impossible for them to reach from without, but they themselves are inhabited by other parasites; so that we have the phenomenon of a parasite within a parasite. The query now arises in all its force, "whence do these beings originate? *how* do they spring into existence?" To this question different replies have been given. The author of the "Vestiges of Creation," and after him, Dr. Mantell, have propounded the idea of *spontaneous generation*. This is nothing more nor less than saying that when certain collocations of matter take place, under certain conditions, a perfect animal or vegetable is formed by the inherent laws of matter itself. In other words, creation is the necessary result of the laws of matter. Thus they hold that the infusions above mentioned merely fulfill the conditions and animalcules are *formed, created*, by the spontaneous organization of the infusory matter, in the same way that crystals of unorganized matter are formed under similar circumstances. Thus also they hold that the bodies of animals actually *breed* or create their own entozoa. Proceeding on this theory of self-creation, the author of the "Vestiges" has attempted to account for all forms of organized matter in existence. According to him, the little animalcular monad was made by

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matter happening to organize under favorable circumstances, and from this invisible monad as primogenitor, sprang by chances equally favorable, all other of the huge organizations which have trod the earth or swum the seas. According to the same wise reasoning, we see it gravely advanced that the human race must claim as their immediate progenitors, the species of quadrumana commonly styled apes! It must not be expected that I should here pursue the theory of spontaneous generation into all its ramifications. The assumption is so great and applicable to a universe of things, that an extended reply would be the task of years.

It must be obvious that if spontaneous generation were demonstrated to be a fact, it would go far to weaken belief in the primitive acts of creation as recorded in the Mosaic history. I hardly need say that this is one great object of some of the propounders of the theory in question, since it must be admitted that many votaries of science, some under the garb of apparent belief, and some in open hostility, are arrayed against the authority of inspiration. It becomes, then, an important question to the humble believer, whether the fact of spontaneous generation has been established, or whether there is sufficient evidence of it to induce a rational belief. I shall in a few words endeavor to maintain the negative.

In the first place no proof of this theory has ever been given to the public. It was only entertained in order to furnish a solution to facts which their want of information could not explain. Instead of being contented with their ignorance where positive knowledge was impossible, our so-called philosophers invited to their aid an entirely gratuitous supposition. This supposition some have thrust forward with an almost dogmatical confidence. At the same time their confessions clearly evince that the theory is not necessitated by facts. But if we are allowed to make suppositions in the total absence of proof, the privilege belongs to one as much as to another. If we must suppose an origin to infusoria, we see not why we can not rationally conceive their occurrence in macerations to be owing to the development of exceedingly minute eggs, which are so light as to be born about in vast quantities by the slightest agitations of the air. These ova find a lodgment in waters, and when the conditions of development are favorable, give birth to animalcules. In regard to en-

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tozoa or parasites, Dr. Mantell contends that the supposition of propogation by minute ova is inadmissible. It must be confessed that there is no decisive evidence on the point, and it is wisdom on our part to entertain no theory where we are perfectly ignorant. The occurrence of entozoa in the interior of animal tissues, and under the circumstances in which they are found, is indeed wonderful and inexplicable. No ocular demonstration of their origin can be afforded. But notwithstanding this, they may originate in a way analogous to all other animals. Indeed, we hear Dr. Hodgkins, an advocate of spontaneous generation, confess that "facts are strongly opposed to the admission of the theory." Thus do we see not only that evidence on the point is lacking, but that the propounders of the opinion themselves confess its untenableness. Again, it would be rational to expect, that if matter organizes itself into animalcules, that organization would always take place under the same conditions. But this is not the fact. Sometimes in the same infusion of matter, different species are developed, and the same species can not be found where it has been accustomed to be. But passing over an argument drawn from organs of reproduction, we close our animadversions upon this theory by bringing forward the authority of decisive experiment. A distinguished philosopher of Berlin has given to the world an interesting account of what may truly be called an "experimentum crucis." I will not inflict upon your patience the details of this experiment. Suffice it to say that it has come out with almost the force of demonstration against the theory in question. Being performed upon two separate macerations of the same substances, the one allowed a free access of the atmosphere, the other supplied with purified air, by a process which destroyed all life or ova which might be in the air, the result was the guarded maceration had no animalcules, while the open one swarmed with them in two or three days. This seems to force us to the conclusion that the atmosphere sustains and bears about innumerable quantities of imperceptible ova, which become animalcules on finding a favorable location.

With the argument on spontaneous generation drawn from geology, I must now have nothing to do. Like other offspring of a too rapid and speculative philosophy, it must soon meet the fate of universal condemnation. Various have been the efforts of men to live "without God in the

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world." They have left no avenue unapproached by which they might reach the secret chamber of nature, to see if some self-moving machinery does not exist there. They have seized with hot haste upon the space-penetrating telescope, and censtructed out of its magnificent revelations the huge theory of a self-forming universe. But the steady roll of the wheels of science has already crushed this "baseless fabric of a vision," into everlasting annihilation. They have unrolled the rocky record of the earth, to see if they could not find a chapter of history to confirm their wishes. But in vain have they scanned the pages of this great palimpsest for such a purpose. And now, with microscope in hand, they stand watching, if perchance they may be favored with a view of nature forging her elementary molecules into the innumerable forms of organized existence. I need not say that here also their ardent efforts meet the same defeat.

Suffer me to conclude by a brief allusion to the design of Deity in the creation of animalcules. I have hinted, in the preceding remarks about their utility when considered in reference to the great operations of nature, and the wants of man. But it would be irrational to conclude that this was the whole object of their creation. They exhibit evidences of enjoyment to as great a degree as any other class of beings. Each invisible animalcule revels with peculiar delight in his unnoticeable sphere. And the aggregate of happiness in the whole multitude must be a source of satisfaction to their Maker. The little creatures, by their tiny sports and pleasurable emotions, help swell the infinite tide of good, of which we ourselves form a part. This good doubtless formed the grand design of the Author of all in their creation. I have often, in my thoughts on this topic, felt a hearty assent to the pointed language of Pope:

"Has God, thou fool! worked solely for *thy* good?
Thy joy? *thy* pastime? *thy* attire? *thy* food?
Is it for *thee* the lark ascends and sings?
Joy tunes his voice; *joy* elevates his wings.
Is it for *thee* the linnet pours his throat?
Loves of *his own* and raptures swell the note.
Know Nature's children all divide her care:
The fur that warms a monarch, warmed a bear.
While man exclaims, 'see all things for my use!'
'See man for mine!' replies a pampered goose:
And just so short of reason he must fall,
Who thinks all made for one, not one for all."

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ARTICLE IV

ESCHATOLOGY;

Or the Doctrine of the Resurrection and the Judgment Day: with other correlative topics, examined in the light of scripture and philosophy: with strictures upon the common and Second Advent theories of Final Events.

BY REV. W. B. ORVIS,
MORGAN, OHIO.

[Our readers will not understand us as introducing the following article into our columns, because we, at all, agree with the sentiments therein advocated. We introduce the article, on the other hand, for the following reasons.

1. Our columns are open to the *discussion* of subjects which the Christian public need to understand.

2. The whole argument is conducted by the writer with much candor and ability, and presents the ablest view of that side of the question which we have yet met with.

3. Our readers, after perusing this article, will read our reply, which may be expected in our next number, with much greater interest and profit, than they would, if our views upon the subject were presented in an article by themselves, without reference to any conflicting views upon the same subject.

4. The whole subject will probably be better understood, after such an examination of it, than it otherwise could be. Ed.]

Man is naturally solicitous to know the future. Nor can it be denied that his present moral character is greatly modified by his belief in respect to the future. It is equally undeniable that a large share of divine revelation, as vouchsafed to each successive generation, has been concerning that which should be in the future to them. Nor is there any mystery in the fact that the whole drama of the future is filled with intense interest to every reflecting, immortal

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mind. Our exit from this world—the solemn scenes and transactions connected therewith—involving and looking forward as they do to the retributions of eternity—are of sufficient magnitude to interest and thrill with deep concern every mind not wholly blinded and hardened through the "deceitfulness of sin."

All men are mortal! Their earthly existence is brief! These truths are acknowledged by all. "What shall be hereafter?" is then a question of momentous consequence to all. Without the light of inspired revelation we should be in comparative darkness on this subject. But in this revelation, "life and immortality" are most clearly brought to light. Not that the great truth of man's immortality, as well as the "invisible things of God," comprising all his glorious attributes and perfections, are not distinctly written upon man's inmost being—as well as upon the whole creation around him. But man has chosen to blind himself as far as possible to these solemn and awful truths. Hence the mercy of God has accomplished what else could not be accomplished to deliver man from this darkness, and to open before him the vista of an immortality of life and glory.

In ancient times (like some in modern) there were many professed religionists, who denied the doctrine of man's immortality, and of course, all future rewards and punishments. Directly over against the teachings of such, we maintain, is the scripture doctrine of the resurrection. Taking this stand-point, we may look at this and other collateral subjects, from the same position, and in the same light that they were viewed by the inspired writers. Neglecting to start with the fundamental inquiry—"From what point of observation did the sacred writers view the doctrine of the resurrection, and its correlatives?" we apprehend has been the cause of the too frequent and general misunderstanding of the scripture doctrine on these subjects. We propose therefore, to investigate the teachings of the word of God and reason, (or a sound philosophy) on the subject before us.

We shall prescribe no definite plan for pursuing the investigation, because the subject and our limits scarcely admit of it. Yet we shall endeavor to pursue the most natural order—perhaps taking occasion as we proceed, to offer some strictures upon what others have said and written on the above themes—and simply asking the candor on the part of others, with which, in the sincerity of the heart, we wish to

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treat the subject and all who treat upon it—we proceed to examine first,

THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION.

We shall first appeal to the word of God—premising that if a rigid exegesis of that word does not sustain our view of the subject, we shall yield the question.

The term *resurrection*, with its cognates, we find to be used in the Bible in four or five different senses. Its simple signification is "a rising again,"—which signification is variously modified and applied as follows, namely:

1. To a physical resurrection, or the return of the body to its physical life here.
2. A moral resurrection, or a rising from the death of sin to a life of holiness here on earth.
3. A rising from a state of depression to a state of prosperity, whether it be of nations or of individuals.
4. The "putting on immortality," which takes place at death, (the time of our entering the spirit world.)
5. The exaltation of the righteous to a glorified state in the spirit world.

These are its main applications in the scriptures. We have to do more particularly with that pointed out under the fourth head, namely, the resurrection as signifying "putting on immortality." Nevertheless we shall have occasion to consider the other uses of the term, in elucidating the scripture doctrine on this particular point.

We therefore state the proposition which we expect to be able to sustain, namely, *the doctrine of the "resurrection," or "resurrection of the dead" as revealed in the Bible, simply teaches—and is designed simply to teach the doctrine of man's immortality.* Hence we maintain that it contradicts the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and affirms nothing in support of the doctrine of a simultaneous resurrection and judgment day. We understand the word of God to speak of this state of existence, as a whole, as the mortal state, in contrast with the future state, which is immortal and unchanging. This mortal existence is the "natural body" which is "sown in weakness," and from which germs forth at death the "spiritual body," which is then "raised in power," and endures with an immortal vigor. Hence those who have departed this life are spoken of as "dead," or "asleep," merely as relatively to this world. Whether the "spiritual body" is any thing more than the immortal, spiritual essence

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that germs forth from the material body at death, the Bible does not so clearly reveal. If being "clothed upon with our house from heaven," which occurs when the natural body dies, means any thing more than this, (which we shall examine in course by and by,) then something more must be predicated of the spiritual body. It is far from being evident however, that it does imply any thing more than a separate personal identity, which in the case of the righteous is adorned with those graces of holiness and heavenly light which will constitute the everlasting habiliment and habitation of the glorified throng.

We return therefore to the position, that the Bible, or rather the New Testament (for here alone is the doctrine philosophically discussed) treats the doctrine of the resurrection simply as synonymous with the doctrine of man's immortality. There are but four places in the New Testament where the physical nature of the resurrection is treated of, that is, where the resurrection is treated of either in a psycological or chronological point of view. Three of these are but repetitions of the same subject matter, as is common in the Evangelists—so that in fact, there are but two passages that attempt to point out the metaphysical nature and precise period of the resurrection. These are recorded as the teachings of Jesus Christ and the apostle Paul. See Matt. 22: 23—36, and the same event as recorded by Mark and Luke: Mark 12: 23—27; Luke 20: 27—38; and 1 Cor. 15th chapter. The three passages cited from the Evangelists, giving us the reply of Jesus Christ to the Sadducees, who denied the immortality of the soul, which was the only question in dispute at the time, teach us that the resurrection (in the mind of Jesus Christ) is synonymous with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Let it be noted, the question in dispute here, is neither the resurrection of the body—nor a future resurrection; for if it were either, the answer of Jesus Christ to the Sadducees proves neither the one nor the other, and hence the Sadducees, in that case were not at all confuted. Let us examine the passage cited from Matt. 22: 23; &c. "The same day came to Him the Sadducees who say that there is no resurrection." Now in Acts 23: 8, we are informed what the Sadducees intended by their denial of the resurrection, namely, the existence of "angels or spirits," in an immortal state. Hence they were deistic infidels. They acknowledged the existence of God, but denied the future state to man, and contended that all

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rewards and punishments were confined to this life. By denying the resurrection, they are to be understood as simply denying the future state to man: and Jesus Christ in asserting the truth of the resurrection, is to be understood as simply asserting the immortality of man. Both predicate the resurrection of *this subject matter, namely, the continued existence of man after the death of the body.* And if the resurrection is the predicate, namely, *immortality*, or *simple unending existence*, it certainly is not any thing else: a rising again of the body, and its conjunction with the soul, would be something *else than 'the resurrection.'* That this passage and its parallels in the other Evangelists proves nothing more than man's immortality, is granted by all the commentators we have been able to examine—those commentators still asserting that the resurrection of the body is abundantly taught elsewhere, or by other arguments; and perhaps may be inferred by implication here. On this point we take issue, and contend that this passage and its parallels not only do not prove the resurrection of the body, but that that they do in fact disprove it. The other verses of this chapter to the 28th, we need not quote. The reply of Jesus Christ to the query of the Sadducees, commencing with the 29th verse, is that to which we now turn our attention: "Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God: For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are *as the angels of God in heaven.*" Now it is to be borne in mind that the subject-matter of conversation here, is not the moral character of those raised, nor their mental capacities, compared with angels—but in view of the question proposed by the Sadducees, this physical constitution is the only matter in discussion. We suppose it granted by all that angels are purely spiritual beings—in other words, their physical constitution is not a union of the material with the spiritual. This point we do not recollect that we ever heard called in question. The averment of Jesus Christ, that the risen spirit is "as the angels in heaven" is given as the reason why they do not marry in that state. We may suppose four different grounds for the statement, "*as the angels*," in the language of the Savior, that thus we may fairly meet the views of those who contend for a final re-union of soul and body. We may suppose that the Savior intended by the assertion:

1. They are "as the angels" in that there is no distinction of sexes in the resurrection state—yet they may still

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be, in all other respects, corporeal beings like those who dwell on earth.

2. They are "as the angels," in many respects: their bodies are etherealized, sublimated, refined; somewhat approaching the purely spiritual, angelic nature.

3. They are "as the angels," in that they are immortal —no longer subject to decay and death as are the inhabitants of this world: Or

4. They are "as the angels," in *all respects;* spiritual, immortal, immaterial, and hence they "neither marry, nor increase by carnal generation—nor subsist in any manner, as do physical beings here on earth.

We believe that Christ intended to assert the latter—for had he intended either of the former points of comparison, it would have required an entirely different collocation of words, and language that would have pointed out the particular points of comparison. As it stands, the comparison is couched in broad, sweeping, universal language, and no reason whatever can be given from the phraseology, why it should not imply an universal likeness of physical nature. Hence if any limitation of the affirmed similarity is to be supposed, it must be deduced from the subject matter in discussion. That the Sadducees are much more effectually refuted by understanding the comparison in the universal sense—and that they would not have been refuted beyond evasion by supposing a limitation, we think is undeniable. For it is not clear that *immortal* beings merely, might not be increased and that wisely, by physical generation even in heaven. Nor is it clear that beings never so much refined and sublimated, might not be procreated in the same way, were they possessed of a corporeal nature still. Hence the subject matter, as we have before hinted, demands that the similarity of physical constitution affirmed of the angels and risen spirit of men, should be understood as complete. Thus Locke, quoting the passage as recorded Luke (20: 36,) (which is, in fact, more ambiguous than either of the others:) "They can not die any more, for they are equal unto the angels" remarks—"that is, *are of an angelical nature and constitution.*"

But as more conclusive evidence still, that Christ designed to affirm a universal similarity between the angels and men in the resurrection state, the remaining part of this reply of Jesus Christ to the Sadducees, defining the time, or

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period of the resurrection as it does, is directly in point. 31 verse. "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, 'I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?' *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living;* [or risen.]" Here he evidently uses the term *resurrection* as synonymous with *immortality*, or continued existence after death.

The term is so clearly used in this sense here, that Dr. Geo. Campbell renders it by the phrase "future state:" that phrase covering as it does the whole of man's existence after the death of the body. By closely criticising the language of this passage we find it contradicting two positions oft maintained:—1. By using the present tense as it does, it denies the *sleep of the soul*, which is a favorite dogma with a certain class of materialists, who contend that the action of the spirit is absolutely dependent upon its connection with a material organization. 2. It contradicts the doctrine of an *intermediate state*, between the death of the body, and a final resurrection of that body, which some contend is necessary to complete the happiness of the glorified spirit. Nothing is said in either of the Evangelists of a future resurrection as being affirmed by the Savior in this passage: but both Mark and Luke use the present tense even more unequivocally than Matthew. Mark has it, "and as touching the dead *that they rise:*" Luke, "Now that the dead are raised"—both making the first as well as the last clauses of the paragraph speak in the present tense—and all of them placing Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the resurrection state. Yet they had been dead more than three hundred years before God spake these words to Moses from the burning bush, and hence more than three thousand years at least before the end of the world. But it might be objected, that the Sadducees confounded the doctrine of the resurrection of the body with the idea of a future existence, supposing it impossible for the spirit to exist separate from the body, and hence they denied both:—or else that they denied the future resurrection of the body, simply as an inevitable consequent of denying the immortality of the soul, or the future state: and hence Jesus Christ by proving that the soul is immortal, or does exist separate from the body, has proved, and only aimed to prove the possibility of a resurrection of the body. This is the construction generally put upon this passage. To all this we reply:—

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1. There is no possible evidence that the Sadducees, who denied the existence of either "angel or spirit" had so confounded such existences in their own minds as to suppose that their existence was necessarily dependent upon a material organization.

2. Jesus Christ, as we have seen above, has affirmed that man in the resurrection state is constitutionally "*like to angels.*".

3. The unwarped interpretation of the passage we are considering predicates the resurrection of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and that in the present tense.

4. By the common construction of this passage neither of the supposed errors of the Sadducees are refuted. No one pretends that the Sadducees meant by the resurrection, a future resurrection of the body. And granting that they were materialists, making the union of the soul and body indispensable to the existence of the soul:—Jesus Christ was no such materialist: and why should he adduce an argument to prove the *possibility* of a *future* resurrection of the body, as a reply to their denial of the immortality of the soul! which is almost universally admitted by commentators to be the point denied! We grant that Jesus Christ was not responsible for any mistaken notions which the Sadducees or Pharisees might have concerning the resurrection, and had he intended simply to prove the possibility of a future resurrection of the body, he has come so far towards it as to prove conclusively *another thing*, namely, there is an immortal spirit to inhabit that body whenever it shall be raised. Hence we are forced, then, upon the conclusion, that Jesus Christ as well as the Sadducees understood by the term "*resurrection*," or "*resurrection of the dead*," simply a continued and endless existence of the soul after the death of the body. We are not driven to the necessity of supposing our Lord framing an argument to prove a future resurrection of the body, or its possibility even; (to either of which it has not the most distant relation,) in order to prove to the Sadducees that there is a *future state*. In reference to what was meant by the term "*resurrection*," they were therefore perfectly agreed. But we wish to dwell a little longer upon this point. We have said that the argument adduced by the Savior had no reference to the resurrection of the body. Let us place it in a syllogistic form. If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living, there shall be a future resurrection of the body. They are: (ergo,)

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there shall be a resurrection of the body. Such an inference by no means follows from the premises. By careful attention to the argument, it will become palpably evident that Jesus Christ designed to prove no such thing. He states his argument for the purpose, and it is understood by his hearers, as demonstrably proving the doctrine of the resurrection. The Bible doctrine on the subject, then, is not such as is commonly taught at the present time..

Says Dr. Campbell, "our Lord brings an argument to prove — not that they (that is, the soul and body) shall be re-united—*to this it has not the most distant relation*, but that the soul survives the body, and subsists after that body is dissolved." This "subsisting of the soul after the body is dissolved," is, then, by Jesus Christ, affirmed to be the resurrection. Try his argument. "If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living, (existing,) there is a resurrection of the dead: they are:—ergo, *there is a resurrection of the dead*." Thus proceeding upon the hypothesis, which every part of this argument of our Lord sustains, that the doctrine of the resurrection was mutually understood to be synonymous with the doctrine of immortality, and it is found demonstrative. God, the Almighty, at the burning bush, fifteen hundred years before, in those very books the Sadducees pronounced inspired, had declared the three patriarchs in the resurrection state. The argument is conclusive—the Sadducees are silenced. The *Pharisees* did generally, though, Dr. Campbell remarks, not universally, mean by the "resurrection," the re-union of soul and body, hence, this reply of our Savior, while it absolutely confuted the Sadducees, did also contradict the false notions of the Pharisees, in as far as they held to a re-union of soul and body, and thus formed gross conceptions of the heavenly state—and also, in as far as they held to an intermediate state between death and the resurrection. Yet was the answer given in such circumstances as not to excite their prejudices—being leveled against the objects of an inveterate sectarian prejudice which the Pharisees had long entertained. But the objector is doubtless ready to reply to the above argument, that although the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not taught in the passage we have considered, it is abundantly taught elsewhere, and therefore ought to be understood as implied in this passage—or at least as not contradicted. We answer, if a fair construction of the language of this passage contradicts that doctrine,

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we can neither avow, nor admit that it is taught elsewhere. If any one can show our interpretation of the passage to be incorrect, and prove the doctrine in question from other passages, the way is open for it to be done. Dr. Scott admits that this passage does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, but says it is "abandantly taught elsewhere"—but where he does not say. Matthew Henry admits that this passage does not teach the doctrine of the of the resurrection of the body—nor does he base that doctrine upon the fact that it is so "*abundantly taught elsewhere*"—but simply on the ground that there is "such an inclination of the human soul to its body as would make a final and eternal separation *inconsistent with the bliss of those who have God for their God!* Strange indeed! From what part of revelation, or from what scheme of philosophy, or from what induction of facts he learned this dogma of the "inclination of the soul to its body," of those "who have *God* for their God," we are utterly unable to divine. Paul, of old, tells us that he considered it better tobe "absent from the body and present with the Lord." Nor does he even hint that he expected to spend one moment in sighing for a re-union of soul and body. He doubtless considered it "far better," to soar on angel's wing, free from every clog of inertia, such as a material element must be, and be "a ministering spirit," swift as thought traversing creation's bounds, on messages of love and mercy, wherever his glorified Redeemer might send him. And not only he, but we think there are very many who, (theory aside,) *are sighing* for a deliverance from these fleshly tenements, and with the apostle and the risen patriarchs, soar to heavenly mansions, and to all eternity be trammeled with the clogs of earth no more.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is taught "elsewhere" we are informed. If so, it is in 1 Cor. 15, for as we before remarked, the philosopical nature of the resurrection is discussed in only these two passages. We turn therefore to the passage last cited. Here also a fundamental inquiry arises! *What is the error the apostle is attempting to refute?* and what the truth he is endeavoring to establish? "For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures: and that he was buried; and that He rose again the third day according to the scriptures." Now we believe that the mistake com-

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monly made in the interpretation of this passage, is found in considering Christ's resurrection as to his body on the third day, as a "proof and pledge" of the resurrection of our bodies. We are persuaded that it has a far deeper meaning —that it is the "proof and pledge" of the *immortality of the soul!* That the error of the Sadducees had obtained in the church at Corinth, and that the apostle's object in this chapter is to counteract this error, the whole drift of his argument, we think, fully evinces. This is also the admission of Matthew Henry and Adam Clarke. Says Henry, "They (that is, those who denied the resurrection in the Corinthian church) took death to be the destruction and extinction of man," and meant, by denying the resurrection, to deny any future state to man. Says Dr. Clarke, "Death, in the sense of the Sadducees, is equal to eternal annihilation." And on this passage he remarks, "Mortality and immortality, on a general ground, are the subject of the apostle's reasoning." Rev. John Howe says, "It is plain the apostles scope through this chapter is more to assert the future subsistence of the soul rather than the recomposure of the body, as his arguments show." If this be so, why, we ask, is there so oft an effort made to engraft upon, or rather to deduce from the apostle's reasoning entirely another meaning? Nothing but a preformed theory, we are convinced, could ever have led to such an effort. But independent of what others have said or written, we are permitted to examine the passage for ourselves, and learn, if possible, its true meaning. In reference to the verses quoted above, we would remark—that the body of Jesus Christ rose again the third day after the crucifixion we do not doubt. But we ask, *for what purpose?* Many bodies had been raised to life again before that time. But all this does not prove that flesh and blood could "inherit the kingdom of God." Hence, of course, it does not prove that Christ's material body ever ascended to heaven. That the body which Thomas handled was a material body, and in form and texture like other material bodies, is there any reason to doubt? Now there are several reasons for the miraculous resurrection of Christ's body, which are equally valid without supposing that his material body ever became a part of his immortal nature. These reasons, are:—1. Such a resurrection by his own power was the highest proof of his divinity, and hence of his claim to be the true Messiah. 2. It was a demonstrative evidence of his continued existence; and

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hence the highest possible evidence of his, and by analogy, of our immortality. And 3. Had his body remained in the grave, it might, and doubtless would have become an object of idolatrous worship. Doubtless it was for this reason that the body of Moses was hid, so that the children of Israel could not pay idolatrous homage to it. 4. Jesus Christ could not exhibit Himself to men in the flesh as we are, except through the medium of a material body, or by miraculously giving man a "*spiritual eye*," as was the case when Elisha was surrounded by the Syrian host, and as the apostle Paul himself afterward saw Jesus Christ in person. The tenor of the narrative seems to announce that our Savior was manifest in both these ways after his resurrection. It was surely fitting that he should be seen in the same body in which He suffered and died, and perhaps was necessary to confirm the faith of his disciples—but that this body was not constantly with Him, during the forty days that intervened between his resurrection and final ascension, is most evident. That the same body which ate bread, and was handled by the unbelieving Thomas, would have been equally visible and tangible, at any other time, we see no reason for questioning. That this body *was not visible*, except on special occasions during that period, the narrative abundantly shows. The Evangelists record these appearances of Messiah in the body after the resurrection, as brief, unexpected, and usually as miraculous. The apostle Paul rehearses them in the same manner, and classes them all as the same in kind with the manifestation of the Lord to himself as he was journeying to Damascus. (See 1 Cor. 15: 5—8.) We therefore conclude that our Lord had no material body after his resurrection, except at such times as he saw fit to re-assume, for a short space, his former body, for purposes immediately connected with the closing up of his mission to earth. These appearances were doubtless similar to those divine manifestations of ancient times, when the Lord assumed an earthly tenement for a brief period, as when He appeared to Abraham, to Joshua, or to the parents of Samson:—and when the object of the visible manifestation was accomplished at each particular time, the material tenement was thrown off, the "earthly tabernacle" "dissolved," and the heavenly tabernacle alone retained. But more, perchance, in reference to Christ's resurrection and ascension in the sequel. Thus much

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seemed requisite to be said here in order to be understood. Christ's bodily resurrection, therefore, instead of being a "proof and pledge" of ours, as Adam Clarke is pleased to state it, we consider rather, as far as it has a bearing on the doctrine of the resurrection, more in point as a proof of his own immortality, and by consequence of ours. This we shall more fully see as we proceed with the apostle's reasoning. His main argument appears to commence with the twelfth verse.

"Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom He raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised; and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; and ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." —1 *Cor.* 15: 12—19.

Now we would candidly inquire, What is the obvious design of the passage above quoted? Why, simply to prove that the Sadducee doctrine of "eternal annihilation" is not true. If that doctrine were true, then they who are "*fallen asleep in Christ are perished.*" But "how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" no future state? If this were so, then Jesus Christ, who took upon himself our nature, and really died, is now annihilated, and there is no longer any Savior for man." For if the dead rise not," that is, if death is not an eternal sleep, "then is Christ not raised:" He exists no more forever. "And if Christ be not risen, that is, in being, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain: *ye are yet in your sins.*" Now how could this follow from the simple fact that Christ had not assumed and retained his material body? Who can explain? And suppose Paul had falsely testified concerning the resurrection of Christ's body, would that prove that the Corinthian Christians were yet in their sins? Is there any necessary connection between the antecedent and consequent in such a case? Long before the idea of Christ's death and resurrection had been in any proper sense conceived by the human mind, faith in God was not *vain.* Sal-

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vation from sin was then possible, and oft experienced; because the Savior existed just as Paul asserts He still exists: but if "Christ be not risen," not in existence, then there is no Being to forgive sin or to save from its power. And if Christ be thus perished, then "they also which are fallen asleep in Christ *are perished*." That the term "*perish*" here is equivalent to annihilation, Henry and Clarke both admit. And so the next verse, and in fact the whole context demands that it should be interpreted. "If in this life only we have hope in Christ we are of all men most miserable." Upon the hypothesis we have assumed, the meaning of this verse is obvious. Nor do we see its force upon any other hypothesis. Let us assume the hypothesis that the resurrection of the body, or the possibility of such a resurrection is the point at issue in this discussion. The argument will stand thus: If it be not possible for the body to rise, or if there be no resurrection of the body, "our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain; ye are yet in your sins, and are of all men most miserable." There is no resurrection of the body: therefore, 'our preaching,' &c. It were vain to say, *non sequiter*, to such reasoning. Try the other hypothesis. If there be no resurrection of the dead—no immortality, or spiritual existence after death, "our preaching is vain, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins, and of all men most miserable." There is no such resurrection: therefore ye are of all men most miserable, &c. Thus, upon the hypothes we maintain the reasoning is conclusive: for if there be no resurrection, no living Jesus to purify, and finally save his people—they are of course yet in their sins, faith and preaching are all vain; they only reap obloquy and persecution here, and are like their Savior, candidates for the same annihilation at death. Why should they not be of all men "most miserable?" They can neither be cheered by the presence of their Savior, while in the perilous warfare they have undertaken, nor have his sustaining grace in the greater conflicts that were yet to come: they are exposed to all the temporal evils of other men, and many more—no divine support any more than others have, and are soon to die like the "beasts that perish." Thus they can neither have their "good things" in this life, nor any prospect of good in the life to come.

Now if our interpretation of the teachings of Jesus Christ and the apostle Paul thus far is correct, (and we are willing to rest the whole question upon it) our hypothesis is estab-

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lished. The common hypothesis, we have seen to be without foundation. The apostle is not reasoning to prove a *possibility*, but a *reality:* something that *really is*. And if the resurrection is something that really *is*, it is not something that is *about to be*, or to be some time in the future. The two positions are contradictory. A tree is not a meadow, nor am I another person. If the *resurrection* as used in the Bible in reference to man's future state, and his constitutional nature in that state, is simply his immortality, or continued and endless existence after the death of the body, *it is not any thing else.* If the scriptures use this term as meaning, and simply proving the *immortality of the soul*, it certainly does not mean, nor bear any relation to the proof of the *immortality of the body.*

We grant the Saducee doctrine would have been refuted by the apostle's reasoning, had the *possibility* of a resurrection of the body been the thing denied, and that denial had been based upon the supposed non-existence of the soul after death. But this was not the point denied. We grant, again, the Sadducee doctrine as it really was, might have been refuted by the reasoning of Jesus Christ and the apostle, if we suppose that their reasoning was simply designed to institute a premise from which the doctrine of the resurrection of the body could be proved, so far as the soul's existence would go toward proving it; but the language of neither will admit of their argument being used as a premiss for any such purpose. To institute a premise from which to prove a resurrection of the body does not require that the annihilation of the soul should be predicated of those whose *bodies* are not raised. But the argument both of Jesus Christ and the apostle, does make the doctrine of the resurrection and the doctrine of annihilation exact opposites. Why is this, if they meant by the resurrection a future resurrection of the body? If the body does not rise, the soul need not therefore be pronounced extinct.

If we have reasoned thus far correctly, we are now prepared to understand the abstruse points (so called) found in the remainder of the apostle's argument, which have puzzled many wiser heads than ours, in their attempts to maintain the theory we are opposing. The theory we maintain, we think, renders the apostle's reasoning much less enigmatical. The apostle proceeds: "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that

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slept. For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead."—1 *Cor.* 15: 20, 21. That the term "first fruits" as applied to Jesus Christ in the twentieth verse, simply implies that Jesus Christ is the earnest or pledge of our resurrection we here stop to prove. That term used in that sense was readily understood by a Jew, and that without implying any thing in reference to precedence of time, or of chronological order. Says Henry, "Christ's resurrection must, in order of nature, precede that of his saints, though some of these might rise in order of time before Him. It is *because* He is risen that they rise." In the twenty-first verse the apostle commences a parallel between Adam and Jesus Christ: "Mortality came by Adam: immortality by Christ: *mortality and immortality on a general ground are the subject of the apostles reasoning here.*"—*Adam Clark.* Thus is the learned Dr. Clark forced by the logical exegency of the passage and context to admit the precise point we are laboring to establish. Nor is the subject-matter of the apostle's reasoning changed throughout the chapter. Why is it assummed that it is? No one essays to point out the place where the apostle slides from the proof of the resurrection of the body to a proof of man's "*immortality on a general ground.*" "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order: Christ the first-fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming."—1 *Cor.* 15: 22, 23.

As by Adam all became mortal, so by the power of Christ shall all be raised to immortality. "But every man in his own order: Christ the first-fruits." Jesus Christ stands as the representative and guarantee of the resurrection of his saints, whatever may have been the period of their exit from the world. The "order" is that of rank, or of logical sequence. This might be more fully shown by considering what is intended by the "coming of Christ," which however we shall defer to a succeeding department of the subject. Clarke does not contend that chronological order is intended in this passage.

"Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when He shall have put down all rule and all authority and power."—24.

"For He must reign until He hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death."—25.

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Delivering up the kingdom to God the Father doubtless signifies the subjecting of all principalities and powers to the sceptre of Jehovah, in such a sense, that they shall acknowledge his attributes—the righteousness of his government, and his justice in fixing their doom, whatever that doom may be. Thus all enemies shall be subjugated. "*The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.*" When this our "earthly tabernacle" is put off, and we enter upon the immortal state; physical death, and all the pains and infirmities attendant upon a life in the mortal body shall have forever ceased. That the apostle speaks of death here, in reference to the body, and not in reference to spiritual or moral death, both the subject matter of discourse, and the general teachings of the scripture on the subject of the future and eternal doom of the wicked, abuntantly evince. The apostle is evidently contrasting the present and future condition of the righteous.

"And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all."—28.

Christ in his official relation as Son and Mediator shall still be subject to the Father. Christ, *the Son* assays neither to do or to speak "any thing of myself." Assays not to do "his own will but the will of Him that sent him," who is Father of all. Nor does this official arrangement at all militate against the doctrine of the veritable equality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

"Else what shall they do, which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why are they then baptized for the dead? And why stand we in jeopardy every hour? I protest by your rejoicing which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die daily. If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die."—29—32.

After a seeming digression from the main point of the argument common to the apostle, for the purpose of explanation, or because of its connection with the subject, he again returns to the main subject under consideration—and again uses language neither ambiguous nor controvertible. "If the dead rise not at all, why are they then baptized for the dead?" They contemplate a nonentity when they thus baptize for those who have no existence whatever! This is folly indeed! And so, says the apostle, would my con-

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duct be, in placing myself in jeopardy every hour; exposing myself to death in every frightful form, for the sake of proclaiming that which is not true; and for doing which I shall only sooner reap the reward of eternal annihilation. Why not rather eat and drink, and seek all possible means of enjoying life in the body—and with care and prudence protract this brief existence as long as possible—for "to-morrow we die," and that is the end of us! This we deem to be the plain straight-forward reasoning of the apostle; nor can the language be fairly construed so as to deduce any other meaning. Commentary, we used not in arriving at our present conviction of the meaning of this chapter, and were somewhat surprised to find Henry and Clarke so fully admitting the above construction of the verses last cited. Our surprise is occasioned by the fact that both these writers insist upon the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; and use the former part of this chapter to prove that doctrine. And in fact it is the general resort of the Christian church. What should have led them (and the church generally) to suppose that the resurrection of the body is taught in the former part or any part of this chapter we cannot tell, unless the fact of the resurrection of Christ's body on the third day, being rehearsed here, has led many to suppose that the resurrection of the body was the subject of the apostle's reasoning. The truth is, Jesus Christ as to his body, *rose* AGAIN, that is, re-appeared on earth in a material or organized body! Man *rises*—not reappears on earth in a material organized body to eat and drink and to be handled by the senses. Christ's bodily resurrection was but the index or evidence of his spiritual existence; which spiritual existence is the *true Christ* who ever lives; and because we have this assurance, we also have the assurance that "we shall live also," which existence in the immortal state we have seen, is *the resurrection* compared with which a material *resurrection* is only a shadow or a sign. Note, neither Jesus Christ nor Paul make the resurrection of the body necessary to complete the idea of "*the resurrection*," but each predicate it of existence in the "*future state*;" as both Campbell and Henry admit. And by making the term "perished" the opposite of the *resurrection*, Paul affirms that those who are not risen, (having died) are annihilated. He does not state this alternative as that which the Saducees had proposed, and which he would disprove by the fact that Jesus Christ had

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demonstrated his continued existence by re-appearing on the third day, (called also a resurrection,) but as the alternative which himself regarded as the only real alternative between the denial and the admission of the doctrine of the resurrection. Again, none but Adventists and Millenarians believe that we are to have material, animal bodies, in texture and configuration like ours in the flesh—capable of eating and drinking and of being discerned by the senses; why then should they make the resurrection of Christ's body, in all these respects, similar to ours now, an example or argument in proof of the resurrection of our bodies? The argument proves too much, and hence proves nothing. Yet here is the rock on which all materialists split. Let a careful examination of the apostle's argument in this chapter, however, correct their mistake. We may there learn that the apostle's arguments "have no force in them," as Henry observes, except upon the hypothesis we have assumed! The apostle next alludes briefly to the dangerous and fatal deistic sentiments he had controverted.

"Be not deceived; evil communications corrupt good manners: awake to righteousness and sin not; for some have not the knowledge of God: I speak this to your shame."—33, 34.

Those who denied a state of future rewards and punishments, by their lives, it seems, gave evidences of being destitute of the "knowledge of God." Hence, the inculcation of such a doctrine, the apostle infers to be of corrupting tendency. "Manners," in the sense the apostle uses the term, doubtless signifies general moral deportment. By "evil communications," irreligious and false teachings, of which the Sadducees' doctrine was a specimen. This passage will give us a clue to the meaning of the same apostle (2 Tim. 2: 18,) where he affirms that some had "erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is passed already; and overthrow the faith of some." Compare with 1 Cor. 15: 12, where the apostle inquires, "How say some that there is no resurrection of the dead?" They doubtless contended that all that was signified by the term "*resurrection*" was fulfilled in this life, so that no future state was to be expected. Such teaching, the apostle informs us, had "overthrown the faith of some." How a denial of the resurrection of the body could lead to any of the above results or inferences we are not able to explain.

Hitherto, the apostle has more particularly discussed the question of fact—proving that there *is* (not shall be) a res-

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urrection of the dead. The question of time thus involved and brought to view—does in fact prove much more than the simple truth of a resurrection—even determining what its physical or philosophical nature *must be*. But lest any should stumble, or cavil, he now proceeds to descant more particularly upon the physical nature and manner of the resurrection.

"But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his [its] own body."—35—38.

The force of this reasoning is obviously leveled against that species of infidelity which made the existence of the human soul depend upon its material organization. "Why" the infidel objects, "the person dies and what evidence have you that that is not the extinction of his being? How can you show that the spirit can and does exist separate from its material organization?" To answer this objection, the apostle appeals to the analogy of grain sown in the earth. "Thou fool! that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." Even grain itself, which you know, continues to live, although its bodily fabric is dissolved, *must die*, ere this quickening into more glorious life can take place. And when thou sowest the grain, "*thou sowest not that body which shall be;* but bare grain," that is, the bare kernel, or naked grain, of whatever kind it may be." The sowing of the grain is designed, doubtless, to be represented as analagous to our receiving a mortal or perishable body, or existence here. We receive from Adam an animal life, which is the "bare grain" which must decay and die. God breathes into this animal being the "living soul" which is the germ that springs forth when the natural body dies, into immortal life and vigor. This immortal part which God has given, and which at death is said to "put on immortality," (that is,) it enters then upon its unchanging state, is then clothed upon with all that glory which our "house from heaven" will display; just as the germ that springs from the seed sown, is clothed upon with foliage and a radiance of glory by the power of God manifest in vegetation.

Viewed in this light, the analogy is perfect; and the remaining part of his argument demands that his reasoning

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should be thus interpreted. And if any are disposed to examine, they will find that Scott and Locke virtually adopt the same construction of this passage. We ask no one, however, to refer to the "standards" in deciding upon the interpretation of scripture, but let a careful criticism of the passage itself be the umpire.

"All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial: but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."—39—44.

The "natural" or animal body is the one we derive from Adam, which, with its immortal germ, (the soul,) is sown in weakness here; and we must wait for our spiritual house from heaven ere we can be clothed with immortal power and glory. The pronoun "it" being used impersonally as it is in the text, does not necessarily distribute the predicate, hence, does not necessarily imply that the same body, in all respects is raised as the one sown upon the earth. Says Scott, "The body sown is not the same which will exist when it has sprung up." The passage might be more properly rendered according to Beza, "There is a sowing of a natural body, there is a raising of a spiritual body. There is a sowing in corruption, &c." This rendering, the last clause of the 44th verse seems to warrant and demand: "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."

That identity in the case reaches no farther than bare personal identity, the whole scope of the passage fully evinces. And as to identity of person we are to bear in mind that the "*person*" is not the material organization, but the *spirit* that inhabits this material organization. Says Scott, "the identity of the particles of matter, as necessary to the resurrection of the *same body*, is nowhere mentioned in scripture; and this chapter strongly militates against that opinion." Truly it does: and on *this ground*, the resurrection of particles of matter are not at all con-

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nected with the *resurrection of the dead*. The "*same body*" that Scott speaks of, is nothing more nor less than the immortal spirit which was connected with the material body: which rises and leaves the "particles of matter" behind. We may understand the apostle, then, from verses 42 to 44, as contrasting our present life, or existence in the body, with the life to come—this life as a whole being, spoken of as the frail, and mortal state; while the life to come is imperishable and glorious.

(The apostle evidently speaks of saints exclusively in this chapter.)

"And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual."—45, 46.

So we do not receive first the "celestial body"—the purely spiritual, angelic nature and constitution—but must wait till the "Lord from Heaven" see fit to affect the change by "dissolving" this material body, and fashioning our spiritual habitude like unto his "glorious body," and thus fit us for the heavenly "mansions" prepared alone for spiritual existences.

"The first man is of the earth, earthy, the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy we shall bear the image of the heavenly."—47—49.

We are like Adam our progenitor in our physical constitution here—we are to be like our risen and glorified Savior in our physical constitution hereafter.

"Now this I say brethren, that flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption."—50.

The "natural" or animal body is "flesh and blood," a combination of material substances—these can not inherit the kingdom of God. That is constitutionally a spiritual kingdom—inhabited by purely spiritual beings who alone are fitted for such a residence. Material structures crumble and corrode. Spirits ever endure.

"Behold I show you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incor-

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ruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."—51—54.

The design of this passage evidently is to affirm the doctrine that all men must experience the same change. Our existence here, as a whole, we have said before, is spoken of as the mortal corruptible state. This must be exchanged for the immortal and incorruptible. This change in every individual is instantaneous. "In a moment; in the twinkling of an eye." This passage is in part metaphorical. The costume is Jewish. Says Clarke, "This, as well as the rest of the peculiar phraseology of this chapter is merely Jewish. Scott admits the same. "At the last trump." No one seriously and intelligently can believe that God or angels sound trumpets, as men sound them. The figure is one of *simile*; resembling the call or summons of the saints to their future glorified state, to the ancient Jewish or oriental custom of convening assemblies by the sound of a trumpet. The costume goes farther, (as is common in the Old Testament and other Jewish writings,) and represents the transactions of perhaps myriads of years, as occurring at the same period. Doubtless those of the Pharisees who believed in the resurrection of the body, expected a general simultaneous resurrection of all the righteous. When they used the term resurrection, in this sense, it seems they denied the resurrection to the wicked. They left them in Hades, under darkness and the shades of eternal night. Hence some of the Pharisees supposed, like some in our day, that it is more glorious to be re-united again to the body—and that in fact it is indispensable to exaltation to the glories of heaven.

In a few instances Jesus Christ and Paul seem to adapt their mode of speaking on this subject, yet not without using the most unequivocal language at other times, and usually in the same context, to disprove such a dogma. The passage we are now considering is doubtless an example in point. So when Paul says, "If by any means I may attain unto the resurrection of the dead." And Jesus Christ, "They that are accounted worthy to attain that world and the resurrection from the dead." Now neither Paul nor Christ meant to deny the resurrection of the wicked in a physical sense. In these passages they doubtless intended by

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the term resurrection, a glorified state. Hence they denied the Pharisees' dogma that the re-union of soul and body constituted any part of the saints' pre-eminence in glory, and left that question where they found it—passing no decision upon it, that is, by that phraseology. The simple declaration of the passage before us then, is: "All the saints without exception, shall be changed—and shall meet in one triumphant throng to praise their living, glorified Redeemer forever. Death has no more dominion over them. Death is swallowed up in victory."

"Oh death, where is thy sting? O grave where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin: and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmoveble, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord."—55—58.

The apostle swelling with a rapturous interest in this subject, breaks out in a quotation from the prophet Hosea:—continuing the language of metaphor which is here a figure of *personification*; Death and Hades being personified and addressed as sentient beings who had claimed victory, and power to inflict pain. But God through Jesus Christ has wrought a deliverance. "The sting of death is sin." Sin arms death with all his terrors. "The strength of sin is the law." By the law is the knowledge of sin. Jesus Christ by saving his people from their sins, has delivered them from the curse of the law and from all that is frightful in death, and brought life and eternal glory within the reach of their enraptured vision; an inheritance they take possession of when they close their eyes to all terrestrial things. Well might the apostle in view of these glories, exhort his brethren to be steadfast and immovable; always abounding in the work of the Lord. They were not to labor and toil amid every danger and every privation and suffering, with only the prospect of a gloomy sleep of eternal annihilation before them. And no wonder that those who consider the apostle as speaking of the resurrection of the body in this chapter, are puzzled to know what there is in such a theme to call forth such an exhortation. And no wonder that Adam Clarke pronounces the subject of the resurrection as discussed in this chapter, one of great difficulty, and is at a loss to know why ancient Christians laid so *much more* stress upon this doctrine than the modern

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Christians do. The reason is, he and they have missed their way, and are trying to prove something from this chapter, that was never designed to be proved by it; hence all their difficulties, and which if it were proved would be of no consequence; hence all their indifference to the subject, compared with the interest in the subject manifested by the primitive Christians. We have now completed our examination of the only passages, as we before said, that speak directly of the philosophical or constitutional nature of the *resurrection*. There is another passage which so unequivocally speaks of the time of our assuming the spiritual body, that we shall here adduce it as an auxiliary in the support of the hypothesis we have thus far labored to maintain, and then we shall leave the subject; only hoping to be permitted, in the sequel, to answer some objections and add a few strictures upon what others have written upon the subject.

The passage to which we have alluded is 2 Cor. 5: 1—9.

"For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: If so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon that mortality might be swallowed up of life. Now he that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Therefore we are always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith, not by sight:) We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Werefore we labor, that whether present or absent, we may be accepted of Him."

The Rev. Sherlock Bristol, in an article upon the subject of the "spiritual body" published in the Oberlin Quarterly Review, Feb. 1847, fully admits that the "house from heaven," spoken of by the apostle in this chapter, is the same with the resurrection body; or spiritual body which we have from the Lord. The article, we have quoted, (self-contradictory as we expect in due time to be able to show it to be,) nevertheless we suppose was received as sound doctrine, by the great mass of those who will read the article we are now penning. It may be important, therefore, that we a

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little more carefully analyze and compare the teachings of the Bible in the premises, than seems to have been done by Rev. Mr. B., and by those who so inadvertantly admit his conclusions. What, we ask, does the apostle affirm in the passage before us. We know that if our "earthly house" was dissolved, we have a building of God—eternal in the heavens. "This "building of God" the apostle in the next verse, calls our "house which is from heaven." This "house from heaven," Br. B. makes synonymous with the resurrection body. Says Henry upon this passage, "Note, Heaven is, in the eye and hope of the believer, *a house or habitation;* a dwelling-place, resting-place, hiding-place; our Father's house, our everlasting home: a house in the heavens." Further, he says, "This happiness, (that is, the happiness of inhabiting this house from heaven,) shall be enjoyed *immediately after death; so soon as our earthly house of this tabernacle is dissolved.*" This we believe to be *prima facie*, the clear meaning of the passage. If so it clearly contradicts the hypothesis Mr. B. assumed in the article above mentioned. So the 6th and 8th verses of this chapter. "Knowing that whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord,—willing rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord."

Not "unclothed, but clothed upon" with the house from heaven. Now if such language does not explictly contradict the doctrine of the intermediate state as taught by the Pharisees, and also the doctrine of an after resurrection of a *spiritual body*, as maintained by Br. B., we know not how language can do it. In reference to these two passages (2 Cor. 5: 1–9, and 1 Cor. 10: 12–18.) we have a perfect specimen of the facility with which the truth of a popular sentiment may be assumed, and the writer proceed boldly to expatiate upon the false assumption, just as though it had been most fully established. Thus the Rev. S. Bristol first assumes that the *spiritual body* is a *material body!* then admitting the spiritual body to be our "house from heaven," he assumes that a large share of the human race, at least, do not receive the heavenly tabernacle until a long period after death. The incongruity of pronouncing a *spiritual body* the same as a *material body*, we shall not now consider. And as ot the time for our taking the "house from heaven,' we are willing to abide by the interpretation of Matthew Henry, as given above.

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Upon the passage, (1 Cor. 15: 18) Matthew Henry says, "It is plain from this that those among the Corinthians who denied the resurrection meant thereby a state of future retribution, and not *merely the revival of the flesh.*" Here Henry assumes that the "revival of the flesh" is any part of the proposition the Sadducees meant to deny, or that Paul meant to establish. Where, we ask, in all the context is any thing so much as hinted? And yet these writers proceed to expatiate upon the theme as though their assumptions were established.

The following points we have considered and attempted to establish in the foregoing article.

1. The discussion of Jesus Christ with the Sadducees, (admitted not to prove the resurrection of the body) we have shown not only does not prove it, but in fact disproves it.

2. Paul's discussion of the subject, (1 Cor. 15) admitted by Henry to be mainly in defence of the immortality of the soul, we have shown to be in defence of naught else: and indeed so arranged have we considered the argument to be, that it not only does not prove the resurrection of the body, but really precludes the idea of such a resurrection.

3. We have found in 2 Cor. 5: 1—9, explicit corroborative testimony to the correctness of our interpretation of the reasoning of Jesus Christ and Paul.

Such is the ground we have gone over. The other passages of scripture where the *resurrection*, or its cognates, are employed, are usually metaphorical, or ambiguous, as a close examination would abundantly show.

We deem the way now open to deduce from scripture and reason a correct view of the doctrine of the *judgment day*. This subject must however be deferred to a future time. Meanwhile we would suggest as worthy of remembrance, that the gross and material notions of the Pharisees in reference to the resurrection and the future state, were probably the main causes of the infidelity of the Sadducees. And the same gross and material notions of later and modern times, have doubtless occasioned much infidelity, and have certainly been the source of all the vagaries and meanderings of Second Adventists and Millenarians, from the Christian era until now. It is time that the legitimate sources of such delusions were dried up.

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ARTICLE V.

THE CHURCH THE WORLD'S REFORMER:

Or, The Church the only Organization appointed or authorized by God for the Moral Renovation of the World.

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[Read before the Congregational Association, and by their request forwarded for publication in the Oberlin Quarterly Review.]

THE term church, taken in its widest sense, means all the chosen people of God, from the beginning to the end of the world, of whatever name or nation, and under whatever dispensation the providence of God may have placed them.

The precise meaning of the word church, is, the "*chosen out*," "*what belongs or is appointed to the Lord.*"

The term "*Christian Church*," is used to designate all believers under the gospel dispensation; all who are truly converted.

The different denominations are sometimes called churches. It matters not in which of these capacities the church is viewed, so far as the question under consideration is concerned, the position we take being this, that she is the world's only reformer in the sphere which she occupies.

The scriptures do not enforce union with the church by commands and penalties. The human mind naturally seeks that union as soon as it is prepared for it. The Bible therefore meets Christians as members of the church, and makes them amenable to no other earthly tribunal, respecting the discharge of Christian duty.

In discussing this subject, I design to pursue the following plan.

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I. Show in what sense the church is the only organization appointed or authorized by God for the moral renovation of the world.

II. Show some consequences we may expect from the substituting other organizations.

III. Answer objections.

This question does not interfere with the Christian's duties in his private capacity, or contemplate the work of reform as laid upon the *church* in such a sense that private members may wait for the church as a body, or the minister and leading members to take a stand against any form of sin before they raise their cry, and put forth all appropriate efforts for its removal. Nor is it the work of the church in such a sense, as to prohibit the employment of *agencies* or the union and combination of the efforts of many churches for the sake of economy, or to secure sufficient ability to promote any benevolent work or reform with energy and success, provided always, that such agencies &c., are only machinery for the use of the church, simply organs or channels through which the church may direct her efforts in any of her appropriate work. If any such organization is simply machinery, it will be evident from its positions and professions. Does *it* take the responsibility, or throw it upon the *church*? Does it *decrease* or *increase* the responsibility felt by the church? Which attitude does it take, that of a master or a servant to the church? To what power is the *success* in the work ascribed, under God—to the society or the church? By whose will is it guided in its operations, its own or the will of the church?

If the former are its positions, though its members were all of the church, and itself within the church; it would nevertheless be a rival organization, a "supplanter," and if it shared in the work it must also in the honors and rewards.

The fact that any society embraces other than God's professed people, shows clearly that it is not and was not designed for the use of the church. Such are most of the voluntary societies of the day—separate organizations independent of the church—an attempt at improvement upon God's plan of reform.

The church is the only organization authorized by God for the moral renovation of the world in the sense that God has authorized the formation of no society to take any part of the work, and thus relieve the church, or God's people as a people, of the responsibility of that part. That is, the

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renovation of the world is a work laid upon God's people *as his people*, in such a sense that we may take no course directly or indirectly to relieve them as a body from the work, or any individual from his share, and that we may form no organization for the performance of any part of this work, which shall invite, or purposely embrace any other than God's people. I mean to say, that God's church is the organized society to which He looks for the reform of every vice, and the cultivation of every virtue. Hence it is evident that no society, either within or out of the church, may or can take any part of the work, in such a sense as to to relieve the church, as a body, from the responsibility of performing that part.

This is not laid upon Christians, more as a reasonable duty which they are under the most solemn obligation to perform, than as an indispensable means to the perfection of their moral character and preparation for their future state.

We have no right to form a society of volunteers even, within the church, to perform any part of the work, and thus make the impression that some of God's people may, with impunity, neglect that part. This would be in effect to decoy them from the discipline necessary for the perfection of their moral characters, and thus rob them of their rewards. God has laid this work upon his people as a body, and He alone can relieve any individual from the responsibility, if indeed even He could do it, any more than from the obligation to be holy; since to relieve the servant of God from the former, would be to remove one of the important means for securing the latter.

If societies are formed by irreligious men to reform moral evils, God's people should only regard it as a scorching rebuke of their indolence, and should bestir themselves to wipe off the reproach their neglect has brought upon their Master's name and cause. Has the church slept over sin until sinners are aroused to rebuke it? And worse than all, do the "sacramental host of God's elect," take it all in good part, and even invite God's sworn enemies to become co-laborers with them in his holy and blessed cause, and that too without requiring an oath of allegiance? Surely this is a "commixture strange of heaven, and earth, and hell," a bold attempt to prove false the assertions of the blessed Savior, "without me ye can do nothing," and "the friendship of the world is enmity with God."

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Again. The church is the only organization, in the sense that no other may be established with a different standard, less or more strict. *Either* would be to set up our judgment against God, and treat his standard with contempt. The very formation of another organization pre-supposes another than the Bible standard. If it was not so, there would be no occasion for it.

Again. It is the only one in the sense that no one may be established which *appeals to different motives.* If we may appeal to different motives in our efforts to remove one sin, we may in the same to remove every sin, and dispense with both the church and Bible.

Again. No one may depend upon different power, either in kind or degree, or different influences for success.

Nor may any one depend upon different sanctions. Political and family governments have their foundation in the nature of things and the constitution of society, and they must exist in some form wherever man is found, whether they are administered in justice or not. They are not human inventions. No more is the church; neither can the demands for a church be eradicated from the mind that has the idea of a Supreme Being in its possession. It is no more a human device than government, neither can any human fabrication any more take *its* place, or do *its* work. Voluntary reform societies, unsolicited assume, as theirs the work assigned to and needed by the church.

Again. It is the only organization, in the sense that no one may encourage its members to enter upon the work *with a different state of mind* in any respect, from that required of the members of the church.

Finally, I conclude that the church is the only organization appointed by God for the moral renovation of the world, for the best of all reasons, namely, that there is no need of any other, for any purpose, except it be to enable men to get the measure of their own wisdom, and work up their own righteousness, that they may fall back satisfied upon the wisdom, plans and righteousness of God. The church is a permanent organization with all the necessary officers and agents for the reform of all sin and moral evil, which may or can appear either within or out of the church. She has her stated meetings also, at which time it is her appropriate business to take notice of and adopt measures to remove all sin and moral evil that may demand attention.

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More than this. Her members have to a man vowed to fight in their ranks until death, maintaining an uncompromising war against all sin, hanging upon the promise, "Lo! I am with you alway, even to the end of the world."

Now it appears like solemn trifling to leave such an organization, with such power, under such solemn vows and obligations, and under the command of such a leader, to form new organizations to do the same work. To say nothing of the tendency of such a course to undermine the integrity and moral rectitude of the human mind, who can measure the responsibility that *he* assumes who teaches men to treat with lightness the most solemn vows ever taken by mortal man—the vows of the church covenant.

II. I am to show some consequences we may expect from the establishment of other organizations.

1. *Consequences to the church.*

(1.) Where voluntary societies are formed, the church as a church will naturally and necessarily feel less responsibility respecting the evils opposed, than she would if she herself was arrayed against them. Where church members unite with voluntary societies to reform evils they will naturally look to the societies to reform them, not to the church. It is not natural for us to depend upon two distinct agencies to perform the same work, or for an individual to direct his efforts through two different channels to effect the same object. Whatever confidence is reposed in the one must be withheld from the other. If then due confidence be reposed in the church, little thought or care will be bestowed on any other organization, and *vice versa*.

If societies appear to do the work of reform, then societies and not the church will have the credit and confidence, and when confidence is withdrawn from the church, she will feel little responsibility or confidence in herself.

Here we see a great error into which we are likely to fall, namely, to conclude that the church is making rapid advances against sin, because she is drawn along in the wake of the societies, and compelled to acknowledge their doctrines, though she may have been a clog in the way, instead of aiding the reformers.

The very formation of a reform society for the suppression of any vice pre-supposes that the church is not expected to perform the work. At least this is the natural and necessary conclusion to which the conduct of those who either form or co-operate with such societies, compels us.

Let the work of reform, on the other hand, be urged upon the church as her duty, and whatever is imposed upon man by reason or revelation, or that sin has made necessary, will be recognized and felt as duty by all of God's true people. But if voluntary societies are organized for the performance of this work, not all true Christians will see that they are under obligations either to join, or co-operate with these societies, however laudable the end they seek.

The plan of reforming moral evils by voluntary societies, will also require as many societies as we find evils to reform, which would not only make our machinery burdensome and unmanageable, but would leave the church as a church with nothing to do, and with no acknowledged duty or even right to rebuke sin in any of its forms. In the end we shall find the church shorn of all her healthful influence and authority, being hated and scoffed at by God's enemies, not for "Christ's sake," but because of her own inherent worthlessness, while God's friends may abandon her through shame and disgust. Is not God's chosen instrumentality even now brought to disgrace in this way, while many are holding her up to contempt and crying "come out of her," instead of her becoming as she is designed by her Master and Lord, "a praise in the earth."

Not only is the church brought into disrepute, but many disgusted with her inefficiency, infer that if the religion of the Bible be such, the God of the Bible must be of a similar character. Thus she that was appointed to bring the world to God by her influence, by the same instrumentality, plunges it into infidelity and ruin.

Again; suppose the reform of any vice is once secured, some influence is required to prevent its recurrence. If the church has not been aroused to reform an evil, on what rational grounds can she be expected to guard against its return? If the presence of the enemy did not alarm her, why should she be alarmed about his return? Moreover the discipline of correcting an evil is indispensable in preparing the church to guard against it. If societies do the work of reform, the societies and not the church get the discipline, and it would be a novel plan for societies to be kept up to prevent or cure evils not in existence.

We see, therefore, that if societies are to do the work of reform, no prevention must be used, but that our whole strength will be spent in contending with overgrown evils, as no society will be formed to cure an evil till it can be no longer endured.

The church is "the light of the world" in such a sense, that her decision for good or evil will have a force that the decisions of no other body of men can have. If the church should speak out fearlessly against iniquity in every appropriate way, there is no power on earth that could withstand her influence, and it is vain and foolish for any other power to attempt to reform sin, while the church is left to be its abettor. If the church is, by her Master, placed as "the light of the world," who would be vain enough to undertake to eclipse that light or overpower that influence? If her light be darkness, how great that darkness. What other body of men can think to raise a taper-light which shall have power to overcome the moral darkness of a corrupt church? Every where the decisions of that body of men who are regarded as the people of God, will be treated as the decisions of God Himself, and if wrong, will be made an impervious shield to those who wish to go on in the practice of sin.

The legitimate influence of societies upon the church is not to reform her and make her light pure, but by setting themselves up as reformers, to throw her into disgrace and make her imperfections the butt of ridicule. It is not difficult to see that many of the wanton exposures which are now made of the imperfections of God's church, with little or no effort to correct them, will have no better effect, than for one member of a family to go abroad and expose the faults of the rest, to excite the contempt or ridicule of his associates. *All* say, rather conceal and correct.

Human governments punish as slander, the wanton exposure of others' faults, and shall Christians count it a virtue to bring their master's cause and family into disgrace? I am aware that these things have been done in a great measure unwittingly, but they will nevertheless produce their legitimate effects, and sad ones too, to the minds of those who love Zion.

Again, the fruit of religion as it is manifest in efforts to suppress vices and advance holiness, is among the substantial proofs of true conversion; proofs which the church can never lose sight of without filling her ranks with every impurity. Society reforms deprive the church of these proofs, the best tests she can have of the spiritual state of her members. The church has no control over these societies, and if she recognizes them as organizations for the removal of sin and moral evil, and approves of her mem-

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bers directing their efforts through those channels, she must in so far give up the oversight of her members to the societies, and can give no decided approval or disapproval of their conduct, in reference to sins with which the societies contend.

It is absurd to talk of one organization having a particular work to do, while another has the care and control of the agents who perform the work. Not only are the members who co-operate with the society, removed from the control of the church, but those also who take neutral ground, for any reason, or even become opposers of the society and abettors of the sins rebuked, are removed from her control in this particular, since church government must be impartial.

Again, when societies take the reforms, ministers are in a great measure silenced from rebuking the sins those societies combat. If a minister does rebuke them, it is not as a servant of God that he is supposed to do it, but as a partizan, a friend of the society, and thus the rebuke is often of little use. Nay more; it often serves to destroy the influence of the man of God. Let God's ministers defend their right and duty to rebuke *all* sin, wherever it is found, in high places as well as low, and let no man or body of men attempt directly or indirectly to destroy the influence of that rebuke, on pain of God's displeasure.

God's people are greatly deceived, if they think his enemies could or would help them forward his holy cause. Have they forgotten the scripture which saith, "The natural man understandeth not the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Then it is not a spiritual work in which worldly men will engage.

We must also drop the Bible standard, of "holiness to the Lord," before unconverted men will co-operate with us.

When only the branches that "bear *much* fruit," glorify God, and those that "bear fruit must be purged, that they may bring forth more fruit," before they please God, shall we adopt a standard resting upon the vain idea that those who claim no union with the vine, can bear some acceptable fruit? Shall we in this way lead sinners on blindfold to eternal death, and deprive ourselves of the peace and spirit of God? There is no possibility of God's people uniting with the world in the

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work of reform, without being drawn away from Him with a perpetual backsliding, until none can discern "between the righteous and the wicked," "between him that serveth God, and him that serveth Him not." God gives full warning on this subject, in the prohibitions laid upon the Jews uniting with the nations around them. It is clear that unconverted persons can never act upon Christian principles, and if Christians unite with them, it must be upon *their* principles, worldly, selfish, unholy principles. The church must be sunk to a level with the world before there can be any union, because the world can never rise one iota to meet the church. She must enter into "friendship with the world which is enmity with God."

Many persons, when pressed to join a reform society, make this reply; I belong to such a society already, namely, the church. Now this is the proper answer for every church member to give. The fact that this answer has often been given, for the purpose of defending some darling appetite, passion, prejudice, or custom, and not the truth, does not destroy its correctness. The church covenant, when rightly understood, is the strongest pledge to faithfulness in every duty, and abstinence from every vice, that man ever binds himself by on earth. How vain to trust the weaker bond, if the stronger fails to hold us.

If society reforms should succeed, they would supplant the church, and eventually throw it into disuse, (the greatest calamity that could occur to either herself or the world,) and it would be thought sufficient for a Christian to unite with so many of the societies as chanced not to oppose his darling sin, or indulgence, or such as interest, or caprice, might recommend. Thus it is clear, that in the present plan of reforms, we are on the direct road to the extinction of the church. This is not the end sought, but will be the end found, unless we find out our error, in time to retrace our steps.

2. *Consequences to the world.*

The tendencies in societies embracing converted and unconverted persons, is to treat the evils they attempt to reform, simply as evils, and not as sins, when in fact, they are evils only because they are sins, and only evil in proportion as they are sinful. To undertake to cure moral evils, merely as evils, would be like a physician applying his prescription to the symptoms, to remove them, and not the disease. The symptoms God has benevolently connected with the disease,

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to enable us to understand its true nature, and seek an appropriate remedy. All moral evil is simply the consequence of sin, as pain is the consequence of disease. God has established the relation in both cases, and we should be just as "wise above what is written," in concluding that there is too much moral evil in the world for the sin that produces it, as that there is too much pain for the amount of disease. Either would be trifling with God's judgments. To undertake to remove moral evil, except by removing sin, its cause, can have no better effect than to blind our eyes to the true state of things, and fill us with hopes, where we have only reason to fear. Unconverted persons can never labor to remove sin as sin, but only evil as evil, and if all the moral evils and fruits of sin that now afflict the world were cured; sin would soon produce another train as cruel and unrelenting as those we now deplore. In society reforms there is almost a certainty that only the external acts will be dealt with, leaving the motive, the sinful quality, untouched, since it is the evil, and not the sin, that attracts the attention, and leads to a society's formation. A view of *sin* can rouse the energies of true Christians alone, and make them burn with zeal for God. A view of evil, moral as well as physical, has a similar effect upon all minds, renewed and unrenewed, as far as it is apprehended, and makes our sympathies for man. If the church prosecutes the reforms, she will be likely to strike at the sin, and thus remove the sin and evil with the same effort. She will therefore be in little danger of getting a wrong standard, or using unwarrantable or injurious measures. If only the evils are contended with, very different measures may be required from those adapted to remove the sin. If we would attempt to remove moral evil only, leaving sin, its cause, unmolested, we must remove all temptations, and as far as it is in our power render it, despite of the existing cause, impossible that the evil should occur. To remove sin, the heart must be changed and the motives purified. To remove evil only remove the temptation. In the latter we shall be likely to adopt a wrong standard and appeal to wrong motives. In other words, if the view of the evil lead us to an effort, another motive than that which would lead us to it from a view of the sin will be required. May we not here learn why in the present reform movements there is so much sympathy manifested for man, the sinner, and so little with God against whom all sins are committed?

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III. *I am to answer objections.*

First. Some who object to these views say that we condemn all the good that has been done in reform societies. By no means. We say nothing against the reform of any vice. We would rather urge to tenfold more thoroughness and energy in the work. The objection is made upon this supposition, namely, if societies had not done the work it would have been left undone.

Now this is not the fact. The spirit of reform that led to the formation of societies was in the church before they arose, or they would never have had an existence, and the spirit might just as well have been directed through the church as a medium or channel of operation, as through voluntary societies. This wrong direction, is the root of the evil with which we are contending. It is not the good that has been done by these reforms, that we oppose, but the evils which have been unnecessarily connected with our efforts, by resorting to other organizations than the church.

It is not certain but that much we have been doing will yet have to be undone. Certainly the self-righteousness in which the unconverted have been confirmed by their union with Christians in efforts to reform the world, must become as filthy rags before they can see God or heaven. Many of this class now think that they are rendering essential service to God's cause, by reflecting a little light which they have received from the gospel, through the influence of the church, not remembering that their reflections, at the best, are *mere moonshine—light without heat.* Could the world be flooded with light and knowledge by the unconverted, as it would be without love, its influence upon the growth of righteousness and true holiness, would be like the reflections of the polar ice upon the plants of a green house. But this is not all, or even the worst of this deception. The unconverted not only think this of themselves, but a large part of the church are doing much to confirm them in their delusion by hailing them with joy, as co-laborers in God's blessed cause, and thus the most effectually shut the gate of heaven against them, by leading them to think, either that they have already entered in, or that acceptance with God is not an indispensable condition to rendering Him acceptable service.

Second. Again, when we contend that the church is the only organization to which we have a right to look for the reform of sin and moral evil, we are met with this objection,

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"The church will not come up to the work, and she can not be depended upon to do it."

Now what is the force of this objection? Is it simply that the church has become so corrupt, so filled with selfish, unconverted persons, that they control all her movements, and pervert all the right ways of God, and that therefore as a body, the church will not at once take a right stand against sin, and in support of virtue? If this is the objection, there is no ground for argument But then what is it worth? It might have been made with much more reason by the apostles to their Master's last command, "Go ye and evangelize all nations." They might have replied, "The world is full of idols, idolatry and superstition, and it is vain to think that these evils will give way before the simple truths of the Bible proclaimed by obscure and illiterate men —at least it will take a long time to turn them from their chosen way to destruction, and lead them to life eternal, if indeed many of them can ever be turned." Such a reply would savor more of the spirit of self-indulgence and human reasoning than of faith and obedience. We might suppose they would have been met with the rebuke, "What is that to thee? Follow thou me. What have you to do with the consequences?—the success or want of success in my cause—the submission or rebellion of my enemies? It is yours to obey and mine to bless."

If God's church will not come up to the work of reforming the world, the hope of its ever being reformed must be abandoned, for there is no other power on earth, or in heaven that can or will do it. It is the height of impiety to excite in the church or world dependence upon any other agency.

The church is the sworn enemy of all sin, and to say that she will not come to the help of the Lord against the mighty, is to charge Him with folly, and to seek any other agency, is an attempt to prove his folly to his face before the world.

In whatever light the objection is viewed, it reflects disgrace upon those who entertain it.

Third. "God has set his seal of approbation upon the labors of some of these societies. He has followed the temperance effort with the out-pouring of the Holy Spirit and the conversion of souls."

Now this is the most plausible objection I have heard, and yet I see no difficulty in showing that it is not a valid one.

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I have no where said that to desire the removal of any vice is not good and acceptable with God, or that it is not a good thing for a vicious man to forsake his way to ruin and shame. Nor do I see that God must frown upon our good desires, because there is imperfection in our plans and modes of operation, even when that imperfection is the consequence of weak faith. The history of the church affords abundant proof that God grants his presence and blessing in connection with the labors of his people, even when they hold errors, which in their full development are subversive of fundamental truth. The germ of an error may long exist in the mind, and not take control of that mind, so as to turn it away from God and duty. When an error weakens the influence of truth apprehended by the mind, God's approbation must be proportionally withdrawn, and yet it is most evident that He does not utterly forsake until fundamental error is so embraced that it controls the moral being.

The objection, then, proves just this and no more, that whatever error there is in the principles and practice of a a reform society, thus blessed, it had not assumed the aspect of a fundamental error, by controlling the minds of its members, at the time when God manifested his presence and favor. Nor is there any thing strange or unaccountable in the fact that the reform movements have been blessed with the Spirit and presence of God, admitting all the evil influences I have mentioned of voluntary societies.

Respecting intemperance, many spiritual Christians became alarmed at its wide-spread and destructive influence, upon the church and world. This led them to the work of reform, by first putting away their own cups, and then striving to lead others to do the same.

This effort being successful, the soul-stirring hope of bringing the reformed ones to God, naturally arose; which was an important step toward the work. The reformed man had his own mind turned from the world upon himself. How favorable the circumstances now. Moreover the spirit of revivals was manifested simultaneously with the temperance reform. Revival ministers, ever since the days of Paul, have reasoned of temperance, as well as of righteousness and judgment.

Fourth Objection. Another in defence of voluntary societies, asks, if it is not a good thing and even a Christian duty to labor to make the world moral and happy, aside

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from laboring to make it holy? God, he says, is laboring to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness in the world irrespective of its holiness.

I must confess that I see no evidence that God is doing anything to produce happiness in this world aside from what He is doing to make it holy, as the necessary condition of its being happy. Nor have I been able to imagine how God would go to work, to make rebels against his government happy, except by requiring them to give up their rebellion. Any effort calculated to produce that result, would be well applied, whatever they might be, and whoever should make them. Now God is actuated by the same motives, in what He does for sinners, that He would be if He was in our places, and had the same duties to perform that we have. Who believes that God does any thing for unconverted men now in which the first and great object is not, to lead them to give up their rebellion against Him, and accept of pardon? Does any one really believe that God does any thing to make men happy in rebellion? Would any one approve of a human governor who acted thus? Whatever means are calculated to lead men to holiness, are safe to be applied and sure to lead them to happiness. They can never be such however as will make them happy by quieting them in their sins.

Fifth. As a kind of objection, we are asked, "What shall be done?"

I answer, Let all who love Zion, or wish to see this sin-ruined world reformed, set themselves in good earnest, to purify the church, and bring her with all her energies to do her Master's work, and then whatever of happiness, peace or good God has in store for the inhabitants of this sin-ruined world, will be secured to them.

Two or three remarks will close.

1. It is easy to be seen that the evil with which we are contending, arose not with voluntary societies, but far back of them in sectarianism, which has long been dividing, subdividing and mangling the church, the body of Christ.

Reform societies are the legitimate fruit of sectarianism, the first ripe fruit the church has gathered from the world. It is the annihilation of the heaven-wide distinction, between saints and sinners, the friends and enemies of God—the heirs of eternal life, and the heirs of eternal death.

I can not now enlarge upon this point, but design to take it up at some future time.

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2. It is evident that there were many spiritual members in the church, when reform societies arose, and as evident that the church as a body was not in a spiritual state; since nothing but despair of her efficiency as a reformer, could have lead to such abandonment of her as is implied in the formation of new organizations.

In the progressive improvement of our race, reform always set things in some respects a step in advance of the previous state, notwithstanding the immediate cause of any reform is a bad state of things which makes the reform necessary. It was a corrupt state of the church that led to the reform commenced by Luther and his associates, and it could not have been a good state of the church, as many suppose, that led to the reforms of the present day. Let us mark the difference in the faith evinced in the two reforms. Luther's faith grappled with all the difficulties of reforming the deplorably sunken and corrupt church of that time. The faith of modern reformers abandons the church, much less corrupt, and seeks a new agency of their own devising. Luther's faith was characterized by strong confidence in God, and his appointed means: ours savors more of reliance upon human wisdom and modern improvements.

Finally. We have seen that the spirit of reform, as well as the need of it, was in the church, when the first reform societies were established, but that confidence in her as a reformer, was so far lost, that there was a readiness to abandon her *as such*, and adopt organizations purely voluntary to do her appropriate work, and although they were at first composed almost exclusively of church members, and their efforts directed in a great measure to the removal of impurities in the church, the natural tendency and perceived effect has been not so much to reform the church, as to bring her, Christ's loved one into disgrace, in the eyes of her own members, and of the unconverted, while many of the latter class are rushing into the societies' ranks, and driving more furiously at the church, with the mistaken idea that Satan can reform sin. Now I am neither a prophet not the son of a prophet, but I venture as my humble opinion that unless the church seize again the reins and urge the invincible car of reform, in the name of the *Almighty God*, against all sin *as sin*, she may ere long write her name "Ichabod," and find herself without fruit, "twice dead, plucked up by the roots."

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ARTICLE VI.

THE SPIRITUAL WRITINGS OF PROF. THOMAS C. UPHAM.*

BY PREST. A. MAHAN.

THERE are few authors of modern times, whose writings have, in our judgment, more nearly realized the idea of universality, in an important sense of the term, than those of Prof. Upham. We refer to their manifest adaptation to the necessities of all truly spiritual minds, not in any one age, but in all future ages of the church. Wherever such a mind does or may exist, and whatever its spiritual attainments may be, it will find in these writings, much, very much with which it will be instructed, edified and delighted. In all future ages, his name will be "as ointment poured forth." As far as reputation is concerned he need not write another book. His influence and reputation, in the form which most perfectly meets the desires of a truly good man, is already secure. Still we trust, and doubt not, that he will continue "to serve his generation" by sending forth other productions of a kindred nature to those through which he is so powerfully and yet so quietly molding the heart of the church into the image of Christ.

* "Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life; designed particularly for the consideration of those who are seeking assurance of faith and perfect love."

"Life of Faith; in three parts: embracing some of the scriptural principles or doctrine of Faith, the power and effect of faith in the regulation of man's inward nature, and the relation of faith to the divine guidance."

"Life and religious experience and opinions of Madame de la Mothe Guyon, together with some account of the personal history and opinions of Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray."

"Life of Madame Catharine Adorna; including some leading facts and traits in her religious experience, together with explanations and remarks tending to illustrate the doctrine of holiness."

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When writings appear destined, as those under consideration most manifestly are, to exert such a permanent, widely extended and molding influence upon sanctified minds, it becomes one of the most important duties of the friends of truth, to carefully mark their leading, fundamental characteristics, for the purpose of understanding fully the nature of that influence, and determining whether it is, in all respects, in correspondence with the true ideal of what Christianity aims to produce, or whether it is, in any important form, defective in this one respect. If that influence is in full harmony with such aims, the more ascendant it becomes, the greater the gratification of all benevolent minds in view of the fact. If, on the other hand, it is likely to be wanting, in any important respect, and such defects are not distinctly apprehended, the evils resulting will be in proportion to the extent and exclusiveness of that influence.

These remarks will introduce our readers at once, to our fundamental aim in the preparation of this article. The object of every writer, in treating upon any subject, is to shadow forth an *ideal* in the interior of his own mind in respect to that subject. The aim of Prof. Upham, which is one and the same in all that class of his writings under consideration, is quite manifest. In his own mind, he has formed an ideal of Christian character, in its highest and most perfect form of spiritual development. His fundamental aim is, to shadow forth that ideal, and thus to secure its actual realization in Christian experience. To appreciate fully his merits as a writer, to understand the entire tendencies of his spiritual writings, we must first ascertain clearly and distinctly what this ideal is, in all its essential elements, and then compare it with the ideal in respect to the same subject, developed in the scriptures of truth. To attain this one end is our fundamental aim in the preparation of this article. The questions, then, to which we propose to find a definite answer, are the following. What is Professor Upham's ideal of Christian character, in its highest and most perfect form of spiritual development? What are the essential elements of that ideal? How far does this ideal correspond with the "pattern shown us in the mount?" How far do his productions tend to induce in believers a realization of the full *scripture form* of Christian experience? To these questions, though not in the precise form or order here presented, we shall endeavor to furnish a full and distinct answer.

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As preparatory to the attainment of our object, we will here make a few preliminary observations pertaining to the general character of Professor Upham as a spiritual writer.

1. One of the prominent characteristics of his writings deserving special attention, is this. Professor Upham seldom *argues* a question, either out of the scriptures, or by an appeal to reason. To the logical department of our nature, he seldom appeals. On the other hand, he addresses mainly and directly the faculty of intuition. All departments of the various subjects on which he treats, are so clearly and distinctly stated and elucidated, that the reader has a direct and immediate vision of the truth itself. Conviction is induced in his mind, he hardly knows how, or from whence it originated. Yet it is there, and requires no logical demonstrations for its confirmation. This certainly is a very great excellence in a writer. Though not the only form of excellence which the church needs in her various teachers of truth, it is one of the highest and most important possessed by any. The church needs her logicians as well as seers, her Pauls as well as Johns. Yet the class of readers who will be most pleased with writers of the latter character, will always, perhaps, be the most numerous.

2. Throughout the writings of Professor Upham of the class under consideration, we seldom find what can properly be denominated positive error. He invariably almost brings the mind in direct contact with important truth. Error, if it ever appears, is rather negative than positive, and consists either in not presenting each particular truth from the great central position from which all truth should be contemplated, or in inducing the impression that the whole truth, when only a part of it, has been presented. This feature of his writings will be particularly noticed in subsequent parts of this article.

3. Few writers possess the power of stating and elucidating with great perspicuity and distinctness the important practical truths and principles of Christianity in greater perfection than Professor Upham. We might cite many examples in elucidation of this remark. One, however, must suffice. It relates to the true idea of an answer from God to our petitions, when we pray to Him. The extract is taken from "The Life of Faith," chapter seventeenth, on the doctrine of receiving by faith. "Every Christian," he says, "who humbly and sincerely addresses his Maker, may reasonably expect an answer."

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"It does not well appear how a perfectly just and holy Being could impose on his creatures the duty of prayer, without recognizing the obligation of returning an answer of some kind. In making this remark, we imply, of course, that the prayer is a *sincere* one. An insincere prayer, just so far as insincerity exists, is not entitled to be regarded as prayer, in any proper sense of the term. Our first position therefore is, that every person, who utters a sincere prayer, may reasonably expect an answer, and that in fact an answer always is given, although it is not always understood and received. And this appears to be entirely in accordance with the Scriptures. "Ask, and it SHALL be be given unto you; seek and ye SHALL find; knock and it SHALL be opened unto you. For every one that asketh RECEIVETH; and he that seeketh FINDETH; and to him that knocketh, it shall be OPENED."

"But it becomes now an important inquiry, What is the true and just answer of God to the petitions of his people? It seems to us that it is, and it cannot be any thing else, than the decision of his own infinitely just and omniscient mind, that He will give to the supplicant, or withhold, just as He sees best. In other words, the true answer to prayer is God's deliberate purpose or will, existing in connection with the petition and all the circumstances of the petition. But some will say perhaps, that on this system we sometimes get our answer, without getting what we ask for; and that God's decision may not correspond with our own desire. But this objection is met by a moment's consideration of the nature of prayer. There never was true prayer, there never can be true prayer, which does not recognize, either expressly or by implication, an entire submission to the divine will. The very idea of prayer implies a right on the part of the person to whom the prayer is addressed, either to give or to withhold the petition. And the existence of such a right on the part of God implies a correlative obligation on the other party to submit cheerfully to his decisions. To ask absolutely, without submission to God's will, is not to pray, but to *demand*. A demand is as different from true prayer, as a humble request is from an imperative order. A request God always regards; He always treats it with kindness and justice; but a demand can not be properly addressed to Him, nor can it properly be received by Him. The true model of the spirit of supplication, even in our greatest necessities, is to be found in the Savior's prayer at the time of his agony in the garden. "And he went a little farther, and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. *Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt.*" True prayer, therefore, that prayer, which can be suitably addressed to the Supreme Being, and that which it is suitable for an imperfect and limited mind to offer, always involves the condition, whether it be expressed or not, that the petition is agreeable to the divine will. This condition is absolutely essential to the nature of the prayer. There is no acceptable prayer, there is no true prayer without it. Such being the nature of the prayer, the answer of the prayer will correspond to it, namely, it will always be the decision of the divine mind, whatever that decision may be, made up in view of the petition, and of all the attendant circumstances."—pp. 135—37.

We are now prepared to state distinctly what is our conception of Professor Upham's ideal of Christian character

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in its highest state of spiritual development, or what are the essential elements of that ideal. Every where his object is to elucidate his own internal conception of what he denominates the "interior life," and the "life of faith." The question is, what are his conceptions of the essential elements of this inward, new and divine life?

The grand characteristic of his ideal of this "interior life" is this, *a union of the human with the divine* WILL. The last sentence of the following paragraph from Catharine Adorna presents this thought, as it every where seems to lie in Professor Upham's mind.

"'I have long seen," she remarked on a certain occasion, "I see today, and as my life passes, I see more and more clearly, *that all happiness is in God alone.* I am aware that there is a sort of happiness which may perhaps be called happiness by *participation;* that is to say, by participating or sharing in the gifts of God, in distinction from God Himself. But I am certain that this happiness, however much it may be valued by many minds, is not, and can not be, the satisfying food of sanctified souls. The holy desire to possess God as He is; just as He is; pure as He is; and *all* that He is.' A possession which can be secured only by a perfect union of the human will with the divine will; and to such an extent that the perception of all other joy shall be merged and lost in the joy which flows from the consciousness of this union."—*Catharine Adorna*, p. 31.

The same idea we find expressed with equal distinctness in the following paragraph from the Life of Faith:

"Religion, in its highest sense, implies an entire union with the will of God. The true food of our souls is God's commandment, which is only another name for God's will. A desire of any thing, and complacency in any thing, which does not place God's will first, is infidelity to God's claims. Holy joy is not a thing, which comes by volition; but by a necessary law. If our hearts are right with God, such joy will always come in its appropriate place; not because it is called or willed, but because it can not help coming. It is a thing which flows from holiness as from its natural fountain. The truly crucified man, therefore, is right in seeking the fountain first. Holiness is something which must be desired and sought *for itself;* something, which must stand, independently of its pleasant results, first in the mind's eye, first in the heart's affections."—pp. 249—50.

We might multiply, to any extent, quotations in which the same thought is expressed. Those who have read Professor Upham's works understandingly, will not fail to recognize this one thought as the great central element of his ideal of a truly spiritual character and life, in their highest state of development. From this great central position,

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we are fully prepared to understand and appreciate other ideas and forms of instruction found in the different productions of our author. His object throughout, seems to be one and the same, to wit, to show—how this divine union may be consummated—what is its nature—and what is the state of the soul, when its entire being is brought under the influence of this divine union; in other words, when it has attained to a state of entire sanctification. No one, as it appears to us, can fully understand, or appreciate Professor Upham as a spiritual writer, who does not contemplate his productions from the central position now under consideration. We will then, from this stand-point, proceed to elucidate the manner in which our author develops this great subject.

1. The union of which we are speaking, between the human and the divine will, is affected in the first instance, by an act of voluntary consecration on the part of the creature, an act implying a full and entire renunciation and abandonment of every thing, on the one hand, which is, in any respects, opposed to the divine will, and in the equally supreme consecration of our entire being, on the other, to the control of the divine will. This act of consecration must be attended by a corresponding act of faith, that God in faithfulness to his own plighted word, does cordially and graciously accept of the act itself, and of us, in putting it forth.

"It would seem from what has been said, that the sanctification of the heart, and all those various blessings which are involved in sanctification, depend, if not exclusively, yet certainly in a great degree, upon two leading principles; FIRST, an entire consecration of ourselves to God, and, SECONDLY, a full and unwavering belief that the consecration is accepted.

"Upon this second principle, which has already been briefly referred to on a former occasion, we propose to say something further in the present chapter. In making a consecration to God in the manner which has been indicated, we take a step, which, considered in any point of view, may be regarded as absolutely necessary. It is not enough, however, to offer all. In the same spirit of reliance on God, we must also BELIEVE THAT ALL IS ACCEPTED.

"It is the belief that God is faithful to his word; and that, in accordance with his word, he will receive and does now receive all that unreservedly lay themselves upon his altar, which seems especially to secure the presence of a sanctifying efficacy. On the contrary, he who consecrates himself to God, however sincere he may be in the act of consecration, but who greatly dishonors the veracity of God by remaining

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without the faith of ACCEPTANCE, deprives himself of that mighty power, which faith alone is capable of imparting, and necessarily lies prostrate and exposed to all the dreadful attacks of the adversary."—*Interior Life*, pp. 61—62.

Again, he says:

"The first step in the process of inward salvation, is to *consent* to be saved; or what is practically the same thing, to submit or consent to give ourselves up to God, *in the act of unreserved and perpetual consecration, to be his, in his own way, time, manner and degree, for ever.* This is a principle which is necessary in the beginning, and is equally necessary in the continuance of the inward life. We can not begin to live without it; we can not continue to live without it. This is the very point where thousands and thousands have stopped, and have thus incurred evils and sufferings which they seemed unable to account for, and still less able to remove."—*Catharine Adorna*, p. 29.

No sentiment is more abundantly insisted on, and more fully and distinctly elucidated, throughout the entire spiritual writings of Professor Upham than this, entire consecration attended with implicit faith in the divine faithfulness in receiving the creature thus consecrating himself, and thus confiding in the divine trustworthiness, as the irreversible condition of union with God. Nor can this sentiment ever be urged with too great frequency and force upon all who would attain to this state.

2. Our author's conception of the state into which the mind is introduced, when this union is affected, and its results consummated in actual experience, next claims our attention. Various terms and phrases are used to express the peculiarities of this state, such as "the excision and crucifixion of the natural life," "inward quietude or stillness," and "interior annihilation or nothingness." But what are the peculiarities of the state designated by such language? The most striking and peculiar characteristic of this state, if we have apprehended our author's meaning is, that to such a mind, but one object is truly and practically real, to wit, the will of God. To all things else the mind is so perfectly crucified, that they have ceased even to be objects of desire, excepting when contemplated as objects of the divine will and desire. Every sentiment and feeling of the mind is concentrated in one, to wit, thy will be done. To all things else it is in a state of almost if not quite absolute indifference. Speaking of Madame Adorna, he says, that in her mature experience, she affirmed to an individual who was conversing with her upon the joys of heaven, "that she had ceased

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to have any specific desire of heaven, and that she had even ceased to desire any thing and every thing else."

"Or rather, that she desired only one thing, namely, that her will might be lost in the will of God. And as she felt that this desire was accomplished by the loss of her will in the divine will, she could still more truly say, she desired nothing.

"Marabotti, (for that was the name of the person to whom we have referred) reminded her, that desire was a natural principle; intimating in the remark, that she ought not to consider its existence as inconsistent with holiness of heart. But her greater religious experience enabled her to make distinctions, which others, who have not had an equal depth of experience, find it difficult to do. She knew well enough, that natural desires, when kept true to their original designs, are good. In other words, that they are good, and can be good, only in being authorized, sustained, and sanctified by the God of nature. And accordingly she did not mean to be understood, that she had ceased to desire in the absolute sense, which would be an impossibility; but that through divine grace, the natural desires, considered as distinct subjects of inward consciousness, had become virtually extinct and lost, by being merged and lost in the desires and will of God. In this sense every holy person not only ought to be enabled to say, but is, in fact, enabled to say, and he does say, in his heart and in his life, at least, that he has no desires."—*Catharine Adorna, pp.* 81—82.

Again he says:

"From the time to which we have referred, she may be said, in a certain sense, (in a sense true but exceedingly liable to be misunderstood,) to have ceased to exercise desire. Even heaven itself, regarded as an object of desire, had lost much of its power. That is to say, she ceased, in a considerable degree, to think of heaven and to desire heaven, considered as a distant locality; and she saw and felt more distinctly the power of that higher and blessed doctrine, that the true heaven is the will of God; and that to be in the will of God is to be in heaven, though that will may place us where we shall be witnesses of others' sorrows, and shall feel deeply our own. It may be added, that she was not alone in her views and feelings."—*Life of Madame Catharine Adorna, p.* 80.

In this state also, the mind becomes alike indifferent to its own present subjective states. Equally acceptable to it, is internal joy and sorrow, or external prosperity or affliction. Speaking of "the true idea of interior annihilation or nothingness," he says:

"Another and remarkable characteristic of this state of mind is this. He, who is the subject of it, is dead and crucified to all internal joys also, as well as to all pleasures and joys of an external kind. He has no sympathy with those, who are always crying, "Make me happy." "Pay me well and I will be holy." Personal happiness, as a supreme

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or even a separate object of desire, never enters his thought. It makes no difference what the form of that happiness is, whether pleasures of the senses or pleasures of the mind. He is willing to abandon and sacrifice even the pure and sublime pleasure, almost the only consolation left him in this sad world, which flows from communion with those, who, like himself, are sanctified to God. His true happiness consists in hanging upon the Cross, and in being crucified to self. Whether he is tempted or not tempted, interiorly and in the bottom of his heart he can say, all is well. Whether he suffers or does not suffer, the throne of peace is erected in the centre of his soul. Wretchedness and joy are alike. He welcomes sorrow, even the deepest sorrow of the heart, with as warm a gush of gratitude as he welcomes happiness, IF THE WILL OF GOD IS ACCOMPLISHED. In that will his soul is lost, as in a bottomless ocean."—*Interior Life*, p. 467.

Again he says in the Life of Faith, "those who are the subjects of inward crucifixion, do not seek, and do not value inward consolations in themselves considered."

To such a mind also, the fact of its own *holiness*, has ceased to any conscious extent to be an object of distinct desire or of inward joy or consolation. Speaking in the Life of Faith of "inward crucifixion," he uses the following language;

"But perhaps the most decisive mark of the truly crucified man is, that he is crucified even to holiness itself. That is to say, he desires God only, seeks God only, is satisfied and can be satisfied with God only, in distinction from those truly spiritual gifts or graces, which God by his Holy Spirit imparts to the soul. The truly devout man, for instance, exercises penitence, submission, gratitude, forgiveness, and other Christian graces on their appropriate occasions; and he has great reason to be thankful to God that he is enabled to do it. But if in some moment of inward forgetfulness, of religious "irrecollection," if we may so term it, he turns the thoughts and interests of his heart from God to the graces which God gives, and begins to take complacency in his religious exercises, and to be happy in his holiness and to love his holiness, instead of a fixed and exclusive love for the Author of his holiness, I think we may confidently say, he is no longer a man dead to self, no longer in the proper sense of the terms a man inwardly crucified. "The purer our gifts are," says Fenelon, "the more jealous God is of our appropriating or directing them to ourselves. The most eminent graces are the most deadly poisons, if we rest in them and regard them with complacency. It is the sin of the fallen angels. They only turned to themselves, and regarded their state with complacency. At that instant they fell from heaven, and became the enemies of God."—*Life of Faith*, p. 250, 251.

In this state, also, love to creatures, excepting through God's will, and as the object of divine love has wholly ceased. This idea is set forth in the following extract from Catharine Adorna.

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"A soul, that ceases from its own desires by making them in harmony with God, is at rest in itself, but it does not follow that it is either insentient or inactive in relation to others. Hear the language of Madame Adorna herself, on this very subject, and in relation to this very point. "Thou hast commanded me, my Father," she said at a certain time, "*to love my neighbor*. But I find myself so drawn towards the great centre of my affections, that I can only love Thee. I can not endure the thought, that any other being should divide and share in that love, which is now given to one alone. And what, then, shall I do?" It will be seen, at once, that the very difficulty, which we have been considering, was present to her own mind. The fear suggested itself, that her union with God might be adverse to a suitable degree of active love for her neighbor. She carried the matter to the Lord with that simplicity of spirit and that faith which were so characteristic of her intercourse with her heavenly Father. Her biographer informs us, that God gave her an interior answer. Of the nature of this inward answer, and of the nature of inward answers generally, we shall probably have occasion to speak in another place.

"In the present case, the answer which the Lord gave her, was this: '*He who loves me loves all that I love.*' Here, it is evident, that we have a great truth in the administration and management of things, which it is exceedingly pleasing to contemplate. God, as the great centre and governor, is interested in the welfare of all; He loves all; and will do, and is doing all that He possibly can, consistently with truth and rectitude, for the good of all. Those who love Him, will naturally and necessarily sympathize with his love; their affections will run in the direction of the divine affections; and if God loves man, as he obviously does, then the man, who is born into God's image, will love his neighbor. In other words, if our love exists in the Central Love, and is made one with it, then our love, in the measure and degree which is appropriate to our inferior nature, will spread out from the centre through the infinitely various radii, which fill up the vast circle of God's love. The love of our neighbor is not so much love, diminished and taken way from the love of God, as some may perhaps suppose; but, is the same thing; is the love of God itself, manifested in a particular way. Such love is free from any intermixture of self; and is sometimes expressed by saying, that we love God's creatures IN God and FOR God."—*Catharine Adorna*, pp. 102—8,

Another of the characteristic elements of this state, is, the frequent experience of the "prayer of silence." As the soul has ceased to have any specific objects of desire distinct from the will of God, as all its desires, wishes and choices are exclusively centred in one all-concentrating desire and choice, that God's will may in all respects, and relatively to all objects and events, be done, and as it is an ever-present reality to the mind that the will of God ever has been, now actually is, and ever will be thus done, hence it is, that when the sanctified heart is drawn, as it commonly is, into direct and distinct conscious harmony with this one infinite reality, it has, and can have really no specific or special

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desires, and consequently no specific objects of prayer. It is held in a state of fixed and devout contemplation, with an inability to give expression to but one sentiment, and one desire, to wit, "they will be divine." This is what our author denominates, "the prayer of silence." This form of prayer is thus described in the Life of Madame Guyon:

"Every body knows, or is supposed to know, what is meant by *silent prayer*. It is prayer of the ordinary kind, with the single exception, that it is prayer in words *unspoken*. But the PRAYER OF SILENCE, as the phrase is used in the higher experimental writers, is a prayer which is too *deep for words*. It is a state of the soul, which does not speak, because it has nothing to say. It has a consciousness of having God; and in the fullness and riches of its possession, it rests, it is silent, it asks nothing more. Having God, what is it possible for it to seek and to ask more than it now has? The reception of God's will, and delight in it, is the inmost throb and life of its life. That will is infinitely wise, unchangeable and eternal. It can not more change than God can change. And those who are perfectly in that will, by spiritual union, rest in it, just as God rests in it. And God, whose ceaseless activity always terminates in an object, which is fixed and established, because it is the expression of his own unchangeable will, has a rest perfect and eternal.

"We have here the principle of the prayer. The soul, in its principle or life, may be in perfect union with God; and yet, from time to time it may be practically distracted and troubled with the cares, the pressures, and the trials of the world. When these distractions and cares cease, it returns to God in the exercise of spiritual recollection; thus placing God not only really but *consciously* in the centre. And in the high state of experience of which we are now speaking, the soul enters into communion with Him not by formal prayer, which specifies consecutively its petitions, but by the *prayer of silence*, which, soaring above the rest and the trial, the joy and the sorrow of *time*, which are good or evil only in reference to the imperfections of the human view of things, rests calmly with God Himself in God's place of rest, *the Eternal Will*. So strong is the instinct of the holy soul for this place of divine repose, that the lips are sometimes closed almost involuntarily. Its prayer is summed up in one word, THY WILL BE DONE; and believing without a doubt, that this will, as each moment passes, is and must be done either into its positive or permissive forms, and having therefore its supplication fulfilled in the very act of supplicating, its prayer almost necessarily assumes the form of adoration without words; *it rests in God and is silent.*"—*Madame Guyon, Vol. I.* pp. 346—8.

In the Interior Life the same state is thus described:

"The state of mind, of which we are speaking, appears to be disclosed in one of the short prayers, that are found in Fenelon's Pious Reflections; a part of which is as follows.

"O Lord, I know not what I should ask of Thee. Thou only knowest what I want; and Thou lovest me, if I am thy friend, better than I can love myself. O Lord, give to me, thy child, what is proper, what-

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soever it may be. I dare not ask either crosses or comforts. I only present myself before Thee. I open my heart to Thee. Behold my wants, which I am ignorant of; but do Thou behold and do according to Thy mercy. Smite, or heal! Depress me, or raise me up! I adore all Thy purposes, without knowing them. I am silent; I offer myself in sacrifice." "—*Interior Life*, p. 458.

As the entire being, in this state, is in perfect harmony with an object which is ever one and unchangeable, to wit, the will of God, interior experience is alike uniform, amid every conceivable variety of condition. The following extract from the Interior Life, presents our author's view of this form of Christian experience.

"The religious state of Madam Guyon, in the latter part of her life, illustrates this form of Christian experience." "In these last times," she says, "I can hardly speak at all of my dispositions. It is because my state has become simple and without variations. It is a profound annihilation. I find nothing in myself to which I can give a name; [that is, no feelings so specific and remarkable, separate from this simplicity and this loss of self in God, as to enable me to describe them.] All that I know is, that God is infinitely holy, righteous, good, and happy."—All good is in Him. As to myself, I am a mere NOTHING. To me every condition seems equal. All is lost in his immensity, like a drop of water in the sea. In this divine immensity the soul sees itself no more."

In that state of internal experience, which is described by Madame Guyon, there seems to be a perfect balance and harmony of the different parts of the mind. There may be deep feeling, (and there is in reality very deep feeling,) but it is so perfectly controlled by a sense of union with the will of God, that the result is complete simplicity and rest of soul."—*Interior Life*, p. 459.

From what has been said, it would follow, as a matter of course, that this state would be mainly contemplative rather than discursive, even in reference to the attributes of God. Such is the light in which it is regarded by our author. He says:

"The mind, in the state of union with God, is disposed to indulge in subdued and affectionate acts of contemplation, rather than in examinative and discursive or reasoning acts. It is undoubtedly the case, that the mind may remain fixed upon God and may be in a certain sense united to him, in what may variously be called a perceptive, reflective, or discursive manner; that is to say, engaged in a perceptive or speculative view of him, occupied in the critical examination of his various attributes, his justice, wisdom and goodness, or something of the kind. But something more than this kind of union is implied in the state of mind, which we are now speaking of. The examinative or discursive state of the mind implies the presence of God to the intellect merely; the contemplative state, although not altogether excluding an intellectual view, implies his presence to the heart. And it is on this ground

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that we make the remark, that the mind in the state of divine union, is rather contemplative, than perceptive and examinative."—*Interior Life*, p. 478, 479.

The *prevading* characteristic of this state will be that of uninterrupted internal quietness. The soul has found its fixed and changeless centre, and there it remains in almost unconcious, yet blissful fixedness. All objects and events are either directly or permissively accordant with the divine will, and as the soul in all its desires, feelings, sentiments and choices vibrates only to that will as its fixed and changeless centre, nothing within or without can transpire to disturb its perfect quietude. For this reason, those who have attained to this state have been denominated Quietists.

Yet Quietists are not inactive. On the other hand, as the energies of the divine will are continually employed in rolling over the universe a ceaseless tide of blessedness, so the Quietist, in harmonizing with that will, is under an all-constraining and sweetly compelling influence, so to speak, ever drawing forth his energies in good will to all, and in acts of beneficence to the sons and daughters of affliction, and especially in efforts for the sanctification of the church and the salvation of sinners. Speaking of the objection often urged that the state of mind under consideration, tends to inaction, Prof. Upham says:

"But a little examination can hardly fail to place all such erroneous views in a right position. The doctrine to which we have referred as having been maintained by many pious and learned persons in various periods of the church, is not that of an absolute extinction of the desires in any case; but when rightly understood, is the simple and important doctrine of a right position of them, namely, a just position relatively to the will of God. In other words, a holy soul is not destitute of desires; but its desires, instead of being divergent to every point of attraction from the world, the flesh, and the devil, are made identical with, and are lost in the divine desire, the divine will. It is not true, therefore, that such a soul ceases to desire; but it is true, that in its present state it desires, in particular cases, through the medium and under the control of its general desire for God's glory. Can it be possible, that such a soul, that such a person, simply because his desires have assumed a just and sanctified position, can fail to act, and to act energetically for his fellow men, when he has before himself, and when he deeply feels the mighty motive of God's express command? Let it be true, if you please, that the whole Christian world ceases to act from this moment, except from the single motive of God's will, and would there be less of watchfulness for the salvation of men, less of prayer, or less of any thing, which constitutes the truth, the power, and the unity of Christian effort?

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"Certain it is, that, in the case of Madame Catharine Adorna, so often cited by different writers in the controversy just now referred to, under the name of Catharine of Genoa, notwithstanding her avowed opinion that in the sanctified person all human desire is merged and virtually lost as a distinct principle of action in its unity with the divine will, she felt, and prayed, and labored, (I think I may say with much reason to the very extent of her capability,) for man's good and man's salvation. It was God's will, whether revealed in his word or his Providences, which sounded to her holy heart like the voice of a trumpet. As a human being, as a woman touched with woman's sympathies, she might have desired, and undoubtedly did desire, the good of her fellow-beings. But what was the human motive to the divine? What was the impulse of human sympathy, which, considered separately from the divine will, might have been right and might have been wrong, according to the circumstances of the case, compared with God's command? No more than earth to heaven, no more than time to eternity, no more than the finite to the infinite. She could not estimate it, nor think of it; she counted it less than a drop to the ocean."—*Catharine Adorna*, p. 99—101.

Our quotations relative to this department of our enquiries have been quite lengthy, because we desired to give our readers full opportunity to understand the views of our author in respect to it. Hereafter we may be more concise in our statements as well as citations.

3. We have now stated our author's view of the manner of attaining this state, together with its essential elements when attained. The inquiry which next arises pertains to the process through which the mind, according to him, must pass after the union between the human and the divine will has been effected, and before its final results are consummated, in the form of experience above elucidated. This process needs to be distinctly developed in our minds, in order to a full understanding of our author's ideal of the Christian life. This process, which in some may be of shorter, and in others of longer continuance, consists in a *painful* crucifixion of the various forms and elements of what he denominates "the life of nature," in other words, of our natural and unsanctified propensities, till our entire being, our intellect, sensibility and will are all subdued into full harmony with the divine will. In Madame Guyon, for example, this process of inward crucifixion was of many year's continuance, before it was fully consummated in the entire extinction of the "life of nature." In Catharine Adorna it was of much shorter continuance. In all, however, it is attended with pain and suffering, properly denominated a crucifixion. He says:

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"A soul, right with God, is a soul *crucified*. A soul right with God, is a soul, which, in having undergone a painful death to every worldly tie, is a soul, which may be described, in the figurative sense, as being *nailed to the cross*. The crucifixion of the outward life, by a separation from outward error, and by doing right outwardly, is of far less consequence, in itself considered, and far less painful than the crucifixion of the inward life by doing and being right inwardly.—*Life of Faith*, p. 243.

Again he says:

"The term crucifixion implies *suffering*. The crucifixion of our inward nature can not take place without the experience of suffering. The suffering which we experience, is mental, and is analogous to that, which we experience at any and all times, when our desires are crossed and disappointed. It is the pain or suffering of ceasing to be what we have been by nature, and what by nature we have loved to be. A desire, a love, a passion, disappointed of its object, is always a sufferer. Such is the natural law in the case. And the intensity of the pain will be in proportion to the intensity of the passion. If we loved the world with but little strength, if we were bound to it but by slight adhesion, the process, which sunders this attachment, and disappoints this love, would give but slight pain. But bound as we are in fact with a tie which reaches forth from the heart to its object with the first moment of life, and which grows stronger and stronger with every pulsation, until it embodies, if we may so express it, the whole strength of the soul, the pain of separation, which corresponds to the strength of the previous attachment, is keen and intense indeed. The suffering of a parent, who sees all his attachments and hopes expiring in the death of a beloved child, are not keener. Hence in experiencing the new inward life, we are said to be crucified to that which went before; not only because we die to it, but because in dying to it we suffer."—*Life of Faith*—pp. 244—245.

4. We have reserved for a distinct topic of consideration, our element of our author's ideal of the "interior life," an element, which might properly have been included under a former division of the subject. We have done this for the reason that we desire to have special attention directed to this one point. We refer to Prof. Upham's idea of the manner in which the will of God is in a pre-eminent degree revealed to the sanctified mind. Such a mind finds the will of God mainly in Providence. It lives and acts according to the divine will because it lives and acts according to the order of providence, sweetly acquiescing in all that occurs, and being controlled by it, as a revelation of the divine will. Daily duties arise from the daily orderings of Providence. Every event of life should be contemplated as a part of the orderings of Providence, and consequently, as a special revelation of of the divine will to us. The inward teachings and sugges-

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tions of the Spirit can be rightly interpreted, only as they are contemplated in the light of the providences of God, as they occur from moment to moment. Much, if not all that he has written upon this subject may be read with great profit by all truly spiritual minds.

As a specimen of his manner of presenting this subject, we adduce a single extract from the Interior Life. After laying down the proposition, that "We can not as a general thing arrive at the true interpretation and import of the inward suggestions of the Holy Spirit, except by connecting with them, and considering them in their relation to God's outward providences, he expresses in a subsequent paragraph, the following sentiments.

"The mind of God, as it is disclosed in his providences, and the mind of the Holy Spirit, as it reveals itself in the soul are one; and consequently in their different developments from time to time can never be at variance, but will always be in harmony with each other. And not only this, they have a relation to each other which is mutually and positively illuminative. They throw light, the one upon the other. Certain it is that the mind of the Spirit, in all cases of mere practical action and duty, can not, as a general thing, be clearly and definitely ascertained, except in connection with providential dispensations. Such dispensations are the outward light, which corresponds to and throws a reflex illumination upon the inward light. And this is so general a law of the divine operation, that persons, who are truly led by the Spirit of God, are generally and perhaps always found to keep an open eye upon the divine providences, as important and true interpreters of the inward spiritual leadings. And accordingly we find the following expressions in the Life of Madame Guyon. "My soul could not incline itself on the one side or the other, since that another will had taken the place of its own; but only nourished itself *with the daily providences of God.* And again, "the order of divine providence makes the whole rule and conduct of a soul entirely devoted to God. While it faithfully gives itself up thereto, it will do all things right and well, and will have every thing it wants, without its own care; because God, in whom it confides, makes it every moment do what He requires. God loves what is of his own order."—*Interior Life*, pp. 372—373.

This view of the relation of the sanctified mind to the external providences of God, has induced, we judge, a conception of the peculiar relations which God sustains to such minds in the advanced stages of sanctification, a conception developed in an article recently published in the Guide to Holiness. "In the higher states of sanctification," he says, "the soul ceases to place limits to God, and to assign to Him a locality. To the view of Christians, in the more ordinary or common state of experience, God *is a*

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Being afar off." "They scarce ever think of Him, except as a being, not only having a form, but a definite and distant locality." He then, in the following language, shadows forth the view which Christians "in the higher states of sanctification" have of God. Our readers will be greatly interested and profited in the perusal of the extract.

"There is a period, however, in the process of sanctification, when God is gradually withdrawn from this position, and ceases to be either limited or local. At this period, the well-defined and impressive image, which had been present to our thoughts for many years, becomes more and more indistinct, more and more remote from us, until it entirely disappears. But this withdrawment of God from a particular locality, which at first is perplexing and trying, is followed by his substitution and re-appearance to the eye of faith, not exclusively in any one place or thing, but in all things and all places;—in every tree, and plant, and rock, and flower; in every star, in the wandering moon, in the floating cloud, in the wide and deep sea,—in insects and birds, and the wild beasts of the mountain,—in men, who more than any thing else, bear the image of God;—and in all events, as well as in all things.

"The idea which we have of God under these circumstances, may be described as a general one, and perhaps as an indistinct or indefinite one. It is necessarily wanting in that clear and definite outline, which characterizes that restricted and inadequate idea of God, which represents Him to the mind's eye as having a particular form and a particular place. The true idea, that which reveals Him without the limitations of form and place, is indistinct in the sense of being without definite bounds, but not in the sense of its being unreal, and is general without being weakened by its unlimited extent. Without assigning God to any one thing or place, it recognizes Him, rejoices in Him, and receives Him in all. Happy is the man, whose heart is so purified that it is thus brought into unity with a God *universal*.

"To him who has this deeper insight and this higher unity, God breathes in the vernal zephyr, and shines brightly in the summer's sun; he sees Him moulding and painting the fruits of autumn, and sending the hoar-frosts and piling up the snows of winter; all inanimate nature is full of Him. He sees God also in what is ordinarily called the work of men's hands. It is God that spreads his pillow—it is God that builds his house—it is God that ploughs his fields—it is God that sells for him and buys for him; God gives him pain and sends him joy—smites him when he is sick, and heals him when he gets well. And what God does for Himself, He does also for others, and for communities. It is God that builds up and puts down—that makes kings and makes subjects—that builds up one nation and destroys another—that binds the chains of the captive and gives liberty to the free—that makes war and makes peace. All men, and princes and nations are in his hands like clay in the hands of the potter. His eternal will, which never has changed, and never can change, dashes them to pieces, or fashions them to everlasting life. All things are his *sin only excepted*, and sin *is sin*, because it is not of God. Whatever is not of God is of the devil—and whatever is of the devil is sin.

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"What blessed results would follow, if all men had that faith which deprives God of form, and displaces Him from a particular locality, in order that being without form, He may attach Himself to *all forms*, and that being without place, He may be found present *in all places*. Such a faith, if it would not at once carry us up to the New Jerusalem, would do that which amounts to much the same thing — it would bring the New Jerusalem down to earth, and would expand its golden walls and gates to the limits of the world and of the universe."—*Guide to Holiness, Vol. III.* pp. 121—3

For ourselves, we can not but regard as a still higher view than that to which our author seems to have attained, a conception which, to some extent, unites in one the two views above presented, of the relations of God, as manifested to the sanctified mind, a view which does not assign to God any special or even an indefinite *form*, (for we do not think that Christians generally attach the idea of form to God,) but which, while it contemplates Him as manifested in all objects and events, according to Prof. Upham's most interesting and delightful representation, yet thinks of some locality where the glory of God is in a special manner *manifested*, and towards which therefore sanctified minds are drawn with aspirations unutterable. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven."—2 *Cor.* 5 : 1, 2.

We have now fully developed our conceptions of Prof. Upham's *ideal* of "the interior life," in the highest form ever realized in Christian experience, the form realized in those who by divine grace, are "wholly sanctified." It now remains to compare this ideal with our apprehensions of that developed in the scriptures of truth. As we have already intimated, if there is any defect in the ideal of Prof. Upham, it pertains mainly to a *want of completeness*, rather than to any positive elements of error which he has introduced into it. We can not but think, that there is in it this incompleteness in the following important particulars:

1. If we may judge from his writings, the idea of redemption *through Christ*, and a union with God conditioned and consequent upon a prior deliverance from the penalty and power of sin, and the attainment of perfect internal purity, *through faith in Christ*, does not possess that distinctness of development, in Prof. Upham's mind, that it evidently does in the minds and hearts of the writers of the New Testa-

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ment. They talk much of a union with God. "I will dwell in them and walk in them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." "And I will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty." But how is this union "according to the pattern shown in the mount," to be effected? and what is its nature, when consummated? "I in them and thou in me, that they may be one in us." "No man cometh to the Father BUT BY ME." These writers, also, talk much of faith. The form of faith, however, of which they speak, is "faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," and faith in God as "in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." They speak of sanctification by faith; but it is sanctification through faith in Christ. They often speak of a victory over the world, the flesh and the devil; but it is a victory obtained "through the blood of the Lamb, and the word of his testimony." "Who is He that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" The great central position from which the entire circle of divine truth was contemplated by them was the cross of Christ, and the mysteries of the incarnation. The burden of all their discourses and epistles was to "make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you the hope of glory."

Now every one familiar with the writings of Prof. Upham can not fail, as it appears to us, to have noticed the fact that such a central position as this Christ does not occupy in those writings. How seldom does even the name of Christ appear in them, and especially the idea of redemption specifically through faith *in Him*. In the chapter in the Interior Life, containing "directions to aid in the attainment of holiness," for example, we find but two and those incidental allusions to Christ; while the idea of sanctification through faith *in Him*, is not even referred to. In giving Christians counsel how to overcome temptation, we should suppose the idea of victory through the blood of the Lamb and the word of his testimony would be the absorbing theme. We will present our readers with all that he says upon the subject, when speaking specifically upon it.

"*Of the manner in which we are to meet and resist temptations.*

"Perhaps no period of religious life, even that in which the soul is most advanced, is free from temptation. The Savior Himself was tempted. Temptations may be met and resisted in two ways. One way is to give them our whole attention; to meet and resist them in a

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direct contest. But such are the laws of mind, that when we meet the temptation in this way, we necessarily withdraw the soul from that entire sympathy and union with God which should ever be its principle occupation.

"The other method is, to turn away the mind from the contemplation of the evil in its outward form, and to keep it fixed, if possible, still more closely and watchfully upon God. A little child on perceiving a monster, does not wait to fight with it; and will scarcely turn its eyes toward it; but quickly shrinks into the bosom of its mother, in entire confidence of safety; so likewise should the soul turn from the dangers of temptation to her God. 'God is in the midst of her,' saith the Psalmist, 'she shall not be moved: God shall help her, and that right early.' Ps. 45: 5.

"If we do otherwise, and in our weakness attempt to attack our enemies, we shall frequently feel ourselves wounded, if not totally defeated; but, by casting ourselves into the simple presence of God, in the exercise of faith, we shall find instant supplies of strength for our support. This was the succor sought for by David. 'I have set,' saith he, 'the Lord always before me; because he is at my right hand I shall not be moved. Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoiceth; my flesh also shall rest in hope.' Ps. 16: 8, 9. And it is said in Exodus. 'The Lord shall fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace.'" —*Madame Guyon, Vol.* 1, pp. 391–392.

Now we can not but regard such a fact as that under consideration, as indicating a manifest defect in the ideal of what constitutes the essential elements of the "interior life" or rather perhaps in the mode of presenting that ideal to the world.

Were we to present in full contrast Prof. Upham's ideal of the Life of Faith, with that presented in the Bible, we would take the following passage of scriptures, as the basis of our illustration: "For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, That He would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man: That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, May be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth and height; And to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled with all the fullness of God."—*Eph.* 3: 14—19. The reader will carefully notice the process through which the soul is here represented as being conducted to a union with God. In the first instance, it is strengthened and enlarged in its capacities for the purpose of receiving Christ as an indwelling God and Savior. It thus becomes confirmed in the exercise of love, and is thereby enabled to comprehend "the breadth and

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length, and depth and height, and to know the *love of Christ* which passeth knowledge." The result is a union with God in which the soul is filled with all the divine fullness. Now the writings of Prof. Upham seem to conduct the reader directly to this last idea, the idea of a union *with God*, without distinctly developing in his mind the prior steps above presented through which alone this blessed consummation can be attained.

2. We are also impressed with the conviction, that the Word of God has not that prominent, central position *in* the writings of Prof. Upham, that it should have in the heart of the believer. The grand object of the faith, and the source of the victory of the saints, is "the blood of the Lamb, and the WORD OF HIS TESTIMONY. Sanctified minds meet God, and learn his will, and enter into endearing intercommmunion with Him in his providences. Yet the dwelling place of their souls, and the main objects of their faith is the written word. Spiritual writings of the most perfect form will conduct the reader to this great center, and induce him to interpret external providences themselves in the light of its divine teachings.

Now in the writings of Prof. Upham, as it appears to us, the idea of providence, and of union with God and harmony with his will, as manifested in providence, and of a life of holiness conformed to the order of providence, is presented with a prominency which tends to prevent the revealed word occupying the pre-eminent place in the sanctified mind which it ought to occupy. The saying of Madame Guyon cited with apparent approbation by our author, that "the order of divine providence makes the whole rule and conduct of a soul entirely devoted to God," should be received with much modification, before it would conform to our conception of "the *whole* rule and conduct" of such a mind.

The two defects in the writings of Prof. Upham noticed above, are referred to by a writer in the Biblical Repository, in a very interesting and commendatory review of the "Life and Writings of Madame Guyon." We will here cite the paragraph to which we refer.

"Now we challenge no man's acceptance of these notes upon what we have called a good book and a rare character, but in making up our mind in regard to a model of piety like that traced and commented upon in this life of Madame Guyon, how are we to fix upon the meridian of truth, and like a skillful lunarian, to settle upon our right

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reckoning? Plainly our Nautical Almanac must be the revealed Word of God, and our comparison must be with that. Is, then, this joint product of Madame Guyon and Professor Upham the true model of piety delineated or elementally found there? We answer at once, after all that we have been glad to say so heartily in commendation of this work, that there is in it and the religious writings of Professor Upham generally, though he meaneth not so, too little of Christ, and too much stress laid on self-denial without Christ. Now that the narrative and sympathetic interest excited by a first perusal is over, we can see clearly that there is too much of self and too little of the Word in this good book. And it would hardly be right to let the strain of remark go forth in which we have naturally written, without cautioning the reader to compare this book narrowly with the Bible, and let every man that peruses it bear in mind that there is no genuine holiness, however lovely or grave its aspect, but what comes *from* Christ as its source and looks *to* Christ as its example, its end, and its aim."—*Bibical Repository*, *pp.* 643—644.

All that Prof. Upham has written in respect to providence, we regard, as we have before said, as true, and of great importance with the exception that the Word should have a more central position in the sanctified mind than he seems to have given it.

3. The want of prominency of the doctrine of the cross in Prof. Upham's view of the gospel has induced him, as we judge, to present as the leading elements of his ideal of Christian character, in its higher and more perfect forms of development, the principles of contemplativeness, internal quietude, and simple acquiescence in providence. These are essential elements of such a character. We cannot but think, however, that they occupy a position somewhat too prominent and exclusive in his representation. A quietist was never made in the presence of the cross. He whose character has been moulded and formed by a full vision of the mysteries of the incarnation, will indeed possess and exhibit "quietness and assurance forever," and this with perfect contentment and acquiescence in the allotments of Providence, in every condition in life. Yet that same vision will blend into that character, and render equally prominent and distinctive in it, other elements of a different and opposite, though not of a contradictory nature. In such a character, we shall find harmoniously blended the wisdom of the serpent, and the harmlessness of the dove, the quietness of the lamb, and the boldness of the lion, a child-like simplicity, quietness and acquiescence in providence, and a spirit of stern rebuke of sin, of burning zeal for the truth, and we had almost said of restless activity in spreading it through the world. Such

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pre-eminently was the character of our great exemplar. He stands revealed to our contemplation as "the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world," and at the same time as "the Lion of the tribe of Judah." We are melted into tenderness, as we behold Him "led as a lamb to the slaughter," and at the same time, we are filled with awe and trembling in his presence as "in the greatness of his strength," He comes to us "from Edom, in dyed garments from Bozra."

Such too was the character of his immediate followers who were drawn nearest to his heart, and drank most deeply into his spirit. The beloved disciple, while reposing with dove-like simplicity and sweetness upon his bosom, received while reclining there, a spirit which, without changing the sweet and attractive mildness of his temper, rendered him truly a son of thunder. While the apostles in their intercourse with the churches, were mild and "gentle even as a nurse cherishes her children," they were imbued with a spirit of stern opposition to all forms of wrong doing which induced them to hold themselves in "readiness to revenge all disobedience" of every kind. Thought itself can never represent a form of character so perfect as that which preserves distinct, and yet harmoniously blends into one the diverse and apparently opposite elements under consideration. When either of these extremes is presented as the sum or even leading element of Christian character, we have then, to say the least, a defective view. Such we cannot but regard that presented by Prof. Upham. While we would not present the mature Christian as less contemplative than he does, we would not, as he does, present the element of contemplativeness as inducing in him a disposition not to engage with all his heart and soul, in "imaginative and discursive or reasoning acts." We would not represent him as imbued with a spirit less quiet, acquiescent and submissive; but we would represent him as blending with these, deep thought, intense emotion, earnest zeal, and tireless activity. The perfection of the gospel, in connection with its sovereign efficacy as a remedial system, consists in its perfect adaptation to secure the fullest development, and to bring into the most vigorous and harmonious activity all departments of our mental nature alike.

4. In order to attain to a full apprehension of the ideal of Christian experience as presented in the scriptures, we need, as it appears to us, to connect with all that Prof. Up-

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ham has said of the "crucifixion of the life of nature," the idea of the most full and perfect *development* and strong action of all the mental powers and susceptibilities under the influence of a revelation of "things unseen and eternal" through the word, providence and Spirit of God. The first aim of the gospel is to subdue the varied propensities of our nature, and subject their entire activity to its own pure and divine principles. Its aim then is to give to every department of our mental being the most full and perfect development, and to secure their most energetic and harmonious activity, in the direction of, and subordination to the ends of benevolence. The perfect Christian is as a weaned child in his submission to the will of God and the orderings of his providence. At the same time his powers are brought into a state of intense and tireless activity. He thinks deeply, feels intensely, and acts with the highest energy. Yet all his activity is a perfectly balanced one. When his powers are the most widely expanded to "comprehend the breadth, and length, and depth, and height," when he "rejoices with joy unspeakable, and full of glory,' when fires are burning within him which many waters can not quench, there is still a divine calm in his inner being which renders all his activity deliberate, benign, regulated. Not that he is *always* in a state of deep emotion, by any means. This we speak of as one of the distinguishing characteristics of his experience. Strong and yet perfectly balanced and regulated action is the highest form of activity of which we can possibly conceive. This is the form which the gospel is pre-eminently adapted to secure. We must contemplate it in its adaptation not only to subdue and harmonize the varied principles of our natures, but to impart to them the most full and perfect development, in order to understand its entire design. In contemplating the gospel in its relations and designs in respect to one department of our nature, the voluntary or moral, for example, we are apt to overlook its adaptations and benign purposes relatively to others.

5. For ourselves, we are not able to assent to all that Prof. Upham has said about the *painfulness* of the process through which the sanctified soul has been conducted to a state "right with God." The Christian to be sure is "crucified with Christ." We believe however, that when the scriptures apply such language to him, they design to express the *fact* of his actual deadness to the world, to sin

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and to "the life of nature," through the cross of Christ, and not the *manner* of that death, as being either pleasurable or painful. In the unveiled presence of the cross, the life of nature does truly become extinct and crucified in the believer. We can not but think, however, that it is rather by a blissful than by an agonizing process, that this crucifixion takes place. Such is the fact, as realized, to say the least, in the experience of many Christians. The Bible also everywhere speaks of it as the privilege of every Christian to be "kept in perfect peace" from the time of his conversion onward. It charges all care and perplexity, and mental suffering, implying internal unhappiness, not to the expiring agonies of "the life of nature" but to one cause exclusively, a want of faith. "Where is your faith?"

6. Nor do we fully accord with Professor Upham's idea, that the soul in the higher stages of sanctification, in the exercise of love to God, ceases to regard, with interest and strong desire, its own holiness, and present and future blessedness. When we read what he said about the relation of the sanctified mind to its own holiness, we were led at once to contrast his representation with that of Paul in respect to the same subject. "Our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world." Here one of the principle sources of the blessedness of the believer is represented as consisting in the conscious possession of personal holiness. When we read also that, in the same state, heaven itself ceases to be an object of strong and specific desire, we were again led to contrast such a sentiment with that revealed in the scriptures in respect to the same subject. "*Earnestly desiring* to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven"—"We are saved by hope"—"Which hope we have *as an anchor* to the soul sure and steadfast, entering into that within the veil"—"To them who by patient continuance in well-doing *seek* for glory, and honor, and immortality, eternal life"—"For they that say such things declare plainly that *they seek a country*"—"but now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city"—"Which is Christ in you *the hope of glory*."

7. Nor does the exercise of love to God render us indifferent to our own blessedness, either present or prospective.

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To become such, we must cease to know ourselves as capable of good. Such love does render us willing to make, and joyful in making any sacrifices requisite to the promotion of the glory of God, and the higher good of others. If the object surrendered, however, was not, in our esteem, a good to us, and a real good, there would be no virtue in making the sacrifice. Besides, if our own holiness and happiness should cease to be to us objects of interest and desire, those of all other creatures should be also, and we should cease to "rejoice with those that do rejoice and weep with those that weep."

8. We are also constrained to affirm, that in our judgment, Professor Upham, in representing the soul in full harmony with the will of God, as ceasing to will and desire any thing excepting when contemplated as the object of the divine will and desire, has stated only a part of the truth. If an object has an intrinsic value in itself, as all immortal souls have, it should be valued by us for its own sake, as well as an object of the divine will and desire. God also values the soul for its own sake. If our love corresponds with his, as all will admit that it ought to do, we shall value it and desire its good for the same reason that God does. Sympathy with the divine love may increase our interest in such object; but it can not create such interest, when we have ceased to regard it for its own sake. The mind that regards itself or any other immortal being "as nothing," unless the term be used in a highly figurative sense, does not regard it as God does. God "did not spare his own Son but delivered Him up" for "nothing." The thing purchased was well worth the infinite price paid for it. So it should be regarded by us, if we would be "imitators of God."

9. The "prayer of silence" also, as it appears to us, as presented by Professor Upham, occupies a more prominent place in the highest forms of Christian experience, than it does in the Bible representation unless we confine the subject strictly to the aspirations of the Christian relatively to his own subjective states.

Relatively to himself the Christian who has found God as the everlasting light of his soul, often feels that he has nothing more to desire or ask. "His cup runneth over." But the same fullness that he enjoys in God, draws out his heart in "strong crying and tears," that the church and the world around him may partake of the same blessedness.

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The full and entire harmony of the whole being of Christ with the will of God, did not prevent his "groaning in spirit" at the grave of Lazarus, nor weeping over Jerusalem in view of her approaching calamities. Nor does it now prevent his being "touched with the feeling of our infirmities." Any view of providence, or of the will of God as accomplished in providence which tends to prevent the continued exercise of a similar spirit in us, does not correspond with the view which God Himself takes of the same subject.

10. We can not but think also that those who read Prof. Upham's writings are in danger of getting the impression though the author meaneth not so, that faith by an influence intrinsic in the exercise itself results in the grace of sanctification. According to the Bible view, we are sanctified by faith, not through any sanctifying efficacy there is intrinsically in faith itself, but by its securing a divine influence, by which we are sanctified, "The very God of peace Himself sanctifies wholly," when in the exercise of faith we count Him "faithful that calleth us." Aside from being the condition of the reception of such an influence, faith has no efficacy to produce such a result. But we must here drop this and other topics, that we desired to remark upon in the present article.

We have said that in every stage of his spiritual progress, the believer may find much in Prof. Upham's writings to edify, instruct and delight him. We here repeat the same sentiment. We close, however, with the expression of the opinion, that these writings are especially adapted to enlarge the vision of the mature believer in whom Christ is already fully formed, the hope of glory, rather than to direct the inquirer to the "fountain set open in Jerusalem for sin and uncleanness." To the inquirer who needs above all things, to be put in full possession of the idea of his *completeness in Christ*, other productions may be more specifically adapted. Communing with the spirit of Prof. Upham, through his writings, is like the partaking of a cool and overflowing fountain to a thirsty soul. When separated from those writings, the recollection of such inter-communion is "like the memory of joys that are past, mournful and pleasant to the soul."

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LITERARY NOTICES.

PUBLICATIONS RECENTLY ISSUED FROM THE OBERLIN PRESS, BY J. M. FITCH.

BY PRES. A. MAHAN.

Since our last number was issued, the following works have been given to the public from the press above named. Without apprehending the charge of egotism, we shall speak freely of our judgment of the merit of all these works save one.

—

GUIDE TO THE SAVIOR; *or conditions of attaining to and abiding in entire holiness of heart and life*, by Prof. C. G. Finney.

The great want of the church is a well developed apprehension of her *completeness in Christ*. The object of this work is to meet this very necessity, and well has that object been accomplished. It embodies one of the best thoughts the author ever attempted to elucidate. We only express, we believe, the united judgment of those who have carefully read the work, when we affirm, that seldom, if ever, has he succeeded better, in the elucidation of any one conception whatever.

—

MY MOTHER: *a grateful tribute to departed worth*, by Rev. Albert Bushnell, Missionary to Africa. Preface and poetry by Mrs. L. H. Sigourney. (Second edition.)

Here, in the compass of a few pages, we have an exhibition, not of an ideal, but real character, in the contempla-

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tion of which, sanctified minds, mothers especially, will receive a new impulse in the way of holiness and usefulness. Such has been the reception of the work with the public, that a second edition has recently been issued.

—

THE SCIENCE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY: by Rev. A. Mahan, President of Oberlin Coll. Institute. Author of "a System of Intellectual Philosophy;" "Doctrine of the Will;" &c.

The motives of authors in giving their thoughts to the public are various. Some write for the purpose of gaining a livelihood. Others to gain a name. Others have a still higher motive, the formation of public opinion in respect to fundamental truth, and thereby molding the public character. Among the class last named, the author professedly ranks himself. Those who study this work, will as *we* judge, whether they agree with the author or not, become *positive* thinkers, and that in respect to those great questions of fundamental morality, on the decision of which will turn many if not most of the great issues in morals and theology, now before the public.

—

GOSPEL MANNA FOR CHRISTIAN PILGRIMS: *being brief comments on rich texts*, by Rev. Henry Cowles.

The readers of the Oberlin Evangelist, were during the issuing of the first volumes of that paper, greatly interested and profited in the perusal of a series of "Short Sermons," from the pen of Prof. H. Cowles. These sermons were then, we believe, and with good reason, regarded as constituting a part of the most precious portions of spiritual nourishment given to the public through the columns of the Evangelist. These productions have been carefully revised by the author, and are now presented for general circulation in a volume by themselves. Our readers will find few productions better adapted to become the companions of their closets than this.

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THE SINNER'S EXCUSES CONDEMN GOD. *A Sermon*, by Rev. C. G. Finney, Professor of Theology, Oberlin Theological Seminary.

This little book contains a single discourse, recently published in the Oberlin Evangelist. The true believer should read the discourse that he may learn how to deal with those who increase themselves in sin. The backslider, the lukewarm professor, and the sinner who does not even profess to respect the claims of his maker, should read it, that they may know how the case will go with them, in the dread ordeal before them.

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ARTICLE VII.

"SAVING FAITH:"

Or the Simple Belief of the Gospel considered: by James Morison. London: 1847.

REVIEWED BY REV. HENRY COWLES.

For several reasons this work is worthy of notice from the religious press in this country. Its author is well known in his native Scotland, and in some portions of England also, as a devoted, earnest, rousing, and effective gospel laborer, both in the pulpit and through the press. It is said that his labors are attended with great success. His work on saving faith breathes the spirit of one whose soul is on fire with love and zeal for the salvation of men. It is eminently lucid and sharp-pointed. When he illustrates, it is done to the purpose. When he has occasion to say, "Thou art the man," he says it. We do not wonder that the book has been useful to many—but this remark can be much better explained after an analysis of its doctrines and teachings has been given.

The volume has not within my knowledge been published in this country. Substantially the same views of faith however, have been spread extensively over the Western States by means of the preaching and writings of Alexander Campbell and his associates. I say, *substantially the same*, for in their one great fundamental point they are identical. I am not sufficiently familiar with the system of Mr. Campbell, to say whether he has carried out his fundamental position in precisely the same way as Mr. Morrison has done. The great peculiarity in the system of each seems to be indigenous in Scotland. Whether it ought to

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be imported into this or other countries, is an important question, upon which my future remarks may indirectly throw some light. My chief object now however, is to illustrate what I deem the true idea of saving faith. The intrinsic importance of the subject will amply justify a humble attempt.

My plan is to present,

I. *An analysis of the work under review.*

II. *A corresponding analysis of what I deem the true doctrine of saving faith.*

I. 1. The strictly fundamental position in Mr. Morrison's system is *that saving faith is a purely intellectual belief of revealed gospel truth.* Faith is nothing else than belief, and belief is a perfectly simple and well-known act of the mind. For example,

"I tell you that I have a Polyglott Bible in my library. If you think me a man of veracity, you *believe* me and you know what it is to believe. Faith, belief, or believing then, is nothing but the credit we give to the testimony of a credible witness; it is our assurance that his report is true."

"You believe a man called Cæsar lived in ancient times, and a man called Napoleon in modern times;" "you believe there is a continent called America, and that it lies west of Great Britain." "In precisely the same manner, are the statements of the Bible believed by every man who is convinced that the Bible is the word of God." "This firm persuasion of the truth of God's report is faith or believing; and it is all important to remember that faith or believing is NOTHING ELSE THAN THIS.—*pp.* 20, 21.

The emphatic capitals are the author's.

"Gospel-believing is exactly the same sort of thing as every-day believing. It differs nothing in its nature; it differs only in its object." Again, in the every-day expressions, "*I believe it,*" "*I don't believe it,*" the word "*believe*" means precisely the same thing and describes precisely the same act or exercise of mind which it means and describes when John the Baptist says,—"He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life." There is not the thousandth part of a difference between the two states of mind, so far as the act of believing is concerned."—*p.* 14.

These quotations might be augmented indefinitely—if need were. I wish to present the author's meaning both truthfully and fully, for this position is logically fundamental in his system.

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2. Mr. Morison *holds it to be absurd if not ridiculous to suppose that saving faith involves in itself any cordial assent of the heart, or any feeling of the power of truth.*

We have this sentiment expressed thus:

"You see how absurd it is to discriminate between heart-believing and head-believing; and you see also how inaccurate and delusive are all those definitions of faith that represent it as something different from the "mere belief of the truth," and transmute it into some such equivocal exercise of head and heart combined, as "a cordial consent." —*pp.* 82, 83.

"Here is one great reason why so many persons miss salvation. Instead of searching their Bible to find out the true thing to be believed by them that they may be saved, they are doing their best to cherish lively feelings, to fan their good opinion of themselves, and to prune their conduct into conformity with the will of God."—*p.* 28.

Again, describing those who "invariably misunderstand what faith is, and completely mistake what the *gospel* is," he says, "as for faith, they imagine it to be something like a devout feeling of the power of truth."—*p.* 32.

This in his view is all wrong.

3. Consequently our author holds that *if one intellectually admits the evidence and assents to the truth, the only liability of mistake or failure of salvation is in not believing the right thing; but cannot possibly be in any wrong way of believing or in any wrong state of heart.*

"The difficulty with the sinner is not to believe the gospel after he finds it out; but it is to find it out that he may believe it. The sinner, however, almost always thinks otherwise. He imagines that, having heard the gospel so often explained, he cannot surely be ignorant of its meaning. He lays all the blame on his bad heart for not feeling its power, and drawing peace out of it; and, in consequence, he sets himself to get his heart made right, and he spends all his time, and expends all his efforts, in trying to get his feelings made better." —*pp.* 34, 35.

Section XI, is devoted to the support of this position—"*There is no fear of believing the right thing in a wrong way.*" The "wrong way" which he attempts to explode is that of a merely speculative or historical belief. He avers it to be

"As impossible to believe the right thing in a wrong way as it is to understand or remember the right thing in a wrong way." "Believing is a simple act of the mind, and there cannot be any danger of the act being wrong if the object be right."—*pp.* 66, 68, 69.

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Again, having endeavored to show "how inaccurate and delusive" those definitions of faith are which include in it a "cordial assent," he adds,

"O sinner, make sure that you find out the right thing to be believed, and there is no danger at all of not believing it in the right way."—*p.* 83.

We come next to the vital question—*What is the right thing to be believed?* On this too, our author is explicit. He holds,

4. *That you are to believe that "Christ has done enough for you to die with;" all which is yours the instant you believe that such is the fact; so that you need no holiness of heart—nothing but this belief of the right thing—as a preparation for heaven.*

It is with Mr. Morrison an axiom that whoever is afraid to die, is an unbeliever. He does not believe *the right thing.*

"The Christian believes that *Christ has done enough for him to die with.* This is what He believes, and consequently he feels that he needs no more to die with." "All that you need to meet death with is in Him, and if you are not contented with what is in Him, but wish something more *in yourself as a ground of confidence in dying*, you are an unbeliever yet."—*pp.* 54, 55.

Again,

"This deliverance from the condemning power of sin you are to attain, not by becoming holy in any measure or to any degree; but by believing that Christ is the Lord *your* Righteousness, and that He has satisfied God for all your iniquities, and made it thus safe for you to venture on Him even into eternity, *just as you are.* Come, then, O sinner, with your bad heart within you, and all your badness about you, and be contented with the complete righteousness of Jesus as all that you need to die with."—*p.* 61.

"If a sinner do not believe that eternal life is given *unto him*, he makes God a liar. 1 John 5: 10."—*p.* 91.

Again, having spoken of the "finished work of Christ," he says—

"God is now propitiated, satisfied, completely satisfied, for your sins. You are not required to attain to certain holy feelings toward God and Christ, or to a saint-like change of heart before God be propitiated—fully satisfied for your sins. No; the work is finished already; all is done for you already that you need to meet God with."—*p.* 94.

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"Perhaps you are supposing that if you felt yourself entirely changed; if you felt a glowing ardour of devoted love to God; a deep horror at sin, and a Jesus-like compassion for souls, you would not then be afraid to venture into eternity on Christ. If you be supposing this, you are yet self-righteous to the core. You are not only self-righteous, but—O suffer me to say it—you are charging God with being a liar, for he tells you that you do not need any thing more at all than Christ's finished work without you, in order to make it safe for you to meet him. You would wish, however, Christ's work *without* you, and a work *within* you too. Now, my fellow-sinner, you will never get that work within you, till you first rest entirely contented with Christ's work without you as of itself, quite enough for you to die with."—*pp.* 95, 96.

Again, the sinner is to go to Christ in the character of one that is "stout-hearted."

"He is to go to Christ in the character of one that is "stout-hearted." In that character he is to venture, or in other words, to believe that Christ has done enough for him, "stout-hearted" as he is, to meet God with."

"Before the sinner feels in the slightest degree any holy change at all in his heart, he must know that, in consequence of what Christ has done for him, it is safe for him to venture, *on the ground of that*, to meet his God."—*p.* 59.

Of course here is the doctrine of saving faith without any degree of personal holiness—a faith that would save the soul into heaven itself, in the utter absence of that "holiness without which no man shall see the Lord."

5. ***Believing the right thing infallibly brings peace to the soul.***

"Remember this: the least faith will certainly bring you peace and joy."—*p.* 46.

Section VIII, lays down and argues this position:—"*Every person who believes the gospel, gets* PEACE *from it and gets it immediately.*"—*p.* 53.

"Since, then, every believer does venture on Christ and does believe that Christ has done enough for him to die with, every believer has, and cannot but have, "peace" in the prospect of dying."—*p.* 55.

But this will be understood sufficiently from our quotations under the next preceding head. If you believe that your soul is certainly *safe*, you will have peace—at least of a certain sort.

It is a striking feature in the practical religion taught in this volume that it makes so much account of being fearless of death.

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"It is a great mistake, aye and a mistake that has sent many to woe, to suppose that you may be a believer, and yet be afraid to die:"

"Death's terror is the mountain faith removes."—*p.* 57.

We had always supposed a greater thing—the greatest thing—to be, *deliverance from sin*—in the heart.

6. *Holiness of heart follows this peace, immediately and by a law of necessity.*

Section X, is devoted to the proof of this position—"*It is impossible to be a "believer," and yet remain without a new heart.*" He adds—

"Though a 'new heart' neither goes before, nor goes along with believing, it invariably comes after and that without delay."

In another passage—page 35, he says,

"A man might try never so much to warm himself by a painted fire—to no purpose. But let him come near a real fire, and he gets warm. So a sinner may believe something that looks like the gospel, and get no warmth;" "but as soon as the real truth is before his mind, he will find himself in an instant pacified in his conscience, purified in his heart, and filled and fired in his feelings with love to God."

7. The author holds that *there is no possibility of becoming holy without first feeling safe.*

"You may as well try to lift the hills in the hollow of your hand, as attempt to become holy before you feel safe. You may hate hell before you feel safe; you may hate sin, because it leads you to hell, before you feel safe; but you will never hate sin because it is sin and "exceeding sinful," you will never have a holy hatred of sin, until you first feel safe. You must first be justified from sin, and know that you are dead to its condemning power, before it is possible for you to begin to be a saint."—*pp.* 60, 61.

The doctrine is—the sinner comes to Christ—"stout-hearted," in his sins,—with no holiness at all, not even penitence; then believes that through Christ his sins are actually all forgiven, that Christ's righteousness is all his own by imputation, so that himself is as safe as a sinless angel;—then, and thenceforward he may begin to become holy. Then begins the new heart. It cannot possibly come in any other order than this.

8. Another prominent point in the system is, *right knowledge necessarily secures gospel faith, and a right moral state; it being impossible that one can know God without loving and obeying Him.*

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Section IV. affirms and elaborates this point with great power. Its doctrine he states thus:

"*Every man, who believes the Bible to be the Book of God, and who* KNOWS *the report which God has given in it regarding his Son's finished work, also believes that report.* In other words, every man who believes the Bible to be the Word of God, and who knows what the gospel is, is a gospel-believer."—*p.* 23.

"If a man, then, *knows the truth*, he is a believer and a child of God."—*pp.* 26, 27.

Hence in the author's view, the delusion, of all delusions most fatal—which has slain its millions upon millions, is "THAT A MAN MAY KNOW THE GOSPEL SUFFICIENTLY WELL, AND YET NOT BE BELIEVING IT." This sentence stands out on his pages in treble-sized capitals. I can not forbear to quote the sentences that follow, for they serve to show the gist of the author's system.

"Other delusions in Christendom may count their victims by thousands and tens of thousands; but this arch-delusion, this monster-heresy baffles all arithmetic in the havoc which it makes. O let the alarm-cry go forth—*every unsaved, every unsanctified man has the gospel yet to learn.* The masses of the unsaved may not be suspecting their ignorance. This indeed is most awfully true. Still it is the case that they are ignorant, ignorant too of the very first lesson of the Bible—the gospel. It is their ignorance of this that "is the mother of their damnation." No man that is an unbeliever and unsaved knows what the gospel is."—*pp.* 24, 25.

Comments on this topic are reserved for their proper place.

9. Consequently, saving "faith is the gift of God only in the sense of *God leading the sinner to know what the soul-saving truth really is.*"—*pp.* 47.

Both the language and the italics are the author's; of course they make his meaning plain, so far; but I find nothing in the volume to show unequivocally the author's views of the nature or necessity of the Spirit's work. He says, "if a sinner *finds but the gospel*, he may give God all the praise, and rest assured it was God that led him to find it out, and it is in this sense, and can be in no other, that his faith is the 'gift of God.'" But he goes right on to say to the sinner—"if you don't know what the gospel is, I am quite ready to tell you what it is, and therefore you need no longer remain in ignorance." Whether in the author's view, the Divine Spirit "tells the sinner what the gospel is" in any other way than Mr. Morrison does it, or otherwise

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than by causing the gospel to be written and preached, is certainly not very apparent in this volume.

10. In coincidence with the rest of the system, repentance, in the author's view, is an "intellectual act"—"is not godly sorrow or reformation, though it is sure to issue in both"—is precisely the "abandonment of error" which naturally precedes the reception of truth, and hence always precedes faith, being correlated to it.

11. If I can understand the author he holds *that when the right truth is presented to the mind, supported by its proper evidence, the exercise of saving faith is* NECESSARY *and in no sense voluntary or moral.*

Thus, he says,

"If a man being previously persuaded that every thing in the Bible is true, finds out the gospel in it, it is manifest that he can not remain one moment in a state of doubt whether or not this gospel be true; in other words, he can not hinder himself for one moment from being a believer in it."—*pp.* 34.

A note in the appendix quotes with commendation a more accurately metaphysical statement.

"Faith is no more at the command of our will, than are any of our senses. If I open my eyes, I must see what presents itself, not what I may wish to behold. If I walk into the fields in a hard frost, when the earth is covered with snow, I shall not see nature robed in her gayest dress,—the fields decked with flowers and variegated beauties, and the meadows clothed with the richest verdure, however delectable such a sight would appear. So it is with faith; I can not believe what I please, but what appears to me to be true."—pp. 114.

The reader will remember the illustration of "a painted fire," already quoted. Following that is another not less decisive to our point. "If a man come into a room filled with hyacinths, balsams and thyme, it would be all in vain for him to try and try hard to smell roses, because there are none *there* for him to smell." Let him go where roses are and he smells them immediately and can not help it. "In like manner" of gospel truth; it is vain to try to *believe* it while the right truth is not before the mind; but when "the gospel in all its naked reality is fairly present to his mind, he will believe it immediately, without trying it at all."—p. 36.

I will carry my analysis of the author's system no farther. My wish to present his system fairly and in its full force and logical connection has induced me to give it this connected

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form, mainly unbroken by any criticisms, objections, or counter views, of my own. The great question, *What is the truth on these points?* yet remains, and to the consideration of this the reader's attention is now invited.

II. WHAT SAVING FAITH IS.

1. My first position is, *that saving faith includes the assent of the heart or will to the truth and is consequently a moral or voluntary exercise of mind.*

It must of course imply an intellectual perception of the truth and assent to it, for no man can consent to yield his soul to the dominion of truth which has never yet reached his intelligence, or which his intelligence has not previously assented to as truth. But though gospel faith includes this, it *is* not this alone, for it must include the farther element of the will's consent that this truth shall be received and treated as *truth*, and consequently shall hold its legitimate sway over the affections and the life. The heart consents to exalt this truth to its rightful throne of power, and yield itself in submission. In believing the gospel with saving faith, I not only say—*This is true;* but I also say—I bid this truth welcome to my soul—I will obey all its demands. It is *good* truth, and has rightful claims, which my heart shall never more resist.

This gospel faith is a voluntary or moral exercise in each of two respects.

(1.) The mind is voluntary in giving its attention to the truth and in examining its evidence; also in holding its own prejudices against the truth in abeyance, and in resisting the counter influence of its sinful lusts. I *voluntarily* hold my mind open in a candid state to hear the truth and weigh its evidence.

(2.) It is pre-eminently a voluntary and moral act for my mind to consent that this truth, thus apprehended as truth, shall receive the homage of my heart. I yield my whole being to its demands, saying—Whatever its claims may be, I acknowledge their supremacy—*I will obey.* Does it call on me for confession of sin, for trust in Jesus, for gratitude in view of mercy, for love in view of perceived excellence? O God, my heart is thine; I yield my will and my affections —yea all my powers, to the claims of thy truth.

This is pre-eminently a voluntary act and state of mind. Yourself must decide the question—Will you do this, or will you not? Will you thus enthrone the truth over your inmost and your utmost powers, or will you not? Here is

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voluntariness itself. Some believe *with the heart*, and some do not.

This may be a fit place to say that a broad distinction exists and ought always to be made, between *believing moral truths and believing truths not moral.* The former always demand the assent of the heart; the latter do not. Into the latter class fall many historical facts, all geographical facts, and mathematical truths. You believe them in the sense of admitting their truthfulness, and you have done all. They have no claim upon you as a *moral being*, for the homage of your heart. Not so of all those truths which reveal God, and consequently your relations to Him and your fellow-men. These truths involve *duty*, and can never fail of presenting and pressing not only the primary question—Do you assent that this is truth? but also the secondary one—Do you consent to give this truth its appropriate dominion over your heart and life? Now in regard to moral truths, the terms, faith and belief, are sometimes applied to the primary act alone; but they are also applied often and legitmately too, in the broader sense of including both the primary and the secondary acts.

But lest our metaphysics seem dark or dull, let us have some cases for illustration. Here is a whiskey-distiller. "Sir, do you believe that your business is fraught with much and almost unmingled evil to your fellow-beings?"

"I don't know much about it."

"But, sir, a man of your acuteness and of your extent of observation can not be in any doubt on this point. Run your eye over the houses, farms, families, rags, poverty, vices and dreadful deaths of many of your neighbors. You know that whiskey, and *your* whiskey too, has done it."

"Yes, yes, enough sir, says he, I have tried hard to evade this conviction, but I can not—I know all you say is true."

He has now taken one step in *belief*, and inasmuch as the question is one of a moral nature, bearing upon *duty*, there yet remains another point. "Sir, will you stop your business at once and forever? You know you ought not to follow it another day. Will you yield your heart and your practice to the dominion of the truth you so well know and so firmly believe?"

He sits uneasy—he counts the dollars—he wishes his interrogator were safely in heaven, or some where else; but at last the decision is made. "It's a hard case," he says, "but I

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must go on—my son, start the fires again; it's a man's first duty to live and pay his debts."

His faith is thus cut short at this point, and strongly as he believes the truth in his intelligence, he certainly does not "believe it with the heart unto righteousness."

The reader will observe that this truth has a moral aspect, and therefore there is a moral supplement to it after the intellectual part is disposed of.

Again, mark that dissipated son. Ask him—"Do you *believe* that your departed father was a good man—a godly man?"

"I don't doubt the fact, he says, but *what do I care for it.*"

You readily see that his faith lacks the homage of the heart. The truth believed is one which has a moral bearing, and of course involves the question of reception in the *heart.*

Yet again. Two State criminals are under sentence of death for treason. The king proposes to pardon them if they will thoroughly believe in his own clemency. The message is brought to them both. One receives it with tears of penitence and joy. "O," he says, "is it possible that after all my crimes, I can be forgiven? I thought the king was a hard-hearted tyrant; I see my great mistake; I shall never offend or grieve him again. Let him be assured, he never shall have occasion to repent of having forgiven me and saved my life."

This is real gospel faith. This man not only assents to the *truth of the fact*, but he also *opens his heart* to all its legitimate influences. He gives this truth its due ascendancy in his very heart.

Now mark the other criminal. He hears the message, but looks sulky still. Yet he does not question the *fact* revealed to him; no, for he says, "No doubt the king is a good fellow: but he is greatly mistaken if he thinks to get me into his service. What do I care for his goodness? Let me only get out of this prison, and then what a glorious time I'll have among the rebels! The king is so kind-hearted we have really nothing to fear."

Now what sort of *faith* is this? It goes the whole length of the assent of the intelligence; it lacks utterly the assent of the heart. The man entirely shuts off the legitimate influence of the truth from reaching and moving his heart. Nay more, he perverts the very truth which should transform his heart,

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and gives it a wrested power to harden himself the more, and make yet stronger his purposes of rebellion.

I need not say that these are possible cases—(the first is drawn substantially from the writer's personal observation,) I need not say that the nature of man's mind and depraved heart *admit* of such results; this I need not affirm or labor to prove, for every body knows it. The fact stands forth in bold relief wherever the gospel comes, wherever there are human hearts to develop their nature and their capabilities for dreadful guilt. Sinners, under the gospel, by thousands, believe God's love as seen in the atonement of Christ, in just this way. They do not question the *facts;* they know them just as the penitent sinner does—that is, they apprehend the same truths, and believe the same things to be true, but they utterly withhold the heart from their appropriate power. More than this: they even seize upon these very truths, and wrest them to their own deeper guilt and more dire destruction.

The point now under discussion, being necessarily fundamental to right views of gospel faith, it is hoped the reader will not be weary of a somewhat thorough discussion of it. Vitally important to such a discussion must be the scriptural usage of the terms, *faith* and *belief*. The strong point of Mr. Morison's argument for his system is that the Bible uses the language of common life, and in its ordinary sense; that the language of common life makes faith and belief mean only the act of intellectual assent; hence, this, and this only, must be gospel faith. I understand him to assume, not to say, assert, that such is the invariable usage of these terms in the Bible.

We come then *to the Bible.* My views may be presented under the following propositions:

1. Bible language, being the language of common life, is always to be interpreted in view of the circumstances of the age and the people when and where it was originally used. This is of course always true of the language of common life, and as it should be, so it always is true of the Bible.

2. The language of common life never makes metaphysical discriminations unless they are called for by the circumstances. It is enough for common men in the common relations of life, that they make themselves understood. Beyond that, they are not wont to amuse themselves with metaphysical discriminations. If circumstances demand

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accurate discriminations, the language of common life is ready to do its best; but always skrinks from the bootless labor unless the occasion demands it.

In conformity with this principle we should not expect such a discrimination as I have made in the meaning of the terms, faith and belief, unless existing circumstances created special occasion for it.

3. A very little attention to the circumstances of the age when the New Testament was written, will show that ordinarily, they were not such as to require any discrimination between believing with the assent of the intelligence, and believing with the assent of the heart. The simple facts of the matter are, that in that age very few believed the gospel in *theory*, who did not also "believe with all the heart." In this great and vital respect, that age differed totally from the present. Then, obstacles rose mountain high, against believing the gospel in theory. Now, belief in the theory costs nothing; it more often costs some peril of reputation to be an infidel. Then the gospel was "to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks, foolishness;" and a man periled his standing for common sense with either class if he said—*I believe it*. Disgrace debarred him; dignities frowned; magistrates threatened; friends besought; every social tie restrained from such an admission even in the form of intellectual assent. I need not speak of the often superadded terrors of prison, torture, death.

Now, what must be the result of such a state of things? This, almost invariably. No man would give in his intellectual assent to gospel truth till his mind became so pressed with its evidence and force, and till his obstacles of heart to the gospel were so thoroughly brought under, that the moment he believed with the intelligence, he would also believe with the heart. All the *heart-obstacles* lying directly in the way of the intellectual admission, when these were overcome, the heart of course yielded, and the strange anomaly of a man, admitting the truth in theory but denying to it the assent of his heart and his life, would but very rarely occur. From the very laws of mind this must have been usually the case. From the history it is quite obvious that it was so.

Consequently there was rarely any occasion then to make the discrimination in question. *We* have occasion to make it every day. The apostles, having rarely any occasion to make it, made it but rarely—and for the best of reasons;

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because there was no need of it. If a man believed, *intellectually*, he also believed *heartily;* and it was therefore usually enough to say simply, he *believes.* The natural consequences of intellectual belief were associated with it under this one term —there being no occasion to use two or more terms, when one expressed the whole just as well. To *believe* in those days was to receive the truth in love and yield the heart to its dominion. Why was this term, then, so comprehensive? Because there was no occasion for making it less comprehensive and more discriminating. Its sense could not ordinarily be misunderstood. It would naturally include what was so uniformly found associated with it, namely, the homage of the heart—the trust and love of the gospel spirit. It is hoped this point will be thoroughly understood.

4. Yet in two important passages, we find special stress laid upon *believing with the heart.* When the eunuch requested baptism, Philip said—"If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest." What unsophistocated reader ever yet construed this passage to mean—If thou believest with all thine intelligence, or with all thine understanding, thou mayest? To construe thus would be to set aside the easy, obvious, natural sense, and adopt one that is, to say the least, nearly akin to nonsense.

The other analogous passage occurs in Romans 10: 10—"With the heart man believeth unto righteousness;" upon which no additional comment is needed.

5. In two other important passages we have the very discrimination, made or implied, which I am now endeavoring to establish. The cases are in my view intrinsically and inevitably fatal to the grand position taken by our author in regard to faith. He maintains that intellectual faith is the only faith, that it is absurd to talk of two faiths, and especially he holds that faith in the great gospel truths inevitably brings peace, and peace is invariably followed by a new heart and a holy life. That is, his fundamental position denies the discrimination between believing with the intelligence, and believing with the heart.

Bearing this in mind, let us consult the Evangelist John chapter 12: 42, 43. He says—"Among the chief rulers also many *believed* on Him, but because of the Pharisees, they did not confess Him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue; for they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God."

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If we might interrogate this writer, we would ask—Do you say those chief rulers believed on Christ? I do.

Do you mean that they believed Him to be the Messiah, as his disciples did? Most certainly. That is the common and obvious sense of the language.

Do you suppose they were real Christians—men of a new heart and a holy life? By no means. I remarked that "they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God."

Then do you hold that it is possible for men to believe the truth of the gospel in the sense of admitting that it is true, and yet remain as wicked as ever? You can easily judge for yourself from what I have said.

We have another passage in Acts 8: 13, 20—23. "Then Simon himself believed also." Soon after, seeing that the apostles imparted the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands, he offered to buy this wonderful power; but Peter said, "Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought the gift of God may be purchased with money. Thou has neither part nor lot in this matter; for thy heart is not right in the sight of God. Repent therefore of this thy wickedness, and pray God, if perhaps the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee. For I perceive that thou art in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity."

Here we might make the same points as in John 12. Did Simon *believe the same things* as the other Samaritan converts? Most obviously. If any language could express this by a natural course of narration, this does. "When the Samaritans believed Philip, preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized both men and women. Then"—so the narrative proceeds right on—"then Simon himself believed also." Believed what? Believed just what the rest did—"the things Philip preached concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ." And Simon was baptized too; but certainly not without professing his faith in Jesus of Nazareth. Now then, did he believe with his heart unto righteousness? No; for his "heart was not right in the sight of God." Hence it is possible for this distinction to exist. A man may believe the right things, and yet not believe with the heart; not "have enough of Christ's finished work to die with;" not have his faith followed by a law of necessity, with a holy heart and a holy life.

For aught I can see, one such case as this of Simon Magus perfectly upsets a long row of Mr. Morison's cardinal prop-

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ositions. It shows that saving faith must be something more than a merely intellectual belief; for Simon had the latter, but not the former.

It shows that there is nothing absurd in making saving faith include the cordial assent of the heart. Simon's faith was not saving, for the simple reason that it lacked the heart's assent—the heart's love. It can not be absurd to suppose this lacking part to be supplied, for in fact it often is.

Simon's case shows that a man may believe the right things in a wrong way. It proves also that holiness does not follow such faith as Mr. Morison holds to and as Simon had, *by a law of necessity;* for in Simon's case, it failed to follow at all. This case also proves that right knowledge does not necessarily secure a right moral state.

I must leave the reader to apply this case to other points in Mr. Morison's system, and here close my remarks upon the Bible usage of the terms, faith and belief.

My main position, thus far discussed, is that saving faith includes, along with the assent of the intelligence, also the assent of the heart. Before I pass to other positions, let me suppose that the reader asks me for my proofs of this. I place them comprehensively under three heads:

1. The evidence of scripture, already explained sufficiently.

2. The evidence from the ultimate design and consequent demands of the gospel system.

3. The evidence from its harmony with the moral government of God, and with the known laws of the human mind.

The second and third points remain to be expanded.

2. I assume that the ultimate design or end of the gospel system in regard to man is to turn his heart from rebellion against God to obedience and love. The means employed are revealed truth respecting God, salvation, and retribution. The end is answered when man believes and embraces this truth *with the heart;* hence this must be essential to saving faith.

For the same reason any form of faith which leaves out the assent of the heart must be radically defective. It can with no propriety be called *saving*, for the good reason that it does not *save* man in that great respect in which he really needs salvation. The sinner exercises this merely intellectual faith, according to our author's view, in a state of mind "as stout-hearted against God as ever." Of course the faith itself involves no moral change. These points

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might be expanded indefinitely; but must be left with the reader.

3. The view of saving faith, which the writer proposes, *harmonizes with the moral government of God and with the known laws of the human mind.* I shall not here write an essay to prove that God is exercising a moral government over men, although so many things in our author seem to deny this palpable fact, and seem hence to call for its support and defence.

A moral government calls for the homage of the heart or will of man. It addresses all its requisitions to man as a moral voluntary agent. So does saving faith as I explain it. On the contrary, saving faith as explained by Mr. Morison, in a most remarkable manner, drops out this radical element. It gives you saving faith without any action of the will or heart, doing homage to God's truth and to God Himself. Most strangely does it fail to demand the free action of man's will or heart *for God;* but it puts the law of necessity in its place. It does indeed ask the sinner to give his voluntary attention to the truth; with this, its requisitions upon man's voluntary action cease. Believing is no act of the will; for under the circumstances in which faith is possible, no man can help believing. The sinner having believed, peace follows by a law of necessity, and holiness follows peace by the same law.

Now obviously, such a system fails to correspond with the nature and relations of a divine moral government over man. If moral government be a fact, then a system of faith which mainly excludes moral agency can not be a wheel in its machinery, or a link in its chain; for it would not work.

Or thus; A moral government assumes that man is a voluntary moral agent, and assays to govern him by precept, by manifested love, by rewards and penalties. Now by universal admission, God *demands the exercise of faith*; hence it must be such a thing as may be righteously demanded of man; or in other words, must be an act of a voluntary or moral nature. Turning our attention to faith, we see that in its most comprehensive sense, there are several mental steps or stages of natural progress from its beginning to its consummation. A directed attention; the mind's effort to learn and comprehend truth; holding the mind open and keeping prejudice and passion in abey-

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ance; scanning the testimony; admitting its force and believing the truth intellectually; and then often a process of great length and many steps in bringing out the assent of the heart. Now among all these natural steps in the procsss, that one which is least moral or voluntary in its nature is the assent of the intelligence to perceived and substantiated truth. This one—this least moral and voluntary step—Mr. Morison's system seizes upon as alone constituting saving faith. This is precisely *the* thing which God demands of the sinner, on pain of eternal death. When God commands the sinner to *believe*, this and this only is the thing commanded—a thing which by his own doctrine is not within the control of the sinner's will—which, under fit circumstances, he can not help doing; and which under other than fit circumstances, he can not do by any possible effort.

But let us look at another system. According to this, God commands the exercise of faith most reasonably because it is a complex act, nearly all the elements of which and all the most important, are of a voluntary nature, and that one which alone can be claimed as being involuntary follows the performance of those which are voluntary by a law of necessity. That is; God commands you to attend to his revealed truth; you can if you will: to hold your mind open in candor; you can if you will: to hold your prejudices, lusts and repellencies in abeyance, and you can if you will: to scan the testimony closely and candidly; and this you can do if you will: then, to believe the truth on its sufficient and most abundant evidence; and this you can not help doing if you have taken obediently all the preceding voluntary steps: then to yield your will or heart perfectly to the control of this admitted truth, which surely is as voluntary as any act of man can possibly be.

In this view of faith there is no clashing between the fact of its requisition and the moral rectitude of Him who requires it.

More importance attaches to this matter than all may at once appreciate. Who has not heard the complaint against God's government, that faith, being an involuntary act, God yet demands it on pain of damnation? Is it not then of great importance to have the subject presented, unincumbered with superfluous difficulties, standing forth in its clear light and most reasonable claims? The reflecting mind that misunderstands this subject on the vital point now in ques-

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tion is thereby thrown into a most unfortunate attitude towards God. You may see a picture of it in a family when the parent is understood by the child to have made some manifestly unreasonable and unjust requisitions. Suppose, for example, the child understands his father to insist that he shall do six days' work in one, or shall love his father for having punished him in a passion. If such requisitions are understood to be the unyielding conditions of parental favor, the child is placed at once in the most critical and terrible position. The authority exercised, conflicts fatally with his reason—has no support from his conscience; hence the moral result can be nothing less than utter ruin. God's moral government stands to us in substantially a parental relation, and enactments, deemed impracticable, must be as terrific for evil in it as in the human family.

Suffice it then to say in reference to the view of faith which I have advocated, that its obvious harmony with God's moral government and with the known laws of the human mind, is a third (is it not a conclusive?) argument for its truthfulness.

Having now disposed of the fundamental point, I shall canvass the remaining minor points with much brevity.

II. *The right thing to be believed.* This is not that "Christ has done a finished work for me"—"enough for me to die with"—which is transferred to me, and becomes mine by virtue of my believing the fact, and before any moral change takes place in my heart. For,

(1.) This view rests on the false assumption that fitness to die is, not holiness of heart, but Christ's imputed righteousness, irrespective of any personal holiness.

(2.) It falsely assumes that I can get that imputed righteousness of Christ by simply believing it is mine, and without either turning from my sins, or in heart embracing and obeying God's revealed truth. Nothing can be more false, or more naturally fatal, than such teaching.

(3.) Every point in this system appeals to and fosters human selfishness, and therefore can not have the least tendency to crucify self and enthrone God in place of self in the heart. Consequently, it can have no tendency towards real salvation, the true idea of which, I insist, is primarily deliverance from sin—not from hell.

Positively—the things to be believed are, all revealed truth concerning God and our duty; but especially in respect to the gospel, this: that Christ has amply atoned for

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my sin, and that now I can have pardon *if I will turn from all my sin, and trust Him for it.* When I voluntarily become his obedient, grateful child, I may know that He makes me welcome to the waters of life, and to the blood of atonement. Hence follows grace for free pardon; and what is more and always connected, grace for entire moral cleansing. This I take to be the gospel; who shall say it is not all-glorious?

III. *How faith brings peace.* Our author errs fundamentally in assuming that God's wrath against sin is the only evil thing in the sinner's case—that the sinner's fear of this wrath is the only bad element in his state of mind; and that the removal and absence of this fear constitutes the saved sinner's peace. Very differently from this, I hold that while the sinner's past sins are bad, his wicked heart is incomparably the worst thing in his case; that his mad rebellion against God is the worst element in his state of mind; and hence, that repentance and submission are essential to constitute any real peace worth having. The sinner, becoming penitent and believing, gets peace in more ways than one. Peace of soul ensues of course when the troubled waters of his rebellious, unreasonable *will,* find calm and rest in deep submission to God. Every element in a soul renewed to holiness is intrinsically and necessarily peaceful. God bestows the witness of his Spirit that He forgives, accepts, smiles and loves; and it is no longer possible for me to fear hell, for my heart loves all that God is, or does, or can do.

IV. *Relation of peace to holiness.* Our author's doctrine is that holiness follows the simple idea of safety by a law of necessity. I suppose him to be in this entirely mistaken. The idea that pardon is possible, may be essential to secure repentance; but the idea that pardon is actually given in anticipation of future repentance would be very likely to fail of the anticipated result. "My child," says the parent, "you have done very wrong and you ought to be punished severely; but I freely forgive you; and now I expect you to repent." "Good," says the child to himself, "I have got off well this time—I'll try it again."

Here is a specimen somewhat like human nature, so much so that it may at least be assumed as a *possible* result; and this is sufficient for my present argument. If such a result in the sinner's case is *possible,* then certainly holiness does not follow such peace as our author describes *by a law of*

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necessity. Besides I have no faith that any holiness will ever come into existence by a law of necessity, in the proper sense of this language. If it could and should, it would be no holiness at all; its instrinsic character could be no longer *moral*.

Yet again. If our author's position is correct, there can not possibly be any such thing as a *false hope*. If hope—of such sort as inspires the idea of safety—necessarily begets gospel peace, and if this peace inevitably begets acceptable holiness, then all hopes are good hopes. Nobody need fear that his hope of heaven and his feeling of safety can possibly prove treacherous or fallacious. Premises, linked by a law of necessity with *such* conclusions, must be false.

It is due to our author, and to the truth itself, that it be stated distinctly, that I speak now only of hopes and of peace which result from believing that Christ has done a finished work for myself in particular, which is available for me simply because I believe it to be;—no moral change whatever in my heart being necessarily implied either in my believing, in my hopes, or my peace. This I understand to be the author's doctrine.

V. *A sense of personal safety not essential to heart-renewal.* That it is, our author holds most strongly; I think most erroneously. I oppose to it the evidence of facts in Christian experience. I have known many persons give the best evidence of being converted who yet had not once thought of being safe. They did not think that this change, though great, could be conversion. It had not once occurred to them that they were forgiven. Yet they had thoroughly submitted to God, and the consequent peace within was bathing their souls with its blessedness.

What singular teaching is this, to lay—as we undestand our author to do—before the impenitent sinner. "You need not expect to turn from your sins till you see that you are safe from the wrath of God." Suppose a man were to come into our families to teach morals and obedience. "Children," he says, "when you have done wrong and are called to account for it, you need never expect that you can repent or confess till you see that your father has burned up his rod. You must have a free pardon before you need think about changing your course or your attitude." Should we like such a preceptor of children in our families?

Again, personal safety never can in fact precede heart-renewal, unless God can forgive the sinner in his sins and

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without gospel repentance, that is, without breaking off from sin by confession, forsaking, and righteousness. Hence if the sinner must believe himself safe before he can repent, he must believe a lie! Is believing a lie the necessary means of his conversion? Is this what James means when he speaks of our being "begotten *by the word of truth?*"

I most fully admit that the doctrine of pardon possible and promised to repentance, has a tendency to melt the heart; and also that in the case of real converts, the idea of past pardon has the same influence. But the idea of pardon conferred upon a sinner *in his sins*, in anticipation of his repentance, is quite another thing.

VI. *Right knowledge not necessarily heart-renewing.*

That right knowlege of God and of his gospel has a legitimate tendency towards holiness, I admit. That it results in producing saving faith, uniformly and necessarily, as our author affirms, I deny; and make my appeal first *to the Bible.*

According to our Savior, one may "know his Lord's will," and yet, not doing it, "be beaten with many stripes;" —in which case his knowledge of duty fails of securing faith and heart-holiness.

"If I had not come and spoken unto them"—the truth of course—"they had not had sin," (comparatively speaking;) but now—what? Are they *necessarily* made believers and holy men? No; but they are the greater sinners, "and have no cloak for their sins."

According to John 3: 19, 20, the chief condemnation of sinners is that light comes before them, but they love darkness rather.

According to Paul, Romans 1, God's wrath is revealed from heaven against the great sin of those who hold back known truth by means of indulged sin. Or if you take the passage in the most natural sense of our translation—who hold the truth in sentiment, and yet sin notwithstanding. In either construction, the passage is fatal to the theory now opposed.

Farther on, Paul says; God hath showed sinful men his invisible attributes, so that they are without excuse fortheir continued sin, because that "*when they knew God*, they glorified him not as God," (all, you observe, in perfect contrariety to our author's doctrine,) "who changed the truth of God into a lie;" (of course they had this truth, but it saved them not.) "And as they did not like to retain God

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in their knowlege, God gave them over to a reprobate mind."

But argument on this point seems superfluous. Most abundantly it might be shown from scripture, (1.) That men have had right knowledge of God and yet have failed of salvation. (2.) That they have only sinned the more; (3.) That God holds them pre-eminently guilty for their having this knowledge, and being made no better by it; (4.) That God in his word rebukes sinners for perverting and wresting truth which they know; (5.) That in numerous passages he warns sinners to take heed how they hear, and how they obey revealed truth, assuming that their great danger is the very thing Mr. Morison seems to represent as an impossibility, namely, that they should know their duty and not do it;—know the gospel, even its most soul-saving truths, and yet be cursed and not blessed by their knowledge.

I ought not to pass this topic without alluding to the great stress laid by Mr. Morison in support of the doctrine in question, upon John 17: 3: "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." His inference is that *knowledge* of God and of Jesus Christ is, necessarily and essentially, eternal life.

I answer, (1.) Eternal life comes only *through* the knowledge of God and of his Son. This may be all that John means to assert. (2.) Knowing the truth, as spoken of in this passage, manifestly implies, putting the heart in sympathy with it, and obedience to it. When this is done, no doubt the truth becomes soul-saving. (3.) The phrase—*to know God*,—is sometimes, and perhaps here, used of that deeper, experimental, soul-subduing knowledge, which of course involves and implies, not only conversion, but a high degree of personal holiness. But the doctrine now in question can not contemplate *such* a degree of divine knowledge, for it treats only of that knowledge which the sinner may have before repentance, and before having a renewed heart.

My comments on our author's sentiments must close. Recurring to the general character of his work, I deem it a most remarkable case of a system of theology and metaphysics, defective to the core, and yet brought out and pressed upon the heart and conscience with astonishing power. The goodness of the author's heart bears him along, despite of the terrible incumbrances of such a system. One can not but exclaim—What glorious results for the salvation

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of men such a writer would accomplish if he only had the right views of the gospel system, of God's moral government, and of the human mind! How could one such man, armed with the panoply of genuine truth, chase a thousand and two put ten thousand to flight! If any reader would put himself in a position to appreciate the value of metaphysical and theological truth, I suggest to him to study this little volume, and with it the history of its author's spirit, labors and successes. For myself, in reading his work I have found much to object to in his opinions, but also very much to love and admire in his developments of heart. It has been indeed a most interesting relief to turn from the crudities of the one, to the lovely Christian graces of the other.

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ARTICLE VIII.

THE JUDGMENT DAY.

BY REV. WM. B. ORVIS,
MORGAN, OHIO.

Our first article was devoted to an examination of the teachings of the word of God on the subject of the resurrection. Intimately connected therewith is the doctrine of the general judgment or *Judgment Day*. The number of scripture passages is very limited where the resurrection and judgment are even apparently associated, as transactions immediately connected in chronological order; yet the doctrine is current that the resurrection and judgment are but different parts of the one great drama the human race must pass through to their final retribution. That all men are to be judged we do not doubt. We have already examined the doctrine of a final simultaneous resurrection, and believe that the proof thereof is wanting. But since the proof of a general simultaneous assize for the purposes of trial and judgment, is not usually drawn from the same premises—and since the resurrection may in fact occur at the death of each individual of the human family, and yet the doctrine of a general judgment, as commonly taught, be true, we are therefore necessitated to examine the doctrine of the judgment upon its own merits. The term "*judgment*" is used in several different senses in the scriptures, and in other writings. Cruden assigns ten or more meanings to the term as used in the Bible. We shall not stop to canvass these different uses of the term. That it is used in reference to a trial and righteous adjudication—to a time of passing sentence upon or fixing the doom of every moral agent who has passed a period of probation, we suppose is not questioned by any. That the term "*day*" as used in conjunction with the term "judgment" in the scriptures, is employed in the generic sense—not denoting a specific period of twenty-four hours duration—but an indefinite period of

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greater or less extent, according to circumstances, we believe is now conceded by all. Concerning the period and transactions of the judgment, however, there are many different views. We shall mention three or four of the more prominent theories, merely to prepare the way for the examination upon which we are entering. The more commonly received theory is this. The world is to come to an end—and at the end of the world there shall be a general judgment immediately succeeding a general resurrection of all the dead, (meaning the dead bodies of all who have died,) which shall then be re-united to the spirit, that having hitherto, (since the death of the body,) been totally disembodied—inhabiting the spirit world, it now returns to the earth, and in union with the body, is judged and sentenced to its eternal destiny of happiness or misery, according as has been its moral character while previously united with the body. This theory affirms the period of the judgment to be of indefinite continuance—some of its advocates conceiving it to be very brief, while others contemplate thousands or even myriads of years as transpiring in the judicial process.

The Millenial Theory of the judgment, as far as it has been defined by its advocates, seems to be something like the following. Immediately preceding the millenium, or Christ's personal reign upon the earth for a thousand years, which they expect, He shall come in the clouds of heaven, (literally the clouds of the atmosphere of the earth)—the righteous dead shall then be raised immortal—the righteous living at the time of Christ's coming still remaining mortal, and increasing and dying just as they now do—the martyrs, and those who have been illustrious in the service of God, sitting with Christ in judgment upon anti-christ during this thousand years—anti-christ is thus to be destroyed—the righteous thus come to possess the whole earth: and at the end of the one thousand years the wicked are to be raised, and after a short and ineffectual effort to regain the "kingdom," they will receive their final overthrow and be doomed to the "blackness of darkness forever and ever." This period of a thousand years thus occupied, if we are not mistaken, they call the "*Judgment Day.*"

The Second Advent view for a time differed from the above; and if we mistake not, was as follows, namely:—Jesus Christ shall come from heaven, (as above,) and raise the righteous dead—change the righteous living from mor-

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tal to immortal—destroy at once all the wicked—purify the earth by fire; and reign among the saints a thousand years: after which the wicked shall be raised, and all, both the righteous and the wicked, then receive their eternal award—the wicked to be sent to hell, (or annihilated as some came afterwards to believe,) and the righteous to remain upon the purified earth forever and ever. This latter view, however, we think is giving way, at least among a portion of the Second Adventists, to the Millennial view as stated above.

We shall name but one other view of the subject—a view which for some centuries past has not been extensively held; although many individuals have all along entertained and promulged the theory in its essential features. The theory is:—The *judgment day*, or general judgment, is continually passing, and every individual of the human race, at death, (and virtually perhaps before,) receives his trial and final award: the wicked being, then, and finally, sentenced to eternal punishment—the righteous then and finally received home to eternal felicity.

The bare statement of the four different views above delineated, is a complete refutation of three or more of them:—for they can not all be true:—the three former theories named may intermingle, and parts of each be true, if either are true in their general outlines:—but the truth of the latter theory more fully excludes the truth of either of the former. The latter theory is simple—easily defined, and intelligible after it is defined: whereas a serious objection against either of the former is, that they leave the mind all afloat on a sea of conjecture. They will cross and intermingle one with another, and either apparently as philosophically and easily sustained as the other. Hence the premises of either are equally unsound. It may be expected therefore, that we shall assume the defense of the theory last named. The questions involved in these theories, are not questions of fact or of principle, the peculiarities of either involve only the questions of *time* or *mode*. In discussing the doctrine of the resurrection, we placed the scripture argument foremost—purposing to touch upon the philosophical argument in the sequel, in connection with strictures upon the writings of others upon the same subject. In the present argument we shall reverse this order, not because we deem the scripture teachings less unequivocal and decisive, but because we prefer to reserve the part of the argument on which we mainly rely to the

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last. For the sake of perspicuity we shall now define the points of agreement, or views held in common by us, and also by our opponents. 1. We agree with the advocates of the other theories, that judgment according to righteousness shall pass upon all men—all shall be judged and receive award according to the deeds done in the body. 2. We agree in the belief that the whole universe shall be made acquainted with the award of each individual, and the grounds upon which such award has been determined. 3. That there will be an eternal separation between the righteous and the wicked—the righteous inheriting eternal happiness and the wicked eternal misery. We differ only in respect of *time and manner*. We shall have little to say in reference to the *manner* of the judgment ordeal, save that we intend to make some allusions to the preposterous, crude and almost puerile notions on that point too common in the church, even at the present time. The great point at issue then is, in reference to the *time* or *period* of the judgment. The *period* of the judgment is the grand peculiarity of the theory we maintain. Our position is:—The period of man's probation closes with this life—that at his exit from the body he is judged and receives his final award according to his character:—that there is no lapse of one thousand, ten thousand, or a million of years from the period of his exit from this world ere he receives his irrevocable doom:—no intermediate state where the soul is half-blessed, or half-damned, and this simply because of its separation from the body, making the soul thus dependent upon the body for its happiness or misery. Such a dependence of the soul upon the body we consider both irrational and entirely without foundation in scripture. Equally unreasonable we consider the doctrine of heaven deferred, or hell but half-begun, through an indefinitely long period called the *intermediate state*.

The simple idea of *judgment* as used in reference to the awards of eternity, doubtless is equivalent to a *righteous adjudication* to every man whose period of probation is closed. This adjudication, whether it take place at one time or another—whether it be the transaction of a moment or of ten thousand years—whether before or after the winding up of all terrestrial things—does not materially affect the question. The *righteous judgment must take place*, and the universe shall know that God has been just in all his ways.

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Now we are prepared to assert that it is the general and almost universal belief of the church; and it is certainly its general and spontaneous teaching, that the soul enters immediately upon its award in heaven or hell when it leaves the world, and only when men come to preach vague theory in opposition to the spontaneities of their own minds, and the dictates of reason and sound judgment, do they contradict this part of their teaching by lugging in the after-thought, or idea of an intermediate state. That idea, of Pharisee or heathen origin, would have become obsolete long ago and buried in the same grave with Popish doctrines of purgatory, and other like relics of the dark ages; had not Bishop Horsely of the English church again evoked its ghost from the ashes in which it seemed likely to slumber. Yet despite the vague sentiment concerning an intermediate, half-way state thus evoked and perpetuated, undefined and undefinable as it necessarily must be, the *real* sentiment of the church at the present, doubtless is, that the soul enters immediately upon its certain award of happiness or misery in heaven or hell, when it leaves the body. And the question is often and rationally started in the minds of the more considerate, "Why need they leave their determined everlasting abode, to return to earth in order to be judged and sentenced, when in fact the sentence is already past, and they have been reaping the reward of their doings perhaps for thousands of years?"

The doctrine seems to be rather a necessity growing out of the doctrine of the future resurrection of the body, and not in reality based upon any evidently intrinsic necessity. And the necessity growing out of that doctrine is obviated, if our interpretation of the scripture teachings on the subject of the resurrection be correct. We are, therefore, prepared to present, in order, our reasons for rejecting the common doctrine of a future judgment-day, that is, a judgment which is yet future to all the human race, and in connection therewith, our reasons for the doctrine that all men are judged and receive their final award at death. The main drift of our argument will lie against the doctrine of a simultaneous future judgment; for if that doctrine be unfounded, the only alternative is the scheme we propose. A righteous judgment we all admit in common. We reject the common doctrine of a future simultaneous judgment, then,

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1. *From the uselessness of it;* or from the fact that there is no necessity for any such event. Here we strike against the only argument ever adduced in favor of such an event, except the proof supposed to be found in the word of God. And even those who adduce the utility or necessity of such a judgment, when pressed upon the point, usually abandon it as a position not so clear and decisive as might be, and endeavor to silence objections by the sage reflection that *we* do not know all the reasons that may lie before the mind of God for such a transaction, and that it is not best for us to be too inquisitive, nor "wise above what is written:" Thus admitting that they have begged the question of the utility or necessity of such a day, and wish to refer the whole question to revelation. In regard to the necessity of the transaction, we ask, "Why the necessity?" The state of both the righteous and the wicked is fixed. At death they entered upon their eternal awards, and that in such a form that no room is supposed to be left for doubt as to their eternal destiny. And themselves at least, know why they receive their doom as it is, perfectly well. The plea of utility or necessity, then, will turn upon the importance of the universe being made acquainted with the grounds of the award of each individual.

This plea assumes that the eternal God has no means of making the universe acquainted with the grounds of his decisions, especially in particular cases, but by such a conclave of the universe as is generally depicted by the advocates of the theory we are opposing.

Now we maintain that not only is the very idea of such a conclave preposterous, as hereafter we intend more fully to show, but also that the very nature of spiritual beings, and the necessary manner of intercommunication between them is such, that no possible necessity for such an assize can be urged. Such a necessity pre-supposes that not only are spiritual beings the same in essence, but that all their laws of communication are the same with beings here on earth. It is this gross and materialized conception of the manner of spiritual existence that is continually giving birth to the most crude and unphilosophical notions of the transactions of the world of spirits. It is an admitted truth of philosophy, that the manner of spiritual existence and activity is entirely different from that conjoined with flesh and blood. Taking this admitted truth as our bulwark, we assert, on the basis of a rational view of the nature of the case, that there is no

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such necessity: and our assertion, made upon this foundation, is as good as any assertion to the contrary, until it is shown that the nature of the case in fact militates against our position. This we suppose can not be shown. We discover then, no ground of necessity for a grand hiatus in the songs of heaven; and a corresponding cessation of the torments of hell, for the purpose of re-pronouncing a doom which has been sealed for thousands of years.

2. We argue, *that the common doctrine of the judgment day is undefinable.* We do not mean by this, that it is not possible to state some of the main outlines of this theory; but we mean to say that a kind of chaotic obscurity rests upon the whole transaction of the judgment, as set forth by its advocates. Upon their theory, who can describe the last judgment? Who can tell where it will be? How long the process? In what form conducted? Who the presiding Judge? All these things come into view, and are not matters of trivial importance in a transaction of such a nature. But says the objector, it matters not what the definite process may be, or where transacted; the fact of such a judgment yet future is the only question of importance. Answer: the same scripture passages that furnish my opponent with evidence that there will be such a future judgment, also describe the process in the most glowing language: and were it not for the fact that these descriptions oft vary, and seemingly conflict with each other; we doubt not our opponents would be as strenuous for the precise form as they are now are for the precise time. If by plain and direct testimony of scripture, disrobed of metaphor, as they wish to have those passages which give testimony on this subject; they can prove a future judgment, we also by the same passages can point out the precise form of that judgment. This being done, and the results placed alongside of the affirmations of reason and a self-evident philosophy, we do not believe they will *tenaciously adhere to their principles of interpretation.* "But the Bible affirms a future and simultaneous judgment, preceded by the resurrection of the dead." "So," says the Millenarian, "the Bible affirms the return of the Jews to Palestine! and that the gentiles will all be joined unto them and go with them. The Bible really *affirms it.*" It also affirms that the followers of Christ shall have a hundred-fold of this world's goods: that the infinite God sits upon a throne: that we shall sit upon thrones: that Jesus Christ shall gird his sword upon his thigh, and ride

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forth conquering and to conquer: that the New Jerusalem shall come down from God out of heaven; and this after the heavens and earth have fled away, and no place is found for them: that death, hades and the sea shall give up their dead, and this also after the heavens and earth are fled away: and thus, if this were the time and place, we might go on to show the unending contradictions and inconsistencies involved in the common and Millenarian interpretations of scripture teachings on this subject. But this investigation must be deferred to its proper place. The great truth of a final righteous judgment and award to all the human family is all that can be substantiated either from scripture or reason.

3. *The doctrine of a simultaneous future judgment as taught in the theories we oppose, is contrary to the analogy of God's ways.*

God's manner of working is not by sudden and instantaneous exercises of power to cause great and universal changes in a moment. He does not usually perform his most stupendous transactions in the twinkling of an eye. This, to be sure, He can do; but it is not his way. Six days He was employed in creating the world; and geologists assert that this period must have comprised millions of years. Yet so great is his power, and so grand his movements, that in order suitably to impress our minds with the majesty of his power and the glory of his works, inspired writers as well as others, oft dress their descriptions in a costume that would represent these transactions as begun and completed in a moment. "He spake and it was done: He commanded and it stood fast," is the language of the inspired Psalmist. By such language it is designed that we should be deeply impressed with the sense of the greatness of Him of whose works the Psalmist is speaking. Yet from such language we are not necessitated to infer that the transactions spoken of are not *progressive* in the order of their accomplishment, nor that they do not proceed fundamentally in accordance with fixed laws of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent. So we find the prophets oft predicting the overthrow of nations, and great changes in nations and communities; and these changes and revolutions spoken of in prophetic language as though they were the work of a moment, or of a single day. The time of

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retribution upon wicked nations is usually called the "*day of the Lord*," "*day of recompense*," "*day of visitation*," &c.; all these phrases signifying that period when the Lord comes out in judgment upon reprobate nations and communities, and sets his hand to accomplish their ruin, which ruin usually requires the lapse of ages to be fully accomplished. Here then is the analogy we wish to present: a nation is prospered and becomes greatly exalted: in due time by transgression against God, it fills up the cup of its iniquity, and then judgments begin to be poured upon it: by degrees it wanes and sinks beneath the mighty hand of an offended Judge. This day of ruin is called the *day of reckoning*," "day of recompense," "day of vengeance," "day of judgment," &c., to that nation. Nor does any one question the propriety of this application of the terms. Moreover these judgments and awards are said to come upon the nations in a "moment," like "lightning" they fall from heaven, or as the falling of a leaf, or the casting of fruit from the "fig tree." And farther, all nations are summoned to hear, and be witnesses to these judgments, at the time of which, or in view of the terrors thereof, the heavens are said to be "parted as a scroll," and all the planetary systems rocked to their centre, or extinguished. The same decriptions precisely, are found in the New Testament writings, of events that the church generally have referred to the "last judgment," as they term it, which judgment however they teach us, is to be widely different from those described in similar language by previous inspired writers.

We do not intend at this point to enter into an examination of the true principles of biblical interpretation, or to enter upon the scripture argument in reference to the judgment; but inasmuch as our opponents base their arguments solely upon the inspired teachings, we are compelled to allude to them; and in so doing we think we have a right to insist upon *consistency of interpretation*. Hence we maintain that if we may reason from analogy, using the inspired language of the Old Testament, the general manner of God's dealings with his people, and the general analogy of his works, we shall come to a far different view of the transactions of the last judgment, from what is common at the present day. There is no possible analogy between the progressive rise and fall of nations, as exhibited in the real facts of history, and the proceedings of the final judgment as set forth by modern theorists. A nation declines and

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falls in successive periods, while all other nations are looking on, not in a circular group, in body assembled around the devoted land, but engaged still in all their multifarious employments, observing from afar, as it were, the movements of God's hand of Providence in judgment, crushing the guilty people. In this way they, and after-ages, read the fallen nation's justly-awarded doom, and they tremble, and give "glory to the God of heaven." Now we ask, what is there in the great drama of the last judgment as commonly depicted, like unto this? The Son of Man coming physically, in a human form, in the clouds of heaven, all the people living upon the earth scattered far and near over its vast surface, being at once assembled, all the dead of a hundred, or a thousand, or ten thousand generations, immediately raised from their graves, and also assembled in one vast conclave, all these in human form, with their Judge in like manner, and an innumerable company of angels of light, and also of fallen spirits summoned to the great tribunal: the Judge now opens the books of record in the presence of this vast concourse, and each, one by one, (like the process of a human court,) receives his trial and sentence: the one literally goes away to the one side of the Judge, the other is placed on the other side. What is there, we again ask, in all this, at all resembling the analogy of God's works and ways, and especially that resembles the real facts of God's dealing with nations, who are every where in the Bible set forth as examples of the judgments of God upon all the wicked, and in fact as examples of his dealings with the race of man? There is no possible analogy in the two cases, and it is perfectly surprising that men of sound judgment in other respects, should have been so inconsistent as to construe the one branch of the analogy, as they necessarily must do figuratively, or metaphorically, and then turn right forward and construe the same language precisely used in reference to an event in which the subject-matter equally at least demands the metaphorical interpretation, in the most literal and materialized sense.

We now proceed to a direct consideration of

THE SCRIPTURE ARGUMENT.

In pursuing an investigation of the few passages of scripture which our limits will admit of our investigating at this time, it were well for us first to allude to some of the more

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simple and self-evident principles of interpretation. As to these we have no book of rules before us, and wishing to be brief and succinct as possible, we shall proceed directly to state some of those self-evident laws of interpretation which lie before our mind at the present moment.

1. No writing that contradicts the first truths of reason, or self-evident truths, or truths of consciousness, can be received as true.

2. No writing or argument that is self-contradictory in its statements or conclusions in any form whatever, can be valid, but necessarily annihilates itself. This principle does not however forbid the use of similar language in different senses, provided the context or circumstances are such as to render clear the meaning of the language in each particular case.

3. The meaning of every writer is to be canvassed in view of the scope or object the writer has in view.

4. Detached sentences are not to decide the meaning of any writer: every particular sentence should be considered in connection with the context.

5. The nature of the subject-matter has much to do with determining the meaning of any writer. Hence it is to be considered whether this subject-matter be physical, mental or moral, and whether the writer is speaking in scientific or popular language.

6. Circumstances of time, place, people or occasion have much to do with determining the meaning of any speaker or writer.

7. A principle of interpretation that is applied to an author in one case, should be applied to the same author in every case where the language is similar; and the meaning of the language in the latter case should be determined by its meaning in the former case, if the meaning in the former case has been determined.

8. It is to be supposed that every writer will state events, whether past or future in their order, this order determining either their time or their quality.

9. Language is to be understood metaphorically, or figuratively, when otherwise there must necessarily be a disagreement between the predicate and the subject, or the thing affirmed is impertinent, or inconsistent with the nature of the subject-matter. This rule pre-supposes that interpreting the language metaphorically gives it a lively and expressive, as well as pertinent sense.

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10. *The language of any sober speaker or writer is not to be interpreted in a double sense.*

Thus we have stated some of the most simple principles of interpretation, all of which, except the last one, we suppose will be readily admitted to be correct. Rule 10 is disputed by Millenarians, and by very many visionary and unlearned interpreters of the word of God, who thereby foist in as many vain and fanciful meanings as their roving conceptions can attach to the everlasting truth of God. Professor Bush adopts the same principle of double sense, which is doubtless the most fruitful source of all his blunders in interpretation, and the cause of all his inability to defend some truths that depend upon biblical exegesis for their support. We have stated them, intending to be governed by them.

The way now being open for us to proceed to the examination of the scripture teachings on the subject of the *judgment*, we would remark, that by a careful examination of a *large class* of passages commonly relied upon to prove a future and simultaneous judgment, or a formal process of judgment before the assembled universe, it might be found that by the above, or any other sound principles of interpretation, no such doctrine is therein contained. We refer to such as the 25th of Matthew; Acts 17: 31; 2 Thess. 1; 1 Cor. 15: 52—57; 1 Thess. 4: 14—17; John 5: 28, 29; and Daniel 7th and 12th. In order to arrive at the true interpretation of the first passage, cited, (Matthew 25th,) it might be well to compare it with the previous chapter, which is usually applied to the Jewish nation. That the 24th chapter of Matthew does refer to the Jewish nation we have no doubt; nor have we any doubt that the same principle of interpretation which demands such an application of the 24th also demands the same application of the 25th. Where, we ask, is the dividing line that points out the transition from the denounced overthrow of the Jewish nation, to the surpassing transactions of the final judgment? In grandeur of description, wherein does the language of the 25th chapter excel that of the 24th? What terms are used in the one that are not used with all their force in the other? We challenge any one, from a fair comparison of the two chapters, to deduce any argument for a final judgment, as generally understood, from the one, that may not be drawn with equal strength from the other? Our limits forbid our entering into a thorough analysis of these chapters side by side, as we should delight to do. We must therefore leave

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it for our opponents to pursue such analysis, while we beg leave to point out the analogy between the language used in these chapters, and language often used in the Old Testament, speaking of judgments and events that all admit to have their fulfillment in time. For instance, the fall of Babylon is represented in prophetic diction by the constellations of heaven withdrawing their light, and the earth being removed out of its place. See Isaiah 13: 9—13.

See also very similar language in respect to Egypt. Ez. 32: 78, and also in respect to the desolation of Judea by Antiochus. Dan. 8: 10. These, and various other passages which we might quote will illustrate the manner of representing great changes and overturnings in nations; very common in the sacred writings. See also, Job 9: 5—8; Ps. 46: 6; 68: 8; 97: 2—5, and the whole of the 18th Ps. So Is. 24: 9, 19, 20: 2 Sam. 22: and Joel 2: 30, 31. So in Ps. 50: 3—7, God is representing as *coming* to judge his people Israel, in language similar to that used by Jesus Christ in respect to his coming, Matt. 24: 25. In either case the whole earth and the heavens are summoned to bear witness to the righteousness of the decisions of the awful Judge.

Now Jesus Christ addressed the same people that David and the prophets addressed; a people accustomed to such high colored metaphor; and for this reason we ask, how would they be likely to understand Him? We would also apply our seventh rule of interpretation (as above) requiring similar language in the latter case to be interpreted similarly to the former. The principle of interpretation must have been determined in the former use of the language; else the former use of it could not have been intelligible to those to whom it was addressed.

There is but one way to evade this argument in reference to the meaning of symbolical or metaphorical language; in the New Testament, and that is, to maintain that the prophet or inspired writer, whoever he might be, whether in the Old or New Testament, looked forward with a prophetic eye, and borrows his diction from the foreseen visions of the future and final judgment, with which he was favored by direct inspiration. There are some difficulties attending such an evasion of the analogy we have presented.

The first difficulty is, this kind of language, as admitted by all, is *first* used by the inspired writers, in speaking of things terrestrial, or events that were to occur in time. Metaphor is used by way of illustration, or to give force and

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beauty to the expression. In what manner, we ask, would an event entirely unknown and unrevealed to any but the prophets themselves, be forcible or appropriate by way of illustration or comparison? This supposition represents the inspired writers as commencing at the *wrong end* entirely in their prophecies.

The whole field of metaphor, simile, or parable, is a making use of natural and physical things to represent moral and spiritual things. Thus the sacred writers make use of the partially observed or conceived shaking and passing away of the planets, meteors, &c., the reverses of storm and sunshine, day and night, and the various motions, real and conceived, of the earth and the heavenly bodies, to represent the dealings of Divine Providence, either in judgment or in mercy, with nations, princes and communities. Or if a special judgment is to be inflicted upon a nation—the drama is oft-depicted like the sitting of a court of justice—the supreme judge upon the judgment-seat, and all the witnesses and spectators thronging around; the culprits arraigned, and after a formal trial, by recurrence to testimony, and to the '*books*' of record, receiving their sentence, and passing off to the right or left, according to the custom of Eastern princes, in placing their favorites, on the right hand, and others on the left; or like the shepherd who would divide his flocks and arrange them according to his preferences, or their real value.

All these emblems the Jews and all Eastern nations would readily apprehend, and perceive at once the moral or spiritual application of them to things that have no more resemblance to these, than mind has to matter; or than God's doings resemble the doings of finite man. It is too evident to need assertion that prophets did thus allude to transactions and events in reference to *courts*, &c., with which all were familiar merely for illustration. How preposterous therefore, the strange conclusion of so large a proportion of the church, that the events foretold are to be like them in form and process; and this conclusion based on the still more strange supposition, that the foretold event itself furnishes the emblematic drapery, or rather the veritable and appropriate language that fitly describes the great transaction! If this is not the *petitio principii*, we know not what is.

We might submit the same considerations in reference to these passages that speak of an "*appointed day*," and also in reference to those in which the general resurrection

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is apparently represented as occurring in conjunction with the judgment. The principle is the same. We are willing to test the argument upon scripture analogy, taking into consideration the known customs, and manner of speaking among the ancient Orientals. Before arriving at the scripture argument, we had spoken of the utter incongruity of such transaction to take place in form in the spirit-world, which would be another difficulty in the way of the common understanding of such passages of scripture. The analogical argument and the argument from the known laws of mind, might be drawn out to any length, by direct comparisons between the language of the Old and New Testaments, and by appealing to philosophical principles; but in so doing we should constantly apply the same principles of interpretation; hence it would be needless. Our object is to illustrate the principles upon which we arrive at our conclusion. If the principle be sound, we stand; otherwise, *we fall*, and we are perfectly willing to abide the issue. We are as willing to fall as to stand; as willing to be convinced of error as to convict others of it.

The essential qualities of the judgment, implying a righteous adjudication to all according to their works, are not changed by iaterpreting those passages in the New Testament which speak upon the subject, in the same manner that we are forced to interpret those passages we have cited from the Old Testament. Neither the truth nor force of the New Testament passages is in any matter lessened by rejecting the rigidly literal interpretation and adopting the analogical and rational interpretation, of which we have given a specimen in reference to the 24th and 25th chapters of Matthew. To obviate an objection which might arise, we would add that both metaphor and hyperbole are oft found in the most unimpassioned portions of the sacred writings. Mark 10: 29, 30, is an example of the former, John 21: 25, is an example of the latter. Moreover metaphor and hyperbole are oft found conjoined in the same passage, and in fact nearly all the metaphorical language of the Old Testament savors more or less of hyperbole; as a reference to those passages we have cited from that department of scripture will evince. Thus great force and impressiveness is secured to the metaphor. These considerations may be of much use in determining the meaning of such passages as 1 Cor. 15: 51, 52, and 1 Thess. 4: 15—17. These are perfect specimens of that *unifying process*

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of mind which gives such vigor and life to descriptions of things unseen and spiritual: a process so common among all orators; and employed equally to represent things temporal and eternal.

In this unifying process, human life is considered as a whole; time and eternity ranged side by side, in one broad expanse; eternity is seen as a boundless ocean, laving the shores of bordering time; the human race in one vast outspreading army, marching simultaneously off the shores of time, and launching into a boundless eternity;—all standing before God, as they enter the eternal state, and being judged according to the character possessed when they finished their course in time, and entered the spiritual world. All this is perfectly similar, in every respect to language oft used in reference to events of time, which are moreover, gradual and successive in their periods of accomplishment: for example, Dan. 12: 2, speaking of the calling of the Jews, and of a portion of the nation receiving the blessings of the gospel, while the remnant reject and are doomed to everlasting shame. And see Ez. 37th chapter, representing the house of Israel, by the dry bones; all of which are seen simultaneously to arise and stand upon their feet and to be clothed with flesh and life: likewise signifying their coming in possession of future blessings, which blessings they received in successive periods. That the change from "mortal to immortality," is "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye," with each individual, we have no doubt, and so was the conversion of each individual Jew to Christianity; until finally they "stood up an exceeding great army." Thus it is with the human race, as generations successively pass off the stage of life and are judged: each individual passes through the final change in a "moment," but it requires the whole period of the earth's duration for the aggregate to pass the ordeal. Nor can we, for our life, tell why the period of the earth's duration is not as fit a period to judge its successive generations, as a similar or an indefinitely long period after the supposed termination of the earth's existence. We think that much light may be shed upon John 5: 28, 29, and similar passages, if any, in the New Testament, by comparing them with Dan. 12: 2, and Ez. 37: as cited above; the same result would follow from comparing Acts 17: 31, and similar passages in the New Testament with Jer. 50: 27, and Joel 2; 2, and numerous other similar passages in the Old Testament. But we must

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not enlarge. We shall close our argument on the subject of the final judgment by examining one other passage of scripture: a passage, which is probably relied upon more than any other in proof of a future general judgment, and one which we also rely upon more than any other as conclusively disproving it. We allude to 2 Pet. 3d chapter. This passage, we suppose to be the fortress of our opponents; and certainly we have all along looked forward to it as the fortress in which we expected to find unfailing protection. The explicit mention of the "day of judgment," as in the seven verses of this chapter, together with the language of the succeeding context, conclusively show that the last judgment is here spoken of. And so we believe it is regarded by all who maintain the view of the judgment which we are opposing: since this passage is usually first referred to, in proof of that doctrine. We shall quote the passage as we proceed and offer some brief strictures which may serve to show the sense we deduce from it. As heretofore, so now, the limits and design of this discussion utterly forbid any criticisms upon the translation, or any reference to the language in which the scriptures were originally written, although such a reference in the present case, and perhaps in others, might be advantageous to our argument.

"5. For this they willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God, the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water.

"6. Whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished.

"7. But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word, are kept in store, reserved unto fire, against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men."

Concerning the matter suggested in the above passage, we would first remark—The same physical heavens and earth that stood before the flood, *stand to-day!* Nor are we aware that any elementary change passed upon it, or upon the heavens that surround it, during the flood.

2. The same God, who by his power created the world, both land and water, and also the inhabitants that dwell upon the earth, by that same power destroyed the antediluvians; or "the world that then was;" and this destruction was accomplished by a deluge.

The deluge was a fact; but it is to the *destruction* of the race, and not the manner of its destruction, that the apostle would evidently direct his readers more particularly.

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This is evident from the first four verses of the chapter describing the character of the persons alluded to. He wished simply to put them in mind of a great fact, and warn them against mocking at the threatenings of Jehovah. These mockers were, doubtless, mostly scoffing Jews, who were scattered throughout Asia Minor and Judea, and who, more than any other class of people, opposed the Christian faith, and mocked at those who denounced God's judgments upon the incorrigible.

The ungodly antediluvians who mocked at the warnings of Noah, were "suddenly destroyed and that without remedy." So these "scoffers" might expect to perish by the judgments of God, as most of the exceeding bitter persecutors of the church seem to have perished, [see Religious Encyclopedia, Art., Judgments of God,] and especially their own nation, which was emphatically "reserved unto fire, against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." Fire is often used as emblematical of the wrath of God, and since the wrath of God did not destroy the material heavens and earth at the time of the flood, so we may suppose that the fire spoken of in this passage, as an emblem of his wrath, will not destroy them: although some parts of the earth, as Jerusalem and other wicked cities have experienced the dire effects of that dreadful element, even to their complete destruction. The contrast drawn by the apostle in the passage before us, is evidently designed to teach that the wicked in all ages may expect to be dealt with on the same principle of righteous justice; having no reference whatever to any physical changes of the earth; nor any reference to a judgment which is to pass upon the righteous, as the last clause of the 7th verse abundantly shows. But we proceed:

"8. But beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day. The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance."

Here the doctrine that God speaks of time or a day, not as we do, but in a generic sense, when speaking of his judgments or his mercies, is clearly brought to view. Hence the day of grace, of probation, of offered salvation to the sinner, and the day of recompense to both the righteous and the wicked, are indefinite periods; and this very fact is

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made use of by wicked men who take occasion thereupon to abuse God's long-suffering and compassion, to set aside the force of God's threatenings against evil doers. Nevertheless the whole history of the world bears ample testimony that all the threatenings of God, as well as his promises have been strictly fulfilled in due time. Jerusalem itself and all the ungodly nations that have been overthrown for their iniquities are examples in point.

Nor can we have any doubt that the crude notions which are too current among Christians concerning the fulfillment of such threatenings, will have to answer for a large share of the infidelity which is depicted in the first four verses of this chapter, and is very common at the present day, simply because such notions of God's movements turn the attention of men entirely away from the real evidences of Jehovah's power, and the real movements of the infinite God, to a looking for some stupendous miracle, or wreck, or revolution of worlds *in a moment*, which they have long waited in vain to see, although the threat has been held over them from time immemorial.

Every generation since the day of Jesus Christ's ascension has been taught by the church to expect the winding up of all terrestrial things, and general conflagration of the heavens and earth, a visible coming of Christ in judgment every moment, and yet these things appear no nearer to-day than they did eighteen hundred years ago, nor can prophecy or the justice of God's ways be reconciled with any such event, for a long time to come. The whole difficulty lies in entirely misapprehending the teachings of inspiration upon these subjects, and consequently looking for the fulfillment of these prophecies so oft perverted, in something not at all intended by the sacred writers. This conclusion we are convinced, the church will ere long be forced to admit. Let us however proceed with the text.

"10. But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat: the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burnt up.

"11. Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness."

"12. Looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God, wherein the heavens being on fire, shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat?"

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"There," triumphantly exclaims the advocate of a literal conflagration of the earth, "is it not decisively and unambiguously taught in this passage?" We answer, No, not at all! Nay, the literalist himself would not be willing to abide by his own interpretation, were it to be *literally* carried out, that is, were it to be pushed to its legitimate consequences. Who of them really believe that the earth is to be literally "*burnt up?*" Burning over, or purifying, is not equivalent to "burning up." A literal interpretation of the passage would affirm a *total consumption* of the *material earth.* The passage clearly inculcates the same doctrine as Revelations 20: 11; "From whose face the heaven and the earth fled away, and *there was found no place for them.*" Upon their principle of interpretation the passage proves *too much*, even for themselves, since they only contend for a *refining process*, which shall still leave the earth for the everlasting abode of the righteous. [See Adam Clarke, and all Second Advent and Millenarian writers upon this and kindred passages.] Thus they reject the literal interpretation of the passage. Well, we have as good a right to interpret the passage metaphorically, or to limit and define its meaning as they! Will the reader please compare the passage with Isaiah 29th, particularly the 6th, 18th and 23d verses. We have not room to go into a long analysis of the passage, or an extended exposition of what we deem to be its true import. Dr. Hamans, of the English church, who wrote in the 17th century, applies it exclusively to the Jewish nation. We believe it has a more extended meaning: that it pronounces the doom of all incorrigibly wicked nations, the entire overthrow of anti-Christ, and the total subversion of Satan's kingdom on earth: while the succeeding paragraph holds up before us the glorious millenial reign of righteousness, which we expect to be the final, and a very extended period of the earth's history. See next verse.

"13. Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."

This (13th,) verse incontrovertibly fixes the period of the judgment spoken of in the previous context, and settles the meaning of the whole passage. The promise referred to is evidently recorded in Isaiah 65: 17, and 66: 22, a promise which the church generally unhesitatingly applies to the triumph of the gospel on earth. Nor will the context of those promises in Isaiah admit of any other application:

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(See Isaiah 65th and 66th.) Thus we, "according to his promise," are to look for new heavens and a new earth, which, says the church, is *the triumph of the gospel on earth!* So we believe. Hence 2 Peter 3d, *must be interpreted in a double sense*, (see rule 10,) else no proof of a final and simultaneous judgment and conflagration, &c., can be drawn from it. We leave the reader to elect which position he will take: the position that this passage really speaks of changes which precede and usher in the Millenium by virtue of the locality which the apostle Peter himself assigns it; or whether he will leap upon the doctrine of a double sense of prophecy, and thereby render it impossible to prove any thing from the Holy Scriptures, or rather render it possible for every visionary dreamer to prove any thing therefrom which his fancy may foist into its import. We have made our election, and we expect to abide by the issue! On strict scripture exegesis, we purpose to stand or fall. We would commend to the reader an article upon the impropriety of giving a "*double sense*" to prophecy, in Professor Stuart's "Hints on Prophecy," and then we would beg leave by a bare allusion, which may not be unlawful to point him to the 20th, 21st and 22d chapters of the Apocalypse, as demanding an interpretation in harmony with the interpretation here given of 2 Peter 3d, both on the ground of scripture analogy, and also on the ground of the intrinsic import of the language itself. We would humbly inquire whether Revelations 21: 24—27; and 22: 2, 6, 12, 17, 20, are applicable to a heavenly state on any consistent or rational principles of interpretation? As well might we apply the last eleven chapters of Ezekiel, or the last twenty-five chapters of Isaiah to the heavenly state? Nothing but a pre-possessed theory, we are confident, could lead any mind that would carefully examine, to apply the teachings of Peter and John, (as above) to any other than the final period of this world's history. We would here cite the reader to an exceedingly able and lucid article from the pen of Professor Bush, comparing 2 Peter: 3; and Revelations 20th and 21st, with Isaiah 65th and 66th; found in the "Hierophant," pages 4, 25 and 49, which, as it is not based upon any double sense interpretation, (an error of great magnitude in some of Professor Bush's interpretations,) the reader will find both interesting, and we think unanswerable. There is another class of passages, which justice to the subject would require us to dwell upon, a class which

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seems directly or impliedly to assert the view of the judgment we maintain, as for example, "Now is the judgment of this world, now is the prince of this world judged;" and whose judgment now of a long time lingereth not, and their damnation slumbereth not."—John 12: 31, and 16: 11; and 2 Peter 2: 3. But we have no room for farther comment; and willing to leave to every man's reason and candor to settle the period of the judgment in his own mind, if the common theory seem to be unfounded—we shall now draw to a close by presenting a brief summary of our argument, and also of the theory we maintain. Our reasoning is this. If there be no direct proofs of an intermediate state, or of delayed judgment in the case of any individual; if the scripture testimony relied upon to prove either of these, together with a final, simultaneous judgment, is equally compatible with the doctrine of a progressive judgment as maintained by us; and if there is scripture testimony that directly implies the truth of our theory, we claim to have established our position. In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to show, 1. That the common theory is neither a demand of necessity nor of utility. 2. That it is undefinable. 3. That it is contrary to the analogy of God's ways; and, 4. That it is unreasonable. Thus far the rational argument. In the scripture argument we have cited the most prominent passages in the New Testament—those most relied upon to prove the common doctrine on this subject, which being interpreted either by analogy, or by an analysis of their import, we have found to be entirely wanting in proof of any such doctrine, but rather to militate against it! We might have enlarged to any extent upon those passages which seem more directly to sustain our position, but necessity does not require it. Here then, we stand! We find nothing in the Bible that so much as alludes to the destruction, end, or desolation of this mundane sphere, physically considered. We are not capable of seeing what would be gained either by *burning it over*, or *burning it up*, in the circumstances in which such an event is expected by the church generally. We believe the Bible to be given to teach moral and spiritual truths, not truths of science, either in the departments of natural history, geography, agriculture, geology, astronomy or physics. We neither know how long this sphere has been rolling in its orbit, nor how long it will continue thus to roll. These are the hidden things which belong to God, and which it is not neces-

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sary for us to know. We believe that God will judge all men righteously; that we shall all "stand before the judgment seat of Christ, to give an account for the deeds done in the body:" and this very idea pre-supposes that the body is now put off for ever. We believe that Christ will *come* and call his saints to Himself; that all shall be raised immortal at death; and then, and finally enter upon their eternal award of rest or wo!

The leading ideas conveyed by the term *judgment* as used in scripture, are, 1. Christ's reign and rule over his saints. 2. A final, righteous adjudication of awards to all men, without reference to time, place or manner. *Christ's coming*, (*alias*, second coming,) is a term employed in three senses: thus Christ *comes*, 1. To convince, convert and sanctify souls. 2. To cause moral and civil revolutions. 3. To take his saints to Himself, and doom the wicked to hell. The great truth intended by the *conflagration of the heavens and earth*, and a creation of new heavens and earth, is the passing away of the existing order of things, where sin is predominant; and the introduction of a new order of things, where holiness is predominant. *The general judgment* runs parallel with the duration of time, or rather, with the period of man's probation on earth. *A general judgment*, (commonly mistaken for *the judgment*,) the most general and extensive of any perhaps in so brief a period, according to St. Peter and St. John, precedes the Millenium. This is nothing more nor less than the overthrow of anti-Christ and a termination of his power on earth. Christ comes to the nations, and *judges* them: He also *comes* to individuals, and *judges them*. All these are but miniature examples, or component parts of the one great "*day of judgment*" which runs parallel with the world's history. A glorious and long-enduring millenial, or New Jerusalem state, is the last state of this world's history revealed in the scriptures. How long this period will be, we know not: it may exceed a thousand fold the period of the earth's rebellion. Christ "shall see of the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied." Such is the theory we maintain. Reader, consider it: if wrong, we would be corrected.

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ARTICLE IX.

DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION.

BY PRES. A. MAHAN.

All the truths of religion, natural and revealed, take their peculiar form, coloring, and value, in human estimation, from the doctrine of immortality. The idea of God, or any other truth of which we can form a conception, of what importance is it to us, if this "intellectual being" is soon to be "swallowed up and lost in the wide womb of uncreated night?" Take away this one great truth, and nought is left us to sustain virtue, enkindle hope, or alleviate affliction in the humanbreast, and the words grace and salvation are words without meaning.

But the *form* which this cardinal truth shall assume in our minds, as well as the place it shall occupy in our estimation, will be determined, in no inconsiderable degree, by the views we entertain of this one question, whether the immortality of the soul shall be in a state purely spiritual and disembodied, or whether the immortal spirit shall then as now exist in connection with a physical organization. The question then, What is the true scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, is a question demanding a more careful and fundamental investigation, than it has commonly received.

The writers of the New Testament nowhere speak of it as a new doctrine, but as a truth held in common by Christians and the main body of the Jewish nation. Paul, Acts 23: 6, directly and positively affirms himself a Pharisee, as far as the question of the resurrection of the dead is concerned. In 2 Tim. 1: 10, Christ is said to have rendered luminous to the human mind this great truth. But, as we said before, it is nowhere spoken of, as for the first time, revealed in this or any other portion of the Bible.

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As the sacred writers speak of this doctrine not as a truth for the first time revealed through them, but as held by them in its essential features, in common with the mass of the Jewish nation, we will introduce what we have to say further upon the subject, by a presentation of the views of the two leading Jewish sects, the Pharisees and Sadducees, upon the subject. The doctrine of the Pharisees, as far as this subject is concerned, may be thus stated:

1. They held to the existence of angelic beings, good and bad, who had never been connected with corporeal organizations. 2. They held to the existence of the human soul after death, in a disembodied state, a state also of eternal retributions. 3. Finally, they held the doctrine of a general resurrection, in which the souls of all men, the holy especially, will be reunited with corporeal or physical organizations.

All the above propositions the Sadducees denied; their doctrines on this as well as on most other subjects, being rather negative than positive. The following quotations from Josephus will show clearly that we have rightly interpreted the views of these sects on the subject referred to. Speaking of the Pharisees, he says:

"The Pharisees live meanly and despise delicacies in diet; and they follow the conduct of reason, and what that prescribes to them as good they do. They also pay respect to such as are in years; nor are they so bold as to contradict them in any thing which they have introduced; and when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away from men the freedom of acting as they think fit, since their notion is that it hath pleased God to make a constitution of things whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. They also believe that souls have an immortal vigour in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards or punishments, according as men have lived virtuously or viciously in this life. The latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison; but the former shall have power to revive and live again: on account of which doctrine they are able greatly to persuade the body of the people: and whatsoever is done about divine worship, prayers, and sacrifices, is performed according to their directions, insomuch that the cities gave great attestations to them on account of their entire virtuous conduct." —(Joseph. *Antiq.* xviii. 1. 3.)

"The Pharisees are those who are esteemed most skilful in the exact interpretation of the laws. They ascribe all to Fate (or Providence) and to God, and yet allow that to act what is right or the contrary is for the most part in the power of man. They say that all souls are incorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies, and that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment. Moreover, the Pharisees are friendly to one another, and are for the exercise of concord and regard for the public."—Joseph. *De Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14.)

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In a speech to his own soldiers, dissuading them from suicide, Josephus, who was himself a professed Pharisee, uses the following language:

"Do you not know that those who depart out of this life according to the law of nature, and pay that debt when He that lent life is pleased to require it back again, enjoy eternal fame? that their souls are pure and obedient, and obtain a most holy place in heaven, from whence in the revolution of ages they are again sent into pure bodies, while the souls of those whose hands have acted madly against themselves are received by the darkest place in Hades."

Of the Sadducees he says, Antiquities, Book 18, Chap. 1, that their doctrine is, that "souls die with their bodies." Of course they denied the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. The Sadducees were skeptics. Their sentiments, consequently, we repeat, were rather negative than positive. What the mass of religionists around them embodied in their creed as positive articles of faith, they (the Sadducees) denied. The Pharisees, the leading sect of the Jewish nation, held to the existence of angels and spirits, together with the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Both these the Sadducees denied.

The account given by Josephus of the doctrines of these two sects in respect to the subjects under consideration coincides in all respects with that given upon the same subjects in the New Testament, with one exception, and here there is no disagreement, the latter supplying only what the former has omitted. Josephus affirms that the Pharisees did hold to the final resurrection of the righteous; but whether they did or did not hold to that of the wicked, he does not inform us. From Acts 24: 15, we learn that they did hold to "a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust."

We are now prepared for a statement and elucidation of the idea of the resurrection of the dead, as developed in the New Testament. Mr. Orvis says, that "*the doctrine of the resurrection,*" *or* '*resurrection of the dead,*' *as revealed in the Bible, simply teaches—and is designed simply to teach the doctrine of man's immortality.*" Our position on the other hand, is, that the doctrine of "the resurrection of the dead," as therein revealed, is *the re-union of the human soul with a new and divinely constituted physical organization.* As this doctrine implies that of "man's immortality," the term resurrection is sometimes used as including both

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ideas. In some instances also, it is used with special, and we have no objections to admitting, with exclusive reference to the latter idea. This, however, has nothing to do with the *doctrine* of the resurrection of the dead, as revealed in the New Testament. We will now proceed to set forth the grounds of our own convictions, in opposition to those set forth by Mr. Orvis, and others holding the same sentiments with him, upon this subject.

1. The first consideration that we adduce is the fact that the idea which we hold is the identical view of the subject denied by the Sadducees, and consequently maintained in opposition their dogma, by our Savior and the writers of the New Testament. It will be admitted by all, that the teaching of the former were in direct opposition to those of the latter on this subject; in other words, that what the former maintained, the latter denied in respect to it. In determining the peculiar *form* of the doctrine of the resurrection denied by this sect, we determine that revealed in the New Testament. What idea then did the Sadducees attach to the term, resurrection, when they denied this great truth of inspiration? Mr. Orvis affirms that it was simply and exclusively, the idea of immortality. We affirm, that it was that of the re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization, after the dissolution of its present weak and corruptible habitation. That we are correct in our view of the subject a few passages of scripture will render quite evident.

In Acts 23: 8, we are informed, that the Sadducees denied the doctrine of the resurrection in connection with and distinction from that of the existence of "angels, and spirit" [the human soul,] in a disembodied state. "For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both." Mr. Orvis says that we are informed in this passage, that what the Sadducees intended by their denial of the resurrection, was, the "existence of angels and spirits," in an immortal state." Such a construction of the passage is a manifest violation of the fixed laws of the Greek language. The original term here rendered "neither," is never, we believe, used to connect words designed to be understood as synonymous in their meaning. It always, on the other hand, separates words, as differing in their meaning, either as genera and species, or by way of opposition, or as belonging to different classes. The doctrine of the resurrection then denied by the Saddu-

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cees was a doctrine distinct from that of the existence of "angels and spirits." What other doctrine can it be but that of the re-union of the soul with a physical organization? In this passage also they are represented as denying this doctrine in the particular form in which it was held by the Pharisees, which as we have seen, is the identical form above presented. This, then, is and must be the form of the doctrine denied by the Sadducees, and consequently held by the sacred writers.

Equally manifest is this fact from certain ideas which this sect attached to the doctrine of the resurrection. They entertained the idea, as we learn from Matt. 22: 28, Mark 12: 23, and Luke 20: 33, that in the resurrection state, granting that doctrine to be true, individuals would of course sustain to each other, as mankind do now, the relation of husband and wife, a relation which creatures can sustain to each other, only when minds are connected with physical organizations. No one, in ancient or modern times, ever entertained the absurdity that pure disembodied spirits marry and are given in marriage. At least, the Sadducees entertained no such ideas of spirits, supposing them to exist. This is evident from the remark of our Savior, that in the resurrection mankind are, relatively to all sexual relations, "as the angels of God in heaven," implying that in the estimation of all, unembodied spirits sustain no such relation. The doctrine of the resurrection of the dead then denied by the Sadducees, and consequently affirmed by our Savior and the New Testament writers, is not that of immortality, but that of the re-union of the soul with a physical organization.

This, we remark finally, is also, to our minds, undeniably evident from the fact, that the form of the doctrine of the resurrection denied by them implies a state into which the soul does not enter at death, but one yet future. In the case which they submitted to Christ, Matt. 22: 23—33, Mark 12: 23—27; Luke 20: 27—38, the individuals referred to were all dead, that is, in the resurrection state, according to Mr. Orvis. The Sadducees, however, refer to their resurrection as an event then future, according to the teachings of Christ upon the subject. "In the resurrection, therefore, WHEN THEY SHALL RISE, whose wife SHALL SHE BE of them? for the seven had her to wife." No individuals would adopt such a form of speech in respect to persons regarded as already in the resurrection state. Christ and the Saddu-

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cees then were at issue not merely in respect to the future existence of the soul, but in reference to a state into which it does not enter at death, but at a period subseqnent to that event. In other words, they were at issue in respect to the re-union of the soul, after the dissolution of the body, with a physical organization, there being no other question aside from these, pertaining to the resurrection, about which they could have differed.

Mr. Orvis tells us that in the argument of our Savior to prove the doctrine of the resurrection, in opposition to the opinions of the Sadducees He has positively affirmed that the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were then in the resurrection state, thus teaching that this state is identical with the future existence of the soul, or that the doctrine of the resurrection is the same as that of immortality. "But, as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead but of the living."—*Matthew* 22: 31, 32. "Here," says Mr. Orvis, "He evidently uses the term *resurrection* as synonymous with *immortality*, or continued existence after death." We are not influenced by such a consideration for the obvious reason, that at that time the doctrine of the resurrection was so intimately connected in the public mind, with that of the continued existence of the soul after death, that to prove the latter was equivalent to the the removal of all objections against the former. The argument of the Savior then based upon the revealed fact of the present existence of the patriarchs, proves the doctrine of the resurrection in this sense, the only sense in which He designed to prove it: it proves a fundamental element of that doctrine, the existence of the soul after death, and thus removes all objections against the doctrine itself.

The sense also in which our Savior asserts the equality of saints with, and their likeness to the angels, in the resurrection state, is manifest from the context, to wit, likeness in dignity and glory, on the one hand, and in the absence of all sexual relations, on the other. Nothing in this language necessarily implies likeness in *all* respects, that is, perpetual existence in a disembodied state.

The fact too that a learned scribe witnessed the entire conversation between the Sadducees and Christ, and fully approved of the manner in which He treated the doctrine of the resurrection, clearly evinces that He did teach that

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doctrine in a form then generally accepted among the Jews, in other words, that He taught not only the continued existence of the soul after death, but its ultimate re-union with a physical organization.

2. We argue also the truth of the doctrine of the resurrection as we have stated it, from the fact that an inspired apostle unqualifiedly avows not only his opposition to the teachings of the Sadducees, but his agreement with the Pharisees in respect to this doctrine.

In Acts 24: 15, Paul asserts that he held this doctrine in the very form in which his accusers, (the Pharisees,) held it. "And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." When arraigned before the council at Jerusalem also, he affirms himself a Pharisee in respect to this doctrine. "But when Paul perceived that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, he cried out in the council, Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee: of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees: and the multitude was divided. For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit: but the Pharisees confess both."—*Acts* 23: 6—8.

In a subsequent chapter he affirms, that the views which he entertained on this subject he held in common with this mass of his countrymen. "And now I stand, and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers: unto which promise our twelve tribes, instantly serving God day and night, hope to come. For which hope's sake, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead?"—*Acts* 26: 6—8. The hope entertained by the twelve tribes was that of continued existence after death, terminating in a re-union of the soul with a physical organization in a state of immortal glory and blessedness. Paul must have held the doctrine of the resurrection in this form, else he could not have been an honest man in thus avowing his argument with his own countrymen in respect to this doctrine.

3. We argue the truth of the view of the doctrine of the resurrection which we advocate from the ideas upon the subject prevalent among the followers of Christ, who were under his immediate instruction. The question pertaining

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to the resurrection, was one of the great questions which agitated and divided the Jewish nation at that time. From the fact that Christ took a leading part in the discussion of that question, it is manifest that his views upon it must have been "known and read of all men." His immediate followers and intimate associates, especially, could not have been ignorant of the real character of his teachings on a subject in respect to which almost no liability to mistake one's real meaning exists.

Now to us nothing almost is more evident than the fact that Christ's immediate followers held the then common view of this subject, and understood his teaching in respect to it accordingly. Such, as we have already seen, was the case with Paul, who spoke and wrote under the direct inspiration of the spirit of Christ.

Take another example, the sentiments expressed by our Savior and Martha at the grave of Lazarus. "Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again. Martha saith unto Him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day."—*Jn.* 11: 23, 24. Of the meaning of the words "rise again" and "resurrection," as used in this passage, there can be no possible doubt. They do and can mean nothing else than a re-union of the soul with a physical organization, in the first instance with the body previously inhabited, and in the next, with one newly constituted. The term "resurrection" as here used, expresses the idea of a general simultaneous rising of the dead in the sense explained above. These statements no reader of common intelligence and candor will call in question. Nor is any form of reasoning requisite to establish their truth. As Martha evidently used the term in this connection, in conformity to the general meaning attached to it, two facts having an important bearing upon present inquiries stand revealed in this passage—the fact that the idea then entertained of the resurrection, or resurrection of the dead, and expressed by these words, was that of a general and simultaneous re-union of departed spirits with a newly constituted physical organization—and that the teachings of Christ had not essentially modified, but rather confirmed the views previously entertained by his followers on the subject. Such facts, in opposition to any positive evidence to the contrary, are abundantly sufficient to determine our views of the doctrine of the resurrection.

4. But another and a still more decisive argument in favor of the views which we entertain is the manifest fact,

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that the ideas which the New Testament writers attached to the words, resurrection, resurrection of the dead, and rising again, when applied to departed spirits, took their form from and were determined by the meaning of the same words when applied to Christ. The doctrine of the resurrection therein revealed, is visibly based upon that of Christ. He is represented as the "first fruits of them that slept," and his resurrection is presented as the symbol and surety of theirs. We will cite a few passages in which the doctrine of the resurrection is spoken of, in connection with the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

"But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept. But every man in his own order: Christ the first-fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming.—1 *Cor.* 15: 20, 23. "The first-fruits" were always of the same nature precisely as that of the grain which they represented. Such is here affirmed to be the relation of the resurrection of Christ to that of the souls of men. Their resurrection, then, must be the same in kind as his, and the meaning of the term when applied to them must be the same as when applied to Him.

Again, "And God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by his own power."—1 Cor. 6: 14. "Knowing that He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise us up also by Jesus, and shall present us with you."—2 Cor. 4: 14. Here the resurrection of Christ is presented as the *surety* of that of his people.

"And as they spake unto the people, the priests, and the captain of the temple, and the Sadducees came upon them, Being grieved that they taught the people, and preached through Jesus the resurrection from the dead."—Acts, 4: 1, 2. The meaning of the words "preached through [in] Christ the resurrection from the dead," is obviously, and to our minds undeniably this, that the apostles made the resurrection of Christ the stand point or great central truth from and through which they elucidated, confirmed and established the general *doctrine* of the "resurrection from the dead." In their teachings this doctrine took its form from and rested upon that great event.

The same fact is fully disclosed in that portion of the discourse of Paul to the Athenians, which relates to the resurrection of Christ together with the remarks of the sacred historian upon the subject.

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"Because He hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom He hath ordained: whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath raised him from the dead. And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked: and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter."—Acts, 17: 31, 32. The only form in which Paul spake of, or alluded to, *the doctrine* of the resurrection was a simple allusion to the fact of the resurrection of Christ. In speaking of the latter event, the apostle is said to have brought before his hearers that *doctrine* itself, thus evincing, that in the judgment of the sacred historian, that doctrine took its peculiar form from that event.

Once more, the resurrection of Christ is appealed to by the sacred writers as an unanswerable refutation of all objections against the *doctrine* of the resurrection. "Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom He raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised."—1 *Corinthians* 15: 12—16. We reserve our particular remarks upon this passage for a subsequent part of this article. We adduce it here for the exclusive purpose of elucidating the relations, in the judgment of the sacred writers, of the resurrection of Christ to the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead. The relation is this: the fact of Christ's resurrection being admitted, all the objections to the doctrine under consideration are without weight. That event must be admitted. Therefore such objections are groundless.

Now such being the relations of the resurrection of Christ to this doctrine, when we have determined the meaning of the words, "resurrection," "rise again," "risen from the dead," &c., as applied to Christ, we have determined the fundamental characteristics of the doctrine under consideration, as developed in the scriptures of the New Testament. Of the truth of this proposition we see not how there can be any reasonable doubt. But of the meaning of these words when applied to Christ, there can be no possibility of mistake. When thus applied, they never, in any solitary in-

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stance, mean, or can be made to mean "continued existence after death." If this be their meaning, then He had no existence at all from the time when He expired upon the cross till the third day subsequent to that event. For on this day, and not before, did He rise from the dead, or enter into the resurrection state. On this point the entire testimony of the New Testament is perfectly positive and utterly incapable of being misunderstood. The resurrection of Christ was in fact just what we have defined the doctrine of the resurrection to be, to wit, a re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization. Such then must be the character of the general resurrection from the dead; or the sacred writers have wholly deceived us in respect to the relations of the resurrection of Christ to this doctrine.

The fixed and changeless laws of interpretation require such a construction of the teachings of the New Testament upon this subject, especially when applied to particular passages. Take, in illustration, the following verse, cited above. "For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised." All the laws of interpretation require us to attach the same fundamental meaning to the term "rise," and "raised," in the two opposite clauses of this verse. But the meaning of the latter term is determined with absolute certainty in the preceding part of the chapter. "For I delivered unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that He was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures."—1 *Corinthians* 15: 3, 4. The term "raised," then, as applied to Christ, means, beyond all controversy, the re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization, an event which did not occur till the third day, subsequent to his crucifixion. Such also must be the meaning of the term "rise" as applied to all the dead in the preceding clause of the verse.

Overlooking the important fact, that the meaning of the words "rise," "risen," "rose again," and "resurrection," as applied to the dead generally throughout 1 Corinthians 15, is to be determined by their known meaning when applied to Christ, (a fact demanded in the connections, in which the words are used throughout this chapter, and demanded by all correct laws of interpretation,) has occasioned all the errors into which Mr. Orvis has fallen in his explanation of this chapter. This is all the reply that we deem requisite to what he has written upon this chapter.

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5. We remark, finally, that there are passages of scripture which, to us, are without meaning, on the supposition, that the doctrine of the resurrection, as we have defined it, is not the true form of that doctrine as taught in the New Testament. Take as an example and illustration of this proposition, 1 Thess. 4: 13—17; "But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first: Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord." The known meaning of the words "rose again," as applied to Christ, in verse 14, determines that of the phrase, "and the dead in Christ shall rise first," in verse 16. The resurrection of Christ was a re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization. So must that of the saints be. Else we have no fixed principles of interpretation of the sacred word? But there are other truths taught in this passage, wholly incompatible with any other view of the doctrine of the resurrection. We are here taught,

1. That when Christ comes, He will bring with Him the spirits of departed saints.

2. That those who are then alive upon the earth, will not enter into the resurrection state before those who have fallen asleep in Jesus; but that the latter will enter into that state before the former. "We who are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent [be before, or enter into the resurrection state before] them which are asleep." "The dead in Christ shall rise first," that is, enter into that state before the living do.

3. That the living being then changed, or introduced into the state referred to, shall ascend with those previously raised, to "meet the Lord in the air."

4. All the events here described are represented as being future at the time when the epistle was written. Now if we understand the doctrine of the resurrection as we have

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explained it, the meaning of this passage is quite manifest and all the statements made therein, are perfectly consistent with one another. The truths revealed also are deeply interesting and important. But what shall we think of the facts here stated, on the supposition, that the words, "resurrection," "rise," "raised," &c., as applied to the dead, mean simply and exclusively, continued existence after death? What is the meaning of the phrase, "we who are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord?" These words imply that when that "coming" occurs, whatever it may be, some are alive upon the earth, and others not. According to the theory before us, all are alike alive when that event occurs, its occurrence being to every man, at the moment of his death. What also is the meaning of the declaration, "we who are alive and remain——shall not prevent [be before] them that are asleep?" If all men enter the resurrection state at the moment of death, need we be informed that we who are now alive, and shall continue so till death, shall not enter into that state before those will who have already been in it for thousands of years? Is the spirit of inspiration given to reveal to us such mysteries as this? We think not. The spirit of inspiration might as well be given to inform us, that our posterity who shall come into the world a thousand years hence, shall not be born before Enoch and the ancient Patriarchs.

Again, "And God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by his own power."—1 *Cor.* 6: 14. "Knowing, that he which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you."—2 *Cor.* 4: 14. These verses we have already noticed under another head. They deserve, however, to be noticed in this connection. We know perfectly the meaning of the words, "raised up," as applied, in the first clause of each, to Jesus Christ. It means and can mean, as we have already seen, nothing else than the re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization. Now on what principle of interpretation, are we to understand the words "raised up," in the clauses succeeding, in a totally different sense? Why should these words when applied to Christ be understood in one sense exclusively, and when applied to saints in the same connection be understood in a totally different sense? For ourselves, we are all afloat in respect to any settled principles of interpreting the sacred word, on such a supposition.

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We can never make such havoc of the sacred text, for the sake of any theory or form of Christian doctrine whatever.

The whole argument in the 15th chapter of 1 Corinthians, in respect to the doctrine of the resurrection, most manifestly proceeds, as it appears to us upon the supposition, that in that state, the soul will be an inhabitant of a body, that is be connected with a physical organization. "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" The foundation of the main objection urged against this doctrine, rests wholly upon this one idea, the re-union of the soul with a newly constituted physical organization. "With what BODY do they come?" If the apostle had held and designed to teach that the resurrection is simply continued existence after death, here was the time for him to have stated the fact, and to have removed the important misapprehension of his real views which the objection above stated implies. But he does no such thing. On the other hand, he meets the objection on the assumption that the soul, in the state referred to, will be re-united with a real body. This, then, must be the doctrine of the resurrection, as revealed in the New Testament. Such are a few of the considerations drawn from the New Testament, on which our views of this great doctrine rest. As such they are commended to the attention of our readers. In further elucidation of this subject, the following additional remarks, are also deemed worthy of an attentive consideration.

1. There is nothing whatever in the teachings of the scriptures in respect to the doctrine of the resurrection that asserts or implies, that the soul, in that state, will inhabit the same body as now, or that its new habitation will be constituted of the same materials as those which entered into the composition of the old. Nor do they convey to us any information in respect to the particular *form* of our immortal habitation. On these points there is an absolute silence throughout the Bible, and most manifestly in all the revelations of the New Testament upon the subject. All the information conveyed to the believer in respect to the question, What shall we then be? is embraced simply in the two great facts, that "a body" is prepared for us, and that that body shall be "fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body." From whence the materials which enter into the composition of that body are derived, and of what particular form it shall be, a perfect silence is preserved by the spirit of inspiration. Dr. Young certainly traveled quite out of the record, and

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mistook the wild shadowings of his own disordered fancy for the teachings of inspiration, when his imagination bodied forth the following conception of the resurrection.

> "Now monuments prove faithful to their trust,
> And render back their long-committed dust;
> Now charnels rattle; scattered limbs, and all
> The various bones, obsequious to the call,
> Self-moved advance; the neck perhaps to meet
> The distant head; the distant head the feet.
> Dreadful to view, see, through the dusky sky,
> Fragments of bodies in confusion fly;
> To distant regions journeying, these to claim
> Deserted members and complete the frame."

Similar representations of the resurrection which we not unfrequently meet with in the writings and discourses of sober theologians, have no other tendency than to render perfectly absurd, in the estimation of thinking men, a great truth of inspiration, a truth against which, when shadowed forth in the simple, majestic and sublime form in which inspiration has revealed it, the reason of no philosopher, saint, or savage can bring an objection.

2. The utter groundlessness of Professor Bush's main objections against the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection, becomes manifest at once, in the light of the view of the subject above presented. His objections rest almost wholly, if not exclusively, upon two assumptions, to wit, that the only form in which the doctrine of the resurrection has been held by the church, has been that of the re-union of the soul with the identical body which it now inhabits, that body re-organized, to be sure, but yet really and truly the same then as now—and that if this be not the true view of the doctrine, his own must be. Now we would reply in the first instance, that as a matter of fact, it is by no means true that this is the exclusive, if it has been the general form in which this doctrine has been held by evangelical Christians. But suppose that it is, and that this peculiar form of the doctrine is not true, there is still a wide and impassible chasm between such a fact, and the conclusion that therefore the theory of Professor Bush is or must be the true one. It may be true that that not a solitary particle of the present shall enter into the composition of the resurrection body, and yet that the soul does not enter into the resurrection state at death on the one hand, and that it will hereafter be "raised incorruptible," on the other. A book possessing less logical consecutiveness than that of Professor Bush, we have seldom read.

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3. We remark, that to the unperverted reason of man, no objections intrinsic in the doctrine itself, does or can lie against the doctrine of the resurrection, as we have stated it, and as we judge, it stands revealed in the New Testament. The question, "Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead?" must forever silence all objections against the doctrine as far as the possibility of a general simultaneous resurrection is concerned. That reasons of infinite weight do not exist in the divine mind for such an occurrence, our intelligence can not deny. The supposition that the soul enters at death into a fixed and changeless state, or that it will in the progress of the divine government, as an inhabitant of "the new heavens and new earth," which God may see fit to create, become reunited with a physical organization, either supposition is in itself equally credible, and the question, Which is true? must be wholly a matter of inspiration. The world on which we now dwell is an orb newly constituted out of an old one long since passed away, and which was inhabited by orders of sentient existences now wholly unknown. What changes the future exigences of Jehovah's empire may require in "the heavens and earth which now are," and what relations we shall sustain to those new orders of things, all such objects we should be "willingly ignorant of," and not attempt by philosophy to explain facts of which we do and can know nothing.

4. We remark finally, that the doctrine of the resurrection, as we have elucidated it, is not only not unreasonable in itself, but presents to the vision of the believer one of the sublimest objects of faith of which we can form a conception. That "Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father," and that he is now an inhabitant of a body infinitely glorious in itself, though we know not the particular form thereof, are facts most clearly revealed in the inspired word. When these facts stand out distinct before the mind of the Christian, when he thinks what that incarnate Word is, and what must be the glory of his present eternal visible habitation, what a conception that is, that in the progress of coming ages, and at the very period which he himself would choose, he too will be an inhabitant of an immortal body, "fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body." For ourselves we feel no desire to have our faith separated from such an idea as that.

Here we close our imperfect cogitations on "this great argument," reserving our thoughts upon the Judgment Day for a future number of the Quarterly.

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ARTICLE X.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND VOLUNTARY REFORMATORY ORGANIZATIONS.

BY REV. JOHN A. ALLEN, COOK'S CORNERS, OHIO.

A review of Rev. Wm. H. Evarts' position "The Church the only organization appointed or authorized by God for the moral renovation of the world."

One of the moral problems which we should continually seek to solve, is this. Since God works by means, what instrumentality, which He will most bless, can we employ to secure the highest well-being of the universe? How can we labor so as most successfully to turn men to righteousness—to induce in them that state of mind which is the necessary and unalterable condition of happiness. One element in a correct solution of this problem, according to our author, is to eschew all voluntary organized societies except the church and its peculiar instrumentalities and agencies. My efforts to solve it have, however, resulted in a diametrically opposite conclusion, namely, voluntary reformatory societies, are providential institutions, needed by the church and the world, designed by God to accomplish a great good, and worthy of the confidence and co-operation of all Christians. They are not in fact, or in theory, rivals of the church in doing good, nor are they designed to supplant or destroy the church, but to assist and enable her to do the work God has commissioned her to engage in.

To understand Bro. Evarts' position, it is necessary to know,

1. What he means by "the church." He has sufficiently defined the term. "The church" is the different denomination. In this sense, and in no other, he uses the term.

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"The church," his language is, "is a permanent organization with all the necessary offices and agents," &c. Again, "Luther's faith grappled with all the difficulties of reforming the deplorably sunken and corrupt church of that time. The faith of modern reformers abandons *the church* much less corrupt." Again, "it is evident that there were many spiritual members in the church when reform societies arose, and it is evident that the church as a body was not in a spiritual state." Now since "the church" is an "organization with all the necessary officers and agents," and at times is "deplorably sunken and corrupt," it can not mean the sum total of all believers in all ages and countries, nor "all believers under the gospel dispensation, all who are truly converted," for in this sense "the church" is not an organization with with "officers and agents," nor is it ever "deplorably sunken and corrupt." Brother Evarts informs us that "it matters not," if we understand by "the church" "the different denominations," and his language shows most conclusively that he intends by "the church" the present organized denominations.

2. It is also necessary to understand what he means by "sin and moral evil." Sin he does not define, but probably uses it correctly, in the sense of "transgressions of law." This is the sense in which he uses the word sin, or else he means by it something back of volitions in the nature of motives or state of heart, a state of heart back of volition. "To remove sin," he says, "the heart must be changed and the motives purified." I am not certain but that he holds that there is sin in the nature of motives, prior to volition, but I think not, and on the whole think he uses the term sin correctly.

"Moral evil" is, he tells us, "the consequence of sin, its effects, its results." "All moral evil is simply the consequence of sin, as pain is the consequence of disease." Again, "to undertake to remove moral evil except by removing sin, its cause." Again, "to remove moral evil, only, leaving sin, its cause." The consequence of sin, then, is "moral evil," the suffering, poverty, wars, ignorance, &c., are "moral evils." This is all plain.

3. We have now, as the agent, the organized denominations, and as the objects, sin and its consequences. What is this agent to do to these objects? The answer is at hand. "Reform them," "remove them." Our author uses the term "to reform" and "to remove" as convertible terms, and he

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means by them, to destroy or annihilate their present existence, or prevent them from coming into existence. Thus, poverty is often an effect of sin. It is "reformed" when it is annihilated—when it *is* no longer in being—when the poor ceases to be poor.

We are now prepared to state Brother Evarts' position. It is this.

The different denominations are the only organizations that God approves of to destroy sin and its consequences. He says nothing about reforming the sinner—purifying the heart, &c., "sin" and its consequences are to be reformed—annihilated—and no organization except the church may lift a finger to do "any part of the work" on pain of God's displeasure, and the fearful retribution of the "great day of his wrath."

In developing his theory he says many things to which I am strongly opposed. I can not believe them true. After a careful examination, I am satisfied that his theory is not only baseless, but detrimental both to the church and the world. And,

1. He affirms of this church—these denominations, that it "is a permanent organization, with all the necessary officers and agents for the reform of all sin and moral evil which may or can appear either within or out of the church."

Is this true? If it is, why in the name of all that is good, does not the church reform it all? Why does it suffer sin and its fearful consequences, to curse the church and the world? It has power to remove it all, not only all actual sin, but all possible sin. Does it judge it best that sin should abound? What fearful guilt must belong to it, if she has this power, and does not exert it! More, this affirmation can not be true, for admitting that God grants his aid, the church, even if all its members from this time should do all their duty, cannot, by any possibility reform all sin and moral evil both in and out of the church. (1.) Moral evil is the consequence of sin, and some of the consequences of sin already committed will appear, in spite of all the church can do, down to the end of time. (2.) Sinners will live on the earth until the end of it, and the consequences of their sin will appear notwithstanding all the church can do. Hence the church has not "all the necessary officers and agents for the reform of all sin and moral evil that may or can appear."

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2. Mr. Evarts teaches that the church has adopted the correct standard in reference to all moral questions: so that if a society is organized with a standard "more or less strict" than that of the church in respect to any subject, it is an attempt "to set up our judgment against God and treat his standard with contempt." "The very formation of another organization pre-supposes another than the Bible standard. When Mr. Evarts will show that the standard of the church, which, with few if any exceptions, justified slavery, when anti-slavery societies arose, was the Bible standard; and that the Bible standard is identical with the standard of the church which permits its members to carry their grain to the still—and feed that *worm* whose poison is destroying the happiness of thousands, and keeps up the stream of death, I will yield the point. The notorious fact is, the standard of the church is not the Bible standard—it is not God's standard—it is too low. What is the standard of the church in respect to holiness? Is it not that men who live all their days in sin may be good Christians?

3. Mr. Evarts affirms that a society which directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally "decreases the responsibility *felt* by the church" is a supplanter, a rival organization." The idea is this: if the church, however wickedly or however rightly, feels less responsibility to supply the world with Bibles, because a Bible society has been organized, this Bible society is a rival of the church, an enemy to it, and should by all means be crushed. Who believes it?

4. "The fact," says our brother, "that any society embraces other than God's professed people, shows clearly that it is not, and was not designed for the use of the church. Such society is "an attempt at improvement on God's plan of reform." Missionary, Bible, Tract, Temperance, Anti-Slavery and Moral Reform Societies, then, are attempts at improvement on God's plan of reform! (1.) If this position is tenable, it is wrong to receive aid from impenitent men to build churches, support ministers, send away missionaries, or any good work. Every missionary who co-operates with a society that receives aid from impenitent men, violates this position. Every church that receives one cent from non-professors, is wrong. Hence every missionary, and every church, so far as I know, are attempting this improvement on God's plan of reform! for they all receive aid from impenitent men. (2.) This position makes the question, whether a society "is a supplanter," or "an attempt at improve-

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ment," or not, turn on a distinction in the absence of any differences. We may organize a society of drunken professors or slaveholding church-members, and all is well, provided our societies are perfect drones—"do no part of the work," nor "decrease the responsibility *felt* by the church:" but if we set an impenitent man at reforming inebriates, or liberating slaves, or sending Bibles to the destitute, our society is an unrighteous "attempt at improvement," an outrage against God and every thing good. Now as many "professed people of God" are children of the devil, and are known to be such, to make a distinction between them and non-professors, is making a distinction without a shadow of difference. Is co-operation with hypocrites more pleasing to God, than with men who do not add to their other crimes that of hypocrisy?

5. Our author thinks it wrong to organize a society to "do any part of the work," laid on the church. Is it wrong to bear one another's burdens? Does a benevolent man rob a poor widow of needed discipline, when he helps her feed and clothe her family? Is it robbing the church and displeasing to God, for his children to induce impenitent men to help send off the missionaries who are waiting for means to go to the heathen world?

6. Mr. Evarts represents God as looking "to the church for the reform of every vice." Is this true? God does not look to the church to accomplish what He knows it will not: nor does He look to it to do impossibilities. But to reform every vice is to the church impossible.

7. We are told that "to invite" impenitent men to be co-laborers with Christians in doing good "is a bold attempt to prove false the assertions of the blessed Savior, "without me ye can do nothing," and "the friendship of the world is enmity with God." Has Christ said, if ye labor with impenitent men as helpers in doing good, I will not be with you? Is it the "friendship of the world" to labor with impenitent men to support missionaries in Jamaica? If it is, I have all unwittingly sinned, for I have co-operated with impenitent persons to do this, and verily thought I was right. Mr. Evarts wisely refrained from undertaking to show how such co-operation was attempting to prove Christ's sayings false.

8. Mr. Evarts has entirely misconceived the nature of co-operation. "It is clear that unconverted persons can never act on Christian principles, and if Christians unite

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with them it must be upon *their* principles, worldly, selfish, unholy principles." The only thing that is *clear* about this is its want of truthfulness. The union spoken of is such union as is necessary for two men to have, one a saint, the other a sinner in order to co-operate to accomplish a given end. Mr. Evarts assumes that both must be alike subjectively—have the same "principles"—intentions. This is not the case. A Christian is one who is subjectively right—has right intentions. A sinner is subjectively wrong—has wrong or selfish intentions. Objectively the Christian may be either right or wrong; so may the sinner. Hence a Christian and an unconverted person may be united in accomplishing a given object—each may really desire to accomplish that object, be united in the end—co-operate to secure it, while subjectively they are moral antipodes. Take, as an object—the reformation of a drunkard. Any person who labors to secure this is objectively right in this particular. To secure this end a Christian and an impenitent person can co-operate—work together to accomplish the same end. All that such union, or co-operation implies is objective union—union as to the objects, and not subjective union, or being subjectively alike. Parents, one of whom is a Christian, and the other not, can co-operate to educate their children—can be united on the object—while they are subjectively different. Hence, although an unconverted person will not act on Christian principles, or be subjectively right, he may be objectively so, and union with him to accomplish a right end, is not adopting his selfish principle. It is best for the world, and hence our duty to induce all men to be both subjectively and objectively right, so far as we can. It is also our duty to prevail on men who will not be right subjectively to be right objectively so far as we are able. An intemperate man, for example, is subjectively, and so far as providing for his family is concerned, objectively wrong. If we can not prevail on him to be a Christian, and support his family with right intentions, and can induce him, so far as his family are concerned, to be objectively right though not from right intentions, we ought to do it. Mr. Evarts seems to have overlooked this entirely. It is well-pleasing to God to have his children influence men to be objectively right. It is the duty of all rich men to be Christians, and use their substance to convert the world. It is objectively right for a rich man to devote his wealth to this end. If he will not be a Christian, and yet will unite in a society to

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advance this good end, it is our duty to receive him into such society, and co-operate with him in this good end, whatever his intentions may be. The fact that he is not subjectively right, while he is objectively so, does not prevent Christians from co-operating with him, and still be subjectively right.

Again, it is often wrong for one Christian to co-operate with another, since Christians may be, and often are objectively wrong. A few months since some Christians were operating to elevate a slave-holding warrior to the office of President. Many other Christians believed this wrong, hence co-operation between these two portions of Christians was wrong so far as this object was concerned.

9. Mr. Evarts asserts "that there is no need of any other" organization than the church "for any purpose except it be to enable men to get the measure of their own wisdom," &c. The denominational organization, then, are the only ones we need to work out the ends of benevolence—the only channel through which human activity can properly flow. Is this true? Civil government is an organization. It is a necessary organization, in order to secure the ends of benevolence, and is not the church? Hence there is need of some organization besides denominational organization. In order to escape this objection to his theory, Mr. Evarts says, "Political and family government have their foundation in the nature of things, and are not human inventions." How does he know civil government is not a human invention? Simply because it is necessary to secure the ends of benevolence. If this proves it a divine institution, then may many of the present societies claim to be of divine origin, for sure I am they are needed. But Mr. Evarts himself being judge, is not correct in saying "there is no need of other organizations," for he admits there is need of political government.

Again, this admission strikes a death-blow to several of his statements. For since civil government is necessary, and in our country he would admit that all the citizens should take a part in the government. It follows that Christians and impenitent men ought to *co-operate*, hence even he must admit that co-operation does not imply that we adopt "their selfish, wicked principles." Hence, too, such co-operation *is not* "dropping the Bible standard of holiness to the Lord." Hence, also, organizations in which impenitent men take a part, *are not* "an attempt at improve-

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ment on God's plan of reform." Civil government in its appropriate sphere "removes" some consequences of sin. Now if Mr. Evarts' theory is true there is no need of civil governments. There is need of it however, hence his theory is not true.

10. "When voluntary societies are formed, the church as a church naturally and necessarily feels less responsibility respecting the evils opposed than she would if she herself were arrayed against them." The idea is this: a society necessarily lessens the amount of opposition felt by the church at the time of the formation of such society, toward the evil this society opposes. Is this a fact? Did the church feel less opposition to intemperance after the Temperance Society arose than it did before? Has the Anti-Slavery Society diminished the felt obligation of the church to oppose slavery? Every one answers, no.

Perhaps he means the church is not arrayed against these evils opposed by societies, and feels less opposition to them than it would if it were arrayed against them. This may be true, and be no objection to societies.

The heathen feel less opposition against sin than they would if the missionaries had staid at home and they themselves had all been arrayed against all sin. This does not prove it bad policy to send missionaries abroad. The missionaries have increased the opposition of many that were heathen, to sin: so the societies have, beyond successful contradiction, greatly increased the opposition felt toward certain forms of sin, both in and out of the church.

11. Mr. Evarts objects to societies, that there will be no way to guard against the return of evils cured by society effort, "if the church is not aroused" to oppose those evils. Does not Mr. Evarts know that the design in part, and the effect, of some society is to arouse the church. This objection then is an invalid one.

12. Our author objects to societies, that the church "can give no decided approval or disapproval of the conduct of her members in reference to sins with which the societies contend;" both those who join and those who are "neutral," or opposed to the societies, can commit sins with which the societies contend, and escape discipline. I have sought in vain for a shadow of a fact to sustain this charge.

Can it be true that societies deprive the church of the right or the will to discipline those who commit sins with which they contend! I believe no such thing. Let us take

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the Moral Reform Society. Is it true then, when some members of a church are, in good faith, members of that society, that any member of that church can violate the seventh commandment in its aggravated form, with impunity, so far as church censure is concerned? The exact opposite is true. The more the members of a church have to do with any society, the more strict that church is, in reference to the sin with which that society contends. I can not think of a single fact contradictory to this, but many corroboratory of it. I doubt not that Mr. Evarts is a friend of moral purity, and that the charge, though a severe one, against those who are associated in the Moral Reform Society, and other societies, is not intended. Again: this charge against societies violates all probability. Take two churches, one of which has many members who are staunch members of a living Temperance Society, the other has rejected all fanatical temperance men, and embraces several distillers, venders and users of liquors. Such a church could be found. One member of each church gets drunk. Which of those churches will be most likely to discipline their members? Mr. Evarts has answered, the rum-loving church! Every man not blinded by a theory, answers, the temperance church.

13. But here is another charge. "When societies take up the reform, ministers are to a great measure silenced from rebuking the sin these societies combat." How he learns this is a wonder!

(1.) Those ministers that are supposed to be silenced, are those who join the societies. He says, "if a minister does rebuke sin, it is not as a servant of God that he is supposed to do it, but as a partizan, a friend of the society." Now, so far are ministers who unite with societies from being silent in respect to the sin combatted by such societies, that they are continually preaching about them—make them hobbies, and ride them everlastingly. Let a minister unite with an Anti-Slavery Society—and he has something to say about the evil of slavery in almost every sermon. I can not imagine what our author meant by bringing this charge. It is evidently unfounded.

(2.) If a minister does rebuke sin, his rebuke is lost because he is "not supposed to rebuke sin as the servant of God," &c. I can conceive of one who adopts Mr. Evarts' theory bringing this charge, for with him union with a society is apostasy from God—it is "dropping the Bible

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standard of holiness to the Lord." May not a minister, as a sacred duty God enjoins upon him, join a society? Certainly. This also can be understood by men, and give greater weight to his rebuke than it could have if he did not join a society. Some ministers are afraid of the pro-slavery men in the church—so afraid that they dare not join an Anti-Slavery Society, their rebuke of slavery is lost. But grant that with some the rebuke is parried off in this way. Is this a good objection to societies? The fact that a man is a minister, operates to destroy his rebuke of sin with some. O! he is a priest—it is his trade, I expect that of him!

14. Our author says, "it is proper for every church member to say he belongs to a reform society." That is, a "deplorably sunken and corrupt church is a reform society!" A slaveholding church that buys and sells Christians is a reform society! A church that prays for unholy war, a reform society! It does not avail any thing to say every church *ought* to be a reform society, since the conclave of devils ought to act benevolently. Mr. Evarts' affirmation relates to what "every church" *is*, and not to what it ought to be, or would be if they rightly understood their covenant obligations," and obeyed them. Every sinner would love and serve God, if "he rightly understood his obligations" and lives up to them. But this is not proving that every sinner is a Christian, nor every church a reform society.

15. Our brother makes a labored argument to show up the difference in the process of "removing sin and of removing moral evil"—the consequence of sin. "To remove sin, the heart must be changed and the motives purified." "To remove evil only remove temptation." That is, you can remove the consequences of sin without removing sin.

Temptation is inducement to wrong choice, or sin. Whatever operates as a motive or inducement to wrong choice, is temptation. Now how can removing temptation remove the effect while it leaves the cause? Again: since the will is free, temptation can be resisted, and often is. Hence, in the presence of temptation, sin the cause may not exist, how then can the effect exist? No how; hence it is not necessary to remove temptation in order to remove the consequence of sin. No person will sin in the absence of all temptation, for sin is surrendering the will to temptation—obeying it. Hence, if temptation is removed, sin is impossible. Sin is not something back of wrong choice—it is nothing in the nature of motives or state of heart, which

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state of heart is back of volition. We come then to these conclusions,

(1.) Evil can be removed in the presence of temptation.

(2.) In the absence of temptation, no sin will be committed.

16. "Sinners," says our author, will not remove sin as sin, but only "evil as evil." Well, when any one removes the consequences of sin, ought he not to do it for what it is? Must evil be confounded with something that is not evil before it can be properly removed? Sinners do not approve of sin as sin, nor delight in it as such. As sin they disapprove of it. It is merely a gratification the sinner delights in, and not in sin considered as sin.

Now what valid objection is there in assisting sinners to remove all the evil they can? Let them cast out devils even if they do not follow Christ. Let them; and even help them make men sober, if they do not belong to the church. It is a good thing to have an inebriate reformed, even if the man who is instrumental in doing it is subjectively wrong. It is better to get a rich man to give his money to send Bibles to the heathen, than that he should use it to publish Infidel books, although his motives be not right, in the former case more than in the latter.

17. Mr. Evarts says "to say the church will not come up to the help of the Lord against the mighty,"—will not do their duty in regard to the sins of the day—is to "charge the Lord with folly." How it does this he did not see fit to tell us.

Has God said as sure as I am wise, the church in A. D., 1849, will be right on every reform? It no more charges God with folly to say the church, for a thousand years to come, will not be right on all points, than to say it has not for a thousand years past. The church may take the wrong ground in respect to some questions and be subjectively right—it may lack knowledge. How can it be charging God with folly to say the church is objectively wrong on some points?

18. Mr. Evarts makes a most frank confession. It is easy to be seen," he says, "that the evil with which we are contending, arose *not* with voluntary societies, but *far back* of them in *sectarianism*." "Reform societies are the *legitimate fruits of sectarianism*." Now why did he spare "sectarianism," the cause and make so desperate an onslaught upon its "legitimate fruit?" Mr. Evarts has told us that to remove the effect while the cause is spared, "can have no

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better effect than to blind our eyes to the true state of things and fill us with hope where we have only reason to fear."

He has undertaken to demolish reform societies—the effect—according to his showing, while he has spared "to some future time," sectarianism, the cause. Hence, by his own decision, he stands condemned of having "blinded his eyes to the true state of things." This fact perhaps explains the way he came to bring such charges against his brethren engaged in benevolent societies, "his eyes were blinded to the true state of things," by his own act.

19. Reform societies are not only the legitimate fruit of sectarianism, they are the first *ripe* fruit the church has gathered from the world." Now what meaneth this? Are reform societies worse than all the heresies that destroyed the purity of the primitive church? Worse than Gnosticism? Worse than Papacy? Does it mean reform societies come from the world, while these other evils come from Satan?

20. "Reform societies are the first ripe fruit," and this "ripe fruit is the annihilation of the heaven-wide distinction between saints and sinners, the friends and enemies of God —the heirs of eternal life and the heirs of eternal death." This "is the severest cut of all." How have societies done this mighty act, annihilated a heaven-wide distinction? Mr. Evarts did not mean that in reality there is no distinction now between saints and sinners. Perhaps he means that reform societies have shown that licentious, drunken and slave-holding professors are in the direct road to hell. On a mere profession of religion a man was once regarded as a saint. Is this the heaven-wide distinction that has been annihilated? That is: before the scathing, annihilating curse of reform societies swept over the church, a bare profession of religion was a "heaven-wide distinction between saints and sinners"—those who professed religion were saints—others were sinners; and reform societies have shown that this heaven-wide distinction is nothing. If this be the charge all I have to say is, reform societies are not alone responsible for the act of dire annihilation. I admit they participated in the crime!

Now, Mr. Evarts will not pretend that reform societies have debauched the external morals of Christians—have made them drunkards, slaveholders, &c.,—he must mean that they have brought impenitent men to put on the garb of morality! And is this a crime! For making sinners outwardly moral

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do they deserve to be anathematized—called the vilest fruit earth has produced—the most grevous curse that is annihilating all that is lovely!

Perhaps Mr. Evarts means that reform societies have induced, in the minds of some sinners, the belief, that they are as good as drunken or slaveholding professors of religion. If this be his meaning, I would reply,

(1.) This belief was indulged prior to the rise of reform societies.

(2.) It is correct and should be entertained by all men. No sinner believes he is as good as one who lives as a Christian should live.

21. Is it true that "reform societies are the legitimate fruit of sectarianism?"

Sectarianism is such attachment to a truth, not fundamental, as prevents Christians remaining in the same organization. It prevents Christians from co-operating for the conversion of the world. How then did it result in the formation of a temperance society in which all Christians, or Christians of all sects, can not only operate together, but even with those who are not Christians, to make men temperate? Sectarianism prevents men from co-operating for a good end—an end which all are pursuing on account of a difference of sentiment on one or more, minor points. How then did it induce these same sectaries to co-operate to destroy intemperance, slavery, &c.? Surely the child has lost the hateful characteristics of the parent, if this charge is true.

22. Mr. Evarts has represented the church as independent of Divine aid, to a fearful extent. One to read his article, would infer that the church is the omnipotent agent in demolishing sin and its results.

"There is no other power on earth, or in heaven, that can or will do it"—[*Reform the world.*] Christianity—the agency that God exercises, through the gospel is the great hope of the world, and is something very different from the denominational organizations—the church. The church is, doubtless, an organization approved of God. One that needs much purifying and reforming—one that is necessary and indispensable. No society can take its place. We should do all we can to purify it, and bring it to take the right ground—the enemy of all sin.

23. Mr. Evarts neglected to present the right view of the sphere of the church. The church is an instrumentali-

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ty by which *sinners* may be reformed, and saints built up—an instrument that God can use to make men holy and happy, by means of the gospel. Christ is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world. We may safely leave all sin and its consequences in his hands, only anxious for the reform of *sinners*, using all the influence we have, acting in the various relations that we may sustain to the family, to societies, to the state and to the church—to make men both subjectively and objectively right.

24. It strikes me that Mr. Evarts position is calculated, if adopted by Christians, to set the reformation spirit of the age directly against the church. Our duty as Christians is to control this spirit and make it subservient to the cause of religion. The opposition that is felt in any department of the anti-slavery reform against the church had its origin in the wicked union of the church with slavery, and the opposition of a pro-slavery church to abolition. If the church had taken right ground—had not opposed the reform, those engaged in the reform could not have successfully opposed the church.

25. Mr. Evarts idea that much more good would have been done if Christians had not formed societies, is a baseless one. Pro-slavery men tell us if the wicked abolitionists had kept still, slavery would have been abolished in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, long ago. "Abolitionists have put back the cause of emancipation at least fifty years." No one believes any such thing. The whig tells us, "if you had not carried abolition into politics," "if you had only acted with us, we would have had slavery abolished ere this." Every man knows better. So every man knows that if Missionary, Tract, Bible, Temperance, Anti-slavery, Moral Reform, and Peace societies had not been formed, the work which is done, would not, to any extent, have been done. No man need say more would have been done without than with the societies. It is an assumption in the teeth of all probability.

The relation that voluntary societies sustain to the church, is that of helps, and God's plan of reform is for Christians to enter these societies—these Providential openings to usefulness—and give them a right direction, or keep them in the right direction. If they do not, if the church throws itself into opposition to reform, it will soon be "deplorably sunken and corrupt"—deservedly despised by all men, forsaken of God, and a new church will rise to bless the world.

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ARTICLE XI.

THE FINE ARTS OF A FUTURE AGE.

BY REV. J. A. THOME,
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THE present age—so prolific in prodigies—is not without its prophets. Unfortunately, however, for their claims to credence, our modern seers are of contradictory schools. There are those who positively announce that there is to be no future age—*terrestrial*. There are others who as positively predict a future age—nay, reveal its character, as an age of transcendent glory, the true golden age of the world.

With the least possible pretensions to the prophetic afflatus, still if, under the imperative behest of the modern law of affiliation, we must classify ourselves somewhere, we shall choose a place in the latter of these schools. We avow our cherished belief, that "the everlasting hills" are yet to stand a little longer! We foresee successive generations walking, with manly port, the flower-enameled plains, and tilling, in the advanced dignity of toil, the fertile fields, and gathering, to the shout of the harvest home, the exuberant fruits of this rock-ribbed earth.

In one word we believe

"There's a good time coming, brothers!"—

—albeit we can not precisely fix the *date*.

Our alliance with the seers being thus publicly confessed, we must in frankness as publicly acknowledge that we hope to derive very little aid from them in our present undertaking. The keenest-kenned prophets fall short of the age

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which is the exclusive field of our predictions. The flight we have projected is far down the dim future, beyond the limits assigned by the most hopeful to mundane attainments. The state of which we have to discourse—for it is a state rather than a stage, the last table-land on the steep of terrene ascent—must succeed the era of the arts and sciences, not yet at its zenith; and will be the terminus and the reward of all the foregone struggles and conflicts which shall have marked the track of human progress. Progress indeed is the theme of all the modern seers of the hopeful school—here we agree. But with most, even of the most hopeful, it is a progress *from* the fine arts—*here we disagree.* The progress we foresee is along an ascending luminous track, toward acclivities glowing "quite on the verge of heaven," on whose breezy summits dwell the Muses—christianized, sanctified, spiritualized.

The Fine Arts to most appear to lie in the buried past—or if occasionally they are seen among men, it is in reality not their living forms we behold, but only their sheeted shades, escaping momentarily from a doomed repose amid the ruins of Greece. To us it appears that their shadows only have as yet graced the earth—the substance and the soul of them are in the glorious future.

The Fine Arts, like the military art, have been reputed as belonging to a profane rather than a sacred era; and hence it has been inferred that with the steady march of Christianity they must gradually recede; and that they are destined to final evanishment at that grand juncture when laborious progress shall terminate in the fruitions of enduring attainment.

We hold on the contrary, that the fine arts are the gift only of a spiritual, advanced age; and consequently that they never have been known among men, save in the types of a foreshadowing dispensation, and never will be fully known until the discoveries in the arts and sciences shall have been substantially completed, until the arduous enterprises of benevolence shall have been mainly consummated, and redeemed man, resting from his labors, shall have full scope and leisure for the high employments congenial to his superior nature.

It must be obvious by this time, where and what is the point of divergence at which we part with our friends—they affirming and we denying the essential incompatibility between the Fine Arts and Christianity, while both maintain

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that the latter is to be the controlling element in the far-coming age.

Respect for those from whom we so widely differ demands that we examine briefly the grounds of their theory, before attempting to support our own.

The theory to be examined assumes various phases, in different hands.

One is that of Dr. Johnson, who contends in an ingenious argument that sacred and devotional themes are not adapted to poetry, and by parity of reasoning, to any of the Fine Arts.

Another is that of Macaulay, the prince of living critics, who asserts "that as civilization advances, poetry almost necessarily declines." We have only to convert the terms civilization and poetry, into the germain terms Christianity and the fine arts, and it will read "as Christianity advances, the fine arts almost necessarily decline."

On the contrary we have what may be called the puritanical phase of the idea, which repudiates the fine arts as heathenish, effeminate, pertaining to a dissolute and degenerate age—phosphorescent lights flickering among the sarcophagi of national grandeur, and lighting to ignominious pleasures a posthumous generation.

The puritanic school has various teachers. One rejects the fine arts as too *ornate* to comport with the simple dignity of the gospel.

Another denounces them as being of the nature of vain display, as fostering human pride, and therefore inconsistent with the *humility* of religion.

Another discards them as dissipating and enervating in their influence—as at best only serving the purposes of idle gratification, which Christianity forbids. Another condemns the fine arts as demanding for their cultivation a waste of time and an expenditure of money wholly unwarrantable—so long at least as benevolence requires them to be devoted to more substantial purposes.

Another decries them as the product of a pagan period, and no more becoming the Christian age than the Delphian oracles, the Isthmian games, or the Eleusinian mysteries.

Another, of a sternly radical cast of piety, contends that the genius of Christianity suffers no compromise with the carnal pleasures of taste; and you shall observe this scrupulous bigot, while a guest at your table, denounce the fine arts as *carnal*, while with omniverous relish he discusses

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your beef steaks, mutton chops, mince pies, custards and plum puddings.

Without farther tracing the diversities and incongruities of the advocates of the incompatibility-theory, we may already discover that their views are reducible to two propositions, namely:

That the fine arts are too loose in their morality, in their aims, and too much aside from the central idea of Christianity, namely, *good*—ever to flourish in her stern presence, or expand under her rigid precepts.

And, that Christianity is altogether too benevolent, too business-like, too deeply in earnest, too purely spiritual, ever to *find the time*, or *feel the temptation* to patronize the Fine Arts.

The former is the position of the friends of the Fine Arts;

The latter is the position of the votaries of Christianity.

Few (of our readers) will call in question the prevalence of the dogmas, (shall we call them?) just stated. We encounter them daily. They impregnate our literature on the one hand, and our devotion on the other.

They stand now directly in our path. Let us pause and examine them.

Even the champions of the Fine Arts—who have too seldom themselves been devout men—characterize them as having no points of congeniality with Christianity, and as therefore destined to fade as it flourishes.

With all deference we affirm that these self-constituted champions understand the genius neither of Christianity, nor of the Fine Arts themselves.

But we are reminded that they support their theory with facts. And what theory, we retort, is so preposterous as to lack this support? and what theorizer can not contrive to conjure from the vasty deep a troop of ghostly facts?

But what are these facts?

1. That the Fine Arts have always flourished best on pagan soils.

2. That they have usually appeared when public virtue was on the decline.

3. That in their progress they have uniformly been accompanied by luxury, corruption and vice.

4. That the great masters themselves, the high priests of the Fine Arts, have generally been profligate, unprincipled characters.

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5. That since the Christian era, the nations most distinguished for devotion to the Fine Arts, have been least noted for the Christian virtues, or for true national greatness.

6. To the above facts the following scrap of philosophy is appended, we suppose to give to the argument of induction the force of *a priori* reasoning. The Fine Arts tend inherently to develop the sensual rather than the spiritual, to cultivate the selfish rather than the social, to substitute the showy for the substantial, to enervate the manly qualities, to undermine the virtues, and to displace devotion to the just, the good and the true, by the absorbing idolatry of the beautiful.

Singular allegations these, to come from the advocates, the *friends* of the Fine Arts!

But the Fine Arts have no consistent friends save those who discern and proclaim their consanguinity with heaven-descended Christianity.

In reply to the above facts, we have to say,

1. That the Greeks, the chief cultivators of the Fine Arts, although pagans, were the most civilized and the most religiously inclined of all the ancients—the Jews only excepted. It was the people of Athens—of Athens—"the eye of Greece," in regard to the Fine Arts—who drew from the great apostle of Christianity a commendation as imperishable as the Book of books, in which it stands recorded, though it has suffered a temporary obscuration by a bad rendering in our version, which unfortunately converts commendation into censure, by making Paul say, "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious," when he meant to say, "very much disposed to the worship of divine beings."

We are loth to take liberties with our version of the sacred scriptures; we therefore, and in order to give credit to whom credit is due, ascribe this stricture to the learned Archbishop Whately.

2. That the age of the Fine Arts in Greece was not the period of her decline, but of her proudest glory. It was indeed a brief day, brief as it was bright, and it was followed by a dark, long night; but this was not the effect of the Fine Arts of Greece, but of the base arts of Macedon Philip, and of the baleful ambition of his greater son.

The Augustan age too, which was the next and the latest era of the Fine Arts before Christ—one of those rare intervals when the Temple of Janus was closed—was the me-

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ridian of Rome's renown, when the sheen of her arms was eclipsed by the lustre of her literature.

3. To the next fact in order we reply that dissoluteness and vice can not justly be imputed to artists above other orders of men, their cotemporaries. Among them is a host of names as illustrious for virtue as for genius,—philanthropists, public benefactors, exemplars of moral excellence, and private worth; and we venture to challenge any secular avocation or any learned profession not strictly sacred, to show a shorter, or a lighter shaded *black list*.

4. The charge against those nations where, since the Christian era, the Fine Arts have chiefly haunted, as Italy for example, must be admitted to have more force. What is soft-skied, sunny-plained Italy but a land of artists, of beggars! and of courtezans?

For the present we shall allow this fact to stand unresponded to and unexplained—promising to dispose of it hereafter.

5. We beg a similar indulgence in regard to the alleged tendencies of the Fine Arts, as in our reply hereto, certain principles are involved which we have not yet educed. But we can not forbear to recommend to those who urge the tendencies of the Fine Arts against our theory, to consider that the very same or equally evil tendencies pertain to the sciences, to the mechanic arts, to commerce, and to that most indispensable institution, human government. Every mortal pursuit tends to excess in its own direction, and there is no department of activity or enterprize which will not distort and finally deprave the character of him who exclusively or excessively prosecutes it.

The other position is that Christianity is intrinsically hostile to the cultivation of the liberal arts, as an idle, aimless employment, that it arrays against the ideal and the beautiful, the actual and the useful, that it inculcates stern principles, sober doctrines, solemn verities, that it enjoins a mortification of the taste, a suppression of the imagination and a repudiation of the gauds and vanities of this world.

I have purposely given a variety of forms to this statement, that by so doing I might present a specimen of the vague generalities which in treating upon this subject are usually employed instead of precise terms and logical propositions. The aim of such round assertions, conveying truth indeed, but not relevant truth, is to make the definite impression that Christianity is irreconcilably inimical to the

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Fine Arts. Such an impression undoubtedly exists. We regard it as both unjust and unfortunate, and to remove it is, we confess, one of the principal objects of the present effort.

The main difficulty here consists in ascertaining definitely the grounds of the unfavorable impression referred to,—an attempt which may well be regarded as hopeless, since the impression is little more than a sheer prejudice. So far as it has any groundwork it consists, we apprehend, of the two following assumptions—both of which are false:

That Christianity is purely utilitarian in its genius; and

That the Fine Arts are merely caterers to personal pleasure.

Now we might grant these statements to be substantially true; and yet insist upon the compatibility of Christianity and the Fine Arts, the latter sustaining to the former the important relation of a recreative system. This is a forcible view of the subject, and it is as far as many would be disposed to go; but we contend for much more. Unquestionably the pursuits of the Fine Arts do furnish the most appropriate recreation for minds engaged in the strife of truth; and accordingly the most devotedly practical men in every age have been wont occasionally to refresh their over-taxed energies by resorting to the creations of genius; and not unfrequently by cultivating themselves some branch of the Fine Arts.

The world is indebted to this recreative efficacy of the arts for many of the finest productions in poesy, music, painting, &c. Hitherto the acknowledged utility of the Fine Arts in this humble relation has been their great recommendation with sober people; this has been in fact their chief function; and will continue to be so probably for some generations longer, that is, so long as Christianity shall be agressive and militant, rather than at rest in her triumphs. Prior to that period Christianity must occupy a sphere in which she can but imperfectly exhibit herself; and the Fine Arts likewise must play a part which, however important, is indefinitely inferior to that noble one to which they are surely destined.

He then who argues, from the hitherto province of either, its true genius and ultimate destiny, must arrive at the most erroneous conclusions.

We desire here to call your attention to the fact that the world has *never yet enjoyed a Christian age!* A Christian era we have had—*but not a Christian age!*

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By this we mean an age in which the principles of Christianity, as revealed in the Bible, and the spirit of Christianity, as perennially imparted from heaven, shall pervade the world and give their full impress to the political, secular, social and literary institutions, then in existence, abolishing such as are inherently vicious, and calling into being such as are demanded by the true interests of mankind. Nothing less than this can realize the idea of a Christian age, and we certainly have had no such felicitous age. Christianity *in* the world is one thing—Christianity *reigning* in the world, another. Christianity winning and working its weary way from one reluctant heart to another is wholly different from Christianity swaying its righteous sceptre over a willing and rejoicing race. Between Christianity as it has been in the beginning, and will be in the end, there is a contrast not unlike that between the conditions of its Divine Founder at his first and his second advent; then a despised and ignominious servant, clad in the costume of poverty, and exhibiting the deep-carved lineaments of supernatural sorrow, anon a descending Prince, invested with the pomp of angelic attendance, announced by cherubic legions trumpet-tongued, and conveyed by bickering steeds of fire in a chariot of burnished clouds.

We can scarcely form a conjecture from the Christian era, what the Christian age will be—especially if we compare the two by way of resemblance. The only method by which we can attain even to a distant conception of the truth is to *contrast* the era with the age—as winter with summer. Upon instituting such a contrast—which we have time now only to hint at, and to recommend as a fine theme for the essayist, with the imposing title, The Christian Era and the Christian Age Contrasted—it will at once be found how numerous and well-defined are the points of disparity. The wide extremes of war and peace, of conflict and victory, of weakness and power, of poverty and riches, of dishonor and glory, of progress and consummation, are scarcely strong enough, with our common-place ideas of them, to represent the actual contrasts denoted by the terms the Christian era and the Christian age.

Many a serious blunder has resulted from the absurd assumption that the maturity of Christianity is to be identical with its infancy; that the manners, usages and sayings of its primitive teachers are an inflexible pattern for all future phases of the great complex system of which they simply

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furnished the primal elements. Especially do the Fine Arts suffer from this assumption; for nothing could be more unlike *them* than most of the early phenomena of Christianity; though in the passing reference we shall make to these it will be seen that they are interspersed with scenes, containing incidents of rare beauty—the richest elements of the Fine Arts.

Look at the Harbinger of this coming kingdom—a hair-habited hermit, issuing from the wilderness of the Dead Sea, with a leathern girdle about his loins and a stock of locusts and wild honey, and with stentorian voice, crying, Repent, Repent, Repent—diversifying this disyllabic monotony with those other words uncouth, which might well have frightened *all the Muses*, "O generation of vipers! who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?"

What could be hoped *for the Fine Arts* from a religion thus harshly heralded?

Yet, look ye, there is an august grandeur about that Nazaritic Monk which may light the fires of genius. There is the beauty of a fair-cheeked child in the humility with which he lays his accumulating honors at the feet of Him, the latchet of whose shoes he was not worthy to unloose.

But who is that Mighter One, in the lustre of whose rising orb, the star of the Harbinger is soon to pale? A carpenter's son! a plain man, with a marred visage, unlettered, unattired, untitled, unattended! A most *anliterary* personage, who never wrote a verse, nor swept a lyre. His teachings and his life seem alike unfriendly to the Fine Arts. He inculcates goodness, meekness, self-forgetfulness, lowliness of mind. He associates with the humble poor, and when he has gathered from their ranks a few illiterate followers, he founds no academy of Philosophy, no school of Belles Lettres, but sets up in their midst as the model of their aspirations, a little child! Strange teacher this!

When shall Philosophy and the Fine Arts find fostering care in his kingdom?

Yet, look ye again, this unique prophet, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks a fool, brought to earth the seeds of a diviner wisdom than ever illuminated the Academy of Plato or the Lyceum of the Stagirite. This man of sorrows, who wrote no poem, was, as Milton hath expressed it, "himself a true poem."

His whole wondrous life—from its epic dawn to its tragic catastrophe—is a transcendent poem. It began in a song

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of angels—the lowly natal spot was lighted by a star, which moved athwart the vault of heaven, *restless*, till it stood over the place where the young child was—though in revolting propinquity to the creatures of the stall; yet his infant senses were regaled with the odors of Araby the Blest, wise men from the East shedding around him the rich perfume of frankincense and myrrh, and laying their golden offerings in homage at his royal feet.

Again you will find the exhaustless treasures of the creative arts in the mystery which hangs over a life of thirty years, preceding his entrance upon his public mission—a life of which we have no record save that exquisitely charming incident of his standing at the age of twelve, in the court of the temple, amid the bearded doctors of the law—while for three days his parents sought him sorrowing. The artist is yet to arise, of imagination vast enough and hallowed with the hue of heaven, to explore and illumine the dense mystery of that hidden life of an incarnate God! Over which for inscrutable reasons, revelation has thrown its veil.

The public career of the Messiah begins with one of the most beautiful pictures that ever poet or painter conceived—the august Savior is seen issuing from the waters of the Jordan, led by the awe-struck Harbinger—the Holy Ghost descending, alights upon his baptized brow in the lovely form of a dove—and now a voice is heard in the deep sky—it is the voice of Jehovah—"This is my beloved Son."

Linger, O linger—seraphic vision, scene august—confluence of divinities. O man, divest thyself of Sabbath school associations, forget if thou canst thy blundering rehearsal of the ill-committed words which record this narrative, and the penalty of a chiding look and a remanded lesson, making the passage, at first tedious, at length intolerable. Come view this scene in its freshness. A God arising from the waters, that trickle adown his form and kiss his sacred feet—favored of streams art thou, Jordan! A God descending from the skies—hovering for one moment on fluttering pinions—then alighting a dove—most beautiful of birds—upon the head of the Christ in token of his anointing! A God—superincumbent, bowing the very heavens in marvelous proximity, and burthening the mute air with his voice, uttering words in the language of men.

Among all the creations of genius, where can aught be found to compare in sublimity with this scene? We won-

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der that it has not attracted the attention of our modern Longinuses, in their quest for the sublime.

Immediately after this, and by a suddenness of transition, which itself eclipses human fiction, occurs the temptation in the wilderness—a transaction fraught with dramatic power and poetic material, which has been but partially developed in the Paradise Regained.

The sombre life of the Redeemer is ever and anon illumined even to its close, by some touching incident of matchless loveliness, as the breaking of the alabaster box by the loving woman, and the shedding upon the Savior's head of the priceless perfume, far-fetched by adventurous merchants; or by some scene of thrilling pathos, as that at the grave of Lazarus, where, in the two words "Jesus wept" is condensed a world of feeling; or by some words from his divine lips which yet gleam "like apples of gold in pictures of silver"—as that passage of which the severely judging, sagacious Christopher North has said—"What is all the poetry that genius ever breathed over all the flowers of this earth, to that one divine sentence,"—"Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin, and yet I say unto you that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these."

But, O where, where shall we send the imagination for inspiration—where shall we bid genius go, and stand with unsandalled feet, and broad brow, bared and bent, and prophet mantle wrapped about his trembling form, while the gift within him burns like an holocaust upon the altar of devotion—where but at the base of Calvary, on which a God expires between the darkening heavens and the rending earth!

We advert to these points to show how there gleams flower-like or gem-like along the Savior's rugged pathway, the primal elements of *a yet future system* of fine arts. To rear this system was far from being the immediate object of Christ. To found his *kingdom* on the earth was the work of his life; and *of this kingdom* the system referred to was to be one of the remotest, latest fruits. We should look therefore for few and faint intimations in his teachings of a result so distant; and we should not be staggered even if we could discover no indications of his ever having such an object in view.

The same observations apply to the immediate successors of our Lord—his Apostles. The absence in their writings

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of any formal recommendation of the fine arts to the attention of the early Christians, the absence even of the slightest outlines of a system of taste, in the Epistles of Paul, of Peter or of John, nay, the occasional occurrence of sentiments and expressions which seemingly bear, and with no small force, against such pursuits, afford not the smallest presumption in reality against the theory that Christianity is yet destined to be the basis of a spendid system of fine arts.

It is by no means essential to suppose that the Apostles had any apprehension of the prospective existence of such a system. If they had, it is not certain that they would have dwelt upon it in their canonical writings; it is even probable that they would have written many things, as they have, apparently unfavorable to such an idea. For example, it is not inconsistent with Paul's having a distinct anticipation of a future system of Christian fine arts, that he should declare to the Corinthians, "I am determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ and Him crucified." What reader doubts that Paul anticipated the distant day when the gospel which he preached in peril of his life, should revolutionize the business, the politics, the science and the philosophy of the world? Yet his language savors as strongly of indifference to these objects as to the fine arts.

The simple solution of this is—Paul was not called to be a philosopher, nor an artist—neither had the time come for Christians generally to enter these departments. Paul had another calling. He was the Foundation-layer, and as such it behooved him to know little and to say less about the superb structure afterwards to be reared upon his foundation, and whose top-stone was to be brought up ages thence, with shoutings of Beauty, Beauty unto it. His was the matter-of-fact business of laying the massive foundation, hence of that he speaks. Christ was the Chief Corner-Stone; hence upon Him he dwells. Wherever we meet with Paul, we find him laboring at the foundation work. Whether he addresses a Roman Governor, beneath the awing insignia of that iron dominion which ruled the world, and whose manacles were at that moment fastened about his wrists; or harangues the Athenians from Mars' Hill, amid the clustering associations of their glory, and the smoking altars of their idolatry; whether he writes epistles to the Seven-Hilled City, to dissolute Corinth, or to shrine-making Ephesus, he is the same Paul—the foundation-layer.

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But it were unwise to conclude from the heavy tools he wielded, from the sturdy blows he dealt, and from the rolling sweat that testified his toil—that Christianity would *never* have any lighter labors, any more congenial offices, any more refining employments for her followers. It were unwise to infer from the severe simplicity of the foundation, where strength alone is demanded, a like character in the completed edifice.

Had you a few years ago stood, as I stood, on the spot where now the fair proportions of Trinity Church grace the metropolis of our country, and had you surveyed the wide spread and high piled masses of shapeless materials, which cumbered the enclosures, you would have been forced to call to your aid both reason and imagination before you could have believed that those crude elements would ever have composed, as now they do, a stately temple,

> "Where through the long-drawn aisle and fretted vault,
> The pealing anthem swells the note of praise."

Judging solely from the spectacle before your eyes, you would have pronounced it a dispensation of rubbish. You might indeed have seen moving amid the chaos, the busy forms of the mason and the carpenter, of the mortar-maker and the hod-carrier; but you *could not* have seen the *genius of architecture*, which presided over the scene, and guided the brawny arm of labor, and before whose lustrous eye there even then glowed the splendid vision of Trinity church.

To have pronounced it in this case impossible that a noble monument of one of the fine arts should be the product of such inextricable confusion and rude toil would have been analogous to the act we have been considering—that of concluding that a system of fine arts can never be the product of a religion founded as was the Christian, in stern simplicity and naked truth. We feel, therefore, warranted in pronouncing the conclusion an unsound one.

We proceed next to say, that as we can not argue from the practice of the founders of Christianity, neither can we argue from the practice of its friends in any subsequent generation, *what* will be the nature of the pursuits in which Christianity will enlist man, when it shall have redeemed the race. The only rational judgment is that they will be materially different and indefinitely higher.

Do you ask how we reach this conclusion? We answer, —The work which Christianity has hitherto assigned her

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followers, has been that of establishing her kingdom. This work has necessarily been slow and arduous—on account of the universal hostility of mankind. At every step of her progress, Christianity has encountered the most strenuous resistance. Her history accordingly has been one of incessant moral warfare. The battle field is seldom fertile in the fruits of the fine arts; it could not therefore, be expected that they would thrive under the auspices of a militant Christianity. But to what end have been these incessant moral conflicts? For their own sakes merely? Is contention the congenial element of Christianity? Nay! If she has been aggressive, if she is yet aggressive, it is in order that she may ultimately be at rest. She is combatting error, darkness, vice, crime, oppression, violence, selfishness and deformity, only that she may introduce her reign of light and love, of peace and prosperity, piety and philanthropy, utility and beauty. It may only be a facetious fiction in regard to belligerent nations, but in regard to Christianity militant it is a fixed principle—she fights that she may *conquer a peace*. Now is it not an obvious conclusion that when her peaceful and equitable dominion shall have been established, and the great mass of the human family, not to say the whole, shall have cordially submitted to her benignant sway, that then Christianity will find some better employment for her millions of illuminated subjects, than that of cleansing the already cleansed Augean stables. Will not even her veteran soldiers, whose venerable forms shall linger on the verge of that better day, and whose dim eyes shall catch the dawn of that brighter sun, gladly unbuckle the harness of war, and sit down among the children to learn, ere they depart, some lessons in the more excellent way?

What this more excellent way will probably be, we shall hereafter see.

We have thus far shown that there has been as yet no Christian age; but that since the Christian era every movement has been preparatory to this grand consummation. A Christian age will surely come.

As there has been no Christian age, so there has been no age since the Christian era favorable to the cultivation of the fine arts. Whether the Christian age will be any more so, is hereafter to be considered. We can not forbear however noticing just now the fact that the very evils and vices which Christianity has been contending against, are

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the worst foes to the fine arts. This affords a strong presumption that when Christianity shall have entirely eradicated them, she will at least suffer the fine arts to experience the relief and benefit of their extinction. This would be only helping the fine arts negatively; but still this is no unimportant point gained.

We pause here, before proceeding to show that the Christian age will be the age of fine arts, to advert to the doctrine of the Christian cycle. It has been common to divide the history of this world into ages merely, without observing that it is as distinctly marked by cycles. For example, we hear of an iron age, a brazen age, a silver and a golden age; a heroic age and a martyr age. We hear of the Egyptian age, the Grecian age, the Roman age, the Saracenic and the Christian ages. These are manifestly incomplete divisions of time, from which no connected and intelligible view can possibly be had of human progress and development. The only correct view of the stream of mortal affairs, as we humbly submit, is to be obtained by reducing the entire course of time to two cycles—the first before Christ, the second after Christ, and therefore called the Christian cycle, in which are comprehended both the Christian Era and the Christian Age.

It is not our present purpose to enter fully into this subject, and we fear that the little we shall have time now to say will but serve to involve the subject in obscurity, and provoke you to reject the whole theory as unintelligible jargon. You will however undoubtedly grant this postulate—that it is both natural and reasonable to make the advent of Christ the end of one and the beginning of another grand division of time, comprising together the entire history of the race. These divisions we call cycles.

Our next position we think you will as readily allow—it is that in each of these divisions or cycles there may be traced, notwithstanding frequent interruptions from disturbing forces, a consecutive stream, in which one generation or age follows another, somewhat as do the successive stages of man's life. Indeed we can discover that each of these cycles, like the life of man, has three periods, the animal, the intellectual, and the moral or spiritual. These distinctions however are not so clearly marked in the pagan as in the Christian cycle; nor is the former in any respect so well developed as the latter.

The first cycle is but the shadow of the second, and was allowed to precede it, as we may reasonably conjecture,

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that there might be a fair and ample experiment of what mankind could attain to as a race, without divine illumination and a Savior.

The philosophy and the fine arts of Greece, and the power and partial freedom of Rome, were the maturest and the richest fruits of that long protracted experiment. They were splendid achievements indeed; yet they were extremely imperfect, and above all, they were essentially evanescent. But they were the best that man, *unchristianized*, could do.

Then begins the second cycle—the Christian. It begins in many respects, *de novo*. It makes nothing of past attainments, it rejects Grecian wisdom, it discards Roman power. It gathers its materials from the simplest elements to be found. It goes to the quarries and the forests. It digs through the alluvial, the diluvial, the tertiary, and the secondary formations, and lays its foundations in the primary. It institutes the same processes of formation, and in the same order; but it proceeds more rapidly, more vigorously, on a scale of greater magnificence, and in a style indefinitely more perfect. As an evidence of its greater rapidity and vigor, we might adduce the fact that, although it has been opposed by all manner of commotions, upheavings, earthquakes, and volcanic irruptions, yet it has accomplished in eighteen hundred years nearly the work of the preceding four thousand, and judging from this rate of progress the expiration of two thousand years may be the completion of the Christian cycle—at least the beginning of the Christian age.

The order of formation, as we have said, is substantially the same as in the Pagan cycle.

1. We observe first the rude period of foundation-laying.

2. For some time after, as well as during this initial period, we notice distinctly the feeble force of the formative principle—other influences originating in the passions of the individual, and in the old, deeply-rooted customs of society, overpowering it for the time.

3. Still the new principle, I mean Christianity, is operating—fighting its slow but sure way to its destined ascendency. Its first signal triumph consists in reducing man from barbarism and isolation into an organized social condition.

4. It gradually habituates the wayward race to industrial pursuits. It then presents partially, civilized man with a system of trade, which lengthens the cords and strengthens the stakes of the social tabernacle.

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5. Next a series of wonderful discoveries facilitates human progress. The compass opens the highway of commerce. Soon the art of printing, or as some one observes, more properly the invention of paper, opens entirely new fields to the restless activity of man.

6. Then begins the intellectual era. The schoolmaster goes abroad.

7. Then we have the union of the arts and sciences—a union productive of the most salutary fruits. All so far is purely utilitarian. But the useful must precede the elegant.

The arts and sciences bring wealth, wealth affords leisure and knowledge improves it in the higher intellectual pursuits. Thus we have schools of philosophy, of science, of theology. The pursuits in these departments kindle an unprecedented enthusiasm, and multitudes are attracted from sensual pleasures and physical labors, into the rich mines of literature—richer far than Californian!

8. Last in the order of development, and highest in the ascending scale, come the fine arts. Their day is not yet. True, they have an individual votary here and there, all along the Christian cycle; but these live before their time. They are never appreciated—they can never be what in a congenial age they might have been. They struggle against the adverse tide, and sink, though their works do follow them.

So much for the theory of cycles. Its application to our subject may be briefly stated. As under the pagan cycle the period of the fine arts came last, so will it under the Christian, which observes the same order; and as the Christian cycle has indefinitely excelled the pagan, in all its progressive stages thus far, so will it in the last. Consequently, the fine arts of the Christian age will be immeasurably superior to those of the old golden age.

Turn we now from this exploration of the past to the more inviting future—to that Christian age toward which we stretch our vision with the passionate longing of a Jew, gazing away from the willow-hung rivers of Babylon toward the sacred city.

"Watchman! what of the night?" Does the day yet dawn? Alas, not yet! How many generations are yet to live and die, before the ushering in of the Christian age, it is impossible to divine. On this point, we have no theory to maintain—no speculations to detail. It were easy to enumerate by the score corruptions, wrongs, abuses, vices strongly entrenched, and institutions yet flourishing in their

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prime which must be, one and all, removed, before the coming of the Christian age. Indeed, the magnitude of the preparatory work yet to be done, is sufficient to appal the stoutest heart. A superficial survey might even suggest the discouraging doubt whether any progress has yet been made—whether Christianity is not as far from supremacy now as it was when Paul was laboring at its first foundations.

But vast progress has in reality been made, evincing the vitality and vigor of the principle which is at work, and putting to flight all doubts of its ultimate triumph. Hydra-headed error, grim darkness, clotted cruelty, gory war, implacable caste, man-imbruting chattelism, long-lived despotism, the hideous extremes of bloated wealth and gaunt poverty, the long-established division of mankind into hyenas and dromedaries, beasts of prey and beasts of burthen, party servility, sectarian strife, business frauds, commercial monopolies, traffic in liquid fire, and traffic in human flesh, brutal vice, shameless sensuality, blood-thirsty revenge, lawless crime, ignorance, idleness, selfishness—SIN—the whole hellish brood, will surely disappear before the irresistible genius of Christianity, coming from heaven to establish a better kingdom.

The social fabric must be gradually re-constructed upon a principle of greater equalization of labor and wealth—the mind-and-body-crushing toil which now degrades "the million," must be lightened—"the masses," as the odious phrase still is, must have free access to the sources of intellectual and spiritual improvement—the heathen-world must be thoroughly Christianized.

The last preparatory work, in our view, will be the perfection of the useful arts, the completion of the discoveries in labor saving machinery, and in motive force, and the thorough exploration of the fields of scientific and philosophic research.

In all the points here enumerated, our own age bears the evident marks of a preparatory one. It will not probably be the last.

But let us pass these intervening ages of twilight—and hasten onward to the dawn of the Christian age.

Christianity is at last enthroned—her battles are fought, her foes vanquished, and transformed into willing votaries, her triumph is complete, her dominion co-extensive with the human family.

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What will be the pursuits of this glorious kingdom? Its subjects renovated in heart, rectified in habits, refined in tastes, elevated in desires, disdaining the gout-bringing luxuries of the banquet, freed from the yellow love of gold, their bodily wants simplified and easily supplied, will demand a very high range of employments and pleasures. Their demands will be mainly spiritual, but not exclusively so, save as the spiritual shall be transfused through all activities and passivities. There must be what we now call intellectual employments, as well as spiritual, though it is impossible to say how far this distinction will then obtain.

Will these various demands be met? Most amply. How? First by the most exalted spiritual offices in which redeemed creatures on earth can be engaged.

In what will these consist? Who can conjecture? We only know that they will not consist in those laborious duties and perilous conflicts, to which, in her march to empire, Christianity has necessarily summoned her followers. A new series of religious avocations must be instituted—corresponding with a state of peace, with a condition of prosperity, with a reign of felicity, with the joyous emotions of happified subjects, forming one great brotherhood.

But who can guess what these employments will be? We venture no conjecture. Only of this we feel assured—they will be as much superior to the present, as the Christian age will be superior to the Christian era.

These demands will further be met by furnishing a scope of intellectual pursuits of proportionate elevation and expansion. The *doom of drudgery*, which, as the primal curse, has rested and now rests upon all pursuits physical, intellectual, and spiritual, will be in a great measure removed from the activities of the Christian age. The operations of the mind will be characterized by unwonted ease, elasticity and energy. The toilsome delving, the arduous climbing, the racking of brain, the air of difficult abstraction, and the pale cast of thought, will not then be the painful conditions of intellectual action.

Just here we find the demand in the Christian age for the pursuits of the fine arts. *Not for the purposes of relaxation*, for with the partial, perhaps entire repeal of the curse of drudgery, relaxation will to a great extent, though never wholly cease to be a human want. The fine arts will be demanded primarily as furnishing the appropriate aliment of some of the noblest powers of our nature.

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They have an independent sphere—a domain of their own, which lies between the purely intellectual and the spiritual—their domain is that of *the imagination and the heart.*

A state of things favorable to the cultivation of these high powers, will at once create an imperative demand for the fine arts. The Christian age will be such a state. The Christian era has not been, partly because of the toilsome and matter-of-fact avocations in which it has engaged the pious, and partly because of the sensual and sordid habits to which the worldly have been addicted.

Above both the toilsome and the sordid, the exclusive matter-of-fact and the sensual must man be lifted, before he will begin to recognize the wants of his higher nature. To this exaltation the Christian age will raise him. The inextinguishable, though long neglected, powers and susceptibilities of the imagination and the heart will thus be aroused never again to slumber.

They will be controlled indeed, but not repressed, quickened rather to almost supernatural energy, by the spiritual element which will at once imbue and vitalize all powers and pursuits.

Living as we do under the dwarfing influences of the animal and the actual of this secular age, what conception can we form of the imagination and the sensibility when dilated, intensified and etherialized under the fostering auspices of a spiritual age?

As the purely intellectual and purely spiritual powers will be furnished with their appropriate employments, so will these semi-intellectual and semi-spiritual powers be furnished with their appropriate employments. These will of course be in the sphere of the fine arts. What, and how great, modifications will be introduced in these pursuits, is as impossible to conjecture, as we have seen it to be in the case of the spiritual and the intellectual. Modifications there will undoubtedly be, perhaps, for this is supposable, the addition of some new and nobler arts than any known among men; but more probably material changes for the better in those now existing, new schools of poetry and music, new styles of painting and sculpture and architecture. These arts will at once have a deeper soul and a higher skill, a sublimer scope and a diviner destiny, than they possessed in the golden age of the pagan cycle.

Who can doubt that to meet such rational demands of these lofty powers, and to carry the fine arts to this high per-

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fection, geniuses of various and superior endowments will arise, *descend* rather, heaven-sent. God Himself—who will then enlist the powers of a regenerated race in the study of the Beautiful, of which He has constitutionally endowed all his creatures with so quenchless a love—will, who can doubt it? adorn and illustrate the golden age of the sanctified fine arts, with a constellation of geniuses such as never yet have dazzled the world.

But all this, say you, is sheer speculation—less substantial than that in submerged city lots on the bottomless bottom-lands of the Mississippi River.

Let us see, then, if evidence and argument do not bring us to the same conclusion. What is the evidence?

Briefly recapitulated and summed up, it is the following—

That the Christian age will be characterized by universal knowledge and virtue—by the predominance of the social and the spiritual over the selfish and the sensual—by peace and plenty—by exemption from drudgery, and by elevated spiritual and intellectual employments. In one word, it will be characterized by the absence of whatever is unfriendly to the fine arts, and by the presence and perpetuity of whatever is friendly to them. At the same time the powers and susceptibilites which they chiefly call into play, the imagination and the emotions, will be in the most perfect development compatible with this bodily state.

These points of evidence will not be called in question.

What, then is the argument?

It is that the fine arts will be cultivated—and if cultivated at all, under auspices favorable to their being carried to an indefinitely higher perfection, than they have, or could have been in any by-gone age.

But should there be one present who clings to the notion that the fine arts are unworthy of a place in so advanced an age, he might have on his tongue the following reply to our argument.

"The general features of the Christian age will undoubtedly be favorable to an unprecedented expansion of the fine arts; so will the bright sunshine of a Sabbath in next July (and sunny Sabbaths are always a little sunnier than other days—or seem so,) be highly favorable for *hay-making*. But can we argue hence that hay will be generally made on the bright Sabbaths of July, '49? No more can we argue from propitious circumstances that the fine arts will flourish

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in the noon-tide effulgence of the Christian age. In both cases there is a principle which forbids such a result—the higher destination of the time in either case, makes it *desecration* to devote it to so low a use. The Sabbath is consecrated to sacred employments; this excludes the labors of the field, *however fine the weather* may be.

So the Christian age, that Sabbath-period of time, (and such it may be literally,) will be consecrated to purposes so far paramount to the fine arts in dignity and importance, that they will be utterly excluded, whatever may be the concurrence of favoring circumstances."

As this is the best reply that can be made to the views we have been advocating, we may be indulged in giving it a passing notice. We of course take no exception to what is said of the dignity of the pursuits of the Christian age. But we do object to the assumption that the fine arts may not be rendered worthy of an honorable place in the meridian of that age.

Greater injustice has never been done the fine arts than that of characterizing them as solely intended to amuse—to please. Adstricted by arbitrary and senseless enactment to this paltry province, they have suffered an immense depreciation. They have been degraded in dignity below the sciences—for these instruct and enlighten the intellect; in utility below the mechanic arts—for these feed the body and fill the purse; while in reality they are vastly above both. Against this absurd theory, in its application to one of the fine arts, Wilson, the distinguished essayist, thus exclaims:—

"Pleasure is no more the end of poetry, than it is the end of knowledge, or of virtue, or of religion, or of this world. The end of poetry is pleasure, delight, instruction, expansion, elevation, honor, glory, happiness here and hereafter, or it is nothing. Is the end of Paradise Lost to please? Is the end of Dante's Divine Comedy to please? Is the end of the Psalms of David to please? or of the songs of Isaiah?"

That the fine arts do yield a rich and uncloying entertainment—cannot rationally be imputed to them as a reproach. It is rather a commendation; it is a proof that they have other and more substantial functions: for mark this, *no pursuit can* afford exalted and perennial pleasure which is not correlated to the higher capacities of man. It is through their vast power over the emotional or sensi-

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tive part of our common nature, that the fine arts are enabled to make such exhaustless contributions to the fund of human pleasure. But whence have they this power? The true answer to this inquiry reveals the dignity and excellence of the fine arts. They give exercise and scope to the imagination—they invitingly out-spread their boundless realms to its aerial excursions—they open to genius, the divinest gift, godliness excepted, and the nearest allied to it, broad fields for its creative energy, while they impose just laws upon its artistic developments.

These broad fields and boundless realms are the two-fold universe of *reality* and of *ideality*, the earth, the heavens, the Infinite, motion, force, color, expansion, being with its magnificent scale, running through shining ranks and orders up to Deity, virtue with its deeds of daring, love and its labors, faith with its heraldry of heroes, all forms, all symbols of the Beautiful—this is the domain of the Fine Arts!

What wonder if such a domain should gush with fountains of joy, and flash with streams of pleasure!

What wonder if from its spicy vales and odorous groves, alive and aloud with birds of every gorgeous hue and charming note, winged zephyr should waft mingled melody and fragrance to the enchanted dwellers there!

But fountains and streamlets, and vales and groves and melodious birds are not the sum total of this domain. It also yields substantial food for thought, the elements of soul expansion, incentives to virtue, and invitations to piety and praise.

An easy and a pleasing work is now before us—as we hasten to our conclusion; it is the rapid review, for it must now be rapid, of the particulars in which the Christian age will favor to an eminent degree the culture of the fine arts.

This topic you will at once perceive, should have been our main one, had not the passage to it been obstructed by prejudices, and false principles, which must first be removed. To many it will probably occur that we have expended an unnecessary amount of labor in effecting this. Perhaps we have. Our apology is, that it is worth some effort to establish the doctrine of the entire compatibility between Christianity and the Fine Arts; a doctrine clear to the few, but doubtful to the many.

In the following specification of favoring influences, we shall be compelled, by want of time, to assume that the points we shall adduce will be characteristic features of the

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Christian age. In most cases, they will be too obviously so to need proof.

1. We mention first—duration; an established order of things continuing for a length of time amply sufficient for the fine arts to arrive at their perfection. This has never been. The periods of their cultivation have been extremely brief. Scarcely any thing in the history of the fine arts is more melancholy than the transitoriness of their longest eras. They have but smiled upon the world, when they have been compelled to take their flight. It is war, civil or international, that has most frequently frayed them away.

Another source of their evanescence hitherto is a tendency, resulting from the very excellencies of the very fine arts, to human degeneracy, when the preservative efficacy of Christianity is wanting. This is a tendency not peculiar to the fine arts, save perhaps in degree. The sciences as we have already affirmed, and all secular pursuits, unless duly subordinated to the supremacy of religion, tend to derange the nice adjustments of the powers, and thus deteriorate rather than improve mankind.

Here for the first time has the opportunity occurred of replying to an objection stated in the early part of this article, and by indulgence waived. The objection urges that the inherent tendencies of the fine arts are to corrupt and vitiate character, to enervate the masculine qualities, and to induce degeneracy. Our reply is that this is only *one phase* of an infirmity common to all branches of physical and intellectual activity, where the agency of the *grand corrective*—Christianity—is wanting. Upon this we can not dwell. A modification of the same principle applies to that other objection the consideration of which was deferred, namely, that since the Christian era the nations most distinguished for their devotion to the fine arts, have been the least distinguished for whatever makes a nation honorably prosperous or happy. Those, we reply, have been the very nations which have been the least pervaded by the energizing element of a pure Christianity—whose religion, if they have had any, has been the nearest assimilated to the refined paganism of Greece and Rome; nothing indeed but a projection of paganism into the Christian era—of course feeble and insignificant, lacking the vigor of the old, and the virtue of the new religion.

The Christian age may be described in one word as the age in which this essential element shall be paramount and

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permanent. It will give character to the age—that character will be an established one. It will suffer no fluctuations, it will allow no interruptions, it will be impregnable to any assailing power, if such should be. Mars, the gory god of the golden age, will not break in, with his sulphureous bolts drawn from the troubled sky of the Christian era, where light in its struggle with darkness, by an unavoidable fatality, puts in the hands of war elements more potent and deadly than it wielded under the pagan era—gory Mars—the semi-Christianized, will not break in upon the final reign of peace. His bomb-shells will not bespatter the manuscript of the half-finished poem with the blood and the brains of the poet. The thunders of his artillery and the demoniac shouts of his soldiery will not drown the sweet strains of music. His cannon balls will not batter down the pillared temples and the stately domes—exquisite monuments of Christianic architecture. Nor will his vandal torch fire the long heaven-lit galleries, where the genius of painting shall range its unrivalled creations.

2. Again, there will be ample leisure to prosecute the fine arts. This is indispensable. Bodily want must not invade the sanctum of the artist; carking care must not corrode his spirit—business claims must not molest—pecuniary embarrassments must not be experienced—a world festering with vice and horrent with multiform crime, must not as now, be perpetually wounding and worrying his sensitive heart. The leisure which the fine arts demand consists in an exemption from all such harrassing influences, it is a leisure alike above the calls of necessity and of duty. The Christian age will furnish such a leisure. The Christian era has not. The pagan cycle did not, or if it did, could not protect it from incessant interruptions.

The want of auspicious leisure, since the Christian era is demonstrative evidence that the time has never yet come for the cultivation of the fine arts. The certainty of such leisure in the sacred age is prophetic of their successful culture then.

The votaries of the fine arts since the advent of Christ have been of two classes—the irreligious and religious. The former of course have been comparatively little indebted to Christianity, and are just so far defective exemplifications of what the fine arts will be. The latter are almost equally defective, because Christianity has had something else to do than patronize the cultivators of the fine arts: so intent has

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she been upon her immediate, though not most congenial business, that she has scarcely withheld her frowns from those children of hers who have turned aside from her utilitarian pursuits in a world of wrong and want and woe, to woo the elegant arts.

The two most illustrious poets of the Christian era, Shakespeare and Milton, are the best representatives of these two classes.

The one was irreligious—the other religious—but both lived in godless ages, when Christianity was struggling at a fearful odds against the most rampant powers of sin. It is only amazing that such ages should have produced such men. Both these geniuses might with propriety have doubted—not as the latter is said to have doubted, whether he was not born an age too late—but whether they were not born several ages too soon.

Almost the sole great fault of the "myriad-minded" Shakespeare was his want of the religious element. That want made him "a little lower than the angels." He had energy, vivacity, intensity; but he had not the Isaiah-like solemnity, and the furnace fusion of all thought and feeling in the fires of devotion, which are indispensable to the highest efforts of the poet. Shakespeare could not have produced an epic.

Milton had this great element; but the very possession of it, under the circumstances in which he lived, made him too much of a patriot and philanthropist, too much of a politician and a preacher, in a word made him too much of a practical man to admit of his being the perfect poet. But for his blindness, which enclosed him for a season from the deficiencies of the actual world, we never should have had his immortal production—which an eminent critic has pronounced not the best, but the only poem in the English language—the Paradise Lost.

The great Milton, in whom

> "The name
> Of prophet and of poet were the same,"

went up indeed into the mount which burned with the awful presence of divinity, and his genius wore the halo of that august communion; and could he have descended to a godly generation, what hallowed fire would have glowed in his undying verse; but he came to a people who derided him and worshipped with senseless shoutings the golden calf.

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Hence the tables of his song, yea even of *his* song, are *broken*.

3. We mention next the congeniality of the spiritual character, and employments of the Christian age. Here where most see the subtle fires which are to consume to ashes the fine arts, we discern the etherializing essence which is to impart to them a higher and a more enduring life.

4. The Christian age will furnish to genius the most expanding themes. Wars and loves comprise the themes of pagan poets, and the Christian era has only given us for the most part servile imitators in *theme* as well as *thought*.

5. The Christian age will provide the very choicest patronizing influences. The culture of the fine arts will not depend upon the nod of a monarch, upon the smile of a queen, or upon the gold of a most noble lord, nor yet upon the applause of a fickle multitude—sickened to-morrow with what tickles to-day.

A thoroughly trained, well principled people, with enlightened minds and refined tastes, are the best earthly patronizers of the fine arts.

6. The enlarged freedom, the liberal principles and enlightened policy of the Christian age will be peculiarly congenial to the fine arts. Its institutions of every kind founded in truth will have nothing to fear from the free utterances of truth-anointed tongues, and truth-inspired pens.

Thought consequently will not cower under an iron censorship—the heaving passions of the heart will not petrify beneath the gorgon-gaze of an omnipresent surveillance—bright-winged fancy will not dumbly droop thrust in the foul cage of proscription—sun-seeking imagination will soar and sing or scream if it chooses, without being hawked at by the mousing owl of bigotry—god-like genius will roll forth its flashing, full-orbed creations, without the Galilean liability to inquisitorial dungeons or ignominious banishment.

Heaven will have no height, earth no depth, ocean no profound, hell no abyss, space no void, creation no clime, chaos no cavern which mind may not scale, fathom, or explore—as its own boundless domain, its exhaustless treasury of thought and imagery. With such liberty and scope, the genius of the Christian age will be to the Parnassus-climbing genius of the Attic or the Augustan age, as the ocean-navigator of our day is to the coast-hugging voyager of the classic period.

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7. The Christian age will also supply the inspiration of *divinity*. The enthusiasm caught from wrapt fellowship with superior beings, *with the Supreme Being*, is the food, the fire of genius. The coming age will be the Immanuel age. God will walk with man, in the gardens of love and beauty.

8. An advantage which the fine arts will derive from the Christian age, is a maturely developed sensibility, emotional power, ardor, intensity, tenderness, sympathy, diffusibility of feeling, facility in taking all tones and moulds of passion—these are essential elements in the artist.

We have almost no well-educated sensibilities. The spirit of the times is unfavorable to development in this direction. If as a rare apparition, a truly great sensibility arises, this clay-built world is ready to hurl at it the clods that lie congenial on its frozen face.

9. The Christian age will be highly favorable to the cultivation of the imagination. Mankind can hardly be said to know this faculty. They certainly do not appreciate it. They seem afraid of it. It is fashionable to decry the imagination and to denounce its productions. Even so sensible a man as Bishop Butler has spoken disparagingly of the imagination as "that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all error."

Our modes of education repress rather than educe the imagination. Perhaps this is well enough. This utilitarian age does not need much imagination. For the mechanic arts matter-of-fact qualities are demanded—much tact—some talent—little genius. The sciences demand judgment and memory. The enterprises of benevolence require goodness and decision.

But there are loftier employments than all these reserved for the Christian age. Then will be called into requisition that sky-piercing, space-ranging, etherial power—the imagination. Then man will be a winged being.

10. Lastly, the Christian age will be productive of transcendent models. As capital is to the merchant, so are models to the artist—particularly to the painter and the sculptor. The poet is less dependent upon them, though he too is indebted to them as embodying some of his most glowing ideals of the beautiful. Models—by which we mean the most perfect moulds of physical or personal beauty—are either natural, as animate forms, or artificial, as the

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standard productions of the masters. The latter are either borrowed from the former, or are the products of human ideals, which are always more or less modified by the age in which genius lives. The former are the product, by modification, of the age in which they originate. Models can never rise much above their natal ages. There is a stolid placidity in the Egyptian beauty, a steel-flashing martial air in the beauty of Greece, a majestic masculinity in the beauty of Rome. Had we time to institute a scrutiny into the styles of beauty now existing in different parts of the world, we should find as many styles as there are nations, and we venture the assertion that we should distinctly discern the impress of that *tout ensemble* which gives each nation its individuality of character: the nation makes the model. This being true, it is preposterous to speak of the models of antiquity as unsurpassable. We can not therefore concur with the usually correct and singularly chaste author of Eothen, in the following sentiment. Speaking of the Sphynx he says—"Comely the creature is, but the comeliness is not of this world: the once worshipped beast is a deformity, and a monster of this generation; and yet you can see that those lips, so thick and heavy, were fashioned according to some ancient mould of beauty; some mould of beauty now forgotten—forgotten because Greece drew forth from the flashing foam of the Egean, and in her image created new forms of beauty, and made it a *law* among men that the short and proudly wreathed lips should stand for the sign and main condition of loveliness through all generations to come."

O thou blind worshipper of Greece—of Greece less besotted, for she turned from her own forms of beauty, to rear altars to the *unknown*—I tell thee the brighter age will come when the short and proudly-wreathed lip—the lip of pagan passion—will in its turn be a "forgotten mould of beauty;" and then the Christian sculptor, whose model shall be caught from the focal intensity of the Christian virtues, will be at a loss to determine whether the Egyptian Sphynx or the Grecian Cytherea displays the lovelier lip. *He* will chisel a lip, in which neither the stolidity of the beast, nor the voluptuousness of the courtezan shall find expression. Over that peerless lip we drop the veil of time.—It will be revealed to the gaze of purer eyes than those of our generation.

There is a similar error in the popular idea that the ancient athlete afforded the best models of male statuary.

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They were undoubtedly splendid models of muscularity—of animal masculinity—of man the racer, the wrestler, the warrior;— but extremely poor models must they have been of man, the thinker, the imaginer, the worshiper.

But passing from the pagan period, we affirm of the Christian era that it has not been productive of pure models, either natural or artificial, whether we regard feminine beauty or masculine majesty.

It could not be—for the same reasons dwelt upon at length in this lecture, which have forbidden it to foster the fine arts. The same reasons being still in force the Christian era can not now be productive of models. Neither men nor women of this busy utilitarian generation, resolved to be true to their obligations, can either be models or produce them.

Christian era-men may be philanthropists, reformers, heroes, martyrs, but they can not be model men. Bent in form and furrowed in face by solicitude and sympathy for a sorrow-stricken world, the Christian may be an angel of mercy, but he can not be a model man. Christ even, though he was incarnate deity, yet with that marred visage where "grief appeared in every line"—could not be a *model man*.

Devout hearts have revolted at the infidel criticism, that the human character of Christ was not a perfect one, because it lacked the element of fun. We may well resent the coarseness of the remark—but we should not hesitate to admit its truthfulness. We could help the infidel to many other elements of human character, using the term in its popular sense, which were not represented in Christ. He seems to have been below Paul in masculine intellect—in genius He has probably had many superiors, both inspired and uninspired—in personal appearance He was perhaps, not superior to the average of his cotemporaries. But what of all this? Does it detract aught from his perfection that is, from his perfect adaptation to the work which He came to perform? Extraordinary endowments, either personal or intellectual, would have interfered with the purposes of his mission, as effectually perhaps as regal pomp and princely opulence. Away then with such paltry strictures. As well disinter the broad-breasted Plato, and drag him before the bar of modern fashion and fastidiousness, and condemn him to obloquy, because the great frame which enshrined his mighty genius, lacked the exquisite proportions of a Parisian bust.

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We have had no model men as yet. Punch has given us the model husband, the model wife, the model baby, but with all his Argus eyes, he never saw a model man.

We might admit that there have been model monarchs, model warriors, and model presidents, (though not very recently,) and model statesmen, and model lawyers, and model schoolmasters, and model merchants, and model mechanics, and model farmers—but all these together would not make a model man. Model men and model women can be the product only of a model age. In these crude times men must be crude. In these bustling times, men, and women too, must *bustle*. To appropriate the language of that refined utilitarian, Henry Coleman—who might have been an artist had not the times made him an agriculturist: "As *well* might the farmer have the Venus de Medicis placed in his kitchen for a wife, as to have a model beauty there." "It would do much better," continues the same writer, though in terms less delicate, "it would be much better to have Lot's wife standing there, for she might answer *one* useful purpose—she might salt his bacon."

You may already have conjectured what is our idea of a model man or woman. To fully portray one would be the work of a lecture—and of a *lecturer* too. It is not man isolated, for then we might have one in any age; but isolated man is a monstrosity, not a model—a Caspar Hauser. It is man associated—man in the midst of his relations—and *true to them;* for a false man can not be a model man—he is a Judas Iscariot. We must then, first have a model social condition—the human family must be improved, so that the relations and duties of the individual shall be favorable to the completeness, the roundness, and polish of personal character and appearance. Mankind must become enlightened, virtuous and happy, the appalling scenes of violence, outrage, wrong and wretchedness, which wring from the sentive heart of genius the outcry—"O for the wings of a dove, then would I fly away and be at rest;" must give place to the charming exhibitions of love, peace, and joy, scattering flowers in their mazy dance. One must not need to say to another, know thou the Lord.

The relations which will then exist will be eminently favorable to individual development. Whereas now, fidelity to social relations necessitates individual deformity, because of social deformity—then the same fidelity will be conducive to individual beauty. Then who live will see the model

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man, the model woman—whom we can only talk about, or draw upon the retina of fancy. Then this renovated earth will be graced with forms of princely majesty and queenly beauty, only inferior to the pair "imparadised:"

> "Adam the goodliest man of men since born
> His sons; the fairest of her daughters Eve."

Genius at once fired and refined by these living models, will produce other models, artificial. Then will the reign of the fine arts commence. The form, the face, the eye of beauty will glow upon the canvass—masculine majesty, "God-like erect," will rivet the admiring gaze in the sculptured marble—the palaces of beings, in whom virtue, worth and beauty blend, and the temples where they worship Deity, will display the wondrous achievments of architectural genius; and then poetry and music, divinest of the arts, deriving still diviner inspiration from an order of things in which the actual will transcend the past ideal, in which the spiritual will etherialize the material, in which the beautiful will invest and dignify the useful, will drop their glittering mantles upon sanctified collossal geniuses—along the broad currents of whose poesy and song shall flow the thought, the affections, the passions, the deeds, the daring, the devotion and the glory of the Christian Age.

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ARTICLE XII.

"THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL."

BY PRESIDENT MAHAN.

The fact that mankind have often attempted the explanation of given classes of phenomena, is a sufficient indication to us, that their true explanation is a demand of the human mind. When therefore a given passage of scripture has attracted the general and special attention of its readers, when much inquiry exists in respect to its import, and when commentators have expended much labor in the development of its realmeaning, we may safely infer, that the passage needs explanation, and that he who shall attain this end will do some service to the student of the Bible. There is one passage of the sacred word which never fails to attract the attention of its thoughtful readers, and to excite in their minds an earnest desire for its satisfactory explanation. Nor have commentators been unmindful of this want in the minds of their readers, as is manifest from the amount of time and space occupied by them in its explanation. We refer to that portion which pertains to the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil," that "tree, whose mortal taste brought death into the world, and all our woe." Few individuals read this passage without having such questions as these arise in their minds in respect to it. What was the real design of the Most High in the location of that tree, and in the solemn prohibition in respect to it? Was that prohibition given, as a mere *test* of obedience? or was some higher end to be answered by it? Why did the tree receive that peculiar name? Was it because the fruit when eaten, tended to enlarge the intellectual capacities? or was it on account of some other reason not yet suggested by commentators? To the mass of the readers of the Bible, these questions have not yet received answers fully satisfactory. To attain this end is the object of the present article. As a means of attaining our object, we will first direct the atten-

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tion of the reader to certain principles of a general nature, principles, a correct understanding of which has a fundamental bearing upon our main design.

1. A law or principle may be in its nature very simple and readily apprehended, and yet endlessly diversified in its applications. The law or principle of attraction in the material universe, for example, is of this character. How simple, and of what ready apprehension is that principle, when once distinctly announced. And yet how endlessly diversified is it in its operations. The same remarks are equally applicable to other universal truths or principles.

2. The human mind is so constituted, that when it has clearly apprehended a universal principle, and distinctly perceived its application in a few specific instances, it will readily understand its application to all other cases to which it is applicable. In the science of numbers as elucidated in our common arithmetics, for example, a few general principles are given together with their application in a few specified cases. When the mind has seen those principles in their application to such cases, it at once and most readily applies them to the solution of any problems falling within the sphere of that science.

3. It is in conformity to this law of mind, that moral duty as a system is revealed in the Bible. The scriptures do not give, nor do they profess to give us a universal system of formal rules for the regulation of our conduct. They do give us, on the other hand, *universal principles* together with their application in a few specific cases. We are then left to determine, in the light of those principles thus elucidated, what duty is, in the various circumstances and relations of our existence. Every reflective reader of the scriptures must be aware of the truth of these statements. We will present an example or two in elucidation. The first that we adduce is found in *Leviticus* 19: 9—18: "And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest. And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather every grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger: I am the Lord your God. Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another. And ye shall not sware by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I am the Lord. Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor, neither rob him: the wages of him

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that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning. Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God: I am the Lord. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt stand against the blood of thy neighbor; I am the Lord. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: I am the Lord." All the particular forms of duty stated in this passage are given as specific applications of the universal principle announced at the close, to wit, "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." When we have distinctly apprehended that principle in the light of such specific applications, we are then fully prepared to apply it in other cases not specified. The parable of the good Samaritan may be stated, as another case in point. All admitted their obligation to obey the precept requiring them to "love their neighbor as themselves." But who is my neighbor? and what are the duties devolved upon me relatively to my neighbor? were questions about which the Jews were divided. The object of our Savior was to elucidate that principle in the light of a specific example, and to elucidate it in such a manner that no honest mind should be liable to misapply it.

It is in conformity to such a method, that duty as a system is revealed in the scriptures. Their fundamental aim is to put us in possession of universal principles applicable to all particular cases of conscience which can come before us in any conditions and relations in life, and so to familiarize us with the true method of applying them to the solution of questions of duty which may arise, that we, thus rendered "wise and understanding," may "from ourselves judge what is right" in the ever-varying circumstances of our existence.

4. This view of the subject under consideration enables us to understand readily and distinctly the reasons for the peculiar phraseology by which duty is revealed in the scriptures. No other book in existence uses language more abstract and universal in its application in expressing the idea of duty. The law of duty is therein announced, for example, by means of such terms and phrases as sin and holiness,

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right and wrong, righteousness and unrighteousness, truth, justice, love, "do justly," and "love thy neighbor as thyself." At the same time, with what particularity is duty in its particular and specific forms often pointed out. This method of revealing a system of universal moral obligation falls in most perfectly with the fundamental design of inspiration, which is, 1. To reveal a system of universal principles; and 2. To elucidate those principles by applying them to a sufficient number of specific cases, so that honest minds shall be in no danger of misapprehending the principles themselves, or of essentially misapplying them in the solution of particular questions of duty which may arise in the ever-varying circumstances of human existence.

5. Our readers will now readily apprehend the great want of man, as a moral agent, at his creation. It was to have the ideas of duty and accountability distinctly developed in his mind, in the forms above stated. He needed to have the ideas of right and wrong, in their universal forms, together with that of amenability to a higher power for his conduct, distinctly developed in his mind, on the one hand, and on the other, to have those ideas stated in connection with a few plain and palpable cases to which they were applicable. Thus developed and elucidated, those ideas would ever after be to the mind internal lights making manifest to it duty in all its various forms arising out of the various circumstances and relations of human existence. That this was the great primal want of humanity at the creation, no reflecting reader can doubt.

Such being the necessities of man at the time referred to, we may safely conclude, *a priori*, that an arrangement was adopted by the Creator, in respect to his rational offspring, adapted, and most perfectly so, to meet this great exigency. The same wisdom and benevolence which dictated his creation, would dictate such an arrangement. It was needful too that this arrangement should be adopted at the very commencement of human existence, before the lower propensities had received such strength of development as to render apostasy from the law of duty certain, when that law should be revealed.

The form and particular applications of the law of duty which it was needful to be first revealed to man, was that law in its special relations to God. We may rationally suppose therefore, that that law as originally revealed to him, would bring distinctly before his mind, God, as his lawgiver

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and judge, and would as distinctly erect in his mind the idea that right and wrong, good and evil, with him consist primarily in obedience or disobedience to the divine will, together with that of amenability to God for such obedience or disobedience. Having attained to distinct apprehensions of the law of duty in this one form, the other fundamental form, to wit, "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," would spontaneously suggest itself to the mind, together with its varied applications, as soon as man should find himself existing in connection with creatures like himself.

We are now prepared to contemplate the command and prohibition originally given to man in connection with "The tree of knowledge of good and evil," as recorded, Gen. 2: 15—17. "And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

Our idea of this passage is this. The special permission to man to eat freely of all the trees of the garden, and the solemn prohibition in respect to this one tree, were given for one purpose exclusively, to develop in the human mind the idea of duty, together with that of amenability on the part of the creature to the Creator, for his obedience or disobedience to that law. In this permission and prohibition, God is brought directly and distinctly before the human mind as the universal lawgiver, governor and judge. Man is as directly and deeply impressed with the idea of his solemn accountability to God for his moral conduct, together with the great fact, that [moral] good and evil, right and wrong, with him consist in obedience or disobedience to the divine will. He was reminded of the truth that the world created for his residence belonged to its Maker, that it was be divine permission, that he was entitled to partake of its fruits, and that the divine will must be supremely consulted, in the use made of all the divine benefactions. By such an expedient the moral nature of man received an early and needful development. He found himself at once a creature of law, and amenable to a higher power for his moral activity. The permission and prohibition under consideration were not given as a *mere test* of obedience, but for the higher and more needful end, to erect in the human mind, the idea of obligation to obedience. Every moral act sub-

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sequent to this one revelation would of course be such a test, just as much as any act in respect to that tree. The tree itself received its particular name, not from any virtue or want of it, in the fruit it bore, not from any intrinsic peculiarity in the tree itself or its fruit, but simply and exclusively in consequence of its relations to the permission and prohibition pertaining to it, precepts designed to awaken in the human mind the ideas of duty and amenability, that is, of "good and evil." Because the special prohibition pertaining to the tree was the means of first inducing in the human mind, the ideas of duty and accountability, the tree was named "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," that is, the tree by means of which, or rather by means of the precept relative to which, a knowledge of right and wrong, or of moral good and evil was first awakened in the human mind. That this is the right view of the subject, we argue from the following considerations.

1. There is nothing in the passage which contradicts this explanation. It is certainly as consistent with the language used, as any other hypothesis that has yet been suggested.

2. The giving of the tree this particular name for the reasons supposed, corresponds with a usage which seems to be coeval with the race. Thus, for example, when the thought suggested itself to the mind of Eve, on the birth of her first born son, that she had "gotten a man from the Lord," she called his name, in commemoration of that thought, Cain, that is, gotten. Because Abraham laughed when he received the promise of a son when he and his wife were "past age," that son, as a memorial of that event, was named Isaac, that is, laughter. How appropriate then, when a precept relatively to a certain tree was given for the exclusive purpose of imparting to man the first ideas of right and wrong, to give to that tree, in commemoration of that fact, the name of "the tree of knowledge of good and evil."

3. The tree itself thus named, and for such a high purpose, would ever after be to man, when in its presence, a standing memorial of the law of duty, and of the great truth of a solemn amenability to God for obedience or disobedience to whatever that law should demand, in any of the varied circumstances of human existence.

4. No other explanation of this passage is to our mind, so rational and so free from objections as the one now under consideration. The supposition that the prohibition pertaining to the tree was given as a mere test of obedience,

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suppose the law of duty already in the mind of man, when his great want at the time was to have a knowledge of that law imparted to him. Such a supposition also leaves wholly unexplained the reasons why the tree received the peculiar name imparted to it. No such objections arise against the explanation given above.

5. Finally, the divine arrangement relative to man, according to this explanation of the passage before us, was most perfectly adapted to his nature and circumstances. The precept itself, and the reasons for the whole arrangement were most manifest, and of easy comprehension, the very arrangement which the primeval state of the human intelligence demanded. We feel the pleasing assurance in view of such considerations, that this is the true explanation of the passage. Assuming it as such, we are now prepared to explain other passages connected with the one before us.

The first that we notice is Gen. 3: 4, 5. "And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." The law under which man was placed by the prohibition under consideration, recognized him as a learner, and not, as God is, an independent judge of what is right and wrong. This was what the serpent told man he would become, on condition of his partaking of the fruit of that tree. Instead of being in the attitude of dependence on another for his knowledge of what duty and wisdom require, he would become so enlightened, that as God does, so he might, of himself and for himself, and independently of God or any other being, judge of what was right and wrong, wise and unwise. Under the influence of the idea of becoming thus elevated, "she plucked, she ate," and became as a consequence, not what was promised, but a slave of pride and lust, instead of a servant of the living God. The first temptation presented to man was an address to pride. Under that temptation, combined with an appeal to appetite, he fell. These propensities, thus developed, have ever since tyrannized over prostrate, degraded humanity.

The only other passage demanding explanation is Gen. 3: 22—24. "And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil. And now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence

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he was taken. So He drove out the man: and He placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life." If we have been correct thus far in our explanations, the meaning of the phrase, "Behold, the man has become as one of us, to know good and evil," is obvious. God, in judging of what is right and wrong, has reference to no authority higher than Himself. In acting in conformity to the law of benevolence, He acts with no reference to the principle of amenability to any power out of or above Himself. In his disobedience, man had assumed the prerogative of judging and acting upon the same principle, the principle of self-judgment and self-amenability alone. Thus he had assumed the prerogatives of God Himself, "to know good and evil." The phrase "man is become," does not affirm what he really *was*, but what he had, in his apostasy from God *assumed* himself to be. Such forms of expression are common in the Scriptures, as well as in all other writings.

The portions of this passage which next claim our attention, are those which present the divine arrangement in respect to man, in consequence of his disobedience, and the reasons for that arrangement. The partaking of the fruit of the tree of life tended, as we here learn, to one result, the perpetuation of man's physical organization, and that notwithstanding his disobedience. Life perpetuated, with a full supply of all physical necessities, as would be the case with man, were he permitted access to the tree of life together with a continued residence amidst the abundant luxuries of his present abode, would prevent his becoming deeply sensible in himself of the evils which he had entailed upon himself by his transgression, and would consequently operate effectually against the influence of the remedial system which infinite wisdom and love had determined on to restore him to moral purity and fellowship with God. If, on the other hand, he should be debarred all access to the tree of life, and excluded from the luxuries of his existing residence, if he should be placed in circumstances where he would be necessitated to gain a subsistence by toil and labor, he would naturally be led to reflect upon his condition and the cause of it. Strong aspirations would arise in his mind after a higher and better state. Such aspirations, in connection with the influences of the remedial system, would tend to induce in him penitence for his disobedience, and a hearty

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return to virtue, a return resulting in a re-union of his soul with God. For such reasons God "sent man forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken," and "placed at the east of the garden of Eden," [the only place doubtless where the garden was accessible, and where the tree of life was located,] "cherubims and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life." The whole arrangement was dictated by the most perfect wisdom and benevolence. No other arrangement could have been adapted to the ultimate designs of the remedial system under which man was to be placed. "The end of toil is rest," and the end for which the necessity of toil was laid upon man was to restore him to everlasting rest in the bosom of God.

Apparent severities in the divine arrangements in respect to man wear the same benign aspect, when their ultimate ends and intrinsic tendencies are clearly understood, that the most melting manifestations of mercy do. The same love which suspended the Incarnate Word upon the cross, excluded man from Eden, and subjected him to discipline in the school of affliction.

There are two extremes of human existence each of which appears to be almost equally unfavorable to virtue,—the state in which man enjoys a superabundant supply of his temporal wants, in circumstances of freedom from the necessity of labor—and a state in which his physical energies are continuously taxed to the utmost, while the result of crushing toil is a bare subsistence under the almost uninterrupted pressure of pinching want. The "golden mean" most favorable to virtue, and every form of real excellence, is at an equal remove from each of these extremes. It is where man feels the continuous pressure of the necessity to labor, but feels it only to the extent requisite to the most perfect physical health and development, and when the result of labor is not luxury, but competence. That parent loves his child not wisely nor well, who would place him out of this "golden mean" into either of the extremes above specified. The wisdom of the prayer of Agur can never be over estimated. "Two things have I required of thee; deny me them not before I die: remove far from me vanity and lies: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny Thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain."

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LIFE AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF MADAME GUYON.

BY REV. OVID MINER,
OF SYRACUSE, N. Y.

Life and Religious Opinions and Experience of Madame de la Mothe Guyon, together with some account of the Personal History and Religious Opinions of Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray. By THOMAS C. UPHAM, *Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Bowdoin College.* 2 vols., 8vo. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1847.

WE THINK it may be said to have been reserved to our own time, to receive just ideas of the greatness and power of God's gracious work in Europe, during the seventeenth century, and to understand aright the history of that memorable age.

The art of printing, which was to endow the church with benefits greater than the gift of tongues, had then become known to the world. This western continent, which was to be a refuge for Christ's persecuted followers, had been discovered and made accessible; so that God could proceed to sift out from the kingdoms a chosen seed, for planting here the tree of liberty and of life. And then it was, in the opening of the seventeenth century, that the Divine Spirit moved in a wonderful manner, upon the mind and heart of Christendom, whence resulted advancements in literature and science, which distinguish this above all other ages;—the raising up of a host of champions of human rights and martyrs of the cross, more illustrious perhaps than had appeared since the days of the apostles;—and the laying deep and broad those foundations, upon which are to be reared the superstructure of the latter day glory.

That a single age and nation should have given to our race such minds as Shakspeare and Milton, Baxter and Bunyan and Fox, Locke and Newton, Hampden and Crom-

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well, renders it manifest that this century was designed of heaven to be the period of stupendous and merciful revolutions. And when to such tokens of God's purpose concerning Great Britain, are added the cotemporaneous events in France, and other parts of the continent,—especially as revealed in the life and labors of Lady Guyon,—the ministry and writings of Archbishop Fenelon,—together with the less known, but scarcely less useful labors of Abbe Molinos of Spain,—we gain a view of the moral aspects and relations to our world's enfranchisement, of the seventeenth century,—which few, probably, have well considered.

The remark has been adventured, that to our own days it is reserved, to be put in possession of just narratives of those times. But very recently has the world seen a faithful history of that greatest captain of his age, and (according to the light of his times,) that devout and noble English heart, Oliver Cromwell, whose character worse maligned, and whose memory more blackened than that of any other man, and the accounts of whose civil administration, (among the most important of annals to an American,) have been handed down by royalist and high church commentators, grossly caricatured.

So also, as far as we know, it has been reserved to the intellectual pen and eminently instructed heart of Professor Upham, to give his countrymen, in the memoir of Lady Guyon, not only an admirable illustration and defence of great central truths of the gospel, which are yet widely condemned and little understood, but an invaluable chapter of ecclesiastical history, in the account of a great awakening throughout the French Catholic church. Adding to the light imparted by these volumes just named, the emendations now being made to the distorted histories of the French revolution, and a well considered *Memoir of the Life and Times of George Fox*, which is yet a desideratum, (and a work for which the Bowdoin professor is so well fitted, as to inspire a strong hope that he will undertake it,) and then we might deem ourselves qualified to understand and judge of the great moral features and bearings of the seventeenth century.

Before proceeding to sketch the life and labors of Madame Guyon, another remark is in place, touching the truthfulness of accredited histories, where they describe the struggles of past ages for civil liberty, and endeavors after reform-

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ation in the church. Such a book as the one now under review, forces upon the mind conviction, that standard authors are often untrue witnesses.

Mosheim, speaking in his Ecclesiastical Institutes, of the great advance in science, and the literary researches of the seventeenth century, says, that as one result of all this, "the original sources and reasons of many absurd opinions and institutions, which antiquity and custom had rendered sacred, were discovered, and exposed in their proper colors; and innumerable errors that had possessed and perplexed the anxious spirits of the credulous and superstitious multitude, were happily deprived of their authority and influence. Many pious and excellent persons whom ignorance or malice had stigmatized, were delivered from reproach, recovered their good name, and thus were secured against the malignity of persecution."

To which extract it might be suggested, there are other theological opinions and dogmas of ecclesiastical philosophy, yet current for their antiquity, which wait to be exploded as unscriptural and pernicious. Indeed every age may be said to have its task in this direction. And furthermore, the same causes which induced the errors and calumnies that learned and pious men of the seventeenth century removed, have led to misconception, concealment, and falsifying of events and characters of that age, for subsequent generations. It is in fact noteworthy, that Doct. Mosheim, in his statements respecting Madame Guyon and her doctrines, (to say nothing of his own account of the Pietists in Germany, the Quakers, and others,) has fallen into the same condemnation as did those historians who were long before him.

Nor is this greatly surprising, though the fact is so much overlooked by the generality of readers, and hence becomes one great hindrance to the establishment of truth in the church, and a leading cause of the fruitless controversies which still exist among good men. How, indeed, should historians, who were the devoted supporters, and sometimes the hired sycophants of royalty, justly portray those patriots who brought forward startling truths, new principles, concerning human rights, and were pioneers in the unbeaten path toward popular freedom? How could writers educated under the frowning shadow of an ancient hierarchy, and candidates perhaps for the honors it dispensed, appreciate the Christian Reformer, the disturber of *their* peace, who was agitating the whole land by endeavors to awaken

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divine life in what he assumed to call a decaying church? And why should ecclesiastical doctors be expected to understand, or fairly present, the theological history of the doctrine of *present full redemption through Christ*, or *pure love*, after being trained in a philosophy which makes such doctrine spiritually absurd and perilous to the soul?

We need not say, as did a celebrated English statesman, when it was sought to controvert his position by appeals to books, "*as to history, we know that is a lie;*" still in regard to great subjects now agitating Christendom, and in respect to individuals who were the republicans and spiritual reformers of past ages, the mis-statements and confusions of history, invite no inconsiderable amount of that labor which was so needful, and whose results were so auspicious, scarcely two centuries since. But we return to our memoir.

Madame Guyon, whose maiden name was Jeanne Marie Bouvieres de la Mothe, and who was of noble parentage, was born at Montargis, a town fifty miles south of Paris, in the year 1648. But though inheriting rank and wealth, and though possessed of great personal beauty and attractiveness of mind, her life was an almost continued scene of crucifixion. We know of no individual, distinguished in the annals of the past, whose threescore years and more, were so full of every variety of heavy sorrow and keen anguish. In childhood she suffered much from want of maternal tenderness, and through varied neglects. At the early age of fifteen, following the wishes of her father, she married a gentleman quite unsuited to her, and was introduced into a family, where, chiefly through the malign influence of a mother-in-law, she spent twelve years amid insult and suffering, most unendurable to a woman's heart. At the age of twenty-eight, she had passed through the successive bereavements of burying a much-loved father, a son, and only daughter, her husband and several dear friends, who had been the choicest companions of her religious life. As her ripening Christian experience, in this widowed state, came to make her widely known and evangelically useful, the hostility of Romish priests drove her from place to place, almost literally an outcast, shamefully aspersed her character, and even bribed her servants to give her poison: and, as though all this were not enough, God permitted several of her later years to be spent in the horrible Bastile, and in other prisons of France.

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But although such was the life of Madame Guyon, her intellectual labors are of a remarkable character, and fully entitle her to the admiration of posterity. No ecclesiastical history has at all done her justice in this particular. Though female education must be supposed to have been greatly defective in her time, (as indeed it is now)—though her mind was probably somewhat shaded through life by Papal dogmas and superstitions—and though her deep trials presented almost insurmountable obstacles to study, still Lady Guyon became a voluminous, as well as an able, and eminently useful author. And this undeniable fact can be accounted for, only by the admission that *she was richly, nay, wonderfully taught of the Holy Ghost.* (See Psalm 119: 97—104.)

Besides a lengthened correspondence with Fenelon, whose spiritual teacher and guide she was, and with other celebrated men of that time, Madame Guyon wrote several treatises on spiritual religion, which passed through repeated editions;—she maintained creditably, not to say triumphantly, a controversy with Bossuet, and the most learned Bishops in the kingdom, defending against them all, the gospel of Entire Santification, or *pure love*, (as this faith was then denominated.) In the gloom of her prison she wrote poems, which Cowper thought it not beneath him to translate and publish. And besides all this, she found time to compose several large volumes of exposition on the Old Testament scriptures.*

* So recent and so popular a work as the Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, presents to the world, substantially in this meagre and grossly incorrect form, a sketch of Lady Guyon:

She is said to have been "a French lady who became *celebrated through her religious enthusiasm.*" "She was born in 1648, *at Angers.*" Having a mind naturally of strong devotional tendency, she became "*heated by meditation, and misled by the Bishop of Geneva and two Monks, she was taught to believe that heaven designed her for an extraordinary mission.*" "*For five years she wandered about preaching her doctrines.*" "During that period she published her Short and Easy Method of Praying, and the Song of Songs, interpreted according to its mystical sense. *The system of Quietism* which she taught, and *which was first imagined in Spain, by Michael Molinos*, drew upon her a long persecution, in which Bossuet was a principal actor. Fenelon in vain espoused her cause. After having been confined in the Bastile, and various prisons, she was liberated in 1702, and died at Blois in 1717." "Her works occupying thirty-nine volumes, *are now almost forgotten.*"

That a biographical sketch, so utterly defective, and replete with fictions—should appear in a volume making pretensions to historic fidelity

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But it is with Lady Guyon's life and labors, *as a Christian*, that we are mainly concerned. As such she is one of those rare individuals whom God signally marks as his own, almost from infancy. In early childhood, she was the subject of deep religious impressions, and the same Providence that sent Martin Luther a Bible, in the monastery of Erfurth, to mould his mind for the transcendent labors of a reformer,—placed a copy of the scriptures in her way, while yet a convent pupil. This she studied with intense interest. Madame Guyon says, "I spent whole days in reading it, giving no attention to other books or other subjects, from morning till night, and having great powers of recollection, I committed to memory the historical parts entirely."

As Mademoiselle de la Mothe emerged from childhood to youth, the courtly and voluptuous circle in which her parents moved, gradually drew the daughter's heart from God. And though her outward life remained uniformly religious, still she confesses to have yielded to the admiration and flatteries that every where followed her, and to have become vain and corrupt in heart. Nor was it, though often visited with pungent convictions, till in the midst of her years of sorrowful and embittered domestic life, that she became weaned from the world, cured of heart-wanderings, and brought to seek God as her only portion.

From early womanhood, she was known as a very holy person, according to the Catholic faith, being abundant in charities, patient in suffering, and exact in all the required forms of worship. But she early saw the necessity of a spiritual and inward life, which devout cermonies could not impart; and sought with intense longings after assured hope and rest in God. Nor was she destitute of rich experience in the love of Christ, though often misguided and perplexed respecting the way of life; and many were the individuals, during this period, whom she was enabled to lead from spiritual bondage to hope and joy in God.

Nor did Lady Guyon, in these earlier stages of her experience, as Doctor Mosheim most untruly says, manifest "an inconstant and unsettled temper, subject to be drawn away by the seduction of a warm and unbridled fancy. Deriv-

and literary research, is certainly disgraceful. And it can scarcely fail to bring into doubt, the Editor's ability and accuracy, in other parts of the volume.

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ing all her ideas of religion from the feelings of her own heart," &c. Though not unfrequently enjoying those manifestations which the Prophet Joel announced as a peculiar feature of gospel times; and though many little circumstances are recorded in her auto-biography, (because her spiritual director expressly enjoined it) which might give currency to the idea that she was credulous and visionary; still no one point did Madame Guyon urge more uniformly, than that devout emotions, impulses of the mind, visions, fancies, &c., are not to be sought and relied upon, as evidences of a gracious state. She always insisted upon those things as true marks of godliness, which our own Edwards, and the more spiritual writers in the Protestant church declare to be such.

Notwithstanding Lady Guyon would at this time, have been deemed an eminent Christian, according to the standard of piety either in the Papal or Protestant communions, —still her mature knowledge of the gospel was not gained. Her remarkable career of usefulness had not commenced. Her great work was not yet understood.

Shortly before her husband's death, Madame Guyon entered into a state of spiritual darkness or "desolation," as she terms it, which continued with slight variations for several years. She lost all sensible communion with God,—peace of mind,—and supposing she had in some unknown manner, sinned, and not well understanding, then, *the way of simple faith*, she remained in "a state of emptiness, darkness, and sorrow;" concluding that she was forsaken of God, a cast-away. This long season of indescribable suffering, however, issued in a far more precious and permanent experience of the love of God, and indwelling of the Holy Ghost, than Madame Guyon had ever before known; and to her record of this we would draw particular attention. It is a delineation of the grace of Christ in the soul of man, worthy of prayerful thought. We know of nothing in the biography of Protestants, more purely evangelical, and very little that it is equal to it in depth and power. Certain it is, that many suppose themselves to be sanctified, who have by no means reached the great and permanent blessedness of this state. And perhaps it is true, that as complete redemption from sin, has heretofore been thought an impracticable attainment in this life,—now the danger is, that disciples will deem themselves to be in its enjoyment, who have not felt the thoroughly transforming power of the Spirit.

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"Great was the change, which I had now experienced; but still in my exterior life, that part of my life which came under the observation of others, I appeared to them quite simple, unobtrusive, and common. And the reason was, that my soul was not only brought into harmony with itself and with God, but with God's providences. In the exercise of faith and love, I endured and performed whatever came in God's providence, in submission, in thankfulness, and silence. I was now in God and God in me; and where God is, there is as much simplicity as power. And what I did was done in such simplicity and childlikeness of spirit, that the world did not observe anything which was much calculated to attract notice.

"I had a deep peace; a peace which seemed to pervade the whole soul. A peace which resulted from the fact that all my desires were fulfilled in God. I desired nothing; feared nothing; willed nothing. I feared nothing; that is to say, I feared nothing, considered in its *ultimate results and relations*, because my strong faith placed God at the head of all perplexities and all events. I desired nothing but what I now had, because I had a full belief, that in my present state of mind the results of each moment, considered in relation to myself, constituted the fulfillment of the divine purposes. I willed nothing; meaning in the statement that I had no will of my own. As a sanctified heart is always in harmony with the divine providences, I had no will but the divine will, of which such providences are the true and appropriate expression. How could such a soul have other than a deep peace, —a peace which was not limited to the uncertainties of the emotional part of our nature, but which pervaded and blessed the whole mind! Nothing seemed to diminish it; nothing troubled it.

"I do not mean to say, that I was in a state in which I could not be afflicted. My physical system, my senses, had not lost the power of suffering. My natural sensibilities were susceptible of being pained. Oftentimes I suffered much. But interiorly, in the centre of the soul, if I may so express it, there was divine and supreme peace. The lower soul, or the soul considered in its connection with the objects immediately around it, might at times be troubled and afflicted; but the higher or central soul, or the soul considered in its relation to God, and the divine will, was entirely calm, trustful, and happy. The troubles at the circumference originating in part from a disordered physical constitution, did not affect and disturb the divine peace of the centre.

"One characteristic of this higher degree of experience was a sense of inward purity. My mind had such a oneness with God, such a unity with the divine nature, that nothing seemed to have power to soil it and diminish its purity. It experienced the truth of that declaration of scripture, that to the pure all things are pure. As God is present to sinners in the matter of instructing and reproving, and also in that of physically upholding and sustaining them, even in the very act of sin, and yet without being rendered sinful or contracting any moral evil, so the person who is truly pure, may see sinful acts, may hear impure and sinful conversation, or may otherwise be brought, providentially or in the discharge of duty, into connection with impurities without contracting any stain from them. Such stains have no affinity with the pure mind. The pollution which surrounds it, has no power upon it; as the dark and impure mud does not defile the sunbeams that shine upon it, which rather appear brighter and purer from the

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contrast. The soul, bright with the brightness which comes from God, seems to have no knowledge of any darkness or evil in itself.

"But, though I was so much blessed, I was not conscious of any merit, nor tempted by any suggestions of merit in myself. Indeed I seemed so united with God, so made one with the centre and sum of all good, that my thoughts did not easily turn upon myself as a distinct object of reflection; and, consequently, it would not have been an easy thing for me to attach to myself the ideas of desert or merit. If I had done virtuously and meritoriously by a *laborious effort*, the idea of merit would more naturally and readily have suggested itself, and I might have been tempted to indulge thoughts of that kind. But now that God had become the inward operator, and every movement was a movement originating, as it were, in a divine inspiration, and as a holy life had become as natural to me as the life of nature formerly had been, I could not well attribute to myself, and certainly had no disposition to attribute to myself, what evidently belonged to God. To Him, and to Him only, to his goodness and his grace, I attributed all worthiness, all praise.

"I regard the deprivations and sufferings of Job, and his subsequent restoration to prosperity and to the manifestations of the divine favor, as a history which illustrates, as if in a mirror, the process of inward death and inward resurrection which is experienced by those who arrive at the state of full interior transformation. God first took away every thing, and then restored every thing as it were, an hundred fold. And so in the inward life. Our worldly possessions, our property, our influence, our reputation, our health, are taken away, if God sees it necessary; He then smites our domestic and other affections, which have persons for their objects rather than things, either by smiting and withering the affections in themselves, or in the objects to which they are attached. He then proceeds to crucify the subject of the divine operation to any attachment to and reliance on his outward works as a ground of merit and acceptance. In its death to everything where self reigns instead of God, the mind dies also to any sense of its own inward exercises and virtues, so far as they are a ground of self-gratulation and of interior complacency. Nor does this process stop, till the life of nature, which consists in inordinate attachments, is entirely exterminated. But the soul can not live without a life of some kind. There are but two, and can be but two principles of moral life in the universe; one, which makes ourselves, or the most limited private good, the centre; the other, which makes God, who may be called the Universal Good, the centre. And by that necessary law which says, where there is life there must be a *principle* of life, when one of these principles dies, the other emerges from its state of abeyance and inactivity, and takes the place of that which has passed away. So that when *self* dies in the soul, God lives; when *self* is annihilated, God is enthroned.—*Vol.* 1, *pp.* 193–198.

We suppose many thoughtful readers will be ready to propound the question, if this great blessedness in Christ is really the promise of the gospel to every believer, why do so few experimentally know it? On this point, Madame Guyon has the following deeply instructive remarks, which

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all who hope for heaven, and especially such as desire to be useful in the church, would do well to ponder:

"There are not many souls who reach this state, and still fewer that reach it immediately. Nature cries out against the process of inward crucifixion, and the greater number of inquirers after salvation stop short. Oh, if souls had courage to resign themselves to the work of purification, without having any weak or foolish pity on themselves, what a noble, happy, and rapid progress would they make?' But generally men have too little faith and too little courage to leave the shore, which is something tangible and has the support of *sense*, and go out to sea, with the support *of faith* only. They advance, perhaps, some little distance; but when the wind blows and the clouds lower, and the sea is tossed to and fro, then they are dejected, they come to anchor, and often desist wholly from prosecuting the voyage of life."

How sadly true is this!

Madame Guyon had now received largely those spiritual baptisms, which Peter described on the day of Pentecost, as the burden of new covenant promise, "to us and our children." So richly had she been taught of God, that to an extent of which she was not aware, the dogmas of Popery, had passed away, or become neutralized in her mind.

Having settled her husband's affairs, it became now a question of deep importance what should be her future course. This after much prayer and consultation, was decided in favor of removing to the eastern borders of France, near Geneva, where she would give herself wholly to works of charity and devotion, as was usual in the Catholic church. Accordingly she left Paris in 1681, and after an eventful journey, took up her residence at a convent, in the small town of Gex. From this period, her labors of astonishing power may be said to have commenced. Her true calling now began to appear.

"The work which the Lord had assigned her, and which she did not yet understand, was wholly different from what, in her limited view of things, she had anticipated. God often works thus. It is often the case, that He forms a sentiment in the bosom, and causes it to be uttered, of which he who is the instrument of its utterance, does not know the full import. And still less does he understand the hidden influences of divine providence, which have placed the burden upon his heart, rather than upon the heart of another, and have caused it to be proclaimed at the appropriate time. He is a prophet of God; and like most true prophets, is so absorbed in the object, as to be hardly conscious of his own relations to it; so that, with the simplicity of a little child, he utters truths, which are so broad and effective in their application, that they affect the happiness of nations, and take hold of time and eternity.

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"Thus at the foot of the Alps, when she thought her great business was to make ointments, and cut linen, and bind up wounds, and tend the sick, and teach poor children the alphabet and the catechism, (important vocations to those whom Providence calls to them,) she uttered a word from her burdened heart, in her *simplicity*, without knowing or thinking how widely it would affect the interests of humanity, or through how many distant ages it would be re-echoed. And that word was, Sanctification by Faith.

"Both the thing and the manner of the thing struck those who heard her with astonishment. Sanctification itself was repugnant; and sanctification by *faith* inexplicable. In the Protestant Church, it would have been hardly tolerable; but in the Catholic church, which is characterized, much more than the Protestant, by what may be termed ceremonial observances, the toleration of a sentiment which ascribes the highest results of inward experience *to faith alone*, was impossible. So that, instead of being regarded as a humble and devout Catholic, as she supposed herself to be, she found herself suddenly denounced as a heretic. But the Word was in her heart, formed there by infinite wisdom; and in obedience to that deep and sanctified conviction which constitutes the soul's inward voice, she uttered it; uttered it *now*, and uttered it *always*, "though bonds and imprisonments awaited her."

"She used discretion, however: but not hypocrisy. She did not esteem it advisable to propose the highest results of the religious life to those who had hardly made a beginning, and who had not, as yet, experienced the blessing of justification. But when she met with those who believed in Christ as a Savior from the penalty of a violated law, she seemed to be impelled by a sort of religious instinct, originating in her own blessed experience, to recommend Him also as a Savior from present transgression, as a Savior who can and does communicate his own spirit of truth, meekness, gentleness, purity, and holiness of heart to those who, in the spirit of entire self-renunciation, look to him believingly for these great blessings. She said what was in her, in God's time, without variation and without fear, scarcely knowing what she did."—*Vol. I., pp.* 237—239.

Of course, great agitation followed this teaching. Some believed and rejoiced for the consolation; while many believed not, but spake evil of that way. About this time also, Lady Guyon began to publish Treatises upon the Interior Life, which, with an extensive correspondence, occupied her pen almost constantly during the rest of her life. Still "she never forgot the mission which she now felt was committed to her, namely, the proclamation to all who bear the name of Christ, of holiness, based upon faith, as their present privilege and possession." Having thus labored nearly two years in the region around Geneva, and effectually established the gospel in many places, the bishop forbade her remaining longer in that diocese. She was therefore driven to seek a temporary refuge in Turin, Italy;—but there the word of God took effect, and many were hopefully brought

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to Christ. From Turin, she returned to France, tarrying for a season in the ancient city of Grenoble, where a most remarkable revival spread from her efforts. Expelled from this place, and so from others successively, she at length decided on going to Paris.

Having reached the great and gay capital in 1686, from which she had been absent about five years, Madame Guyon remained for a season in comparative seclusion. Such, however, was the fame of her writings, and the power of her teaching, that she could not be hidden. Inquirers gradually gathered around her, and at length numbers from all ranks—those high at court, as well as bishops, priests, doctors of the Sorbonne, &c., sought through Madame Guyon, acquaintance with the gospel. In various other ways, also, "*the new spirituality*," as her teaching was called, sounded abroad into different parts of the kingdom, till the dignitaries of the church became greatly alarmed, and the civil power was invoked to put down the heresy.

It was about this time, (1688,) that Madame Guyon became acquainted with the Abbe Fenelon. This great and good man, had in the early part of his life performed a missionary tour in Canada, and among the Indian tribes of these states.* Returning to France, one of the most devoted and eloquent of the priesthood, he was called to the very difficult task of pacificating and converting certain Protestant provinces, among which Louis XIV had just before sent the sword of persecution. Acquitting himself nobly in this work, Fenelon was next appointed preceptor of the young Duke of Burgundy, heir to the crown, and for his distinguished services here, was raised to the archbishopric of Cambray—a position of vast influence.

It was upon his return to Paris, from the distant province of Poitou, that he sought the acquaintance of Madame Guyon. Fenelon's mind soon became, perhaps it was previously, deeply interested in the doctrines of the inward life. Frequent interviews followed, and a lengthened correspondence of two years, as the result of which, he embraced the gospel of Sanctification by Faith, and evidently entered richly into the enjoyment of the blessing of pure love. No historian, so far as we know, gives any just idea

* That Fenelon was actually a missionary in this country, contrary to the statement of Prof. Upham, we suppose to be settled by recent publications of the New York Historical Society.

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of the agency and influence which Madame Guyon had in directing and maturing the Christian faith of Fenelon. Doubtless for much of that in which he has benefitted the church and the world, we are indebted, instrumentally, to this remarkable woman.

Though the wealth, distinguished connections, and eminent piety of Lady Guyon, shielded her for a season, when others of humbler name would have fallen and did fall martyrs; still Paris and all the country around becoming excited by the new doctrine of the inward life, she was at length formally denounced as a heretic, and thrown into prison.

At this juncture, Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, and the oracle of the French Catholic Church, undertook to silence the new teachings with his pen. Accordingly, after laborious preparation, and special pains to forestall the public mind, he issued a book, entitled "*Instructions on the States of Prayer*," in which he personally attacked Lady Guyon, as well as her doctrines. Fenelon's approbation of this work having been sought and refused, he felt called upon to give the world a full statement of his views. Accordingly, there soon after appeared a volume, entitled "*Maxims of the Saints*," in which, (assuming Prof. Upham's abridgment to be a fair draft,) with a few abatements on account of sentiments peculiar to the Romish church, the Archbishop nobly expounded the way of salvation through Christ, in its simplicity, freeness and power. Thus, as God permitted the chief instrument in his great work to be laid aside, temporarily, He raised up another advocate, whose voice was heard with deep reverence, throughout France not only, but well nigh throughout Catholic Europe.

Following these first publications, a controversy was carried on through the press, between Bossuet and Fenelon, in which the whole kingdom became intensely interested. The doctrine of Sanctification by Faith, was then, we suppose, as fully canvassed throughout France, as it has been by any portions of the American church, during the last ten years. And it seems reasonable to conclude, that thousands became savingly instructed into the knowledge of Jesus Christ.

For his defence of the gospel, Fenelon was banished from court, and his book laid before the Pope, with earnest demands of the French King, that it should be condemned, and its author excommunicated. But, surprising to relate, the great truths of the gospel still lingered, and were loved,

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in the Sacred College at Rome! We are free to confess that Protestant prejudices had so far possessed our mind, that we were not prepared for such a history as Prof. Upham has sketched respecting Fenelon's trial at Rome. To know that in the seventeenth century, many of the highest dignitaries of the Romish church, not only adhered to the grand truth of *salvation through faith in Christ*, but even apprehended the central idea of the gospel, *sanctification by faith*, was at once astonishing and delightful.

Many readers of this paper, doubtless, will contrast with feelings of humiliation and deep sorrow, the treatment which the doctrine of sanctification received from Romish Cardinals, in 1698, with that which the same truth received at the hands of American Presbyterians, about 1840.

"The pope [Innocent XII,] began the unpleasant work which was thus devolved upon him, by appointing a commission of twelve persons, called *consultors*, for the purpose of examining the book of Fenelon, and giving an opinion upon it. They were directed to hold their meetings in the chamber of the master of the Sacred Palace. Having discussed the principles and expressions of the book, in twelve successive sittings, they found themselves so divided in opinion in relation to it, that no satisfactory result could reasonably be anticipated from a continuance of their deliberations. They were accordingly dissolved.

His next step was to select a commission or congregation of cardinals, in the hope, if the work was so heretical as it was pronounced by some to be, that they would be able to come to some conclusion, which would aid him in forming his own decision, a decision which he felt would naturally involve great responsibility. This body also had twelve sittings. They found themselves, however, greatly divided; came to no conclusion, and were dissolved.

He then appointed a new congregation of cardinals. They met in consultation no less than fifty-two times. The result of their deliberation was, but by no means with entire unanimity, that they extracted from Fenelon's work a number of propositions which they regarded as censurable, and reported them to the pope. After they had advanced so far, they held thirty-seven meetings to settle the form of the censure. In addition to these more formal meetings, private conferences on the subject were frequently held by the pope's direction, and sometimes in his presence.

The cardinals Alfaro, Fabroni, Bouillon and Gabriellio, and some others perhaps of less note, took the side of Fenelon. Men of no ordinary learning and power, they maintained with great ability, that the doctrine in question had authority and support in many approved Catholic writers. They did not hesitate, in the least, to defend the statements repeatedly made by Fenelon in his arguments with Bossuet and on other occasions, that it was a doctrine not only received but greatly cherished by many pious and learned men in all ages of the church; by Clement, Cassian, Dyonysius, Thauler, Gerson, De Sales, John of the Cross, St. Theresa, the bishop of Bellay and others; and to this they were willing to add,

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that there was not more of such learned and pious authority in its favor, than there was of scripture and reason. Gabriellio said, on one occasion, expressly, that it was a doctrine conformed to the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Mystics.

They did not, however, in maintaining the doctrine of pure love, exclude the idea of a suitable regard to our own happiness. They seem to have taken the ground that God and ourselves, considered as objects of love, are incommensurable; and consequently that the motive of God's love, exceeding the other beyond all comparison, practically absorbs and annihilates it. So that a soul wholly given to God, may properly be said to love God alone. But the doctrine of GOD ALONE does not exclude other things, since God is *All in All.* In other words, in loving God for Himself alone, who is the sum of all good, we can not help loving ourselves, our neighbor and every thing else in their proper place and degree. Alfaro, in concluding some remarks, at one of these meetings, read a letter addressed many ages before, by St. Louis of France, to one of his daughters, in which he advised her to do every thing from the principle of *pure love.*

* * * * "They went so far as to intimate that if the doctrine of PURE LOVE were condemned, sustained as it was by such a weight of authority and argument, and encircled as it was by so many strong affections, it could hardly fail to produce a schism in the church."—*Vol. II., pp.* 279—281.

The controversy unfolding the idea of a substantially pure gospel, having spread throughout France, and now transferred to Rome, occupied the Papal councils there, about two years, before even a qualified condemnation of Fenelon's book could be procured, the king of France meanwhile exerting himself to this end.

"It was under such circumstances as these, on the 12th of March, 1699, that a decree was issued over the signature of the pope, condemning the book of Fenelon, or perhaps more properly condemning twenty-three propositions, which purported to be extracted from it. The pope, however took the pains to say, and to have it understood, that they were condemned in the sense which they might bear, or which they were actually regarded as bearing in the view of others, and not in the sense in which they were explained by Fenelon himself. "The pope," says Monsieur de Bausset, "had openly declared on many occasions, that neither he nor the cardinals had intended to condemn the explanations, which the archbishop of Cambray had given of his book."—*Vol. II., pp.* 290.

Respecting Madame Guyon, it is perhaps necessary only to add, that being released from her first imprisonment of a few months—the influence of her writings and labors were soon again widely felt, and abundantly owned of God. But now the rage of wicked men threw her into the Bastile, where she remained in solitary confinement four years. The suffer-

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ings of that terrible place quite destroyed her constitution. Being released in 1702, she but exchanged the gloom of a dungeon, for the sorrows of banishment from early friends and from her only daughter. She died at the city of Blois, in great peace, A. D. 1717, aged 69.

The preceding sketch will, it is thought, enable the reader to understand and appreciate the type of piety which Madame Guyon inculcated and realized in her own life: though it will fail, we are aware, to convey a just estimate of the astonishing labors and vast influence of this remarkable woman. Indeed, the light of eternity can only reveal that.

Nor ought the distinct acknowledgment to be omitted, that in Professor Upham, the great revival in the French Catholic Church, during the seventeenth century, has at length found a competent historian. Both by his peculiar College studies, and by rich experience of that grace concerning which he has so frequently spoken through the press, this gentleman is qualified to lay open in a discriminating, copious, and most attractive form, an invaluable chapter of ecclesiastical history; and at the same time to present a volume of spiritual instruction admirably suited to every class of inquirers.

In now bringing this review to a close, it remains but to touch upon some of the practical reflections, which a study of the Life and times of Madame Guyon have suggested, and which seem to us deserving of special consideration. And

1. The Scripture doctrine of *Divine retribution following those nations which openly reject and persecute the gospel*, invites remark. But want of room utterly precludes going into this subject further than to say, that the history of France for the past hundred years, and even its condition to-day reveal the bloody and terrible consequences which may be expected by every nation, that through its rulers determinedly make war upon Christ, as did that kingdom during the reign of Louis XIV. Nations, as such, exist only in this world: and with them God deals in providential, though certain retribution. Would that our own Republic might learn this fact, ere it be too late!

2. We may disabuse our minds respecting the character of those who in different ages of the Church have been stigmatized as *Mystics* and *Quietists*, so named because their doctrine of "the inward life," was accounted mystical; and because deep quietude or rest of spirit was a prominent characteristic of their lives. Ecclesiastical history dis-

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courses largely of these people, in a manner somewhat vague, and not a little contradictory—though always agreeing in one thing, namely, that they were fanatical, corrupters of the faith, guilty of monstrous follies, and were, besides, great troublers of *the Church*. We now know that "Mystics" and "Quietists" denote substantially the same faith; and that this was the religion of Lady Guyon and Archbishop Fenelon. The testimony of Catholic and other writers is quite uniform upon this point. A celebrated French writer (quoted by Professor Upham,) in the annals of his own times, has the following items of collateral proof:

"1685, *July 10th*. I am informed that a Jesuit named "Molinos, has been put into the inquisition at Rome, accused "of wishing to become the chief of the New Sect called "Quietists, whose principles are somewhat similar to those "of the Puritans in England."

This was Abbe Molinos, the distinguished priest and reformer, in Spain and Italy, cotemporary with Lady Guyon, an idea of whose ministry may be gathered from the fact that after his death near twenty thousand letters were found among his papers, from all classes of persons, seeking instruction and guidance in the way of life. His principles were similar to those of our Puritan fathers, in that he insisted upon salvation *through faith* in Christ. It is only in such incidental ways, and by the merest hints, that we can ascertain the truth respecting many of the noblest men of past ages.

The histories lying before us, which seem to grudge the Mystics and Quietists any thing but an ill name, trace them up to the second century, and describe them at first as "a melancholy set of men," whose faith grew out of the Platonic Philosophy, &c. In the fourth century, Mosheim says, they were found in great numbers in Greece and Syria, and and from thence spread through "the whole Christian world with amazing rapidity." It is a significant fact, that prejudiced historians, even, so far as we can discover, do not convict these people of immoralities—but charge them with the fanaticism of seeking in absurd ways, a deep communion with God,—with mortifying the senses;—withdrawing the mind from all external objects;—with a holy sort of indolence, &c. Again, in the fifth century we hear of the Mystics, pretending to high degrees of perfection, and drawing after them a vast number, "by the striking appearance of their austere and singular piety." In the ninth century they

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are prominent in history,—the same wrong-headed, solitary fanatics, we are assured, as ever; and again also in the twelfth. In the thirteenth century, they appear as the formidable opposers of the Schoolmen, "rejecting every thing that bore the least resemblance to argumentation or dispute about matters of doctrine and opinion, confined their endeavors to the advancement of inward piety, and the propagation of devout and tender feelings, and thus acquired the highest degree of popularity!" In the fifteenth century, these ancient heretics again appear, triumphing over the Scholastic Theology, and are found to number "some men of distinguished merit," such as Thomas a Kempis, Savanarola, &c. And in the sixteenth century, lo, Ecclesiastical History discovers, that, "if any sparks of real piety subsisted under this despotic empire of superstition, they were only to be found among the Mystics!" What the Mystics and Quietists were in the seventeenth century, fragments of Abbe Molinos' writings, the Life of Fenelon, the Memoirs of George Fox, and the works of William Law, abundantly teach.

The truth unquestionably is, that amid great diversity of outward religious form, and allowing that some individuals bearing their name, were really fanatics and strangely deluded, still *we are to seek among the Mystics, for a chief part of the true church of Christ, during the darkest ages of the Man of Sin.* And it is devoutly to be hoped, that some capable hand will ere long undertake the research of evolving from ancient records, their true history. They would thus give to the world, as we doubt not this would, new chapters of delightful interest, respecting the existence of communities of eminent Christians, and the glorious workings of the divine Spirit, at places and times of which we are ignorant.

3. The Memoir of Lady Guyon, will aid in forming a more intelligent and just opinion, than now prevails, respecting *the religious character of Catholics.* The descendants of English Non-conformists, and of French Huguenots and of the Scottish Kirk, Americans have been educated in such intense hatred of every thing connected with the name of Catholic, that the popular sentiment respecting it, is altogether uncandid and unjust. We yield to none in abhorrence of the spiritual despotism of Popery; nor do we forget that many of its leading dignitaries, have been monsters of wickedness. But what then? So have wicked men, and atrocious systems of cruelty nestled in the bosom of the

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Protestant Church. While it is equally true that many of the most illustrious names of past ages, in science, in government, and in religion, were Catholics. And in modern times, this communion has unquestionably numbered multitudes who were among the most devoted children of God. A church that has reared such members as Xavier and Taulerus, Kempis and Lopez, Pascal and Fenelon, Catharine of Genoa and Madame Guyon, and in our own days, Archbishop Cheverus and Father Matthew, ought not to be unsparingly denounced, nor thought destitute of God's saving presence and Spirit.

We know it may be said that "Popery is always intolerant and persecuting." This is too true; but Protestants, possessing far greater light, have exhibited a measure of the same bad spirit. "Popery withholds the Bible from her subjects." This is indeed a great wrong; but so does Protestant and republican America withhold the book of God from near three millions of our countrymen. "Romish Priests bind men with superstitious rites, forbid freedom of thought," &c. So they do; and so does more than one Protestant sect in our midst, bind the conscience with creeds and human systems, some points of which the bulk of the church never did understand, and other points of which are grossly unscriptural. * Perhaps it will be said, also, that "the very individuals, on account of whom this paper would honor the Romish Communion, were essentially *protestant* in it, and were persecuted." Some of them were—and sorry we are to add, that a humiliating parallel does not here fail; for within the last ten years, numbers of unquestioned piety, have been loaded with reproaches and driven from the churches of this land—for confessing the same faith as Fenelon's;—the doctrine of Sanctification by Faith.

We ought to love and esteem the Catholic church for the numbers of great men she has given to our world. And while we are to expose and rebuke her errors and wickedness, this ought to be done with a measure of tenderness, remembering how far we Protestants have also been tempted. It is strongly hoped that God is sending to this land multi-

* It will be a sufficient justification of this apparently harsh remark, we trust, to refer to the doctrine of *baptismal regeneration*, taught in the Episcopalian Liturgy, to the doctrine of *the damnation of non-elect Infants* in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith; and to the teaching and usage of Close Baptists, that *there is no gospel church* or *gospel ministry*, save among themselves who have been regularly immersed.

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tudes of Catholics from the old world, in order that they may be converted to the truth and made free. It therefore becomes us all to purify ourselves thoroughly from the stains, similar in kind, though perhaps much less aggravated than those from which it is sought to emancipate our foreign population.

In view of such considerations as these, we have not been able to sympathize with some of the associated movements of the day against the Romish Church; nor to see the wisdom of frequent sweeping attacks from the pulpit and religious press, upon the Catholic faith. And because too, of our entire confidence, that Catholics in this land, if not embittered by what shall appear to them sectarian assaults, and thus thrown beyond our reach,—must in spite of priestly domination, become enlightened in the truth, and raised above the power of a superstitious hierarchy,—we have not participated in the alarms that this Republic is likely to fall under the tyranny of Rome.

4. Another topic suggested by the memoir of Lady Guyon, respects *the propriety and duty of women becoming religious teachers.* We do not suppose the Bible authorizes the appointment of females to office in the Christian Church; but that the Holy Spirit designs they should occupy a more active, efficient position in what might be termed *the general ministry of instruction*, than is allowed by most denominations, seems quite apparent. We see not how a thoughtful Christian can peruse this memoir without being forced to such conclusion.

The Scriptures declare it to be a distinguishing feature of gospel times, that upon our sons and *daughters*—upon our servants and *handmaids*, the Spirit shall be poured out, and they shall *prophesy*. One of the Deacons first chosen in the Christian Church, had four virgin daughters all of whom *prophesied;* that is, taught others the will of God—communicated to the people, (at what *places* or *times* is not material,) messages which were revealed to them by the Holy Ghost. And Madame Guyon did the same. Nevertheless there are few denominations of Christians at the present day, that would allow this thing which God ordained and has so abundantly blessed.

It is not deemed necessary in this connection to examine the popular interpretation of those passages in which Paul prohibits women speaking in the churches, usurping authority, &c.,—since in the same Epistle in which this prohibition oc-

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curs, the Apostle gives instruction how females should pray and prophesy in their meetings, (1 Cor. 11: 4—6;)—and in another Epistle he names with high commendation those women who were commissioned with the business of a sister church; who were his "helpers in Christ Jesus," and who "labored much in the Lord;" (Ro. 16: 1—12.) We are not disposed to trifle with this subject by admitting for one moment, that Paul contradicts himself: or that he forbids what the Holy Ghost commands. The truth is, that in very many churches, three-fourths of the whole body, and nearly all the spiritual portion of the membership are females. And there is abundant reason to know that they are at times richly anointed of the Spirit to speak his truth—to reprove the ungodly—and to comfort and guide the doubting. But thoroughly impressed with the conviction that it is improper, not to say, indecent, for them to speak in religious meetings, their own growth in the divine life is hindered, and the work of God around them marred and even arrested. And is not one cause of the present inefficiency of churches to be sought in the fact that pious females are kept in such a position of deep inferiority?

We might almost as well believe there is no Holy Ghost as to deny that such women as Madame Guyon, Mary Fletcher, Elizabeth Heyrick, and other individuals, (some of our own time,) were anointed of God to bear a part of the ministry of the word. Their lives and labors demonstrate the fact. With the Apostle, they can say respecting very many ransomed souls, "ye are seals of our ministry."

5. The last topic of remark induced by the Memoir, of which we now take leave, is this: *The seasons of great and wide religious awakening*, by means of which a pure Christianity has been preserved in the earth, *have been Revivals of the doctrine of Entire Sanctification or pure love.* It is singular that this striking fact has been so completely overlooked.

With the light that has been recently shed upon this point, we need not hesitate to say that the doctrine of Pure Love, or as it is now nick-named "*Perfectionism*," was the faith of the whole church, down to the times of Augustine, in the fourth century. From that period the church became so deeply corrupted that we have been left in doubt as to the existence of pure societies of Christians, for many hundreds of years. The statements of Prof. Upham, taken in connection with the occasional admissions and incidental

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hints of Ecclesiastical History, now show that during this long period there existed a people called *Mystics*, who taught the doctrine of Sanctification through the indwelling Spirit, and that great Revivals from age to age, occurred in connection with their labors. In the sixteenth century it is confessed that this people, who insisted so strongly upon Sanctification, or the Inward Life, possessed all the real piety there was known to be on the earth.

In the seventeenth century, wonders of God's redeeming grace throughout France and Italy, (and we think we might add other parts of Catholic Europe,) were manifested in connection with the revival of this same truth. Nearly at the same time, the mighty work of the Divine Spirit, throughout Great Britain and elsewhere, followed the preaching of the same essential doctrine, by George Fox and others of the Society of Friends.

About fifty years later, the same precious gospel was revived among the Moravians, and by them taught to Wesley; through whose Apostolical labors, the doctrine of Holiness or Christian Perfection, was spread anew over the British Isles, throughout the American colonies, and extensively upon the continent, bringing salvation to many thousands.

And ere the great revivals which sprang up in this land, twenty years ago had ceased, the same truth, *present complete redemption from all sin through faith in Christ*, was again revived and pressed upon the forgetful heart of the church, so that now this has become a chief topic of inquiry, among serious and devout minds throughout the states! "O, the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!"

We do not intend to say, that every season of wide spread and glorious reformation, in past ages, has brought up anew this doctrine of the Inward Life, or Christian Perfection. And two facts account for these exceptions. In the first place, there have prevailed in sections of the church, a philosophy of depravity and a theory of moral obligation, that rendered the idea of keeping our Father's commandments an utter impossibility. Of course, it should not be expected that religious awakenings, in such communities, would be likely to bring out the full blessedness and power of the gospel. In the second place, one class of reformations have been more or less blended with state affairs, and guided and controlled by princes and politicians. In such,

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it would not be reasonable to expect a work of the Spirit, altogether pure and deep. The great reformations in the days of Luther and Zwingle, John Knox, and the English Non-conformists, were of this class. But with these exceptions, we think it quite just to say, that every past season of the remarkable spread of Christianity, has been a revival of this same doctrine, whether called *pure love, sanctification by faith*, or *Christian perfection.*

And this opens to us the true doctrine and work of the Holy Ghost. Here are unfolded the promised blessings of the new covenant. The church is now in the midst of the "last days." The Divine Spirit is abroad in the earth, if we may so express it, the Executor of Christ's will and Testament. And it is a significant, a solemn fact, that cavils, and reproaches, and persecutions, (both in the church and out of it,) are not now directed against the one living Father, nor so much against Jesus Christ the propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world, and risen Savior, but *against the Holy Ghost.* (See Matthew 12: 31, 32.)

On this topic Madame Guyon has the following deeply-instructive remarks, which are commended to the prayerful consideration of such brethren as have strongly opposed the doctrine of a pure love, and with which this paper is concluded.

"During the period of the Old Testament dispensations, there were several of the Lord's martyrs, who suffered for asserting the existence of the one true God, and for trusting in Him. The doctrine of the one true God, in distinction from the heathen doctine of a multiplicity of gods, was the test by which conflicting opinions were tried; and in supporting which there were some who were martyrs to this important truth.

"At a later period another great truth was proclaimed, that of *Jesus Christ crucified for sinners.* This was a truth so much at variance, either in the principle or the facts of its announcement, with men's pre-conceived opinions and feelings, that it naturally arrested their attention, and provoked their hostility. And accordingly, in the primitive times of the Christian church, there were those who suffered and who shed their blood for this truth.

"At the present time there are those who are *martyrs of the Holy Ghost.* In other words, there are those who suffer for proclaiming the great truth, that the reign of the Holy Ghost in the souls of men has come; and especially for proclaiming their personal and entire dependance on his divine presence and influence. It is the doctrine of PURE LOVE, the doctrine of sanctification and of the Holy Ghost within us, as the Life of our own life, which is to be the test of spiritual perception and fidelity in the present and in future times. The Spirit of God, in the language of the prophet Joel, is to be poured *out upon all flesh.*

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"Those, who have suffered for the doctrine of Jesus Christ *crucified for the world's sins*, have been truly glorious in the reproach and sorrows they have endured; but those who have suffered, and are destined to suffer, for the doctrine of the coming and of the triumphant reign of the Holy Spirit in men's souls, will not be less so. The doctrine of Christ crucified as an atoning sacrifice is essentially triumphant. Satan has ceased, in a great degree, to exercise his power against those who receive and believe it. But, on the contrary, he has attacked and will attack, both in body and in spirit, those who advocate the dominion of the Holy Spirit, and who have felt his celestial impulse and power in their own hearts."—*Vol.* 2, pp. 52, 53.

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THE EVIDENCE OF THE WORLD'S ULTIMATE REFORM.

BY REV. S. H. WALDO,
DOVER.

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The history of this world presents us man in no enviable light. And must his future history correspond with the past? Must war continue to rage, oppression to trample its hapless victims in the dust, and stupid animalism debase our common humanity? These are questions of deep interest to benevolence and philanthropy.

To those who feel for human woe, any intimations of a happy reform yet coming over this world, will be hailed with no ordinary delight. Such intimations, as a matter of fact, are actually given as intimations adapted to stimulate the hopes and strengthen the hands of those who labor and pray for the good of our race, especially when contemplated as so many items of evidence, in a combined form like the colors of the rainbow, pointing with a steady hand to the divine purpose of redeeming and greatly elevating the human family.

The subject that I would respectfully suggest for your consideration at the present time, is *The Evidence of the World's Ultimate Reform.*

I. The sacred scriptures intimate and imply the reformation of the world.

It may be unnecessary to dwell upon this item of evidence before the assembly now addressed. Permit me, however, to cite a few texts by way of refreshing your memories with the biblical argument on this subject; and also allow me to make a few remarks in connection with such citations.

"In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed."—*Gen.* xii. 3. Has this promise received a fulfillment? If not,

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it is consequently yet to be fulfilled. To refer its fulfillment to another world and interpret it as favoring the sentiments of universal salvation, is unnatural—the connection in which it is found suggests no such reference. It obviously refers to this world, and not the next, as the place of its fulfillment, that is, "in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" in the present world.

"And it shall come to pass in the last days, [or gospel dispensation] that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many nations shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths. For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plow-shares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."—*Isa.* ii. 2–4.

When has the spirit of war ceased since the bright visions of Isaiah respecting the millennial glory? After all that was done by Constantine and Theodosius to banish heathenism from the Roman empire, according to Gibbon, the latter died in January, "And before the end of the winter of the same year the Gothic nation was in arms." Whatever peace existed in the Roman empire under these illustrious defenders of the faith, does history inform us that the barbarians had during the same time abandoned the practice and spirit of war? If they had not, then the world has not yet seen the peaceful reign of Christ, predicted in the scriptures of truth. For I am not aware of any other period that more nearly approximates to the one predicted by holy men who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. "All the ends of the world shall remember and turn unto the Lord, and all the kindred of the nations shall worship before thee."—*Ps.* xxii. 27. "All nations whom thou hast made shall come and worship before thee, O Lord: and shall glorify thy name."—*Ps.* lxxxvi. 9. If these cheering promises have not yet been fulfilled, then a glorious day is yet to dawn upon this world. The friends of God and humanity may lift up their heads and rejoice in view of the blessings that await our apostate and self-degraded race.

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Before proceeding to notice other considerations bearing upon the subject before us, it may be well to suggest that a *moral* regeneration of human society does not long exist alone. An *intellectual, civil, social* and *physical* elevation will naturally follow. Let the light of the gospel fall upon the human mind, and all the elements of humanity are warmed into life, and stimulated into their natural development. Such is the relation between our moral powers and our intellectual and physical being, that the rose does not more naturally bloom in spring, than such a result follows. These developments under the control of correct moral principle, in turn become auxiliary to a more perfect state of moral excellence. This thought will recur again before we are through.

II. The physical condition of man as an inhabitant of this globe, corresponds with other intimations favoring the world's ultimate reform. This item of evidence must not detain us long.

Were the population of this world to outrun the means of comfortable support, society would naturally degenerate. Wealth is not indispensable for an intelligent, refined, and happy state of society. But competency *is*. Now by a slight examination of the means of support and comfort provided by a beneficent creator, it will appear that the world is competent to sustain in physical comfort a vast augmentation of its present number of inhabitants.

According to Mr. Sidney E. Morse, the geographer, in North America there are five inhabitants to the square mile; in South America, two; in Oceanica, five; in Europe, sixty-five; in Asia, twenty-five; in Africa, six.

It has been supposed that this continent, without any reliance upon future discoveries in the arts and agriculture, would sustain some forty times its present population, 2,000,000,000.* This estimation might have had no reference to the gold region of California, (it being made at least some eighteen years since,) a territory 1000 by 300 miles in extent. This calculation appears *far*, if not well nigh *infinitely*, too low. And yet, Yankee as I am, I hardly dare to venture a guess as to the number of inhabitants that this continent is capable of sustaining in physical comfort even in the present state of the arts and the science of agriculture. But when the science of agriculture shall ap-

*About forty times its present population, 50,240,000.

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proach perfection, and the arts shall have come to the same condition, the number may be almost illimitably increased. Such is our present ignorance upon this subject, that it may not be possible to calculate with any considerable accuracy, how many inhabitants our world would sustain in circumstances of comfort, were all the materials economically worked up. However,

1. There is light and liberty enough manifestly to sustain a great multitude that no man could with ease number.

2. The air contains oxygen and other elements sufficient for how many I am not informed, perhaps no one is.

3. The treasures of gold, and silver, and iron, and copper, and lead, coal, salt, &c., are immense.

A high state of civilization manifestly requires the use of these treasures to a considerable extent. It is worthy of notice that the most useful minerals are the most abundant. Iron is more abundant than gold. This analogy in some form may run through the vegetable and animal world.

4. If we notice the vegetable kingdom, there we find rich provision made for man and the animal world over which he presides with such thoughtless stupidity. There we behold grasses, grains, fruits and trees, in rich abundance.*

5. The animal kingdom also pours forth its treasures for the support and comfort of man.

Besides numerous other species, there is the elephant, the horse, the ox, the sheep, the beast of the field and the fowl of the air, "the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas."† Who, on viewing the treasures provided for man's physical comfort, that is not lost to all sense of gratitude to the Author of all good, is not ready to exclaim with Israel's sweet singer, "O LORD, our God, how excellent is thy name in all the earth."

The relation of the various departments of the external world, interlinking with each other for the promotion especially of human comfort, and their proportion to each other reciprocally, as it respects their volume, combine in the exhibition of divine wisdom and benevolence. The animal produces the vegetable. The vegetable and mineral sustain the animal, excepting so far as animals prey upon each other. The animal having passed through the natural process of decay, returns to the sustenance of the vegetable world.

* About 60,000 species. † About 100,000 species or more.

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Their proportion to each other, in volume is so complete, that I presume no considerable *residuum* of any portion will remain after the others are worked up. That is, there is atmosphere enough, with its various properties, for the vegetable and animal kingdoms; minerals enough for the vegetable, and man, both as an animal and a being fitted for refined civilization; vegetables enough for the animal world, and all human uses; and animals sufficient to meet the wants and comforts of the human race. The provisions for sustaining a numerous population in comfort, are *ample*. Were the resources of the world fully developed and appropriately employed, the physical efforts of man to meet his daily wants would not much, if any, exceed the amount demanded for the most vigorous health. Let such a period arrive in the history of our world, and let moral principle prevail, then study can be more generally prosecuted.

III. Human capacity is in harmony with divine promises touching the world's reform.

I have no confidence in the notion that humanity self-moved will reform the race. But the capabilities of man are such that when appropriately employed, he is competent to rise to a high elevation. There is no necessity for him to pass through a physical regeneration in order to reach such a position.

1. Whatever differences may obtain among minds, they harmonize in their convictions of truth. One mind may not be competent to apprehend truths as readily as another; and under certain circumstances to apprehend it at all. But what one mind intuitively perceives to be true, another mind does not intuitively perceive (viewing it in the same light,) to be false. If the maxim, "all men cannot think alike," is intended to teach that minds are so constituted that they can not harmonize in their convictions of truth, it is incorrect. Any such insinuation is slander of the workmanship of God as displayed in the structure of the human mind. In the broad field of scientific inquiry, is there any want of harmony in the intellectual world? Do not all minds concur in the truth demonstrated in the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid's elements? There may be a wide difference among students respecting their talents and dispositions for mathematical study. But who ever heard of Old and New School views in this department of

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knowledge? And how is it with logic? Is a difference *possible?* Minds may differ in matters of mere conjecture, owing to variety in capacity and information; but in logical truth the shining links fasten every mind to the same identical conclusion. The same is true in every branch of knowledge strictly scientific. A science that does not produce identical conviction in the human mind universally, would be a contradiction in terms. Conscience is as identical and universal in its verdict as any other function of reason. It has been well said, "when a reference is made to the intentions, the only appropriate object of conscience, we find a more universal agreement among men than is generally supposed."* The truth, as it appears to me, will allow a more positive averment, that is, in passing judgment upon moral conduct, all minds concur when the motive is given. And the motive is all that renders an act virtuous or vicious. That motives are the *same* in their moral character, as viewed by different minds, is not a matter of fair debate: that is, all minds concur in calling right, *right;* and wrong, *wrong.*

In judging of moral conduct, it always falls into one or the other of those classes. It is true that we may be in doubt in consequence of imperfect information, under which class to arrange conduct; and, through ignorance, we may erroneously judge as to the real character of the actuating motive. But sufficiently augmented illumination produces correct and identical conviction among all minds. Thus it appears that minds are made for harmony and not discord. It is true that diversity exists: but it is a diversity that admits of a unity—a harmony in all convictions of truth.

If the human mind is necessarily discordant in its convictions of moral truth, of what utility would be a general judgment? How could God justify his ways to men, if they were not endowed with capacity for the apprehension of right? How could He secure the verdict of all intelligences in his favor, provided their moral judgments did not harmonize with right, and consequently with each other? It were utterly impossible.

Again, what would heaven be if filled with intuitive contradictions? One thinks a certain species of conduct to be right, while another as honestly condemns and abhors it. One sees infinite excellence in the character of a bene-

*Pres. Mahan, Intellectual Philosophy, page 193.

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volent God, while another in the contemplation of the same characteristics sees nothing good, or views them with necessary dislike. Such an idea of the final residence of the redeemed is revolting. And yet who can avoid the conclusion, if mind be made to differ constitutionally, and in that state passes to the rewards of the blessed? And if any one, to escape from a conclusion so unwelcome, suggests, that mind may pass through a physical change in becoming qualified for the society of heaven, it may be interrogatively replied, What then would become of the rational confidence now entertained in our convictions, if we found ourselves sincerely believing personal convictions of truth diametrically opposite, uncaused by different degrees of mental illumination? When we possess different convictions of the same truths, we always account for such variation by a change in the amount of mental illumination. Now let the mind be induced to account for a change in its honest convictions of truth on the belief of a constitutional transformation, and what but the most gloomy infidelity would naturally follow? Can a mind act with ease and power when its own honest convictions of intuitive truth receive no credence in its own apprehension? And after such conviction had fastened upon the intellect, how long would the flame of pure and ardent devotion continue to ascend? No such supposition is admissible in order to evade the argument of identity of mental convictions.

The notion that mind is so made that a constitutional jargon is the natural and necessary result, is a mistake. God has not framed his intelligent universe on that principle, nor did the fall introduce it. And yet this idea may be exceedingly precious to a particular class of persons, who are more fond of their own opinions than they are of the truth; especially if it challenge from them a frank acknowledgment of error. When closely cornered and no other door of escape opens, this false maxim is exceedingly convenient—"All men are not made to think alike." And yet it is possible that the same individuals would not be well pleased to be paid in their own coin, if an individual could give no better reason for rejecting a favorite notion of theirs.

This notion is one of a most pernicious character, adapted to protect stubbornness in its adhesion to false and absurd notions in theology. Can not honest minds see alike in the examination of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian scheme? Can they not see alike respecting the doctrines of

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depravity, the atonement, and the moral government of God? Yes, they can see *alike*, if competent to see at all. Can not the nature and reasonableness of moral law be seen and of course apprehended *alike?* Yes, just as really as Euclid's elements can be seen to contain incontrovertible truth. And on the other hand, can not mind perceive rational truth in the Panadamic system—all men sinning in Adam by receiving from that ancestor a certain taint treated as sin on the part of God? No. God never made a mind adapted to perceive rational truth in such an absurd theory. Men may have thought that scheme were true. But as for ever *seeing* the reasonableness of it, that is more than any mind ever did.

Is it not possible for rational mind to perceive the reasonableness of a system of moral government based on moral instinct?—that is, God acts right because He has a holy nature—unregenerate men act wrong because they possess a bad nature—and the saints are imperfect because their nature is not wholly sanctified. I do not say that good men have not adopted this erroneous scheme as of divine origin. But we may affirm that God never made a mind to respond to such nonsense as truth. A very little attention to the operation of minds adopting such absurdities will convince any discerning man that such ideas are not received as the verdict of reason, but on the ground of early impressions, convenience, or at any rate, not from rational conviction. Such persons affect to be more religious than to receive the testimony of reason—they receive the testimony of the Bible. That is, when they look at the clock to ascertain the time of day, *they are more orthodox than to believe their eyes; they believe the clock itself.* This illustration of the clock, exposes also the absurdity of the notion that we are not to follow the dictates of conscience, but the word of God. If any consolation may be derived from being far removed from error, this class of minds may rejoice that they are in little danger of becoming Transcendentalists; unless extremes, *in this instance*, should meet. Such persons when pressed with the absurdities of their creed, denounce reasoning as mere human philosophy, that is, speculation—moonshine. They base their views on the Bible. Thus their mode of discussing Biblical topics reveals the fact that truth with them is not held by the strength of evidence.

But all this jargon of folly results not from an appropriate exercise of those powers with which we are naturally

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endowed. Mind was made to act rationally, and harmoniously with other minds existing under the same wise and benevolent moral government.

2. The human mind can perceive the claims of God and humanity in the light of demonstration.

Mind, to act most powerfully, requires a clear view of important truth. Obscure views always diminish the power of truth. Those minds that possess faint impressions can accomplish but little by way of swaying others by strong and conclusive argumentation. The human mind requires the influence of truths viewed as of vast importance, in order to awaken its energies and call out its power in vigorous action. It needs the magic touch of the "*aliquid immensum infinitumque.*"

Such is the constitution of the mind, and such is the rationality of the claims of God and humanity, that we are competent to apprehend with great clearness the duties enjoined upon us. Such is our capacity for the apprehension of moral truth, that the things of another world can sway us with infinite ease. As the soul bows to God, and raises its imploring gaze to the mercy seat, what floods of emotion and what living energy can be made to start up within the human mind! It can feel and act under the pressure of the unseen world with quenchless zeal and untiring ardor.

3. We are not only capable of promoting greatly the happiness of others, but of doing it while urged onward by a desire for their highest good. We are competent to act *benevolently*. But in acting benevolently we necessarily act for infinite and not partial good. A partial benevolence is an absurdity. No mind can act in that manner. When the mind comes within the circle of saving mercy, it always occupies this state. To use the well-known language of the young convert, it "loves everybody." Thus the soul is emancipated from its selfishness and brought to act on the same principle with a benevolent God. "God is love." And so is the mind stamped with his moral image. God is happy in acting for the good of being; and so are angels and men. Let man resemble God in the principle of action, and the same kind of happiness is enjoyed. O who can correctly estimate the volume of happiness enjoyed by a sanctified and enlightened world all governed by the God-like principle of pure benevolence!

4. Human beings are not only capable of resembling God in their principle of action and kind of happiness en-

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joyed, but they are capable also of indefinite improvement in capacity of intellect and refinement of emotion.

5. The human family is susceptible of great improvement in a *physical* point of view also. Much of our physical suffering is doubtless avoidable. Were the laws of life carefully studied and faithfully practiced, who could predict the happy results in physical and mental vigor, and in the prolongation of human life? As multitudes *now live*, there is nothing wonderful in the fact that so much suffering, infirmity and premature death ensue. The wonder is that comfortable health and life continue as long as they do.

Without prosecuting farther this item of evidence harmonizing with the divine promise that the world shall ultimately be reformed, it is manifest that our race is susceptible, even in the present world, of becoming a happy portion of God's intelligent universe.

IV. The nature of the Christian religion is happily suited to a reformed state of mankind; and is adapted to produce it.

1. The Christian religion is adapted to man as a sinful being living for another world. Man as a sinner needs pardon and peace of mind. These the gospel bestows upon those complying with its requisitions. As an immortal and accountable being, hastening to the retributions of eternity, he needs a hope that will sustain him amid the trials of life and the agonies of death. Such a hope the gospel furnishes —a hope that is as "an anchor to the soul, both sure and stedfast, and which entereth into that within the vail."

2. The Christian religion is adapted to man as an intellectual being. Mind was made for progressive thought. It delights in action; and under this condition it unfolds itself. The Christian religion falls in with the pre-established mental constitution of man. It awakens thought and stimulates the mind to perpetual and progressive effort. Thus the mind is delighted with the exercise of thinking, and the conscious augmentation of its wisdom and development. Mental activity and the consequent delight spread through the soul, are not the nestlings of depravity brought to life by the contemplation of divine truth. But they are parts of a divinely constituted humanity. "*Deus nobis hæc otia fecit*"—God gave them to us. The intellectual treasures of the mind are unlocked and revealed by the powerful hand of moral truth. All truth that is important for man to know is not embraced in the sacred scriptures. Other

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truths scattered through the universe are important. One of our missionary brethren has well remarked,* "It is the combined light of *all truth, scientific as well as religious,* which is to render so perfect and glorious the splendor of the millennial day."

What folly to suppose that science, (the natural offspring of mind quickened by the power of moral truth,) is antagonistical to religion? Is not truth consistent with itself? Is there any necessary antagonism between the scientific and moral world? Does God say one thing in the splendid science of astronomy, and the opposite in a direct revelation? Does geology speak a different language from the Bible? Does the "stone book" contradict that made of parchment or paper? Truth is one, and all efforts to stigmatize truths not revealed in the sacred scriptures, are adapted to produce infidelity.

The Christian religion retains its hold on the human mind on the condition of progressive mental development. Let a Christian church have no intellectual progress, and the shades of moral death will fall upon it—from two, if not more sources.

1. Dead formality. An unprogressive state of mind naturally produces an intellectual and moral paralysis. Progress is as truly a *sine qua non* in sustaining intellectual or moral vigor, as atmospheric air is in preserving animal life and physical energy.

2. The human mind is liable to entertain imperfect and erroneous views. These, though comparatively harmless from their inaction for a time, are by and by brought to life by the progress of society, or some other providence of God. Had the mind been progressive, these mistakes might have been seen and rectified. But by mental inaction the enemy has found his way within the walls of the city, and evils numerous and great afflict delinquency during long years, as retributions for the violation of the divine law of progress.

Mind is progressive. Hence any system of religion at war with this constitutional element of our being, is at war with the arrangements of God. Let Calvinism be pushed into the position of *one-idea immobility*, and that moment its influence begins to decline. For it has taken a hostile attitude towards God—it tramples on the divine law of pro-

*Rev. Justin Perkins, Oorooniah, Persia, quoted from Pres. Hitchcock's Geology.

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gress. This occurs though all its doctrines were in the most perfect harmony with revealed truth. And if the system be still susceptible of improvement, surely nothing better can be anticipated.

Let Arminianism take the same position of *immobility*, and the stupor of death will fall upon it, though some of its sentiments accord with truth.

Unitarianism falls under the displeasure of heaven not only from its other errors, but from the fact that the moral nature of man is not pressed with sufficient power to appropriately energize his intellectual being. And yet this class of nominal Christians may be very active under certain circumstances to advance the cause of education. Let this system stand on its own principles merely, and it will by and by fall. It possesses no organic life. The same is true of Universalism, Campbellism, and all other radically false systems of religion. Discussion and self-will may give to false systems of religion a temporary existence. But let them be compelled to stand on their own inherent principles by an elimination from all factitious circumstances, and they will soon be found dead. And were an intelligent jury called to hold an inquest over them, their verdict would be, *Died by the providence of God.*

God has a twofold providence for the destruction of false systems of religion, and for the perpetuity of the true. The mind is so framed that it naturally loathes and repels erroneous schemes. Men may from selfish considerations cherish and defend false systems of religion. But this is the work of depraved man to do so; not the work of God as displayed in the appropriate action of the human intellect.

Besides this species of providence, there is another by which the affairs of this world are affected. A Hebrew youth was once sold as a servant into Egypt, to whom his brethren and father subsequently paid homage.

Napoleon ungenerously repudiated his wife Josephine. but a descendant of *hers* now rules France.

In addition to God's providential operations, He gives or withholds his Spirit as seemeth Him wise and good.

Some false systems may hold out longer against a tendency to ruin than others. Just as it is with the human system under some fatal epidemic. One man may fall at once, while another may linger for weeks.

But whether false systems die sooner or later, they all *constitutionally* contain the seeds of death. The human

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mind and divine providences are adjusted to the promotion of truth, and not falsehood, on earth. Nor must truth itself be pushed out of its divinely constituted relations. If it is, it so far becomes opposed to God's economy in promoting the interests of his government. At times particular ideas claim special attention. But there is a limit in pushing them. Let that limit be transcended, and God will fight against us.

Some regard progress in theological views as heresy, or nonsense. They have adopted a creed, perhaps framed by good and wise men of a past age. Modern views are *an utter abomination* to them. They have a peculiar delight in "crying and cutting themselves among the tombs."

They are very fond of remaining *immutable* on Plymouth Rock, or some other venerable basis, forgetting that *immutability* in a rational faith demands change corresponding with additional illumination. The same honesty that adopts a creed in view of evidence, requires a modification or renunciation when augmented light reveals its inaccuracies or falsehood. Hence a man who adopted a creed honestly in view of evidence, and yet refuses to change his opinion when additional information demands it, has no claim to moral consistency. "He taketh the wise in their own craftiness."

Any system of religion, or type of the Christian faith that discards or discourages mental development, is in opposition to the arrangements of God in securing the perpetuity of his religion on earth. Hence every system of heathenism, ancient or modern, is at war with the nature of the human mind, and God, both directly and indirectly, by overlooking the interests of man. There is nothing to uphold them but stupid bigotry, priestly cunning, or state policy. What is the religion of the false prophet adapted to accomplish by way of elevating man as a rational being?

And how is it with the religion of the man of sin, the Pope? What has that mystery of iniquity accomplished for the mental elevation of Europe? Among other items of mischief, it has aimed to hold *free, immortal mind* in perpetual vassalage. But this iniquitous system has re-acted upon itself, and well-nigh annihilated all piety within its own pale.

View any other type of defective Christianity refusing to make rational progress, and you will see the frown of heaven stamped upon it.

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In the planetary world two forces operate—the *centripetal* and *centrifugal*. Destroy the former, and the planets run wild through immensity. Destroy the latter, and they all rush to the sun and stop. So as it respects the influence of religion and intelligence in the formation of human character. Take from man his obligation to love and serve God, and he becomes in a moral point of view, a wandering star. Crush his *intellect*, and all that is excellent and godlike is ruined.

3. The gospel is adapted to promote the *civil*, *social* and *physical* interests of man. The gospel induces not only mental but physical activity. Thus competency and comfort are the attendants of Christian civilization. Christianity promotes the interests of "the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come." Civil government, where Christianity has its appropriate influence, is framed for the promotion of the universal good of the state, and not for the benefit of a few.

Who need be informed that social happiness has from time immemorial principally followed in the footsteps of revealed truth? What is the condition of woman where the moral light of heaven does not fall? Where man has not been made to feel his relations to God and his fellow, what is the social condition of a mother, a wife, a sister? But let the religion of heaven throw its happy influence upon a given community, and woman is raised from the dust, polished like the corner-stone of a palace, and placed as a companion by the side of man. The gospel is adapted to give our social nature *development*, *tone* and *purity*.

And as it respects our physical nature, the gospel is adapted to bless the body as well as the soul. It encourages temperance, exercise and neatness. In short, all the interests of man for time and eternity are protected and promoted by the religion of Christ. In this respect it challenges comparison with any other system ever propagated or framed during all past ages. The stars of heaven are no more eclipsed by the light of day, than all other systems are by the splendor of this.

4. The Christian system inculcates benevolence. To act on this principle, produces the highest happiness of the actor and the greatest good to the community. And as true benevolence is universal, not partial, it naturally seeks the salvation and improvement of the whole human family. Let the principle of benevolence grasp the mind of the church

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with sufficient power, and the glad news of salvation by Christ is speedily heralded around the globe. The benevolence of the gospel commissions the church *speedily* to spread it among all nations.

As the gospel strikes for the universal and highest good of our race, it consequently stands opposed to *war*, *slavery*, unjust governmental arrangements, erroneous systems of theology, wickedness of all kinds, physical and mental idleness. Attila the Hun, was styled "the *Scourge of God*." Christianity is the heaven-appointed scourge of all that curses humanity.

V. The circumstances and tendencies of the present age favor an ultimate reform of the world.

1. The world has made progress in the sciences and the arts. These not only advance the interests of human happiness when rightly employed, but they aid the benevolent in reforming mankind. Knowledge in these respects, with efficient effort for man's moral good, operates in favor of virtue and not of vice. Hence civilization increases the facilities of the church for doing good. Let the press, the steam engine, and the telegraph, be wielded by the good for the advancement of Christianity, and Christian civilization, with energy, and all the powers of darkness can not stay the progress of reform.

2. The world is now occupying an advanced position for the study of the philosophy of history—all history, sacred and profane This also favors the world's reform.

3. Theology is in its most advanced stage for scientific development. We may hope that the time is approaching when the grand elements of theology will stand revealed before this world in the unquestionable form of scientific truths.

4. The church has an improved acquaintance with the manners, customs and languages of the different nations of the earth. The Bible is now translated into some 172 or 173 different languages and dialects.

5. The learning, wealth and piety of the world are principally conjoined in the same nations. Christendom possesses most of the wealth and learning of the globe. Christendom comparatively is intelligent and rich; heathendom *is* ignorant and poor.

6. The idea is beginning to fasten on all thoughtful minds of a philanthropic character, of acting for the *universal*, and not the *partial* good of our race. This may be the day-star of

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millenial glory. The thought is *beautiful*, *grand*, and yet *simple*. The mind realizes a conscious elevation in being thus actuated. Let this sentiment become thoroughly developed in any community, and its tendency will naturally be to elevate human society.

7. There is a tendency to *independent thought*. Mere human opinion, unsustained by evidence, is regarded as of small importance. The cry of heresy as an *argumentum ad terrorem*, to repress free inquiry, is incompetent to arrest honest investigation. It is dying away like the distant thunder of a cloud already passed. It has been said, "The whole world has been summoned, by representation, to a *post mortem* examination of the exhumed thoughts and ideas of our fathers."* Because all are not skillful in making the investigation, it by no means follows that none are. Be assured of this however, wisdom is hewing out her seven pillars.

8. There is a tendency to *toleration* in religious opinions. Depravity will of course reject the light and resist the truth, more or less. But the arm of persecution in an open and bloody form is broken. The inquisition is closed, and the rack is laid aside, and the *crescent* no longer refuses to tolerate the *cross*. The Turkish empire no longer declines to protect the Protestant faith.

9. False and imperfect systems of religion are rapidly tending to ruin. The heathen are becoming dissatisfied with their false schemes of religious faith.

10. There is a strong tendency throughout Christendom to reform in all that affects the interests of humanity. God and humanity combine their voices in demanding it. The four winds of heaven sigh for the redemption of man. The pope and all other anti-reformers may invoke their tutelar saints, but the world of mind, heaving like the ocean "vexed with storms," is becoming difficult for saints to manage. Let the friends of God and humanity avail themselves of the circumstances and tendencies of the present age, and all the *popes*, and *crowned heads*, and *immutables* on earth can not meet and turn back the rising waves of reform. It is true that man is a depraved being, but there is a God in heaven whose heart is filled with pity for our race.

It is also true that the present popular type of Christianity is ill adapted to the ushering in of a millenial morn. But this does not fill us with despair. The beautiful

*Smith's Philosophy of Reform, p. 286.

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insect that sports so happy and gracefully in the summer's sun, gives little apparent indication of occupying such a blissful state while in the condition of a larva or chrysalis. Moral forces in their action on human society can not be measured by time and mere appearances. There is an under-current that works the transformations of human society. Now what do all these arrangements in *earth* and *sea*, in *mind* and *matter*, in *nature* and *grace*, mean, if not to redeem, enlighten, and refine humanity? Is this too much to anticipate of an infinite God who has already made such displays of his beneficence in the gift of his Son? Is it not rational to conclude that these vast preparations have been made with reference to the erection of a glorious temple for the residence of God on earth.

REMARKS.

1. If I have exhausted your patience I have not the subject. Though I have failed to do it justice, yet may I not hope that a few hints have been given worthy of present notice and subsequent study?

2. After all that is said respecting *primitive Christianity*, we should not anticipate such a type of piety in the millenium. That was the piety of heaven to be sure, but it was the piety of childhood. This, when it comes, will be the piety of enlightened well-developed manhood. The love of the beautiful, in form, and thought, and deportment, will be unfolded under the refining influence of high mental culture and heavenly piety. God will be admired and loved as seen in his works as well as in his word. While moral truth will resemble the head of Nebuchadnezzar's image in that it will be pre-eminent in estimation, yet the inhabitants of that peaceful and happy age, will not regard free inquiry as heresy, burn incense to antiquity, and laud the Bible to avoid thinking. It will not be a millennium of good-natured, stupid animalism, in which the gratification of the sensuous part of our being is practically regarded as "the chief end of man."

3. In our efforts to reform the world, we should endeavor to walk with God. Our efficiency in doing good, *ceteris paribus*, is in walking with Him; that is, in not going too fast or too slow, but in walking *pari passu* with Him who governs the affairs of this world. And by all means also we should cherish a calm activity of mind. Stupidity will

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not convert the world, nor will fretting. Self-possession is a grand element of character in him who holds the helm in a storm.

4. Gentlemen of the Society of Inquiry, You are living in a glorious epoch of this world's history. Will you throw your whole being into the business of blessing mankind? In doing so, remember that God is on the side of truth and reform. Take enlarged views of truth, and embrace it wherever found. Act for God and humanity, and your efforts shall not be in vain.

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THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.*

BY REV. WM. L. PARSONS,
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We have several reasons for presenting a brief review of the above entitled work. 1. The subject is intrinsically important. Whatever our view may be of the nature of the human soul, it will seriously modify the whole circle of our theology. 2. The subject needs discussion, as appears from the fact that many minds are unsettled respecting it. There are many of the friends of Christ, some who possess strong intellects, some who have been able promoters of reform, who have come to believe that the soul is not immortal. 3. We feel an obligation, under such circumstances, to do what we can to fortify the doctrine of the Bible against objections, though they may be radically illogical, and carry no force whatever to the mass of Christian believers.

In preparing an article for the Quarterly Review, we have placed before us the above-named work, together with notes of lectures recently delivered in this city, by the same author. Elder Cook was formerly a regular minister of the Baptist denomination, and he still enjoys the reputation of being a pious, able, and devoted man. He speaks and writes fervently, and doubtless with Christian motives. We wish we could as heartily approve his logic as we can his zeal. He has published his views by request; and it is presumed that his defence of them is regarded, by those who sympathize with him, as sufficiently able and conclusive.

Our author professes to adhere to "*the word*" with the greatest tenacity. The Bible, on this question, is all in all.

*The True Source of Immortality: or the Origin of the Popular Doctrine on this Subject. By J. B. Cook. Hartford: W. H. Burleigh. 1847.

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He administered to us a gentle criticism for saying that we designed to give *our views* on the subject, and insisted that we should only think of giving *God's views*. A man may bring the printed page of a book so near his eye, as to render distinct vision utterly impossible. So a man may bring the *letter* of the Bible so near his mental eye, as to render perfectly invisible the real scope and spirit of the sacred oracles. It is no uncommon thing for men to be wandering egregiously from the Bible, while they deem themselves to be adhering most closely to its teachings. We must think this is the case with our author.

In the outset, he sets down the definitions given by the Lexicons of the terms, "life," "death," "resurrection," "mortal," and "immortal," and applies them through his work as though dictionaries were made before the Bible, and as if definitions could precede discussion. The question at issue is involved in the very definitions he assigns to these words, and hence, so far as he follows his definitions, he assumes the whole question as settled. But this process is fallacious in another respect. If abstract definitions are to be introduced as of any account, it is certainly just that *all* the definitions which pertain to the subject should be introduced. If our author had pursued this course, he would have unsettled his own argument, and the press need not have labored to bring forth his book. Hear Webster define the word *soul*. "The spiritual, rational, *immortal* substance in man, which distinguishes him from the brutes; that part of man which renders him a subject of moral government. The immortality of the soul is a fundamental article in the Christian system." Walker defines the soul to be, "The *immortal* spirit of man." Cobb, "The immaterial, *immortal* part of man." Webster defines the death of the soul to be, "(1.) Perpetual separation from God, and eternal torments, called the *second death*. (2.) A separation or alienation from God; a being under the dominion of sin, and destitute of grace or divine life, called *spiritual death*." He defines spiritual life to be "*supreme felicity*," and quotes Romans viii., 6, as an instance.

Suppose, now, I use these definitions all through my argument. I have gained my case, of course; but have I proved anything from the Bible? I presume our author would deny it. Nor has he proved anything by pursuing the same course. Nor would he have done, if he had given the definitions of the book entire, instead of garbling them.

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Our author should have given us an original investigation from the Bible, of the terms which it uses to express the nature and condition of the soul. If he had done this, he would have illustrated, much more forcibly, his professed attachment to the Bible. How far he has made such an investigation, will perhaps appear as we progress.

Elder Cook's grand and fundamental position is, *that man has no soul, capable of existing separate from the body.* He comes near ridiculing the idea of a soul, or "embryo angel," existing in man's body, which takes its departure to the spirit-world as soon as the body dies. He maintains that man was wholly made of *dust*, and, therefore, when the dust returns to dust, man is no more in existence than he was before he was fashioned from clay. This is as true of the righteous as of the wicked.

If this radical position be true, we have nothing of which to predicate immortality but the body, and we know not that we ever shall have. We do not propose to prove that the body, in this world of death and tombs, is immortal, and we must, therefore, grapple at once with our author's main position, and show *that man has a soul which is capable of existing separately from the body.*

But before producing our direct proof, let us briefly examine the Elder's argumentation. His first section is devoted to showing that the term "soul," usually, in the Bible, means "*person.*" That it is often so used is not denied. This, however, is of no account; because to show that it is so used, proves nothing as to the real nature of the soul or person.

His second section is headed, "The condition of man—the first living soul." Here we are told, in short, that he had life with no sentence of death—that he was placed in Eden, the Lord of Creation—that the Lord God commanded the man not to eat of the forbidden fruit, and threatened him, *the man*, with death, if he disobeyed. The *man* ate in person, and the *man* died. In subsequent sections, he repeats the idea that "*the man proper*," the real man God made, who ate the forbidden fruit, did die.

But what of all this? There is no dispute about his *dying;* but in what did his death consist, is the question. Our author *assumes*, in accordance with his definitions, that the death consists in the loss of existence. He seems to realize that his assumption needs some verification, and in this fifth section, we have the scripture proof spread out.

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What is it? "All the days that Adam lived, were 930 years, and *he died*. Who died? *Adam*, the first man, the living soul, that lived so long." Of each patriarch it is said, HE DIED. "These all DIED in faith, save Enoch." Abel is spoken of 4000 years after Cain slew him, as being dead. Abraham BURIED *his wife in the cave of Machpelah*. Samson said, "let my *soul die* with the Philistines." "MAN *lieth down* and riseth not till the heavens be no more; they shall not awake nor be raised out of their sleep." "David is both DEAD and BURIED."

Our author makes numerous quotations of this class of passages, which I need not collate. One such passage proves just as much as a thousand, and a thousand *prove* nothing to the purpose. His assumed definition of *death* is applied in each text, and no real argument is made by such quotations. We do not differ about the fact asserted in these passages, namely, that the persons referred to, *died* and were *buried*. There is no question about this. The patriarchs are not upon the earth now. These facts are as consistent, we claim, with *our* theory, as with our author's. We hold that such passages prove no more than that man, as a *physical being*, as composed of *flesh and blood*, as dwelling in an earthly visible house, dies and is buried. Our author quotes them as proving that man has no other than a flesh and blood being. The very point at issue is involved in the sense we give to these passages, and to quote the passages, in regard to the meaning of which we differ, is not to reason, but to dogmatize.

For our author to quote such passages as settling, is only to beg the question. By the same logic, precisely, he might prove that all men now hold, and always have believed his theory, which, he knows, is false. Suppose, in a familiar correspondence with our author, we should say, "Your friend A. B. *died* on the 20th ult. and was *buried, and he will slumber* on till the resurrection." Would he be authorized to set us down a convert to his theory? O yes, of course, as he quotes scripture. We said *the man* DIED and was BURIED, even, and still more, he would *slumber on till the resurrection*. Surely we are a convert! Consult the records of the dead, in the newspapers, or upon the tombstones: do not all say, "the *man*," "the *woman*," "the *person died* and was *buried*"? Who does not say so? What then? Are we all destructionists? Certainly, by our author's logic. Indeed the doctrine of immortality has

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never been in the world if such reasoning be good for anything.

The texts quoted by our author are in popular language, and palpably were never designed to teach *any theory* in reference to the nature or end of the soul. The Bible, like all other books, and like all men, speaks of things according to their appearance in the world of visibilities. In the nature of the case, it must do so. Joshua says the sun stood still rather than the earth; and the sun is spoken of as returning back in the days of Hezekiah, (2 Kings 20: 11,) because such was the appearance to the eye. After the same manner of speaking, God Himself says to his people, (Jer. 23: 29,) "I, even I, will utterly forget you," that is, it shall appear to you that I have done it. Would our author quote these passages in order to overthrow the commonly received views of Astronomy, or to disprove the omniscience of God? He might with precisely the same logical force as accompanies many of his proof texts.

The Bible, we insist, speaks of death and kindred subjects according to their appearance to the eye. Man, as we see him, as he appears before us, as an acting, thinking, speaking, rejoicing, mourning, weeping and living being, dies, and we bury him. He is gone. He no more appears among his fellows. His thoughts, plans and feelings, as he was visibly executing them on the earth, have perished with him. We see no more of them. He lies in his grave, hidden from our sight. At the resurrection he will become visible again, and we shall *see* him, as we saw him before his death, a living, thinking, feeling being.

This is a perfectly natural way of speaking. It is as we all speak, as we always have spoken, and doubtless as we shall always speak. The language is not technical, and proves nothing, one way or the other, touching the issue our author makes with the world of Christians. His rule of interpretation will enable him to prove many things which are certainly false. Perhaps our author had better carry out his principle and insist that the doctrine of the soul's immortality has never been believed in the world. Possibly he may think best to give full play to his powers, and insist upon the fundamental erroneousness of the Copernican system of Astronomy. He can easily prove it by various passages of scripture, and by the very language of the astronomers themselves; for they do talk of the sun as being "high" and "low," and as "rising" and "setting," daily,

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although the facts of science contradict their statements. If he would like to prove that "the sun" will be actually "turned into darkness and the moon into blood," instead of having the appearance of being so changed, the proof is at hand. The facts of science are not to be allowed to modify the plain language of scripture, and of the philosophers too! Surely not.

Again. Our author labors hard to show that the doctrine of the soul's immortality had its origin in heathen philosophy. He is equally confident, as appears from other parts of his work, that the lie was first proclaimed by the devil in Eden.

Possibly he regards the father of lies as a heathen philosopher.

Suppose, as our author insists, the doctrine "was taken from the Platonic philosophers," does it necessarily follow that it is false? This seems to be assumed. Probably our author would not soberly pronounce all mental science which is not directly revealed in the Bible, false. Plato doubtless possessed a gigantic intellect. Suppose for a moment, as this "heathen philosopher" was revolving in his thoughts, the subject of *matter*, this question had arisen, "*What is matter?*" He thinks, ponders, long and earnestly, and at length answers it thus: "What matter really is I do not know. It is *something* which has the attributes of form, divisibility, extension, resistance, &c." Immediately another question is sprung upon his intellect: "*What is mind?*" He weighs it long and patiently, and thus he answers it: "It is *something* which has the attribute or quality of being able to *think*, to *feel*, to *will*." He concludes this something must be very different from the other something which he calls matter, because the attributes of the two somethings are so perfectly unlike, and because the only way of knowing substances, their correspondencies or their differences, is by comparing their attributes. His thoughts trouble him still, and he finds no rest, till his reason says farther: "Surely mind then, is not matter—not material: it must be spirit, like God its Creator; for He thinks, *feels*, and wills; and because it is not material, it will not perish, like matter: surely it is imperishable, *immortal*."

What if this were the exact history of the origin of this idea: must it necessarily follow that the idea is false? It would be nonsense to pretend it. There is nothing in this process of thought which seems to lie beyond the reach of reason. We think it a shame for reasoners to be perpetu-

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ally assuming that all the conclusions of heathen minds are of course false. If a position can not be sustained, show it, and not raise the cry of "heathenism." Such argumentation, if such it can be called, is good for nothing only as this suppressed premise is assumed, namely, all conclusions of minds unacquainted with revelation, are false. All the demonstrations of geometry may be proved to be false by such an assumption. Euclid, its author, was but a poor black Egyptian heathen. Shall we therefore abandon as unsound the demonstrations of that science? The same might be said of the science of logic. Its author too was a heathen. What would be thought of such a *Freshman?* Surely, that he had lost his wits.

To quote Plato's belief of the doctrine of immortality, as proof against the fact he believes, is inexcusable nonsense. The logic would be just as conclusive if the atheist should quote Plato's belief in the existence of God as proof of atheism. The atheist doubtless thinks theism is a mere "dogma of Platonic philosophy"—a mere "heathenism." The Universalist follows the example of our author, and is quite sure the doctrine of future retributions is a miserable heathen superstition—a production of heathen philosophy.

Let us now consider some direct arguments in favor of the position that man has a soul which is capable of existing separate from the body.

I. The presumption is wholly in favor of this position. It will be admitted, of course, that God is a conscious being whose existence is, in no wise, dependent upon a physical organization. It is fair to presume, that those moral agents whom he has made in his own image, may exist in a like manner. It is difficult to see in what sense we can be in the image of a rational, conscious, immaterial mind, if we possess no such minds. The resemblance between creator and creature can not be found in the fashion of the human body. Nor can it be found in moral character; for such character is not an object of creation. Men may fashion their own character, after the model of the divine, but no being can create character for another. The resemblance, then, must be found in the very nature and constitution of the man as God has made him. If so, the soul is, probably at least, capable of existing independently of the organization with which it is connected in this world.

The presumption is in our favor, because there is no evidence that mere matter can think, reason, feel, will, and be

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accountable to moral government. The notion that the brain secretes thought as the liver does bile, is encumbered with all the difficulties of materialism and fatalism. On this theory, men are not even moral agents; and the secretion of the idea of moral obligation in the human brain is a demonstration of insanity.

The presumption is in our favor, from the fact that mankind spontaneously recognize this position to be true. The universal, spontaneous convictions of the human intellect are held by all philosophers, perhaps, to be presumptively true. Such a belief of the existence of God is thought to carry with it strong evidence of his existence; and of the fact that God has lodged this conviction in the human reason, as one of its fundamental intuitions. Mankind, universally, seem to believe that the soul is a distinct and separate existence from the body. All languages make the distinction, and it appears to be one of the fundamental intuitions of the human mind.

II. Our main proof must be Biblical, and we proceed directly to the examination of the scriptures.

Ex. iii. 6, 15, 16. God says to Moses from the burning bush, "I am the God of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." We understand this declaration of God to teach, that, although these fathers were dead as to their bodies, and as to a life among their fellows on the earth, they were, nevertheless, alive and enjoying the blessed fruits of God's moral government over them.

The Sadducees came to cavil with Christ about the resurrection, Matt. xxii. 31, 32. He quoted this saying of God, and expressed a sort of surprise that they had not understood from it, that "*God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.*" The Sadducees were materialists. They held as their fundamental position, that the soul died with the body—that there was no soul which could exist after the body was dead. They denied also, as was consistent for them to do, the existence of angels. Their materialism, also, brought them into collision with the Pharisees and our Savior, on the subject of the resurrection. Their views resuscitated the denial of the resurrection. If they were right, such a thing could not be. They undertook to confound the Savior, but he silenced them at once by quoting God's words to Moses, and adding the comment, that, "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." The fathers

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were not dead in the materialist's the Sadducee's sense, but were living.

But how does this confound the Sadducees on the subject of a future and actual resurrection, since he merely shows that the fathers were then living, and not that they had really come forth from their graves? Some say that we are to understand Christ as speaking of things that would be hereafter, as though already existing—God would, at and after the resurrection, be "the God not of the dead, but of the living," risen from the dead. But he did not so speak. And if he had, what force would it have had to the mind of the Sadducee? God said to Moses, He *was* the God of the living, not *would be*. Christ added nothing to the passage.

A late writer in the Quarterly supposes that the resurrection and the future state, with the Sadducees, were the same thing, and that the Savior therefore overthrew their cavil by merely proving a future state of existence. But they did not confound the two doctrines. They denied both the resurrection and the future existence of the soul out of the body. Acts xxiii. 8. The Pharisees contended for both; and Christ was plainly understood to favor their views, as did Paul subsequently. The ground upon which they objected to both, was the same—their *materialism*. The only way to overthrow either their objection to the resurrection or the future state, was to confound their fundamental position of materialism. This, the Savior did by showing that these fathers were not dead in the materialist's sense. Materialism was false, and their objection to the resurrection, as well as to the future state, was swept away in a breath. The Savior, as was his wont, dealt a blow at *their whole system*, and thus tore away all their refuges, and those of their modern followers, against the doctrine of rewards and punishments, or moral government in general. The wisdom of the Savior's reply to the Sadducees, is sufficiently apparent.

Rom. xiv. 7–9 is kindred to the one we have now noticed. "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's. For to this end Christ both died, and rose, and revived, *that he might be Lord, both of the dead and living*." Christ then is exercising his lordship over us his saints, whether we are dead as to this world, or alive in it. And since he does not exer-

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cise lordship over the non-existent, but the existent, it follows that those who are dead as to this world, are nevertheless in existence, and enjoying his government.

These passages, taken together, settle the question in our mind. But our author, clinging to his proof texts, will say, "Is not Abraham DEAD, and was HE not BURIED in the cave of Machpelah—was not the whole of him, the entire man, as God made him, *dead* and *buried?* And do you pretend that he is still alive and not in the cave? Is not this absurd and contradictory?" Certainly, sir, it is, on your theory, but not upon ours. Abraham *as seen among men*, as *dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh and blood*, was dead; but, as a rational, immaterial mind, was not dead, but was alive with his Heavenly Father in the spirit-world, and enjoying his favor.

Again, Gen. xxv. 8. "Then Abraham gave up the ghost and died in a good old age, an old man and full of years, *and was gathered to his people.*" The same expression is made of Moses and other patriarchs. What does it mean? That Abraham was buried in the same sepulchre with his people? But, according to our author's theory, his people had no souls which could survive death; and their bodies had doubtless quite returned to dust. Was this dust, "the people" of Abraham, to whom "he was gathered?" Certainly he was not gathered to his people in this sense; for, his people had not been buried there. At this time, none but Sarah had been buried in the cave of Machpelah. Moreover, the being gathered to their people is spoken of as a thing distinct from burial. The fathers believed, doubtless, that their people were gathered in *hades* after they left the body, and there they expected to meet them, although their flesh had returned to dust. Jacob, in view of such a belief, when afflicted beyond consolation at the supposed removal of his son Joseph from him, could properly enough say, "For I will go down into the grave (hades) *unto my son*, mourning," that is, I will mourn till I die, then I shall see my son.

Again, Eccl. xii. 7. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." Solomon doubtless spoke here the sentiment of his nation, as well as God's word. Did our author know that this passage was in the Bible? Did Solomon fall into the mazes of Plato's philosophy, centuries before Plato was born? No, but "his breath went to God." What, the

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atmosphere he breathed? No, "the animal life." And is that a spirit which can leave the body and exist independently of it, and go to God? That seems more absurd than to admit that the spirit is the rational, accountable mind which God has made in his own image, and fitted to dwell with him.

Again Matthew x. 28. "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." This is a simple passage, and easy of interpretation, if we let it speak for itself. It obviously implies that man has a body and a soul; that each is endowed with a life which can be destroyed; that man can destroy that of the body, and can not that of the soul; that the body and soul are so distinct from each other that although the life of the body might be destroyed, yet that of the soul would not be impaired; that God alone can destroy the life of the soul. But this teaching is directly contradicted by the theory of our author, according to which it is impossible to destroy the life of the body without also destroying that of the soul. Indeed there is no soul but the life of the body. It matters not whether we understand by the soul's life, in this passage, its *existence*, or that *spiritual life* which is the fruit of faith in Christ. On our author's theory, the whole being goes out of existence at death, with whatever of life of any kind it may possess. The promise of Christ to these believers, was, that as to their souls, they should never see death. Men or devils should not be able to inflict it upon them. But upon the theory we are opposing, man can as perfectly destroy the life of the soul as that of the body. He can put it so completely out of existence that nothing but the resurrection can recover it.

Paul's experience and statements also are perfectly unaccountable upon our author's theory. "For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. But if I live in the flesh, this is the fruit of my labor: Yet what I shall choose I wot not. For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and be with Christ, which is far better."—*Phil.* 1: 21—23.

What, now, was the secret of Paul's desire to depart? Was it that he wished to get rid of his tribulations in the flesh? He who had grace to "glory in infirmity," to "take pleasure in persecution;" he who could wish himself "accursed from Christ for his brethren's sake;" he who loved Christ as did Paul, who prayed to be made conformable unto his

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death, that he might enjoy fellowship with his sufferings, who gloried in perils and stripes, and tribulations in Christ's service, could never have been in a strait to be released from these things. It were just as reasonable to suppose that Gabriel could be tired of his angelic duty and office, as that Paul was of his. The apostle loved his work, trying as it was, and was he desirous to pass into an unconscious state for ages? Could he have desired to become unconscious of Christ's love, unconscious to all the glowing themes which so charmed and molded and sanctified his soul while in his Master's vineyard? Impossible. Could he wish ages of such experience as he enjoyed, blotted out of his consciousness? What if he should have no sense of the passing away of those ages? He knew they would pass away, and that all he could have learned and enjoyed,—all the good he could have done in the moral universe during them, would be a dead loss. There could be no greater libel upon the character of Paul than to charge him with desiring to lie down in unconsciousness. He was in a strait *to be with Christ*, that he might behold with unclouded vision, the face of Jesus. On this supposition death would be to him a "*gain*," but upon that of our author, it would be an unspeakable loss to him, and no gain, unless it should be thought a gain to get out of fellowship with Jesus Christ in the travail of his soul for the salvation of men. We submit whether that man is worthy to be called a Christian who could esteem such a thing a gain to him.

Paul evidently believed that if he should die, his desire to be with Christ would be immediately gratified; and hence it is not strange that he felt anxious to leave the world. This belief is expressed still more unequivocally in 2 Cor. 5: 1. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." The body is our *earthly house*. Mark the figure. The house and the inhabitant are not confounded. If this house should be dissolved, no matter, we have a building of God made without hands, eternal in the heavens. It is even desirable in itself, to leave the earthly house and dwell in the heavenly. The earthly is corruptible, the heavenly incorruptible. Nevertheless we must bide our time and tarry willingly till our work is done, lest we should fail to be clothed upon with the heavenly house. God has given us the earnest of the Spirit, and established our souls in the confidence of assur-

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ance, that only while we are at home in the body we shall be absent from the Lord; and that surely we shall be at home with the Lord as soon as we shall be absent from the body, and not still more emphatically absent from him in a state of utter unconsciousness. Therefore we labor, that whether absent from the Lord by being present in the body, or present with the Lord by being absent from the body, we may be accepted of Him. This we understand to be the apostle's course of thought in this passage. He assumes, as a fact well understood, as needing no labored discussion, that when the saints leave the body, they are consciously and joyfully present with the Lord. Paul certainly, is against the theory of our author.

A difficulty is felt by many in reference to this "house not made with hands." Is it the spiritual body, and is it to be dwelt in as soon as we leave the earthly house? So say some; and so saying, they conclude that every one is raised from the dead when he dies, and that no future resurrection is to be expected. We do not believe such are right. Why may it not be supposed that this house is a sort of celestial dwelling suited for the development of mind in the spirit-world, and yet of such a nature as that it may at once, at the general resurrection, combine with the glorified body? The soul would then occupy a kind of double house after that event. This celestial dwelling or vehicle may be to the glorified body what the animal life is to the earthly house. The soul may need something then, answering somewhat to the nervous system in the present house, by which to reach and control, according to the laws of the other world, the various members and organs of the incorruptible and glorious body. Possibly, this "house not made with hands" may eternally supply some such demand.

There is another passage from Paul which seems sufficiently conclusive as to his belief of the possibility of the soul's existing separately from the body. In describing his visions, he throws in this remark, parenthetically twice: "Whether in the body I can not tell; or, whether out of the body, I can not tell." The use of such an expression shows what his belief must have been. Had his theory been that of our author, he could have used no such expression. Men will not talk of enjoying heavenly visions out of the body, when they hold that they can have no existence out of the body. If to be out of the body is to

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be out of all conscious existence, why speak of any enjoyments as being possible except in the body?

What can Paul mean, too, when he talks of the *outward* man as perishing, and the *inward* man as being renewed day by day? Does our author consistently speak of an outward and an inward man? And what does he mean by the *spirit* of man which is in him, and which is the only knower of the things of man? And what distinction can he have in his mind, when he speaks of the body as dead because of sin, and the spirit which is life because of righteousness? We know not our author's exegesis of such passages.

Leaving the apostle, we now quote Rev. 14: 13: The Spirit says to John, "Write, *blessed* are the dead which die in the Lord *from henceforth*." How can the dead be experiencing *blessedness from their death* if they are out of all conscious existence from that event till the resurrection?

Again. When holy Stephen was about to fall asleep, he prayed and said, "*Lord Jesus, receive my spirit!*" When he said this, his spiritual eyes were wide open—the spiritual world was his field of vision, and he saw, as he gazed into heaven, the Lord Jesus standing upon the right hand of God. When he thus commended his spirit to his Savior, for whom he was suffering martyrdom, is it possible that he was sent into an unconscious sleep of ages?

Again, the appearance of Moses and Elias, upon Mount Tabor, and that of an old prophet to John on Patmos, Rev. xxii. 9, most palpably contradicts the theory of our author. These men were dead and buried as to their bodies, but yet, they were existing in the spiritual world, and enjoying enough of its glory to overwhelm the disciples who saw them. The supposition of one writer, that Moses was raised from a state of non-existence to appear in this scene, to which state he returned after the event transpired, is quite inadmissible. It were as reasonable to make the whole scene a parable, and deny that Moses was really seen by Peter, James and John upon the mount.

Again, Christ said to the thief on the cross, "Verily I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise," This passage, our author seeks to escape from, by amending the punctuation, thus: "Verily I say unto thee to-day, thou shalt be with me in Paradise." This is simply ridiculous. No Greek Testament so punctuates; and there is no possible reason for doing so, except that the theory of our author demands it. The natural, easy, and plain sense of the passage,

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is that which it is made to express by the common punctuation. How out of all joint it seems to make "*to-day*" qualify the time when Christ was giving utterance to the declaration. The declaration qualifies itself in this respect. It is unnatural to qualify a declaration in any such way. If I tell a man, I will do for him a certain thing, it is unnecessary to specify *when* I am making the statement, for *now* is the only time in which it can be made; but on the other hand, it is quite essential to state when I will do the thing promised. If I state that an important event will occur, the demand is at once made by every hearer, *when?* to-day, to-morrow, or next year? The mind makes this demand; and it is imperious in proportion to the magnitude of the event. The idea of time was embraced in the thief's request; "Lord, remember me *when* thou comest into thy kingdom." The Savior replied, "*To-day* shall thou be with me in Paradise." What possible reason could our author find for altering the word of the Lord Himself, except that, as it stands, it contradicts his theory? It looks badly for a man professing such reverence for *the word* to be twisting it to his theory in this manner, especially, when there is *no reason* in the context or the nature of the case, authorizing it, and when the emendation mars the sense of the passage.

It is, we think, further, altogether certain that the *penalty* of the law which was *death*, fell upon Adam immediately following the transgression, although he did not die in our author's sense until nine hundred and thirty years after he sinned. We do not mean that the whole penalty was experienced at once. It required an eternity for its entire execution. It fell upon him in the same sense as the penalty of civil law falls upon the criminal when his prison life begins.

Our author's position here is, if we comprehend him, that the death threatened, as the penalty of the law, was specifically that which takes place when dust returns to dust, including not merely the death of the body, but the extinction of the soul with it, so far as there is any soul which can be spoken of, as, in any sense, separable from the body. Adam died, in this sense, nine hundred and thirty years after he sinned; and as a day with the Lord means a thousand years, the penalty was inflicted as threatened, and the devil proved a liar.

In answer to all this, we remark, that the expression, "*in the day*," means no such thing as a thousand years. God

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no where uses the words to signify any such period of time. Peter tells his readers that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. This simply means that God does not take note of time as men do, and it no more proves that a day means a thousand years, than that a thousand years are contained in one day. "*In the day*," evidently means *at once, immediately*. This is the natural sense of the words; and such is their general, if not universal usage in the scriptures. We have the same words used in the context, and similarly applied, and the history demonstrates that their true meaning is the one we have assigned them. Gen. iii. 5. "For God doth know that *in the day* ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." They ate, and *immediately* their eyes were opened, so that they knew good and evil. This God declares Himself, v. 22. It will hardly do for our author to trumpet his own praise by proclaiming that HE "*dare hold and teach the Bible as it is*," while he is making such wholesale work of altering the record. We doubt whether he "*dare*" teach the word just as it is, now that he has written his book.

That the penalty of the law fell upon Adam as soon as he transgressed, we argue from analogy. Under the administration of God's natural government, as soon as law is violated, the execution of penalty begins; although, in many cases, its execution lasts the life time of the transgressor. We believe the penalty of moral law begins to be inflicted when the law is broken; and think the belief justified by the fact to which we have referred.

Again, we establish this position by the fact, that Adam and Eve immediately experienced in their souls, what the New Testament every where calls *death*. They fell at once into that moral state in which other sinners are, who are declared to be "*dead* in trespasses and sins; who are "alienated *from the life* of God;" who "abide in *death*," and "in whom there is *no life*," but who, nevertheless, as to their bodies, are full of life and enjoying the pleasures of sin, and who as really have *existence* as God has.

The Savior was immediately promised to our first parents, and it is generally acknowledged that they believed on Him unto life—the life they had lost; that they passed from death unto life, were born again, and restored unto that life of God from which their sin had alienated them, and were brought into that moral state into which the re-

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deemed come and receive the heavenly promise that they shall *never die, never perish.* If this be so, Adam did not *die,* in the sense of suffering the threatened penalty of the law, when he was nine hundred and thirty years old, as our author maintains. Adam, we maintain, died the very day he sinned, as God said he should. Christ was promised, and our first parents believed and were restored to life from the sin-death; and in respect to that life, after it was received by faith, they *never perished.* When Adam was nine hundred and thirty years old, he died as to his body, and as to a visible life among men, his dust returned to dust, but his Spirit, his inner man—the man that had died the sin-death, and experienced the faith-life, did not perish, but went to God who gave it, never to experience the sin-death more, but to enjoy the bliss of heaven.

If we are correct in these remarks, we have cut the "*tap-root*" of our author's theory, as the Savior did that of the Sadducees. *Extinction of being is not the penalty of God's law.* The penalty of that law can be inflicted without, in the least, impairing the soul's existence. It is certain this penalty is inflicted upon a department of man's being, wholly distinct from his body.

Our author's only argument for establishing the non-existence of the soul after the death of the body, seems to be this—and it is an assumption in the outset, namely, "The penalty of transgression is the entire destruction of the sinning being." But, as we have shown that this is false, we conclude, in accordance with the scriptures, that man has a soul which can exist independently of his present physical organism.

Again, the mode of speaking, all through the Bible, and wherever language is used, implies the distinction for which we are contending, between soul and body. "Though I give my body to be burned." "I pray your whole soul, and spirit, and body." "Your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost." "Michael disputed about the body of Moses." "As being yourselves also in the body." "That ye present your bodies." "We are at home in the body and willing to be absent from the body." "Whether in the body or out of the body, I can not tell." "He considered not his body, now dead." "To the spirits of just men made perfect." So we might quote by the column.

III. The whole Jewish nation, with the exception of the Sadducees, in the days of Christ and Paul held the doctrine

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we are defending, and both the Savior and the Apostles sided with them against the Sadducees. The Sadducees were the infidels, the heretics, the innovators. How could our author assert that the doctrine was not known in the church till the third century? Was it even denied in the church up to that time?

The Sadducees did not obtain their belief from the Bible, but deduced it logically from their materialism. The belief of the Jews had always been what it was when Paul took sides with them against the Sadducees, and when Luke said they held to the existence of the spirits of men and angels.

Enoch understood, before the flood, that God's saints were not out of existence, and prophesied, saying, "Behold the Lord cometh *with ten thousand of his saints*." &c. The fact too, of Saul's calling for Samuel to come up from the dead, implies his own belief in the conscious state of the dead. The belief of the king was doubtless the popular belief of his nation. It was evidently a common thing for the Israelites to endeavor to hold converse with the dead. They consulted the dead when they ought to have communed with the living God and his prophets; and God made a special law, Deut. xviii. 11, forbidding this practice of necromancy, or consulting the spirits of the departed dead, without even the slightest intimation that there were no spirits of the departed dead in existence. The object of the law was to prevent the people from going to the wrong source for help. Saul broke this law in calling for Samuel.

There is no evidence that the opinion of the Pharisees on this subject, was an innovation. It was the established doctrine of the people of God. The Pharisees formed their views with the Old Testament Scriptures in their hands. They saw nothing in the numerous passages quoted by our author, to establish the theory he holds. Paul held with them after he was consulted, as before. He intimates no change of his sentiments on this subject. He still taught the resurrection, and believed he should be with Christ as soon as he left the body. The Savior himself saw nothing in the Old Testament to favor the views of our author. He learned from it that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, were in existence, though they had long been dead and buried. He knew, better than any man, the meaning of all those passages which speaks of man's *death*, *destruction*, *ceasing to think* or *to know* any thing after death, of his being consumed, burned up, and the like; and yet, he gave them no

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such interpretation as does our author. Even the Sadducees saw that it was useless to quote such passages to establish their cavil with the Savior. When Christ told them that the fathers were alive, why and did they not insist that Abraham was *actually and entirely* DEAD and BURIED in the cave of Machpelah? That "man lieth down and riseth not," &c. Possibly they were not as shrewd as those in the nineteenth century, whose views are like their own.

The attempt of our author to establish, mainly from Old Testament passages, and by forced constructions, a theory contradicted by our Savior, seems to us not a little presumptuous.

We will accumulate no more evidence of the truth of the proposition that man has a soul which can exist separately from the body. We see not how we could make the proposition plainer. If we have established this position, we have taken our author's strong hold. His whole theory breaks down under the proof of this proposition.

We propose to inquire *secondly*, Is there any evidence that this soul which can exist separately from the body, will ever be annihilated? That God might annihilate it, we will not dispute. Is there any evidence that He will do it? If there should appear to be no proof to the contrary, we should deem it fair to conclude that the soul's existence will never terminate.

1. There does not appear to be any spontaneous sentiment in the mind itself which would lead us to expect the extinction of the rational being. Man certainly does not court annihilation; he dreads it. Such are the fixed and fundamental and universal sentiments of the human reason, that the whole man clings to his existence with the utmost tenacity. Existence in almost any circumstances is better than non-existence.

2. Death as commonly understood, carries no evidence with it that the soul expires with the body. This proposition has been indirectly established in what has gone before.

The strong passages which are quoted to show that the soul itself is to be destroyed, must be referred to the returning to dust of the flesh-and-blood organism in which the soul tabernacles through its earthly career. There is no assertion stronger than the declaration that they (the wicked) "shall *perish*." Does this mean any more than we ordinarily mean when we speak of temporal death? We think not. *Perishing* is predicated of the righteous as well as the wicked.

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"The righteous," says Isaiah, "*perisheth.*" If to perish means extinction of being, then the righteous are to be extinguished as well as the wicked. But Christ declares that the righteous, (his sheep,) "shall *never perish*" or *die.* This declaration of Christ makes it positively certain that the *conscious, moral, holy beings,* called his "sheep," shall never cease to exist. These BEINGS are not *clay, unconscious matter;* matter which can not love, worship, obey moral law or enjoy moral blessedness, but they are the *inner men* of Zion, dwelling each in an outer man, who possesses moral virtue or holiness. These inner men, these sheep of Christ, *shall never perish.* Still, the righteous shall perish; but who are the righteous, of whom Isaiah speaks? Certainly the *outer men* of Zion; the unconscious, yet *apparent* men, the men we see and hear and feel, the tabernacles, the bodies of flesh and blood. It must be so, or we make the Savior's declaration false: the righteous, the sheep do perish. But if to perish is applied to the death of the body, in case of the righteous, by what rule of criticism can we make it applicable necessarily to both soul and body when used in reference to the wicked? We leave that question for our author to answer.

A thousand scores of such texts prove nothing. What if the "dead know not any thing?" What if "their thoughts perish on the very day of their death?" What if "there is no knowledge or device in the grave?" Such declarations are made of the man as we see him, not of his immortal mind. Must we conclude that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were thoughtless beings in the spirit-world? that Moses did not appear on Mount Tabor as an intelligent being? that the old prophet who appeared to John was a non-existent, perished, thoughtless being, although he made revelations to John, kept the sayings of the Bible, and would not allow John to worship him, but commanded him to worship God? Must we veto all those transcendent and glowing emotions and expectations of dying saints, awakened by the consideration that they are just about to wing their way to be with Jesus, who is to them the chiefest among ten thousands and altogether lovely? And must we away also, with those awful forebodings with which the wicked often die, awakened by a fearful consciousness that they must immediately stand before their insulted and abused Savior, and begin to drink of that bitter cup which they have filled up with their iniquities? We believe it not. The family of interpreters to

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which our author belongs, harp much upon the passage we have referred to in Eccl.: "For the dead know not any thing," and deem it quite conclusive of the whole controversy. Let us look at it a moment fairly. It occurs in connection with other declarations which must be allowed to have the same force. Solomon says in the context: "All things come alike to all—there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth as he that feareth an oath. For the living know that they shall die; but the dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a reward; for the memory of them is forgotten; go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart, for God now accepteth thy works."

Dare our author endorse all these statements as containing God's eternal truth? When he insists to his hearers that the dead know not any thing, will he also teach them that God takes no account of men's deeds in this world; thatit is just as well to swear as not to swear, to be profane as pious; that the sinner will fare just as well as the holy, for neither will ever have a reward hereafter; and will he use these considerations to influence the minds of his hearers as far as he can, to eat their bread with a gluttonous joy, and drink their wine with a drunkard's heart? We know he would not. He believes it is of infinite consequence that men should be righteous.

Solomon is here plainly giving us a map of the infidel's thoughts and feelings. The doctrine of his infidel is, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die, and that is the end of us, and of our thoughts. God makes no moral distinctions. To sacrifice is useless; profanity is safe. There are no rewards hereafter. We are but refined brutes, and when we are dead, we shall know nothing and suffer nothing. Now is our time. Let us eat, and drink, and take our fill of love, wine, and vanity."

It were just as logical to quote Voltaire's assertion that "death is an eternal sleep," as to bring forward this passage to prove that "the dead know not any thing." The character Solomon is drawing acknowledges no moral Governor of the universe, no retributions, no distinction between right and wrong; and is essentially *atheistic*. It is exceedingly painful to see Scripture quoted so irrelevantly, so loosely, as in this case. We can not forbear

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thinking that he who does it, is in danger of experiencing that fearful declaration, "*The letter killeth.*"

3. There is nothing in the death which sin brings upon the soul, which at all implies the destruction of its existence. Sinners are declared to be "*dead* in trespasses and in sins"—not *dying*, not candidates for death, but actually "*dead*," "alienated from the life of God;" and to have "*no life* in them." These declarations must apply to the soul, and refer to a moral, spiritual death. Transgressors are *dead*, being in sin. "He that hates his brother, abides in *death*." When men are converted, by receiving the gospel, they "pass from *death*," real, not constructive death, "unto life." They rise to a new life, a life before unpossessed.

According to our author, sinners are not dead, even in, or by reason of sin, now, but are only candidates for death. But here again, notwithstanding his remarkable tenacity for *the word*, he has departed very far from it. The universal representation of the New Testament is, that sinners *are already dead*, dead in the sense of having fallen under the sentence of God's violated law.

There is nothing in *this* death, plainly, which implies the extinction of the soul's being. The existence of this death is perfectly compatible with the existence of the soul. Indeed the existence of the soul is indispensable to the existence of the death. There is no evidence whatever, that should this death continue eternally, it will in the least tend to the annihilation of the soul itself. Devils have experienced it for ages, we suppose, and yet their existence is as firm and enduring as when they first transgressed. It is perfectly certain, from the plain statements of the New Testament, that death and destruction of being, are not synonymous ideas, that the former does not imply the latter, and that it is absurd to infer therefore, that death and the extinction of the soul's existence are identical. Death no more means extinction of being, than sin or transgression does. Men are dead in sin, and yet alive in existence; and it is impossible to show that they may not always remain so.

4. There is nothing in the eternal life or immortality which the gospel confers, implying that it consists in saving the soul from non-existence, and in conferring upon it the boon of perpetual existence.

The argument we propose here is this: The gospel is palpably given to restore to man what he lost by sin. If the

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gospel comes to restore existence, then existence was the thing lost by sin. If it comes to restore the favor and peace of God to a condemned and sinful soul, by the pardon and destruction of sin, then the thing lost by sin, was the favor of God, and the moral blessedness of obedience to his law. If the gospel comes to restore men to *holiness* and *happiness*, then, holiness and happiness were lost by sin. The life the gospel brings is the very opposite of the death which sin inflicts.

What now is the life which the gospel gives? Men are made alive by regeneration—by this process they pass from death to life—they rise to newness of life. Converted men are *alive from the dead*. To be converted is to come into the favor of God; to experience the pardon of sin; to be won over to the love of Christ; to be delivered from condemnation; to receive the spirit of adoption, crying, Abba, Father; to become children of God; to be married to Christ, and changed into his moral image from glory to glory. The death of sin results from a spiritual ignorance of God, while the life, eternal life, consists in a spiritual knowledge of God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent.

Now, in all this, there is nothing which even hints at any such change as our author's theory demands. The change is *wholly* of *a moral character*. The life conferred by the gospel, is as perfectly distinct from the existence of the soul, as was the death which sin inflicted. Passing from death unto life can not be passing from non-existence to existence. Before this passing from one condition to the other took place, the being was just as really in existence as afterwards. Sin takes nothing from the *existence of the soul;* life adds nothing to it.

We are assured that this change is brought about by the agency of God's spirit, wielding the truth. But truth has no adaptedness or tendency to effect any change upon the substance of the soul. But it has all adaptedness to produce a change of moral character. Moreover, whatever the life may be, it is certainly brought about through the medium of faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. There is no possible relation between faith in Christ, and a life which consists in the naked existence of the soul. The only life it is fitted to inspire is a moral one, a life of holiness and happiness. Faith in Christ is an eye which beholds his moral excellency, which sees his love, his justice, and all his infinitely glorious moral perfections,

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as displayed through his life from the manger to the cross. These things beheld, and brought into living contact with the mind, act upon it to produce their correspondencies in the moral character of the beholder. By the process of assimilation, the believer is in this way, made like Christ in his thoughts, purposes and emotions. Faith in Christ, the cross, the promises, the blood of the Lamb, and the whole circle of divine truth, have a most powerful and direct influence to produce and perpetuate a moral, holy life, but no tendency to prolong, for a single instant, the mere existence of the soul. This could be done only by physical omnipotence. Moral considertions would be just as ineffectual to produce such a result, as they would be to communicate life to the dead in their graves.

We conclude, then, that the life inspired by the gospel furnishes no evidence that the death of sin which it extinguishes is any other than a *spiritual*, moral death. The death of sin is spiritual; the life, the immortality, or eternal life of the gospel is also spiritual and gracious, produced by moral influence and not by physical omnipotence. We are to seek immortality, indeed, but it is exemption from the death sin inflicts. And we need not seek in vain. "He that believeth *shall never die;*" no, not even between the grave and the resurrection. We look in vain, among the great themes of the gospel, for the first breath of evidence that it comes to rescue mankind from a destruction of the soul's being.

5. The final disposition which the Scriptures make of the wicked, furnishes no evidence whatever that the existence of the soul will ever terminate.

If the emphatic doom to be pronounced upon the wicked at the final judgment, were, thenceforward, positive nonexistence, it could very easily have been made to appear. No such teaching appears upon the face of the Scriptures; as is sufficiently plain from the fact that the great mass of Scripture lovers and Scripture students have never discovered it.

Let us look at a few passages which refer to the subject now before us. Rev. xxi. 18. "But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderous, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolators, and all liars, shall have their part [portion, reward,] in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death." Here

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is an account of the final disposition of the wicked. We see nothing in it, showing that the soul is to be extinguished by the second death. The term death, as we have abundantly seen, proves nothing. If the language of this text is used literally, as our author maintains, nothing, to his purpose, is established by it, only as two things are assumed, neither of which is proved, namely, that the bodies of the wicked are raised corruptible and perishable; and that the soul also is a substance capable of being annihilated by fire. We have shown already that the soul survives the physical organism in which it dwells; and therefore, though the body might be burned in a fire-lake, yet the soul would not necessarily be consumed. If the language of the passage is to be understood figuratively, as is doubtless the case, then it merely represents a state of keen and burning mental anguish, to which the soul will be subjected, as the penalty of its crimes. But the endurance of pain and anguish has no effect to destroy the soul's existence. This passage, then, is against the theory of our author. It does not teach that the doom of the wicked is final annihilation.

Matt. xxv. 41–46. "Then shall He say unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Ch. xiii. 42. "And shall cast them [the tares, the finally impenitent] into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth."

All these and similar expressions manifestly refer to the same thing—*the final disposition of the wicked.* This final disposition of the wicked, is a state of *punishment*, to which they are subjected, as the just reward of their wickedness, and not a mere loss of existence. So the context plainly shows. The scene is the last judgment. All men are arrayed before God's bar. Their characters are investigated. The righteous are upon the right hand; the wicked, upon the left. The former receive the announcement of their reward, which is life without end, meaning *blessedness*, most certainly. The reason, namely, their obedience, is given for the bestowment of their reward. The latter, the wicked, hear their sentence to *death* or *punishment*, which will be accompanied with deep sorrow, expressing itself in weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth. The condition to which they are assigned is an *everlasting* one. *Forever* they are to experie ce "indignation and

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wrath, tribulation, and anguish," as the appropriate reward of their wicked deeds, as developed at the bar of final adjudication.

All acknowledged rules of interpretation require that *everlasting* in the passages in Matt. 25, should be taken to qualify the *punishment*. It describes, or defines its length, as plainly as it defines the length of the life or blessedness of the finally righteous. This is too obvious even for our author to dispute directly; and he attempts to make his escape in another direction. It is very convenient for him to play the critic again. He tells us that "*kolasis*, rendered *punishment*, means *cutting off*," and that the sense of the passage is this: "The wicked are to be cut off, destroyed, put out of existence, and that this will be *everlasting* in the sense of being *final*—of lasting for ever. They will never be restored." Our author's criticism is urgently called for by his theory, but entirely forbidden by every other consideration. The word is used but in a single instance more in the whole New Testament: 1 John 4: 18. Fear hath *torment*. We know very well that slavish fear brings misery and sorrow, but it has no tendency to destroy the soul's existence. It cuts off happiness, but not being. The verb from which the noun is derived is used in Acts 4: 21, and 1 Peter, 2: 9, where our author's criticism finds not the least countenance. We have abundantly shown already, that the "fire" threatened against the wicked, if it be literal, can not destroy the soul's existence. It can only extinguish animal existence. If the fire be mental and figurative, it is still more manifest that it will have no tendency to destroy the living being.

It may be remarked also, by way of showing that the punishment of the wicked is not annihilation, that it is evidently synonymous with "the shame and everlasting contempt," to the experience of which Daniel says they will arise; with the experience of the damnation or condemnation spoken of by the Savior, to which they are to have their resurrection, and with the experience of the gnawings of the worm that never dies. The wrath of God is to *abide* upon the wicked. Their destruction is that which results from the being excluded from the blissful presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power—a loss of blessedness, of hope, of love, of all good. They are to be "tormented day and night for ever and ever," to "have no rest day nor night," and to be eternally unjust and unholy, if they so die, either

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of which would be quite impossible if they were at last to be annihilated.

We must conclude then, notwithstanding our author's criticism, that *the Bible leares the wicked in a state of suffering which it declares will be "eternal," "everlasting," "without end."* This is the final disposition it makes of them. Here revelation ends. We can go no farther. The same rules of interpretation, and the same criticisms which would make the doom of the wicked any thing else than suffering, and its duration less than eternal, would annihilate the whole current of Bible evidence that the reward of obedience to the righteous is exemption from sorrow and the enjoyment of the bliss of heaven, and that this reward is to continue without end. If the penalty of disobedience is extinction of being, the reward of obedience is mere blank existence, which in itself is no reward; for existence is not a good irrespective of the way in which it is to be employed.

Our author evidently supposes that there will be something peculiar in the destruction which is to take place at, or following the judgment. We think he is plainly mistaken. If we understand it, that day is simply *declaratory* in its design. It is a day appointed for the "*revelation* of God's righteous judgment." It is the day when God will draw forth the actual characters of men and exhibit to the moral universe, the reasons which have impelled him, as the Supreme Moral Governor, to award eternal death to the wicked, and eternal life to the righteous. The reward of the righteous does not begin with the judgment, but as soon as faith begins. "He that believeth hath everlasting life." They enjoy this from their conversion to the judgment, and eternally afterwards. The measure of their life will doubtless be unspeakably augmented after their judgment. The dim visions of Christ on earth will be followed by a full, cloudless, face-to-face view of the Savior, in his glory in heaven; and then, as a consequence, the bosoms of the saints will swell with new delights, like the tides of the ocean. There is no need of holding to the doctrine of an unconscious, intermediate state, but the saints should get their reward before it is proclaimed at the judgment. They do get a measure of it every day, if they are faithful, and will doubtless forever, as well before as after the great day of accounts. Nor does the death of the wicked begin at the judgment. The destruction, or punishment, then proclaimed, began when the sinner first sinned. The wicked

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experience a measure of it here by being excluded from the favor and fellowship of God. They experience little of it on earth comparatively, because they are placed upon probation, that they may be reformed and saved; but when their probation is ended, and they enter the eternal world, pass the judgment, and wend their way onward into the depths of hell, they will begin to drink more deeply of their cup of sorrow. Then the full apprehension of their guilt, the knowledge of their absolutely lost and hopeless condition, the unutterable fury of the war between conscience and will, between reason and lust—a war without end, and in which victory breeds contempt, and defeat revenge—the thirty pieces of silver for which they sold the Lord Jesus Christ, the mess of pottage for which they parted with their birth-right to eternal life and glory, will terribly increase the bitterness of their cup, the keenness of their anguish and the mournfulness of their death. It is just as reasonable to suppose that the wicked will be drinking of their bitter cup between death and the judgment, as in the fact they taste some of its elements in this life, and still more of them after the resurrection and judgment. The destruction proclaimed in the day of final judgment is not of a different nature from the death in which sinners are involved by sin in this world. The one is no more extinction of existence than the other. The difference lies in degree and not in kind; in circumstances and not in nature. The difference between the condition of the righteous, before and after the judgment, is also plainly one of degree, not of kind.

We must conclude, then, that there is an utter want of evidence, that the human soul is ever to experience an extinction of its existence; and therefore, that it will exist on forever, and be happy or miserable as its character shall be like or unlike that of its maker, Jesus Christ.

There are a few items in our author's book, having no bearing upon his subject in the way of argumentation, which must be briefly noticed.

1. He discourses vehemently upon the terrible results of the common faith on the subject of the soul's immortality. He seems to himself to find in it the grand source of idolatry. This leaven of Platonism has resulted in the most dreadful and wide-spread apostasy. The grand lie first told to our first parents was, "Ye shall be as gods,"—ye shall not die, that is, ye shall be immortal. The misery of

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the world is, that its deluded inhabitants have believed this lie of the devil and Plato, and have ever since, and consequently, been playing the *deity*, the *immortal*, worshiping, and being worshiped by, men. They have bowed down before them while they were on earth, and apotheosized them after they had left it. This first lie of Satan was designed to seduce men into sin, to murder mankind, to dishonor God and desolate the world; and it has done it most effectually. This fountain of false doctrine has encircled the world with its polluting streams. Our author claims to have discovered "the bitter root of that tree which has filled the world with idols, idolators, lamentation, mourning, and woe." "This world-wide empire of idolatrous delusion and death, arrays the earth against its God." "This denial of Jehovah's truth, this affront to his majesty calls for his intervention in judgment—in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them who know not God," &c. "The bearings of this dreadful truth, ("that almost all men believe themselves immortal,") are seen! The pious who have fallen into this awful and damning error are only to escape this terrible judgment of God on the ground that they have been led into it unwittingly. Is it not a little marvelous that the entire host of God's dear saints should have fallen into, and continued as long in, this crowning sin of the world, and that unwittingly!

Now in reply to such remarks, we would say,

1. That while the world have believed in the immortality of the soul, they have held that it would be punished for its sins, either forever, or until it should become pure. Mankind have not believed that they were gods, or as gods, in such a sense as that they could control their own destiny, and shun the retributions of God's government. They have acknowledged their allegiance to their Maker, and sought his favor by prayers and offerings.

We see nothing in this belief which would necessarily tend to the so awful corruption and idolatry of the race. The belief that the soul would suffer hereafter for its sins, in this life, would seem naturally to restrain mankind from the commission of sin. The sentiment of our author, on the other hand, would naturally tend to the moral corruption of mankind. Who has ever done more mischief than those who have taught that "death is an eternal sleep?" How dreadful was the influence of that sentiment in France!

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The position of our author is substantially that of Voltaire, so far as the wicked are concerned: and it is only from the wicked that moral corruption flows. The difference between the two, so far as we can see is this: Voltaire did not believe that the death would be interrupted by a resurrection and judgment, but that it would be unbroken from the grave. Our author does believe that death in respect to the wicked will be so interrupted. He believes also, that the wicked are to suffer awhile, perhaps a long while, after the judgment, before they are destroyed or annihilated; although this sentiment is incompatible with his main theory, which is that the penalty of the law is *death*, that is, *extinction of being*, which, so far as he knows, involves no more suffering than is implied in temporal death. The final destruction, he holds, is to be inflicted by literal fire; and our author will hardly be able to show how his sinner can live in the lake of fire an hundred years unconsumed, if the same fire will ever annihilate him. With him, as with Voltaire, the end of the sinner is annihilation, though taking place somewhat later than the period fixed by the French infidel. We do not wish to associate our author's theory with that of Voltaire, if it be not just. But as far as we have done it we think there is a real resemblance; and that, too, in the most objectionable points. The follower of Voltaire would say, "Death is an eternal sleep: I will gratify my lusts." The wicked man, who should hold with our author, would say: "I am a sinner, but the penalty of the law is the extinction of my existence. I shall be eternally unconscious:—I will not fear to sin."

The world is miserable, not because they believe in the immortality of the soul, but because they reject the wise and benevolent reign of the Messiah. They have chosen to please themselves rather than the Lord Jesus Christ; and this is the source of their misery. In this state of moral alienation from God, it makes comparatively little difference what may be their speculative tenets. The world would be no better if they should fall so far into the notions of the Sadducees as to agree with our author, that there is no soul which can exist separately from the body. Idolatry does not begin with theories, nor would it end with their overthrow. It begins with sin. The heathen first have their vices, then they create their gods to correspond with these vices. Gods or no gods they will have their vices till they believe in the Lord Jesus Christ.

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2. Our author asserts that the doctrine that there is life in the soul of the wicked—that their soul is deathless, was taken from the Platonic philosophers. p. 23. And yet his book is teeming with the awful fact that this lie originated with the devil in the garden. It was Satan's master-piece of falsehood for effecting the world's ruin. Which is true? If the latter, then its source is not to be found with the Platonic philosophers; and all our author's lamentations and cant about "heathenism" is ridiculous and quite wasted. Or was the lie disbelieved down to the days of Plato, and then re-originated by the philosopher. But this supposition would spoil all our author's great words about the evil and ruinous influence of the doctrine of immortality, since idolatry and wickedness abounded quite as much before Plato as after him. In order that the sad and awful picture of our author, drawn from the prevalence of this error may not be spoiled, and his loudest thunders hushed to whispers, we must acquit Plato, and give the devil his due. We object, however, to giving him more than his due, as we think our author has done. He insists that the lie of the devil was this—that men should be as gods. This was what men believed to their ruin, according to our friend. But this is not presenting the case of Mr. Diabolus fairly. The devil did not say, "Ye shall be as gods," and stop there, but he added, "knowing good and evil." He told our first parents they would be as gods, in this respect, that they would know good and evil. Now was this a lie? Doubtless Satan had a lying heart when he said it. He spoke with an evil design, as when he quoted scripture to Christ, but was the thing he said false, as our author represents? By no means. Says God, speaking of man in the same chapter, after He had transgressed, "Behold the man has become as one of us, to know good and evil."

Then again, if the death threatened against man was that which he experienced nine hundred and thirty years after his creation, as our author maintains, and if the devil meant to tell our parents that they should not die that death, then it is not true that the race have at all believed the devil. They all expect to die just as Adam did, the devil to the contrary notwithstanding. Whatever Adam experienced, in what we call temporal death, all men expect to experience. We think our author is a little severe on his serpent ship. We would kindly advise him not to provoke unnecessarily, that mighty foe of salvation.

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3. Our author is greatly concerned, lest, upon the common theory, the glory of the resurrection should be seriously marred. If the soul does not perish—if it goes immediately to God at death, what need of a resurrection? Why talk of being raised from the dead, if the soul, the rational man, does not die? Our author would have the whole man, body and soul, perish, in order that more glory might be added to the resurrection. In reply to this, we would say,

1. The resurrection upon which Paul dwells so fully in his epistle to the Corinthians, is plainly a resurrection of the *body*. The corruptible, natural body dies, and is raised an incorruptible, spiritual body. On either theory, the glory of the resurrection, as far as it pertains to the body, will be precisely the same. His theory has no advantage in this respect.

2. Does our author's theory promise a more glorious resurrection than the common theory, so far as the soul is concerned? Far from it. It certainly promises nothing better in the fact, that after ages of unconscious sleep or death, an act of omnipotence is to be put forth to bring it again into conscious existence. If it shall appear that God has been exerting his omnipotence to keep the soul in existence between death and the resurrection, we see not why its taking possession of a glorified body may not be quite as notable an event as would be that of its being awaked anew into existence, by a single act of omnipotence, put forth at the period of the resurrection of the body.

Then again, the glory of the resurrection may bear some relation to the moral glory which may have been attained by the subjects of it. This will doubtless be so unless the glory of the event is to depend wholly upon the exertion of mere omnipotence, which we do not believe. If, then, the glory of the resurrection is to be somewhat as the moral and intellectual glory which shall have been attained by the subjects of the resurrection, no one can doubt which theory promises the highest honor to God. On the theory of our author, God suspends all communion with his redeemed children from their death to their resurrection. They cease to enjoy the favor and fellowship of God: they lose all thought of the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, it may be for an hundred centuries: they cease to be the subjects of any of the sublime and holy emotion which the great themes of the gospel are fitted to generate; they are wholly debarred

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from the exercise of moral virtue towards God or man, and from all participation in the great and glorious work of honoring God or blessing the universe. The necessary result of this must be an absolute arrest of all growth in grace and holiness. The powers of the mind must come to a dead stand in their processes of expansion, development and acquisition. Not a single advance step can be taken in any direction or by any agency; and after an hundred centuries, it may be, when the resurrection comes, the soul will be waked into being and find itself just where the sleep of death commenced. Such is the theory of our author. Contrast with this the glory of the resurection as presented in the theory which we maintain. According to this theory, the soul, after ages of intellectual and moral growth and development, is re-united with a physical organization corresponding in glory and perfection to its condition and prospects at that eventful crisis. With these thoughts we take our leave of our author, and of the subject which he has with so much zeal, brought before the public mind.

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WOMAN'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES.*

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THE subject selected is in some respects an unfortunate one. The very mention of it arouses disagreeable associations in many minds. It has come before us in such a variety of ways, it has been the burden of so many earnest discussions, and spirited essays, and reformatory harangues, that it seems hazardous to venture upon it.

The subject, too, is so intimately connected with our personal relations, that when any interest at all is felt in the matter, it is often too intense to be agreeable. It requires a good degree of self-control to receive even the truth, much more to make reasonable allowance for a mistake, when our cherished views are opposed. If you will pardon the personal allusion, I may say that the undertaking is in some respects an unpleasant one to myself. I shall be obliged to express views which I have reason to suppose will be disapproved of by some whose characters I admire, and whose opinions I respect, and whom I should feel honored to be permitted to regard as my friends. I have no hope of convincing these or of much enlightening others, still I feel inclined to "bear my testimony," and shall endeavor to tell what I think to be true, "without fear or favor," sacrificing nothing to friendship, to gallantry, or to squeamishness. For what may be said I beg to be held solely responsible, not because the views presented will be new or original, but because I speak only for myself.

Our question is, "what are woman's rights and duties?" The answer must be; the same in general, as those of all other human beings, because she possesses the common

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attributes of humanity. She is endowed with all the faculties which characterize the human soul, and of course can claim all the rights and must meet all the obligations which devolve upon man at large. The great object of existence is the same to all, and the means necessary for the accomplishment of that object belong by inalienable right to all. In the sight of God we stand on this common platform, listen to the universal law and are summoned to a common judgment. We can not shift responsibility from one to another upon the plea, "the woman gave me, and I did eat"—"the serpent beguiled me, and I did eat," but man, woman, and serpent must stand or fall to a common Master, according to their individual deeds. Milton's Eve forgot the great end of life when she said to Adam,

"God be thy law, thou mine."

No such obedience can one created being owe another. All our relative duties are to be performed with an eye to the supreme claim of the Creator, and woman as well as man is justified only when she walks according to her conscience in his fear. On this point then there is no difference. All human beings sustain the same great relations to God, and the rights which those relations confer are common to all.

But these facts do not show that all are to accomplish the great end of life by the same means. Each human being is bound to inquire in reference to his particular capacities and adaptations, and take that place in the grand work of the world, which the Creator thus seems to assign him. This is the first dictate of common sense and none can prosper who neglect it. A distribution of labor is a part of the Creator's plan, and He has effected it by giving to his creatures different susceptibilities and tendencies. The sphere which belongs to each is manifestly that to which he is adapted. This is an axiom in practical ethics which none ever dreamed of denying. Specific powers impose specific duties.

The question which next meets us is, Are there such differences in the constitutions of the sexes that different duties seem to devolve upon them? Do such differences exist between them as classes, as to indicate that as classes they have a different work to do?

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This question, from time immemorial, has been answered in the affirmative, and few have had the hardihood to object—yet enough perhaps to preclude the application of the convenient principle, "what all believe, must be true." A glance at some of these leading differences seems necessary; and here I shall endeavor to shun disputed territory, and seize upon those characteristics of the sexes which common consent assigns them.

The characteristics of woman are both physical and mental, and at the head stands that which makes her woman, a constitution which imposes on her the duty of being the mother of the race. To dwell on this, may scarce seem proper, but to omit it, is to omit the leading fact in her character. In this fact you find the philosophical reason, the final cause, of all the other peculiarities of her nature. All her other duties and responsibilities will harmonize with this. Her sphere of activity must to a great extent be determined by this.

Again, woman is distinguished from the other sex by a delicacy of constitution which shows that she is not designed for the rougher labors of life. If there is one department of labor which requires more bone and muscle than another, it is as clear as any truth of nature can be, that woman was not designed for this. If there is a department of labor which requires a more delicate sense than another, a gentler touch, a lighter and more graceful step, it is as clear as revelation that woman was designed for this.

It is sometimes contended that the weakness of the female sex is the work, not of nature, but of an abuse of nature. It may be so. It is not weakness that I refer to so much as delicacy of constitution, from which weakness is perhaps, to a certain extent, inseparable. That this superior delicacy is not a characteristic of the female sex no woman will contend, and no man will allow. It is essential to our ideal of female beauty, it always has been, it always will be. There are some women that are destitute of it, there are some men that possess it, but it is regarded as a misfortune to both. The ideals of physical perfection in the two sexes are strongly contrasted. Delicacy is demanded on the one hand, and strength on the other. A woman with giant frame and brawny arm and bearded lip and heavy tread, may be good, but no woman's rights' logician can persuade the world that she is beautiful. On the other hand, the womanish exquisite with lily hand, taper finger, cherub face, rosy

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cheek, velvet skin, and soft, curling hair, is admired by none but himself. He might do for a show box where dolls are kept, but should never answer to the name when a man is called for. This view of things is natural to us we can not escape it if we would. It corresponds with the order of nature. Throughout the animate world we find a similar difference in the constitution of the sexes, a fact which shows that this difference is original, and not the result of accident or of cultivation.

Another physical difference is found in the voice. Woman's voice is pitched an octave above that of man. This holds true the world over, and so far as history goes, has been true from the commencement of the race. The songs of Eden were doubtless relieved by this variety. If not, the world has gained something by the fall. I do not affirm that this difference is absolutely universal. There are men afflicted with a treble voice, and there are women that speak in a deep-toned base; but the difference still exists between the sexes as classes, and the exceptions only make the fact more striking. Thus much for physical differences.

Let us now turn to the mental characteristics, and notice the differences and resemblances. The question is often mooted whether man and woman are equal in their intellectual endowments. The question, Are they alike? would be more rational. If they are alike they can be compared in reference to the extent of their powers, if not, such comparison is absurd. You might as well discuss the question, Which is the largest, a steamboat or a railroad? Which is the longest, a day in June, or a boa-constrictor? Which is the strongest, sugar or salt? Which is the sweetest, a fresh-blown rose or "Bonnie Doon?" Which is the softest, a pillow of down, or a pillar of fire? I propose no such comparison. My inquiry is, Are the sexes alike in their mental characteristics, and what are the differences?

The first characteristic that strikes us, is a predominance of the sensibility in woman. Her feelings are more easily moved, and these emotions constitute a more important part of her mental exercises. I do not say that her feelings are more intense, but their excitement is more frequent and their influence more abiding. Some women, I am aware, disclaim this distinction, and repel the idea as a slander on their sex. With trembling voice, and heaving bosom, and tearful eye, the logic of the heart, they vindicate their intellectual nature. Observe, I do not deny woman's intellec-

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tual power, nor depreciate it in comparison with man's. I only affirm that a predominance of the sensibility gives a bias to her mind, and gives her tendencies and susceptibilities which a less sensitive nature would not have. And why should this be esteemed a slander? Or why should one who holds such views be regarded as undervaluing woman? Is it settled beyond a question that thought is a more valuable commodity than feeling?—that the intellect is a more precious boon than the heart? Which is the ultimate object of our being? Have even philosophers yet determined whether feeling exists in order to thought, or thought in order to feeling? In my humble opinion neither can be dispensed with, both are good, but neither is better. I do not contend that woman does not possess the power of thought to the same extent with the other sex, but that thought and feeling exist in such combinations that the latter gives color to the female character. Such a temper of soul has its results.—First, it gives to woman a tendency to the concrete rather than the abstract. Abstract sicence she can master and enjoy. She can even excel in it, but leave her to the bias of her own soul, and she comes back to the living world. The naked relations of things she can trace and understand, but breathe into those ideas the breath of life, and they have for her a greater charm. It is scarce safe on this point to be very definite, but I will venture upon an example. In our institution young men and young women pursue their studies side by side in the same classes during a four years' course,—and I am free to say, with equal success. This is my unqualified testimony after ten years' experience in teaching these classes. When the opportunities have been equal, I expect a manifestation of equal ability in the recitation room. Near the end of their course they engage together in metaphysical studies, and the young women show by their readiness in recitation, that they are not behind even here. But herein the difference is manifest. The young men you may meet in circles, discussing from day to day the topics of the lecture with an interest which amounts almost to a passion. Such a tendency among the young women I have yet to hear of. No doubt such things have occurred, but it can not be denied that they are rare. This is to be attributed, not to a lack of intellectual ability, but to a lack of taste for abstract investigations. No doubt these young women have employed their time in matters quite as profitable to themselves and to the world. Nor do

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I call this lack of taste for abstractions a deficiency, but a difference, a difference resulting from a more active sensibility, giving a taste for the actual, the real. Woman, except under the pressure of circumstances, is not a metaphysician. And here there is room for exceptions. There are women with masculine minds as well as masculine frames. I speak of the characteristics of the class.

A second result of this predominance of the sensibility in woman, is a more delicate perception of the proprieties of life—an instinctive apprehension of the fit and the unfit. The perception of what is proper in the nicer adjustments of society is more a matter of feeling than of thought. Thought is too slow in its operations to be depended on in all our social emergencies, an active sensibility sees by intuition what ought and what ought not to be done. Directed by this superior sense, woman moves more easily in social life, and is less likely to blunder or offend in circumstances that are new and trying. Place a brother and sister who have enjoyed the same social advantages in an untried position, and observe how readily the sister will adapt herself to her new situation. She will soon move with perfect ease and freedom where the brother will be awkward and offensive in his manners. Thus the young women of any social circle may be patterns of ease and grace, while the young men who have been their associates from childhood, will be striking examples of coarseness and clumsiness.

Closely allied to the perception of propriety is the love of order in personal arrangements. A room in which a young man can stay and study with tolerable comfort, would be worse than purgatory to a woman. Nor is this difference a result of the ideas which the sexes have of the different duties imposed upon them. The demand of society may have its influence; but the higher love of order in woman is a natural and necessary result of her more active sensibility. Tidiness is, to man, one of the comforts of life, to woman, it is one of its necessaries.

The same remarks apply to dress. Attention to dress is more natural and more essential to woman than to man. I do not mean merely that society demands it of her, but it is a demand of her own nature. She is uncomfortable without it. I am aware that many attribute this difference to the arrangements of society, and to what is regarded as woman's defective education and perverted taste. Nor do

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I deny, that under the prevailing influences, she is prone to an excessive indulgence of this natural taste, but still it is too obvious to be disputed that a degree of attention to personal appearance is required of woman which would be regarded as weakness in man. We instinctively feel that a degree of ornament is, in itself, becoming to woman, which would not be tolerated in man. A finger ring, or a showy bosom pin, is, in general, regarded as evidence of some degree of levity of character in man. Nay, a pair of nicely trimmed whiskers, which bespeak a careful adjustment before the mirror, will almost convict a man of foppishness in the high court of taste. No such judgment is pronounced on woman. Some call this, one of the prejudices of society. But what is the origin of this prejudice? Why is it universal? *This* must be accounted for. It is said that woman's tendency to give attention to dress arises from a lack of other objects of interest in the sphere which has been arbitrarily assigned her. The difficulty is transferred but not removed. Why has this sphere been assigned her? But we are anticipating. The explanation is not adequate. Doth not even nature itself teach us that untidiness in personal habits is a defect in man, but a capital failure in woman? Thus much for the influence of the sensibility.

Another general difference in the mental constitution of the sexes, is, that woman has less of *will* in her character. This may be doubted by some, but the peculiarities which result from it can not be rationally denied. Let us attend to these.

First, then, woman is less aggressive in her nature—is less disposed to form plans in reference to the business of life, and to execute those plans. She can do such things if necessity is laid upon her, but she prefers to be excused. The work is a burden to her; while on the part of man it is essential to his self-respect. Such a responsibility is the demand of his nature. He does not regard it as a favor to be relieved from it.

Woman is not disposed to be a leader in the more prominent affairs of life. Recollect that there is allowance made for exceptions in all these points. There are women that love to guide, but the normal woman has no such tendency. She naturally looks for some leading influence, and commits herself to it. You may call this dogmatism or what you will. The entire experience of the world sustains

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the idea. When two persons of equal intelligence and common sense, are brought to act together, he becomes the leader who has more of the aggressive in his nature, or in whom the element of will predominates. He naturally assumes the direction, and the other as naturally yields it. The notorious fact in reference to the sexes is, that in all countries and in all time, man assumes the leadership and woman as cheerfully accords it. To attempt the explanation of this fact, without granting a corresponding difference in the sexes is a simple absurdity. I have heard it attributed to superior physical strength on the part of man. But physical strength has nothing to do with it. It is force of character, depending on the element of will. When two men act together, he is the leader who has the stronger will, though he be a dwarf, and the other a giant. This does not necessarily imply any exercise of authority. Neither party may ever have thought of the relation which subsists between them. Yet one is the leader and the other is led. It is certainly a wise arrangement of providence that this greater force of will should be found, in connection with the greater physical force.

Intimately connected with this is the difference between the sexes in reference to the exercise of authority. The exercise of authority is but the expression of this superior force of will. This in its widest legitimate scope is not natural to woman. She was not made to govern, in the technical sense of the word. I have not forgotten the long catalogue of queens, from Semiramis of Babylon, to Victoria of England. Some of these governed and some did not. Victoria has almost as little to do with the government of England as any other English matron with seven children. Of the queens who have been rulers, they have all been nearer men than women, unless you except Isabella of Spain. It is common to find such characters introduced in biographies of distinguished women. But to call such creatures as Catharine of Russia, and Elizabeth of England, distinguished women, is a libel on the sex. They were distinguished monsters—women changed into pillars of salt, towering in the distance, beyond the utmost limit of woman's sphere. I do not deny that some of these female chiefs rank high among successful rulers. I only deny that they were even decent specimens of female or of human character.

Another result of this lack of will is the feeling of dependence which characterizes the female sex. I trust my lady

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hearers will not be indignant. I am going into no rhapsodies over the figure of the ivy and the oak. I will endeavor to state the facts in the case, and leave you to employ the figure which suits you best.

It is an undeniable fact that woman naturally looks for a protector, and that man feels himself chartered by nature with the privilege of affording her protection. It is a marked distinction between the sexes throughout animated nature, and as it is not peculiar to the human family, the plea that it is a factitious sentiment, got up to flatter man's superiority, falls to the ground. It is an original principle marking the difference between a masculine and a feminine nature. It is one of the many links which bind the sexes together. All the arrangements of refined society correspond with this fact. The attentions which man spontaneously pays to woman, and which woman as spontaneously receives from man, are examples of the fact. Obliterate this sentiment and the propriety of such attentions ceases at once. You will meet young ladies gallanting young men along the street, or at the livery stables bargaining for carriages to give them a ride. Women will have the privilege of a deck passage on a stage-coach, when men apply in advance for inside seats. Carry out the picture, and admire it if you can. When woman is compelled to take her chance and elbow her way through every crowd, the days of decency, as well as chivalry, will be past. Yet it has sometimes been recommended to young women to eradicate their feeling of dependence and reject the attentions which imply such a relation between the sexes. Now I am no admirer of that childish weakness which women sometimes cultivate—which screams over a streaked snake, and faints at the sight of blood. Common sense and self-possession are as valuable in woman as in man. Self-reliance, in its place, is a becoming trait of character in either sex. But this does not imply that woman must issue a declaration of independence and set up for her herself. Instead of elevating woman, such an idea degrades both sexes alike. These delicate attentions appropriately bestowed and received, are a mutual good, as essential to the one as to the other. I pity the man that shall be alive when such regard shall be generally rejected by the sex. The meanest of living creatures may look down upon him—even the male goose that he encounters in the street, will hiss his contempt for a being

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so much beneath him. If this be woman's jubilee, the day is yet distant: nature will have her own.

Closely connected with this difference of the sexes in the matter of giving and receiving attentions, is the fact that proposals of marriage come from man to woman. This custom is sometimes stigmatized as absurd, a foolish prejudice. It may be both foolish and absurd, but it has always existed, and always will exist. Convince the world of its folly if you can, and you will still fail to introduce any other practice. It grows out of the difference between the sexes in reference to aggressiveness, or rather, is a particular example of that difference. It is of little use to argue its propriety. It belongs to the domain of sentiment and taste. It is proper because such are the feelings of mankind.

People sometimes greatly blind themselves by inquiring of their reason, and neglecting their taste, as if taste were not among the highest exercises of reason. Why will you not rear a Guinea fowl for its music rather than a Canary? Its note is far louder—the creature is more easily obtained and kept, and then it is more useful in other respects. Out upon the absurd admiration of a Canary! Reason is entirely on the other side. Perhaps so, but reason in such matters speaks only through taste.

How absurd, says Logic, that a woman can not indulge her preference and declare her love! Why should she be oppressed by this fantastic notion? How many unhappy marriages arise because woman holds only the veto power! This may all do very well for Logic, lame in its most important premise. Make the unreasonableness of the thing upon such grounds as clear as sun-light if you can, still woman can not get her own consent to indulge her affections, or avow, even to her own soul, a love unasked by word or deed; and man will fly from that proffered love as from the breath of the desert. The only reason that need be given, or that can be given is, thus we are made. If one does not feel the fact, he need not try to see it. But it is a happy circumstance that the peculiarity of woman's nature which imposes this restriction upon her, makes her very contented under the privation. Her habits of thought and feeling are less rigid, her nature more pliable. With a greater adaptive power, she can meet the emergency and feel measurably satisfied. If to these facts you add the romantic idea, which I am not inclined to question, that a mesmeric influence, or

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something in that shape, brings together kindred spirits, the matter will be very well disposed of.

These, if the world's judgment can be taken, are a few of the differences of the sexes. Do they, or do they not indicate a different sphere of action? It is universally admitted that the adjustments of nature are perfect in their way, that means and ends are admirably adapted to each other. By a careful study of these adaptations, naturalists have become so skilled in nature's laws, that when they discover a power they can divine what its result must be; when they discover a susceptibility they can determine what were the circumstances of the subject of that susceptibility. Gather a few fragments of bones from the four quarters of the earth, carry them to some naturalist in Europe, and he will put them together, and complete the skeleton, and tell the habits of the animal and its sphere of activity, even though the form should correspond with nothing that now lives or has lived in earth or sea for six thousand years. This thing has been done, and subsequent discoveries have verified the work. Let a naturalist, from another planet if you please, have given him the characteristics of the two sexes, such as should be agreed upon by a joint committee, and in connection with these characteristics, let him understand the great work of the race in the world, and how would he divide that work between them? In the first place he would link them together in a common destiny and bid them take each other "for better or worse." He would show, that by their very constitution, their interests can never conflict, that what is best for one is best for both, that their wants are perfectly harmonious, and that each is essential to the other. He would declare the family relation to be the order of nature, and marriage one of the duties of life, as well as one of its blessings.

But as I promised at the outset to speak only for myself I will leave you to consult this naturalist at your leisure and will continue with my own views.

It must be safe to assume marriage as the order of nature. The fact is settled without argument. The theory may not be. It is regarded by some as a libel on the race to represent marriage as a necessity, to either sex. It is sufficient for our purpose to maintain that it is a good to both, and that it is designed for both sexes as classes. If any one feels disposed, for the accomplishment of any specific object, or under the pressure of peculiar circumstances, to live a single

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life, no one can properly object. But it is still manifest that the great mass of men and women, the educated and the uneducated, must be married; nor is this a matter of regret. Celibacy has been tried by both sexes with indifferent success. The monastic system has been prolific in corruption, and has failed to accomplish any end which might not have been better secured by other instrumentalities. The world has had its Sisters of Mercy and its Knights of the Cross, but Religion and Charity could have spared them both. The chances for success and usefulness are ten to one, in favor of those in married life. The man becomes a better man, and the woman a better woman. The soul shut out from sympathy is in danger of becoming intensely selfish and misanthropic, indifferent to human happiness and misery. Or if it overcomes this strong temptation, its powers become dormant, effort becomes a burden, it lacks incentives to action. You say that religion is the proper remedy for these disorders, and furnishes the highest motives which can operate upon the soul. This is true, but religion works by means. It cures selfishness by enticing the man out from himself, kindling up his affections and giving them objects. It teaches him to value human happiness, by surrounding him with beings whose welfare, by the very laws of his nature, he prefers to his own. It teaches him regard for the "Father of Spirits," in the light of that respect which he requires of his child. Thus in a thousand ways the domestic affections are favorable to religious impressions. It may be safely asserted that a man with a family, bent on usefulness, besides bequeathing to the world his children, a well ordered household, will in general accomplish twice as much in direct efforts for the good of his fellow men, as one whose domestic nature is undeveloped, for he moves with the strength of two hearts combined, and with motives to action which the family relations only can impart. With few exceptions the world's benefactors have been married men. It might be shown that the same facts apply with equal, nay, with greater force to the case of woman. But it is not necessary to the argument. If man must be married, woman must be too; hence, marriage is the natural condition of life. A thousand considerations might be brought to strengthen this position if it needed them. Take one—the almost universal fact that those who have no families of their own, contrive to make up the deficiency as best they can. If a family lack children, some

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homeless one is taken in to supply that lack, often from motives of benevolence, but oftener because the want is felt. The single man, who has passed the meridian of life, if his heart is not entirely withered, will adopt as his own some brother's or sister's, or even a stranger's family, not simply to do them good but because the outgoing of his heart demands it. So of the unmarried woman. By a sort of natural necessity she casts in her lot with some family and makes their fortune her own. These and kindred facts show the strength of the domestic tendency in man and woman, and in making out the division of labor it is safe to assume marriage and the family arrangement as the basis of calculation.

It can not be neccessary then even to affirm that home is woman's domain, the centre of her influence. I doubt whether this fact has ever been seriously questioned. It can not be supposed that the sexes are to divide the duties of home equally between them, and that the one has the same kind of responsibility in reference to this matter that the other has. I would not, of course, imply that man's influence is not to be felt at home as well as woman's, but I do intend to say that woman's chief responsibilities lie here, that this is especially her sphere and that when she acts well her part, these home duties are well performed. There may be other objects of interest and effort to her, but these are incidental and must hold a second place. The claims of the household are paramount, all other things are secondary. It is plain that matters at home and abroad which each family must attend to, will be better managed with a division into in-door and out-door duties. If man and woman were precisely alike in all their tendencies and relations, it would be the part of wisdom for them to make this division of labor and let the life of each be devoted to one or the other of these departments. Each field is wide enough for the exercise of all the human powers, and a life time only is adequate to the attainment of the highest excellence in either.

Such is the division of labor which the Creator has made, and by such means has he made it, that the race is relieved from all responsibility in the matter. The man and woman who unite their interests and fortunes in marriage, never think it necessary to arrange between them what part of the duties of the firm shall devolve on each, who shall be the in-door and who the out-door partner. The theory of

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the matter is forever settled, and if ever a practical question has arisen, it pertains to the limits of each sphere, where in-door duties terminate, and where out-door duties begin. The Creator has settled the matter and settled it by the very nature of the parties, so that each takes the place assigned without dreaming of a question. If the household arrangement is the natural order, then woman is the natural house-keeper. Every peculiarity of her nature fits her for this. There is not a particular in which her constitution differs from man's, which does not find its meaning and its purpose here. She is the mother of the children, and the laws of maternity and her maternal nature make it absurd and impossible that she should be much abroad. The facts, to which I need only refer, make home the sphere of woman, both as a matter of propriety and absolute necessity. This one consideration has forever settled the question. There are others still. The child looks to the mother as naturally for the early guidance of its mind and heart as for its early food, and it is doing violence to nature to deprive it of the one or the other; and nature has fitted her equally for each of these duties. Woman has a delicate physical constitution—hence she is unfitted for the rougher duties of life, and by that same peculiarity she is admirably adapted for the duties of home. Her softer hand is the support of childhood, and her gentler form and motion the charm of domestic life. She has a voice of far less compass than that of man, but not less powerful. It reaches not so readily the ear, but more readily the heart. It was made for the fire-side and not for the forum. It is decidedly agreeable in its natural use with the circle at home, but unpleasant and even painful when strained for a wider auditory. Woman has an active sensibility, and she needs it as the guide of childhood, and the minister of suffering. Childish wants and sorrows are not apprehended by the intellect. They appeal to the heart. An angel's intellect is less valuable, as the dependence of childhood, than the mother's heart. But the same sensibility which fits for domestic life disqualifies for the harsher struggles of the world. Woman's peculiar perceptions and tastes, in dress and manners, fit her admirably for the detail of private and social life. But of these things individually our time will not allow us to speak. Nor is it necessary. The point in question is too obvious for argument. It only needs a statement. Whatever else may devolve on woman, the care of home is her peculiar vocation.

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But here a multitude of questions press upon us, as to the limits of woman's sphere. If home, as all admit, be her peculiar care, still has she not more to do with the bustling world than has been generally allowed her? Are there not duties of a more public nature which fall properly to her lot? On some of these points I shall venture to express an opinion, perhaps rashly—I trust candidly. The question then is not what *can* woman do, but what can she *properly* do? It may be safely admitted that woman can do, and has done almost all things which fall within the range of human power. In the physical, the intellectual, and the moral world, she has accomplished feats which are reckoned among the proudest works of the race. In the comely and the uncomely, the noble and the base, she has born her part. With the German emigrant of our own land, she graces the harvest field with her presence, and "follows the cradle," day in and day out. With the Indian of the western forest, she performs all the drudgery of life, and literally bears house and household on her shoulders. With the Amazons of other days she has donned the warrior's helm, and met the foe upon the field of blood. With the martyrs of the early time she has embraced the stake and the faggot, and rejected life at the sacrifice of her faith. With the women of Galilee she has stood by the Savior when bold men fled,

"Last at the cross, and earliest at the grave."

With the Spartan mother she has stifled her maternal heart, and bid her son return from war a conqueror or a corpse. With Charlotte Corday she has nourished the flame of patriotism in her bosom, and enacted the Brutus alone and unsustained. With Elizabeth of England, she has held the scepter with a steady hand, and maintained the prerogatives of royalty against a clamorous people. With Madame Roland she has mounted the tribune where Danton and Robespierre faltered, and calmly answered for herself in the face of the most turbulent assembly the sun ever looked upon. With the furies of the reign of terror, she has caught the purple stream flowing warm from the guillotine and quaffed it like a goblet of claret. With Theroigne de Mericourt, she has laid aside the apparel of her sex, and with a musket on one shoulder, and a sabre on the other, and a belt hung with pistols, astride a cannon, she has marched at the head of a mob of demons. She has ascended the heights of science with Mrs. Somerville, who enjoys the distinction of being the only woman in the world that can

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read the Mecanique Celeste of La Place. With Mrs. Hemans and many others, she has wrought for herself a diadem from the choicest gems of poesy and romance. With Abby Kelly she has mounted the rostrum in angry debate, and shaken her delicate fist in grave men's faces. With a multitude, unnamed on earth but known above, she has performed the high duties of daughter, sister, wife, and mother, and gone to receive her reward. There is scarce a field in the wide range of human effort, in which woman has not, in some character or other, been conspicuous, unless it be in the matter of metaphysical science. I have inquired for her successful labors in this direction, and a friend who can be trusted for such statistics affirms that they are not. Here then is a niche in the temple of female fame unoccupied. It will not always be so. Some metaphysical Minerva will lay claim to it. With this view of the facts in the case, you will not suspect me of setting limits to woman's sphere from any lack of confidence in her ability.

The first practical question which meets us is, Are the learned professions as naturally open to woman as to man? Should she pursue a course of education with the view of entering these? Let the question be understood. Probably not more than one in fifty of the human family is needed in these professions, or can be sustained or furnished with work. Shall half of these be from the female sex?—or is such a station as rational an object of effort in woman as in man? Take the pulpit and the bar. Can woman occupy these stations to an equal extent with man? The answer must be, No, for two general reasons: it is improper and impossible. The impropriety consists in this, it is contrary to the general sentiment of the race—a sentiment which is natural, and which makes the distinction between the proper and the improper. This sentiment may have been eradicated in particular cases, but the race can never lose it. It is a thing positively disagreeable to both sexes to see a woman a public character. With few exceptions, woman shrinks from it, and man can not but loathe it. Thus we are made. Some call the sentiment a prejudice—weak and unworthy of man or woman. Then is the sentiment which clothes the race a prejudice—and indeed the last assertion might be sustained on stronger grounds, for the demand for clothing seems to have resulted from the fall. When one of these sentiments is obliterated, the other may be, and it is just as rational to make war upon one as upon the other. That

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some men and some women have trampled on this feeling, is no argument against its existence, for some men and women too, under the influence of enthusiasm, have been constrained to present themselves unclothed in public assemblies, to testify their view of the naked condition of an apostate church. I do not suppose that the outrage upon nature is as great in the one case as in the other, but I do believe it is as real. The reason why we are so made as to dislike to see woman a public character, is found in the fact that in general it is impossible that she should be. The impossibility arises from her relation to the family interest as before referred to. If you can contrive how a woman can be a respectable wife and mother, and at the same time a respectable public character, you will solve a problem which has never yet been solved. Grant that she could be either with equal propriety, yet to be the two at once, may be set down among impossibilities. All the considerations which make woman the natural house-keeper, forbid her appearing in the pulpit or at the bar. Let it be regarded as a settled question that woman is to attend to the duties of home, and it is at once settled that she can not perform the duties of a public profession. To succeed in a profession is the labor of a life. The brief intervals which a wife and mother could devote to it would be utterly inadequate to success.

But it may be asked, may not women devote themselves to a single life, and thus find leisure to prosecute a profession? The very suggestion is a yielding of the point at once. If to pursue a profession, women must remain unmarried, then no profession will ever be sustained by women. The world will never entrust a profession to any class of celibates, male or female, nor will any large class of persons devote themselves to celibacy for the sake of a profession. Let a woman have completed her education preparatory to public life. She will then have a favorable offer of marriage. I do not say that she will accept, but if she is wise she will. To make the case as favorable as possible, let her marry a man who is entering the same profession with herself, so that it shall have all the advantages of a business copartnership. At first it may be difficult to tell which is the active and which the silent partner; but let household responsibilities multiply, and as sure as nature is not a falsehood, the woman will leave the study and the office to her husband, and assume to herself the oversight of the parlor, the nurs-

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ery and the kitchen, not only as a matter of choice but of absolute necessity. Since such is woman's necessity, Heaven in mercy has withheld a taste for public life and given her a taste for private life, and has implanted deep in the human soul the sentiment which approves of the necessity.

It is not necessary here to insist upon the peculiarity of woman's voice, which disqualifies her for public speaking, and yet it might be insisted on with unanswerable force.

But the question recurs, Are there not women of masculine minds and aggressive tendencies, like Abby Kelly and Harriet Martineau and Madame Roland, to whom the public professions should be open. I answer, If there are such women who can not be satisfied in domestic life they are exceptions, and the question is at once reduced to one of comparatively little consequence. The matter is no longer one of woman's rights, but of the rights of certain peculiar women—exceptions to nature's general laws. A woman should regard it as a misfortune to have such tendencies, nor should she readily admit herself an exception. I am well persuaded that these exceptions are far more rare than they are generally thought. Among the many that are interested in this so-called reform you will find very few that dream of availing themselves of the privileges which they claim for themselves. The thought of engaging in public life they never cherish, but they contend that if Miss So-and-so wishes to become a public speaker, she ought to have the privilege. It is a misfortune to a woman to be such an exception. If she represses her tendencies, it will be a constant self-denial. If she follows her tendencies, she must run athwart the common sentiment of the world, and meet rebuff and calumny where sympathy and co-operation are most needed. If the world greatly required such a sacrifice, it ought to be cheerfully made, but where the only necessity lies in one's own nature, and that nature an exception, a woman may well excuse herself from the thankless task. If to exert a public influence is a woman's passion, let her seize the pen, and relieve her heart. For the love of personal notoriety in man or woman I have no respect.

But are there not emergencies when women may forget the peculiarities of their nature and the nicer sentiments of the race, and rush to the rescue? Unquestionably there are. When those buildings were burnt on the corner, ladies neglected the considerations of health and ordinary propriety,

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and passed the buckets with a ready hand. This was as it should be. But for ladies to organize a company, and drag a fire-engine about the streets for the sake of being prepared for such emergencies, would be quite a different affair. Emergencies may arise in which woman should lift her voice in public, but to institute a system of education or an order of things mainly to qualify her for such emergencies, is absurd. The emergency itself affords the best aid for the performance of the duty. Nothing can be an emergency of which we are forewarned, or which exists as a constant and permanent fact. That the world needs light, is not an emergency. The same fact has always existed. No such reason can justify woman for appearing either in the pulpit, or at the bar, or on the public stand.

But shall not woman qualify herself for public life that she may administer to assemblies of her own sex? Such occasions are rare. The greater part of the public instruction which the race needs, is better given to both sexes together. It is scarce necessary that a class of public speakers should be educated for this sole end. If a woman should feel called to such a mission, the way should be open for her, and so it is.

But does not liberty of conscience belong to woman? If a sense of duty impels her to engage in public speaking, may she not do it? Undoubtedly she should follow her conscience; but let her not mistake the principle which says *I will*, for that which says *I ought*. The question is not what an unenlightened conscience may dictate, but what in itself is right and proper.

But what was Anna the prophetess, and what were Philip's "four daughters that did prophesy?" I confess I do not know. If "God is not the author of confusion but of peace," and if "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets," then the strong presumption is, that they were not public speakers. But if they were, these isolated cases, under special inspiration, no more prove that public speaking is a rational object of woman's effort, than the fact that Deborah was a warrior under a similar inspiration, proves that women should establish a military academy and train themselves for the tented field. Paul doubtless understood the case of Anna and of Philip's four daughters. Yet this did not prevent him from saying, "Let your women keep silence in the churches." Thus much for the clerical and the legal professions.

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The argument from propriety does not apply as strongly to the professions of medicine and of teaching. Indeed these pursuits, in some particulars, seem very appropriate to women. Yet the argument from necessity applies with almost equal strength. Either of these professions is the work of a life. If a woman marries, nature imposes on her another work for life. The two burdens can never be sustained together. To engage then in either of these pursuits for life, dooms woman to celibacy. It could scarce be the part of wisdom or duty for a woman to devote herself to a single life for the sake of either of these professions; but having chosen a single life for good and sufficient reasons, there can be no objection to her engaging in these pursuits. There have always been and there always will be female physicians and female teachers, but the burden of neither of these professions can ever be sustained by women. It is more important that the world should be supplied with well ordered families than with female physicians and female teachers. The principal demand for female teachers is for the instruction of children. This work is well appropriated to young women who do not make it their profession or engage in it for life. There are always enough to do the work in the intervals of their own education or in their early years before entering upon higher responsibilities.

Another question meets us. Is it not important that woman's sphere should be extended by opening to her many of the trades and occupations now monopolized by man? The argument runs thus. Woman's wages are oppressively low. The reason is that the field of her operations is too narrow. Open to her other pursuits, and the price of her labor would increase as the demand for that labor should increase. Let her have the control of the printing office, the tailor's shop, several varieties of manufacturing and mercantile establishments, and she would then be comparatively independent. This argument applies chiefly to our cities, and is extended in the following manner. The inadequacy of woman's wages to furnish the necessaries of life, constitutes her great temptation to vice. When a life of virtue brings poverty and suffering and unrequited toil, and a life of vice affords ease and luxury and wages without work, the temptation is too great. Our cities can not be purified until this great cause of impurity be removed. It can not be denied that there is force in this argument, and local and temporary changes in this respect

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might be an improvement; but no great or general change is probable or desirable. The laborer is worthy of his hire, and it is desirable that woman should receive according to the work she does. This must and will come to pass. But it is not desirable that woman should be driven to these trades to make her living. The world can not afford such an outlay. The only condition upon which woman can occupy these trades is, that she should relinquish her natural field of labor, the family circle, and leave her natural duties entirely undone. It is not desirable that the family interest should thus be sacrificed. Nor can any such employment be committed to women. It is the work of a life to carry on a trade and attain the highest excellence and success. Let a woman undertake for example the business of printing, and when prosperity crowns her efforts, her hand will be solicited and she will exchange her labor for more congenial employments. So it should be—so it will be. Women will enter these departments of labor and find employment, but they can not aspire to the more profitable stations in them, because to attain these is the work of a life and is inconsistent with marriage, an arrangement more important to the race than even the art of printing. There is some derangement in society when women in large numbers, are obliged to resort to permanent occupations of this kind to secure a livelihood. Where such an unnatural state of things exists, it is desirable that they should get employment and adequate wages. But my idea of well-ordered society is far different from this. My expectation is that as society advances, instead of finding more women in such stations we shall find fewer. Those who now look in vain for *employment* shall find a *home*. In proportion as vice is checked, families will multiply; and as families multiply, vice will be checked. The wages of women will then be raised, not by furnishing more varied employments for women, but by diminishing the number of those who need such employment. That form of society is not most favorable to virtue where women have ample employment, if that employment separates them from the privileges and duties of home. Of all instrumentalities aside from religion, the family influence is most potent in favor of virtue. We are sometimes referred to France and Paris, for evidence that women can be properly employed as artisans, and merchants. The reference is unfortunate. Of all countries in Christendom, France has suffered most from a lack of the family influ-

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ence, and of all cities on earth, Paris has been most deeply scourged for departing from this great law of nature. No, it ought to be understood that as a permanent arrangement, such a disposal of female labor is not desirable. It may be good for the present necessity in certain localities, but to dream of thus enlarging woman's sphere, and extending her usefulness and securing her independence, is a sad mistake. The true hope of woman and of the race is in the extension and elevation of the family arrangement. Anything less than this will not meet the necessity, and anything above it does not exist this side of Eden—nor even there; for in Eden it existed in its perfection, the first institution given from God to man.

But we must not forget the question of woman's relations to political life. Is the responsibility of voting one of woman's rights or duties? The argument in favor of woman's voting, stands thus: woman is a human being to all intents, purposes and constructions whatsoever. She is characterized by the attributes, and sustains the interests common to the race. Half of the responsibilities of society devolve on her. She is a subject of government, and depends on it for her welfare. It is a matter of as much concern to her that our civil institutions should be right as to any one, and she is as well qualified to understand what those institutions ought to be. If the attributes, the responsibilities, the interests and capabilities common to the race, confer the right, and impose the duty of voting, then to vote is both woman's right and duty. Such, in substance, is the argument of Miss Harriet Martineau: and no one ever stated it more ably than she.

I grant, at the outset, each and all of the facts alleged, and still deny that any or all of these can make it one's duty or right to vote. The right of voting is not inalienable—or one of our natural rights inseparable from humanity. It arises with circumstances, and ceases with circumstances. A government not democratic or representative, may still be legitimate. It is a man's duty to sustain such a government and submit to its laws, and yet the right of voting does not pertain to him. There are, or have been states of society where a popular government would be an impossibility. A monarchy is certainly legitimate there, and yet who has the right of voting under a monarchy? Take a purely democratic government, and there are classes of persons here possessing all the attributes of humanity, who

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have not the right of voting, and who, as all acknowledge, should not have. There are minors, or those who have not reached a certain age specified in the law of the land. Now these are human beings, and all natural rights pertain to them. Many, before they reach this lawful age, are as well qualified to exercise the right of suffrage as their elders; and yet the good of the whole requires that they should not vote, and therefore they have no right to vote; for no one has a right to do what it is not best should be done. It is right that foreigners should be excluded from the polls until they have had reasonable opportunity to learn the genius of the government and the responsibilities of citizenship; and yet many of these are as honest and as capable as the best of men. I adduce these instances to show that the right of voting depends on circumstances, that it pertains to some, and to some it does not pertain.

There are reasons why woman should not vote: not because she has not interests that government must provide for; not because she has not equal responsibilities with man; not because she is not capable: all these points are conceded. The reasons are: she is not to be a public character; her own taste and the world's taste are against it; voting will make her a public character. But all men that vote are not public characters. True, but all are liable to be. Woman is not to hold office; and yet the offices must go with the votes. It would be an unprecedented thing for a class of persons to have the right of voting, and still have no right to office. The two things must go together. In public conventions, where women vote, women are put on business committees, appointed moderators and secretaries. This is the natural result. So would it be in the affairs of state. I need not stop to argue the question in respect to woman's holding office. The thing is too unnatural to be dreamed of. But the voting itself is improper for woman. The polls are not her place. I can not prove it; the ultimate appeal must be to unperverted taste. On that taste the customs of society are built. What, up to this day, has kept woman from the polls? Is it the barbarous love of power on the part of man?—a fear that if the right of suffrage were extended to woman, she would wrest that power from him? I have heard such such reasons assigned. The thought is absurd. A regard to the sex is as natural to man as his breath. His self-respect requires that he should give woman the preference. No one to whom we think of ap-

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plying the name man, would hesitate a moment to disoblige himself to show his respect for woman. How is it that while he confers on her the best of other things, he withholds this inestimable privilege? Has there been a great caucus of the universal male sex, at which it was determined to perpetrate this outrage on the rights of woman? No such thing. Nature did the work before men were born. It is not man, but nature, that stands at the polls, and bids woman keep away; and "though you drive out nature with a pitch-fork, she'll come back again." Men and women may combine, and hold a caucus, and vote nature down; she'll not stay down.

There are reasons why woman should not vote aside from the intrinsic impropriety. It brings the excitement and animosities of political life to our homes and firesides. Either the man and his wife will agree in their political views or they will not agree. If they agree, then parties will stand as they now stand. The number of votes may be doubled; but what object would be gained? If there should be a political difference in the family, the result would be any thing but agreeable or salutary. It is not necessary to dwell upon it. The husband and wife may differ in their political views when the woman does not vote; but that difference has not the same point and edge as when they stand together at the polls, and commit themselves by their votes in open opposition to each other. You may say they ought to respect each other's opinions, and agree to disagree. So they ought, but the temptation is too strong: it would be an apple of discord thrown into the family circle. I do not present this as a sufficient reason for denying to woman the right of suffrage, but as one of the favorable results of the present order of things, and as an evidence that it is the order of nature. Political strife runs high enough, and its influence is wide enough, without our opening to it the penetralia of our homes, and enshrining it among our household treasures.

But it is argued that woman's influence is what is needed to check the extravagancies of party strife, and remove from politics its coarseness and bitterness. True, it is needed. But that influence ceases to be woman's influence, when she becomes a party in the conflict, and elbows her way to the polls. Woman's influence is potent and salutary in its place, but out of that place it is the coarsest of vulgar things. The question whether woman's influence would be happy

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in political life depends entirely upon the previous question whether political life is woman's place.

Those who urge this argument, are ignorant alike of history and of human nature. The most dangerous thing in personal differences, is *nerves*. Differences never result in quarrels and animosities without the aid of nerves. These are the combustibles which the friction inflames. It is well agreed that woman is more highly endowed with nerves than man, and a personal collision is to her a greater evil. Let me inquire, with all deference to woman, whether contests in which women are the principal parties, are wont to be conducted with less bitterness and hate, and with more coolness, reason and decency. The question may seem ungallant, but when truth is at stake, it must be asked and answered too. Experience on this point is uniform and undeviating. Excitements which distract churches and neighborhoods and families, are intense and fatal in proportion as women are involved in them. The reasons are complicated. The leading reason is that woman possesses a warmer sensibility, and kindles more easily than man with his cooler temperament. This is woman's highest charm, but constitutes her strong temptation in personal collision. Another reason is that men under such influences become unnaturally excited. They have, in addition to the ordinary influence, the extraordinary one which arises from sympathy with their wives. Men can often bear a direct assault with tolerable firmness, but when a woman appeals to them with trembling voice and tearful eye, they think they do well to be angry in her cause. Samson was strong before the Philistines, but he yielded his locks to Delilah. Add to this the fact that when women become interested in a quarrel, then the exciting cause is constantly operating. A man does not escape the tempest by retiring to his home. That home ought to be sacred to the rest and repose of the spirit. He ought to find there that which shall quiet a perturbed heart, and recall the feelings of kindness and good will; but if instead he meets an influence which shall urge him on more strongly in the conflict, then you may as well enthrone Turmoil at once, and make contention the great end of life. I will not specify: let each one consult his own experience, be it long or short. When a quarrel enters the domestic sanctum, and interests the female portion of a neighborhood, is it more or less disastrous? Are discussions more or less exciting in which woman largely participates? To take one

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instance, was that a week of remarkable quiet and deliberation and healthful feeling when Abby Kelly was the presiding genius in a public discussion here? Do not understand me as presenting her as a fair specimen of female character. She is a specimen of what woman becomes when out of her place. Even *Stephen Foster* owned himself outdone, and acknowledged that his wife surpassed him in the sharpness of her words and the bitterness of her denunciations. Interrogate history. Its answer is unambiguous. Read the records of the revolutions in France. Of all the outrages which have been perpetrated, there you will find those the most loathsome in their detail in which women most largely participated. Of all the political clubs which disgraced human nature by their orgies, those of the women are most conspicuous there; and the crowning mob in that city of mobs, was made up of ten thousand women, who went out to Versailles bent upon tearing the Queen in pieces. True, these were not respectable women; but women in general cease to be respectable when they trample on their nature and forget the proprieties of their sex. No, instead of securing a healthful influence by introducing this new element into politics, you will heat up the furnace of political strife seven times hotter than it is wont to be heated, and it is no heavenly form that will be seen walking in the midst of the fire.

While truth requires this statement, it is still true, that of all the influences which tend to allay excitements and quell the storms of political life, the influence of woman stands first and foremost. Without this, the world would be indeed a Golgotha—a place of skulls. The great conservative element of society is the family arrangement. If the world's strife is ever calmed, and wars are made to cease from under the whole heaven, it will be because the influence of home is extended and elevated. Upon woman devolves the great responsibility in this matter. It is her character and power that make the home.

We are ready then for the conclusion, that whatever may be woman's right or duty, an active participation in political life is neither the one nor the other.

But is not great injustice done by such an arrangement? Ought not woman's interests to be represented in the government? They are represented, and just as well as if woman deposited the vote with her own hand. Woman has no interests separate from the interests of the family,

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and of that family the man is the proper representative. The great object of the popular vote is to have all interests represented in the government. This is secured by giving the right of suffrage to every male over twenty-one years of age. Children are not wronged thereby, for every child is represented by his father or his guardian. Women are not wronged thereby, for every woman is represented by a father, a husband, a brother, or a son. I confess that my sympathies have never been moved by the cry that has been raised in reference to woman's disfranchisement. When all other wrongs have been redressed, the Millenium will come, even if this matter should not be mended. Those who have mounted this Rozinante of reform, will find themselves riding a Gilpin race,

"And where they did at first get up, They will again get down."

But some reply, if all these things be true, how limited is woman's sphere, and how contemptible the part she must act! I answer, the field is wide enough for her usefulness, if not for her ambition. If her ambition is to be useful, then it is wide enough for ambition and usefulness both. There is no greater delusion than the fancy that one's usefulness is proportioned to his notoriety. Only a few of the human family can be noted, but are they all doomed to a life of uselessness therefore? The ideas which have been presented do not limit woman's influence but they pertain to the manner in which that influence shall be exerted. I regard home as her domain, because any other plan curtails her influence, and robs the world of the good which she, and no other being, has power to accomplish.

Young women in a course of education, and before entering upon domestic life as principals, sometimes aspire to public stations, upon the mistaken notion that the more public their duties are, the greater good they do. If they could engage in some interesting school, or become authoresses and write some useful book, they would feel that they were not living in vain; but to spend years in acquiring an education, and then to bury themselves in domestic cares forgotten and unknown—the prospect is too dismal—better to die at once. There is involved in this a great misapprehension as to the relative importance of these different occupations. A young woman engaged in teaching, flatters herself that she is in a more useful station than her sister who has taken her place in the family circle; and the chief ground of her judgment is that she is brought in contact with more

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minds. Let me recommend to that young woman, after continuing her school a week, to leave it and take another; and thus never allow herself to devote more than a week to one set of scholars. A further improvement would be to have several schools in operation at once, and devote an hour a day to each. Thus her sphere of influence would be greatly extended, and the number of minds with which she comes in contact greatly multiplied. Herein lies the fallacy in all such reasonings. The amount of good done is measured by the number who are influenced; whereas influence has depth and duration as well as superficial extension. An influence to be deep and permanent, and all controlling, must be confined to a few objects. God has given power to no mortal man to exert a permanent and all-controlling influence over a multitude of his fellow creatures. The stake would be too great. He has given to each the privilege of influencing powerfully a few—or of influencing a multitude slightly. We have then this choice—to extend our influence superficially at the sacrifice of its depth, or to limit it to a few objects and make it permanent and controlling. This is an unvarying principle, and applies to all pursuits from the fireside to the throne.

The economy of the Creator's arrangements is a matter of universal admiration. How happens it that by a law of nature such narrow limits are set to the family circle. If woman must be employed at home, why not give her work according to her strength, and make each family a congregation, where she might preach without impropriety, as every mother may to her children? You answer, food and clothing must be provided for their bodies, and every mother's physical powers are taxed to the limit of endurance to supply these material wants. I ask again, why are these powers so disproportioned to each other that while her hands are occupied her mind is unemployed? Be assured there is no such want of adaptation. The mother in the midst of her children finds her heart as busy as her hands—and if she possessed an angel's soul she would still feel only competent to her task. Nature's limits to the family record are well appointed, with a careful adjustment of the work to be done and the power to do. That wife and mother who thinks her household cares beneath her capacity and fancies that she was made for some great thing, is engaged in a work far above her powers, not merely of accomplishment, but even of apprehension. Let her eyes be opened like those of Eli-

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sha's servant, and if we ever hear her complain again, it will not be for want of work to do but of power to do it.

Of all human influences what is most potent in forming character? What influence has been most important to each of us in making us what we are? The unhesitating reply is, the influence of home. All other influences combined will not compare with this? And what makes home? The answer is just as clear—the home is where the mother is, whether it be a palace or a prison. Not that woman's influence is all that is needed there, but there is no home without it. Who was Washington's school mistress? Doubtless a worthy dame. I never heard a word against her. Who was his preacher? Musty records might tell—nought else can. But Washington's mother is as immortal as her son. It was just as important that Washington should have a mother as that the world should have a Washington; and the work of being Washington's mother was as truly exalted as that of being Washington himself.

When people seek for distinction and immortality they they often misjudge as widely as when they hunt for usefulness. Ask, who built the pyramids? and even hoary-headed history is dumb with ignorance. Inquire, who poured the ointment on the Savior's head, and anointed him for his burial? and millions of *children's* voices will echo the reply, and "wherever this gospel is preached under the whole heaven there also shall that which this woman hath done be told as a memorial of her."

I may allude to the life of the mother in Israel * who once dwelt among us, and whom God hath lately called to her rest. Though early left a widow, the sole dependence of her fatherless children, she did not yield to despondency nor repine at the lot which Heaven had assigned her. Earnestly she toiled and prayed till her children had reached maturity and were prosperously settled in life—the reward of her efforts and her faith. But her work was not yet done. She came among us to stand by the bed-side of her dying daughter, and opened her arms to receive the babes that the mother might die in peace. She went in and out among us, almost the impersonation of goodness and benevolence. Her gentle words fell softly on the ear of suffering and her cheerful countenance gave strength to the faint-hearted. There are students that will long remember the hand that spread

* Mrs. Tupper.

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their couch in sickness and bathed the fevered brow as none but a mother's could. They will mention her name with gratitude to their children and their children's children, when names more prominent have been forgotten. We may gather lessons from her life and from her death, and "being dead she speaks." Call such a life a hard one if you will, but oh, call it not a useless one, lest Heaven in wrath assign to others the work which you have no heart to do.

The uneasiness which women sometimes feel in reference to what they regard as their contracted sphere, comes if at all, in early life, before they can well understand the objects of their being. Every cultivated human soul in passing from the outward tendencies of childhood to the outward tendencies of maturer years, passes through what may be called the zero point of its activity—a period of introversion. The soul turns in upon itself and inquires, for what was I made? It becomes conscious of powers which ally it to the Infinite—of "thoughts that wander through eternity," and begins to demand an object upon which those powers and thoughts may be employed. The young man easily finds that object. The busy world opens a thousand paths before him. But woman's work is all unseen. Like the kingdom of heaven, it cometh not with observation. The "lo here," the "lo there," is apt to be a false announcement—an ignis fatuus gleaming through the murky atmosphere of our imperfect social state, rather than the calm and steady light which leads woman to her home. The more strongly a young woman feels the want of an object for life, the more she is tempted to embrace some modern notion of woman's sphere, if it presents that object in a more tangible form.

The peculiarity of our institution is, that the sexes are educated together. It is a peculiarity with which we could not dispense. The reciprocal influence is salutary and elevating. The temptations from within and without, to which one is exposed in passing through a course of education, are thus greatly diminished, and the advantages are greatly increased. If there be any evil to which we are liable in pursuance of this plan, may it not be this—a tendency on the part of young women to become dissatisfied with the work which Heaven has appointed them? This may be only a fancy of my own, but the thought has at times occurred to me. I have no fear that the evil will become marked, or extended. Nature is stronger than a false idea. The danger is not that

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any false notion on this point will become generally prevalent, but that in particular cases the misapprehension may lead in a wrong direction and end in disappointment and mortification. The young men and the young women pursue the same studies, recite in the same recitation room, and listen to the same lectures. There is a difference however. In those exercises which have for their direct object a preparation for public speaking and for public life the ladies take no part. It seems difficult for some to undersand the reason of this. Shall any one say to the expanding and aspiring soul, thus far shalt thou go and no farther? While most admit the propriety of the arrangement, there are others who long to see this wall of partition between the sexes broken down. They deem it a relic of superstition, dishonorable, so far as it goes, to the institution and to those who sustain it. There has been an effort from time to time to have a change in this respect. Why shall not the young ladies take part in the discussions and declamations of their classes? Why shall they not read their own essays at the public rhetorical exercises? Why not before the assembled thousands on commencement day? Young ladies read in the same church, at the same stand, before an audience almost as large, the day before commencement—why not on commencement day? Does not consistency require an advance in this direction? To all this I answer, there is a difference between the sexes in their tendencies and in the immediate objects of their lives—a difference traced by God's own hand. It is no part of our business to undo the work which he has done. He has destined female mind for a specific sphere of action. For one, I could not cheerfully bear a part in a system of female education which is false to nature and blots out God's hand-writing. It is better to aim at consistency with truth than consistency with ourselves. If consistency requires us to go forward and remove the distinctions which remain, then decency requires us to go backward. Propriety is a jewel of far higher value than consistency. Let us aim, then, at propriety and leave consistency to take care of itself. The design of the institution is to educate both sexes in the best possible manner. This requires that they should be educated not as one sex, but with due regard to the necessities and prospective sphere of each; and any arrangement which is necessary to maintain this distinction, is the demand both of duty and of decency.

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If I might offer a word of counsel to a young lady in a course of education, not as an instructor, but as a brother, I would say, cultivate to the utmost the faculties you have, and never fear lest your education may be thrown away because of the limited sphere assigned your sex. Your sphere seems contracted only because you view it from a distance. Enter the hallowed circle and as you approach the center the circumference recedes. Follow with your eye the distant outline, and awe-struck you will observe that it crosses the bourne of time and is lost in the unseen world beyond. With such a view you will not wonder for what your powers were given you, nor inquire why years should be devoted to their education.

Remember then that woman's lot is on you, lest, if you forget it now, you may one day learn it and regret the error with bitterness of heart. If that lot seems to you a cheerless portion, destitute of objects of interest and effort, inquire of your mother who watches your footsteps with an interest a guardian angel might feel, and lives a new life in the life and happiness of every child of hers. Inquire of your mother as she is ready perhaps to lie down in an early grave, exhausted with the labors and anxieties and sufferings which she has borne, not merely without complaint, but cheerfully and gratefully. If the lot seems too hard and the burden greater than you can bear, then learn self-denial of the Captain of your salvation, and as you deliver up your trust to Him you shall receive the highest praise which mortal ever received from Him—"She hath done what she could."

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EXEGESIS OF 1 CORINTHIANS, XIV., 34, 35; AND 1 TIMOTHY, II., 11, 12.

BY MISS ANTOINETTE L. BROWN.

"Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but *they are commanded* to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn any thing, let them ask their husbands at home; for it is a shame for women to speak in the church."

"Let the women learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence."

It is not proposed at the present time to discuss the question of the propriety or the expediency of woman's becoming a public teacher, nor to enquire whether it would be at all consistent with her nature and her relations to be engaged to any extent in public life; but simply to examine what has been supposed to be the Bible prohibition against this, and to ascertain if possible the real meaning of the inspired teacher. Before entering upon a direct examination of these passages, it will however be proper to inquire whether there is *that* in the nature of things, which makes it wrong, *per se*, for woman to engage in public teaching.

If there is nothing intrinsically wrong in this, then circumstances *may* make it right and even duty for her to become a public instructor; and no universal rule could be given prohibiting this. If it *is wrong per se*, then God Himself could not make it *right;* and we are driven to the necessity of maintaining that none of the ancient prophetesses were called of the Lord to become teachers of Israel. This is a proposition which no believer in revelation would think of assuming. We are then led directly to inquire in regard to the *limit* of the apostolic doctrine on this subject.

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Whatever may have been the meaning of his teachings, the question still arises, were they designed alone for the Corinthian women, and for those females who were under the pastoral charge of Timothy, or were they given as universal principles, binding upon all nations, in all ages?

Undoubtedly, unless we have some good *reason* for limiting their application—something in the nature of those principles as connected with the circumstances of the persons to whom they were immediately delivered, which renders them inapplicable to the rest of the world, the very fact of their having been handed down to us as a revelation, is *prima facie* evidence of their universality. Besides, the very nature of a moral law or principle is such, that it must be applicable to all moral agents; and though its letter may change indefinitely with the circumstances, its spirit is unchangeable. St. Paul may have given directions to the Corinthian females in regard to their *manner* of doing things, as he did in the 11th chapter of his epistle, or he may even have commanded them to abstain from eating *meat offered to idols*, if it caused their brethren to offend; but he has no where indicated that *these* were the reasons for his directions in the passages under consideration.

From what other source then, can we gather such a conclusion? Surely I know of none, and can give no good reason why the inspired apostle did not say, "let your women keep silence in the churches," as much to the females of the 19th century, as to those who lived in the first dawning of the Christian era.

Furthermore, since spiritual gifts were so abundantly bestowed upon the Corinthian church, and also upon Christians generally at that time; since the Spirit of the Lord rested upon the people of God in such a peculiar manner, as it seldom has done either before or since that period, and since the inspired writer himself tells us, Acts ii., 16, 17, that this was that which was spoken by the prophet Joel, "And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams: And on my servants and on my *handmaidens* I will pour out in those days of my Spirit; and they shall prophesy;" and since we know from Acts xxi. 9, and from the eleventh chapter of 1 Cor., that females were accustomed to act as prophetesses in those days, evidently too, under the direct sanction of the

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apostles, we certainly have not a shadow of a reason for believing with many of the new school interpreters of these passages that it was inexpedient and therefore unlawful for the women of that age to speak in the church, while, from a change of circumstances, it has become at the present day, entirely proper, right, and even necessary to the promotion of the best interests of society.

If the circumstances of this latter age, in which the truths of Christianity are so fully substantiated and so generally prevalent, thus diminishing the necessity for public instruction, when compared with that day of inspiration and prophetic vision, leave us to draw any inference of that nature, the conclusion must be the direct opposite of that which has been drawn. *They* had many reasons for acting as instructors of the people which *we* can not have. They often received truth direct from the lips of the Most High, and they knew the doctrine whereof they affirmed was infallible. *We* can have no advantage over *them*, but that of superior general intelligence, and this consideration is overbalanced by the fact that our auditors have been making equal advancement.

To assume that the apostle commanded those women to abstain from public teaching, lest it should prove a stumbling block on account of the Jewish and Gentile prejudices of the surrounding nations, is entirely unwarrantable; for degraded as was the social position of women in most respects, there were and always had been prophetesses in the Jewish church, and the priestesses of the heathen deities had been uttering their mysterious oracles from time immemorial. Let us, if we please, consider this as one of the manifestations of their barbarism, and place in opposition to it all the superior refinement of modern times; but let us not from such premises, draw the diametrically opposite conclusions, either that females were permitted to be prophetic teachers to the people on account of their ignorance, and the hardness of their hearts; or, on the other hand, that they were forbidden by the apostle to teach in their social meetings, because the world had not yet made sufficient advancement to appreciate such a dispensation. There *is nothing* in the *circumstances* which does not make the rule here laid down by the apostle universally obligatory. If it was wrong for them to teach in public, it is wrong for us; and if it was right for them, so far at least as this rule is concerned, it is right for us.

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It becomes us then to inquire carefully into the real purport of his directions. It has generally been maintained that the doctrine taught in the 14th of Corinthians and the 2d of Timothy are identical, and that the sacred writer is guarding against the same evils and abuses, in the two passages; and though this is to me by no means evident, because they are usually supposed to refer to the same thing, I shall treat of them in connection, but will consider them separately. One word more by way of introduction. It is not now designed to say anything in reference to those clauses which relate to obedience and subjection, any farther than is necessary to the explanation of such phrases of the passages as are supposed to militate against public teaching.

"Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak: but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home; for it is a shame for women to speak in the church."

On entering upon this exegesis, it will be proper to enquire into the meaning of some of the terms here employed, as used in the original. First, let us look at the word *lalein*, translated "to speak." What is its use in classic Greek? It is defined in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, "to talk, chatter, babble; strictly to make a babbling, prattling sound, as monkeys and dogs; hence also of birds, locusts, to twitter, chirp."

Its primary signification seems to have been, to use the voice, whether of man or of irrational beings, and hence, from its application to this class of subjects, it naturally came to be used in reference to idle talk, chattering, babbling. It will be admitted that this is its general use in classic authors. A single example will illustrate. It is quoted by Plutarch from one of the old poets. He says, "*lalein aristos, adunatotatos legein*," "skillful to talk, the most unskillful to talk sense."

Now the question arises, has this word materially changed its signification as used in the New Testament? Robinson, in his New Testament lexicon, defines it, "to speak, to talk, to use the voice without any reference to the words spoken." Used in reference to children, "to talk much, to prattle. In the N. T. generally, to speak, to talk; less frequently in profane writers." Then under a second head he gives us the word as "modified by the context where the sense lies not so much in *lalein* as in its adjuncts, for example, of one

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teaching, for to teach) to preach," and under this head he refers to this 14th chapter of 1 Corinthians, 34, 35 verses. The definitions in other Greek Testament lexicons do not materially differ from these, and it is evident the lexicographers have about the same view of the passage under consideration.

Now it must be true, from the nature of the subjects treated of by the sacred writers, that the word in the New Testament does generally mean "to speak, to talk," that is, it refers to sounds made by the human voice, but it must also be true, that if Christ and his disciples had been treating of the whining and barking of dogs, the chattering of magpies, and the croaking of frogs, *laleo* would have been the term used, since there is no other in the Greek language which so accurately expresses the idea. Because their writings were confined almost exclusively to mankind, the term could not be employed by them except in this connection; and as the topics were generally of a grave and important character, bearing the interests of a universe upon their solemn precepts, the idea of light and babbling talk, must be discordant, and inappropriate: so, from the very nature of the subjects, it *was* chiefly made to signify mere speaking, or using of the voice, leaving it for the context to determine the purport of the *laleo*. This, from the peculiarity of the word could not be otherwise; and yet there was no real change in its signification. The idea of idle talk, prating, babbling, &c., was still retained, wherever from the nature of the case it was allowable, and, indeed, even the profane writers had no other license than this, the precise meaning attached by them to this term being always indicated by some attendant circumstance.

Let us now refer to a few passages, as examples of St. Paul's method of using this word, and we shall then see from the connection, he evidently intends to include other ideas than that of mere speaking. In 1 Cor. ix., 8, he says, "say (*lalo*) I these things as a man? or saith (*legei*) not the law the same also?" thus evidently contrasting the vain irresponsible words of human teaching, and the sure precepts of the law. Again, 1 Tim. v, 13, "tattlers also, and busy-bodies, *speaking* things which they ought not. Also 1 Cor. xiii., 11. "When I was a child, I spake as a child." 2 Cor. xi., 17, 21, 23. "That which I speak, I speak not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly, in this confidence of boasting. I speak as a fool. I speak foolishly, &c." In

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all these places this word is used, and without doubt it is employed with a signification like that in classic Greek, to be loquacious, prattle, talk unwisely, inconsiderately.

Now what do Robinson, and the commentators of the old school find in the context of this 14th chapter, which compels them to attach to this word the idea of teaching or preaching? That it may sometimes acquire that signification from some attendant circumstance, there can be no question, as for example, in Luke v. 4. "And He sat down, and taught the people out of the ship. Now when He had left *speaking*, (*lalon*,) He said unto Simon, Launch out into the deep;" — that is, when He had ceased teaching, of course, as it refers directly back to the preceding word, *edidaskein*. Then, if in the passage under consideration, there is any such necessary reference to something in the connection which means to teach, why then teaching must be prohibited to women; or, if on the other hand, there is any other modifying circumstance which so influences this word as to give a peculiar turn to its signification, then the apostolic doctrine must be interpreted accordingly. Again, if the connection plainly shows that the word here means simply to speak, to use the voice, without any reference to the words spoken, then all the vocal exercises of the church must be unlawful to females, and a manifest violation of this precept.

These three cases will cover all possible interpretations of the passage. We will examine each separately; but first let us inquire in regard to some of the external circumstances connected with the Corinthian church in apostolic days.

It was composed of both Jews and Gentiles, the latter comprising by far the greater number. All were but recently converted to the Christian religion. They were still under the influence of former impressions, habits, and prejudices, and when enlightened in regard to anything upon which they had formerly been in error, they seem to be greatly inclined to go over into an opposite extreme; hence the apostle is constantly warning them against their excesses, irregularities, and unwarrantable liberties, throughout both his epistles.

This has always been the tendency of human nature, and we might predict with a natural certainty, such a result, in regard to any class of persons placed in a similar position; so that even if the voice of history had been silent upon

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this point, we might still calculate upon the fact. But happily this was not so; and the Corinthians, who of all others most abounded in spiritual gifts, are found to have been unusually faulty in this respect, and to have sustained that reputation at a still later day, as will be seen by examining any of the early church histories.

Particularly must this have been true of the women, as they were the more ignorant and degraded class. The Jewish females had been brought up under the influence of their time-honored maxim, that whoever would teach the law to a woman was a fool, and of course were most deplorably ignorant of every thing connected even with their former faith; while the Gentile women were lifted from the abject degradation to which heathenism has always subjected its female victims. Now they were all quickened and regenerated by the Spirit of truth. They had received the adoption whereby they were permitted to cry Abba, Father; and they were taught that there was now no longer Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, male nor female; for they were all one in Christ Jesus.

No wonder, then, introduced as they were into a new world of thought and feeling, that their ardent, susceptible temperament should often hurry them forward with a zeal which was not according to knowledge, and often occasion improper and disorderly conduct, from which nothing but the restraining influences of the Spirit of the Most High could deliver them.

That they were not withheld from these evils, is abundantly evident from the writings of the apostle Paul; and that to err in that direction was a common fault of the females of that age, must necessarily be inferred from the continued council and reproof, administered to them wherever instructions were given to any new organization of Christians: and yet this fact has been greatly overlooked in explaining the nature of the duties and relations every where so strenuously insisted upon by the epistolary writers of the inspired volume, and also in accounting for the reason why these subjects were introduced so much more frequently in this, than in any other portion of the Bible. With these facts distinctly before our minds, let us now look at the context in which this passage is found.

What is the subject treated of in this connection? and what abuses is the apostle here laboring to rectify? The whole chapter is taken up with spiritual gifts, and the im-

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proper exercise of the liberty connected with those gifts, occasioning noise and confusion in the church, and thus bringing disgrace and reproach upon the cause of Christ, and retarding the very ends they were anxious to secure. He speaks first of the nature of gifts, and then reproves them severely for a wrong exercise of them, and lays down rules to regulate their conduct in future. There is nothing in the chapter until we come to the 34th verse, which could lead us to suppose his teaching was not to the whole church, and just as much to the females as to the males. It is true he addresses them as brethren, and so almost the whole Bible is delivered to the brethren. The masculine names and pronouns are used almost exclusively, and yet no one will think of applying to woman only those portions of the sacred word which are addressed immediately to females; else she has indeed a miserably deficient revelation. We are of course then to conclude, as has been already remarked, that the instructions of the Bible apply equally to all mankind, unless there is something in the nature of the circumstances or of the subject, which makes it appropriate only to a certain class.

Now if there is any thing in the doctrine of the 34th and 35th verses which does not harmonize with the rest of the chapter, when applied to the *same individuals*, then we must suppose this portion relates to the females, and the other to the males; but if the doctrine is essentially the same, and only applied in a different direction to the women on account of their peculiar liability to err in that direction, then we have not the shadow of a reason for supposing the first part of the chapter, as well as the five succeeding verses, does not apply to the whole church.

Now let us inquire what there is in the context which gives *lalein* the signification *to teach*. What adjuncts do we find here which so modify it, and affix to it that particular meaning? The apostle is not talking about *teaching* at all. To be sure the design of exercising spiritual gifts, is for edification and instruction; but the subject here is the *abuse* of those gifts, and the improper manner in which, in connection with them, they conducted church exercises. Then, if for a woman to teach in the church is an abuse of this character, and if, "since the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets," it is wrong for her to exercise even the prophetic gift by teaching in public, then certainly it was appropriate for the inspired teacher to include *this* in his category of improprieties.

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But the word *lalein* can not possibly mean *to teach*, unless it obtains that signification from something external to itself. Then which are the adjuncts, I ask again, from which it derives that meaning? There is not a single expression in the whole chapter, nor the slightest intimation of any thing in the context, or in the known relations of the parties from which, by any logical or possible deduction I can affix to the word here used such a definition; and unless it arose from what has been supposed to be a parallel passage in the letter to Timothy, where the apostle does say, I suffer not a woman to teach, I am wholly at a loss to account for the manner in which that idea could have crept into the connection, and been so generally received.

The instruction given to Timothy will be examined in its place, and as we shall then see, it contains no prohibition of this character.

We are then driven to the necessity of assuming one of the two remaining positions: *lalein* is to be taken in its absolute sense, thus making the apostle prohibit to woman all talking, or using of the voice in the church, or we must suppose it to be modified by some attendant circumstance. The first of these suppositions will exclude woman from the privilege of praying audibly, speaking, and even singing in the social meetings of the assembled church. It must be a universal rule, and it involves the absurdity of making a violation of it wrong *per se*, thus either contradicting portions of the sacred volume, or reducing it to entire nonsense. But this interpretation has already become obsolete, and few persons at the present day are willing to be its advocates. Indeed it never has been received in its legitimate bearings, for the church has never yet been able to dispense with the female voice in its solemn hymn of praise. Equally happy is the inconsistency of some of the more liberal theorists, who have maintained that public teaching is here prohibited to woman, and yet have been unwilling to repress the low voice of supplication at the throne of grace, and the thrilling relation of experience on the part of their Christian sisters, and so have been compelled, notwithstanding the apostolic injunction that *all things* should done to edifying, virtually to adopt as their definition of this same phrase, to teach, talking from a text and delivering formal lectures.

We will, then, look for something in the context to give us the true idea of what it was the apostle prohibited to those females. He says, "Let your women keep silence in

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the churches, *for* it is not permitted unto them to speak." This silence, therefore, though it may possibly be considered as opposed to the noise and confusion occasioned by the commingling of so many different gifts, is evidently more directly opposed to *lalein*, which must be *some kind of talking* which was *not profitable* to the church.

There is nothing in the word *sigatosan*, to keep silence. which need in any language mean absolute stillness, or cessation from all sound. On the contrary, from the nature of the idea expressed by this term, it is generally used in reference to some particular thing, and then it necessarily expresses a resting from that thing; but it never implies perfect stillness, unless used in opposition to all sound. In this connection it is not contrasted with anything except *lalein*, and therefore gives directions to abstain from nothing else; unless, indeed, we include the abuses he had just been specifying, and of course, ladies are not expected to counteract the influence of the brethren in their efforts to maintain good order in the congregation.

In the 35th verse, the apostle says, "If they will learn any thing, let them ask their husbands at home, for (because) it is a shame for women to speak in the church." Here then is a *clew*, which will guide us to the meaning of the word *lalein*. The women are represented as ignorant, and desiring to be instructed. It is assumed also that their husbands and male friends are capable of giving this instruction, and they are directed not to ask for the desired information in the church, but to wait till an opportunity is afforded for doing so in private. This, considering their circumstances at the time, was a regulation of the greatest importance. They were discussing interesting questions, and revealing new and absorbing truths; hence to be continually interrupted by inquiries and idle remarks, which perhaps were foreign to the point, must occasion unpleasant digressions, and destroy the interest, causing confusion and disorder—an evil of such a nature as not to be tolerated, when it could be remedied at so small a sacrifice of personal convenience.

The apostle does not reprove them for being desirous to obtain information. He only tells them kindly to wait and ask their husbands at home. This was demanded by the greatest good of the church, and therefore required by the law of disinterested benevolence.

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Asking ill-timed questions, then, certainly was one thing which was prohibited—prohibited too, for the same reason that he censured them for the improper use of spiritual gifts. It was a stone of stumbling to strangers, not calculated to do them good; and it made God the author of confusion. With this view of the subject, we must therefore infer that *lalein* includes *all* irrelevant speaking, as this of course would fall under the same condemnation. Whatever was not calculated to instruct and benefit the congregation, had no right to a place in their public assemblies, and it must be given up by all who would be the disciples of Him who was meek and lowly in heart, in the same spirit which characterized their divine Master, even though this must be done at the sacrifice of a lesser individual interest. Who could find fault with such a precept, and who supposes St. Paul would sanction irregularities of this nature, especially if they were bringing dishonor upon the cause of Christ? We should expect, *a priori*, that the apostle would declare it "*a shame* for women to *lalein* in the church." Yet this interpretation is not only required by the connection, but as we have already seen, it is exactly what we must necessarily expect under the circumstances. Degraded as the early Christian females had been, and ignorant as they still were, when permitted to take part in their meetings, they would naturally say things entirely out of place, and doubtless, sometimes, too, they would do this in such a spirit as would make it necessary for the inspired teacher to insert in his writings such a clause as that in the last of the 45th verse, "to be under obedience, as also saith the law."

This exegesis makes the passage have nothing whatever to do with the question of public teaching. The females were not forbidden to take part in the work of instructing the church, of speaking, "either by revelation, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine," or of doing any thing else which they had the wisdom and ability to do, "to edification, and exhortation, and comfort:" and moreover, as we have already seen, being taught by the Spirit of the mighty God, they did actually take part in these exercises. They were reproved for nothing but pernicious customs which existed among them, and they were commanded to abstain from nothing except those practises which were not calculated to cause "all things to be done decently and in order."

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What is there in this interpretation which is forced, or unnatural, or not in harmony with other Bible doctrines, or not in accordance with the *usus loquendi* of the Greek language.

We will now turn to a consideration of the remaining passage which is also quoted as a proof text against woman's becoming a public teacher. The whole burden of the epistle to Timothy is to give instruction in regard to the nature of pastoral duties, and to point out the various Christian graces and qualifications which he must labor to secure in the different members of his congregation. To this end the apostle commences almost at the beginning of his epistle, to give directions in regard to the duties and relations of women, thus condemning certain practices, which, evidently were prevalent among them. He says, "In like manner, also, that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shamefacedness and sobriety; not with broidered hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array; but (which becometh women professing godliness,) with good works. Let the women learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence."

It will be clearly seen from the internal evidence of this passage, taken in the connection in which it occurs, that it can not have been given to instruct them in regard to their apparel and manner in *public alone*, but it must have referred to their general walk, and was particularly applicable to private life. Nothing has been said or intimated, either in the verses quoted, or in the context, which could lead us to suppose that the teaching here referred to was confined to public life—to public assemblies. Why then should we regard it as applying exclusively to lecturing and preaching? Where do we find any evidence that it was intended to be thus restricted in its application? The apostle says unqualifiedly, "I suffer not a woman to teach or to usurp authority over the man;" and this instruction is to be taken without limitation. If he has directed her not to instruct a public assembly, he has also commanded her not to teach in the Sabbath school—in the social circle, or in the nursery. Shall we then admit the supposition that the inspired writer has forbidden woman to instruct even her own children, and that he has entirely prohibited her from acting as a teacher, considering it alto-

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gether *unwomanly* for her to guide even the most ignorant heathen to the fountain of true wisdom.

No one ever thought of assuming such a position. It is too repugnant both to reason and common sense, and besides to be obedient to such a requirement would be a natural impossibility. What then are we to do with this word *didaskein*, the usual signification of which is, to teach, instruct, &c.? Evidently exactly what we do in interpreting all documents whatever. Look at the connection in which it is found, and since words in all languages have various significations, see what particular meaning is here required.

The apostle is speaking of certain relations of the sexes to each other, and he insists that to teach and to usurp authority over man, are inconsistent with the character of females. On the contrary, he says, they are to learn in silence, with all subjection. It is not necessary here to inquire minutely into the nature of the subjection spoken of, as, whatever other elements it *may* contain, it certainly *must* include a meek, submissive, teachable, Christ-like spirit, which is the opposite of usurping authority. The silence referred to must also be something which is in harmony with this spirit of subjection, and opposed to its opposite.

But let us look more carefully at the phrase, Let your women learn in silence. This certainly can not be a silence which prohibits the asking of questions, as the apostle has expressly declared this to be a privilege of females; and it is ridiculous to suppose it requires them to be perfectly still and noiseless, as though they were hardly to be permitted to draw a long breath during the time they were allowed this unspeakable privilege of receiving instruction.

How could the acquisition of knowledge be at all secured unless the females were permitted, under proper circumstances, and in an appropriate manner, to converse freely upon all subjects on which they would be informed, to express their opinions, and if it is supposable that they might have any new ideas which had never been developed in the minds of their male friends, to really convey instruction by the expression of those ideas?

This silence then, must refer to a quiet, teachable spirit—that state of mind which is attentive, willing to listen and learn, and entirely opposed to the arrogance and self-confidence, which would very naturally influence persons who had just begun to drink at the Pierian fountain, and had

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not yet learned that its depths were inexhaustible. A few passages to illustrate the New Testament usage of this word *esuchia*, may not be inappropriate. In 2 Thess. 3: 11, 12, St. Paul says, "For we hear that there are some which walk among you disorderly, working not at all, but are busy-bodies. Now them that are such we commend and exhort by our Lord Jesus Christ, that with (*esuchia*,) quietness they work, and eat their own bread." Here the word is used in opposition to all kinds of disorderly conduct, and evidently refers to a state of tranquillity.

Again, in Acts 12: 2, we are told, "And when they heard that he spake in the Hebrew tongue to them, they kept the more (*esuchia*,) silence, that is, they were the more quiet and attentive listeners. The word is derived from *esuchos*, which means quiet, tranquil, and it still retains the definitions of its primitive in all the lexicons. This is the state of mind which the apostle instructs Timothy; to insist upon as essential in regard to the females of his congregation. But he says, "I suffer not a woman to teach." We have already seen that this word *didaskein* can not be taken in its usual sense, since it is impossible, as well as undesirable, for woman to cease to be a teacher, in a private sphere.

It must then be taken in a *bad sense*, as condemning something which is unwomanly or un-christian. That this word is sometimes used in this way, will be evident from the following passages: "Whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not."—*Titus* 1: 11. Here the apostle does not direct Titus to stop the mouths of these unruly talkers because they had no *right to teach*, but because their teachings were of such a character as would subvert whole houses, doing incalculable mischief. Again, Rev. 2: 20: "Notwithstanding I have a few things against thee, because thou sufferest that woman Jezebel, which calleth herself a prophetess, to teach and to seduce my servants to commit fornication. The meaning of *didaskein* here is similar to that in the former passage, and so far is the inspired writer from condemning them for suffering Jezebel to teach, because as a woman she had no right to be a teacher, that he represents her as being able more effectually to accomplish her wicked ends, by *calling* herself a *prophetess*, thus implying that there *were true prophetesses*—teachers whose character she had impiously assumed.

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But the word *didaskein* must not only be taken in a bad sense, but it must also be opposed to *esuchia*, or that quiet, tranquil, peaceful state of mind which indicates true Christian subjection. It is connected with usurping authority, and evidently includes a dictatorial, self-important, overbearing manner of teaching, which was far from salutary in its influence. The idea of tutoring, dictating, directing, is often included in the word *didasko*, both in a good and a bad sense. As examples of the latter, we will quote Rev. 2: 14: "I have a few things against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of Israel." Also Acts 21: 18: "This is the man that teacheth all men every where *against* the people and the law and this place. In this category we must then place the *kind* of teaching prohibited by the apostle.

Here we may again appeal to the united testimony of history and human nature, to substantiate the fact that the females of the primitive church were greatly faulty in this respect; and that their inordinate love of power and want of meekness, was entirely at variance with the great law of love, and was worthy of the severe rebuke which it every where receives from the inspired penman. Now because the women of that, or of any other age of the church, who had been kept in an ignorant, degraded and un-christian subjection, when placed suddenly upon the gospel platform of equality, should be led into the snare of the adversary, and attempt to *teach over man*, and usurp authority over him, thus deserving the reproof and exhortation of their instructors; therefore to infer that woman may not teach at all, even though she might have truths to deliver which would be for the edification of the church, is certainly very illogical.

The apostle does strictly prohibit *that* kind of teaching, and if there had been no explicit direction upon this subject, it would still be forbidden by the spirit of the entire gospel. He does also, as we have seen in the passage first considered, give instructions to the women, extending of course the spirit of those instructions to all mankind, requiring them to abstain from talking in the church, even though it might be desirable for their own improvement, when this must be done at the expense of the highest interests of the congregation, and to the general injury of Christianity: but in what portion of the inspired volume do we find any com-

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mandment forbidding woman to act as a public teacher, *provided* she has a message worth communicating, and will deliver it in a manner worthy of her high vocation? Surely nowhere if not in the passages we have just been considering.

Where have any of the inspired writers said, I suffer not a woman to teach in public, and to stand up in the name of her Redeemer, administering the cup of salvation to the lips of dying immortals, even though her spirit is yearning to break unto them the bread of eternal life? This was too sacred a subject to be coldly decided by the voice of *law*, and they have left it, where it must ever remain, at the portal of the individual conscience of every moral agent.

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BIBLE WAR AND PEACE.

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The subjects of Peace and War are among those with which the moral world is agitated and convulsed. Its agitations and consequent revolutions have rolled us up to that meridian, where, in the combined light of science and revelation, the past and future are revealed. Each successive revolution on the axis of truth, and about the sun of righteousness, rendering the dimness and mysteries of the past visible and intelligible, and multiplying in proportion to the ratio of its light, the seers of the future, with no aphelion as a whole, *brings* itself nearer and nearer its true light and predicted destiny.

Felicity and immortal honors await the man and his followers, who with pace equal to the march of truth, has ears to hear, and eyes to see the light, by which he may interpret the past and expound the future. But remorse, doubt, and moral darkness cloud the soul and career of him and those following him, who stationary or retrograde, fails of the opening truth, and thus in blindness misjudges the past, misstates the present, and misinterprets the future; for it is all one in the judgment of the Eternal, to blot out the light or refuse to come to it. On no other subject is this more true than on that of Peace. In this, as in all other great moral movements, there are three classes—the two extremes and the means—the cis, super and trans-Alpine Peace men. The first claim for themselves truth and stability, and in their darkness condemn the others as unsafe, too

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fast and fanatical; the second on the meridian, discern the past and discover the future, urge the one and check the other, keeping the whole in equilibrio; while the third, out of all patience with the immobility of the first, and tardiness of the second, condemn them both, and claim for themselves perfection. In the investigation of the Peace question, both its friends and its foes have had many difficulties to encounter. By these, some, discouraged, remain under the old dispensation of war and blood—others, "*ad captandum vulgus*," leap the whole, and make war on the peace of the new. Others have made a false issue, and thrown away the Old Testament, and confounded the new:—while a few have, through the sea, over the mount and midst the foe, made their way from Egypt to the land of promise. The Bible, the polar star, seems to present the greatest obstacles to the settlement of the question. If one takes the Old Testament, he is met by the new: and if another takes the new, he is attacked in the rear by the old, and how to bridge the gulf he lacks the material, or science, or both.

Not to concede that there are difficulties of the sterner sort, would argue folly and weakness on our part. The majority of peace productions have, as it appears to us, been guilty of assumption or error for data, false logic in their course, and irrelevant conclusion in their result. Some, with a particular premise, swell into a general conclusion. Millions of souls are inquiring, but difficulties beset them.

1. One says he can see no difference in war; all are alike, the wars of Joshua and David, Nebuchadnezzar and Buonaparte, Washington and Taylor, all as by permission of God. He finds the Bible against him, but it is the best he can do.

2. Another says the Old Testament is one of blood, but the New one of love, and therefore they both can't have the same author, and the Old is denied, while the new is better, as divine.

3. Another says, I read the Old Testament wars, and they are so bloody and cruel, that I don't know what to do, and I just stop and shut up my Bible for fear I shall deny the whole.

4. Another says, The law of the New is the law of the Old, and that is love; now how God can require us to love Him supremely, and our neighbor as ourselves, and yet command us to kill our neighbor, I can't see.

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5. Another says, "Peace men say that the difference between the Old and New Testaments is that the Old requires justice, but the New more, not only justice, but love; the New goes beyond the Old:" as if there were no love in justice, or justice in benevolence, no New in the Old, or Old in the New. These are some of the many difficulties, and yet there is truth somewhere. May the good Lord help us to find it, that we and thousands in our wake, may escape perdition. To remove the difficulties, is one way; to render aid for another to do it for himself, is another. We propose the latter, to bring in the light, by which each can dispose of all the above difficulties and their cognates. We invite attention to two passages of scripture.

"Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. And I will cut off the chariot from Ephraim, and the horse from Jerusalem, and the battle-bow shall be cut off: and he shall speak peace unto the heathen: and his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth."—*Zech.* 9: 9, 10. Here the prophet gives us the incipient stage of the kingdom of Christ, under the new dispensation, its commencement in peace.

"And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plough-shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."—*Isa.* 2: 2—4. Isaiah presents the seer's vision of the advanced condition of the kingdom of Christ, and the result of the almost imperceptible leavening, of the pure and peaceful principles of the gospel, to the nations of the world. The great question we propose to consider, is, *Is war compatible with holiness?* or if the reader please to be less general, *Is it right for Christians, under the Christian dispensation, to engage in war?* Either of

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these questions will cover the whole ground. The question has hitherto been considered by the mass as problematical. Whether we shall still have it so, or not, making our readers the jury, sworn and empanelled, and shut up with the burden of our truth and logic upon them, we shall await their verdict. The order of the people in the present age, is to concede to the writer and orator, data and logic, but reserve for themselves the conclusion. But by a stern necessity, if they will give us our data and logic, we will bind them with a more than a Promethean chain, to our conclusion.

To settle the following points is necessary to a full solution of the problem.

1. Define what we understand, on the largest scale, to be the true meaning of the question.

2. We affirm that the Old Testament did *sanction* war.

3. We aver, and shall attempt to show that the Bible, both the Old and New Testaments, condemns war under the new dispensation.

4. We advance the fundamental principles developed in the administration of God's government, under which war is approbated in the Old, is reconciled with its condemnation, of the peace, in the New.

5. The genius of the gospel makes it the duty of the Christian to abstain from war, and enjoins the promotion of universal peace.

6. Objections to this view of the subject.

7. Has a resort to arms ever been justifiable in the Christian since the advent of Christ; and objections to this view. This, as will appear, will constitute a third main point in our work.

8. What is the present, and probable future duty of the Christian, and the church of God, in the world.

This, as is evident, must cover the whole field, and any thing short would leave the work unfinished. To achieve the object thus imposed upon us, is the work, not of an hour, nor of a day, week, or month, of severe and grappling thought, of mental effort. And all we ask, is, one-fourth part the same care and untiring toil in the reading as that with which we have taxed ourself in the production.

1. Define the question. The social and civil relations of man may be divided into three classes: the relations of individuals to each other; the relations of individuals to society or government; and the relations of one society or

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government to another. The principles of peace are applicable to man in all these relations, but the present technical "Peace Reform," is concerned, or has to do with the intercourse of governments and war between nations or states as such, and for reasons necessary to their honor, growth and independent existence. Now is war as such, compatible with holiness, or right for holy men or Christians to engage in? To ask the question is easy; to answer it, more difficult. No one surely will object, and say that in our definition we have erected a building to demolish, without involving in the objection a confession of his own ignorance of all war and history; for war is not mere shooting, for then a shooting match is war—hunting is war—and William the Conqueror in his "Foresta" was a mighty warrior: nor is shooting a man, war; for then punishing deserters is war; nor is capital punishment, war; for then the "Board" declares war against Major Andre: nor is self-defence, war; for then running from under a falling limb or building—effort to escape the jaws of a lion—or break the power of a tiger or a murderer, is war: nor is government war, for then war will be till the end of time, and is required by reason and the Bible: yea, more, God is at war with the world. But *war*, according to all dictionaries and histories, *is a contest between nations, kingdoms, or states, by physical force.* Strictly war is a contest, mortal, between nations or kingdoms, by force, that is, physical or moral, for example, 2 *Kings* 3: 26; *Rev.* 19: 19. The question will not therefore include the exercise of government, civil, parental or school, in the inflicting of stripes and imprisonment on transgressors; nor the exer cise of self-defense; nor capital punishment; each of which will be discussed in its proper place under the fifth head, and shown to be a duty devolving upon all in like relations, and growing out of the relations we sustain to each other and the society, which relations and consequent duties will continue till the end of time: not so with war, for in time it will be "that nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

2. This brings us to our second point, which in our inquiry for Christian duty, directs us to the great Protestant standard of Christianity, the Bible.

We affirm that the Old Testament did *sanction* war, we do not *concede*, but *affirm* it. In all our Biblical investigations, we shall assume that the Bible is all that Protestantism

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or orthodoxy claim for it, in its authenticity and inspiration, in short that it is the word of God, and yet that it *sanctions*, not merely *permits* war.

"And the Lord shall fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace."—*Ex.* 14: 14. In the great fear of the Israelites pursued by the Egyptians, they murmured and cried unto the Lord, and also said to Moses, It had been better for us to serve the Egyptians, than to die in the wilderness—to whom Moses replied, "Fear not, stand still and see the salvation of God, which He will show you to-day, for the Egyptians whom ye have seen to-day ye shall see again no more for ever. *The Lord shall fight for you*, and ye shall hold your peace."

Verses 25, 26: In the morning, as the Lord appeared through the pillar of fire, and troubled the host of the Egyptians, and took off their chariot wheels, they said, "Let us flee from the face of Israel, *for the Lord fighteth for them against the Egyptians.*" And the Lord overthrew them in the midst of the sea."

Ex. 15: 3: In their song at the great deliverance of Israel from the Egyptians, they break forth, "The Lord is a man of war, the Lord of hosts is his name."

Deut. 1: 30. At the report of the spies, sent to view the land, the people were discouraged, to whom Moses said, "Dread not, nor be afraid of them, for the Lord your God which goeth before you, *He shall fight for you.*"

Num. 1: 3; 26: 2. At Sinai, and at the plains of Moab, "all, from twenty years old and upward, *that were able to go forth to war*, were numbered."

Deut. 20: 4. To encourage the people when they went forth to battle, and saw the enemy, horses and chariots more than they, it was proclaimed to them, "Be not afraid, for the Lord thy God is with thee; let not your hearts faint, fear not, and do not tremble, neither be ye afraid because of them, for the Lord your God is He that goeth before you, *to fight for you* against your enemies, to save you."

Josh. 10. Here we have a day in Israel, like unto which "there was no day before it nor after it," "that the Lord God hearkened unto the voice of man, for the Lord fought for Israel." When the five confederate kings of the Amorites came up against Gibeon, who appealed to Israel for help, "The Lord said to Joshua, fear not, for I have delivered them into thine hand." "And the Lord discomfited them before Israel, and slew them with a great slaughter at

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Gibeon, and then chased the fugitives to Beth Horon the nether, and smote them at Azekah, and even to Makkedah," "so that the number the Lord slew with hail-stones was greater than the children of Israel slew with the sword," &c., &c.

A few corollaries from the foregoing premises are in point, and demanded for light and safety in our course. The presentation of them, however, must be deferred to a subsequent Number of the Quarterly.

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ARTICLE XIII.

WOMAN'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

BY REV. C. C. FOOTE, FARMINGTON, MICH.

No apology will be demanded by those who have read in the Oberlin Quarterly the recent article of Prof. James H. Fairchild on the "Rights and Duties of Woman," for the appearance of this "counter testimony." It is the design of the present contributor to present a somewhat different train of thought on the same subject, embracing the views of a rapidly growing class of the friends of Christian progress and reformation, whose views have seldom found a place in the literary and theological reviews of the age. In the course of the present discussion the article mentioned above will come in several particulars more or less under review.

Let it be premised, that the question of "Woman's Rights and Duties," is not yet, *nor will it be*, settled, until woman takes her rightful place *beside* [not beneath,] her equal brother man. On few subjects has man erred more than in assigning to woman her position in organic society. Although created in the genesis of the human family to be the companion and equal of man, ["In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him, male and female created He them; and blessed them, and called *their* name Adam."—Gen 5: 1,] yet the dim glimpses we get of her condition in those far off ages, reveal but too plainly that she was soon cast down from her lofty and heaven-appointed station by the superior strength of her imperious companion. Even in the patriarchal habitations, woman was a degraded being; living for but little higher purposes than to minister to the pleasure and do the bidding of her self-constituted lord; suffering from him dishonors which

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would now consign their perpetrators to the penitentiary. The history of forty centuries from the creation reveals to us with too painful certainty the truth that she occupied a place far below that assigned her by her Father in heaven. Even the chosen people of God assigned to their mothers and wives, their sisters and daughters an obscure place in their synagogues, forbidding them to mingle with their fathers and husbands, their brothers and sons in their devotions. If such was woman's condition in the most favored spot on the earth, how frightfully, how awfully debased must have been her state in those lands where "darkness covered the earth and gross darkness the people." 'Tis no conjecture; the history of those lands and times reveal the painful fact that woman was there the trembling slave of her master's nod, or the living doll of his amusement. Such ever has, and ever will be the condition of woman where the gospel, that lifts up the lowly and debases the lofty, is not known. By most heathen nations she is denied the gift of immortality; and by many she is yoked in with beasts of burden. The place assigned her in the Mahomedan paradise by the Koran is too familiar to need a recital.

But in the lapse of ages the clock of prophecy struck the fullness of the time, and the great Deliverer made his appearance among men, to break the midnight darkness, and to illumine the understandings—the souls of men. And one of the first influences of his mission was the amelioration of the condition of woman. The genial rays of the Sun of Righteousness shot down into the leaden depths of her spiritual being, and suddenly she awoke from the long and dreamless slumber of ages to feel the impulse of a new life springing up within her, and to appreciate and exhibit her intellectual, social and moral nature.

But the true gospel was in time supplanted by the fitful hallucinations of sentimentalism. As the long-stringed bow when released pauses not at its proper place, but flies beyond; so woman passed from the extreme of deepest degradation to that of almost angelic exaltation. Thus was she regarded in the palmy days of knight-errantry, when the bold cavalier kissed the memento of his lady love, and dashed into the hottest place of battle; and returning, laid the trophies of his valor at the feet of his mistress, as offerings to propitiate her favor. It was a state of society not very dissimilar to this that produced that anomaly of her age, Joan de Arc, the Maid of Orleans, of imperishable

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memory for her deeds of lofty daring and cruel fate. But the age of chivalry, with its bewitching splendors, its tilts and tournaments, and nodding plumes, has gone forever; and woman is now returning from that absurd pre-eminence to the place assigned her of Heaven; not a menial slave to be trampled in the dust, nor a divinity to be adored; but a companion of man, his equal in every right, his co-laborer in all that is high and holy. It is now proposed to enumerate briefly what are regarded as the rights of woman, to state the arguments commonly relied on for their defence, and to review the arguments and objections to our position, in the article under consideration.

1. What are woman's rights? "The answer must be, the same in general as those of other human beings, because she possesses the common attributes of humanity. She is endowed with all the faculties which characterize the human soul, and of course can *claim all the rights*, and must meet all the obligations which devolve upon man at large." Ample concession this, of which none need complain. Here then we are on common ground: here let us drive a nail, that there be no *taking* "back part of the price," while we enlarge upon this "general" admission.

Woman is not "the better half" of man, but his equal half. When depressed below him, she is robbed of her natural right, when she aspires to domineer over him she is a usurper. Man was not "born to command," nor woman "to obey." Lord Kames uttered a half truth and a half untruth when he said "both should govern; the husband *by law*, and the wife *by persuasion*. Both should govern by *persuasion*, neither by law: the one that reasons best and loves most should have the supremacy; and such supremacy as is consistent with the law of their moral and intellectual being. Woman is not only the equal of man, but the same intellectual being as himself, possessed of the same sentiments and affections, the same emotions and wants: not one mental faculty or power is found in man that is wanting in woman; hence their unity of nature. And do not human rights have their origin in the mental constitution? All men have the same mental attributes, and *therefore* the same rights; although some have far more ample intellectual endowments than others, yet the right does not depend on the *degree*, but on the *character* of the mental phenomenon. The dwarf and the herculean intellect occupy the same platform of rights. The law propounds but one

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question—"Is he sane?" What then necessarily follows from these premises? This, the rights of man and the rights of woman are precisely one and the same: the "lord of creation" is just as well off as the lady of creation, and not one jot or tittle better. The law of right knows human beings, not as men or women, but as mankind.

Nothing is gained then by an effort to establish woman's inferiority,(even if it were successful,) if she has the attributes, she has the rights of humanity. All this, (if we mistake not,) is admitted. And yet not one of the entire sisterhood may wield her powers to reinstate and defend her rights; in other words, woman may have no active participation in civil government! And why not? Whose institution is civil government, man's, or God's? For whose benefit is it established? And what are its functions? Government is the offspring of God-given rights—for the defence of all who have rights. Hence woman's concern with government is as great and as important as man's. Why then is she excluded from participating in what so immediately concerns her? Is she not sane? Has she not precious rights? And shall she not vindicate and guard her own rights? Does not every being throughout sensitive creation, not excepting "the" fe-"male goose," assert and defend its rights? How much more is a rational and moral being ordained to this work. The right of *self-government* is a natural right. It is the key-stone in the magnificent arch of democracy? Deny this, and you open the door of violence and fraud; and subtle tyranny will cheat you out of every right of humanity. The affirmation that "a government not democratic, may still be legitimate," is void of truth. Such a government is a usurpation, a "conspiracy," and "duty" enjoins us not "to submit to its laws," but to pluck it down. Who denies this, pronounces the Declaration of Independence a fraud, and the men who pledged their "lives, fortunes and sacred honor" to the defence of its doctrines, traitors. True, "the right of voting depends on 'one' circumstance: 'Is the voter a proper subject of civil government? Correlated with that fitness is the right to choose who shall administer the government. Here the 'law of nature' knows no respect of persons, condition, sex or color. 'The stranger' that to-day sets his foot on American soil as a resident, has the same right with him that is home-born." But "all these points are conceded;" and yet "there are reasons why woman should not

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vote:" she is not a public character; and the *tastes* of the world are against her being such. Then let "the taste of the world" be corrected. The "world" pronounce the mingling of young men and women in the halls of science extremely untasteful: why not disband? Go ask the hoary tyrants of the past and present, yea, ninety-nine hundredths of the inhabitants of "the world," if popular governments are in keeping with "good taste." Go urge the teeming millions of Asia to place woman beside her brother, and they will tell you "the taste of the world is against it." Go ask the sturdy aborigines of the forest to transfer the axe and hoe from the hand of his wife to his own, and his quick "Humph, do you think I am an old woman?" is his mode of telling you that "the taste of the world is against it." And if the testimony of our beloved brother, J. P. Bardwell, can be relied on, woman's "taste" in that shady land is harmonious with man's. (See Oberlin Evangelist of Sept. 20th, 1849.) Prof. Fairchild may, (it is to be hoped he will,) live to see this barbarous "taste" numbered among the things that were.

But "if women vote they must [may] hold office; a thing too unnatural to be dreamed of." How quickly has our Brother "forgotten the long catalogue of queens from Semiramis of Babylon, to Victoria of England," "some of these governed"—yes, they did, and what has been, may be "dreamed of," and performed again, perhaps will be. The throne is not the only official seat filled by a woman, in England. The Countess of Pembroke held the office of hereditary sheriff; and exercised it in person, occupying a seat on the bench with the Judges at the Assizes. In English courts, women are admitted to be capable of serving in almost all the offices of the kingdom, from the Queen down to the constable. And in the United States, the law has so modified the public "taste" as to allow woman to hold the office of administratrix on the estate of her deceased husband. A place is also allowed her in the Post Office Department. But if you assign to woman a place in the activities of government, you "bring the excitement and animosities of political life to our homes and firesides." *Where* has this been learned? Let the experiment be made ere you decide. For reasons not very dissimilar the Jesuit withholds from the laity, the word of life. Apply to woman's religious life the mode of reasoning by which she is denied a political life. Tell her (which is true) that of all strifes, those of

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a religious stamp are the most acrimonious, that here, emphatically, "the most dangerous thing in personal differences, is *nerves*;" religious "strifes run high enough without our opening the penatralia of our homes; true we ought to agree to disagree—we ought to respect each others opinions, but the temptation is too strong; it would be an apple of discord thrown into the family circle." To acknowledge your religious rights—to accede to you the privilege of being controlled by your own reason and conscience—of worshipping your Creator, when, where, and how you please; "would but heat up the furnace of" religious "strife seven times hotter than it is wont to be heated, and it is no heavenly form that will be seen walking in the midst of the fire." We are ready then for the conclusion, that whatever may be woman's right or duty an active participation in religious "life is neither one nor the other." Milton's Eve was right, when she said,

"God be thy law, thou mine."

Are we shocked and horrified at so wild and guilty conclusions? Equally indignant ought we to be at any attempt, whether by logic or by law, to merge the political existence of woman in her fellow masculine worm, lest she abuse that existence.*

When the injustice of denying to the sisterhood a representation in the halls of legislation, is urged, we are gravely told that "they are represented; that they have no interests separate from the interests of the family, and these interests are secured by giving the right of suffrage to every male over twenty-one years." This argument could be urged with the same justice in excluding nineteen twentieths of men from participating in the affairs of government. Suppose a constitution to conditionate voting on the possession of a free-hold estate worth twenty thousand dollars, (a state of things not unlike that in France prior to the revolution, there being but two hundred and forty-thousand voters out of a population of thirty-four million; and not very dissimilar to the present voter of South Carolina,) and yet as the voters in this case might be supposed to support laws in harmony with their own "interests," which are the

* This alarm of danger and detriment to our hearths and altars from admitting to woman her political rights, is so manifestly a *ruse*, that patience is put to flight, for consenting to combat or notice it.

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same as the non-freeholders, it might still be said that the excluded class "are represented."

This is the main argument in favor of a pure aristocracy, and it has too often been refuted to demand a labored argument. But is it true that "woman has no interest separate from man?" How stands the case in the marital state? The law demands jurisdiction here, it declares in favor of supremacy not only, but rests the supremacy in the hands of the husband. This supremacy not only places the wife under the control of the husband's will, but it also gives him the delicate power of "correction and moderate chastisement." Is this a matter of "taste," or is it the *nature* of woman and universal nature that revolts at such demonstrations? And shall not woman be heard on this point—shall she not be consulted as to her willingness to submit to these loving demonstrations of conjugal authority?*

2. In the married state woman has interests separate from her husband, in regard to the rights of property. She has a natural right to the fruits of her toil. Woman as man, was ordained by her mental constitution to live in human society—this being so she must enter the social state without surrendering any of her rights, as the laws of nature all harmonize with each other. But what saith the law (of man's device)? To man it saith, "to the victor belong the spoils"—obtain her hand and you shall become served of her purse also. Princes acquire dominion and wealth by conquest—why shouldest not thou, one of creation's lords, have thy plunder for thy pains? Man goes in all the dignity of his nature to the altar of Hymen—takes the vow and walks forth undivested of any right of humanity. While she

* It is urged in justification of this state of feminine vassalage, that the Bible says, "Wives submit yourselves to your own husbands in the Lord." So does it say to man, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake." Paul will thank none of us for attempts at justifying oppression by a resort to any of his "hard to be understood" sayings. It might puzzle the wit of woman, even, to decide how a wife can submit herself in the Lord to a man who is dead drunk one half the time, and a fool the other half in consequence; from whose "cherish and love" she receives only "shameful spewing" and cruel blows. The old common law allowed the husband to whip and beat his wife, so that he performed this salutary infliction with a lawful weapon—and a *broom-stick* was solemnly adjudged to be such lawful weapon—and a rod not larger than the thumb was not objected to unless it were of *iron*. He may still confine her in a close room—and bind her with cords—treating her not as a companion and equal—but as an inferior dependant.

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who was wooed as "an angel" by the bended knee of suppliant man, goes forth with her existence merged in her husband—and in the eye of the law she exists not at all; her lost rights are appropriated to himself. The law confers on him her estate—for can the dead retain their possessions? and legally the wife is dead. "Our law," says Blackstone, "considers marriage in no other light than as a *civil contract*"—(a bad law to be sure)—but why should there be but one "civil" contractor? Is it not high time that woman's rights in this contract were vindicated at her own hands? *

3. Great injustice has been done to woman, by the selfish legislation of the male sex—as to what should be a proper cause of divorce. How deeply is woman's happiness involved in this question? but in its settlement she is allowed no voice.

4. Phrenology clearly demonstrates woman's superior love of offspring. In case of voluntary or forced separation from her husband, the law decides as to the disposition of the children of the marriage. What intense interest—yea, downright agony—is manifest in this question. Ought she not then to have a voice in the enactment of laws that so deeply affect her happiness? These interests are too sacred to be entrusted to the selfishness of man's unfeeling heart. There is, then, no escape from woman's right to participate in the privileges and duties of government. Whether she possesses a nature similar or dissimilar to man—if similar, it is a claim of right; if dissimilar, of peculiar necessity. The work under review has enumerated a long catalogue of "unlikenesses" peculiar to woman, wherefrom the conclusion is obtained, that her proper place is, to *consent to be governed*, without a voice in the choice of her governor. This certainly augmenting the list of unlikenesses. Now I confess a very dissimilar conclusion from these "dissimilar" characteristics: they do but enhance her necessity for a peculiar representation in the legislature. By reason

* Sir Wm. Blackstone gives so graphic a description of woman's married existence, that I cannot forbear transcribing a single sentence. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law—that is, the *very being* or legal existence of the woman is *suspended* during the marriage, or at least is *incorporated or consolidated* in that of the husband, under whose wing, protection and cover she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-French, a feme-coverte, is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, *baron or lord*, and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture."—1 *Bl. Com.* 422.

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of these "dissimilars" man can not properly represent her interests; not appreciating her wants, he can not answer them. Hence she should not only have a personal representation, but a separate branch in the legislature; and a separate election of their own peculiar representatives from their own sex. This would save all sensitive beholders the agony of seeing woman "elbowing her way to the polls."

But it is still urged that from her mental constitution, woman is manifestly subordinate to man: she has "less of will—hence is less aggressive—possesses the feeling of dependence—is not disposed to be a leader—and was not made to rule."

This argument extended a little farther, would defeat all human liberty—it would give the power of government to a select few, of superior minds, and exile the inferior masses from all participation in the affairs of state. The masters superior mental organization, is the chief vindication of slavery.* Admit woman to be possessed of less of will, (combativeness—love of power,) it should be borne in mind that government emanates from the higher attributes—as justice and benevolence. Tyranny has its seat in the love of power—but not democracy. The history of civil governments is a history of conspiracies against human rights—of wars and outrages. How much the enthroning man's combativeness—destructiveness and love of power—and the dethroning woman's justice, benevolence, and reverence, has contributed to this state of things, each will judge for himself. But we have to deal with these objections to woman's rights in a more specific form.

But we have not yet disposed of that long catalogue of "differences" existent between the sexes urged in the form of objections to woman's rights. "At the head stands that

* The following extract from Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, August, 1849—shows with what skill Prof. F.'s logic may be wielded for the exclusion of the masses from government activities. It is evidently intended to correct the march of democracy in Great Britain. "Mankind can not exist for a day, but under the lead of a few. Self-government is the dream of the enthusiast; oligarchy is the history of man. In vain are institutions popularized, nobles destroyed, masses elevated, education diffused, self-government established; all that will not alter the character of man, it will not qualify the multitude for self-direction; it will not obviate the first necessity of mankind—*the necessity of being governed.*" What is the difference between this and the article under review? It is little more comprehensive, but arrives at its conclusions from the same premises.

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which imposes on her the duty of being the mother of the race—so also is she distinguished by delicacy of constitution —has a voice pitched an octave above that of man—is characterized by predominance of sensibility—has a more delicate perception of the proprieties of life—greater love of order"—and we may add, (which has as much to do with the question of her RIGHTS, as the above "differences") in stature, woman differs from man. And now for the deductions and inferences—many of which to some of us, have as little connection with the premises, as "Old Whity" with the salary of the Queen of England, or "the length of a day in June with the length of a boa-constrictor." Which of these "differences" disqualifies woman from voting? Not one of them. "But if she may vote, she may hold office also." To be sure she may, if she can persuade the people to vote for her: and they are the persons to look after condition, when the question of her receiving the popular suffrage is agitated. Let it be observed that the further men escape from the dominion of the *animal* of their being, and the more their spiritual being is developed, the period of "her duty of being the mother of the race" will occupy but a brief portion of her earthly career. This is a matter of observation, and urged with much philosophical force and beauty by Mr. Dick. When the laws of health and "hydropathy" shall be understood and conformed to, these "motherly duties" will hardly occupy an interem in the activities of life. Let us not be misunderstood: our motto is, *tools for those who can use them.* What man can do, woman can do, with this difference, that in physical labor, (not in mental,) she requires more time: this holds true in nearly every department of human activity—as a spinster, weaver, tailor, baker, washer, sweeper, cook, &c., &c. With the same propriety, therefore, may you obstruct her pathway with legal disabilities in these vocations, as in civil or *any other* department. Leave her then to her own native prowess, and she shall prove a successful or unsuccessful competitor to all rivals that shall choose to enter the list against her.

These remarks hold with equal truthfulness in reference to the medical profession. Had Prof. Fairchild been acqainted with the history of the medical profession in *Russia* he would not have affirmed that "the burden of this profession can never be sustained by women." There institutions are provided by the government for the qualification of female physicians. And in the department of obstetrics, (and here,

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if any where, does nature demand not only the physician, but the most skilful *females only*, are employed—from the Empress *up* to the wife of the serf. There are eminent female physicians in this country, and their number is increasing. A society has recently been formed in New England for the education of female practitioners; this is as it should be: as society becomes more enlightened, they shall feel what multitudes now do—that the attendance of male practitioners on female necessities is an outrage upon nature.*

Next we would enlarge woman's sphere by opening to her many of the trades and occupations now occupied by man. And what is the objection? "It is not desirable that the family interests should be thus sacrificed. Nor can any such employment be committed to women. It is the work of a life to carry on a trade and attain the highest excellence and success." Is it, indeed?—then the majority of tradesmen live a good many lives. There are manifold thousands of women destitute of family and home, and thus it will be for ages; and shall these perish all, lest the beau-ideal of a home be not realized? The heart of humanity bleeds over the desolations of these homeless sisters of ours.

"No home, no home! poor wanderer,
Earth has no home for thee;
Forever driven to and fro,
A wave upon life's sea:

No home, no home! oh bitter thought,
And full of agony;
It makes the eyes grow dim with tears,
The heart grow wearily.

No home, no home! oh cruel world,
Most cruel and unkind,
How gladly would I leave thy shores,
Some better land to find!"

* "Until within about two hundred years male accoucheurs were wholly unknown. And why are not women quite as well qualified for this office as men? They have *personal experience*—the most important preparation of all. There is not a shadow of a reason why they should be denied access to colleges, or to any of the advantages proffered to medical students."—*Fowler on Maternity*, p. 182.

A *large proportion* of our physicians ought to be females. There is a fitness and propriety in the thing which it might be supposed would strike every mind; and with respect to the whole labor of love among the sick, women have capabilities many and peculiar."—*O. Miner's Address in Family Guardian, Oct.* 16, 1844.

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Where, how, and when, shall these fugitives from the tender mercies of the wicked, find a home? With much solicitude I am forced to inquire, did our brother give his vote for THE MAN who above all other men the world ever saw, has "advanced" so far into his "idea of a well ordered society" as to give *four thousand* "homes" to the homeless —who would have wielded all his official influence, (had not the folly of the people prevented his elevation to the Presidential chair,) to secure instantly a home to every landless woman in the nation—if not, he has not only written but voted a pitiless storm of desolation upon the defenceless heads of these homeless ones.

We do well to inquire for the Bible record of the woman who is blessed with a home. The *inspired* professor describes her position and appropriate duties in an age when a large number of the avenues of employment now existing were unknown. "The virtuous woman—is like the merchants' ships; she bringeth her food from afar—she considereth a field and buyeth it. ["Her maternal nature makes it impossible that she should be much abroad,"—"has a delicate physical constitution—hence she is unfitted for the rougher duties of life."] With the fruit of her hand she planteth a vineyard." ["Her soft hand is the support of childhood, and her gentle form and motion the charm of domestic life."] *O tempora! O mores!!* "She girdeth her loins with strength, and strengtheneth her arms. She maketh fine linen and selleth it. She openeth her mouth with wisdom." Like the matrons and wives of our pilgrim sires and revolutionary fathers, she possesses an energy and resoluteness of character which happily free her from that effeminacy and delicateness deemed so "becoming" in her sex in these days. Her self-reliance renders her quite capable of making her own way honorably through the world. Shall we be told that such "are certain peculiar women—exceptions to nature's general laws—nearer men than women—distinguished monsters—towering in the distance beyond the utmost distance of woman's sphere?" Estimated by the standard of these days, they would be judged coarse, vulgar, unladylike, doubtless; but by the rule of heaven "far other judgment waiteth them." In every age such women have been the ordained ones of God, to bless their race; pioneers in the cause of humanity—champions and martyrs for the truth—the glory of the church and the world. O, when will triflers and flatterers cease to talk of

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woman as a mere toy! O, when will woman spurn the praise of redolent lips, rosy cheeks, sparkling eyes, a soft and lily tapering hand! When will they vie in emulating that noble band of sisters in the Canadas, the West Indies and the Western wilds, whose blistered, bare feet, brawny faces and hard hands are all studded and glowing with brightest jewels in the eyes of angels?

Next, we would place woman beside her brother, as a teacher of the sciences, languages, theology, &c. And why not? Hear the Professor—"I do not contend that woman does not possess the power of thought to the same extent with the other sex: abstract science she can master and enjoy; she can even excel in it; the naked relation of things she can trace and understand." "In our Institution, (Oberlin,) young men and young women pursue their studies side by side in the same classes during a four years' course; and I am free to say, WITH EQUAL SUCCESS. This is my unqualified testimony after ten years' experience in teaching these classes. When the opportunities have been equal, I expect a manifestation of equal ability in the recitation room. Near the end of their course they engage together in metaphysical studies, and the young women show by their readiness in recitation that *they are not behind even here.*" Gerrit Smith recently informed me that President Mahan's testimony was to the same effect. Now for the "difference." "The young men engage in daily discussion upon these topics with an interest that amounts almost to a passion—the young women never." "Hence," (so is the inference,) "there is a lack of taste for these abstract investigations." I confess not a little astonishment at an inference so wide from the mark. What branch of study pursued at Oberlin belongs appropriately to "the concrete rather than the abstract—to the living world?"—physiology, anatomy, botany, poetry, music, painting—which? Perhaps all. But on which of these studies has the Professor witnessed his "more affectionate" pupils "meet in circles, discussing from day to day with an earnestness which amounts almost to a passion?" "Such a tendency among young women I have yet to hear of." How wild would be the inference that would ascribe this "difference" to "a lack of taste" for these studies! Not more wild than the first. Man's superabundant combativeness accounts amply for this difference. Woman's combativeness is small, hence she is averse to disputation. During a recent journey of fifteen hundred miles,

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I have heard but a solitary discussion the parties to which were females. While every stage-coach, steamer, packet and car has been made the theatre of earnest, angry, noisy and protracted debate, on an endless variety of topics, urged on by masculine combativeness. But "woman has less of *will* in her character—is less aggressive in her nature—has a more delicate perception of the proprieties of life, an instinctive apprehension of the fit and the unfit." Hence she "moves more easily and is less likely to blunder in social life." Her small firmness, combativeness, destructiveness, coupled with her large cautiousness, veneration, benevolence, agreeableness, &c., induce her instinctively to shun wrangling debate and disputation. Yet is she none the less qualified to grapple with and conquer the most abstruse studies. But "in metaphysical science she does not excel—can point to no successful laborers;" but not because "woman does not possess the power of thought to the same extent with the other sex." Why make the statement then? But let the inquiry be pushed—*Why* has not woman excelled as a metaphysician. *Why* is this "niche in the temple of female fame unoccupied?" The reason is obvious. Inferiority here, as elsewhere, results from woman's irrational treatment by man. Her intellectual powers are not half developed. Not a college, not a university in the world perhaps but refuses to woman a place in the professor's chair. But what man has occupied the mental philosopher's "niche in the temple of fame" until he has long encumbered that high seat? Ere it is hardly commenced, woman's career is arrested by that foolish custom which excludes her from the most efficient facilities for intellectual development. And then as "the most cruel cut of all," she must needs be taunted for leaving "unoccupied that niche in the temple of female fame." Take from your sister her books, and chastise her for not getting her lesson. Bravo! One is forcibly reminded of the logic by which our colored brother is denied his rights. "Don't you see they are "different," says the usurper, "their 'tastes' fit them for a lower condition." But you give them no opportunities. "If they were not different they would find opportunities to rise to distinction." Then we point to the long catalogue of distinguished statesmen, generals, philosophers, poets and orators of colored extraction, and lo! these are "exceptions"—certain peculiar, colored persons, "exceptions to nature's general law." I believe it is generally admitted that woman's musical powers

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and "tastes" are fully equal to her brother's; and here the "tastes of the world" are in her favor: but where among the sisterhood are your Mozarts, Haydens, Beethovens or Handels?—your Raphaels, Guidos or Titians? There can be but one answer, and that answer *is not* that "she has no taste for such studies," for here is found a realization of "the concrete, the living world, ideas into which have been breathed the breath of life, and they have for her a double charm." And yet "this niche in the temple of female fame is unoccupied." Why? Because opportunities are denied, means are beyond her reach, facilities are not afforded, no adequate demands are made upon her musical powers. Hence this talent is not half developed. Justice requires that the experiment be fully and fairly made ere you make your inferences. We are not, however without illustrious examples of woman's ability to excel, opposed as she is and ever has been by obstacles well nigh insuperable, examples both ancient and modern, that shall shine with brilliant lustre to the end of time. Suffice it to say, that some of the ablest sovereigns that have ever wielded a sceptre have been women. How much did the illustrious Isabella of Spain accomplish for her sex, her nation and the world?

A multitude of females contributed by their rare scholarship and intellectual endowments, to the general illumination of that period. The Marchioness of Monteagudo, and Donna Maria Pacheco, sisters of the historian Don Diego Hurtudo, afford the most remarkable combination of literary talent in the enlightened court of Castile. The Queen's instructor in the Latin language was a lady named Donna Beatrice de Golando, called for her high attainments, la Latina. Another eminent woman, Donna Lusia de Medrono, publicly lectured on the Latin classics in the university of Salamanca. And another, Donna Francisca, daughter of De Sclerya the historian, filled the chair of rhetoric with honor at Alcald. Madame de Stael held a commanding influence over Europe's great warrior, because of her discriminating judgment on the policy of his government: and there was no one in his empire of whom Bonaparte stood more in awe. And what mortal man occupies a higher "niche in the temple of" missionary "fame" than Ann Hesseltine Judson. The pen of Elizabeth Herrick gave an impulse to the heart and intellect of Wilberforce, that resulted in the suppression of the slave trade and the emancipation of every slave on British soil. Her power to control and restrain the vicious

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has given to Mrs. Fry of England an illustrious name among reformers. By her side stands Eliza H. Farnham. Who that is acquainted with her lectures, writings, and individual influences, does not award to her a place among the strongest and most intellectual minds in the nation. She has reasoning faculties of herculean development, enabling her to comprehend and grasp principles lying far beyond ordinary research, while her extraordinary energy and stability give her self-control and a commanding influence over others. How many mathematicians of the more sturdy sex have ascended the heights of science so far as to be able to read the Mecanique Celeste of La Place, with Mrs. Somerville? Miss Mitchel of Nantucket, has inscribed her name high on the scroll of fame by her astronomical discoveries, for which she has recently received a gold medal from the King of Sweden. And what a beautiful diadem of stars cluster around the lofty brow of that charming woman, Catharine Hershel, the maiden sister of that great astronomer, the elder Sir John. This devoted sister, says Prof. Nichol of Glasgow, constantly assisted the labors of her brother, braving with him the inclemency of the weather, and heroically shared in his privations, that she might participate in his delights, whose pen committed to paper his notes of observation as they issued from his lips, and having passed the night near the telescope, took the rough manuscripts to her cottage at dawn of day, and produced a fair copy of the night's work on the ensuing morning. She it was who planned the labor of each succeeding night, who reduced every observation, and made every calculation. She it was who helped her brother in the construction of the great telescope, polishing the great speculum with her own hands; afterwards discovering therewith several comets. She it was who helped her brother to gather an imperishable name. More fortunate was she than even that brother, she having lived to reap the full harvest of their joint glory. Her name is inscribed upon the roll of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, from which she also received some years ago a gold medal. In the brilliant catalogue of our own country's women, the noble kinswoman of the great Franklin occupies no obscure place. Who that has marked the highly intellectual countenance, and listened to the powerful reasoning of Lucretia Mott, will fail to assign to her a "niche" among the first order of minds. In immediate proximity stands our self-sacrificing but more youthful sister, Fanny Lee Townsend, whose lec-

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tures on National Reform have revolutionized thousands of minds in various parts of the nation. I will only add, that many of the best writers in the English language, on political economy, and other topics, have been women. Of all these, and a multitude unnamed of like precious deeds and faith, will it be affirmed that they are "certain peculiar women, exceptions to nature's general laws," and that the question of their rights and duties "is reduced to one of little consequence!" No. These women, by their words and deeds have enlightened and blessed the world. Far in advance of its present state would this sorrow-smitten world of ours now be, had woman, unobstructed by the factitious arrangements of man's device, been permitted to equal participation in all social, civil and religious activities. The wisdom, the virtue, the good order, the peace, prevalent in families where woman now rules, would have been diffused in all its saving power through states, nations and the world.

All effort for the world's reformation has proved thus far well-nigh a failure. That the universal degradation of the universal sisterhood, is the sole cause of this failure is not affirmed, but that it is to be numbered among the causes is beyond a doubt. It might be supposed that these sad mistakes, mismanagements and failures would lead the candid and serious to give this matter a little more earnest reflection.

But, alas! woman's capacity for public activity has been forever put at rest in the person of "Theraigne de Mericourt astride a cannon, marching at the head of a mob of demons," and "Abby Kelly in angry debate upon the rostrum, shaking her delicate fist in grave men's faces!" And is it to such specimens we are to look for just representatives of the universal head and heart of womanhood? No. The Professor would have us believe they are "specimens of what woman becomes when out of her place." Monstrous. As well affirm the whipping of Amos Dresser, the incarceration of Delia Webster, the murder of Charles T. Torrey, the burning of colored men at the stake without trial, are "specimens of what" men "become when out of their places," attempting self-government. As well expect "some naturalist of Europe would put them together, complete the skeleton, and tell the habits and describe the sphere of activities" of the ox, were you to "gather and present to him a few fragments of bones" of some *lusus natura*—a calf with two heads, three tails and six legs.

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Here is ample room for manifold reprisals, but I forbear, leaving it for those more immediately concerned to show

"What things a woman, when despised, can do."*

Poor Abby has perpetrated an unpardonable offence, and must needs suffer the just penalty of her evil doings. "She has shaken her delicate fist in grave men's faces!" Pugnacious. She should have left that impolite task to her husband, with whom it would have passed as a graceful "suiting the action to the word," as all the world will testify. A *man* may innocently shake his fist in other people's faces, but in a woman it is outrageous vulgarity. "It is of little use to argue its propriety—it belongs to the domain of taste—such are the feelings of mankind." Seriously. If there are to be such demonstrations, my taste would confine them exclusively to the "delicate fists" as less harmful to life and limb. But why are not propriety of conduct, courtesy of manners, purity of speech, delicacy, refinement, gentleness and love just as becoming in one sex as the other. I know of no reason why a rough, violent, passionate, abusive, loveless manner should pass unnoticed in man, but become the subject of severe criticism in woman. For one I protest against the "taste" and the practice. Ill-manners in woman, are ill-manners in man. Whatever is becoming, attractive, excellent and beautiful in woman is equally so in man. Study earnestly, accurately the life, the deeds, the spirit, the character of the perfect man—"the man Christ Jesus"—and in that immaculate personage, you shall behold as full a development of the feminine as of the masculine. Patience, tenderness and delicacy are as needful to complete the character of man, as firmness, perseverance and moral courage are to complete the character of woman. To attain the stature of perfect men and women should be the chief labor of all.

I come now to "the first practical question" in the article under review, which by design has been deferred to the last in the present work. This "first question" Bro. Fairchild has introduced as a compound one "the pulpit and the bar"—I call for a division, for this reason, I do not believe that any person, male or female, is called of heaven, to enter the "legal profession." The world is none the better for

* Femina quid possit, spretæque injuria formæ.

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its existence, and would be no loser for its non-existence. This is not the place to prove nor discuss this question. Come we then to "the question" "shall women occupy the pulpit in common with men." Or, as the Quakers repudiate "pulpits" and others of us occupy the common floor—shall the gospel ministry be as naturally open to the female as to the male sex—is such a station as rational an object of effort in woman as in man. First, I object to the frightening the timid and these "more highly endowed with nerves" from the performance of duty, by proclaiming the gospel ministry a "learned profession" as distinguishing it from agricultural, mechanical or any other professions. If by "learned" we are to understand (as rightfully we are) *apt to teach—a workman that needeth not to be ashamed—he that winneth souls is wise—called of God as was Aaron*, we accept the appellation. But if by "the learned profession" we are to understand that entering upon the work of preaching the gospel, is conditionated upon a "nine years preparatory, collegiate and theological study," we reject the phrase.

Prof. Fairchild knows full well that the Apostles and primitive preachers belonged to no *such* "learned profession." And yet as competent to their task were they as any of their "learned" successors. Equally certain is it that two thirds of the present pulpit incumbents have "never seen a college or theological seminary," so to speak. Are they not in the "Apostolic succession?" "God forgive me for begetting a fool" said Samuel Hanson Cox to his son of Roman tincture, who denied even his father's right to the "learned profession." These words were directed not against "learning" but against the exclusiveness of a "learned" ministerial aristocracy or cast.

How truthful is the following sentiment adopted at the recent Peterboro (N. Y.) Anti-sectarian Convention.

4th. Resolved, that every rightly conducted church is a simple and thorough democracy; subject to no other ecclesiastical authority than its own, ackowledging the equal right of *all its members* to exercise their respective gifts in the worshipping assembly; and choosing for its pastor whom it will, among the "ordained" or "unordained" the "licensed" or "unlicensed."

Why then should the choice of a pastor "or preacher *never* be made from among the sister-hood—for if one choice may be made, a thousand may be made—yet never be made, though among that sister-hood were found "Hulda the

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prophetess, and Anna, and Priscilla the teacher of Apollos, and Phebe servant of the church of Cenchrea, and the four daughters of Philip that did prophecy."

Why not? The Professor gives two general, and three specific reasons:—"it is improper and impossible." Let us see. The impropriety consists in this, it is contrary to the general sentiment of the race—a sentiment which is natural. It is positively disagreeable to both sexes to see a woman a public character, the race can never lose it." But what is the meaning of the explanation of this "natural sentiment"—"the reason *why* we are so made as to dislike to see a woman a public character, is found in the fact that in general it is impossible (from her relation to the family interest) that she should be." And this you call "a natural sentiment!" Then we have but to enlighten the same, by this brief item of intelligence, that it is *quite possible* (by reason of "their relation to families" unborn, or dead, or never to be born, or past care, or in the preferred care of the father) for a great company of females to become public characters—and we have not only a "re-hearing" but a "reversal of judgment" and "decision" in our favor. For observe the first sentiment was founded on a *supposed* impossibility—this being disposed of, the "sentiment is eradicated." If it still exist in the absence of reason, (as in many it does,) then is it unreasonable, unnatural, (shall I say wicked?) purely the fruit of a factitious and foolish education.

That it is *not* a "*natural* sentiment" but a prejudice, I argue from the fact that the best and wisest men and women in the world have cast it off as a loathsome thing.

The whole Methodist sect as a denomination, advocate the rights of female preachers, and in their brightest days a long catalogue of names from the sister-hood brilliant for piety, activity and success adorned their "preachers' list." The Free Will Baptist denomination are in favor of, and have their women preachers. This from the first has been true of the Quakers. The same is true of other sects. The tempests of applause showered upon the "exquisites of the stage" may indicate the "sentiment" out of the church. This "positive disagreeableness at seeing a woman a public character" attaches then not to men and women as such, but to "certain men" and "women, exceptions to nature's general laws," of whom our good Professor is perhaps "chief." The inquiry is pertinent—"may women exercise their gifts

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at all, out of the circle purely private?" O yes, is the almost universal response, in the prayer meeting—in the conference room. She may give expression to her burning thoughts and offer to heaven the orisons of her heart. It should be remembered however that this "sentiment" has but recently obtained in many circles, especially among Presbyterians and Congregationalists. A person by my side has just acquainted me with this queer relic of antiquity. "When in my nineteenth year I attended a conference meeting in a private house in Western N. Y., where a *woman* fell upon her knees and prayed. This singular occurrence was considered so great an outrage upon decency that the leader of the meeting and several others immediately left the room. The excitement was so great as to destroy the effect of the meeting." The late excellent Mrs. John Brown of New York informed me that in her early life she was present at an evening conference meeting in Andover, (Mass.) when a young Methodist woman prayed, and that the mortification of the people would not have been greater had she appeared in their midst in a state of nudity. Surely it will not be said of a "sentiment" so unchristian—so heathenish—that "the race can never lose it." Beyond a doubt it was much more "positively disagreeable to both sexes" to hear a woman's voice in the prayer meeting, than it now is "to see her a public character." This progressive tendency of our "nature" affords occasion of thankfulness. But behold a darker—a deeper rooted "natural sentiment." In the eastern world "when the ladies appear in public, they always fold themselves up so closely in their hyhes, that, even without their veils, one can discover very little of their faces. But although they are so closely wrapped up that those who look at them can not see even their hands, still less their face, yet it is deemed indecent in a man to fix his eyes on them: he must let them pass without seeming at all to observe them. When a lady of distinction travels on horseback, she is not only veiled, but has generally a servant to run or ride before her to clear the way; and on such occasions, the men even in the market places, always turn their backs till the women are past, it being thought the highest ill-manners to look at them." [See Encyclopedia, article, veil.] Here is a "taste" and "sentiment" sufficiently orthodox and high-toned, to suit the most fastidious. Perhaps "when all other wrongs are redressed, the millenium will come, even if this matter should not be mended."

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"Those who have undertaken in this reform" may "find themselves riding a Gilpin race,"

> "And, where they did at first get up
> They will again get down."

But when this public sentiment is righted, so as there shall be (in rights, privileges, and activities,) "neither male nor female, but all one in Christ Jesus," then, it is urged in the form of objection, that "woman is the natural housekeeper, her chief responsibilities lie here, this is her sphere. The claims of the household are paramount, all other things are secondary." All this may be true, *provided* she is not called to the discharge of some other duties, in which case she may still *have charge* of these duties, as many New England ministers do of their farms, performing little or no manual labor themselves. There is another mode of disposing of or sharing in these duties—but then, it would be so unbecoming a "division of labor" for a man to bend his strong muscles over a wash tub, to seize the broom, or gird his loins with a towel, though he might (does) perform all these tasks with skill and effect. It must not be dreamed of.*

But then, "the child looks to its mother as naturally for the early guidance of its mind and heart as for its early food, and it is doing violence to nature to deprive it of the one or the other." "Nature" is a virtuous dame no doubt, but whether our author has not assigned to her charge some illegitimates, may admit of a doubt. That "the child looks to" the goat or the "sucking bottle" "for its early food" as "naturally" as to its mother, has been demonstrated in my own, and in ten thousand other families. That the child looks to the father as naturally for the early guidance of its mind and heart, as to the mother, is equally capable of demonstration. A few weeks ago a stranger brought into the neighborhood a young child, carrying it in his arms. He requested the privilege of leaving it with a neighbor for a few hours. Its mother, he said, died in Nova-Scotia. The stranger has not since been heard of. Mark, this child manifests a perfect indifference to all of woman kind, while for the *male* members of the family its attachments were strong

* The male loon is partner to the nest in the labor of incubation. Shall we learn the lesson of protection from "the male goose," and spurn the equally important lesson of "bearing one another's burdens" from the chivalrous loon.

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from the first—in their absence it is uneasy, moaning and weeping—in their presence, peaceful and happy. I have just returned from a visit to the above family—present three women, two or three children, and one man, and the little cast-off nestling quietly in the bosom of the man. Make your own inferences. I make two: the child has evidently been placed among men. Like cause will produce like effect. Call you this "nature"? It should be observed, however, that all efforts to magnify maternal responsibility at the expense of paternal, are uncalled for. The family should be no more neglected by the father than by the mother. There is an especial reason why the father should secure to himself the highest reverence and purest affection of his children. God is represented to them in the endearing appellation of a *Father:* how sure are they to transfer the character of the earthly to their heavenly Father. Let the visible father prove deficient in solicitude, watchfulness, love and munificence, and how loveless will be their conceptions of their invisible Father. Will it be said the father may follow his profession without neglecting the family duties. So may the mother.

It is further urged that "woman's voice is pitched an octave above that of man, but not less powerful—it reaches not so readily the ear, but more readily the heart,"—the very thing to be attained by preaching. What a charming preacher is here described. Lay your fingers on a keyed instrument and see if a pitch an octave above does not reach the most distant ear as readily as an octave below. I have listened to many a "woman preacher," but have never experienced any inconvenience or unpleasantness in this respect. Lastly, "woman is characterized by a predominance of sensibility—her feelings are more easily moved." And yet the Professor is not sure "beyond a doubt that thought is a more valuable commodity than feeling—that the intellect is a more precious boon than the heart." We will, therefore, "have the benefit of the doubt," and regard this predominance of sensibility as an invaluable qualification in a preacher. It is his (her) irresistible battery. "If you wish me to weep—weep yourself," has been the rhetoric of hoary centuries. I have searched long, but in vain for Prof. Bartlett's "Whitefield's unction." There is nothing in Whitefield's printed sermons, to shake a continent as with the tread of a giant. But when we behold his vast "sensibility" urging its way like "many waters" through his burn-

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ing lips, uplifted hands, and flooded eyes, the mystery is solved. Woman has an exuberance of this Christ-like qualification. Let her go forth then "bearing precious seed —*weeping*," and she "shall return again with joy bearing her sheaves with her." 'Tis the very influence needed to shame our *insensibility*, and melt our iceberg hearts.

It now remains to present a brief outline of the direct argument in defence of woman's right to the ministerial avocation. The Bible is eminently a reasonable book; its teachings are conformable with consistency. It is reasonable and consistent for the capable—those who have light—the qualified, to instruct the ignorant—to impart of their light to the unenlightened, and not "to hide it under a bushel." Reason asks but one question in the presence of the qualified, "is there a necessity?" She knows nothing of "emergencies"—the authority of necessity is infinitely superior. A woman qualified, finds herself (or places herself, if you please) in the presence of a *necessitous* congregation—to-day—to-morrow—next day—and all her days. What now is the voice of reason? "*Tools for those who can use them.*" Does she refuse to stretch forth her hand to the heavenly task—then is she a traitor to human necessity, and no woman. A beautiful illustration of conformity to the voice of reason in the presence of necessity have we in the wife of our brother Wm. H. Evarts, of the West India Mission; who in the absence—sickness—exhaustion—or other duties of her husband, immediately takes his place in the pulpit, to the great gratification of her numerous auditory. Should we find an isolated text that on the face of it *appeared* to prohibit this highly reasonable course, we should feel bound to give it a place among those sayings of Paul, "in which are some things hard to be understood"—or that the writer "spoke not by commandment from the Lord"—or what is more plausible, to be confined to the immediate time of its utterance, like the commendation of unmarried life, "for present distress." So long had the Corinthian women been regarded—and treated as inferiors, so long trampled under foot that they were disqualified for public teachers. Then let them "keep silence," for who wishes to hear a woman or man either, that has naught to communicate but "prattling," (one of the definitions of the word "to speak" in Cor. 14.) But now women marry, and women may preach, (being qualified.)

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That females did preach in the Apostle's days, and that this practice was pleasing to God, I infer from the following considerations:

1. In 1 Cor. xi, Paul refers to the practice of woman's praying and prophesying, in a manner that clearly shows it to have been a *common custom*. To affirm, (as does Thomas Scott,) that Paul is here only insisting that an unlawful practice shall be performed in a *decent* manner, without expressing disapprobation of the practice, is so anti-Pauline as to need no refutation.

2. Of Anna the prophetess it is positively affirmed that she was a public speaker, (Luke ii, 37, 38.) Nor is there any evidence that this, or the case of Philip's "four daughters that did prophesy" were "under special inspiration." How did it appear that these women were prophetesses, if to speak in public were a "confusion"—and if the spirits of the prophets are so subject to the prophets that they must needs never open their mouths?

3. The promises of the Spirit's effusion, in Joel ii, and Acts ii, are rightfully regarded as the property of the whole church. But mark the fruits of that "out-pouring;" "and your sons and your *daughters* shall *prophesy*." And on my servants and on my *hand-maidens*, I will pour out in those days of my Spirit, and *they* shall prophesy." To "prophecy" is to preach the gospel; (see 11th verse,) "we do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God." "Desire rather that ye may prophesy—he that prophesyeth speaketh unto men to edification and exhortation and comfort—he that prophesyeth, edifieth the church. But if all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, he is convinced of all, and thus are the secrets of his heart made manifest, and so falling down on his face, he will worship God and report that God is in you of a truth." 1 Cor. xiv.

And Judas and Silas, being *prophets*, exhorted the brethren with many words and comforted them." Acts xv, 32. Thus may the sisterhood, by "*divine right*," claim access to the ministry. And their claim is sanctioned by the practice of multitudes of their primitive sisters, beyond a reasonable doubt. No text of "doubtful interpretation" should be allowed to set aside palpable Bible record. In other words, we are not to interpret our knowledge in the light of our ignorance. Our ignorance of one text is never to control our knowledge of many texts. The rights of woman are from God. No human power can bequeath nor abridge her

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right to preach the unsearchable riches of the gospel of Christ. It is a right that outstrips all logical deductions—it addresses itself to our every perception, can gain nothing from analogy and borrow nothing from illustration, comparison can not aid in its developement, and similes can not make it more clear to the human mind. It is the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever.

As this article is already extended beyond the original design, several topics in the work under review, which I had designed to notice, must be passed by. No attempt at originality has been made, but I have gathered up thoughts with equal freeness from the labors of others, as from my own reflections. To E. P. Hulburt, of N. Y., and to Saml. J. May, of Syracuse, a special acknowledgment is due.

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ARTICLE XIV.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND SLAVERY.

BY REV. WM. B. BROWN,
OF SANDUSKY CITY.

It is said that every age has its hobby. The hobby of the present age is slavery. No other subject is so hackneyed as this. It is the theme of remark and the bone of contention every where, and continually. While some are ever struggling to keep it out of sight, others are perpetually thrusting it into view; and there is no place where it is not. It stands in the senate-chamber and before the altar; it meets you in the highway and follows you to the domestic circle; it intrudes itself upon your hours of business and haunts you amid the slumbers of the night. There are no periodicals so trifling or so grave, no books so superficial or profound, no gatherings so literary or so vulgar, no institutions so sacred or profane as to exclude this "vexed question." It has become an old story, and most persons dread to encounter it; and were such a thing possible they would doubtless for a time, at least, banish it from view. In some circumstances it might have been a suitable theme for elegant writing and for literary display: but now it is too vulgar, too matter of fact, too common place.

But notwithstanding all, it is to be made in one of its aspects the burden of this article, and we beg to be heard this once before we are condemned for our presumption in the choice of a subject. If we can not promise a lit-

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erary treat, we do promise to utter important truths, and truths that ought to bring the professedly religious and anti-slavery part of our population to a solemn pause. We do not promise to entrance the mind by an array of new, beautiful and brilliant thoughts, and glowing description; for we have another work to accomplish, more serious and more rational. It is to state truths new and old, clearly and strongly, and to make them so bear upon a single point as that duty in that direction should be no longer doubtful, and the point referred to is one of no common interest. At this day, as it respects the church of our land, it is the question of questions.

It is a well known fact that our principal ecclesiastical organizations, and leading religious institutions, are charged with being so connected with the sin of slavery as to have become unworthy of our confidence; and it is affirmed that those who act from high Christian principle and enlightened views, can not consistently co-operate with them. These charges are brought, not by the enemies of religion alone, but by many of its truest friends; not only by enthusiasts and those who make this a mere pretext for stabbing the church, but by sober-minded, honest, reflecting, devoted Christians. Indeed, the conviction in the minds of thousands is every day becoming stronger and stronger, that these institutions ought not to be practically sustained while their present position on the subject of slavery is continued; and these too, are persons who have long looked upon these institutions with the spirit of veneration not to say idolatry. They have not been led by their prejudices to think and feel thus, but against their prejudices. Some have already withdrawn such co-operation and many others doubtless will. Do they act wisely or not? This is surely an important question. If they have not good grounds for thinking, feeling and acting as they do, the fact ought to be known; and if they have it should be known also. The good of the world, the glory of God, requires that the truth should be spoken. If these Institutions are not guilty they have been greatly injured, if they are they are great injuries.

In the present article we shall take the position that they are guilty, and that enlightened Christians ought not to co-operate with them. This is the unpopular side of the question; and the side that no one could be justifiable in taking without having, after the most prayerful consideration, the deepest conviction that truth and justice demand-

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ed it. In the light of that solemn declaration, "Every one of us shall give an account of himself to God," we dare not take the other side, and we feel bound to take this. With that truth before us, when we see a worldly and temporizing spirit sapping the very foundations of our spiritual Zion; when we see religious institutions, and Institutions which combine immense learning, wealth and far-reaching influence, and who give a tone, character and direction to the operations of the whole church, bowing down to a corrupt public sentiment, and taking special pains to shape their entire course so as to accommodate immense systems of wickedness; when we see this course pursued with cool and studied deliberation year after year, and hear nearly all the people saying, amen; when the few who do not say amen are treated with cold suspicion, and often as the enemies of the cross of Christ; when the right of calling these organizations to an account or even of withdrawing from them is denied, thus evincing that the spirit of monopoly not to say of popery holds dominion there; when we see all this, our duty is plain. God and humanity require us to speak; yet would we speak with kindness, and caution, and candor. We would not deal in generalities or wholesale denunciations, but would state facts precisely as they are, and as most know them to be, and then draw our deductions from them.

With respect to most of these organizations there are several reasons on account of which we find it difficult to stand connected with, or to co-operate with them. They, with their complicated machinery seem so unlike those institutions, in their simplicity, which Christ and the Apostles established; they stand directly in the way of promoting the work of general reform, for these institutions never do, and never can give their influence in favor of an unpopular movement until it is mainly carried in the community, and all reform is at first unpopular; then there is a strong tendency in all large bodies of men to corruption, and when they become corrupt it is almost impossible to reform them, or to prevent their doing immense mischief. But these are not the grounds on which it is now proposed to urge objections. We shall speak alone, or mainly of the relations they sustain to the sin of slavery, and show that while this connection continues we can not consistently co-operate with them.

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But lest our true position should be misunderstood, it is important here, once for all, to state in their favor, that we believe they were originally formed by godly men and with the purest of motives; that they have already accomplished in the world immense good; that still there is a vast amount of true piety acting in connection with them; that in many points of view their influence is still excellent, and their usefulness great; and that they are not to be regarded as past hope of reform; but notwithstanding all this, while they maintain their present connection with slavery, we can not consistently, as enlightened Christians, while acting from high moral and religious principle, give them our countenance and support.

The argument which this article is intended to develop, is embodied in the following propositions or resolutions:

I. That American slavery, and consequently slave-holding, *in the light of this day* is enormous and unmingled wickedness, and can no more be reconciled with the spirit of the gospel than heaven can be reconciled with hell; they are direct opposites, and to give countenance to one is to oppose the other.

II. That the principle of ecclesiastical and religious organizations of our own land, including those churches and organizations which admit slave-holders to their communion, together with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the American Home Missionary Society, the American Tract and Bible Societies, the American Sabbath School Union, and perhaps some others, are exerting in different ways a direct, powerful and studied influence to harmonize slave-holding with their respective enterprises; they are giving countenance to the system and are partakers of its guilt.

III. That those who assent to the above propositions are bound, as men of principle, as Christians, and for the good of all concerned to withhold co-eperation with these institutions till this unholy compromise is broken up.

The first of these propositions, it will be seen, relates to the intrinsic sinfulness of slavery. In remarking upon it, much stress should be laid upon the expression *in the light of the present day*. The degree of guilt which attaches to this, as to all other sins, is graduated by the amount of light which may have been elicited in relation to it. The time has been when the sin of slave-holding was immeasurably less than it now is. It is urged by some, and with

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the show of reason that the time has been when slave-holding did not necessarily imply sin. Before sin can be affirmed as a *necessary* accompanyment of slavery, the idea of the *inherent right of self-ownership* must be developed in the mind. Without that idea it is impossible to declare slavery to be in its *essential nature* sinful. Now, we are told that the time has been when this idea was not developed —when not a single individual upon the whole earth was in possession of it. The Bible itself as understood by those who held it, did not reveal the inherent right of self-ownership. If the grand truths and principles which it announced, in their logical deductions involved this, those deductions were not drawn, and this conclusion was not seen. Nor was it necessarily the fault of men that they were ignorant. The abuses of slavery they could understand; but that the fundamental element of the system, the relation itself was sinful, they could not know unless God should assert it in positive and unmistakable terms, terms at the time and to those addressed unmistakable, or unless it should be developed in their minds by a series of discipline, experience and reflections through which they had passed. Now it is claimed, or at least might be, that the time has been when neither of these conditions existed. If some portions of the Bible seemed to condemn slavery, others appeared to countenance it.

It is true that our Savior gave us the golden rule, saying, "Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you," and this rule as we view it condemns the vital element of slavery; but as it was understood when first announced, it struck only at its abuses; it taught masters not to give liberty to their slaves, but simply to treat them as they would wish to be treated were they slaves themselves. In that day nothing had occurred to develop in the minds of men the inherent and fundamental rights of humanity, and they were not developed. In such an age the inherent right of self-ownership was not recognized, and perhaps it was not the fault of those who then lived that they were ignorant.

Now let all this, and surely no one will claim more, be granted, and what follows? We answer nothing by which slavery can be justified in our day, unless it can be made out that the idea of the inherent right of self-ownership is not yet developed. If this could be shown, slavery in its moral aspects might be a very different

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thing from what we now regard it. It might stand where persecution for conscience's sake stood hundreds of years ago, before the idea of the inherent right of conscience in matters of religious faith was developed. Then persecution in its sternest forms may have been a less crime than it now is, even in its mildest features; and perhaps there were cases when it was no sin at all. So when the right of self-ownership was not recognized as inherent, (if there ever was such a time,) slavery was one thing, but now in the light of that great truth it is a very different thing. In those days of ignorance God may have winked at it, but now he demands repentance.

We think no one in our day will deny man's inherent right to himself, except as that right is forfeited by crime. It is one of the great truths of reason, which when once developed the mind knows absolutely; when once apprehended by the world can never be lost again. Whatever may have been true in past ages, or may still be true in some countries, every American has this idea as fully revealed as are the ideas of the existence of space, of duration, or of his own existence. If there are any exceptions it is because they are willfully blind, (and such blindness does not lessen responsibility and guilt,) or, because they are semi-idiotic. This is not a truth that we arrive at by a course of intricate reasoning; it belongs to that class of first truths, which, the moment they are announced, and the statement is understood, are seen and known to be true. It is a truth, which, in our day no one will deny, and which many think has always been known.

Now let us proceed a step further. This truth—the inherent right of self-ownership—is not only seen to be a truth, but it is by far the most fundamental and important truth appertaining to man in his relations to his fellow man. It is the central pivot on which all the others turn; the inner fort to which all the others in the extremity of danger flee, and are defended. Strike down this truth and man has nothing left. If you deny him the right of self-ownership, he can have no rights whatever. His case is helpless, hopeless, intolerable. Grant him this right and he need scarcely ask for more; "he has all and abounds." There flows from this, by stern necessity, the right of contract, the right of property, the right of domestic relationship, the right of conscience, and the right to be treated in all respects as a man and a brother.

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The grand inference for which we are now prepared, is, that whoever disregards, or tramples upon this inherent right of self-ownership, commits the highest crime against his fellow mortal that he is capable of committing. If that right is more sacred, and more important than all others, then to violate it is the greatest possible crime. Indeed it involves within itself every species and degree of wickedness which was ever committed by one man against another, unless murder be an exception. It involves fraud, extortion, stealing, robbery, injustice and cruelty in every form, and in the superlative degree.

What now is slave-holding? It is the practical denial and contempt of this right. It makes *man* a mere *thing*, an article of merchandize. It is therefore "the vilest system that ever the sun shone upon," "the sum of all villanies." In point of guilt and meanness, common stealing and robbery bear no comparison. With the great principle, man's inherent right to himself distinctly in view, we speak calmly, and wisely, and correctly, when we pronounce the inmates of our penitentiaries to be, as a class, gentlemen, benefactors to the world, and almost saints before God, in comparison with the great mass of slave-holders at the south, and many of their abettors at the north.

We repeat then the position with which we started, namely that slaveholding *in the light of the present day*, is enormous and unmingled wickedness and can no more be reconciled with the spirit of the gospel than heaven can be reconciled with hell; they are direct opposites, and to countenance one is to oppose the other. If slave-holding in the light of this day may be reconciled with the gospel, then there is no sin in the universe that can not; and if to countenance slaveholding is not to oppose the gospel, then man is incapable of opposing it. And if giving it countenance, is opposing the gospel at all, it is opposing it in its application to the rights of man entirely; for slavery is at war with all those rights. Besides, the spirit of the gospel like the spirit of the law is one, is a unit, and we can not partly oppose it and partly sustain it at the same time. We may appear to do this in the sight of men, but not so in the sight of God. "We are for Christ or against him." "He that is guilty in one point is guilty of all." "We can not serve God and mammon"—God and slavery.

This part of our subject has been dwelt upon thus long, because we have always noticed that those who attempt to

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justify our ecclesiastical bodies, and other religious institutions in their relations to slavery, have invariably attempted this by really justifying slavery itself. They may, and commonly do admit in general terms that slavery is a great sin, but the moment you press them on this point, they will turn and tell you that slavery is not so great a sin as it might be, that the people are ignorant, that the system was entailed upon them by their fathers, that it is hard to ask them to give up their property without compensation, that there are many good Christian slave-holders at the south, that the slaves are better off in bondage than they would be if free, that if you let them loose they would cut the throats of their masters, and all this. Now if these excuses mean anything, they are an attempted justification of slavery. But if our positions thus far have been sustained, they are based in delusion and falsehood—slavery is an unmitigated sin, which neither deserves nor can have any apology. Yet if all this be true, those organizations can not be justified, as we shall soon see, even for a moment. Indeed this, by those who attempt their justification is felt to be true, hence their arguments for slavery; hence too, the necessity of setting this matter in its true light before we proceed further.

We come now to the second proposition, which is, that the principal, popular religious organizations of our land, embracing those churches and organizations which admit slave-holders to their communion, together with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the American Home Missionary Society, the American Bible and Tract Societies, the American S. S. Union, and perhaps some others, are exerting in different ways a direct, studied and powerful influence to harmonize their respective enterprizes with slave-holding; they give countenance to the system and are partakers of its guilt.

These are grave charges, and in considering them we shall not labor to make out a case, but shall speak of such facts as are within the reach of all and generally before the community.

There are three questions in this connection to be proposed and answered. 1. What position ought they to occupy? 2. What position do they in fact occupy? 3. Does this position imply countenance of the sin and participation in its guilt.

What position ought these Institutions to occupy in their relations to slavery?

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We answer, not one of neutrality. This is the position they have labored hard to sustain, but under the circumstances they can not be neutral, and if they could they have no right to be so. These Institutions incorporate within themselves the principal part of the professed Christianity of our country, and exert the great portion of so-called religious influence. Now, we ask, with such mighty power in their hands, when they see one sixth part of our countrymen held in the cruel grasp of slavery; when they see this hell-born institution exerting a powerful and successful influence to corrupt both church and state; when they see that the question of liberty and slavery has become the great question of the age, a question that is pressing itself upon their notice, and staring them in the face at every turn; when they have reason to know that their indifference and attempted neutrality is understood to be a sanction of the system, is bringing reproach upon the religion of Christ, and driving thousands into infidelity; when they know it is encouraging, if indeed it is not intended to encourage, the slave-holder in his crimes, while it is leaving his helpless victim uncared for; when they know that the power is in their hands by which they might bring this curse to a speedy termination if they would employ it; when they may know that to exert this power would bring untold joy to hundreds of millions, while it would cause sadness to none but tyrants and their minions; when they know all this, and much more, have they a right to be neutral? nay, is it possible to be neutral?

The great plea for neutrality has ever been, we must not turn aside from our appropriate work. But what is their appropriate work, except to destroy sin, to promote holiness, to bless mankind? When they depart from such labors have they not already abandoned their appropriate work and joined hands with the wicked? If it be said that there is something else to be done in the world besides warring with slavery, we grant it; but, if it is claimed that slavery does not lie within the natural province of these institutions, we deny it. What, let it be asked, are they doing so important and so peculiar, that none of them can lift a finger "to undo the heavy burdens and let the oppressed go free," without stepping aside from their proper work? One is promoting the cause of missions abroad; but have we not three millions of Christian-made heathen at home to be converted? And would it be departing from the missionary

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work to give them a single look of sympathy, or intimate that they need the gospel? Another is engaged in the work of missions at home. Is this too, inconsistent with doing any thing for the slave? Is he outside the pale of foreign missions and of home missions, both? Another society is promoting the tract cause. And may this society without leaving its proper work, write tracts against every sin in the universe but that of slavery? Another society is promoting the Bible cause; and do the slaves need no Bibles? Another is engaged in the Sabbath-school enterprize; but does the poor slave need no instruction? The truth is, that slavery lies directly within the field, and almost within its very centre, which every one of these organizations professes to cultivate; and so far from going out of their way to notice it, they are going almost infinitely out of their way even to the very borders of infidelity to get around it. Three millions of crushed bondmen clank their chains before the doors of these several institutions, and beg for help; theirs is the eloquence of solemn, agonizing, heart-broken silence, for they dare not speak a word. It is a plea for themselves and their children; it is a plea for the light of the gospel, and they plead in the name of God and humanity; but what answer do they obtain. They are turned away with the cold reply, Your cause does not come within the circle of our labors. There is no sense, nor truth, nor honesty, in that reply. It is a mere excuse gotten up in the absence of any thing better, for the purpose of self-defense. It is a miserable defense. It is worse than nothing; for besides being cold as an ice-berg, it is false as error. It were far better, like the Priest and the Levite, leaving the poor slave half dead, to go on the other side without speaking a word.

But grant for a moment that these institutions are neutral on the subject of slavery, and what follows? We reply, their very neutrality is proof conclusive of their guilt. If they may be neutral in relation to this sin they may be in respect to all others. It is their condemnation that they do nothing where they ought to do much. In the day of judgment will it not be said, "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these my brethren ye did it not unto me." The conclusion to which we arrive, is, that these institutions are bound to exert a direct, powerful, and uncompromising influence against slavery wherever they meet it. We do not demand more; yet if, like David when he slew Goliah, they

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should occasionally step a little out of their natural path to destroy an enemy that is boldly defying the army of the living God, who would blame them? At least let them not attempt to be neutral; for this, besides the wickedness it involves, is cruel as the grave.

"'Tis the most unkindest cut of all." So much for the position they ought to occupy.

Our next inquiry is, what position do they in fact occupy? We answer at once, it is a position in which they constantly and powerfully uphold the system of slavery; they constitute its stong bulwark of defense. They are the house of refuge to which it flees for safety, the brazen altar on which it hangs for protection; and it has found in them a protection thus far which has been unfailing. Now for the proof.

These institutions have not only refused to advance of themselves, and freely, in the work of opposing slavery, but how have they generally treated those, who in Christian faithfulness, have endeavored, in the form of memorial, remonstrance, petition and resolution, to bring the subject before them for consideration? As a general rule such persons have been regarded as intruders, and treated with coldness. Their counsel has not been received, much less sought, and they have generally been made to feel that their presence was not desired. Petitions on the subject have not only not been granted, but often they have not been admitted, and when they have found admittance it was only to be hurried upon the table as soon as possible. If discussions have at times come up, it has been to the great and manifest annoyance of the majority, and they have generally been choked down as soon as possible. Every species of wire-working which talent, skill, experience and ingenuity could invent, has been employed to keep this subject outside the door, and when they have been successful, the highest possible satisfaction has been manifested. In the appointment of officers every precaution has been taken to secure those who would not commit these institutions in favor of liberty and against slavery. That one is a slaveholder is generally no objection, but he must not upon any account be a decided and avowed abolitionist. The appeals of slavery are listened to when those of liberty are rejected. The threats of slavery produce fear and counter-movement, while those of liberty pass uncared for. More is done to cover up and conceal than to expose the wickedness of slavery. While every

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effort is made to show up the errors and fanaticism of the anti-slavery man nothing is left unsaid by which the slaveholder could be screened. If these institutions have made any progress it has been forced out of them by an advancing public sentiment, the growth of which they have opposed at every step.

This is not idle talk, but sober truth; and what do all these facts put together show? They show that these institutions are allied to slavery, that they give it countenance and support, and must share in its guilt. They are inexplicable on any other hypothesis.

But lest the correctness of these statements should be doubted or denied, let us enter into detail, and learn there how the case stands.

We speak first of churches and ecclesiastical organizations generally. What is their relationship to slavery? They open their arms wide and receive it to their very bosoms; they baptize it under the name of religion; they call it brother. They fellowship it at the communion table, and receive instruction from its traitor lips at the altar. They treat slaveholding as a mere trifle—as no evidence against Christian character. While they hunt down as heretics, and cast out of the church, those who in a few non-essential points of doctrine, and points of almost no practical importance can not believe in exact accordance with the prescribed creed, they take slavery with its hoofs and horns into the church, and hide it from its heaven-sent pursuers under the very altar of the sanctuary, and defend it to the last. Yes, they do this amid the full-orbed light of the present day.

Go to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. See Southern slavery represented by slave-holding ministers on that floor; see nearly all the Presbyterian churches of our land, slaveholding and non-slaveholding, represented there, and standing side by side in brotherly affection and Christian fellowship; hear them consulting together about converting the world to God; see them sit down at the communion table and take the emblems of Christ's broken body and shed blood from hands stained with the blood of slaves; see them arise from that table to denounce what they call northern fanaticism, and defend the "peculiar institution;" listen to the committees' would-be non-commital report on the subject of slavery; mark the excitement when a single northern man dare move a report which shall

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mean something; see that amendment voted down almost unanimously, and the original one unanimously sustained; then hear the shout, " we have capped the Vesuvius for the next three years; "—mark all this, and it is repeated annually, then answer the question, Have we overdrawn the picture?

What is here said of the Presbyterian Church, is essentially true of the Episcopal, the Methodist, and the Baptist Churches, although the ecclesiastical polity of some of these make the connection less perfect. But in justice it must be admitted, and we rejoice to admit it, that there are many individual societies or churches of all the above-named denominations who have severed the bands that bound them to slavery, and others we hope will soon do it. It is due also to state that many individuals in pro-slavery churches are not at home there, and are only waiting to see if something can not be done to break up this unholy combination. If there can not be they will soon change their relationship. Our statement is, that these organizations and churches as a whole, countenance and sustain slavery, and if it has any guilt they share in it.

Let us now turn to some of the daughters of the church —those institutions that have been brought into existence to promote given departments of Christian effort. It would be natural to anticipate that they would possess the general character of their paternity. So we shall find it.

These institutions are truly in a sad predicament; they are between two fires—one in the front and another in the rear. Slavery is before them, God and humanity are behind them, and they are not willing fully to surrender themselves to either. The consequence is, they are in turns fired upon by both. If they cut and trim as they usually do, to suit the demands of slavery, humanity showers down its artillery upon them, and if they retreat before the storm so far as to encroach upon slavery and come within the reach of its batteries, they suffer a raking fire from that direction. They are, and they evidently feel that they are in a most uncomfortable position, in miserably close quarters. They really know not what to do, and we know not what they will do. Of one thing we may be certain; if humanity should take down her battery they would at once make peace with slavery, and we fear they will at best, if indeed it has not been done already. Our conclusion is that this galling fire in the rear, even though it may seem

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cruel, must be kept up; the only hope of their future usefulness depends upon it.

Let our position be re-stated. These institutions, in different ways, are exerting a direct, powerful, and studied influence to harmonize their respective enterprizes with the system and demands of slavery, thus countenancing the sin, and partaking of its guilt.

Look, first, at the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

It is admitted on all hands, at least by all who have any true anti-slavery feeling, that for many years this almost worshipped institution has been bowing and cringing at the mandates of Southern slavery. Thousands, while they have loved the missionary cause, have felt the deepest interest in the Board, have nevertheless felt bound for truth's sake to withdraw active co-operation, while thousands more have been induced to continue their support, only on the hope they have had, that she would soon change her position. A year or two since, events transpired which greatly encouraged that hope. Statements were made by the officers of the Board that caused every anti-slavery heart to rejoice. Now leaving her past history where is she to-day? She has changed her position, but it has been towards slavery. Look at the records of her recent annual meeting in Pittsfield—a meeting with which all her officers, all our pro-slavery periodicals, and all the South are in perfect ecstasies. Why this rejoicing? We answer, because those who were there were afraid to speak, and those who would have spoken had they been there, staid away. They did this because they knew their presence was not wanted; or they believed that speaking would be useless to the Board, while it would bring down indignation upon themselves. But for these things the anti-slavery note would have been sounded by a thousand voices, and by many of the strongest and best men in America. As things were the meeting was harmonious, and as Dr. Anderson tells us, was the most glorious meeting ever held. But what did it do? *It took back the only seeming anti-slavery act it ever performed.* It virtually asked pardon for ever having done it; and declared that it never intended to do what all anti-slavery men supposed was done deliberately and in good faith. We refer of course to the matter of Mr. Treat's letter in connection with Cherokee and Choctaw missions. That letter, and other things connected with it, when presented at Chicago raised the ex-

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pectation that unless those missions abandoned slavery and rejected slave-holders from the church, they would themselves be rejected by the Board. By the recent meeting in Pittsfield that expectation is annihilated. Secretary Treat's letter is explained away by saying that it was mere advice to those missions, but was not authoritative, and it is more than intimated that the *advice* was such as would not again be given. Certainly it was not given, for there is not a word in the doings of the late meeting which recognizes slavery as existing in those churches, or as any way connected with the missions except in the mere matter of hiring slaves to do their work. The Board has now deliberately taken her position. She says she never intended to declare slave-holding to be inconsistent with church-membership, or to require mission churches to banish it from their midst. Her present position and future purposes are thus defined by the New York Observer in its account of the Pittsfield meeting. "Next, the specific case of the Choctaw mission came up, and a letter recently received from those *noble missionaries* was read. It was a masterly letter; putting the facts and the argument in such a light that nothing short of dullness could fail of being convinced. Not a voice was raised against it, not an exception was taken to it. * * * * There is no flinching from former positions—no concessions to the demands of unreasonable men. It reaffirms former views, and so far as it respects the matter of *hiring* slaves it turns the argument of Mr. Treat's letter back upon all those who use slave productions with a force that can not be resisted.

It was evident that no farther action was needed. The Board had taken its own ground and expressed it year after year. *There was nothing in the practice of the missionaries inconsistent with that position.* It now only remained for the Board to go on with its appropriate business—the cause of missions to the *heathen*. It did so to the great joy of thousands."

This is out-spoken and needs no comment. The American Board has bound herself to the car of slavery; she is in full fellowship with the system; she is there deliberately and from choice. Let this be remembered, and let those who give their money through this Board remember it. Let anti-slavery men who still support this Board, instead of others who are promoting the cause of free missions, begin to search for that invaluable but lost "jewel," consistency.

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Let us turn next to the American Home Missionary Society.

A single sentence will state her position. Not only does she in common with all the other societies, have slaveholders among her life and honorary members, if not in her corporate body: not only does she have slave-holding auxiliaries at the South; not only does she send agents to solicit funds from slaveholders, and this too with the distinct understanding that they are not to utter a word against slavery, but she does what is infinitely worse. She contributes the funds of anti-slavery men to build up and sustain slavery churches. Of course then she is striving to harmonize slavery and Christianity, that is, if she regards the building up of those churches as promoting Christianity.

Perhaps it may said that the Home Missionary Society has recently taken an advance step in granting assistance to a small anti-slavery church in Kentucky, notwithstanding slaveholding presbyteries petitioned against it. We know this has been done, and we rejoice in it. We hope it was done freely, and not from dread of that fire in the rear to which we have just referred. But what are the inferences? Plainly these. That this society is willing to support an *anti-slavery* church, but not because it is anti-slavery, for to say the least, it would just as soon give that church support were it decidedly pro-slavery. And further, if any claim in view of the fact that this society has aided *one* anti-slavery church at the South, that therefore it is opposed to slavery, we have much greater reason to claim in view of the fact that it gives aid to *many* slavery churches that it is therefore in favor of slavery. And further still, if this act is claimed to be proof of marked progress in that society we beg to inquire what must have been her character before this progress was made? Then she was for slavery entirely, now she is for both. We would not be severe, but such a position strongly reminds us of the case of that poor sailor who in the midst of a terrible storm, not knowing into whose hands he might fall, and desiring to make peace with both, cried out, good Lord and good devil alternately. Shall such a Society be supported when we may give our money to the support of home missions just as well, and much better, in another way.

We come next to the American Tract Society.

We do not complain of her that she sends her tracts and other publications to the South, for we wish they had more

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of them; but we do complain that she selects and employs slaveholders and their apologists to carry and distribute them. But there is another high ground of complaint. It is that while this society, as it should do, publishes tracts on the subjects of profanity, gambling, drunkenness, Sabbath-breaking, lying, stealing, licentiousness, and almost every other form of evil, it has never published one single word against slavery. This neglect is not because they have not been urged to do it, for they have been repeatedly, and thousands of dollars would be furnished them immediately if they would employ it in printing and circulating anti-slavery truth. A donation on such terms they do not want, and we presume would not receive. Nor is this neglect because slavery is not within the field of their operations, for this Society more than any other carries on its work in the very midst of slavery. Why then this neglect to publish any thing against this system of iniquity? It is solely because to do so would give offence to slaveholders at the South and their apologists at the North, and they are not willing to break hands with them; they would sooner followship and cover up iniquity than do it. No other construction can be put upon their conduct unless it is claimed that they do not regard slavery as a sin, and therefore do not oppose it. Either view makes the society culpable.

We come now to speak of the American Bible Society.

This in its relations to slavery has generally been regarded as an exception to the others. It has been so regarded by the writer. But what are the facts? There are in this land three millions of human beings destitute of the Bible, and forbidden by law to read it. What has this society ever done to remove this hindrance to their work of giving the Bible to every one on earth? Absolutely nothing. From anything they have ever said or published as a society, the world would never know that such a fact as the above existed. A few years ago the Society announced to the world that it had supplied every destitute family in the United States, who were willing to receive it, with a copy of the Holy Scriptures, when they well knew that two hundred and fifty thousand families, that nearly one half the destitute families in the land, that one sixth part of all our population had never had the Bible offered them. Thus did this Society show that like the laws of the south they do not regard slaves as human beings. Now why is it, we ask, that so much is said and done to supply one half of our

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destitute population with the Bible, while not a finger is lifted or a word spoken to secure the same blessing to the other half? It is not because they are less needy, but because they are slaves, and this society is the slave of slavery. The Bible Society is loud and constant in denouncing the Pope for withholding the Bible from the people, but it has never alluded to the customs and laws of the whole south on this subject. We have in our country about two millions of Catholics, many of whom have no Bible, and what lamentation, and curses does it call forth. We have three millions of slaves and they have no Bible, and not a whisper is heard. What does this mean? Till some explanation is given we can not take back that remark, that this society is the slave of slavery.

We must not pass over particulars. Several years ago five thousand dollars was guarantied to this society on condition that it should be used in supplying the slaves with the word of God. Did they receive it thankfully? No, they *rejected the donation.* They would not promise to give the Bible to the slave even if the means were put into their hands. They, refused, not because they hated the slave, but because they feared his master. In 1841 a Bible Agent was arrested in New Orleans for offering the Bible to a slave. Before the court he plead ignorance of the law, and on that ground was released. But the judge declared to the Agent that he had just escaped the penitentiary, and warned him never to repeat the act. He, or the N. O. Society promised for him accordingly. The parent Society never remonstrated, nor even adverted to this interference with their work. In 1843 at the annual meeting of the American Bible Society held in Cincinnati, the following resolution was presented, and after a long and heated discussion was rejected by a vote, twenty-nine to seventeen, most of the members skulking or refusing to vote.

"Resolved, That all our auxiliaries located in slave-holding states, be urgently requested, as far as practicable to supply every person in their vicinity, able to read, whether bond or free, with a copy of the Holy Scriptures."

What does the rejection of such a resolution mean? Its explanation has already been given.

We are told that the society has its auxiliaries at the south and the matter of distributing the Bible is left to them. But the officers of these societies are slave-holders, at least many of them are, and the rest are in favor of sla-

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very, and what are the inferences? One is that the Society has slave-holders among its officers, and is thereby allied to the system. Another is that such men will not give the Bible to the slave. Hear the testimony of four of the officers of the New Orleans Society, given under oath when the Agent above refered to was on trial for offering the Bible to a slave. They said that when they appointed their agents, "it never for a moment entered the mind of the society to present *a single Bible to a slave.*" From such societies what can be expected? Yet this is one of the American Bible Society's most efficient auxiliaries. Put all these facts together, and the necessary inference is that the Bible Society is striving to harmonize its operations with slavery, that it does this voluntarily, and deliberately, and perseveringly, and therefore partakes in its guilt.

We shall speak of but one society more, the American Sabbath School Union.

Like the Tract Society it has never, to our knowledge, but in one instance, published a single word that was understood to bear directly against slavery. That was in a small book by the Rev. Thomas H. Gallaudet, late principal of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum at Conn.; a man no way famous for his anti-slavery sentiments, but extensively known as the author of various Sunday School books and other juvenile publications. This book was first published by the American S. S. Union, about sixteen years ago, and was entitled, "Jacob and his sons," and is among the best works of that author. The following is the passage refered to.

"What is a slave, mother? (asked Mary.) Is it a servant? Yes, (replied the mother,) slaves are servants, for they work for their masters and wait on them; but they are not hired servants, but are bought and sold like beasts, and have nothing but what their masters choose to give them. They are obliged to work very hard and sometimes, their masters use them cruelly, beat them, and starve them, and kill them—for they have nobody to help them. Sometimes they are chained together and driven about like beasts."

When, not long since, this paragraph was discovered by slave-holders, and found to have been published by the American S. S. Union, they were thrown into a great rage. They denounced the Union through the press, and called upon the whole south to with-hold all contributions from that society, and in no way to co-operate with it till this

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book was stricken from their catalogue. They passed resolutions at home, and sent up their complaints to the Board at Philadelphia, and the officers of the Board, *at the demand of slave-holders dropped the book from their list.* Then, and not before, the south became reconciled; and the Sunday S. Union of South Carolina, which was auxiliary to the American S. S. Union, among other expressions of satisfaction used the following language:

"Resolved, that the confidence of this Board in the American S. S. Union is undiminished, and that the recent action of their Committee of Publication is a sufficient pledge that nothing will at any time hereafter be issued from the press under their control, calculated to awaken sectarian feeling or *sectional jealousy.*"

They further resolved, "To vindicate the society from any disposition to *agitate or meddle with a topic altogether foreign to the designs of the American S. S. Union.*"

This shows how the South understood the matter; and the Board has never intimated that it did not understand it in the same light. But this is not all. When the facts became public the Board was earnestly petitioned and entreated from many parts of the north to restore the rejected book. They were assured that its rejection under the circumstances could only be regarded as a fearful and deliberate compromise with slavery—as an endorsement of the system. The Board disregarded their petitions and refused to restore the book. The south forbid their telling the world what a slave was, and they dared not disregard the prohibition. They stand virtually pledged not to speak for the slave.

Now if all this had been done openly and in the face of day, it would be less inexcusable. But it was done secretly, and every effort has been made since then to keep it secret. They have refused public discussion, and to a considerable extent private correspondence. They have expressed deep regret that northern men should have spoken or published anything in relation to it. When the light of investigation has approached them they have shrunk back into the darkness which their own deeds have generated and exclaimed, "Let us alone, what have we to do with thee;" thus adopting the watchword of Satan's camp. Is such a society worthy of confidence? Has it not more sympathy for the cruel tyrant than for his crushed victim?

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We have now gone through the list but before leaving this part of our subject, fairness and candor require, that with respect to all these organizations, one general admission should be made. It is that the great majority of those who act in connection with them are free to admit, in general terms, the sinfulness of slavery. They almost uniformly admit this as private individuals, and frequently in their associated capacity, they incorporate the same sentiment in their reports and resolutions. It is on this ground alone that these institutions can claim the slightest defense. It is on this ground alone that our preceding statements can be condemned as exparty or untruthful. Let the inquiry be made, does this fact constitute the slightest ground of defense for them, or of condemnation to us?

These admissions do not excuse them because they are always made in such circumstances, and with so many neutralizing and qualifying statements, as entirely to destroy their force. Take for illustration Dr. Beman's report on the subject of slavery, made at the last meeting of the N. S. General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. There were sentences and parts of sentences in it, which were good, but taken as a whole it was worse than good for nothing. While it gave no offence to slave-holders at the south, because it was no rebuke to them, it delighted pro-slavery men at the north for the same reason. It was a compromise of principle which was infinitely worse than nothing. So it uniformly is when these societies speak on the subject of slavery. Commence as they may they are sure to end in such a way as to gain the applause of slavery; and make humanity weep. This double dealing is merely for effect's sake. It is *appearing* to be one thing and *being* another. Or as Aristotle would represent the matter, it is attempting to clothe the wolf in a sheep's garment; and a greater than Aristotle has referred to the same thing.

If it seems hard that we should represent these admissions as unmeaning, if not insincere, then we will take the other view, which we believe is the true one, and grant that these organizations do really believe slavery to be unqualifiedly enormous wickedness, and consequently slave-holders enormous sinners; what follows now. Plainly this; that they are in full fellowship with this wickedness. But such a conclusion is the very one we had before arrived at. The truth is, these societies, if they really believe slavery to be a great sin, are by far less excusable than they might be,

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if they could be so dull and blind as to think it no sin at all. This declared ground of justification then, if it be a reality, is, in point of fact, a ground of greater condemnation, and if it be not a reality, it leaves the question unchanged, except that it casts upon those organizations the charge of double dealing not to say hypocrisy. But in our comments we have chosen to speak not so much of what these societies have said, as of what they have done; and if their conduct has been rightly represented our argument is sound.

With all that has been said before the mind we are now prepared to submit the question. Were the statements with which we started too strongly drawn? It was affirmed that these institutions were exerting in different ways a direct, powerful and studied influence to harmonize their respective enterprises with the sin of slavery; that they were giving countenance to the system, and were partakers of its guilt. If all this has not been made out, then it would seem that nothing can be proven by evidence. There is no more proof that Popery favors spiritual despotism, and general ignorance, than that these Institutions favor slavery. There is no more proof that the great political parties of our land have been bowing and bending to accommodate slavery than that these institutions have; and if the former are culpable so are the latter. And if we ought to withdraw from the former on account of their connection with slavery we are bound to withdraw from the latter for the same reason; unless indeed, purity in politics is more essential than purity in the church. But this brings us to the last and following proposition.

That those who assent to the truth of the two preceding propositions are bound in consistency, as men of principle, as Christians, and for the good of all concerned, to withhold co-operation with these institutions until this unholy compromise is broken up.

This conclusion, as it appears to us, follows inevitably. If slavery, as we have seen, in the light of this day is unmingled wickedness, "the sum of all villainies," "a crime without a name;" if this wickedness flows not from the abuse of the system, such as over-working, under-feeding, whipping, &c., but from its essential nature—from a practical disregard of the inherent right of self-ownership; and if these institutions, as we think has been shown, are giving countenance and support to this system of enormous wickedness, and are doing it deliberately and perseveringly, then

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how can we escape the conclusion, that as men of principle, and as Christians, it is our duty to withdraw active co-operation with them till this unholy compromise is broken up. If we reject the conclusion either in theory or practice without rejecting the premises also, (and to reject these is to blind our eyes to evidence,) then it follows of necessity, that we have a morality and a religion which permits us voluntarily to co-operate with those who sustain directly, and of choice, the greatest and vilest of crimes; and so to co-operate as to encourage and uphold them in their position. We appeal, is such conduct consistent with Christian ethics, not to say Christian character?

Let us suppose a case, for this point must not be dodged or lost sight of. We will suppose there are in a given community an extensive band of horse-thieves; that many of them are persons of natural amiability, of wealth, and of learning. They are brave generous and hospitable; they are frank in avowing their sentiments, and in acknowledging themselves horse-thieves. Their fathers were horse-thieves before them, from whom they inherited much of their present stock, and also such compromises with the people round about as to enable them with safety to continue the business. They have gained such power and influence that although thousands of horses are stolen every week, it is dangerous, nay, impossible at present to break them up. Indeed they have followed so long, and so successfully this business, that they claim and maintain the right to continue it. They denounce those who deny this right as fanatics, and intruders, and threaten to hang them if they come within their reach. Now in the midst and in the near proximity of these horse-thieves there are certain churches, ecclesiastical institutions, and benevolent societies. Those churches receive these horse-thieves to their communion and call them brethren; for they say we must make great allowances, they were educated to steal horses, and have been doing it from childhood. Indeed in some of these churches the minister is a horse-thief, and so are the deacons, and all the officers, and most of the members. And these same churches belong to the Presbytery, and Synod, and General Assembly; and when the sons of God come together at their great meetings, those horse-stealing ministers and elders come also with them. And what seems remarkable, they are appointed to the "uppermost seats," and are especially consulted on questions relating to the pu-

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rity of the church and the salvation of the world, for these men greatly desire the salvation of souls, and are exceeding zealous for the law, especially for the law of their church, and of horse-stealing. But if there happens to be present a fire-brand of a fanatic, as is sometimes the case, who intimates that in the light of this day horse-stealing is not quite right, and suggests that a committee be appointed to examine the subject and report at the next meeting, a terrible sensation follows. Every horse-stealing minister flies into a rage, and threatens to withdraw from the body if that matter is pressed farther. He declares that the church has nothing to do with the business of horse-stealing, and that this subject shall not be looked into, and the rest of the brethren say, Amen. And then to heal the wound more fully, and prevent any such unpleasant occurrence again this offending brother is severely reprimanded for introducing a subject which would disturb the peace and harmony of the church, and turn it aside from its appropriate work. When all this is done, they adjourn and go home. But these same churches with many others further removed from these horse-thieves, have certain benevolent associations under their control, some designed for one thing and some for another. Now the horse-thieves claim the right of dominion, or censorship at least, over these associations also. They demand that nothing shall be done by these societies which can in the least interfere with their business. They must not be called sinners, those from whom they steal must not be apprized of danger, and when property is thus obtained no effort must be made to restore it to its rightful owner. On these conditions they promise to give their prayers, and the tithing of a tithe of their ill-gotten gains. The argreement is made, and the societies send their agents to collect the money, ask the thieves to pray for them, and promise to keep dark about the stealing. When the good people ask them not to do such things, they call it interference, and say that others are sinners as well as these. Indeed they persevere in their course year after year deliberately, and justify it, and all too in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Now we ask, would any of us co-operate with such churches and societies? All answer no. But unless man-stealing in the *light of this day* is a less crime than horse-stealing, those who belong to, or act in connection with the above specified institutions are doing this very thing.

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But to press this point still further, are there not hundreds and thousands of Christian people scattered throughout the North, and acting in connection with these institutions, who are convinced of the inconsistency of their position? We are confident there are; and were it not for the self-denial and sacrifice it would cost them, they would break from it without delay. Their friends are there, their associations are there, they have loved these institutions, and it is painful, even where duty calls, to part with them. The consequence is they linger along, half condemned, and with constant misgivings from year to year. They cherish a hope, a disappointed hope, that there will soon be a change for the better. But for this hope their position would be unendurable. And what is more, these persons are among the most spiritual, active and godly part of the church.

Now from all this what are the inferences? First, that those institutions in their present relations ought not to be encouraged. If good men in direct opposition to all their preferences and preconceived opinions are compelled to feel thus we may depend there is some good reason for it. But there is yet another inference. It is that these same good men lack that firmness, boldness, and decision of character, that deathless attachment to high moral and religious principle, which they ought to possess. The great sin of the church in our day is that she is governed by a groveling selfishness. She is not willing to make the sacrifices for God and humanity which the cause of Christ and of truth require. When duty calls she frames some excuse for disregarding it. It is this that has brought these organizations into their present relations to slavery, and still holds them there. And is it not the same thing which induces the brethren referred to, to continue their connection with them. If so, why should they remain where they are, and play into the hands of slavery, while at the same time they countenance, and encourage, and practice the same selfishness which is eating up the piety, and destroying the usefulness of the church?

Would they but withdraw co-operation, these institutions might be purified and saved. The last hope of their reform and extended usefulness depends, not upon our sustaining them, but upon our withdrawing from them. If all who are convinced of the fact of their unholy compromise with slavery would do this, and do it promptly and manfully, and assign boldly their reasons, it might, and doubtless would

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bring them to their senses, and lead them to repentance. Probably nothing less will do this. The longer we let them alone, and the longer we go with them, the worse and more wicked they become. This is the natural tendency with all overgrown and corrupt bodies. To encourage is to corrupt them. If we would save these institutions we must abandon them. We must leave the sinking ship or go down with her amid the billows. If we escape and sound the alarm, she may yet be saved. Slavery, which in mid-ocean is scuttling her very bottom, may yet be attacked and cast overboard.

But aside from all this, the Christian must be a *Christian*. There are great and eternal principles of action, principles infinitely above the low grounds of human policy and expediency, by which he is to be governed. Having looked at all the facts in the case, he must decide what is duty, and then come what may, he must do it. While we have no sympathy with the system of metaphysics, which teaches us to decide our duty without any reference to the bearings or results of our conduct, we have still less with that other system, if system it can be called, which is blind to principle, and makes policy and expediency its great rule of action—which studies consequences to self in full detail, before it decides what to do. On all subjects we are to weigh the whole matter before making up our minds, then wherever judgment preponderates and conscience points, there we must go. No matter whether the world smile or frown, whether we stand among the millions, or remain solitary and alone. We must be willing to sacrifice, if need be, feelings, property, reputation, and even life itself. This would be Christ-like, and if it did not bring to us the praises of men and the wealth of earth, it would confer what is infinitely better—peace of conscience and the smile of Heaven. If such a course were generally pursued, what would become of our leading religious institutions? They would either cut loose from slavery and other kindred sins, or be left to "be filled with their own devices."

When Christians are urged to withdraw active support from these institutions, a number of objections are frequently urged; but among them all there is only one which appears to have any force, or to demand an answer. It is stated thus: "If we begin to withdraw from our religious institutions on account of their connection with slavery, or for any other corruption, there is no stopping place; we must in

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consistency withdraw from every institution on earth, for no one is pure."

This seems to be a formidable difficulty, but let us consider it. It is nothing for or against the real merits of the case to say, that this is precisely the objection that papists have always urged against protestants for withdrawing from the church of Rome; and it is the grand argument by which Puseyites are endeavoring to persuade us back again to the arms of the mother church. We have merely alluded to the origin of this objection for the sake of saying that if it is really good for any thing in the hands of those who object to our withdrawing from the organizations in question, it is equally good, so far as logic goes, in the hands of Popes and Puseyites against our leaving Rome. If the corruption of a church is not a sufficient reason for withdrawing from it, then let all protestants repent of their sins and become papists. And if we deny the right of Christians on this ground to withdraw, let us proclaim the infalibility of our church, surrender our consciences to the keeping of a Pope, and submit to an ecclesiastical despotism.

But who is to judge as to what kind and degree of corruption shall justify such withdrawal? We answer, every man is to judge for himself. "To his own master he shall stand or fall," and "every one of us shall give an account of himself to God." This right of withdrawal, and of individual judgment as to when such withdrawal becomes necessary, is inherent; it belongs to the right of conscience. None but a Pope, or one who stands on the fundamental platform of popery will deny it. When we hear men denying this right, and denouncing others for its exercise, we bless God that they are not Popes, holding in their hands the power which the Vatican wielded six hundred years ago. The truth is, the spirit of popery is not yet cast out of protestant churches; the rights of conscience in matters of religious faith and practice are not yet half recognized. It is a serious question whether a pure Christianity has not more to dread from the misrule and corruption of overgrown protestant organizations than from the Roman pontiff, or rather from the tottering throne from which he has fled. We would not intimate that popery is less corrupt, but we know what she is, and the world is awake to her influence. Not so with the others. They are constantly and imperceptibly letting down the high standard of Christian character and conduct, and the people generally suspect it not.

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It has been said that every Christian is to decide for himself on the great question of withdrawal. By what principles or tests ought this decision to be made? He is simply to ask whether the position which he occupies compels him to give countenance and support to sin. If so he is bound to escape from it. Whether it does do this or not, he is himself to determine, and is responsible to God for the judgment he forms and the action he pursues. This answer may be thought indefinite, and we grant it is, but yet no other can in consistency be given.

With this principle before us *our* duty is plain. We must withhold active support from these institutions. We do this, not from enmity, but as their friends. We rejoice in all the good they have done, and in some points of view, are still doing. We regret only the evil. We have waited long in the hope that this evil and sin would be removed; but really it seems to be getting worse and worse. Having reasoned the case, having spoken plainly and faithfully, as we were bound to do, our duty in this respect is performed. If others differ from us and do it honestly, we hope not to esteem them the less. If any of our statements have been unfair we desire to be corrected; but if they are truthful we hope they will be carefully considered, for our subject is one of serious and solemn import.

The principle of withdrawal which has been announced may be abused, and in two ways. Some may think it duty to withdraw from all churches and religious institutions, from the government under which they live, and may adopt views which should compel them to withdraw from all co-operation with their fellow men, and even with themselves also. We certainly regret that they should do this, although we are bound to admit that no human authority has a right to interpose. We feel it duty to say that nothing in this article is intended to encourage what we deem such extravagance, not to say fanaticism. But while we fear that some may imbibe a harsh, censorious and reckless spirit, and go further than the facts in the case warrant, we have yet stronger fears that thousands will stop short of what the cause of truth and holiness demands. We speak now, not of the mass of professed Christians, but of anti-slavery Christians. Why, when they denounce the spirit of compromise in others, should they practice it themselves? Will not those who are convinced of duty be decided? Let them consider the example of Christ—his sacrifices for the

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truth's sake. If they still falter let them hear their Savior saying, "Except a man forsake all that he hath and take up his cross daily and follow me, he can not be my disciple." By these words we shall be judged at the last day. If any think it their duty to remain in these institutions a little longer, we beg of them not to be silent, not to go with the multitude to do evil, but to lift up their voice like a trumpet and cry aloud against this unholy compromise. And when the poor slave, having gone to all these societies for aid, and had the doors of them all shut in his face, and when he sits down alone in his grief to weep, oh, then let those anti-slavery men who still co-operate with these institutions, have compassion on the innocent victims of their cruelty! Let not sympathy for the oppressor harden the heart against the cries of the oppressed. Treat him kindly and pray for him. And may those who have taken their stand and withdrawn their support realize how great is the responsibility they have assumed. Let them be consistent, liberal and immovable, yet kind and Christ-like. Let them watch their spirit. Let them not return evil for evil, but contrary-wise, blessing. Let them be followers of Him who was meek and lowly of heart and who went about doing good. Let them be faithful unto death and they shall have a crown of life.

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ARTICLE XV.

BIBLE WAR AND PEACE.

BY REV. MARTIN WILCOX—UNIONVILLE.

CONTINUED FROM OUR LAST.

1. The Israelites did practice war both offensive and defensive. Josh. 10th chapter presents both in the conquest of the kings and kingdoms of the southern portion of the land of Canaan; and the 11th chapter presents, both in the reduction of the northern portions. Joshua had been some time in the land and not much done. True, "They were made masters of Jericho by miracle, and of Ai by stratagem, and of Gibeon by surrender," whom they had sworn to protect. Joshua, at their request, when attacked by the Amorites, went to their aid, and defended and saved them, and destroyed the enemy. Joshua then turned from the defensive to the offensive, and pursued the enemy, and stayed not till the five kings were dragged from their hiding place, and hung between the heavens and the earth, and in their cities there was left none that breathed. Here most unequivocally was both offensive and defensive war.

2. Both these were right, for the Lord God of the Israelites is the Almighty, Eternal, and Holy God. He did go before them, commaded, and led them on to battle, to victory and triumph. He so did it as to secure to Himself all the glory. They were right. To condemn them is to condemn God Himself.

3. War, *per se*, is not wrong. We *grant*, all that the objector or infidel asks; yea more, we *affirm*, that the *Old Testament* and the *God* of the Old Testament, did *sanction*

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war; yea, more still, we *assert*, and stand pledged to prove, that the *New Testament* no where condemns the Old, "in that thing which it alloweth," but stands by and sanctions the same. Then on the immutable authority of the Bible and its God, we affirm, that *war* is not, *per se*, *wrong*. Yea farther, we *aver*, that *war* may be *virtue*, and its *prime actors holy*. Let therefore, those that, "*a la mode*," advance the *sentiment*, that war, all war, is of the devil, and every soldier a murderer, review, "repent and be converted," or be prepared to abide the fell conclusion, that impeaches and subverts the divine administration, and hurls, with an Iscariot's heart, the Eternal from his throne.

4. No stronger testimony can be produced, from the combined histories of Rollin, Josephus, Gibbon, or Thirlwall —Tytler, Allison, Thier, Hume, or Bancroft, that such men as Hannibal and Herod, Cesar and Alexander, Wellington, Buonaparte and Washington, ever led on their armies to battle, and by their skill to victory, than there is in the Old Testament that God led on the Israelites to battle, and by his wisdom and power gave them the victory. The data and logic, that will substantiate or overthrow the one, will equally the other. He that denies that God is the Leader and Conqueror of the battles of the armies of Israel, ascribed to Him in the Old Testament, should, with the same logic, deny that Alexander, Buonaparte, and Cesar are of the battles history ascribes to them. Therefore on the immutability of the attributes of Jehovah, the wars of the Old Testament, commanded and sanctioned by him, are perfectly consistent with his justice, mercy, and love—or He is against Himself. Therefore those who condemn the wars and at the same time approbate and love God, should *show*, not assert unproved, their inconsistency with his love, or deny both war and God. The laws of evidence chain them, by an unfaltering necessity, to admit or condemn the whole. No half-way logic can stand in open court.

5. The *modus operandi*, in the prosecution of the wars, most fully indicate their origin and authority. The means of achieving the victories were various, yet the authority was one. The agents and instruments selected and suited to the wisdom and glory of God, for example, the Red Sea, Ex. xiv., at the behest of the Almighty, swallowed up the Egyptians—the hail-stones, Josh. x., smote the Amorites—the hornets drove out the Canaanites, Ex. xxiii.—the angel, 2 Kings, xix., slew the Assyrians—the sword of Joshua,

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Joshua x., the enemies of Israel and her God—and neither can claim superiority over his fellow servant, in the mere matter of the execution of the stern mandate of his God. Therefore those who find fault with and condemn the sword of Joshua, should, equally, the angel, sea, hailstones and hornets. Moreover, God had a right to protect his people, and fulfill his promise to them, and select the competent agents, free and necessary. Those, therefore, that join issue with the servant, do with the command, promise, and Promiser, and deny the right to promise or fulfill.

6. Of all the wars of the Old Testament, none perhaps have been a greater stumbling-block to the honest reader, or a greater Herculean club in the hand of the infidel, against the Bible, than the Canaanitish wars, for they, with their bloody, indiscriminate, and universal slaughter, are of the class that come under the special direction, command and sanction of God. A moment's delay therefore may be in place, and due from us in love to the reader.

(1.) The reason of their destruction evidently was their wickedness—their sin. "The land was defiled, and vomited out her inhabitants."—Lev. xviii., 24, 25. It was not therefore, an arbitrary and unjust act to make way for the Israelites. Nor was it *directly* and *legitimately* to make way with their idolatry, and save the Israelites from it. Although both these would be accomplished by their destruction, yet these were not the reasons, but their *sins*. These the cause, and those the result.

(2.) A question—Has God a right to punish sin or sinners?—a man or a nation? Then He had the right to punish the Canaanites.

(3.) Has He a right to expect to select his own means or agents to execute his will in his own government? To deny this, is to deny a plain principle of all governments; the right of the executive to the proper and lawful means of administration; the right and ability to fulfil executive obligation.

(4.) When for the wickedness of any people, God sends a plague, pestilence, or earthquake, and it is announced and understood as such, there is no complaint of injustice, for example, the plagues of Egypt—the pestilence of the Philistines, the earthquake of Korah, in which all classes and ages are involved and suffer. There is no demur, but all are regarded as acts of exemplary penal justice, perfectly consistent with the moral character of the Moral Governor of the world.

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(5.) Then the right and justice being conceded to punish, it is left to object to the means only. For example, it being right for God to punish the guilty, He may command and use the plague, the pestilence, and earthquake, but not man. He may command insects and angels, but not man. These He may command, and they may do his will, and execute the remunitory and vindicatory sanctions of his law—but not man; he may do the former, but God has no right to command him to do the latter, nor he to obey.

(6.) Their sins account for the fact of their destruction, and to them, the manner is of little account—for where is the choice between pestilence, plague, and famine, or sword, surely all the preferences lie on the side of the latter.

(7.) But it is said, the innocent suffered with the guilty. Grant it. Is it not so in the plague, pestilence, and earthquake, and all the judgments of Almighty God in time? And still, because here the innocent suffer with the guilty, it is denounced as unjust, and therefore God is not the God of the Old Testament. Mark, the objection is, the innocent *suffered* with the guilty, not *punished*, for that would be too audacious. Did they not in the plagues of Egypt, in the emerods of Ashdod, in the famine of Jerusalem, and in every application of the great principle of the second command of the decalogue, in the entailed disease of the inebriated father, and in short, in the administration of God's government the world over, all, *all*, suffer with and for the guilty.

(8.) The manthat denies the right and justice in the penal wars of the Canaanites, should be consistent and deny all penal sanctions—the man that curses the Israelites for doing God's will, should heap his execrations on the boils and murrain, the lice and frogs of Egypt, yea, on the sea and angel of justice. Ah, shall the Israelites be cursed because they did it *voluntarily? In that lies their virtue.* The man that denies that God is the Author of the penal wars of the Canaanites, because the innocent suffered with the guilty, should deny that God is the Author of the plagues of Egypt, of the famine, of the pestilence, of the laws of nature, and of providence, for the same reason. Yea, I call on the unbeliever, the infidel, that denies that the *God of the Old Testament* is the *true God* of love and peace, for these reasons, to be consistent and deny that the *God of nature and Providence* is the *true God*, for the same rea-

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sons. Also let him that denies the *Old Testament* for these reasons, be consistent and *deny nature and providence* for the same reasons.

(9.) So linked are revelation and nature, that a denial of the one involves a denial of the other, and he that denies the Bible for any reason has already entered the maelstrom of difficulties, and absurdities and darkness, and no power can save him from its narrowing circles and subterranean outlet in the abyss of damnation, unless he repents and obeys the gospel. No wonder infidels, in the light of their own continued existence, amid mercies, condemn the destruction of the Canaanites; but let them, in that light, not condemn the unmingled ire that consumed the Canaanites, but rather read their own direr damnation.

(10.) The reason why God preferred the sword of the Israelites to pestilence or plague, is found in the overwhelming proof it gave to the nations and world of his power and purity—also to furnish a standing historical illustration of the awful judgments of God that awaited the Israelites should they be like guilty, and to keep them in the way of life.

7. The wars of the Old Testament may be divided into three classes. 1. Those that were wrong, but were permitted. 2. Those that were right, and preparatory to possession. 3. Those that were right, and penal or inflictive. We omit the proof till the future.

We are brought, in our investigations, to our third proposition.

III. We aver that both the Old and New Testaments condemn the practice of war, during the entire Christian dispensation.

Both alike in principle and object, demand and sanction war in the old dispensation; and both equally forbid and condemn war in the new. Not only in the *latter days* of the new, but in the whole.

1. The Old Testament. It is incontrovertibly settled, that the Old Testament required and sanctioned war in the Jewish dispensation. It as unqualifiedly forbids and condemns it in the new. The *reason* of the change will be made to appear more decidedly under the next general head. Our object *now* is, solely for the *facts and teachings; reasons then.* Zech. ix, 9. It has been fully settled by the ablest commentators that the King and his condition in this verse is none other than Jesus Christ, and his humble en-

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trance into the joyous but devoted city, in the days of his incarnation. Therefore the *time* is the *commencement* of the Christian dispensation. Verse 10th, as Hengstenberg says, "proceeds to give the characteristic difference of the Messianic, from all worldly kingdoms, and especially from the theocracy." While earthly kingdoms are upheld and extended only by the power of arms, while even the theocracy formerly employed them, it shall, in the time of the Mesiah, be deprived of every external weapon, since it will need them no more, because its head, the Prince of Peace, by his bare word extends peace over the whole earth, which willingly and joyfully submits to Him." Heng. vol. ii, pp. 101–2. This difference which is general and not particular, consists in the means of existence and support. The kingdoms of this world, as example, Ephraim and Judah, had relied on the chariot, horse and battle bow, here was their reliance for their existence and continuance. But his kingdom, in its present and future form and development, shall begin and continue, not by these, but by the sword of the Spirit—the gospel of God. It is not said that his kingdom shall destroy necessarily the identity of earthly kingdoms; but shall spread through and embrace all others and fill the whole earth. To this it will be objected, by the discerning mind, that "this refers to the commencement and spread of the *spiritual* kingdom of Christ among the nations, and not to nations in their *civil* capacity, that truly *his kingdom* is to be spread by the truth; but nations, as such, must be set up and continued by the force of arms." We answer. The very text is against the objecter; for it says, that from Ephraim and Judah, civil nations, "the chariot" and "battle bow shall be cut off." It does not say that they shall be destroyed, only that they shall not rely thus, but shall, if at all, live by other means. It is a sufficient reply that the objection is a gross assumption unsupported by any exegetical proof from this or any parallel passage. Let us summon others to the stand. Micah, iv, 3. "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks, nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." Isa. ii, 4, is the same. Here positively are nations referred to, in their civil capacity; and the very thing is affirmed *to* be done, that in Zech. ix. 9, is said *should* be done.

But it is to this, objected, "that this refers to the ultimate effect of the gospel on the nations." We reply, no

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matter *when* this takes place, only so that the proposition is true, which the objector himself condes, namely, that this mode of national existence and support is abolished, and the nations, albeit in the last days, live by other means.

We *now* say that the Old Testament not only condemns war "*in the last days*" of the new dispensation, but in the *first days*—that Christians have no more sanction from the Old Testament to engage in wars in the *first days*, than "in the *last days*" of Christianity. But it is objected, "that we must not confound the *effects* of the gospel with the *means* of the gospel to *produce* that *effect*." We understand it, all these objections will be examined and met in their proper place. Suffice it to say *now*, that the effect of the gospel is stated in the Bible to be, in the *change produced* in the *nations* and the *world*. The change is, *war is abolished* and *peace reigns in* the world, and this by Christianity. Now mark, the change is not, as the objector assumes, *in* the kingdom of Christ and Christianity, but *in* the world and its nations *by* that kingdom and that Christianity. And that shall be when this kingdom and this Christianity shall change the world and the nations. Now, is Christianity to do this by war—by the world?—what! change the world by the world!—fight a man peaceable!—wage war till there is a universal peace!—scatter darkness till the whole is light—roll on the waves of damnation till all be saved!—the simple application of the principle, in any other form, is a perfect confutation of such absurd and rotten logic. What connection hath light with darkness, or peace with war? What! multiply evil into universal good—multiply war into universal peace,—as well multiply the finite into the infinite. No, there is an eternal and bridgeless gulf between them,—no, all the reasoning of Christendom and pages of science and revelation converges in the logic, that a continued removing of the light increases the density of the darkness—that evils and evil men wax worse and worse—you must add leaven to leaven the whole—you must bring in and increase the light, if you would illumine the whole—to have friends you must be friendly—in Jeremiah's logic, it is, "seek ye the peace of the city, and pray the Lord for it, for in the peace of the city shall ye have peace." Therefore the Old Testament logic is, that you must *start with*, and *begin in* peace, if you would *end* in peace. Here is where Zech. ix, 10, starts, and there is where Isa. ii, 4, ends.

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If to all this it be objected, "that if the Old Testament sanctioned and required war as preparatory to the gospel dispensation of peace, it may require war as preparatory to the spread of universal peace and abolition of war, that is, all war may not be abolished, as preparatory to universal peace, for it sanctioned and required war as preparatory to the kingdom of Peace." Answer. As well might it be objected that all the radii of a circle are not equal, for the radii of a square circle are unequal. Would that logicians could see their own logic, that the objection has to assume an absurd impossibility in order to the truth of his proposition. For there is no deeper chasm between a *spherical* and a *square* circle, than there is between the *military* kingdom of the Jews, and the *belligerent* kingdom of Christ. A circle is from its nature spherical, but a square circle is a contradiction, just as from the nature of the two specific kingdoms. The *objects* and *means* of these differ as widely as the *natures* of those, as will appear subsequently. One or two passages more and we pass on. Isa. ix, 4. "The connexion of the illustrous prophecy, of the 6th and 7th verses, with this and the preceding verses, assures us that it was the immediate scope of the Holy Spirit in the whole passage, to point out the coming and kingdom of Christ." The image here employed is supposed to be taken from the custom of antiquity. "To pile the arms of prostrate enemies, the spoils of less value, and their foully spotted garments, into a heap and then burn them." Virgil, has it, En. viii. 562, thus expressed.

> "O mihi præteritas referat si Jupiter annos,
> Qualis eram, cum primam aciem Præneste sub ipsa,
> Stravi, *scutorumque incendi victor acervos.*"

Although it is said "that the subject of discourse is not a peace which follows conflict, but a peace which shall be introduced by Jehovah, without a conflict," still the conviction from this and parallel passages is forced upon our mind, that it is a peace that *follows* a conflict, and yet introduced without a conflict, and the figure of conquest, consumption and peace is strikingly pert and impressive. The conflict that the peaceful kingdom of Christ follows, is, not a war direct for the object, but the slaughter and conquest achieved by the Jewish nation among others, for the accomplishment of their destiny as a nation, "till the seed should come," and

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then "all weapons and garments dipt in blood," taken by his army, should be consumed,—they have waged the last war—fought the last battle—accomplished all he designed to by war—now all preparations for war with Him, together with all the weapons and spoils of prostrate and conquered foes, shall be burnt, as of no farther use. And now, following the long and bloody conflict of the Jews, commences a reign of peace that shall never end but fill the whole earth.

The commencement, spread and final triumph of the kingdom of peace, (and I use the phrase as designating that kingdom in the new dispensation,) will be, like the conquest of Gideon, not by force of arms, but by the power of God, the spirit and gospel of Christ.—*Com. com. Heng. in loc.*

The figure and scope are strong and glorious, swelling sublimely beyond any finite comprehension, exhibiting the infinite conception, of having fought and conquered the last battle, consumed the arms and spoils of foes and friends, and now introducing and setting up a kingdom that "shall break in pieces all others, and shall stand forever."—Vid. also Ps. 72; Isa. 11; Dan. 2: 44; and Micah 5.

From these and their parallel passages a few corollaries are pertinent and legitimate.

(1.) There is a mighty change to take place in this world and the kingdoms thereof, both in their religious and civil aspects, as is plain from the strong figures used, representing change in the natural world. The change is from pollution, war and idolatry, to peace, purity and God.

(2.) That this change is to be produced by the kingdom and gospel of Christ, which like leaven, is to be introduced and leaven the whole lump.

(3.) The kingdom of Christ in nature, spirit and operations, is the same both in its commencement and completion. But says my brother, "Is a Christian to be now the same as in the millenium?" Answer, I know not that the Bible says that the abundance of sin or sinners about me changes my obligation to Christ, or the promise of his grace. "My grace is sufficient for thee," whether in private or public, thorns, thistles or flowers. My obligation *as a Christian* is not inversely as sin, sinners and temptation, but directly as my

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ability and the promise. The Christian is now, as then, to be filled with the Spirit. "But," says one, "are we to treat the sick as if he were well, and the knave as if he were honest?" No, now nor then, nor in the old dispensation. You might as well ask me if I, being a merchant, would not now, in transporting my goods, use camels? No, I would use canals; or if a physician, I would not change the location of the oxygen, by a blister, no, I would use an "umshlag." Why, in the name of reason and gospel, do you hold on to the old dispensation. God Almighty has repealed it—why use the damnation of the Canaanites, and not "the balm of Gilead?" Why hang on to Moses and Joshua, and leave Christ? Why usurp the sceptre and empire of Jehovah, and defer the gospel dispensation and the reign of peace? No, this is the last dispensation of earth, and everlasting righteousness brought in, and the Chistian is a new creature, "another name," the millenium in miniature, and he is to multiply his kind, "till all shall learn the Messiah's name."

(4.) The great change spoken of in the Old Testament, as taking place in the kingdom of Christ in the new dispensation, is in its *numbers and dimensions*. This most fully condemns war in the new.

2. The New Testament. On the ground of the union of the two, we might assume that it condemns war. To cite the anti-war parts, would be to transcribe the whole. Everywhere its principles, objects and means, wrests the sword of war from the hand of the Christian. The injunction of Christ, "to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," and the *nature* of his kingdom, having *subjects* in *every nation*, entirely forbids and condemns all war. How different the instructions of Christ to his apostles, Matt. 10, from his instructions to Israel, Deut. 20! All affirm that the abolition of war is or will be the fruit of the righteousness of the gospel. But James 5: 18, says "the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace of them that make peace." The many objections we defer till a more favorable period in our argument. These are the Bible facts in the case. We have seen that the Old and New Testaments sanction and require war in the old dispensation, and that both equally forbid and condemn war in the new. These are the incontrovertible positions of the two, on this great subject. But

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what are the reasons? Where is the common base for the government whose administration is so diverse? Where is the mighty bond of union between such warring elements? The Bible, "ex cathedra," divine, presents us an inspired "syllabus" of the divine administration, in which stand prominent the leading *events* and *characters* of the divine government. *These mighty developments publish the great principles upon which God has not written a commentary; but more, He has given to each an understanding, and a commentating faculty.* They are heaven's beacon, elevated, and overlooking the highway of nations—and in whose light recondite questions are no longer problematical—they are the grand desideratum for the resolution of opposite forces into one symmetrical whole. From the oft-alleged opinion "that the Bible is not a book containing any system of polity and philosophy, we beg leave to dissent. Is there any system in the natural world? Is there any in the moral? Is there any in remedial provisions? Aye! and the most rigid polity, or constitution of fundamental laws and principles, as the fruit of Infinite Wisdom. The most rigid system in creation, location, number, adaptation, proportion, size, parallax and geometry,—the most rigid system in the moral world, and the remedial plan, the most transcendent and harmonious system of complicated means for the achievment of one vast and unmeasured result. Now what is the Bible but a sublime copy, presenting the divine conception, of the demonstration of vast, complicated and infinite problems. It gives truly, not like our systems of philosophy, an abstract skeleton, but a perfect concrete system of ontology, psychology, mental and moral philosophy.

The fact that it gives, not a skeleton, but a living body, a concrete system, destroys not its system, but adds to its value, in proportion to the wisdom manifested in the concretion. It describes a mighty, complicated, living body truly, with its arteries and veins, its head and feet, coursing in opposite directions and on opposite ends, but forming one beautiful whole. Thrice favored is he to whom it is granted to enter the inner sanctuary of its holy principles, whose analysis our present object forbids. But suffice it to say, it is wonderful, that amid all the elaborate and multiplied arguments for the divine authority of the Bible, that this perfect and unanswerable internal argument should have been overlooked. The Bible in its principles and philosophy so

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proclaims its divine authority, as to awe even its hot enemy into the solemn confession that

> "Within this awful volume lies
> The mystery of mysteries.
> O, happiest they of human race,
> To whom our God has given grace,
> To hear, to read, to fear, to pray,
> To lift the latch and force the way.
> But better had they ne'er been born,
> Who read to doubt, or read to scorn.

This is the book, the wonder of angels, joy of saints, and terror of sinners—whose contents sweep the world's history, the past and future. This is our light, our guide in the great subject before us.

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ARTICLE XVI.

THE EDUCATION OF THE SENSIBILITY.

BY REV. J. A. THOME,
OHIO CITY.

SHOULD it not be regarded as a singular fact that among the multitudinous volumes, readable and unreadable, and the countless speeches, tolerable and intolerable, on man and on education, almost nothing has been written or said about the education of the sensibility? While the terms education and sensibility are as familiar to the ear as consonant and vowel, in whose mind have they ever stood mutually related? Who thinks of the sensibility when dwelling upon education? and who thinks of education when dwelling upon the sensibility? Where are the systematic treatises on this department of education, where the text-books? What provision has been made in our institutions of learning, by professorship or tutorship, lectures or recitations, for educating the sensibility? Not only have no positive provisions been made, but it has been with some who have been awake to this subject a matter of serious doubt whether the popular educational systems are not actually hurtful to the sensibility. Now there is some foundation for this fear or there is not. If there be, it follows that the founders and supporters of the systems of education have had no just idea of the education of the sensibility; if there be not, if the established courses of training be favorable to the culture of the sensibility, it follows that those who entertain the fear have misconceived the wants of the sensibility. This betrays confusion where there should be the utmost clearness; a confusion which can not be accounted for save on the ground that the subject has not received the consideration which it deserves. What a humiliating comment upon our boasted educational achievments that we have not yet learned how to educate the most valuable, the most

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vital part of the human mind! At the same time we do not hesitate to reckon among the bright omens of our day, the nascent desires, expressing themselves thus far only in rude hints and crude suggestions, yet the irrepressible desires for a system of education which shall develop the sensibility.

The two-fold design of the present essay is to quicken these desires that they may eventuate in action, and to contribute something toward giving to such action a right direction. Should the principles here advanced prove to be unsound, still the effort will not be a failure if it prompts abler minds to explore this opening region, which glitters, like the gorges of the Sacramento, with redundant gold.

The sensibility is one of the three mental faculties, and may be termed the feeling-faculty, or the faculty which feels. The function of this power, as thus defined, is one—to feel; but its range of action is as wide and comprehensive as the diversities of feeling of which mind is capable. The education of the sensibility consists in strengthening, expanding and disciplining the faculty, and in bringing it under the control of the will, through the agency of the intelligence—which is the appointed mediator between the other powers, not only when they are at variance, but at all times.

In treating of the education of the sensibility, and of the importance of incorporating in our systems of education some measures for the attainment of this object, we have mainly in view the class of students who are aiming at the gospel ministry; for as there is no class of men whose right training is so essential, so there is none who need so much to have the sensibility educated. At the same time our remarks shall have a general application to all classes of students, in every stage of their progress.

Our discussions on this point will embrace—

A *statement* of the principal causes of the neglect of the sensibility in institutions of learning:

A *plea* in favor of educating the sensibility: and

An *inquiry* into the principles upon which its education should be conducted.

1. A prime cause of the educational neglect of the sensibility has been the notion that nothing but the intellect is the proper subject of education.

It has been customary, in accordance with this notion, to exclude from the purview of the higher systems of educa-

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tion, both the physical and the spiritual powers. The former have been consigned to the sphere of labor, the latter to that of religion; the one below, the other above the domain of education. The sensibility has been classified with the spiritual part, and has been shut out from the scope of educational agencies. Thus excluded—although classed in the superior departments of spiritual faculties—the sensibility would ultimately come to be regarded as below the attention and beneath the dignity of scholars. Its association with the spiritual could not prevent this, for the spiritual itself suffers a similar degradation—professedly exalted, it is practically despised.

This result in the case of the sensibility has been precipitated by the assumption that its action is inimical to *thorough intellectual discipline*. Under the influence of this idea, there have been studied and strenuous efforts among scholars to sear the sensibility. To feel has been regarded not only as vulgar, but as fatal to high intellectual culture. This idea has begotten a scholastic asceticism, twin hag to the religious, and only less baneful. It has prompted unwearied and but too successful efforts to stifle nature, to dry up the fount of feeling, to extinguish the emotions, to paralyze the passions, to turn the heart to stone. Scholars have trained themselves to look at truth as coldly as a granite light-house looks upon the night-invested sea; and as little caring whether the forlorn voyager is ever cheered by the rays which as if per chance escape from their studies, and straggle athwart the darksome deep of human destiny.

They have been schooled to think abstractly, to dissect human relations with surgico-scholastic stoicism, binding their own quivering hearts by the omnipotent will, till they learned to quiver no more. This is the sign of *intellectual discipline*, and the promise of profound thought.

2. Another influential cause has been erroneous views of the *religious* bearings of the sensibility. Driven from the intellectual into the spiritual enclosure, the ill fated sensibility has been there viewed with an evil eye.

As the great lights of the church have also been the chief guardians of learning, we must know their spiritual estimate of the sensibility before we can understand fully the ground of its proscription in the halls of education. Beginning with the true position—

"Sense is a dangerous foe to grace—"

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our spiritual teachers of past generations have proceeded to most unwarrantable lengths in their reprobation of the sensibility. It has been with them "the enemy of all righteousness, the child of the devil." It was not enough to control it, it must be extirpated. The sage Catos clamored—"*detenda est Carthago.*"

The extermination of the sensibility has been the aim of the Romish Church for centuries. To this end have been its fasts, its macerations, its mendicacy, its monasticism—and the whole round of its ascetic austerities. Strange to say, Protestantism—which unfortunately was more awake to the doctrinal than to the practical corruptions of Rome—borrowed, with immaterial modifications in the form, this hideous system of asceticism—only applying it to sanctification instead of justification. This was an error as sad and well nigh as fatal to Protestantism, as the incorporation of chattel slavery in our government has been to republicanism. Who can read the memoirs of Dr. Payson—who can note his aspirations after holiness, and then mark the rigorous penances which he imposed upon himself for life, with the vain hope of thereby becoming holy—and hesitate to admit that Romish asceticism has poisoned the Protestant church? The reformation then did little for the priest-ridden sensibility. Puritanism did little more. In its protracted conflicts with prelacy and king-craft in the old world, and with barbarism and witch-craft in the new, it acquired a sternness, which however suited to the times was not very favorable to the development of the sensibility. Its colleges were a sort of intellectual iron founderies.

The revival era was an outbreak of the sensibility—a resurrection of the entomed soul; the first memorable one since the Apostolic age. The excesses and irregularities which ensued upon this sudden vivification of the great heart of the religious world, aroused though most unreasonably, the puritanic prejudices against the sensibility. The votaries of formalism were shocked. The peace and order of their churches were disturbed. Their Zion was scandalized. "Animal excitement" had usurped the place of devotion, feeling had been substituted for piety, and passion for principle.

We have spoken of the Whitefieldian revival era. The very excesses of that first awakening of the sensibility from so long and deep a slumber, induced, by means of the exhaustion of its subjects as well as through the alarm with

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which it affected its opponents, a reaction, in which the good old times of order seemed coming back apace. But the reaction was brief. A new series of revivals, of still greater power, burst out anon in this country. These have had a singular effect upon the sensibility. They were more cautiously guarded against animal extravagances. They were more philosophic in their genius—more artistic in their mechanism. The theory of conversion which was inculcated and in accordance with which the measures were adjusted, namely, that it was a *simple submission of the will to God's law*, seemed, if we may so speak, to *excommunicate* the sensibility, to exclude it wholly from the pale of religion. If such a thing had been possible, these revivals would have transpired without any excitement, but this could not be—and there was excitement, great excitement; but it was a bad excitement both for the reputation of the sensibility, and for its healthful culture. It was not the excitement of love—the breaking, the melting, the flowing of the heart; but rather the excitement of the intellectual machinery driven almost to derangement by the terrible motives of the law. We have always deemed it a marvel that at so late and enlightened a period as that of the last great series of revivals, such a wide-spread and mighty religious movement could have been so successfully carried through its regular stages, with so very little of the presence of the distinctive element of the gospel. We advert to this fact here in order to remark how seriously the sensibility has suffered between formalism on the one hand and legalism on the other, and to call attention at this stage of our discussion to the truth that there is no religion which can properly develop and magnify the sensibility but the religion of the gospel.

It is a fact that the revivals just alluded to have begotten as violent opposition to revival measures, and that too on the score of hurtful excitement, as was ever waged against the revivals which preceded them. From the morbid fear of religious excitement, thus superinduced, the churches of this country have not yet recovered. To this we believe is to be ascribed the long and melancholy dearth of revivals. The demand has been—give us revivals without excitement, or give us no revivals. The consequence has been—*no revivals!* A more God-provoking stand could scarcely have been taken. The Holy Ghost will not be dictated to by doctors of divinity, nor by clerical conventions. The

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note of alarm is but just beginning to be sounded from high places—"*Peradventure* we have grieved the Holy Spirit by so much opposition to excitement." This is hopeful. Perhaps, ere long, ministers and Christians generally will open their eyes to the mistake they have made—and learn to discriminate between bad excitement and excitement itself. The truth, we apprehend, will be found not very wide of this mark—that no degree of excitement is to be deprecated which is the legitimate fruit of the *gospel earnestly preached*, of the gospel preached "in demonstration of the Spirit and with power."

The erroneous views of the religious bearings of the sensibility, which are so apparent in the facts thus sketched, and which as we have seen, have been unfortunately confirmed from time to time by the prevalence of unsound excitement, will be corrected only by the urgent enforcing of the gospel, the whole gospel and nothing but the gospel, and that by men full of faith and of the Holy Ghost; *men* who having themselves well-educated and sanctified sensibilities, will exemplify as well as teach the almost omnipotent power of the soul, when its fountains are stirred up by the love of Christ.

3. Another cause of the educational neglect of the sensibility has been a certain false but very fashionable ideal of religion. The ideal to which we now refer is comparatively of modern date; it makes religion consist in abstractions, in doctrines and principles. In accordance with this notion —a religious man is a *man of principle*—one whose will is conformed to the law of right as it lies revealed in his intelligence. From this religion, *being* is excluded—save as the embodiment of principle. It knows neither God nor man, but as the substratum of truth. It excludes the sensibility of course. To feel is only to betray the remains of indwelling sin, or the infirmities of poor human nature.

This religion confesses no fervor of love, no rapture of devotion, it experiences no frames, it never melts with pity, nor sinks in contrition, nor soars in seraphic joy. It boasts its uprightness and its stability; but it is the uprightness and stability of Mont Blanc, stiffened into everlasting perpendicularity by a heart of rock and a strait-jacket of ice and snow.

Our systems of learning, being as we have seen, controlled by the clergy, who may be supposed to be guided in their superintendence of learning by their views of religion, we

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need not expect that right and adequate provisions will be made for the education of the sensibility, until a sounder theory of Christiany obtains.

4. We mention but one other cause of the fact we are now considering. Our educational systems have been constructed on the principle that the intellect is obstructed rather than facilitated in its appropriate action by the presence of emotion, and that since it must or should perform its functions without excitement, it ought to be trained separately from the sensibility. It is true that there are many important intellectual processes which elicit no emotion. Such are those involved in mathematical and metaphysical studies, in abstracting, analyzing, investigating, arguing, judging. To qualify the mind for these and similar operations should undoubtedly be a prominent aim in all systems of learning; but to make it the exclusive aim is seriously to err. This error has been too generally committed. The discipline of the naked intellect for purely intellectual efforts has been the overshadowing object. The sensibility accordingly has been neglected; not only so but cautiously suppressed as unfriendly to the precision, vigor and soundness of the intellectual action. On this very ground there has been a wakeful jealousy in our institutions of learning in regard to the cultivation of spirituality; and so there should be if the position be true that the paramount ends of education demand the suppression of the sensibility.

That we are not speaking at random in regard to the facts in this case, might if necessary, be shown by adducing the well-known distinction which has prevailed in the most of our colleges till very recently, if it does not now prevail, between pious or good hearted students and *fine scholars*—a distinction which has been the basis of a system of college caste, the proscriptive bearing of which has almost driven spirituality and the sensibility too from the haunts of learning. A memorable example of this occurs just now—that of James Brainerd Taylor, who, as we have been informed by a class-mate of his, had almost no character whatever for scholarship; a fact which we think can not be entirely explained without a reference to the persecuting prejudices and haughty jealousies of intellectual caste. And should we mention in connection with the deathless name of James Brainerd Taylor that of our informant, it would be a trumpet-tongued testimony to the baleful fruits of this college caste, which sometimes unable to dwarf the sensibility,

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leaves it *to come* up untamed and untrained, and sees it afterwards visit upon intellect and conscience, and alas, upon the interests of truth and of humanity, the terrible vengeance of its college wrongs.

Of the causes we have now assigned for the general neglect to educate the sensibility, the last is altogether the most plausible; yet it is only plausible. For supposing it true, as this view assumes, that the development of the sensibility is detrimental to the discipline of the pure intellect, and embarrasses it in its separate processes, it would only follow that that comparatively small class of educated men who devote themselves exclusively to scientific, and perhaps we should add, juridical pursuits, should neglect the education of the sensibility; while the large class destined for practical life, who are to act upon society through the learned professions, who are to move mind and mould character and reform customs by the tongue and the pen, should cultivate the sensibility though at the cost of a tithe of intellectual discipline. This would be our position—on the assumption that the training of the sensibility was to some extent unfriendly to the thoroughness of mental culture. But we are far from allowing this. The bearings of the sensibility upon the intellect will be considered under our next head, to which we now advance.

A plea for the education of the sensibility.

Persuaded that if the importance of this object were duly appreciated, there would be little difficulty in determining the *modus*, and arranging the details of the educational process, we shall devote our chief attention to this branch of the discussion. We hope to make it appear that if the sensibility can be educated at all, it ought to be, and that if it ought to be educated at all, it should be educated with the utmost thoroughness.

1. We first then affirm that the sensibility can be educated. Does any one doubt this? If it can not be, it is the only part of human nature that is not the subject of education. The body can be educated, the intellect can be educated, even the will can be educated. Can not the sensibility. It is true that the sensibility can not be enlightened —but neither can the body, nor the will. The *intellect* only can be enlightened. But enlightenment is not the whole of education. To educate is to develop, to invigorate, to train, to reduce to rule and management. The body is educated when its powers are developed by proper exercise, when its

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form and proportions are perfected by a due attention to regimen, to postures, and to a just alternation of labor and repose. The will is educated when it is strengthened by use, when it is guarded against the violent action of the passions, when it is subjected to the law of reason and the will of God. So too may the sensibility be educated; it may be expanded and invigorated—made more susceptible, more diffusible, more intense, it may be trained to evervesce in merriment, to melt in tenderness, to tremble with the awe of devotion, to swell and heave ocean-like under the wing of mighty thought-winds. By right and sufficient education the connection between thought and emotion may be made both firmer and more intimate; or by wrong education or none this correlation may be indefinitely weakened, if not wholly obliterated. This we think must be entirely obvious, and if in no other respect the sensibility were susceptible of education—this object alone would warrant the effort. But furthermore the subordination of the sensibility to the will may be affected or promoted by the disciplinary influences of right education. To secure this is among the highest ends of human training.

The sensibility then may be educated. It falls not a whit behind the chiefest of the mental endowments in this respect. Nay, we affirm that in no other department of our nature may the efficacious results of education be more conspicuous.

2. If the sensibility can be educated, it ought to be, and if it ought to be educated at all, it ought to be educated with the utmost care and attention. In support of this position we allege that the sensibility is the most important, the most valuable endowment of rational being. As this idea, which has been before hinted at in this address, must be admitted to be somewhat paradoxical, that is, contrary to current opinions, it requires to be established. In ordinary as well as scientific use, the sensibility is assigned a subordinate rank in the mental trinity. Metaphysicians extol the god-like intelligence, and exalt the sovereign will, but call the sensibility the *sensuous nature*. Divines pronounce it earthly, sensual and devilish. Good people often deplore its existence—as the adversary of the soul.

It would be superlative arrogance in us to scout at all this, and sweepingly deny that there was *any* foundation in truth and in fact for distinctions so unfavorable to the sensibility. Undoubtedly the will and the intelligence deserve

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more honorable designations than the sensibility, as we find them represented in depraved man; since the last has sustained the chief shock of the fall. But in an inquiry into the relative importance of the mental endowments, it is clearly irrelevant to allege any circumstances which are purely accidental, in a logical sense, namely, which do not necessarily or essentially pertain to the subject. If we were discussing the question whether the Anglo-Saxon or the African race possessed the more intellect, it would be utterly inadmissable to adduce as specimens of African intellect, the slave from the Louisiana plantation gang, and the biped brute from the Brazilian harness. Our inquiry is, what rank belongs to the sensibility—as a primitive endowment, without any reference to its circumstantial depravity. Viewed thus, we contend that the sensibility is no less God-like than the will or the intelligence.

Philosophers, we suppose have proceeded, in this case, upon the principle of giving chief prominence to those faculties which they most largely discuss. In the mere science of mental anatomy, both the intellect and the will make more figure than the sensibility, and the intellect, which is really third-rate, more than either. Psycologically the sensibility discharges a specific function, entirely different from that which belongs to it in the great economy of human well-being, which accounts for its subordinate rank in the metaphysical sphere. *Action* being the scientific end of the rational machine, the sensibility is made to play the part of an impulsive or motive principle, a middle and therefore obscure part between the will which acts and the intelligence which sweeps the entire field both of motive and of action.

Not to detain you too long upon this incidental discussion we must briefly indicate the place we assign the sensibility—from which we deduce its relative superiority—and from which too we infer a valid reason for placing it last in the order of enumeration.

We make the sensibility the seat of good—of happiness, it is the receptive department—the ultimate reservoir where all the streams of thought and volition, when in harmony with truth, empty themselves in distilliations of happiness. Without a sensibility man would be incapable of happiness—to him there could be no such thing as good—his intelligence could not apprehend the idea any more than it could conceive of the objective idea of some supposed

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fourth mental faculty, which has no existence and of which we can form no distinct conception. In other words the third mental function—the sensibility, did it not exist, would, with all its phenomena, be as much beyond the scope of the intelligence—which sees only realities as realities—as some indefinite fourth mental power.

Maintaining as we do, though in opposition to some, to whose philosophical powers we bow with profound deference, that good is the grand terminus of the human economy—the ultimate product to evolve which the entire mental machinery was constructed, and since good is the objective or correlative of the sensibility, we assign to the sensibility the highest rank among the mental orders and for the same reason we place it last. To state this view in a condensed manner, and also to indicate the relation of the three mental faculties with that of their correlates—the intellect gives truth, the will secures action in accordance with truth, and the sensibility yields happiness, as the ultimate fruit of this complex process. Here is the ne plus—there is, there can be nothing beyond.

We would apologize for quoting in this place a short paragraph from an article on the Divine Perspective in the O. Quarterly for May 1847. We beg leave to refer to the article for a fuller discussion of this point than we have space at present to give it.

"The three departments of the mind, intelligence, will and sensibility, stand related respectively to the three great objective ideas, truth, right and good. What does this relation indicate as to the relative importance of the sensibility? Truth is in order to right, and right is in order to good. This is the only consistent arrangement of these terms, their only possible order of correlation. Accordingly good is the *ultimate* of truth and right—that *without which* they would be objectless and therefore valueless. It follows then that the intelligence is in order to the will, and the will in order to the sensibility—from which it follows that the sensibility is the ultimate of the mental faculties, the crowning department of rational being."

Speaking shortly afterwards of the divine mind, it is said, "The infinite intelligence and the almighty will both do reverence to the sensibility and lay their offerings at her feet. We are aware that we seem to contradict a fundamental principle of metaphysics, that the will is monarch of the mind. But it is only a seeming contradiction. The

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will *is* the monarch, but the sensibility is the empire—comprehends the interests over which this monarch presides; and we ask, which is the paramount object, the king or the kingdom, the *central throne*, or the almost boundless circle of interests which it protects and promotes?"

It must now be understood what we mean by calling the sensibility the most important third of the mind. If we have established this position, it will be superfluous to add further arguments to prove the importance of educating the sensibility, having previously shown that it is capable of education. But I am not so sanguine as to presume that the argument on this point carries conviction at once to every mind. It were unwise too to rely, in the present discussion which is designed to conduct us to sober practical results, upon speculations, which however plausible, may prove at last to be only speculations. We turn therefore to other arguments, which, if you please, are of a more substantial texture.

3. We argue the importance of educating the sensibility from its influence upon the intellect. In this argument we allow the popular theory—which we have already seen obtains—that the intellect is the prime subject of education. Our position is, that from the relations of the sensibility to the intellect, and its consequent influence over it, it is impossible to educate the intellect rightly without educating the sensibility.

(1.) The sensibility has a vast influence upon the growth, expansion and discipline of the intellect.

We should judge *a priori* that of two co-ordinate faculties the culture of one could not be neglected without seriously affecting the other. Analogy brings us to the same conclusion. The co-ordinate organs in the physical system are known to maintain a most intimate sympathy which makes all share in a measure the disorders and infirmities of each. But a strict analysis of the influence of the sensibility over the intellect enables us to demonstrate what antecedent probability and analogy render so highly presumptive. We can here do no more than point out the range of this analytic inquiry. The sensibility is a complex faculty, embracing numerous affections, emotions and passions. These various excitables are the sources of an almost indefinite variety, both in kind and degree, *of stimuli to intellectual action*. A familiar example of this is the passion of curiosity, which is the main stimulus to mental activity in

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youth. Without these instigations of the sensibility, it is impossible to say certainly what would be the state of the intellect. It seems however quite clear that it would be hopelessly sluggish, of course it could not grow, acquire strength, secure discipline. Such being the result of the sensibility not acting at all upon the intellect, it is not difficult to determine the result when the sensibility acts feebly for want of culture, or irregularly for want of training.

Says Prof. Wilson: "It is an impossibility that a low and hard moral nature should furnish a high and fine scholar. The intellectual endowments must be supported and made available by the concurrence of the sensitive nature—of the moral and the imaginative sensibilities." If then the great object of education were the perfect development of the intellect it would be absolutely necessary to educate the sensibility.

(2.) But again—from the same considerations it must appear that the education of the sensibility is indispensable to the sound, the safe and the vigorous action of the intellect, even in those cases above specified in which it is required to be most cool and calm. For, although the sensibility is not called into requisition in such processes, it must have operated conspicuously in qualifying the intellect, both by discipline and knowledge, for undertaking and accomplishing these its sterner tasks.

(3.) Still more is the action of the sensibility required in the more practical department of intellectual action. We refer now to the applications of the intellect to those multifarious questions in the useful arts, in government, in social life, in moral enterprises, and in the promulgation of the gospel, which bear more or less directly upon human well being, and which therefore we may not err in saying constitute the most vital sphere of intellectual activity. We say still more in these cases is the sensibility called into play; for it is not only required to train the intellect for action as in the former case, but also to sustain it in efficient, fresh and persevering effort. It was eloquently said, by one who a few years since arose above our mental horizon a star of the first magnitude, gigantic in intellect and almost superhuman in the resources of his sensibility—"Whenever the intellect moves in the sumblimity of its might, it is the heart that generates the momentum." Of that splendid truth there has seldom been a more admirable exemplification in person than the individual himself who uttered it—

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whose genius, glowed and flamed in the fires of his sensibility, like the bush which Moses saw, burning yet not consumed, or like the angel in the burning fiery furnace bright but unhurt.

Hear Prof. Wilson again. Better human authority can hardly be quoted. "I lay down upon the threshhold of the scholar's studies this first condition of his high and worthy success, that he will not pluck the loftiest palm by means of acute, quick, clear, penetrating sagacious intellectual action alone—let him not hope it: that he requires to the highest renown also a capacious, profound and tender soul."

In the three several respects then which we have specified—in disciplining the intellect, in qualifying it for its abstract processes, and especially in sustaining and accompanying it in its practical labors—we see abundant reason for educating the sensibility. One of our best poets has finely conveyed by an unique simile, the enriching and fertilizing influence of the sensibility upon the intellect, in a eulogy upon our gifted authoress, Mrs. Child.

> "If her heart at high floods
> Swamps her brain now and then,
> 'Tis but richer for that when the tide ebbs again;
> As after old Nile has subsided—his plain
> Overflows with a second broad deluge of grain."

4. We further urge the education of the sensibility on the ground of its influence over the will. We do not necessarily call in question the freedom of the will, when we affirm that it is greatly influenced by the sensibility operating as a temptation to wrong volitions, or an incitement to virtuous ones. This opens a wide field—an inviting one—and highly profitable, but, pertinent though it is to our present purpose, we can not traverse it. We can barely call your attention to an observation or two—suggestive of further thought.

All sects and schools—widely differing in the philosophy—yet agreeing in the fact of the sensibility's immense influence for evil or for good over the will,—have perplexed themselves with the question—how shall the will be guarded and protected from the hurtful influence of the sensibility?

The most approved method, as we have already intimated, not only among papists but protestants also—has been the *ascetic*, the object of which is to suppress the sensibility. The efforts to this end which have been made through suc-

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cessive generations, and under the most favorable circumstances, have utterly failed, not only so, but have resulted in a ghastly train of vices and abominations. The sensibility can not usually be suppressed—never wholly. When it mocks the insane attempts at its extinction, it becomes the prolific source of untold evils—it is at once a giant and a fiend, and all the more terrific for being blind. Even where it is almost suppressed—its very impotence and its deathlessness are displayed in low vices, in dastardly crimes, in grovelling pollutions and in mental imbecilities. And could the sensibility be wholly obliterated, the will, instead of being delivered from its most formidable internal foe, and rising proportionably in vigor and steadiness of action, would become emasculate, contemptible, incompetent to any great or daring exploit, unstable as water.

The true view of this subject, as we apprehend, may be expressed by a comparison, which we do not flatter when we say that it has more force than elegance—the sensibility is to the voluntary power what the stomach is to the vital power—it supplies it with its nutriment, imparting thereby muscular strength, nervous energy, vital tone, healthful spring, steady activity and continuous fire.

If the sensibility is untrained and unsanctified, it can only elaborate poisonous drugs, either stupifying opiates or fiery stimulants, to deaden or madden the will.

But let the sensibility be both in power and in temper what it should be, and it will be a potent ally of the will. To make the sensibility what it should be we do not deny that spiritual influences must do much—but still educational influences are indispensable.

5. The importance of educating the sensibility is further demonstrated by its intimate association with the imagination. The judgment may operate to evolve its appropriate products best in what is called 'a dry light,' but what can the imagination do without heat, passion? If this winged faculty of the soul ever mount upon its sun-soarings, or dart along its space excursions, it must be indebted to the sensibility for its propelling power. What is a poet—without "his eye in a fine frenzy rolling?" What is a painter—whose "fine earnest eye flashes (not) with a passionate fire?" Most of all, what is a musician—whose soul "is not moved with concord of sweet sounds?" He may be "fit for treason, stratagems and spoils"—but he certainly is not fit for the composition or the execution of music.

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6. We would insist upon the education of the sensibility for its own sake—not simply as a handmaid to the intellect, the will and the imagination. We have already pronounced our encomium upon the sensibility—as the superior faculty of the soul. We ask now, shall the intellect be cultivated, shall the will be cultivated, shall the body even be cultivated, and shall the sensibility be neglected or proscribed? We plead for the education of the sensibility—as a measure of naked justice. Let it have a fair opportunity to vindicate and magnify itself. Let it no longer be treated, as the sons of Ham have so unjustly been, trampled under foot, placed under ban of Christian and infidel, and then insultingly reproached with its degradation.

Of how many splendid geniuses who have gone down to untimely and dishonored graves, is this the epitaph—"their headlong passions ruined them." A writer speaking of the author of Lacon, says—"he fell a victim to his turbulent desires and unregulated emotional sensations."

We confess that among our most ardent desires is that of seeing, and of having the world see, what the human sensibility may become, and through it what a better, nobler, mightier being man may become, when it shall be educated *pari passu* with the intellect, under the double auspices of a system philosophically adapted to its wants and of teachers alive to its worth, and its wealth.

7. We have reserved to the last place under this division of our subject some observations upon the education of the sensibility by gospel ministers. It is a melancholy fact that as no profession has had so much to do with banishing the sensibility from the seats of learning, as the ministerial, so none has realized to the same extent the pernicious results of this policy. What gaunt and barren intellects have filled the sacred profession. They have been neither sons of thunder, nor yet sons of consolation; they have been the mailed and steel-clad knights of theology, longing for polemic tilts, and thirsting for ecclesiastic tournaments.

This Quixotic stamp of divines, we are glad to say, is now only wanting some Christian Cervantes to duly despatch it, and embalm it in everlasting ridiculousness. May he arise! Meanwhile let us endeavor to describe them, and to contrast them with another class of gospel preachers.

To understand the class of mediæval divines—mediæval in cast, not in date—consider first their standard of ministerial excellence, namely, *adamantine orthodoxy and naked intel-*

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lectuality. Then reflect, that as they regarded themselves, they were the ambassadors of an *impassible* God—a God without a sensibility. It will not be difficult to trace the legitimate fruits of these *first truths*, in the personal and social traits of the ministry. The first-named would induce a dogmatic religion, a legal sternness, overshadowing views of the divine sovereignty, a seventh of Roman experience—altogether producing an ascetic character.

The last-named, their ambassadorship under an impassible God, would impart exhorbitant notions of ministerial authority, and pertinacious efforts at assimilation to the God they represented, resulting in a cold elevation, a stern manner, a sombre aspect, and an awe-inspiring address.

This class of men would never make the impression that they were ministers of Jesus Christ—but rather ministers of Jehovah. They exhibit none of the lineaments peculiar to Christ. Their aim is to symbolize sovereignty, in its unmitigated idea. See them yearn with compassion? Never. See them weep at the grave of departed affection? Never. That would not be ministerial. Encourage the approaches and sweet offices of Christian love? Their clerical austerity, their cold eye, their cadaverous countenance, their statue-like immobility would freeze the current of affection.

Let us now contrast these ministers with another class, who about a century ago sprang up—the natural product of the monstrous excesses of the class first described. For the sake of convenience we designate the class to which we call your attention, the Methodistic; for although it no longer consists exclusively of Methodist preachers—yet it began with Methodism, the distinctive mission of which, as we opine, was to lead off in a grand movement which should eventuate in the re-development in the mind, of the true, the primitive idea of the gospel minister. We say to lead off in a movement which should eventuate in this; for as we shall see, Methodism has not itself embodied the true idea. It has rather represented an opposite extreme—the usual instrumentality by which divine Providence ultimately educes the truth.

Methodism, judging the system of educating ministers by its prevalent fruits, and taking strong ground in favor of emotional power, as the first, the second and the third ministerial virtue—discarded a learned ministry. The two systems have been working side by side for one hundred years. They have produced respectively the results that might have

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been foreseen. They have demonstrated the essential vices of both. In one we have seen almost superhuman zeal, energy and boldness, and immense executive power. In the other we have seen authority without influence, power without progress, orthodoxy, learning and wealth—with little actual accomplishment. To contrast the two systems in several particulars,

1. Mark the difference in regard to *emotional susceptibility.*

In this respect a thorough-bred Methodist preacher in the prime of life and a strictly trained Presbyterian minister, are as widely different as if they belonged to diverse races of beings. How different their preaching! their praying! Who has not been astonished at the vast, almost incredible emotional resources of some Methodist circuit preachers? Who has not been struck with the immobility of some Congregational or Presbyterian pastors?

Look at the two men! Mark the rotund, lambent countenance of the one, the over-flowing eye-fountains, the broad, generous mouth, the quivering chin—where pleasantry and pathos alternately play. Then glance at the lank, lanthorn-jawed, thin-lipped, sharp-chinned, peaked nosed, attenuated Presbyter. Is that a mask? or is the entire phenomenon a perpendicular petrifaction, an antedeluvian fossil?

Rest assured these are denominational or rather educational formations. The systems under which they have been respectively trained have made them what they are.

2. Notice the attitudes of these two ministers toward religious excitement. The one lives only in excitement—the more the better; the other is a much out of his element, when in a religious awakening, as a Quaker in a cannonade. We are persuaded it is not half so much a matter of principle with either—his favoring or discountenancing excitement—as it is of educational influence, producing in one case both bias and qualification for it, and in the other the reverse. In other words, it is more a thing of feeling and habitude than of principle. The itinerant kindles the fire, because he loves to blow the coals—and to feel the warmth himself. The Presbyter deprecates the fire, because by a long educational process which has eliminated his mental succulence, he is chronically cold-blooded, and withal has a morbid dread of conflagrations. Better, he thinks, shiver in the cold than consume in the flames.

The Methodist indicates his decided preference by getting up an old fashioned log-fire, blazing in the capacious chimney.

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None of your black stoves for him—especially your air-tights, which professing to be heaters, look more like money-safes—all varnished and lustred and brushed, and cool enough for one to sit down upon—reminding one of Goldsmith's amphibious article of household furniture which

> "Served a double debt to pay,
> A bed by night—a chest of drawers by day."

The Presbyter as decidedly prefers the stove—*particularly the air-tight.* The heat, he contends, as he fillips the polished drum-stove with his finger nails, is milder, and more diffused—and the process of combustion involves far less waste and glare and noise and danger.

We have pursued this contrast sufficiently far to make one thing clear—that neither system of training is the right one—that the two should be combined in one, upon a basis which shall allow the full development of the sensibility in connection with thorough intellectual training. The two systems apart, give us partial results; the one generates thought, the other feeling. We want a system which will generate both thought and feeling. The result will be a product rather than a simple aggregate; for in fact neither thought nor feeling is of much consideration by itself. They must be combined to display their immense powers. Feeling wings thought—thought guides feeling. Without thought feeling drives the vessel adrift or a wreck. Without feeling, thought makes a waveless calm where being withers and rots piece-meal. Thought is not only the regulator of the sensibility—but its sustainer, as in its turn feeling is the sustainer of intellect. The indefinite varieties, the nice shades, the airy shapes and volatile essences of emotion and passion are produced by thought.

Should we be required to choose between a ministry all intellect and a ministry all sensibility—we confess we should be at a great loss. Neither realizes the idea of the gospel minister. We can not, however, disguise our particular aversion for heartless intellectualists, calling themselves Christian ministers. There is something here so hideously inconsistent with the benignant aspect, the beaming eye, the melting accent, the loving heart of Christ. Instead of multiplying by reason of their ministerial relation the points of junction between themselves and their fellow men, it seems their policy to reduce them by an *abscissio infiniti.* It was said

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of Wilberforce, "few men ever lived who had so many points of contact with their race." The true idea of a gospel minister involves the utmost perfection in this respect. We need scarcely say that without the proper education of the sensibility, it is impossible to stand thus intimately related to mankind.

We have asked—what is a poet without a sensibility? We have asked, what is a painter without a sensibility? We have asked, what is a musician without a sensibility? With three-fold emphasis we ask—what is a MINISTER OF CHRIST without a sensibility? The strengthener of the weak, the lifter up of the cast down, the comforter of the afflicted, the soother of the sorrowing, the visiter of the sick, the companion of those who go down into the dark valley, the mouth-piece of God at funerals, the representative of Christ at the grave, the friend of the bereaved, the guardian of the poor, the father of all children, the universal sympathizer, the omnipresent angel of mercy, the omniscient adviser—such is the gospel minister! O, shall he be like

"The stoic of the woods—a man without a tear?"

My blood chills as I think of a certain doctor of divinity, called as pastor to administer comfort and consolation to a pious mother on the sudden death of a child—addressing the bleeding hearted woman in the following terms—"Well, madam, the Lord has struck you a heavy blow—over the head." Will you wonder when I tell you that that mother, shocked and stunned by such a salutation, declared that she wished never to see her pastor in her house again? Yet this is one of the first divines of this country. He is a distinguished champion of sound learning, and par eminence defender of the faith. He is one of your true Wallah-wallah warriors, with tomahawk ecclesiastic.

But it is chiefly as gospel preacher that the ambassador of Christ needs a cultivated sensibility; for in that capacity he is the appointed channel through which the living streams of feeling flow and reflow—the human God-ward, the divine man-ward.

Should we start the inquiry why men were commissioned to preach the gospel? why the written gospel itself, placed in the hands of men, would not, with the spiritual agencies which accompany it, avail for their salvation? we might set you upon a train of reflections and reasonings which

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would lead to a most important conclusion. The office-work of the minister as a preacher is not simply delivering the gospel to men. Were this all—he might as well deliver it with the hand, in a printed form, as with the tongue; which would be bringing down the province of the preacher to a level with that of the colporteur, or rather with what that would be did he barely hand over his Bibles and tracts without uttering a word. The minister of the gospel would be little more than a carrier-pigion, and could pigions be trained to convey the leaves of life to the abodes of spiritual death, they might be as effectual apostles as men—upon the supposition we have made. What, then, is the province of a minister? It is to communicate the gospel to dying men—accompanying it with the peculiar influences of personal presence, of voice, gesture, tones, expression of mind over mind, of heart over heart, of soul over kindred soul. These influences are nameless, some of them so subtle that it is impossible to trace or analyze them, though we have all felt their power. They may however be ranged under two heads—thought and feeling. It will be seen at a glance that by far the greater proportion of these influences fall under the latter heads. This conducts us to the conclusion that the sensibility well developed and well trained is the most important human acquisition of the gospel minister. We have only to consider how directly spirituality operates upon, and employs the sensibility to be satisfied that this prime ministerial qualification, is intimately allied with the one upon which we are now insisting.

Permit us here to say that we have never before realized how deeply philosophical was that charming sentence, whose very beauty perhaps has blinded us to its meaning, "Words fitly spoken are like apples of gold in pictures of silver."

Here we are pointed, as with the radiant finger of an angel, to the very relation we have been unfolding, that of the truth to the truth-teller. *Words fitly spoken*—are thus made to shine like apples of gold in pictures of silver. The pictures of silver are the manner, the spirit, the heart, the soul of the speaker, which invest or surround the golden thoughts, the truth-utterances.

We have now done with the discussion on the importance of educating the sensibility. It remains to institute an *inquiry* into the principles on which this work should be conducted.

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Here we shall endeavor to proceed cautiously.

1. It seems obvious that the education must be chiefly indirect. The familiar teaching of philosophy that feeling is excited by thought, affords us a clue in our present inquiry. Throwing this truth into the generic form of a principle, it would be, the sensibility is to be reached and moved through the intelligence. An application of this principle, which we feel warranted in making, is that the sensibility is to be educated through the intellect. Perhaps we may safely add through the education of the intellect. From all this it appears to be deducible—that the more, and the more thoroughly the intellect is educated, the more, and the more thoroughly the sensibility is educated. But this conclusion evidently requires certain qualifications; since we have just been deploring the existence of a system of education which develops the intellect while it dwarfs the sensibility. We would qualify the above conclusion thus—the more the intellect is educated, provided its relations to the sensibility be duly regarded, the more will the latter be educated. Whether a due regard to this relation—including of course a just attention to the education of the sensibility—would involve a material alteration of the established course of collegiate instruction so far as branches, text books, &c., are concerned, we shall soon be prepared to consider.

The point to which we must antecedently call your attention is the connection between the education of the sensibility and that of the intellect. There is a divinely instituted relation between the intellect and the sensibility, in accordance with which the growth and progress of the former secures the growth and progress of the latter—but this depends upon certain conditions. A supposition or two will make this clear. A student may, for particular reasons, deprecate the development of his sensibility, and this may be so active a sentiment that it may prompt him to keep up a perpetual interference with that nice relation which subsists in his nature—the result of which ordinarily would be that the sensibility would wither while the intellect was thriving. Again, an instructor may, from unfortunate education and habits, undervalue the education of the sensibility, while he is an enthusiast in disciplining the naked intellect. His entire influence would be fatal to the development of the sensibility in his pupils. The relation then between the intellect and the sensibility is by no means necessary insomuch that the education of the former can not but result in the

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improvement of the latter; but it is rather such a relation as subsists between the intelligence and the will—which, while it requires that the teachings of the one be obeyed by the other, yet does not compel or necessitate obedience. The will may or may not conform to the laws of the intelligence, and so the will may secure or prevent the legitimate action of the intellect upon the sensibility. It is thus in the power of man to unship the wheels—and work the intellectual machinery without moving the being.

The conditions then upon which the education of the intellect will operate favorably upon that of the sensibility, are such as the following.

The student and the instructor must be intellectually convinced that it is a high duty to train the sensibility, that otherwise education is grossly incomplete, if indeed it be not a curse, and that the true mode of educating the sensibility is through the intellect. Furthermore, they must fully enter into this work—they must feel as much zeal and interest in it, as they do in the education of intellect—they must guard against any and all influences hurtful to the growth of the sensibility as sedulously as they usually do against whatever tends to dissipate the mind—to sum up the whole, both the students and the officers of our literary institutions must strive to create and maintain what we may call a college atmosphere, a pervading sentiment, which shall favor the fullest symmetrical development of the sensibility. This is indispensable—with this all would soon be right.

These conditions then being observed, the principle above stated will be found true—that as the intellect is educated the sensibility will be educated. The stronger, the more vigorous, the more enlightened and expanded, the more soundly disciplined the intellect—in a word, the more complete its training, the more perfect will be the sensibility.

As a friend of the sensibility, therefore, we should earnestly deprecate any change in the collegiate course, (we mention it because it embraces the principal educational instrumentalities,) which would involve a material diminution of disciplinary power over the intellect. We would as soon urge such a measure in behalf of the will—as in behalf of the sensibility. Trained intellect is a deformity and a curse, without a self-controlled will; but the remedy is not to cease training the intellect, but to make its training conduce to the subjugation of the will. With even greater force do these remarks apply to the sensibility. To reduce the

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amount of available intellectual training would be to wrong, to rob the sensibility. Give it a tongue, and it would say to us—"Educate the intellect—educate the intellect—educate the intellect! For in its power, activity and resources lies my strength."

In order to be explicit here we must advert to a discrimination which we have made under another head between the mental processes which are purely intellectual, and those which are mixed, involving the action of the sensibility. A familiar illustration of this distinction, were any needed, might be instanced in the *logical process of investigating*, and the *rhetorical process of advocating*, including persuasion. Says one "the heart must be kept cool while we search for truth." Then we abstract it from being. But when we have found it, then our human instincts begin to impel us to communicate it to our fellows, as a good to them; and just so soon as we turn from abstract truth to *being*—being needing our truth-acquisitions—that moment the sensibility begins to play, and then it is that "intellect moves in the sublimity of its might."

This distinction suggests a corresponding distinction in the processes of education—which divides the system into two main departments, the one including all educational agencies which operate for the training of the intellect alone, the other, including all those agencies which educate the intellect in conjunction with its ally, the sensibility. Both these departments of education are essential; for if there are cases demanding of learned men the use of the intellect, acting alone, the intellect should be trained to act by itself; likewise if there be cases innumerable in real life where the intellect must act in conjunction with the sensibility, where it can do nothing separately, it must clearly be trained to work in concert with the sensibility.

Between these two ends, then, our educational agencies should be distributed. So far, the coast is clear. A more difficult question now demands attention. In what proportion should college training, for example, be divided between these two objects?

Without presuming to answer this question definitely, we would submit some hints. It might perhaps occur to some that the isolated intellect should receive the larger share of attention, from the fact that the growth and improvement of the sensibility depends upon it. But here two things already mentioned should be recollected—the development of

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the sensibility does not necessarily follow from the education of the intellect—this should impose some limits to the exclusive training of the latter. The other thought is that the proper improvement of the sensibility reacts most favorably upon the intellect—consequently even supposing the exercises of the pure intellect, that is, of the intellect acting separately, to compose the most important functions of that faculty, considerable attention should be paid to the education of the sensibility. But on another supposition, more in accordance with fact, that by far the larger and more important share of intellectual activities are those in which the sensibility is extensively and indispensably involved, it would appear that the scale must preponderate in favor of the joint education of both faculties.

With these observations we shall dismiss the inquiry now before us, and call up another question—perhaps of more practical importance, namely, how may the intellect and the sensibility be jointly educated? Here we may be aided by the previous inquiry—how is the intellect separately educated? By being put upon studies which have no tendency to affect the sensibility, and which moreover can not be successfully prosecuted unless the sensibility is kept in abeyance. Such studies are the mathematics, the languages, and perhaps we might add metaphysics, though they have an aspect glimpsing sensibility-wise.

Our answer, then, to the question—how may the intellect be jointly educated? is—by being engaged in studies which involve the enlistment of the sensibility, and can not be advantageously pursued without some excitement of that faculty. The studies in this department, branch off into two divisions—the useful and the æsthetic. The former embraces all studies pertaining to ethics, that is to human relations and duties, also studies pertaining to politics, including history, also studies pertaining to practical and professional life—comprising the rhetorical department, with compositional and elocutionary exercises. The æsthetic branch embraces the fine arts, the magnificent domain of the imagination and the sensibility.

In this schedule it will be seen that we have not introduced studies, which more properly come under a third division, of a spiritual character, including religious truth, the God-ward relations and duties of man, and the great gospel principle of all moral action, *love*, benevolence.

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Now while we hold that it is perfectly futile to attempt to educate the sensibility without cultivating spirituality, yet this can hardly be said to come within the sphere of education, save in a very modified sense. Pupils indeed can be instructed in the *theory* of religion, but that will be of little service to the sensibility. The great Educator of the sensibility is the Holy Ghost, dwelling in the heart of the pupil by faith and holy living.

The interests involved in our theme imperatively require that every student be from the commencement of his studies to the close a deeply spiritual man. When, oh when, will ungodly students come to see the irreparable wrong they do their sensibility!

While in strictly devotional exercises, every pupil must mainly be his own teacher, or rather must place himself under the Holy Ghost, great benefit may be secured to the sensibility by incorporating in a course of study—frequent Bible lessons.

There is another class of studies eminently beneficial to the sensibility, which we are just now, at some loss where to put, whether among the useful, or the æsthetic—they seem to run into both. We refer to the natural sciences. The study of man physically, of animate nature, of air, earth and water, of rocks, shells, and flowers, of the glorious orbs and systems of Jehovah's material empire—whether you assign it to the useful or the beautiful, or to both—is unquestionably congenial to the development of the sensibility.

In these hints it will be noticed that no branch of study has been specified, which does not actually have a place in the common college course. From this it would appear to be not strictly true that no adequate provision has been made for the education of the sensibility. But do not the actual results of our educational system, on the other hand, show that substantially this is true? There may be abundant supplies of food in a city for all its inhabitants, yet the very class of the population who most need it may derive no benefit from it. To them therefore it will be as though there were no supplies; it will be worse—it will be a cruel mockery of their necessities, that there is an abundance, which the strong and the rich monopolize.

Our complaint in behalf of the sensibility is, that the practical neglect of its demands, and the exclusive devotion to the intellect, has made all the provisions of no effect to it.

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We complain that not only that portion of studies, which as we have seen, belong exclusively to the intellect, have been allowed perhaps too much space, but that the other portion which pertain to both intellect and sensibility together have been so managed as to be almost wholly intellectual. Intellect has monopolized—has taken the lion's share.

We lay this charge not at the door of intellect, but of the scholastic class, who have reared themselves into an intellectual aristocracy, who would not much sooner sully their pale faces with the flush of emotion or the flash of passion, than they would soil their long, lank fingers with toil. We complain of the college atmosphere, which is such that a full grown sensibility can not breathe in it. We complain of the literary fashion which is such that a rotund, full-orbed sensibility is no more tolerable in the college halls, than a capacious chested, rosy-faced, chubby-cheeked country lass in a city saloon of bodied or bodiless belles.

What then do we ask for the sensibility? We ask that its educational rights be respected. We ask that its college claims be recognized. We would create no strife between Lot and Abraham, nor between their respective servants; neither would we separate them. We would bring the intellectual Jacob, and the fierce untamed Esau together, locked in fraternal embrace, weeping on each other's necks their unnatural jealousies and reciprocated injuries.

We ask that the sensibility be educated,

(1.) By institutional agencies, adequate in extent, and vigorously applied;

(2.) By the fostering influences of a good sentiment in college;

(3.) By teachers encouraging each student to take care of his sensibility.

(4.) By the addition to the present college course of a permanent course of lectures on the philosophy of the sensibility, on its province and functions, its uses and abuses, its history, the modes of educating it, &c., &c.

A prominent object of such a course of lectures, would be to guard students by enlightening them in regard to the fatal consequences of neglecting, of contemning or of abusing their sensibility.

We are not of the opinion that it would be found necessary, in compassing all that is demanded for the sensibility, to reject any of the purely intellectual branches. Any great

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reduction of these would defeat the object by leaving the intellect defectively disciplined.

We have now offered our views on the education of the sensibility. The reader we think will at least admit that we have not over estimated the importance of the subject. He may not however fully coincide in the measures we have proposed for the attainment of the object. We leave the question, as we found it, an open one. We commend it to the consideration of thinking and earnest men. We shall be highly gratified if this imperfect essay should elicit further discussion, even though the result should be the refutation of our positions. With our whole heart we say in reference to this subject—"Let there be light;" though we are by no means sanguine that the response of the reader of this essay will be, "And there is light."

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ARTICLE XVII.

PRIDE OF HEART.

BY J. R. JOHNSON,

PASTOR OF THE "FREE CHURCH," CAZENOVA, N. Y.

THE PROUD IN HEART disregard the claims of Him to whom is due the universal homage of Man. Jehovah demands that all shall walk softly and humbly before Him. Man is a mortal being, residing in his present state of existence only during a fleeting hour: as a sinner he is under the sentence of that Law which he has transgressed. Shall such an one be proud? The worms of the earth will soon feast upon his body: and if his soul clothed in pride, rushes into the unseen world, that soul must sink in shame and everlasting contempt. It is enough to banish our pride, to read the following questions and answers which are recorded by the pen of the prophet Micah:—"Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God," (Micah vi. 6–8.)

The proud in heart not only disregard the claims of God, they also contemn the rights of their fellow men. Pride, more than avarice, impels man to claim his fellow man as property. In Psalm x. 2, the inspired testimony is,—"The wicked in his *pride* doth persecute the poor."

The report of Solomon, as found in Eccls. iv. 1, is full of instruction: "So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter: and

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on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter."

What makes the oppressors determine not to relinquish that power which is on their side? It is pride. While proclaiming to the world that the Creator hath bestowed on us all, "Inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—the strong and proud American enslaves his feeble brother. What sustains this most cruel system of oppression, after men are convinced of its iniquity? What is it which induces men to apologise for it, though they may not be directly connected with it? What is it which now prevents thousands from pleading the cause of the oppressed, and opening their mouths for the dumb? The love of gold in opposition to the love of God—party spirit in Church and State—tame and base subserviency to certain leading men—all must have place in the answer: but PRIDE is the strong man armed, who keeps this castle of tyranny. "The wicked, through the pride of his countenance, will not seek after God: GOD is not in all his thoughts," Ps. x. 4. The wicked man never thinks of God as he ought. The inspired penman decides that his pride makes him thus stupid, thoughtless, and reckless. Consequently, he is prepared to trample on the mandates, and merciful arrangements of the Creator, and on the most precious rights of suffering and beseeching Humanity. On the day of our national anniversary, when we unite in shouts of triumph and gladness for the blessings of liberty, why is it that more than three millions of our coutrymen send up to the God of the oppressed, the groans of weeping bondmen? It is because of this nation's pride. By it we wield the rod of the oppressor, and rivet the chains of the sighing, and then mock at their flowing tears, and unutterable agonies.

In addition to the enslaving of man, the proud sustain absurd and degrading distinctions in society. Some regard labor as disreputable. Others stigmatize as dishonorable, certain kinds of honest and useful occupations. For example, the mechanic, who builds your house, they would place in a lower grade of society, than the merchant who measures off your tape and silk. The man who furnishes substantial protection for your feet, may style himself "cordwainer," but he cannot escape the stigma which the proud are resolved to fix upon the shoemaker. He cannot be shielded even by the name of ROGER SHERMAN. Perchance

he may gain an iota of relief, by working for some capitalist who makes wholesale bargains at the South. This may be regarded as a little more endurable, than to be found at "custom work," which will require him to toil for his neighbors, and thus occasionally compel him to assume a stooping position, while measuring their feet. Having ascertained that to work for the feet is peculiarly contemptible in the estimation of those who are distinguishingly proud to be noticed as the wearers of a neat, closely fitted boot, we may imagine that we have obtained a data by which we may venture to classify the occupations of those who help to clothe us. How capricious are the decisions of pride! Such calculations are suddenly foiled, when we learn that the man who makes our hat, has not an undisputed title of superiority over the maker of our coat—especially, if on the sign of the latter, we can read "Merchant Tailor." Such contempt do the proud pour upon honest industry, while they bestow applause and office upon such as are "mighty to mingle strong drink," or who can boast of surpassing skill in butchering thousands of men, women, and children!

If such incongruous, insulting, and cruel decisions, assailed only the stronger portion of the human family, (usually stronger for physical endurance,) who are expected to buffet the boisterous tide of life, we could better endure to witness the attack. *But* WOMAN *is the greatest sufferer.* Frequently, the daughters of the rich maintain a marked superiority of manner toward those of their own sex who obtain their bread, shelter, and apparel, by their industry. They affect to use great condescension, if they consent to notice those who maintain themselves by the instruction of youth in the rudiments of a plain education. As for her who skillfully plies her needle in making useful articles, she cannot be their companion, whatever her talents, or her virtues may be. Will they introduce their "seamstress" to genteel visitors? Each alone can occasionally seek her society, and in some degree appreciate it; but to be seen by their lady confidents, and gentlemen flatterers, on terms of companionship with the "serving girl"—O, who can think of it! They would thus lose *caste.* Here is a curiosity for us—it is this: those who use the needle in merely ornamental fancy work, if they display the appearance of doing it only for amusement, may have a passport to the first circles of elegant society. In rebuke of such notions, see Solomon's description of a virtuous woman:—Prov. 31.

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"She seeketh wool and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands. She layeth her hands to the spindle. She looketh well to the ways of her household, and eateth not of the bread of idleness." The widow, who exerts herself to provide for her fatherless children, is neglected by those who would have earnestly sought the favor of her society, if she had been the heiress of an ample fortune. How does such conduct appear before the God of the widow, and the Father of the fatherless!

The indigent and disconsolate orphan girl, suffers beyond expression, by the disdainful treatment of the sons and daughters of pride. She is despised by them because she must work for her support. They reduce her earnings to the lowest pittance. She pines under the influence of wound, after wound; and perhaps at last she falls into the snares of some idolized representative of that very circle of proud ones who had combined to crush her. Then, of course, she is a poor, fallen, forsaken creature—marked as abandoned, and treated with scorn; but her destroyer boasts of his conquests, and proudly lifts up his head in the splendid halls of wealth and fashion. O there must be a day of final judgment! Then "all the proud shall be as stubble."

There is a prejudice in reference to the employment of females in one department which deserves a much stronger rebuke than it can now, or ever receive from my pen. Will *Pierpont* assail it with his keenest poetic satire?

We refer to that foolish whim, that to be hired to perform domestic labors, is degrading. This idea has a tendency to destroy the self respect of those who are thus employed: others avoid that employment, and as a direct result, other avocations, particularly in large cities, are crowded to excess. The melancholy sequel is, poverty, discouragement, distress, temptation, and loss of character.

To acquire skill in the minutia of household affairs, should be regarded as a necessary part of female education. Why should it be thought more degrading for a young woman to be hired to work in the house, than for a young man to be hired to work on the farm? Common sense can give no answer, only that this is according to the creed of the proud. Possibly the writer may better convey his meaning, by changing the form of the question, thus:—Why should it not be thought as honorable for a young woman to be hired to work in the house, as for a young man to be hired to work on a farm? For there are those who honor the young

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man for his industry, who have been so much contaminated by prevailing prejudice, that they do not bestow on the young woman equal credit.

A painful truth must here be stated; it is this, namely: that there are those females who are employed in various branches of industry, who themselves join in the cruel rite to degrade her who is paid for doing household work; thus they assist to multiply the applicants for their own employments, and consequently reduce the compensation which is already unendurably low.

This is amazing. It seems unaccountable. Upon what principles of mental or moral philosophy can we explain it, that this industrious class of abused persons, should thus lend their influence to the efficient countenance of a proud aristocracy, whose iron heel is crushing them in the dust?

Far be it from us to engender and cherish a spirit of jealousy among our fellow men. The rich should not be excited to despise the poor, nor the poor to be suspicious of the rich. There are those of the rich, who, in theory and practice, fully recognize the common brotherhood of man. Ten miles from where the writer now sits, there is a rich man, who regards the human race as one vast family of our common Father. The widow, and the orphan, the landless colored man, and the landless white man, the fugitive slave, and many a child of want and of sorrow, have been sheltered under his hospitable roof, have been placed as equals at his table, and have received substantial evidence of his desire that they should permanently enjoy freedom, happiness, and homes. Such will remember him in the kingdom of glory—*as the friend of the poor*; and this shall be his enduring monument, when his fame as an orator shall cease to be mentioned; though the rich cadence of his musical voice uttering the unpopular truths of God, can never be forgotten even amid the melodies of Heaven.

Some others of the rich there are of the same spirit. May God multiply their number!

Pride is not necessarily inseparable from the heart of him who possesses riches. It is always predominent in the heart of him who trusts in riches; for he will not receive the truth, that he is merely a steward of the bounties of Him whose is the earth, and the fulness thereof.

Having taken the precaution to guard against misapprehension, let us make a record of the mortifying and alarming fact—that here in Republican America, we have a proud

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ARISTOCRACY, glorying in riches, learning, office and influence, and despising the homeless poor. It puts forth its pretensions as far and as fast, as the prevailing sentiments and habits of our country will permit. In large, and eastern cities its strength is greatest.

This same disgusting aristocracy puts on airs, and strains itself to attract attention in some villages, and inland cities, not far from our thoroughfares. But the stiff imitation is so grotesque, that little more is now accomplished than to amuse sensible people with a peacock pageant. We might all freely join in the laugh, if we did not remember, that in evil, as much as in good,

"Tall oaks from little acorns grow,
"Great streams from little fountains flow,"

In every community, in town and country, the most precious interests are jeopardized by the incipient manifestations of pride. It should be remembered, that all these invidious distinctions which we faintly sketched, and others which are like them, are the offspring of the same haughty spirit, which, in other portions of our country, enslaves those for whom Jesus shed his own most precious blood.

Pride is one of the most abhorrent manifestations of selfishness. A selfish heart is a proud heart, and is an utter abomination in the sight of a Being of infinite benevolence. When every thing is claimed for self, it can not be otherwise that the rights of God and man should be alike contemned. If we would see inordinate self-love, (which is selfishness,) exhibited as the parent of pride, and its bitter cluster of evil fruits, we must read what Paul writes in 2 Tim. 3: 1—5: "This know also, that in the last days perilous times shall come. FOR *men shall be lovers of their own selves*, covetous, boasters, PROUD, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, truce breakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good, (horrid characteristic!) traitors, heady, *high-minded*, lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God, (rather than lovers of God,) having the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof: from such turn away." Yes, "turn away," ye followers of the Lord Jesus Christ! "Turn away" from selfishness and pride, and all their polluting influences and accompaniments. Turn away from "*such*;" from whom? From those who are lovers of

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pleasure in opposition to being lovers of God—from those "having the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof." Let us well understand, that we can not escape the character and doom of such, if we cherish a proud heart.

As we turn away from such, to whom shall we turn? To Him who says, by inspired writers, "Humble yourselves under the mighty hand of God." "Be clothed with humility." "Let nothing be done through strife or vain glory, but in lowliness of mind, let each esteem other better than themselves. Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus; who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." If we can see Immanuel in the manger—can see him at twelve years of age subject to his earthly parents—can see Him, with not where to lay his head, can see him rebuking our pride, having selected for his text, a little child; if we can see the Lord of glory, not only clothed in human nature, but girded with a towel, and as a servant washing his disciples' feet, and in the sequel see him expire on the cross, if all this we can see, and contemplate, and yet cling to our pride of heart, we must expect that in just indignation, God will give us up to our own heart's lusts, saying, in the language of the prophet Obadiah, "The pride of thy heart hath deceived thee." Among the seven things which are noted in Prov., 6th chapter, as special abominations to the Lord, is, "A proud look." In Prov. 16: 5, we learn, "Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to the Lord." For an encouraging contrast, read Isaiah 57: 15: "For thus saith the High and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy, I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." "The High and Lofty One" will thus dwell with us, if we listen to the voice of his incarnate Son, who says, "Come unto Me, and I will give you rest: learn of *Me; for I am meek and lowly in heart;* and ye shall find rest unto your souls."

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ARTICLE XVIII.

MODERN INFIDELITY.

BY REV. HENRY COWLES.

It is a remarkable fact in the history of Christianity, that she has never been for any considerable time relieved from conflict in some form with infidelity. The most thoroughly Christianized lands and times have in no case formed any important exception to this general rule. So far back as runneth the memory of man, or the records of church history, there have been disbelievers in the midst of believers, creating occasions for defence and vindication of the Bible against its impugners and rejectors.

Another equally remarkable fact is that the assailants of revelation have been frequently shifting their ground. Scarcely in any case has the same ground been maintained longer than the natural term of a single generation. The most permanent principle in the tactics of infidelity is this; —*If repulsed from one position, try another.* It being often easier and sooner done, for ignorance or folly to raise an objection than for learning and wisdom to answer it, this running, skirmish warfare suits the genius and the resources of infidelity. It has indeed seemed to be the only way to make her *light* troops at all available against the heavy artillery and the phalanxed battalions of the faithful. In tracing the history of this warfare, it would be amusing to observe how much profound Christian learning has been drawn out against how much infidel pedantry—how much sanctified genius and talent, against how much skeptical pretension—how many ponderous tomes, weighty with the best matter, and in manner unblamable, have been brought into the field against assailants whose heaviest ordnance have been squibs, and their most cogent arguments, sneers. A most curious warfare this! Often has Christianity had occasion to say—

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Give me only an open enemy, a fair field, and a fight with *decent* weapons!

It were moreover something to be *desired*—perhaps we can not say to be *expected*, that the enemy, once vanquished, would surrender. We are not aware that this has been the case in a single instance. As already intimated, after defeat comes, not concession, but a new form of resistance; not surrender, but a change of tactics for a fresh assault. Hence Christianity is destined to be militant, age after age,—at least till she becomes, in a higher sense than ever yet, triumphant. Her men of war must be alert and sleepless, eagle-eyed and ready-handed—ever adroit in changing their mode of fight, how often or how much soever occasion may require.

It is obvious that for this purpose, the friends of Christianity must have their watchmen on every hill-top in her moral battle-field; or, dropping all figure of speech, must keep themselves apprised of the latest modes and phases of infidel sentiment. *Modern* infidelity becomes a needful study, if not each year, at least each decade of years in her history.

In facts and circumstances like these, we think to find our apology, if any be needed, for presenting this subject to the readers of the Quarterly. A subject so vital to the practical sway of the gospel we love—of the Book of Books wherein we find God, duty and salvation, can never be void of interest, or out of place.

Paine's Age of Reason—(its title a perfect misnomer,) has had its run and its exit. It is not unnatural that a strong analogy should obtain between its own career, and that of its shrewd but impious author. As he shone in brilliancy for a brief period, but went down wonderfully, debauched, besotted, execrated and forgotten; so his works dazzled the while and beguiled unstable souls, till in due time the common sense and reason of men revolted at their spirit, and their obvious results in society became a mill-stone attached, to sink them into general detestation. Individuals there may be who read and admire the Age of Reason; they are only individuals; their movements are not aggressive through the press or the living voice. The aggressive movements of modern infidelity have taken on a new type altogether, and its prime actors look down upon the admirers of Paine as nearly half a century behind their age.

There is an infidelity, exclusively modern, which is making its aggressions through the press and the platform—some-

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times even the pulpit—the real character of which ought to be thoroughly understood. Compared with any antecedent form, it is covert, and by no means enamored of its awn appropriate name. We may regard it as decisive testimony to the ascendant influence of Christianity upon the public mind that its most formidable assailants should zealously affect both its name and its reputation as legitimately their own. The character of Christ as a man, who does not now applaud? The morality of the New Testament, who does not professedly admire? The modern infidel is loud and clamorous on these topics, as if he would outdo the humble Christian whose highest aspiration is to wear the image of the Man of Nazareth.

Paine and Voltaire left their names as a curse to their followers. They made the name, *infidel*, reproachful. No wonder, therefore, that modern deniers of divine revelation should reject and seek to evade the name.

Perhaps at this point, candor will rise for a hearing, and ask whether it be fair to give the name, *infidel*, to those who so much dislike it, and who are not wont to apply it to themselves? The question is not out of place, and shall have an answer.

The amount of this plea is that the men in question reject the name, infidel, and with more or less warmth complain of being slandered thereby, and claim that they be first convicted of being infidel before the term is applied to them. Usually, however, their defence assumes the following more candid form: "We believe thus and thus: Moses and Paul had neither more nor better inspiration than good men now have: let the Bible be treated, believed and reverenced like all other books according to your own view of its merits:—this we believe, and if you call this infidelity, we glory in the doctrine notwithstanding, though we disown the name."

Now manifestly these men discard the name infidel, not for its unfitness, but for its odium. Not for its odium, but for its fitness, we apply it. We do not claim or imply that they are infidels of the Paine and Voltaire stamp; but they are *infidels*—disbelievers in the divine authority and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, most palpably and undeniably.

The question at issue between revealed religion and its opponents is perfectly simple. Is the Bible God's word or man's? Is it divinely revealed, or humanly excogitated? Is it an authorized rule of duty, or a code of optional advice

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from which you may cull in your wisdom, or spurn in your caprice?

Obviously in view of these alternatives, the Bible must be either the one or the other. According as men hold it to be the one or the other are they technically either Christian or infidel.

Far be it from us to use the latter term opprobriously. By a most legitimate misfortune, it has usually happened that infidelity has begotten odious fruits and consequently entailed a bad name upon its advocates. Hence we do not wonder at the sensitiveness of the modern school in regard to this appellation. We doubt not it is their hope and their expectation even, to secure better results from the new system—with how much reason time will show. That so many of the external moralities of the Bible, and so much of its spirit of reform should be forced into unnatural wedlock with the denial of divine inspiration, is indeed a new experiment in the line of moral amalgamations—the failure of which it needs no prophet's ken to predict.

But it is time we should come directly to the question—What *is* modern infidelity? In what respect does it differ in mode and form from its immediate predecessor? The latter question, answered, will furnish the answer to the former.

The reigning dynasty of infidel sentiment differs from the Paine and Voltaire family,

1. *In its more liberal admissions in favor of Christianity.*

This may be seen in their respective views of its founder. The Voltaire school characterized itself by its impious watchword—"Crush the wretch;"—the modern school might analogously say—*Glorify the* MAN. The latter motto should not be understood to mean—Adore the Son of God;—or, Reverence the Messiah of the eternal throne; much less still, Believe in Him as your Savior from sin; but simply—Give him honor as one of the model men of our race. His spirit was generous and self-sacrificing; his sympathies with his brother man were warm and pure; genuine philanthropy had a home in his heart; therefore we honor him as one among the great and good men of our race.

2. By consequence, similar admissions respecting the doctrines taught by Jesus Christ distinguish the modern from the next antecedent school of infidelity. The latter had no good thing to say voluntarily of the doctrines of Christianity, or of its moral system. In fact their own system

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stood in every main point in direct antagonism with that of inspiration. Comprehensively it had but one great moral or rather, immoral doctrine—viz. *unlimited self-indulgence.* "Let the appetites of each man be his law. Abhorred be the marriage institution; away with continence and self-restraint; throw a loose rein on the neck of every passion." Such was their moral system.

We are not aware that this doctrine of morals finds any favor in the modern school. But they are wont to pursue this course. Distinguishing carefully between the moral and the spiritual, or perhaps more strictly the *religious*, they would fain retain the morality of the New Testament and reject its religion. Its morality is applauded; but its worship of God and its provisions for transforming the inner heart of man are held exceedingly cheap. On their system there is no other God to be worshipped than what is found in universal nature; or if there be any other, his appropriate worship consists in the soul's admiration of all his beautiful works;—in the heart's esteem of whatever it accounts real goodness. Hence the homage of prayer and adoration is lightly esteemed—doubtless would be contemptuously rejected, in keeping with the spirit of their system, if public sentiment had not too sacred a regard for it to be rudely trifled with—if it were not desirable to retain, if possible, the good opinion of many who respect prayer. It becomes both easy and natural for men of such sentiments to decry *public* prayer as hypocrisy, and all public worship of God as coupled with base ends and therefore to be discarded.

It is only a matter of course that these sentiments should concentrate their animosity against the Sabbath and the gospel ministry. Perhaps no form of infidelity was ever more bitter against the institutions of the gospel than some types of the modern. The most caustic allegations of craft, put forth in the strongest and often the coarsest dialect of billingsgate, seem to flow, or rather *gush* as if from under an ocean pressure of malignity.

It is not strange that modern infidelity, though applauding the morality of the gospel, should discard its spiritual provisions for renewing the heart. The system sets out with the assumption that the human heart is natively good, let it only be discreetly trained. Then availing itself, perhaps unconsciously, of the general atmosphere of Christianity in which all its own morality has had its being and its nurture,

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it turns upon its benefactor; rather let us say, upon the author of its own existence, with parricidal hand. It thinks to murder the parent, yet honor and caress the offspring. It would fain enjoy the fruit, but tear up the bearing tree by the roots. Give us, say they, the second table of the law, but let the first be sunk into disregard and contempt. Let us have the law of equal love to man, but no gospel power to renew the heart into its image: no gratitude for redeeming blood to enforce it.

In a word, this modern scheme extols philanthropy, but decries piety; makes much of human rights, yet little of divine rights; talks loudly of the regard due to fellow men, yet is dumb as to the proper regard due to God; exalts humanity, and dishonors the divinity. Yet, bearing this character, it often claims admission within the Christian pale, has honied words in profusion in praise of Christian liberality and catholicity, and puts a strange, a most perverted sense upon such terms as honesty and sincerity, claimed as passports to Christian fellowship. A man sincerely honest in rejecting the divine authority of the Bible is to be regarded as a Christian man and not an infidel!

The method by which modern infidelity disposes of the evidences of divine revelation is characteristic. The spotless morality of the Bible is laid away upon the same shelf alongside or a little below *their own*. Hence if it proves the inspiration of its author, no less, nay, somewhat more does their own morality prove theirs. They too, and all good men are inspired by an indwelling divinity. A portion of this divinity is an attribute of all the good. So much for this argument in favor of inspiration.

The prophecies of scripture attract but little of their attention. It is supposed that their usual mode of disposing of the argument from prophecy is the *neological*. On this scheme, the prophecies pass to the credit of human sagacity. They are perhaps subjected to the whittling-knife of hypercriticism and made to date after the events predicted; or they only illustrate the world-wide tendency of the human mind to plant some golden age in future time and relieve present sorrow by visions of hope. Thus prophecy falls under the general laws of the human mind, and bears no testimony to the interposition of the Omniscient.

With marvellous philosophic acuteness, they account for the agency of the so-called miraculous powers. Referring especially to the miracles of Jesus Christ, they ascribe his

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power over unclean spirits to the moral charm of his benevolent character. All good men or good women carry along in their very goodness a power that even devils can not resist. As Milton has it in his portrait of Satan before an angel—

> "Abashed the devil stood, and felt
> How awful goodness is;"—

so before the somewhat superior goodness of Jesus Christ, the devils fled astounded. Wicked men and devils quailed before him—not that they either felt or feared any physical power: no; it was only the charm, the awe-smiting impression of *moral* power.

Most philosophically, on the same principle, the five loaves, awe-smitten by the presence of goodness, supplied the five thousand; the winds and the waves, under the sympathetic influence of goodness, hushed themselves to rest; fell Disease bowed respectfully, and then shrunk away; and even Death, confounded by the presence of so much goodness, unwittingly relaxed his grasp and let loose his victim. Would you believe it? One of the most acute thinkers of the age has come to believe, and shrinks not from averring, that if this be not sound philosophy, there is none in the universe; that if Christ's miracles can not be rationally accounted for on this principle, they can be rationally accounted for on no principle whatever; and that if this disposal of the miracles of scripture involves conviction of infidelity, he glories in the name! Of course, he will not object if we ascribe to him the honor of being the prince of philosophic infidels!

We must continue our description of modern infidelity. It has many good things to say of the Bible, and many evil things also. For lack of any better defence, it is wont to adduce the former in vindication for the latter. Why, say the oracles of this modern system, should we not place the Bible on the same footing with all other books? It is but a *book*—made up of words and printed with ink and types; why exalt it to the honor of being more divine than any other good book is? Infinite mischief, say they, comes of this blind reverence for a book because of its supposed origin.

And yet sometimes the men of this sentiment indignantly disclaim the appellation of infidels. Let their own words convict them. The pillar doctrine of their scheme is—*God*

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from the Bible just what you like. Apply the scissors as the editor does to his exchanges. If you find passages that seem to you good, truthful and reasonable, receive them as such. You would do as much with the writings of Confucius or Plato. As to inspiration, all good men have it—especially all good poets and moralists have it. It is the prerogative of no age exclusively—of no class of men. It needs no divine attestation—nothing but its own inherent stamp of quality and character. It must carry its own conviction to each heart; it admits no other testimony to its authority.

It has been already stated that the modern infidel concedes that Jesus Christ was a good man, and considering the darkness of his age, in a somewhat eminent degree, inspired. But he deems it vital to his system to maintain that Jesus was by no means exempt from liability to error. The modern infidel may have reasons of policy for not proceeding to table his charges of error against the Author of the Christian system; but it is easy to see that his scheme of doctrine involves the charge in at least one very important point. According to modern infidelity, that good, that model man of Nazareth, was deeply in error in his opinions of the Old Testament scriptures. Of these writings, *He* always spake with reverence; they with irreverence: *He* held them to be of divine origin; they, of human; *He* enforced their divine authority; they discard it: He averred that not one jot or one tittle should pass from the law till all is fulfilled; they aver that the same might just as well have been said of the works of Plato or Cicero: He insisted that its prophecies spake of Himself, and had their fulfillment in Him; they discard this whole matter as worthy of no credit.

An equally strong contrast lies between the teachings of the men whom Christ taught, and the teachings of these modern infidels. The former tell us that "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;" the latter affirm that any other good men—themselves, for instance—are as much moved by the Holy Ghost as the Hebrew prophets were. The former hold that "all scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness;" the latter teach that however much or little inspired it may be, a small portion of it may be profitable, but the greater portion, belonging to a barbarous age, ought to go to oblivion with a people long since left behind in the onward march of the world in science and civilization. Paul did not con-

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sider, perhaps did not know, what rapid strides of progress this great world would make within eighteen hundred years of his writing.

It might not be wholly aside from our purpose to enquire at how great discount the goodness of Jesus Christ and his Apostles must stand, if, as modern infidels say, they did not speak by divine authority. For, nothing is more plain than that they openly claimed the sanction of Jehovah, solemnly averring that they spake by his authority, and delivered his messages. Were they mistaken in this? Then it was a capital mistake, and they were culpably negligent not to know the facts as they were. Did they intentionally deceive? Then their claim to be good men is fatally down. What sort of men were those who write and speak throughout the New Testament, that they should endorse the Old Testament with the entire weight of their own credentials as heaven-taught men, averring that it was positively "written by holy men of God, moved by the Holy Ghost," if after all, the truth is with the modern infidel, namely, that this same Old Testament is an out-dated almanac—a book to be culled from with proper discretion, and put on a level with Seneca and Aristotle? What shall we think of those who give the New Testament writers such a character, and in the same breath extol them to the skies as "model men?" Are they likely themselves to be better than the models of their own creation?

II. But we must hasten to dispose, more briefly, of our main enquiry, namely, *into the origin and causes of modern infidelity.*

Here we have no occasion to measure the force of that ever constant quantity—the depravity of the human heart—which evermore finds one of its developments in the love of darkness rather than light, and in consequent mental infatuation and gross delusion.

Nor again will our space allow of detail sufficiently minute to trace out the history of the aberration of individual minds, however instructive and interesting such a course of investigation might be made. We must content ourselves with tracing out in general some of the influences which have operated on masses of mind, preparing large numbers to receive—might we not also rather say—to originate such a type of sentiment as has taken form in modern infidelity.

Historically and geographically, the sentiments of which I speak have come by natural descent from New England

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Unitarianism. Boston, the literary and intellectual metropolis of the East, has been its centre of germination and radiation.

How Unitarianism itself sprang up—the joint product of neological sentiments and of spiritual declension—I need not, may not stop to show. Unitarianism, its base being unsupported, naturally gravitated downwards to its legitimate resting place,—infidelity. That its peculiar form of infidelity became what it is, may be ascribed to various causes. Among all the forms naturally possible, there was none so convenient as this—none so well adapted to public sentiment—none that could be made so popular. It must for many reasons be a different edition from its predecessor, got up in better binding, on fairer paper, and with more handsome type. Ample scope lay open for improvement upon the infidelity of the past generation. The general influence of Christianity had begotten a spirit of reform, and most unfortunately for some orthodox Christian bodies, they had failed to keep pace with the demands of this spirit. Their own Christianity had taught the doctrines of reform, but their conservatism hung back from pushing them practically in a manner bold and ardent enough to meet either the wants of the suffering, or the demands of philanthropy. Here then a field of toil and glory lay open, in some measure unoccupied; and the Prince of darkness has rarely made a more adroit movement than when he managed to divorce these churches from philanthropic reform, or at least we might say, entice them into the rear of the movement, and put ahead in this work men who deny the proper inspiration of the scriptures.

It seems too plain a fact to be questioned that the development of modern infidelity has taken its form in part at least, *from the state of some nominal churches.* Real piety has languished. Formalism abounds and reigns. Especially have some churches too much dissociated philanthropy from piety, and while retaining the forms of worshiping God, have failed to carry out the benevolence enjoined in its doctrines, towards suffering man. Conservatism has been their curse, and bitterly must they rue their folly in permitting it to have so enormous a development. With sorrow we say what we would gladly "not tell in Gath," that in our view the conservative churches have dishonored the gospel they profess and have misrepresented the spirit of its author, and hence must now be reminded of his words—"Them that honor

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me, I will honor, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." Those churches suffered a deplorable loss of the general esteem of the age, when through their conservatism they yielded the foreground in the march of reform to the bitter enemies of their faith.

It is no less sad for these churches that some among their doctors have so interpreted the Bible as to expose it egregiously to scandal. Think of their making God's blessed Book pro-slavery! Think of speeches, sermons, editorials and pamphlets, devoted to prove that the Bible sanctions this "domestic institution!!" Every such speech has begotten a score of infidels—every such pamphlet, its hundreds or its thousands. You might measure off men by masses who, with no misgiving of conscience, will aver that if the Bible upholds American slavery, the sooner its authority is discarded the better. If, say they, God is good, He execrates slavery: if your Bible sustains slavery, it never came from the good God.

It is obvious that religion must command the respect of ungodly men, not by its spiritual worship, its prayers, its Sabbaths and its ordinances—but by its practical developments of gospel beneficence—by its doing good to man. Its esteem in the eyes of the world will be *as* its philanthropy —*as* the fruit it bears of good to the human family. The Christian system might sustain its doctrines with the very highest Theological ability from both the pulpit and the press, yet if these doctrines fail of being carried into beneficent practice, outstanders will see but little of their beauty and glory, and will revere still less. The church may hallow her Sabbaths, may hold good all her precious institutions, and may nurse carefully her ecclesiastical power; yet failing to meet the obvious demands of philanthropy, she forfeits the esteem of the age and loses her hold on the public conscience. She may find herself shorn of her glory by infidel hands—of her glory we mean as viewed externally and as judged of by men of the world. Those elements which she guards and nurses so assiduously may even, in the absence of gospel philanthropy, prejudice her cause, for they expose her to the suspicion of dishonesty. They generate a fear of consolidated power—a fear both natural and strong wherever the church has dissociated herself from the work of reform and the good of society, and consequently from the sympathies of those who judge of the value of her religion only by its external utility to man.

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These remarks may suffice to indicate briefly why modern infidelity has taken its present type. The foreground in the march of reform was to be struggled for, since the church was receding and faltering; the Bible was by some of its professed friends subjected to the scandal of being inert, not to say hostile, in the reforms of the age: what more then could men of skeptical tendency ask than such a field for bringing out a new and popular system of infidelity?

Theologically considered, there lies deep among the causes of modern infidelity, the assumption that the goodness of God precludes Him from ever inflicting pain upon his creatures. The system holds that the infliction of pain in any way upon sentient beings is inconsistent with goodness. Hence, maintaining staunchly, (yet with singular perversion of the true idea,) that God *is* good, the next inference is *universalism*—a form of universalism which rejects all punishment for sin. Then, if the Bible can be readily construed so as to admit this sentiment, well; if not, the alternative is, *reject the Bible*. You may often meet with men candid enough to reveal this to be the attitude of their minds, and the precise course of their logic—The Bible *with* universalism; but otherwise, no Bible. At all events they abide by this doctrine—*the divine goodness against all inflicted suffering*. A good God can not cause his creatures pain.

Again. Holding firmly the doctrine that God can not Himself inflict pain upon his creatures, they hold, not illogically, that He can not employ one clase of his creatures to inflict pain upon another class. He never could have employed the Hebrew people to scourge and exterminate the idolatrous and corrupt nations who had possession of their promised land. The idea that God should have done this is so horrible that they joyfully take the other alternative—no confidence in Moses, Joshua, or David, as men taught of God.

It is not strange that consistency should carry such minds straight on to the conclusion that God never sent the Cholera—that sickness is no servant of his—that earthquake and storm are doing their own bidding, not God's. God is too good to have any agency in the infliction of pain upon his creatures. He is so compassionate, you can not consistently ascribe to his heart any thing whatever that causes a pang of grief or a twinge of pain. So enamored are they with the idea of a God of pure sentimental compassion, that they would sooner rule his hand out of the agencies of the universe, than admit it as even inflicting pain even for the moral

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good, and the ultimate highest blessedness of creatures.

No wonder that men of such views should find it needful to reject the Bible. They may perhaps admit some of it as good and true, but only with the proviso of rejecting whatever they choose to reject. They admit nothing *on divine authority*. Its being the word of God, endorsed by miracle and prophecy, and sustained by its perfect harmony with natural religion, with man's state as lost by sin, or as saved by grace—all this goes with them for nothing.

The germinant errors of this system are that it loses sight of God's relation to his intelligent creatures as their moral Governor, and has no adequate conception of his deep abhorrence of sin. But our limits and space forbid our enlarging on these points.

We name yet another cause of this system, a pride of human philosophy—an element never wanting in any scheme of infidel sentiment, yet one which, so far as we are aware, has had no unusual degree of development in the modern system. Let it suffice, therefore, to have dwelt chiefly on what has been peculiar, omitting those things which are in the main constant quantities.

III. We come lastly to speak of the *remedy—the mode of defence and assault against modern infidelity*. On this point the less need be said, since we have to some extent indicated our views already.

All the action we have to recommend against the sentiments under discussion may fall under two heads—the *polemic* and the *practical*—of which the latter is deemed by far the most essential and the most efficient.

Polemically, little need be done. It were well to show by thorough discussion that the Bible and the whole Bible *is* the true friend of man, evermore reformatory towards and up to the point of a perfect state of society;—that, legitimately interpreted, it has no sympathies with American slavery, or with intemperance, or any other form of social evil;—nay more, that its principles are perfectly beneficent and wise, and need only to be faithfully carried out to make earth a paradise. Let this be shown of the Bible and of the *whole Bible*. Good must come of such showing.

Next, let it be shown that Christ and his Apostles did endorse the whole Bible as of divine authority, so that there can be no tenable ground between receiving the whole and rejecting the whole. If Christ and his apostles are trustworthy in their own personal teachings, they are equally so

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in their endorsement of the Old Testament Scriptures. You must therefore receive or reject the whole.

Practically, the churches have a great work of personal reform to accomplish. Discarding their conservatism, they must be benevolently and earnestly aggressive. The church must reassert her claim to possess and develop gospel Christianity, and must show that this gospel Christianity is the divinely appointed regenerator of human society—the panacea of all social evils. If other reformers are in her judgment *ultra*, she must not thereby be repelled into the opposite extreme. To suffer this will be fatal. Let her rather bear a steady but an active hand, revealing evermore an honest and an earnest heart as the fast friend of all real reform. The place for the church is in the front rank, first and foremost in all genuine, needful reforms, and especially in all those of a social and moral kind. Her position there ought to be most obvious and apparent, such as shall be known and read of all men.

But above all, it is in our view essential that the church should regain her lost spiritual and moral power. For such a conflict she needs all that legitimately belongs to primitive, original Christianity—just that and all that which is inherent in its very genius, and which should be evermore possessed by all her children. There *is* a moral power in the gospel, which, adequately brought out, would show itself equal to any emergency—competent to cope with any foe. To bring it out, doctrine and duty must assume their parental relation. The doctrines of gospel Christianity must beget benevolence of heart, and benevolence of heart must not fail of generating beneficence of hand. The great power of Christianity lies in *developed goodness*. Shorn of this, she is weak as any other system. Robbed already of much of the credit of this, she has given broad scope for modern infidelity. Her salvation now depends upon her earnest promptness and sincerity in returning to her first love. Let her remember therefore from whence she has fallen, and repent, and do her first—her *primitive* works; else in the resistless movements of Providence, her Lord may come unto her quickly, and remove her candlestick out of her place. Let the gospel spirit live in her heart and develop its genuine beneficence through her hand—it will be her salvation from infidel foes; but let her fail of this and trust on other reliances—then must her descent be rapid, and her ruin irretrievable.

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